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May Green

For Your Information

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The Jewish Week, Inc. March 28, 1986

THE
New York

JEWISH WEEK

MAR 28 1986

Approach is 'wrong'

The March 14 editorial "The wrong approach" is exactly that, the wrong approach.

It contends that President Reagan, in speaking to a Jewish group about a non-Jewish issue—Central America—is somehow suggesting that Jews are less American than other Americans. This reasoning is impossible to follow, because it is dangerously inverted.

I see no reason to object to the president of the United States sharing with a group of Jewish Americans the concerns about national policies which are uppermost in his mind, and hoping to convince them—not as Jews but as citizens—of the correctness of his approach. In fact, there would be more grounds for concern if political figures spoke only about Jewish issues to Jewish organizations, a posture that could be seen by some as patronizing. The president's selection of a topic for presentation to our group was appropriate, and his references to the Sandinistas' support of the PLO and opposition to Israel, while not central to his ar-

gument, were certainly relevant.

As for my remarks, they again were misquoted. I made it very plain that my response was not on behalf of any Jewish organization or any group of Jews, and certainly not for "an entire people." Regarding Central America my full remarks are as follows:

"I do want to say that we admire your defense of freedom and your condemnation of terrorism. Your eloquent plea for the contras, to support freedom and democracy in Central America, to preserve the ability to maintain a decent and balanced society, to keep Central America in freedom's camp, has touched many of us and will find resonance in our community.

"As the chairman of the Conference of Presidents, I would lose my job if I said the whole Conference of Presidents speaks as one in supporting you. But I do know from my own experience and my own expression that, while there may not be unanimity—there never is in a democracy, and I assure you we're a democracy—I believe that the overwhelming sympathy and support of the American Jewish community rides with freedom, rides with the defense of those who wish to fight for their freedom, and would support you in your interested and objective and principled effort in that end."

Note that I do not purport to speak on behalf of any organization, nor do I expressly support a particular legislative program. I stated my belief about the sentiments of the American Jewish community. It was my belief then and now that my comments accu-

rately reflected the sentiments of most Americans, including Jewish Americans. Indeed, my remarks were supported by spontaneous applause on the part of the national presidents and other representatives of nearly 40 organizations present.

Kenneth J. Bialkin
*Chairman, Conference of
Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations*

JEWISH PRESS

BROOKLYN, N.Y.

Sandinista Persecution Of Nicaraguan Jews

APR 4 1986

Sandinista persecution of Nicaraguan Jews — including the firebombing of the Managua synagogue, death threats and harassments and expropriation of property which led to the exodus of virtually the entire Jewish community — was described in a white paper issued today by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.

Abraham H. Foxman, ADL's associate national director and head of its International Affairs Division, said the white paper was being made public "to set the record straight, to answer published denials about the Sandinistas treatment of Jews." The League's information is based on testimony from Nicaraguan exiles, on disclosures from an ex-Sandinista informant and on other investigations carried out by the agency during the last five years.

According to the ADL white paper, Sandinista persecution of Jews took place against a background of unrelenting hostility to Israel and long-standing alliances with the Palestine Liberation Organization and other anti-Israel terrorist groups.

The ADL report gave details on the repressions which began with the Managua synagogue bombing in 1978, the year before the Sandinistas came to power. The bombing took place while the congregation was inside and when they attempted

to escape, they were confronted by armed Sandinistas who ordered them not to leave the burning building.

One of those in the congregation, Oscar Kellerman, a Nicaraguan businessman now living in exile in Miami, is on record as saying that the Sandinistas threatened to "burn all the Jews."

According to the former Sandinista informant, Mauricio Palacio, who served as a "spy" within the Jewish community, the synagogue attack was part of an attempt to frighten the Jews into leaving.

The League white paper noted that at a Washington meeting on March 14, 1985, Mr. Kellerman said that the Sandinistas "tried to kill me on three occasions, including one attempt to firebomb my car." He also declared that in 1979 a member of the Jewish community was shot and left for dead.

Among other instances cited by ADL of Jews being menaced was the experience of Isaac Stavisky, a former textile manufacturer who now lives in Miami. Mr. Stavisky, at a meeting in Washington, July 20, 1983, said he and his son had been stopped by Sandinistas while driving in Managua and their lives threatened at gunpoint. They were warned that their factory would be taken over when the Sandinistas came to power. The threat was subsequently

carried out.

Mr. Stavisky went on to say that for 18 months prior to July, 1979, members of his family received death-threat phone calls and graffiti was scrawled on their factory walls reading, "Death to Jews," "Isaac will be killed" and "Beware of Sandinista Justice."

The ADL report said that the director of its Latin American Affairs Department, Rabbi Morton M. Rosenthal, received a letter from an attorney representing the Nicaraguan government in December, 1983, stating that at least 17 Jews had had their property taken away by decree. Other Jews who fled Nicaragua were deprived of their homes and businesses because of a Sandinista edict that anybody outside of the country for more than six months automatically forfeits property. The Sandinistas, by intimidating Jews into leaving the country, thus forced them into a "Catch 22" situation, as one exile described it.

The ADL white paper said Sandinista repressions have taken place in an anti-Semitic atmosphere that can best be summed up by one graffiti slogan scrawled on walls in Nicaragua which reads: "Judaism, Zionism, Somozism — all the same thing."

According to ADL, three years after the Sandinistas came to power in 1979, the semi-official newspaper, *Nuevo Diario*, charged that the "world's money, banking and finance are in the hands of descendants of Jews, the eternal protectors of Zionism."

Of the total of approximately 60 members of the Nicaraguan Jewish community prior to the Sandinista takeover, only two or three elderly Jews still remain in the country.

The Situation in El Salvador



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

April 1986

This report responds to the congressional requirement that the Administration report on progress during the period October 1, 1985, through March 31, 1986, in four key areas relative to El Salvador's emerging democracy: dialogue between the government and the insurgents, civilian authority over the military, judicial reform, and land reform. In addition, it provides a review of other significant developments in El Salvador prior to the reporting period.

Overview

On March 31, 1985, Salvadoran voters went to the polls to elect legislators and municipal officials in the fourth national election in as many years. In all, nine parties participated. After a vigorous and, at times, acrimonious campaign, 1.15 million persons voted, an estimated 66% of those eligible, in spite of a determined insurgent effort to disrupt the balloting. Voting took place in all but 21 municipalities. In 1984 guerrilla actions had prevented voting in 43 towns. President Duarte's Christian Democratic Party won over 52% of the vote, capturing 33 of 60 legislative seats and 153 of 262 municipalities, including 11 departmental capitals and more than two-thirds of the larger cities. The ARENA [National Republican Alliance] party and the old "official" PCN [National Conciliation Party] party ran in coalition; they captured 38% of the vote, giving ARENA 13 seats and the PCN 12 seats. The new legislators and municipal officials were sworn in on June 1.

The insurgents' attempt to block the March elections demonstrated their targeting of noncombatants and undefended civilian facilities. In the 6 weeks preceding the voting, guerrillas burned more than 20 town halls, attacked the headquarters of several of the political parties, and assassinated political figures and civil defense volunteers. In the course of their "travel ban" at election time, they machinegunned a vehicle in which two parish priests were riding, killing one and wounding the other. Attacks against the national electrical grid resulted in a power blackout of eastern El Salvador on March 29 and 30.

Following their failure to block the elections, the insurgents began attacks on the just-elected officials, in some cases before they were sworn into office. On May 1, they killed Christian Democratic Mayor Edgar Mauricio Valenzuela in the town of San Jorge in San Miguel Department; his predecessor had been killed by guerrillas in January 1985. On September 26, Salvadoran Armed Forces personnel found Antonio Hernandez, town administrator of San Simeon in Morazan Department, near death after having been kidnaped and abandoned by the guerrillas. In all, between the March elections and October 1985, guerrillas kidnaped at least 30 town officials, some of whom were executed by their captors, and assassinated numerous civil defense members.

On June 19, 1985, a terrorist team made up of members of the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC) faction of the FDR/FMLN [Revolutionary Democratic Front/ Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] guerrilla alliance machinegunned a San Salvador cafe killing 13 people, among them 4 unarmed, off-duty U.S. Marine security guards and 2 U.S. private citizens. Twelve other people were wounded in the attack, many of them critically. Three of those involved in the slaying were arrested and are currently imprisoned awaiting trial. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the ringleader, the brother of one of those arrested, was killed later in 1985 during a military operation on the Guazapa volcano. The San Salvador slayings demonstrated again the brutal and indiscriminate nature of the tactics employed by the Salvadoran insurgent movement.

In 1985 the guerrillas, experiencing a significant decline in their military capability, embarked on a two-part strategy of urban terrorism and rural landmine warfare. With their numbers reduced to about one-half their peak strength by more effective Salvadoran Armed Forces performance, the insurgents increased assassinations and kidnappings of those they describe as "enemies of the people." In early March a guerrilla splinter group, the Clara Elisabeth Ramirez Front (CERF), killed the armed forces' press spokesman, Lt. Col. Ricardo Cienfuegos. In the same month guerrilla terrorists killed retired general and former politician Jose

Alberto Medrano. On September 10, members of the Salvadoran Communist Party's armed branch kidnaped President Duarte's daughter and a companion as they left a university in downtown San Salvador. Two days after her release, on October 26, the guerrillas kidnaped an Air Force colonel serving as the Director of Civil Aviation. Other guerrilla terrorist acts during the year included the April 8 massacre of 21 civilian men, women, and children in Santa Cruz Loma and the machinegunning and burning of buses during some 14 "travel bans," which resulted in numerous civilian casualties.

The September 10 kidnaping of President Duarte's daughter underscored FDR/FMLN terrorist tactics. With this abduction the guerrillas succeeded in drawing government resources and attention away from critical national issues and in forcing the government to come to terms with the kidnapers through the use of blackmail. President Duarte personally directed the ensuing 44-day hostage negotiations. Archbishop Rivera Damas, assisted by the rector of the Jesuit-run University of Central America, Dr. Ignacio Ellacuria, served as intermediary between the government and the guerrillas.

The negotiations resulted in an exchange on October 24 involving the release of the President's daughter, her companion, and 23 mayors and other municipal officials (whom the guerrillas had kidnaped during the previous 6 months) in exchange for 25 prominent guerrillas, imprisoned on criminal charges, plus safe conduct out of the country for 101 disabled guerrilla combatants. The FDR/FMLN also agreed to cease targeting the families of Salvadoran Government military and civilian officials. Among the 25 prisoners released in exchange for Duarte's daughter were one of the leaders of the terrorist organization which murdered 13 people in San Salvador on June 19 and the second ranking member of the Salvadoran Communist Party.

The guerrillas failed to fulfill their agreement with the government. While they did free most of the kidnaped local officials, others were withheld in violation of the agreement. In December, Auxiliary Bishop Rosa Chavez called on the guerrillas to free the officials they were still holding and expressed his concern that some might have been executed. Rosa Chavez said: "This is not a simple request, but a call to comply with the agreement signed in Pana-

ma." On December 30, the clandestine guerrilla radio broadcast that the mayor of Cacaopera, Morazan Department, and others from that town had been executed soon after their kidnaping in July 1984. The town secretary of Villa El Rosario had met the same fate in December 1983. On February 22, 1986, the insurgent radio broadcast an announcement from the FDR/FMLN High Command that they would "no longer be bound" by the agreement not to target family members of government officials for kidnaping and assassination. In March the church strongly criticized the guerrilla repudiation of the agreement. The UN Special Rapporteur also called on the guerrillas to respect the agreement and not to target family members.

Indiscriminate guerrilla landmine warfare maimed and killed many civilians in 1985; over half of the victims were children under the age of 15. The guerrillas have announced on their clandestine radio stations their intention to continue to plant mines to impede the repair of damaged power installations and to block the coffee harvest in order to damage the government's "war economy." The landmines employed by the guerrillas are homemade and difficult to locate with mine-detecting equipment. On October 7, a guerrilla mine destroyed a Red Cross ambulance.

Church authorities repeatedly condemned the indiscriminate landmine warfare of the FDR/FMLN, most recently in the Easter homily on March 30, 1986. Archbishop Rivera Damas made note of the maiming of a man and two of his children and stated: "The indiscriminate use of these devices cannot be justified." In his February 9 homily, Rivera Damas called upon the FMLN "not to place mines where the civilian population passes through." The Archbishop added that in the majority of cases "the victims of the explosions of these mines are innocent." The guerrillas, however, have not desisted from these attacks despite criticism from the church.

In the only large-scale, rural guerrilla military action in 1985, a major insurgent force attacked the Armed Forces' National Training Center in La Union on October 10. The guerrillas penetrated the installation and inflicted 113 casualties (including 46 killed) and damaged two of the trainees' barracks. Quick reaction from many of the 1,700 trainees prevented a higher toll. The guerrillas lost 10 killed in action before retreating without accomplishing their primary objectives of killing U.S. trainers and destroying the facility.

Damage to the economy as a result of the conflict remained a serious

problem in 1985. The electrical distribution system was particularly hard hit. Public transport also suffered higher losses than in 1984, although damage remained well below the 1979-83 levels. But damage to the major export crops appears to have slackened, despite increased guerrilla presence in the major coffee-producing areas in the west. Since 1979, insurgent damage to the economy is estimated at \$1.5 billion, more than the total amount of U.S. economic assistance provided to El Salvador during the same period.

The armed forces continued to maintain strong pressure on the guerrillas in the countryside, while improving—with U.S. assistance—their ability to counter urban terrorism and attacks on the economic infrastructure. Morale and confidence within the armed forces remain high, and resources—principally U.S. military assistance—while less than desired, will be adequate to achieve significant military objectives and further reduce guerrilla ranks in 1986. The national plan to defend and revive population centers caught in the war was extended to cover a total of 9 of El Salvador's 14 departments. Progress in establishing new civil defense units moved forward in 1985 but was slowed by an inability to provide the needed weapons and training and by a series of guerrilla attacks specifically targeting civil defense units.

Throughout 1985 the Salvadoran Armed Forces consolidated military gains, strengthened command of the battlefield and continued improving human rights practices. Employing a mix of large-unit operations and smaller, patrol-size tactics, they often kept the guerrillas on the move and unable to mass. Six years into the conflict, the armed forces displayed a better understanding of the importance of increased civic action, psychological, and other operations resulting in increased popular support and larger numbers of guerrilla defections.

The armed forces developed a new tactic called *relampago* (lightning strike) to enhance offensive capability. Blending significantly increased mobility for ground troops with aerial fire support, this tactic helped the armed forces' effort to regain control of traditional guerrilla strongholds and seize important guerrilla documents. *Relampago* scored one of the major successes of the year on April 18, 1985, with the capture of PRTC guerrilla leader Ana Maria Valladares, known as *Comandante Nidia Diaz*.

The number of guerrillas dropped from a high of 9,000-12,000 in 1982-83 to an estimated 5,000-7,000 by late December 1985. The decline has forced the insurgents to consolidate or dissolve some units as well as to disperse their dwindling ranks into the countryside, adversely affecting their command and control. Estimated guerrilla casualties remained at the same level as in 1984. The number of overall Salvadoran Armed Forces casualties in 1985 jumped 16% from the previous year, although the number of those killed in action declined, due, in part, to improved medical care provided through U.S. assistance.

The Catholic Church in El Salvador has continued to play a key role as a trusted and credible intermediary between the government and the FDR/FMLN guerrilla forces. Archbishop Arturo Rivera Damas and other church leaders accept the legitimacy of the Duarte government but have maintained the independence and authority of the church, which allow it to act as an intermediary. Church leaders have been outspoken in insisting on respect for the rights of noncombatants and that both sides work toward a peaceful solution to the conflict.

The church has actively stated its concerns about actions in which civilians are killed or threatened. On April 15 Archbishop Rivera Damas denounced the guerrillas' murder of 21 people at Santa Cruz Loma on April 8. The Archbishop condemned the guerrillas for capturing and then executing unarmed members of the town's civil defense and then attacking a house inhabited by women and children. He added that this was a human rights violation that raised doubts among the people about the guerrillas' commitment to pursue dialogue. In June, the church newspaper, *Orientacion*, issued a strong condemnation of the June 19 massacre of 13 people. The editorial stated:

In view of the bloody event perpetrated in the Zona Rosa and claimed by the FMLN, there is room to ask ourselves whether there are still some guerrillas or if perhaps they are not bandits and terrorists who will make the promised revolution. What is happening guerrillas? Have you invoked the spirits of Trujillo, the Somozas, the Duvaliers, Batista, and Stroessner? The terrorist has neither name, nor ideology, nor belongs to any social class . . . once he has killed he continues killing for its own sake and for the pleasure of seeing men, women and defenseless children fall.

In an August pastoral letter, the eight Salvadoran bishops gave their

views on the conflict and examined the impediments to its peaceful resolution. They stated in the letter:

We have, on one side, a constitutional government, endorsed by the massive turnout at the voting urns in four successive elections, which have been practically a repeated "referendum" in favor of democracy; and, on the other side, are the FDR/FMLN, who arrogate a representativity of the people which they cannot certify and who, in addition, resort to violence and sabotage as an essential component of their struggle, thus placing themselves in a position which we cannot approve.

The bishops reflected further on the difficulty of dialogue by quoting a reference to the Salvadoran guerrilla groups in a statement made by Pope John Paul II during his visit to El Salvador in 1983. The Pope said that a dialogue will be made difficult and sterile "when some parts are supported by ideologies which, in spite of their declarations, are opposed to the dignity of the human being and his just aspirations . . . ideologies which see the motor of history in battle . . . and . . . the source of right in force."

Since the bishops' August statement, leaders of the church have spoken out frequently in person and through church publications on dialogue and other national issues. In a September 22 editorial, *Orientacion* condemned the kidnapping of President Duarte's daughter. In the editorial, the church labeled the abduction a "cowardly, criminal act that constitutes the most despicable act of blackmail." The article added that "the Archbishop saw in the action of this kidnapping a dangerous and nefarious sign of the negative attitude of some confronted with reasonable and honest means that must be taken to build peace in our country."

An editorial of December 8 summarized the church's views on the conflict. In the article, the church described the conditions of injustice which prevailed in El Salvador for decades as the root of the conflict and the reason why some took up arms against the system. It went on to note that the "guerrillas lost their cause and evidently their popular support" with the advent of social and economic changes. The editorial continued:

The actions of the extreme left against the national economy, with grave repercussions for our people, caused them to lose their credibility and sympathy. The revolution thus ceased to be popular. The guerrillas no longer tried to claim the people who, to the contrary, had been given positive hope in the reforms of the social order and, above all, with the democratic experience of elections. It is important to note that in this fight of two armies, representing two ideologies, the

people now have demonstrated their preference. Their presence at the voting booths and their response to the call of elections, are indicative of the popular will.

The UN Human Rights Commission's Special Rapporteur on El Salvador, Dr. Pastor Ridruejo, submitted his report to the General Assembly on November 5. The report noted the attempted disruption of the March 31, 1985, legislative elections by the guerrillas and their policy of economic sabotage. On the latter question, the report expressed "deep concern with these attacks, which help undermine the country's already weak economy and seriously compromised important economic, social and cultural rights of the Salvadoran people." The report also strongly criticized the Salvadoran judicial system for being slow and ineffective. In a November 26 address to the General Assembly's Third Committee, the Special Rapporteur expanded on his report by lauding the continuing democratization in El Salvador and the government's commitment to improving human rights observance.

On December 14, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on El Salvador noting: "the Government of El Salvador is continuing its policy of attempting to improve the condition of human rights." This resolution also labeled the Salvadoran judicial system as "notoriously inadequate." On March 12, the 42d Human Rights Commission in Geneva passed a resolution recognizing "with satisfaction that the question of the observance of human rights forms an important part of the policy of the present government of El Salvador."

Following his election in 1984, one of President Duarte's goals was the creation of a "democratic space" for labor in which unions could express their interests. The Salvadoran Government succeeded in this effort; through 1985 and into 1986 labor was highly active. Most labor activity focused on traditional issues—wages and working conditions. Nevertheless, labor, including leftwing labor organizations, also played an active and prominent political role.

Between May 1985 and April 1986, there were numerous strikes, Salvadoran labor's basic bargaining tool. El Salvador's private sector experienced the longest strike in the country's history when workers at the country's largest shrimp exporting company, Pezca, struck for 196 days. The dispute was settled in July 1985, but only after Pezca had suffered significant foreign exchange losses.

Public sector labor associations, many of them leftist controlled, coordinated strike activities last year. In May and June, sewage and water works (ANDA) employees, social security (ISSS) workers, and teachers engaged in strikes and work stoppages. The ANDA strike ended June 11 after a labor judge ruled the strike illegal, because the union had not followed legal procedures in calling the strike, and ordered the strikers back on the job. At the urging of the union's leaders, 237 workers disobeyed the judge's order and, as a result, were fired. The labor ministry stripped the union leaders of their leadership status after they were fired on the grounds that they could not be union members since they no longer worked at ANDA. The Supreme Court ruled March 19, 1986, that the labor ministry acted unconstitutionally and that ANDA either had to rehire the fired union leaders or pay them through February 12, 1987, 1 year after their terms as elected union leaders end.

Leaders of the ISSS union also failed to abide by labor laws governing strikes. Their strike in May and June 1985 was ruled illegal by a labor judge. Union members occupied the Central Social Security Hospital and social security clinics. During the occupation, which lasted from May 6 to June 2, social security beneficiaries were refused services and the rate of patient deaths in the hospital was greater than average, even though there were fewer patients. On June 2, security forces entered the hospital and arrested two union leaders. Four policemen were accidentally shot and killed by security forces during the operation. The arrested union leaders were released June 5. On June 7, the strike ended and union leaders called the settlement terms a victory for the workers.

A spate of public employee strikes took place in October and November when employees at the Finance Ministry, Public Works Ministry, telephone company, Agriculture Ministry, tourism institute, and the municipality of San Salvador walked off the job. Negotiated settlements to these strikes between unions and the government included a large salary increase for all public employees.

Two important new labor umbrella organizations were recently formed. One, the National Salvadoran Workers Union (UNTS), has as its largest member the Communist Party-dominated May First Committee. UNTS has been highly critical of President Duarte's administration. The other, the National Worker-Peasant Union (UNOC), has also

criticized parts of the Duarte administration's austere economic adjustment package. UNOC, however, has voiced its support for the democratic process and land and social reforms.

During the 6-month period beginning in October 1985, various labor demonstrations took place. In January, several thousand people marched to protest a package of economic measures implemented by the government. On February 21, leftists led 7,000-10,000 people in a demonstration against the economic measures. On March 15, democratic worker and farmworker organizations led a march of some 35,000 who voiced support for the democratic process, peace, and land and other social reforms. These and other demonstrations in the last year have been peaceful.

Dialogue

In October 1984, President Duarte began a dialogue between his government and the FDR/FMLN guerrilla groups. The peace offer which Duarte presented at the talks held at La Palma on October 15 called for pacification of the country within the framework of the constitution approved in 1983 by the elected Constituent Assembly, plus guarantees for the reincorporation of the left into the democratic political process. President Duarte offered the guerrillas the opportunity to take their cause to the people by participating in the democratic process. At the second round of talks at Ayagualo on November 30, the insurgents proposed a phased plan that called for the abrogation of the constitution, the formation of a new government, the end of outside military aid and advisers, a cease-fire based on territorial demarcation, and reorganization of the armed forces. Only after all of this was completed would elections be held. President Duarte rejected the guerrillas' proposal as unconstitutional and illustrative of the left's determination to seek power through violence. He noted that the proposal marked a return to the guerrillas's past intransigence and negated any joint efforts for peace.

Since the failure of the talks at Ayagualo, President Duarte and members of his government have frequently stated the government's willingness to reinstate the dialogue when the guerrillas demonstrate their intention to engage in serious talks. In his state of the nation address on June 1, President Duarte reiterated his commitment to

continue the dialogue and stated that he would meet with the guerrillas again when he saw some sign of a real desire for peace on their part. On August 14, President Duarte restated his desire to continue a dialogue with the rebel groups in order to find a rapid solution of the war in El Salvador. In November, following the release of his daughter by her FDR/FMLN captors, Duarte told reporters in Madrid that his offer of talks with the guerrillas still stood and that he was ready to engage in a serious dialogue "at any moment and at any place."

In contrast, the FDR/FMLN utilized the dialogue issue for propaganda. Although making numerous "overtures," they never deviated from their demand that the constitution be overthrown and the government restructured in an undemocratic manner. In October 1985, while holding President Duarte's daughter kidnaped, they advanced yet another version of the same proposal, signed by FDR President Ungo and Communist Party Secretary General Handal; its timing demonstrated the initiative's propagandistic nature.

In March 1986 President Duarte announced a major peace initiative. Recognizing the critical role played in support of the Salvadoran guerrillas by the Marxist-Leninist Government of Nicaragua, President Duarte wrote to the head of the Sandinista regime, Daniel Ortega, and proposed a three-part plan to achieve a peaceful political solution to the conflicts in the region. The plan called for a simultaneous dialogue between the Nicaraguan Government and its political and military opposition and between the government and the FDR/FMLN in El Salvador. (Talks between the Nicaraguan regime and its democratic opposition would have triggered bilateral U.S.-Nicaragua talks.) The plan also called for the Central American presidents to meet to discuss integrated solutions to the problems of the region.

Duarte's plan envisioned the creation of a Central American parliament. The parliament would include representatives of all of the political and social sectors of the region and would act as a permanent forum for dialogue and consultation on regional problems. President Duarte stated in his letter to Ortega that his government had initiated a dialogue as a means to achieve peace. He noted his continuing belief in a sincere dialogue as a workable formula to reach a peaceful solution to the conflict in El Salvador.

Spokesmen for the Nicaraguan regime and Salvadoran guerrilla representatives immediately rejected

President Duarte's effort to achieve a comprehensive peace in the region. The initial Nicaraguan rejection was made in Moscow by Sandinista *Comandante* Bayardo Arce. In an editorial on March 6, the Sandinistas' newspaper *Barricada* denounced the proposal as part of a strategy engineered by the U.S. Government. The Salvadoran guerrilla reaction hewed the same line as the Nicaraguan response. Immediately following Duarte's announcement, a principal political leader of the guerrilla groups, Hector Oqueli, rejected the plan and repeated the false and discredited assertion that the Salvadoran rebels do not depend on Nicaragua. Guillermo Ungo, the president of the guerrilla political arm, said that the proposal to link Salvadoran and Nicaraguan talks was "madness" but did not address the issue of the Nicaraguan Government's provision of arms to the rebels.

In rejecting President Duarte's peace initiative, the Nicaraguans and the FDR/FMLN either denied the existence of or ignored a key reason for linking talks in El Salvador and Nicaragua: the longstanding and continuing Sandinista intervention in El Salvador's internal affairs. Since its assumption of power in 1979, a key feature of Sandinista foreign policy has been support for leftwing subversive movements in other Latin American countries. The Nicaraguan regime has not wavered from its original commitment to foment revolution in neighboring states. Salvadoran guerrillas have been the prime beneficiaries of this policy. Facilities were set up in Managua in 1979 for the transfer of materiel to the Salvadoran guerrilla groups. Guerrilla training sites were also established. U.S. weapons were shipped from Vietnam to the Nicaraguan Government and then provided to the FDR/FMLN. Sandinista subversion of the democratic government in El Salvador continued through 1985 and into 1986.

Sandinista collusion with the Salvadoran guerrillas took place during the negotiations to obtain the release of President Duarte's daughter when guerrilla negotiators in Panama were in regular and open communication with Managua. New public evidence of the continuing supply of materiel to the guerrillas in El Salvador was obtained in December 1985 when a vehicle which crashed in Honduras was found to contain ammunition, grenades, radios, and other communications gear and a manifest listing the call signs of insurgent command posts in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Most recently, Honduran

troops discovered a cache of arms which originated in Nicaragua and were stored in Honduras by Salvadoran members of the PRTC guerrilla group.

In contrast to the Nicaraguan and FDR/FMLN reaction, the response to President Duarte's plan from other governments in Central America was highly favorable. On March 15, the Presidents of Guatemala and Honduras and the President-elect of Costa Rica asked the Nicaraguan Government to accept the proposal to seek a dialogue between the Sandinistas and the opposition. In their statement the three leaders said of the proposal:

We support it, convinced that it is necessary to mount a broad and very serious effort in concert to induce the rulers of Nicaragua to recognize the urgency of opening dialogue and thus creating propitious conditions for achieving peace in the isthmus and consolidating democracy.

An exchange of telegrams between Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega and Costa Rican President Luis Alberto Monge in late March demonstrated clearly the contrast between the reactions of the communist Government of Nicaragua and the democratic Government of Costa Rica to the initiative. In his March 24 message, Ortega wrote:

I have to express my firm and categorical rejection of the recent declaration signed in Honduras on March 13 supporting the initiative of President Duarte, which in essence involves his Government in an act which violates morality, international law and existing treaties, and promotes the manipulation of the Government of El Salvador by the United States. The proposal of President Duarte is directed at intervening in internal matters of Nicaragua and seeks support for the mercenary forces in service of a foreign power attempting to establish an absurd and immoral symmetry between the civil war in our brother republic of El Salvador, resulting from structural and economic injustices, and a war of aggression imposed by the Government of the United States against the people of Nicaragua and condemned by the international community.

In his response to Ortega on March 26, President Monge said:

With respect to your opinion that Costa Rica committed an immoral and illegal act in supporting President Duarte's initiative, I must point out to you that the plan responds to the spirit of the Contadora negotiations, in the sense of moving forward with national reconciliation processes in Central America. I understand that for the current Government of Nicaragua, it might be unacceptable to go forward with a process of that nature, but for that reason I cannot accept your criteria of the manner in which Costa Rica should direct its foreign policy, and for that reason I reject those criteria energetically, emphasizing that we have always believed in dialogue as a way of solving political problems, and that if we

have maintained that should be the line followed in El Salvador, we believe it's equally indispensable that it should also be so in Nicaragua.

Other support for Duarte's initiative came from the Archbishop of San Salvador, Arturo Rivera Damas. On March 9, the Archbishop responded to Duarte's plan by saying that the church supports all efforts which favor a solution to the Salvadoran conflict through an authentic dialogue. He added that to be effective the dialogue had to encompass three levels: national, regional, and geopolitical.

Civilian Control Over the Military

Since the October 1979 coup d'etat which overthrew the government of President Romero and the subsequent purge of officers opposed to reform, the military in El Salvador has supported establishment of a democratic political system and a more equitable economic system in their country. The coup itself was the result of the conviction held by many in the military that Romero's removal was a prerequisite to implementing the reforms the country needed. In the period of joint civilian-military rule following the coup, in spite of the opposition of some recalcitrant officers, the military as an institution helped to implement the fundamental changes in the country's social and political system which culminated in the free elections in 1982, 1984, and 1985 and the establishment of a democratic civilian government.

The armed forces remain a major force within the country; they are now, however, subject to a civilian authority elected by the Salvadoran people through a democratic system which many in the military helped to bring about. The military is now defending that democratic government against extremists who would reimpose the rightist dictatorship of the past and against those who seek to establish a permanent leftwing tyranny in the future. The Salvadoran Armed Forces continue to respect the authority of the elected government and to abide by their constitutional role. The role of the military in the crisis provoked by the kidnapping of President Duarte's daughter demonstrated their respect for the country's civilian authority.

During the October 1985 negotiations between the government and the FDR/FMLN, rightist leader Roberto D'Aubuisson attempted to capitalize on discontent within the armed forces over

the concessions to the guerrilla groups by lauding the military's sacrifices and contrasting those with the government's willingness to free those responsible for those sacrifices. On the opposite political extreme, the clandestine guerrilla radio also sought to drive a wedge between the civilian authorities and the military with broadcasts which claimed that the crisis was exacerbating "contradictions" and deepening divisions within the government. These efforts to undermine the military's support of constitutional civilian authority failed.

When one rightist military officer criticized the government's handling of the crisis in a petition to the Minister of Defense, his criticism was rejected by the military high command and received almost no open support from other officers. His position on that occasion was repeated in January when he disputed the military's full backing for a package of economic reforms proposed by President Duarte. These two episodes plus his subsequent charge that the government was penetrated by communists led to his reassignment as military attache in the United States. In response to a question about the military's support for the economic reforms, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Adolfo Blandon, noted that the government had consulted with the military about the economic package, that rightist doubts about the armed forces' support for the package were unfounded, and that the military had a constitutional function to support the government.

The Salvadoran Armed Forces continued to make institutional changes in order to eliminate abuses of human rights by government troops and members of the security forces. In a year when air power became a key factor in the conflict, President Duarte's guidelines governing use of aerial firepower near populated areas appear to have been closely adhered to by the Air Force. These guidelines require that the target of bombing be free of civilians, that the area be clearly visible to the pilot, and that permission to bomb be obtained from the General Staff in San Salvador. Salvadoran pilots are complying with these rules. In a report on the observance of human rights in El Salvador, submitted to the UN General Assembly on November 5, 1985, the Special Rapporteur concluded that the "Salvadoran Army is endeavoring to conduct the war in a more humanitarian manner than in the past and is therefore not pursuing a policy of indiscriminate bombing, although in a few cases air and mortar attacks are causing civilian casualties."

On January 9, 1986, the Salvadoran Armed Forces began a major military operation called Operation Fenix to dismantle insurgent headquarters and support facilities on Guazapa, a volcano about 17 miles north of San Salvador. That area had served as a guerrilla stronghold since the insurgency began in 1979. Guerrilla military operations, sabotage of economic targets, and even the kidnapping of President Duarte's daughter were mounted from Guazapa.

Salvadoran troops involved in Operation Fenix were careful to avoid endangering civilians and prevent civilian casualties. They broadcast warnings to noncombatants to remove themselves from the scene of the fighting and avoided firing into areas where civilians might be located. More than 500 civilians were evacuated from the area of the fighting. The civilians were transferred to a safe area several miles from the combat and were supplied with food, water, shelter, and clothing. They were also provided with medicines and attended by doctors, dentists, social workers, and representatives of the International Red Cross and the Human Rights Commission. Most of these civilians were quickly settled with family or friends or in camps for displaced persons.

San Salvador Auxiliary Bishop Rosa Chavez stated in his homily of January 26 that he had received "unconfirmed reports" that 1,000 civilians were surrounded in 2 villages northeast of the Guazapa volcano. On January 27, he celebrated Mass on Guazapa mountain and determined that these reports were unfounded. He made no reference to them in his next homily, on February 2, but did express continued concern for civilians who might still be hiding on the volcano. Bishop Rosa noted that many civilians had already been safely evacuated by the armed forces. Members of the international press were able to interview civilians evacuated during the Guazapa operation. No credible allegation of mistreatment was published.

Judicial Reform

The Salvadoran Government is pursuing a comprehensive program to reform its system of justice. A 10-member Revisory Commission has been established to conduct a thorough review of the Salvadoran judicial system and identify solutions to the problems it faces. Another commission has also been established to oversee the work of a specially trained unit assigned to investigate major criminal cases. The government is also work-

ing to implement plans to establish a judicial protection unit that would be responsible for protecting judges, jurors, witnesses, and other participants in the judicial process from threats or intimidation.

The Revisory Commission dates from June 1985, when the Legislative Assembly formally approved the decree creating the commission. Its 10 members include 2 Supreme Court magistrates, representatives of the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, the Ministries of Justice and Defense, law faculties, and lawyers' professional associations. Once hiring of the technical and expert staff is completed, approximately 40 persons will be working under the commission members.

To date, the work of the commission has focused on identifying the judicial areas most urgently needing revision. Three groups of three members each were established to focus on penal, civil, and administrative issues. The plan of action that resulted from the work of these groups was discussed on February 7 in a consultative meeting which attracted over 200 participants, among them Supreme Court magistrates, representatives of several government ministries, members of lawyers' associations and law faculties, and Legislative Assembly deputies and other representatives of political parties. The plan presented to this gathering was revised in 22 areas on the basis of observations made during the forum.

The commission's priority for penal law is a comprehensive review of the state of emergency legislation known as Decree 50. The commission's review will include an in-depth study of all of the cases currently before the special tribunals and a revision of the appropriate penal procedures relating to the suspension of constitutional guarantees, including the study of the amnesty issue. In addition, the commission will seek to make changes in current laws that are needed immediately such as the jury selection process and the procedures relating to the bail system. Commission members expect to complete their work on Decree 50 and related issues and submit proposed legislation in 5-6 months. Anticipating the commission's recommendations, in February the Supreme Court submitted a proposal to the Legislative Assembly which would augment the number of Courts of First Instance in order to deal with the backlog of Decree 50 cases. The measure was unanimously passed by the Legislative Assembly.

In the administrative field, the commission will focus on the National Council on the Judiciary and judicial career

legislation. The 1983 constitution mandates that a National Council be formed to ensure that the selection of judges is based on ability and experience and not on political considerations. A draft of the legislation needed to implement this constitutional requirement was submitted to the Legislative Assembly by the Supreme Court in 1984. However, because of opposition in the current court, the proposed legislation was shelved. As a result, the commission took the initiative to develop an alternative proposal. Commission members intend to accompany the proposed National Council legislation with a proposed judicial career law governing assignments and sanctions of judges; identifying standard requirements for service as a judge; and a proposal on salaries, benefits, and hours of work, which are currently half-day only. The work on these drafts of legislation is scheduled to be completed in August or September.

In the area of civil law, the extraordinary number of common law marriages and children born out of wedlock and the inequitable treatment which these Salvadorans face before the law led the commission to focus on family law. The commission's work will include a reform of the laws governing the rights of illegitimate children and of the partners in informal marriages. The reforms which the commission contemplates could bring about fundamental changes in Salvadoran society. The proposed legislation in this area is expected in October 1986.

The Commission for Investigations was created in July 1985 by legislative decree. It is headed by the Minister of Justice, with the Vice Minister of Interior and a designee of the President as the other members. The commission directs the activities of an executive unit, a 23-member investigative unit, and a 17-member forensic unit. The investigative unit is currently working on several major criminal cases, including the Sheraton murder case, the Armenia well case, the Las Hojas massacre, the Sullivan murder case, the Romero assassination, the murder of an attorney and related adoption racketeering and the killing of the former head of a government land reform agency, Juan Pablo Mejia. This unit was also involved in the investigation of the kidnaping of President Duarte's daughter and in coordinating the security force task force which identified and arrested some of those involved in the massacre of 13 people on June 19, 1985.

The commission's investigations unit has accumulated and reconciled the evidence available on the cases it is handling, interviewed witnesses, and reinterviewed others who had testified previously and pursued new investigative leads. On March 9, a group of 5 investigators traveled to Costa Rica to interview 10 witnesses who may be able to shed light on the role of Capt. Eduardo Avila in the Sheraton case and, possibly, the Romero assassination. Unit investigators are also looking into allegations that Walter Antonio Alvarez, a former National Guardsman who was killed in 1981, was involved in the murder of the archbishop. A reversal of the provisional dismissal of charges against the suspects in the multiple murder known as the Armenia case was recently obtained. Efforts are also underway to obtain a judicial order to exhume the remains of the victims from the well into which they were believed to be thrown. The commission investigators are also pursuing the Las Hojas case in which 18 people were murdered by an army patrol in February 1983. The unit will be involved in developing evidence to support the testimony of two witnesses who have recently come forward with previously unknown eyewitness accounts of the murders.

During this period, the case of two gunmen who committed the murders at the Sheraton Hotel in 1981 went to trial. The two former National Guardsmen, Santiago Gomez Gonzalez and Jose Valle Acevedo, were each convicted on February 13 on three counts of aggravated homicide. The jury reached its verdict after hearing the prosecution's argument that the gunmen were members of a "death squad" within the National Guard which carried out political murders and was responsible for acts of terrorism which must not go unpunished. In the case of these gunmen, the weak Salvadoran judicial system was able to overcome its deficiencies and render a just decision in a notorious case.

Beyond that, however, this case is significant because of the government prosecutor's appeal to the jury to convict the two gunmen for the violence they perpetrated as members of a death squad. The determination of the government to put an end to the brutality of some of those within the army and security forces was accurately and effectively summarized in the prosecutor's message. That determination was seconded by the five jurors who agreed that the two gunmen should be punished for their actions. Despite reversals before the courts, Salvadoran Government prosecutors are continuing their efforts

to develop evidence against one of those who ordered the two gunmen to commit the murders, Capt. Eduardo Avila.

Land Reform

El Salvador's agrarian reform is now in its sixth year of implementation. Progress has been slow but steady and has resulted in changed land tenure patterns and new opportunity for the rural poor. The reform's three phases currently affect 26% of the rural poor and 22% of the farmland. To date, Phase I of the land reform has transformed 469 large farm properties into 517 cooperatives, benefiting more than 31,000 cooperative members. Under Phase III, more than 240,000 acres of farmland have been granted to 65,782 beneficiaries, who were formerly tenant farmers or sharecroppers. Under Phase II of the reform, landowners have until December 1986 to sell properties in excess of 605 acres or face expropriation without prior compensation.

Phase I (properties in excess of 1,250 acres): A major reorganization of ISTA, the Salvadoran Government's land reform institute, was undertaken in 1985 in order to focus its activities largely on land acquisition and titling. This reorganization came after President Duarte ordered ISTA to resolve remaining titling and compensation cases by the end of 1986. The result has been a near doubling of the rate at which cooperative titles have been issued by ISTA, compared to the year before the reorganization.

Two hundred and nine professional managers and accountants have been placed on cooperatives to date; 41 since the previous reporting period.

The single most important factor affecting the financial viability of Phase I cooperatives is the agrarian reform debt. As many as 95% of the Phase I cooperatives are unable to meet their debt service obligations on an estimated \$800 million in agrarian land debt, emergency credits, and accumulated investment and production loans. In this regard, the Salvadoran Government's Advisory Council on Agrarian Reform continues to explore possible means for the Government of El Salvador to ease the cooperatives' debt burden by reducing interest rates on the debt, extending the grace and amortization periods, approving a moratorium on payments for 1980-81 emergency production credit, and generally improving the liquidity of cooperative financial accounts.

**Phase I Indicators,
February 28, 1986**

Direct Beneficiaries	31,359
Including Family Members	188,154
Land Affected (acres)	542,044
Percent of All Farmland	15%
Number of Cooperatives	317
Properties Affected	469
Properties Compensated	329
As Percent of Phase I Properties	70%
Total Compensation Paid	\$202,750,534
Cash	\$ 15,415,454
Bonds	\$187,335,080
Titles Issued	141
Total Estimated Agrarian Debt	\$800,000,000

The Government of El Salvador is also working to increase the independent status of Phase I cooperatives as private enterprises through enhancement of beneficiary rights and by strengthening the roles and responsibilities of the beneficiaries in the management of their enterprises.

U.S. legislation encourages the use of local currency for agrarian reform activities including the titling/compensation process. The 1986 economic support fund (ESF) balance-of-payments program currently under negotiation should result in the Government of El Salvador making available up to 200 million colones (\$40 million), including 140 million colones from ESF local currency generations (\$28 million), to pay obligations due to former landowners in the land transfer process. The estimated cost of the cash portion of agreed, but still unpaid, compensation settlements,

plus interest and redemption payments due on agrarian bonds, is estimated at \$88 million.

During the reporting period, the Phase I implementing agency ISTA provided compensation to former owners of 42 properties, raising the number of properties compensated to 329. ISTA issued final titles on 45 more cooperatives for a total of 141.

The armed conflict continues to affect the reform cooperatives. As many as 50 cooperatives have been totally or partially abandoned and others have incurred direct and indirect losses because of the war. As long as the violence continues, it represents an additional obstacle to the financial well-being of the reform cooperatives.

Phase II (properties between 605 and 1,250 acres): In accordance with the Salvadoran Constitution of December 1983, landowners have until December 1986 to sell land in excess of 605 acres or holdings over the limit can be expropriated without prior compensation. Approximately 41,000 acres of land may become available under Phase II private land sales. While implementing legislation has not been submitted to the Legislative Assembly, land in excess of the 605 acre limit is being bought and sold on the open market.

Phase III (land to the tiller, up to 17 acres): Recently passed changes in El Salvador's Registry Law should accelerate the Phase III titling process by the National Agricultural Land Financing Institute, FINATA. With definitive titles, beneficiaries should be more able and motivated to secure credit and technical assistance resulting in increased productivity and standards of living for agrarian reform beneficiaries.

**Phase III Indicators,
February 28, 1986**

Direct Beneficiaries	63,668
Including Family Members	382,008
As Percent of Potential Beneficiaries	54%
Land Affected (acres)	240,054
As Percent of All Farmland	7%
Petitions Filed	79,142
Titles Issued	
Provisional	65,900
Definitive	17,569
Owners Compensated	1,622
Amount Paid	\$21,873,452
Affected Parcels	24,667
Voluntary Payments	
Beneficiaries	45,631
Amount	\$3,055,792

Between the 1982-83 and 1984-85 crop years, much progress has occurred on Phase III lands resulting in increased production yields and investment. Specifically, beneficiary land holdings have increased by 18.3%, fixed assets have increased by 200%, indicating that there are profits to reinvest and incentives to expand production on Phase III lands resulting from land security. In addition, basic grain production increased by over 200% and is now equal to one-quarter of the national production. Use of hired labor increased 400% during this period.

During the reporting period, an additional 224 provisional titles were issued under the Phase III program, bringing total provisional titles issued to 65,900. Also, 2,341 definitive titles were issued for a total of 17,569. An additional 310 former landowners received compensation for their properties, for a total of 1,622.

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A WHITE PAPER ON THE SANDINISTAS AND JEWS

published by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith
March 19, 1986

INTRODUCTION

Members of the Jewish community-in-exile came to the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith to tell of their experience of Sandinist anti-Semitism in Nicaragua and seek assistance. In 1981, a League representative raised this issue in New York with Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto. Despite assurances that the government would investigate, the ADL received no reply to queries about anti-Semitism, the status of the synagogue and private properties.

In May, 1983, after 19 months of futile quiet diplomacy, the ADL publicized the plight of Nicaraguan Jewry. Only then did the government of Nicaragua react. It denied charges of anti-Semitism, and falsely claimed that four cabinet members are Jews. It also claimed that the synagogue was a private home, legally confiscated. When ADL provided documents proving that the synagogue was built by the congregation, the government offered to return the building.

At that time only two or three members of the congregation were still in the country. The small Jewish community, its members fearing for their lives, had fled in the face of anti-Semitic threats and harrassment.

Since then, various individuals and organizations have attempted to distort the facts and deny that Jews, as Jews, had reason to fear or flee the country. This paper sets forth basic facts about the Sandinistas and Jews.

ANTI-SEMITISM

"Anti-Semitism was one of the major factors, though not the only one, which caused the Nicaraguan Jews to leave Nicaragua."

Marcel Ruff, President

Federation of Jewish Communities of Central America (FEDECO), May, 1984

* * *

Nuevo Diario, a Managua newspaper which closely adheres to the government line, charged (July 17, 1982), that "the world's money, banking and finance are in the hands of descendants of Jews, the eternal protectors of Zionism. Consequently, controlling economic power, they control political power as now happens in the United States."

* * *

"I remembered that it was the Levites in the synagogue who crucified our Lord."

Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto
Washington Post 1/27/85

THE SYNAGOGUE

The synagogue in Managua was firebombed in 1978 while the congregation was worshipping inside. When congregants attempted to flee, they were confronted with armed Sandinistas who ordered them not to leave the burning building.

* * *

"I remember one day, one evening, on a Shabbat evening while we were singing, two bombs hit the door. We had a big wooden door in the synagogue, where a big Star of David was, and all of a sudden, the whole place was on fire.

"I remember running, getting the fire hose, and started running to the entrance of the synagogue, when I stopped because two other members that used to be in concentration camps in Europe, they had already reached the outside of the synagogue. We were met by a jeep and another small car with eight members that had handkerchiefs on their faces, and they identified themselves as members of the FSLN, means the Sandinista movement, guerilla movement. They said that they were the FSLN and the PLO and that they were going to burn all the Jews. So we were forced back into the synagogue."

Oscar Kellerman, Washington, July 20, 1983

* * *

Mauricio Palacio is a non-Jew who lived among the Jews and served as a Sandinista informant.

"I let them know where....the Jewish people would gather so that a little burning of the cars of these Zionists could be done and tell them all "JEWS GO HOME."

Mauricio Palacio
Managua, March 3, 1980

"The purpose of this operation, was intended to intimidate the community and, in that way, to stop the flow of arms from Israel. It was determined that the best place to carry out the operation was the synagogue....the synagogue was attacked and they attempted to set fire to the doors; a verbal message was given to the congregation...."

Mauricio Palacio
Chicago, April 15, 1986

THREATS AND INTIMIDATION OF INDIVIDUAL JEWS

"I, together with my brother-in-law, Mr. Saul Retelny, ran a complex of factories manufacturing textiles and candy which employed at peaks, over 1,200 heads of families. For a period of 18 months prior to July, 1979 anonymous

callers would contact Mr. Retelny and threaten his life and that of his wife. These calls came to his business office and to his home, now also confiscated, at all hours of the night. One favorite tactic was to call around three in the morning and tell my brother-in-law that I had been shot and killed! At the same time, I would get a telephone call claiming that my brother-in-law was shot and killed.

"In addition, there were writings on the walls inside and outside the factories: 'Death to the Jews; Isaac will be killed. Beware of Sandinista Justice.' Dry runs of abduction attempts were made. In one instance, I was stopped, with my son inside the car, and at gun point my life was threatened. I was warned that my businesses were to be taken over when the Sandinistas came to power. Although Mr. Retelny and I were both born in Nicaragua, we never participated directly or indirectly, in politics."

Isaac Stavisky, Washington, July 20, 1983

* * *

"Three times I was followed, and they tried to kill me three times. With gasoline, they tried to burn the car. Other times, I did not take the path or the road that they thought I was going to take, because every day we would take a different road. We knew already that we were being followed. We were all receiving, not only myself, but the rest of the Jewish families, receiving harassment, threats, phone calls. And all this made us little by little, one by one, leave Nicaragua."

Oscar Kellerman, Washington, March 14, 1985

CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY

The government of Nicaragua informed the ADL in December, 1983 that only two members of the Jewish community faced the possibility of criminal charges, but that 17 had had their properties confiscated by decrees. The others are caught in the "Catch 22" situation of being out of the country for fear that their lives are in danger and, therefore, falling under the Nicaraguan law providing for the confiscation of property of those who remain outside the country for more than six months.

SANDINISTAS' RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

After coming to power in 1979, the Sandinistas maintained minimal relations with the State of Israel, never permitting the Israeli ambassador to present credentials. In 1982, the Nicaraguans broke relations with Israel.

Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto, in a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations announcing that his country was breaking relations with Israel, used the Israeli move into Lebanon as a pretext for that action. He told

the U.N. body, "Never since the time of Hitler has such mass genocide been witnessed...." D'Escoto said that his government, since it came to power, had "suspended all contact with the Zionist regime...all that remained was to break off diplomatic relations formally."

In the last two sessions of the General Assembly, Nicaragua has actively supported efforts to expel Israel from that world body.

SANDINISTA LINKS TO P.L.O.

The P.L.O.-Sandinist relationship involved P.L.O.-supplied weapons, training and funds. Sandinist guerillas and P.L.O. terrorists have also fought side by side. Jorge Mandi, a Sandinist spokesman, told a reporter for the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Watan (Aug. 7, 1979), "There is a longstanding blood unity between us and the Palestinian revolution....Many of the units belonging to the Sandinist movement were at Palestinian revolutionary bases in Jordan. In the early 1970's, Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood was spilled together in Amman and in other places during the 'Black September' battles."

In August, 1980, the Kuwaiti press reported that P.L.O. members had gone to Nicaragua to supervise military training. This was done in accord with an agreement reached with Yasir Arafat, the P.L.O. chieftain, who had gone to Managua in July to celebrate the first anniversary of the revolutionary Government. The Sandinists paid their debt by authorizing the opening of a P.L.O. "embassy" in Managua.



Nathan Perlmutter
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March 24, 1986

Letters to the Editor
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, NY 10036

To the Editor:

Your March 20 editorial observes, "Of the millions who heard Mr. Reagan describe the 'desecrating and firebombing' of Managua's only synagogue, how many will catch up with the rejoinder, by Rabbi Balfour Brickner...? He says the building was abandoned during the street fighting in 1978, a year before the Sandinistas seized power. The rabbi's own investigation in Nicaragua failed to sustain Mr. Reagan's charge of virulent anti-Semitism."

Paraphrasing your editorial, one wonders how many will catch up with the rabbi's questionable assertion given such amplification in a Times editorial, yet.

When is anti-Semitism heaping "catsup and snake oil into the dish of disputation" as you assert, and when is anti-Semitism plain anti-Semitism?

We submit that President Reagan was accurate in his characterization of the Sandinista government as anti-Semitic.

It is anti-Semitism when the Sandinistas' Foreign Minister, Miguel D'Escoto publicly declares, "I remembered that it was the Levites in the synagogue who crucified our Lord." Biblical rhetoric? It's the very rhetoric that historically has fueled pogroms. Moreover, coming from the same Foreign Minister who, addressing the United Nations, has said of Israel's actions, "Never since the time of Hitler has such mass genocide been witnessed...", it becomes an official expression of anti-Semitism.

It is anti-Semitism when Nuevo Diario, the Managua newspaper which adheres closely to the government's line, charges "the world's money, banking and finance are in the hands of descendants of Jews, the eternal protectors of Zionism. Consequently, controlling economic power they control political power as now happens in the

Letters to the Editor
The New York Times
March 24, 1986
Page Two

United States." Tell me, how's that different from the anti-Semitism that Goebbels broadcast and which today echoes in the Soviet Union?

It may not be overt anti-Semitism when early on in their victory the Sandinistas invited Yassir Arafat to Managua where he promised that the "way to Jerusalem lies through Managua." Jews have, however, sadly learned to hear the sound of danger in such messages.

An extensive citation of anti-Semitic statements and acts of Sandinistas is available from the Anti-Defamation League, including corrections of your statement that the Managua synagogue was abandoned a year before the Sandinistas seized power. To be sure, one statement, two statements, one desecration, two desecrations, do not necessarily suggest an official pattern of anti-Semitism. But we are not discussing aberrational happenings. We are discussing patterns. And the Times' sources to the contrary notwithstanding, Marcel Ruff, president of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Central America in May, 1984 said "Anti-Semitism was one of the major factors, though not the only one, which caused the Nicaraguan Jews to leave Nicaragua." What makes the New York based Rabbi Brickner a more compelling observer than the Jewish presence in Nicaragua and Central America?

The terms "major factor" and "though not the only one" merit attention. Why? Because the issue of anti-Semitism aside, Jews, like all people, are multidimensional. And so they left Nicaragua because being Jewish was dangerous; and they left because free speech too is dangerous in Nicaragua; and they left Nicaragua because businessmen there are an endangered species; in short they left because freedom is a risky business in a Marxist-Leninist society.

So are the Sandinistas anti-Semitic? Of course they are, and anti other forms of civilized life as well.

Sincerely,

Nathan Perlmutter
National Director
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith

Rabbi Disputes Reagan Point About the Jews in Nicaragua

Special to The New York Times

MANAGUA, Nicaragua, March 18 — Although President Reagan said in a televised address Sunday night that the Nicaraguan Government had persecuted Jews, several outside investigations have found the charge baseless.

The President, in his speech on aiding the Nicaraguan rebels, said that Managua's only synagogue had been "desecrated and firebombed" and that the "entire Jewish community" had been "forced to flee Nicaragua."

Rabbi Balfour Brickner of the Stephen Wise Free Synagogue in New York, who investigated charges of anti-Semitism by the Sandinista Government during a visit in July 1984, challenged Mr. Reagan's assertions.

"The synagogue in Managua was abandoned during the fighting in 1978, and it is now being used by some Government youth group," Rabbi Brickner said in a telephone interview Monday. "The Sandinistas told me they would be happy to give it back, but there is no one to give it to. There is not a Jewish community in Managua to support a synagogue."

Rabbi Brickner said the few Jews who lived in Nicaragua before the 1979 revolution were closely linked to the dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle.

He said most left the country of their own accord after the revolution that toppled Mr. Somoza.

The property of several prominent Nicaraguan Jews was confiscated under laws decreeing the seizure of goods belonging to Somoza backers.

Last November, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a liberal lobbying group that opposes Administration policy toward Nicaragua, issued a report citing five separate investigations of the Sandinista Government's attitude toward Nicaraguan Jews, including the ones conducted by Rabbi Brickner. According to the council's report, none of the five investigations had found evidence of persecution of Nicaraguan Jews.

The report said an incendiary bomb was thrown onto the synagogue's lawn in 1978, before the Sandinista takeover. It said the attackers wore hoods and were never identified.

The former synagogue is intact, and officials of the Sandinista Children's Association were working there Monday.

(OVER)

The New York Times

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Making Bad Things Even Worse

Over the years, Americans have made good-natured allowance for President Reagan's fondness for whoppers. Flustered White House aides routinely amend some of his fanciful statistics and unverifiable anecdotes. But the argument over Nicaragua, and a commitment to support war against it, has gotten ugly enough to require a stricter standard. Mr. Reagan in his zeal has heaped catsup and snake oil into the dish of disputation. This time he has evoked corrections even from the Government of Brazil, an eminent New York rabbi and his own drug enforcement agency — surely a record for a single speech.

Does it matter? Politicians pleading a case are not under oath, and in this Administration, lie detectors tend to be reserved for those who leak truths. When the House votes today on aiding the contras, it is unlikely to be swayed by Presidential blarney. The facts about the Sandinistas are unpleasant enough and well known, as are the pervasive doubts about the "contra" army.

But what may matter in the vote is the spreading fear that Mr. Reagan's overstatements prefigure a dirty November campaign in which anyone's reservations about the wisdom of his policy will be attacked as a craven surrender to Communism.

It matters, too, that Americans treated to a Presidential lecture on threats to their security retain some confidence in the quality of the information that reaches the White House. Of the millions who heard Mr. Reagan describe the "desecrating and firebombing" of Managua's only synagogue, how many will catch up with the correction? According to Rabbi Balfour Brickner of the Stephen

Wise Free Synagogue, the building was abandoned during street fighting in 1978, a year before the Sandinistas seized power. The rabbi's own investigation in Nicaragua failed to sustain Mr. Reagan's charge of virulent anti-Semitism.

Also suspect now is Mr. Reagan's assertion that Nicaragua's ministers are big-time drug peddlers. If true, that is news to the Drug Enforcement Administration, which says it is unable to confirm rumors that the President presented as fact — complete with photographic evidence. And the Government of Brazil says it cannot understand what Mr. Reagan had in mind when he pointed to a map showing Brazil tinted red and accused the Sandinistas of training Brazilian revolutionaries. The State Department agrees that there is no guerrilla movement in Brazil.

The fire in Nicaragua is real enough without ringing these false alarms. No one doubts the depth and sincerity of Mr. Reagan's loathing for Leninist tyrannies, or the perplexities of fixing a sensible course in Central America. But the first requirement of a realistic policy is respect for the rules of evidence. When fibs and rumors are paraded as truths, discourse is doubly polluted — the credulous believe what their President says and skeptics grow to distrust him even when he is right.

The worthy St. Augustine, in an essay "On Lying," offered a useful instruction for Presidents and lesser mortals: "When regard for truth has been broken down or even slightly weakened, all things will remain doubtful."

BIAS IN NICARAGUA REPORTED BY JEWS

Anti-Defamation League Says
Accusation by Reagan in
Speech Was Accurate

By ALEXANDER REID

The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith asserted yesterday that President Reagan was correct when he accused the Nicaraguan Government of persecuting Jews in Nicaragua.

The group issued a four-page white paper in which it said the Government conducted a campaign of death threats and harassment against Nicaraguan Jews. The persecution led to the flight of almost all the Jews in Nicaragua, the league said.

President Reagan, in a televised speech Sunday night calling for Congress to approve \$100 million for anti-Government rebels, said that Managua's only synagogue had been "desecrated and firebombed" and that the "entire Jewish community" had been "forced to flee Nicaragua."

Five investigations into allegations of anti-Semitism in Nicaragua found no grounds for such charges, according to a report last November by the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, a liberal lobbying group that opposes Administration policy.

The B'nai B'rith report yesterday detailed the firebombing of a synagogue in Managua, death threats against Jews, the burning of cars belonging to Jews and the confiscation of property owned by prominent Jews.

The organization said the reports came from Nicaraguan exiles, disclosures from a former Sandinista and investigations by the league over the last five years, the league said.

Reason for White Paper

The B'nai B'rith paper said the persecution grew out of the Government's hostility toward Israel and the Sandinista relationship with the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The paper was published "to set the record straight, to answer published denials about the Sandinistas' treatment of Jews," said Abraham H. Foxman, associate national director for the league and head of its International Affairs Division.

Mr. Foxman was speaking of reports by agencies and individuals who investigated and found no evidence of persecution.

Rabbi Balfour Brickner of the Stephen Wise Free Synagogue in New York, who investigated charges of anti-Semitism by the Sandinista Government during a visit in July 1984, said: "I'm not impressed by any white paper by the Anti-Defamation League which presumes to set the record straight. All it actually does is to confirm their own previously held position, which happens to be in line with the view of the President."

Rabbi Brickner said that in two visits to Nicaragua he had found no persecution.

He asserted that the few Jews in the country before the 1979 revolution that toppled Anastasio Somoza Debayle were linked to Mr. Somoza and left the country of their own accord after the revolution.

CSA + 2
America

RESOURCE PAPER

GROUPS OF THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE:

WHO ARE THEY?

APRIL 1985

The Department of State has prepared this resource paper on the Nicaraguan democratic opposition in response to requests from members of Congress, the press, and concerned citizens. Its purpose is to provide brief information on the principal opposition groups and their top leaders.

GROUPS OF THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE:

WHO ARE THEY?

The Sandinista government of Nicaragua came to power in 1979, promising respect for pluralism and human rights, a non-aligned foreign policy, and a mixed economy. The communist leaders of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) have consistently failed to honor these pledges made to the Organization of American States and the Nicaraguan people. They systematically pushed aside the democratic members of the broad-based coalition that overthrew Somoza. They have shipped arms, ammunition, and other supplies to the Salvadoran guerrillas and operated guerrilla bases for training Salvadorans, Hondurans, and others in guerrilla warfare, sabotage, and terrorism. The Sandinistas cooperate with the Soviet Union and Cuba in carrying out their expansionist policies in Central America. (See the joint Department of State/Department of Defense paper The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean, March 1985.)

Between 1979 and 1981, the United States authorized \$118 million in economic assistance and sought friendly relations with the Nicaraguan government, at the same time through quiet diplomacy expressing concern about the Sandinistas' aggressive acts against Nicaragua's neighbors. It became clear to democratic Nicaraguan groups that the Sandinistas would not alter their behavior unless pressured from within and without.

As a result of Sandinista repression and growing ties to communist countries, opposition developed, made up in part of persons who had been Sandinista supporters, even some who had been members of the post-revolutionary government, such as Alfonso Robelo, Arturo Cruz, Alfredo Cesar, and Eden Pastora, the legendary "Commander Zero." The Sandinistas' opponents are indigenous Nicaraguans fighting for their cause. They are, as President Reagan said on February 11, "the people of Nicaragua who have been betrayed in the revolution that they themselves supported."

There is, however, an obvious congruence between United States objectives and those of many of the anti-Sandinistas. United States objectives are clear:

--the reduction of Nicaragua's greatly expanded military apparatus to restore military equilibrium among the Central American nations;

--the removal of Soviet and Cuban military personnel and termination of their military and security involvement in Nicaragua;

--the termination of Nicaraguan support for subversion in neighboring countries; and

--the implementation of the Sandinistas' commitments to the OAS.

The Sandinistas are waging an intensive propaganda campaign to paint the opposition as henchmen of the former dictator Anastasio Somoza. But the facts show that nearly all of the opposition leaders opposed Somoza. This campaign, focused primarily on the Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (Nicaraguan Democratic Force, or FDN) which has a number of former National Guard officers in its membership, tries to equate former service in the National Guard with being a Somocista. But even if that questionable assumption were accepted, the number of former guardsmen in the FDN is relatively small. FDN records indicate that less than 2% of its members were guardsmen as compared to about 20% who are former Sandinistas.

Several groups of the armed and unarmed opposition met in San Jose, Costa Rica, and formed a coalition called the Nicaraguan Resistance. On March 2, 1985, they issued a document calling for a national dialogue with the Sandinistas under the sponsorship of the Nicaraguan Bishops' Conference. In addition to the dialogue, they called for:

--a cease-fire in place;

--lifting of the state of emergency;

--amnesty for political prisoners (approximately 3,500);

--granting the rights of habeus corpus and asylum;

--a guarantee of protection for participants in the dialogue.

The National Resistance offered to recognize Daniel Ortega as President pending a plebiscite. They called for the presence of guarantors from other Central American countries to oversee the proposed dialogue and invited other interested nations and groups to send observers. The opposition seeks only the right to participate in a free and open election and does not demand in advance, as do the Salvadoran leftist guerrillas, a place in the government.

Within the recently formed Nicaraguan Resistance are the Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (Nicaraguan Democratic Force, or FDN), the Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica (Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, or ARDE), and MISURA (Miskito, Sumo, and Rama), as well as smaller or lesser known groups. MISURASATA (Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista Unity), the Frente Revolucionario Sandino (Sandino Revolutionary Front, or FRS), and others, although not signatories of the San Jose document, are also fighting to force the Sandinistas to return to the original goals of the anti-Somoza revolution.

The following descriptions of the principal opposition groups and their top leadership should help to counterbalance the misinformation being spread about them. Included are brief biographies of all the members of the FDN Directorate and the principal leaders of the other opposition groups.

GROUPS OF THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION

The Nicaraguan Resistance

The Nicaraguan Democratic Force, or Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense (FDN)

The FDN, the largest of the armed opposition organizations, was founded in 1982. Although originally composed primarily of former guardsmen, as a focal point for armed resistance to the Sandinistas it quickly attracted many others who had become disaffected with the FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional). The influx of members led to a transformation of the FDN into a broadly based organization drawn from all sectors of Nicaraguan society.

The FDN's policy-making Directorate, reorganized in 1983, is composed of six persons. Five are civilians who were long-time opponents of Somoza; the other member is a former National Guard colonel, Enrique Bermudez, who heads the military general staff. The Directorate is responsible for making and carrying out all FDN policy.

The FDN reports that in 1982 a number of former Somoza National Guardsmen with records of human rights violations were expelled. Since that time, three FDN military leaders who had committed gross human rights violations were tried, found guilty, and executed under the leadership of the Directorate. A written policy requiring respect for human rights and good conduct is stressed constantly during the training and operations of the FDN soldiers.

The executive committee of the FDN directorate responsible for military affairs is the Civil-Military Command (CMC). The CMC's three members are civilians Adolfo Calero and Indalecio Rodriguez, both Somoza opponents, and Colonel Enrique Bermudez. The FDN's Civil-Military Command controls all finances. Reporting to the CMC are the secretariat, finance officer, logistics center, communications center, strategic command, and the medical center.

As noted above, the military general staff of the FDN is headed by Enrique Bermudez. In addition, several other former National Guard officers serve in key staff positions. However, the FDN reports that its overall military leadership, including the general staff and regional and task force commanders, has a greater number of former Sandinistas than National Guardsmen. The composition of the FDN military leadership is as follows:

Former Sandinistas	43%
Former National Guardsmen	32%
Campesinos (small farmers)	19%
Other	6%

Of the 56 regional and task force commanders in the FDN responsible for day-to-day operations, the FDN reports that 27 were former Sandinistas; 13 were National Guardsmen, none above the rank of lieutenant; and 12 were farmers. The remainder include a medical doctor, an evangelical minister, a fourth-year university student, and a civilian radio technician. The overwhelming number of the reported 15,000 FDN troops are peasants, workers, shopkeepers, businessmen, and others with no previous ties to Somoza.

The Democratic Revolutionary Alliance, or Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica (ARDE)

The Costa Rica-based ARDE is a coalition of organizations created in 1982 by individuals who were active during the revolution, including many who were initially officials in the Sandinista government. From its beginning, its leaders sought to restore the original course of the revolution through political means. In the spring of 1983, after peaceful efforts had proved futile, ARDE began military operations in southern Nicaragua. There have been internal disagreements among various ARDE leaders. In 1984, Eden Pastora, leader of the military arm, was expelled by other members of the ARDE coalition. There continues to be a dispute over which faction can legitimately claim the ARDE name, with both sides doing so. Pastora has retained the loyalty of most ARDE troops and continues military operations in southern Nicaragua. The political head of ARDE, Alfonso Robelo, was a principal organizer of the Nicaraguan Resistance.

Current groups in the Robelo-led ARDE coalition are:

Nicaraguan Democratic Movement, or Movimiento Democratico Nicaraguense (MDN)

The MDN is a social-democratic party founded in 1978. It drew its support from lower and middle class Nicaraguans, including many peasants, and it played an active role in the revolution which overthrew Somoza. Its leader, Alfonso Robelo, was an original member of the ruling revolutionary junta. He resigned in protest over Sandinista efforts to create a communist state. Subjected to extraordinary harassment by the Sandinistas, Robelo went into exile in Costa Rica in 1982.

Nicaraguan Democratic Unity/Nicaraguan Revolutionary Armed Force, or Unidad Democratica Nicaraguense/Fuerza Armada Revolucionaria Nicaraguense (UDN/FARN)

UDN/FARN is a political/military organization founded by veteran anti-Somoza fighter Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro. UDN/FARN was one of the original founders of ARDE, but pulled out in 1983 in a policy dispute. In the spring of 1984 those differences were overcome and UDN/FARN rejoined the coalition. Chamorro was a signer of the Nicaraguan Resistance document.

MISURA

MISURA is an armed group that evolved out of an Atlantic Coast Indian organization ALPROMISO, founded in 1973 with the help of Protestant churches in that region, and its successor group MISURASATA. Former supporters of the Sandinista revolution, Miskito Indians Wycliffe Diego and Steadman Fagoth, founded MISURA in 1983. Its military operations are carried out in northeastern Nicaragua.

Nicaraguan Democratic Solidarity, or Solidaridad de Trabajadores Democraticos Nicaraguense (STDN)

STDN was founded in 1983 by two Nicaraguan labor leaders who had been forced into exile as a result of Sandinista persecution of the independent labor movement in Nicaragua. The founders had long been opponents of Somoza; one of them, Zacarias Hernandez, was a signer of the Nicaraguan Resistance document.

INDEPENDENT RESISTANCE ORGANIZATIONS

Sandinino Revolutionary Front, or Frente Revolucionario Sandino (FRS)

The FRS was created in 1982 by disillusioned Sandinista militants, many of whom had fought on the southern front against Somoza in 1979. The FRS was a founding member of ARDE, but later its ties were severed. Its leader, Eden Pastora, has steadfastly refused to align himself or his organization with any former National Guardsmen. Most of ARDE's combat troops remain loyal to Pastora. In September 1984 the FRS entered into a new understanding with ARDE. However, Pastora has not signed the Nicaraguan Resistance document.

Miskito, Sumo, Rama, and Sandinista Unity, or MISURASATA

MISURASATA evolved out of the Atlantic Coast Indian organization ALPROMISO. Following the fall of Somoza, ALPROMISO was renamed MISURASATA. By the end of 1981, Sandinista persecution and the forced relocation of many Indian communities prompted the beginning of a large-scale exodus of Miskito Indians from Nicaragua, primarily to Honduras. The Nicaraguan government officially ordered MISURASATA disbanded, but members formed a fighting force to resist. It conducts military operations in southeastern and eastern Nicaragua. Divisions within the organization led to a split in 1982. Brooklyn Rivera heads the faction that retains the MISURASATA name. MISURASATA pulled out of ARDE in mid-1984 and was not a signer of the Nicaraguan Resistance document.

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES

Arturo CRUZ Porras

Mr. Cruz was a long-time member of the Democratic Conservative Party. He is an economist who holds graduate and undergraduate degrees from Georgetown University.

He was twice jailed by Somoza, once for 11 months and later for 3 months. In 1977, Cruz was chosen by the Sandinistas to be one of "The Group of 12" prominent Nicaraguans who would serve as a bridge between the Sandinistas and other groups in the civil opposition to Somoza. Following the revolution, Mr. Cruz served as president of the Central Bank in 1979-80, as a member of the Sandinista junta from May 1980 to March 1981, and as Nicaragua's ambassador to the United States from June to December 1981. He resigned that post in protest over the growing Marxist-Leninist totalitarian tendencies of the Sandinistas.

Mr. Cruz was the presidential candidate of the unified opposition in the election in November 1984. He refused to register his candidacy in protest over the ruling Sandinista government's refusal to permit a fair electoral contest, and the harassment by Sandinista controlled mobs of Mr. Cruz and other opposition candidates.

Alfredo CESAR Aguirre

Mr. Cesar holds a B.S. degree in industrial relations from the University of Texas and an M.B.A. from Stanford University. After serving as general administrator of the Nicaraguan Sugar Estates, he joined the Sandinistas in 1973 in the struggle to overthrow Somoza. He reported that he was tortured while imprisoned during that time. After the Sandinista victory in 1979, Cesar became Executive Director of the International Reconstruction Fund. In 1980-81 he was Executive Director of the Banking Superior Council. In 1981-82 he was President of the Central Bank. After breaking with the Sandinistas and leaving Nicaragua, Cesar went into exile in Costa Rica and became an adviser to the Costa Rican government, specializing in external debt.

THE DIRECTORATE OF THE FDN

Adolfo CALERO Portocarrero

A lifelong opponent of Somoza, Mr. Calero has been president of the National Directorate and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the FDN since December 1933.

Mr. Calero graduated from the University of Notre Dame in 1953, did graduate work in industrial management at the University of Syracuse, and holds a law degree from the University of Central America in Nicaragua.

In the late 1950s, Mr. Calero became manager of the Coca-Cola Company of Nicaragua. He served as director of the Chamber of Commerce and was a member of Nicaragua's development organizations, INDE and FUNDE. He was a co-founder of the Human Development Institute. In the early 1970s he was dean of the faculty of economics and business administration at the University of Central America.

Mr. Calero began his political career in the 1950s. He became an activist in the Conservative Party and in 1959 he helped organize managerial strikes in support of an insurrection headed by Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, editor of the opposition daily La Prensa.

In 1970 Mr. Calero, offered a seat as an alternate in Congress as part of a pact between Fernando Aguero, head of the Conservative Party, and Somoza, refused. Mr. Calero joined with other conservatives and founded the Authentic Conservative Party.

In 1973, Mr. Calero served as his party's representative in the Broad Opposition Front (FAO), and along with other FAO leaders was jailed for initiating a general strike that shook the Somoza regime.

After the fall of Somoza, Mr. Calero attempted to cooperate with the Sandinistas in rebuilding Nicaragua, but by the end of 1982, having become totally disillusioned, he went into exile.

Enrique BERMUDEZ Varela

Mr. Bermudez is the military commander of the FDN armed forces. He served in the National Guard under Somoza, but was cleared of "war crimes" by a representative of the Sandinista military in December 1982. He has described himself as a professional soldier and, under Somoza, apolitical. He is a graduate of the Nicaraguan Military Academy and received training at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the U.S. Army School of the Americas. He also received military training in Brazil.

During the closing years of the Somoza regime when the most intense violence occurred, Bermudez served in Washington as defense attache.

Alfonso CALLEJAS Deshon

Mr. Callejas was trained as a civil engineer at the University of Santa Clara in California. After working for several years for the Standard Fruit Company, he founded his own business and eventually had interests in cattle, bananas, and cotton. He held various local and national offices in his capacity as an engineer and headed the National Office of Water Resources in the early 1960s. He served as Minister of Public Works and later was named Vice President of the republic under Somoza. He then became disenchanted with the Somoza regime, and in 1972 resigned his position in protest over Somoza's efforts to maintain himself in power. While still a member of Somoza's National Liberal Party (PLN), he led a group of dissidents who sought to restore genuine liberal values to the party. In 1973 he organized a grassroots PLN movement designed to force Somoza to resign. He spent the last months of the Somoza regime in exile in Honduras. Callejas returned to Nicaragua after the revolution only to have his properties confiscated by the Sandinistas. Again he went into exile and joined the FDN.

Indalecio RODRIGUEZ Alaniz

Dr. Rodriguez is a doctor of veterinary medicine who served as a professor and president of the University of Central America. The son of a prominent anti-Somoza figure, he became politically active at an early age. He participated in the anti-Somoza youth movement and became involved in the Independent Liberal Party (PLI). He was jailed twice in the 1950s for his anti-Somoza activities. After spending several years abroad, he returned to Nicaragua to accept a position at the University of Central America where he remained during the revolution. In 1981 he abandoned his university post to go into exile and take up the struggle against the Sandinistas.

Lucia Cardenal Viuda de SALAZAR

Mrs. Cardenal Viuda de Salazar is the widow of a prominent Nicaraguan businessman, Jorge Salazar Arguello, who was murdered by the Sandinista security forces in November 1980. She was educated in Catholic schools in Nicaragua and the United States. During the revolution the Salazars collaborated with the Sandinistas and harbored Sandinista militants who were being sought by Somoza's forces. Her late husband, a top official of the private sector organization COSEP, played a key role in the civic opposition to Sandinista policies in 1980. A progressive leader whose popularity was rising, he was shot by Sandinista State Security police for allegedly participating in a conspiracy. After his murder Mrs. Salazar fled Nicaragua and joined the FDN.

Marco A. ZELEDON

Mr. Zeledon was a prominent businessman who served as president of the Nicaraguan Chamber of Industry, as a member of the board of governors of the Central American Institute of Food Marketing, and on the Financial Committee of FUNDE. As a businessman he promoted the constructive interaction in the decision-making process of the private sector, the government, labor unions, and community organizations. He became increasingly active in anti-Somoza activities during the 1970s and participated in the private sector initiative to persuade Somoza to implement policies which would result in a more equitable distribution of wealth. Following the revolution, Zeledon went into exile after his cereal business was confiscated by the Sandinistas.

ARDE LEADERS

Alfonso ROBELO Callejas

Mr. Robelo, political coordinator of ARDE and head of the MDN, was trained as a chemical engineer. He served as director of the University of Central America from 1970 to 1972 and was president of the Nicaraguan Chamber of Commerce until 1975. He then headed the development institute INDE. Following the assassination of La Prensa editor Pedro Chamorro, Robelo founded the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), a political party of businessmen, industrialists, and professionals opposed to the Somoza regime. After the revolution Robelo was one of the original five members of the junta. He resigned in 1980 over the communist tendencies in the FSLN-dominated government. He complained also about the ever-growing Cuban influence in the new government. Harassed by the FSLN after his resignation, he was finally forced into exile in 1982, at which time he and Eden Pastora founded ARDE.

Fernando "El Negro" CHAMORRO Rappaccioli

Mr. Chamorro, leader of UDN/FARN and commander of ARDE's military forces, has been a prominent anti-Somoza figure since the 1940s. He participated in numerous military actions against the dictator and was repeatedly jailed or exiled by Somoza. During the revolution he executed a spectacular rocket attack on Somoza's Managua bunker from the nearby Intercontinental Hotel. In 1979 he fought on the southern front with the Sandinistas. The increasingly communist nature of the regime, and the absence of an effort to implement the democratic goals of the revolution, drove Chamorro into exile in 1982 at which time he joined in the founding of ARDE. When Pastora was expelled as a result of policy disputes within that organization, Chamorro became the military leader .

SOME OTHER OPPOSITION LEADERS

Eden PASTORA Gomez

Mr. Pastora, the legendary Commander Zero and leader of the FRS (Sandino Revolutionary Front), was the Sandinista's most popular hero and a senior official of their government until he broke with them in 1982 and took up arms against his former colleagues. Pastora fought for years against Somoza; in August 1978 he led the unit that captured the National Palace in Managua. That operation gained the release of 59 political prisoners, but its lasting significance was that it captured the imagination of the Nicaraguan people and enabled the Sandinistas to become the symbol of resistance to Somoza. After serving first as Vice Minister of Interior and then as Vice Minister of Defense, Pastora became disgruntled by the radical policies implemented by the Sandinistas, and was particularly distressed by the presence in Nicaragua of thousands of Cubans. In April 1982 he denounced the Sandinista regime and went into exile to found the FRS. That same year he was a co-founder of ARDE. In April 1983 he took up arms against the Sandinistas in southern Nicaragua. After being expelled from ARDE in the spring of 1984, he later reached an understanding in which he and Robelo agreed to consult with one another.

Donald CASTILLO

Mr. Castillo was a labor leader and held important posts in the Social Christian labor confederation, the Nicaraguan Workers Central (CTN). A long-time opponent of Somoza, he supported the FSLN during the revolution. He became the CTN delegate to the quasi-legislative Council of State following the victory in 1979. He served as coordinator of a civic opposition group which held discussions with the FSLN in an unsuccessful effort to resolve national problems. Castillo subsequently went into exile and became a co-founder of STDN. He broke with that group, however, over the unity issue and joined Pastora's FRS.

Jose DAVILA Membreno

Mr. Davila studied economics at the National Autonomous University and went on to advanced studies in economics and development in West Germany. Active in student politics, he later became a leader of the Social Christian Party, one of the principal groups opposed to Somoza. Following the revolution, Davila was a delegate to the Council of State. In 1982 he went into exile and founded an anti-Sandinista group called ANUDE. Davila later left ANUDE and has joined Pastora's FRS.

Roberto FERREY

Mr. Ferrey, Secretary General of the FSDC (Christian Democratic Solidarity Front), studied law at the Autonomous University of Nicaragua and did graduate work at Southern Methodist University in Texas. He was a founder of the Youth Christian Democratic Front which was opposed to Somoza. In his law practice he specialized in labor cases and frequently represented unions affiliated with Christian-Democratic Latin American Workers Central (CLAT). Because of his involvement in strike actions, he was jailed several times by the Somoza regime. He became an important figure in the Social Christian Party. He went into exile in 1976 and from there continued to participate in the fight against Somoza. After the revolution he returned to Nicaragua and became a legal adviser to the Ministry of Justice. In July 1983 he resigned and went into exile in Costa Rica where he joined the FSDC.

NICARAGUAN INDIAN LEADERS

Brooklyn RIVERA Bryan

Mr. Rivera is a Miskito Indian from the Nicaraguan Atlantic Coast. He initially supported the revolution against Somoza and was a founding member of MISURASATA when it was created under Sandinista auspices in 1979. In February 1981 Rivera and other Indian leaders were arrested by the Sandinistas and accused of "counter-revolutionary activities." He was released from jail after a short time and continued to protest Sandinista efforts to nationalize Indian lands and to relocate the Indian population. He resisted efforts to force the "cultural assimilation" of the various Indian groups by the Sandinistas. He was driven into exile and has carried on the fight against the Sandinistas. He is involved in an effort to negotiate an agreement with the Sandinista government over the future of Nicaragua's Indian population. He states he did not sign the Nicaraguan Resistance document because he did not wish to jeopardize that negotiating process.

Wycliffe DIEGO

Mr. Diego is a Miskito Indian leader from the Atlantic Coast town of Puerto Cabezas. He was a Moravian pastor and an active member of ALPROMISO. He was jailed by Somoza in 1971 for allegedly being a communist. When MISURASATA was formed in 1979, Diego served as a member of its executive board. Reacting to the Sandinista treatment of Nicaragua's indigenous population, Diego went into exile and helped found MISURA. He was wounded in a Sandinista-engineered 1982 assassination attempt.

Steadman FAGOTH Muller

Mr. Fagoth, a Miskito Indian leader, was a long-time opponent of Somoza. While a student at the National Autonomous University he was twice arrested for his political activities. Following the revolution he became a leader of MISURASATA and was that organization's first representative in the National Reconstruction Government's Council of State. Fagoth's increasingly outspoken criticism of the Sandinista treatment of his people led to his arrest in February 1981 for "counter-revolutionary activity." In May he was released on condition that he accept a long-term scholarship in a Soviet-bloc country. He fled to Honduras, however, where he joined other MISURASATA members in the fight against the Sandinistas. Fagoth, wounded in the same 1982 assassination attempt that injured Diego, later joined MISURA.

Central America: US Policy

November 1985

Background: Central America comprises Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. US policy there embodies the goals President Reagan enunciated to Congress on April 27, 1983: to support democracy, reform, freedom, human rights, and equitable economic development; to promote dialogue within and among Central American countries in order to resolve differences peacefully; and to support the region's security against those who seek to spread tyranny by force.

National Bipartisan Commission on Central America: In 1984 this Presidential commission concluded that the region's crisis was acute, ~~resulting from indigenous historical factors, and that indigenous~~ reform, even revolution, did not threaten the US, although outside intervention had added a threatening East/West dimension; that the US had a strategic as well as a moral obligation to support democratic development there; that the crisis must be addressed at once in all its aspects (social, economic, political, and external subversion); that we should help, but the Central Americans must find their own solutions; and that we must make a long-term, bipartisan commitment to a coherent policy. These conclusions have been embodied in legislation reflecting wide bipartisan support and remain valid today.

Central America Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative of 1984: This initiative implements the commission's recommendations through executive, legislative, and private sector actions. Funding at levels close to the commission's recommendations and Administration requests has been approved by Congress to support social, economic, and political development together with the necessary security.

Social development: We have worked with friendly governments to promote greater observance of human rights. Although abuses continue to decline, the objective of both the US and Central American democrats is to eliminate them completely. Our Administration of Justice Program is helping to strengthen judicial systems and to promote equity, efficiency, and human rights. Other US programs promote land reform and help to meet housing, education, and health needs.

Economic development: Central America, like other developing areas, was hard hit by the world economic recession at the turn of the decade and is in need of economic growth. US programs in these countries--excluding Nicaragua--assist structural economic reform to encourage exports, promote a greater private sector role, and achieve sustainable and equitable long-term growth. We welcome the increased economic assistance of other developed countries--for example, the European countries and Japan--as well as their support for a political solution to the region's crisis.

Security: Although only one of every five dollars in US aid to Central America is for military purposes, security assistance is essential to

defend friendly governments from subversion, originating in or aided by Nicaragua and encouraged and assisted by Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Terrorism: With subversion and insurgency facing growing difficulties in El Salvador (as well as Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica), Central American Marxist-Leninists have turned increasingly to terrorism. The primary target is El Salvador: examples in 1985 include the Zona Rosa murders of 13 people, including 4 US Marines assigned to guard our Embassy; the kidnapping of elected mayors; and the kidnapping of President Duarte's daughter. The Administration is proposing a Central American Counterterrorism Program to meet this threat.

Political development: US policy, programs, and official statements have contributed to the resurgence of democracy in Central America. Specific programs have helped to support democratic leadership training, inter-country cooperation of democratic political parties, educational exchanges, and scholarships. The most encouraging developments have been the strengthening of democratic institutions.


- El Salvador: When Jose Napoleon Duarte was inaugurated President in June 1984, he was the first Salvadoran head of state in 50 years chosen in free and fair elections. The March 1985 legislative and municipal elections completed the transition to democracy begun in 1979.
- Honduras held national and local elections on November 24, 1985. In 1982 Honduras returned to civilian government after 18 years of military rule.
- Guatemala held national and local elections on November 3, 1985. A presidential runoff election will be held on December 8. On January 14, 1986, a civilian president will be inaugurated for the first time since 1966; intervening presidents have been former high-ranking military officers.
- Costa Rica will hold presidential elections on February 2, 1986. It has had unbroken democratic rule for more than 35 years.

Nicaragua is the only Central American country moving away from democracy, cynically using "elections," a rubber-stamp legislature, and a current show of drafting a new constitution as the means to avoid internal dialogue. We ask the Sandinistas to: reverse their military buildup to restore military balance to the region; sever their security ties to Cuba and other Soviet bloc countries (some 3,000 Cuban military advisers are in Nicaragua); stop supporting subversion in neighboring countries; and keep the promises they made in 1979 to respect democratic pluralism. To achieve a pluralistic society and national reconciliation, they must engage their democratic opposition (both armed and unarmed) in a serious dialogue.

Contadora process: The four points of our Nicaragua policy are central to the Contadora process, a mediation effort by Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela to produce a regional peace treaty. We support a comprehensive and verifiable implementation of the September 1983 Contadora Document of Objectives, a statement of 21 goals agreed to by the Central American states--including Nicaragua. A simultaneous, verifiable, and comprehensive implementation of these objectives is the best hope for a durable peace and would meet US policy concerns.

Resource Book

The Contadora Process



United States Department of State



SUMMARY

In January 1983, the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela met on Contadora Island, Panama, to initiate what has become the principal multilateral mechanism in the search for a peaceful solution to the conflict in Central America. This "Contadora process" produced its first tangible agreement in September 1983, when the four Contadora Group and the five Central American governments issued a "Document of Objectives," which identified twenty-one political, security and social-economic goals to be negotiated.

A second agreement in January 1984 created working groups in political, security and social-economic affairs to develop recommendations on how to implement the twenty-one objectives. These recommendations were submitted to the Contadora Group on April 30, which then integrated them into a draft agreement. On issues where the working groups had been unable to reach a consensus, the foreign ministers presented their own proposals.

On June 8, 1984, the Contadora Group foreign ministers presented this first draft agreement to the Central Americans. During the summer, the Central Americans submitted their comments, and a vice-ministerial meeting was held in Panama August 23-27. The Contadora Group circulated a revised draft on September 7.

Two weeks later, Nicaragua announced that it would subscribe to this draft, provided that no changes were made, and it called upon the United States to formally adhere to and ratify an Additional Protocol. Nicaragua subsequently has refused to consider any substantive changes to the September 7 draft. The other Central American states each submitted written comments on the revised draft. Guatemala said it looked on the draft favorably and, noting the observations of the other Central American governments, pledged to continue supporting the process to a successful conclusion. At a meeting in Tegucigalpa October 19-20, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras developed proposed changes and presented the "Tegucigalpa draft agreement" the following week. The proposed modifications dealt primarily with timing and verification issues. The Contadora process is currently in a period of intensive private consultations as the nine participating governments prepare for negotiations to reconcile the two drafts.

The United States has consistently supported the Contadora process. We welcomed the adoption of the Document of Objectives and stated our willingness to support its comprehensive and verifiable implementation. We have noted that the September 7 draft was much improved over the original June 8 version, although in our view it needed to be strengthened in order to make it an effective instrument to end conflict in the region. Since June 1984, Special Envoy for Central America Harry W. Shlaudeman has met nine times with Nicaraguan Vice Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco in a series of bilateral talks in support of the Contadora process.

THE CONTADORA PROCESS

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THE CONTADORA PROCESS

Introduction

In January 1985, the Contadora process marks its second anniversary. During the last two years, it has become the principal multilateral mechanism in the search for a peaceful solution to the turmoil in Central America. This paper describes the development of the Contadora process, examines its current status, and explains the policy of the U.S. Government in support of its efforts.

Background

The Contadora process grew out of a meeting of the foreign ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela in January 1983 on Contadora Island, off the coast of Panama. (A chronology of key events in the Contadora process is attached as Annex 1.) These four countries are known as the "Contadora Group." Their effort to mediate among the five Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) is known as the Contadora process.

Meetings among the five Central American and four Contadora Group governments during the spring and summer of 1983 led in September to agreement on a "Document of Objectives" (See Annex 2). This identified twenty-one political, security and social-economic goals to be negotiated by the Contadora process. These objectives drew heavily from the October 1982 "Declaration of San Jose," issued by seven democratic governments (including the United States) that met in San Jose, Costa Rica, to formulate a regional peace initiative.

Since adoption of the Document of Objectives, efforts have focused on devising concrete measures to implement the twenty-one points. A second document on which all the participating governments also agreed was the January 8, 1984, "Norms of Implementation of the Document of Objectives." The Document of Objectives and the Norms of Implementation are the only two substantive documents on which all five Central American governments have agreed.

The Norms of Implementation agreement created working groups in political, security and social-economic affairs to develop recommendations to implement the twenty-one objectives. The working groups submitted their recommendations to the Contadora Group foreign ministers on April 30, achieving consensus on some issues while failing to do so on others. The Contadora Group foreign ministers then integrated these recommendations into a draft agreement ("The Contadora Act on Peace and Cooperation in Central America"), presenting their own proposals in areas where the Central Americans had failed

to achieve consensus. The resulting draft agreement was presented to the Central Americans on June 8, 1984.

Comments on the June 8 draft were submitted by the Central American governments during the summer of 1984 and a vice-ministerial meeting was held in Panama August 23-27 to review these comments. The Contadora Group subsequently revised the first draft and presented a second draft on September 7.

The September 7 draft would commit the parties to take a number of specific measures to end support for insurgencies in the region. It would proscribe the installation of foreign military bases (as defined in an annex) and require the dismantling of any existing foreign bases and schools within six months of signature. It would proscribe international military exercises, requiring their suspension thirty days after signature, and regulate national military exercises.

The September 7 draft would commit the parties to negotiate agreements on arms, troop levels and military installations after signature of the agreement. A freeze on the acquisition of military equipment would be in effect during negotiations on arms. The agreement would also commit the parties to "establish" (i.e. negotiate) a calendar for withdrawal of foreign military and security advisers, which, once instituted, would require the immediate withdrawal of those advisers engaged in "operations" and training. Advisers engaged in installation and maintenance of military equipment would be subject to numerical limits. Security commitments would be subject to verification by a Commission on Verification and Control established provisionally thirty days after signature. The revised draft also assigns substantial responsibilities to the Commission for supporting continuing negotiations. The Commission also would have a responsibility for handling disputes among the parties to the agreement.

A chapter on political matters commits the parties to hold "honest and periodic elections," including the adoption of measures to ensure participation of political parties on an equal footing; "to promote actions of national reconciliation," including the creation of mechanisms for dialogue with opposition groups and amnesty; and to guarantee full respect for internationally recognized human rights. The political provisions would come into effect only following ratification by all five parties. An Ad Hoc Political Committee would be created to verify compliance. An Additional Protocol, open to all states, would commit those signing not to frustrate treaty objectives.

Current Status

On September 21, Nicaragua announced its willingness to subscribe to this draft provided that no changes were made, and

it called on the United States to formally adhere to and ratify the Additional Protocol. Nicaragua has consistently refused to consider any substantive changes to this draft agreement.

The other Central American states each submitted written comments on the draft agreement by an agreed October 15 deadline. Guatemala said it looked on the draft favorably, and noting the observations of the other Central American governments, pledged to continue supporting the process to a successful conclusion. Costa Rica, Honduras and El Salvador all indicated a need for modifications. At a meeting in Tegucigalpa October 19-20, these three countries developed proposed changes and presented the "Tegucigalpa draft agreement" the following week. (Nicaragua was invited but declined to attend; Guatemala actively participated in the meeting but did not otherwise associate itself with the result.)

The Tegucigalpa draft agreement is substantially the same as the September 7 draft. Its commitments would enter into force following ratification by all five Central American states, instead of implementing some provisions prior to ratification. It would regulate rather than prohibit international military exercises. It would significantly strengthen the Commission on Verification and Control, providing it with an international corps of inspectors and a budget. The Commission would assist in the relocation of irregular forces once they have been disarmed. It would simplify the post-signature negotiation of agreements on arms, troops, military installations and advisers from a four-stage to a two-stage process and assign support functions to an Ad Hoc Group on Disarmament instead of to the Commission on Verification and Control. It would limit the freeze on arms acquisitions contemplated in the September 7 draft to 60 days.

The Contadora process is currently in a period of intensive private consultations as the nine participating governments prepare for further negotiations to attempt to reconcile the two drafts. A meeting of plenipotentiaries currently scheduled for mid-February is to deal primarily with questions of verification and control.

United States Policy toward Contadora

United States support of regional diplomatic peace efforts has been strong and consistent, and it continues undiminished. In his April 27, 1983, speech to a joint session of Congress, President Reagan explicitly stated that support for dialogue among and within nations was a key element of the U.S. approach to the region. The President outlined the U.S. position as supporting:

Any agreement among Central American countries for the withdrawal--under fully verifiable and reciprocal conditions--of foreign military and security advisers and troops;

Reintegration of opposition groups in the political process in all countries and competing "by ballots instead of bullets;"

Any verifiable and reciprocal agreement among Central American countries on the renunciation of support for insurgencies on neighbors' territory; and

Any verifiable, reciprocal agreement on the non-importation of offensive weapons.

The President on the same occasion announced the creation of the position of a Special Envoy for Central America to facilitate such dialogue. Former Senator Richard Stone was appointed and held the position until February 1984. Ambassador Harry W. Shlaudeman has been the Special Envoy since March 1984.

Following a meeting of the Contadora Group chiefs of state in July 1983, the President wrote each to express our support for Contadora goals and objectives. The United States welcomed adoption of the Document of Objectives, characterizing it as an excellent basis for a regional peace settlement. We have consistently stated our willingness to support a comprehensive and verifiable implementation of the Document of Objectives.

The Document of Objectives addresses our four basic concerns with respect to Nicaragua:

We seek an end to Nicaraguan support for guerrilla groups: The Document of Objectives calls for an end to support for subversion.

We want Soviet and Cuban military and security advisers to be withdrawn and to prevent Nicaraguan territory from being used for military purposes by the Soviet bloc: The Document of Objectives calls for the proscription of foreign military bases and the reduction and eventual elimination of foreign military advisers and troops.

We seek reduction of Nicaragua's military strength to levels that would restore military balance in the area: The Document of Objectives calls for the reduction of current inventories of arms and military personnel.

We seek fulfillment of the original Sandinista promises to support democratic pluralism: The Document of Objectives calls for the establishment of democratic systems of government based on genuinely open elections.

Following presentation of the September 7 draft, the Administration expressed publicly its view that the draft was a much improved version of the June 8 draft and that its elaboration was a positive step in an ongoing negotiating

process that we strongly support. The Secretary and other authorized spokesmen have also indicated that in our view the September 7 draft needed to be strengthened to make it an effective instrument to end conflict in the region. In particular, we believe that it did not constitute a comprehensive implementation of the Document of Objectives, since important objectives would be subject to further negotiations while implementation of other commitments, primarily those of interest to Nicaragua, would be triggered by signature. We also stated our view that provisions for verification needed to be strengthened. In numerous private consultations with Contadora process participants, we have stressed that our reservations about the September 7 draft are in no way to be equated with opposition to an effective treaty, which we would support.

The United States has also sought to facilitate a successful outcome of the Contadora process in bilateral talks with Nicaragua, held in Manzanillo, Mexico. These talks were undertaken at the request of the President of Mexico, acting on behalf of the Contadora Group. Secretary Shultz visited Managua on June 1, 1984, to launch the process. By the end of 1984, there had been nine rounds of talks between Special Envoy Harry W. Shlaudeman and Nicaraguan Vice Foreign Minister Victor Hugo Tinoco; further meetings may be scheduled pending a further evolution of the Contadora process. To give the talks the maximum chance to succeed, both sides agreed not to describe the specific content of their discussions publicly. Although the Nicaraguans have characterized the talks publicly in a general way, they have largely abided by this ground rule of confidentiality, as have we.

January 1985

1984

January 8: "Norms of Implementation" declaration adopted in Panama by nine Contadora foreign ministers establishes three working commissions in political, security and social-economic matters to recommend by April 30 specific measures to implement Document of Objectives.

April 30: Five Central American foreign ministers request Contadora Group to integrate recommendations into single negotiating text.

June 8-9: Contadora Group delivers "Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America" to Central American governments, requests comments by mid-July.

August 25-27: Technical Group (vice-ministerial level) of Contadora process meets in Panama to consider oral and written comments on the June 8 draft.

September 7: Contadora Group submits revised draft Contadora agreement for Central American comment by mid-October.

September 21: Nicaragua states it is willing to sign the September 7 draft without modification, calls on United States to sign and ratify its Additional Protocol.

September 29: European Community, Contadora Group and Central American foreign ministers meet in Costa Rica and issue communique supporting Contadora process, viewing proposed draft as a "fundamental stage in negotiating process."

October 15: Comments submitted to the Contadora Group by Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras identify verification and need for simultaneous implementation of commitments as areas for modification.

October 19-20: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Nicaragua was invited but did not attend) meet in Tegucigalpa to consider the September 7 draft agreement and draft proposed modifications. Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras endorse modifications and forward them to the Contadora Group and Nicaragua.

November 12-16: Extensive private consultations among the Contadora participants are held on the margins of the Organization of American States General Assembly in Brasilia.

1985

January 8-9: Contadora Group foreign ministers meet in Panama; issue communique calling for a February 14-15 meeting of plenipotentiaries primarily to consider questions of verification and control.

Annex 2

Document of Objectives

Considering:

The situation prevailing in Central America, which is characterized by an atmosphere of tension that threatens security and peaceful coexistence in the region, and which requires, for its solution, observance of the principles of international law governing the actions of States, especially:

The self-determination of peoples;

Non-intervention;

The sovereign equality of States;

The peaceful settlement of disputes;

Refraining from the threat or use of force;

Respect of the territorial integrity of States;

Pluralism in its various manifestations;

Full support for democratic institutions,

The promotion of social justice;

International co-operation for development;

Respect for and promotion of human rights;

The prohibition of terrorism and subversion;

The desire to reconstruct the Central American homeland through progressive integration of its economic, legal and social institutions;

The need for economic co-operation among the States of Central America so as to make a fundamental contribution to the development of their peoples and the strengthening of their independence;

The undertaking to establish, promote or revitalize representative, democratic systems in all the countries of the region;

The unjust economic, social and political structures which exacerbate the conflicts in Central America;

The urgent need to put an end to the tensions and lay the foundations for understanding and solidarity among the countries of the area;

The arms race and the growing arms traffic in Central America, which aggravate political relations in the region and divert economic resources that could be used for development;

The presence of foreign advisers and other forms of foreign military interference in the zone;

The risks that the territory of Central American States may be used for the purpose of conducting military operations and pursuing policies of destabilization against others;

The need for concerted political efforts in order to encourage dialogue and understanding in Central America, avert the danger of a general spreading of the conflicts, and set in motion the machinery needed to ensure the peaceful coexistence and security of their peoples;

Declare their intention of achieving the following objectives:

To promote detente and put an end to situations of conflict in the area, restraining from taking any action that might jeopardize political confidence or obstruct the achievement of peace, security and stability in the region;

To ensure strict compliance with the aforementioned principles of international law, whose violators will be held accountable;

To respect and ensure the exercise of human, political, civil, economic, social, religious and cultural rights;

To adopt measures conducive to the establishment and, where appropriate, improvement of democratic, representative and pluralistic systems that will guarantee effective popular participation in the decision-making process and ensure that the various currents of opinion have free access to fair and regular elections based on the full observance of citizens' rights;

To promote national reconciliation efforts wherever deep divisions have taken place within society, with a view to fostering participation in democratic political processes in accordance with the law;

To create political conditions intended to ensure the international security, integrity and sovereignty of the States of the region;

To stop the arms race in all its forms and begin negotiations for the control and reduction of current stocks of weapons and on the number of armed troops;

To prevent the installation on their territory of foreign military bases or any other type of foreign military interference;

To conclude agreements to reduce the presence of foreign military advisers and other foreign elements involved in military and security activities, with a view to their elimination;

To establish internal control machinery to prevent the traffic in arms from the territory of any country in the region to the territory of another;

To eliminate the traffic in arms, whether within the region or from outside it, intended for persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the Governments of Central American countries;

To prevent the use of their own territory by persons, organizations or groups seeking to destabilize the Government of Central American countries and to refuse to provide them with or permit them to receive military or logistical support;

To refrain from inciting or supporting acts of terrorism, subversion or sabotage in the countries in the area;

To establish and co-ordinate direct communication systems with a view to preventing or, where appropriate, settling incidents between States of the region,;

To continue humanitarian aid aimed at helping Central American refugees who have been displaced from their countries of origin, and to create suitable conditions for the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, in consultation with or with the co-operation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international agencies deemed appropriate;

To undertake economic and social development programs with the aim of promoting well being and an equitable distribution of wealth;

To revitalize and restore economic integration machinery in order to attain sustained development on the basis of solidarity and mutual advance;

To negotiate the provision of external monetary resources which will provide additional means of financing the resumption of intra-regional trade, meet the serious balance-of-payments problems, attract funds for working capital, support programs to extend and restructure production systems and promote medium- and long-term investment projects;

To negotiate better and broader access to international markets in order to increase the volume of trade between the countries of Central America and the rest of the world, particularly the industrialized countries; by means of a revision of trade practices, the elimination of tariff and other barriers, and the achievement of the price stability at a profitable and fair level for the products exported by the countries of the region;

To establish technical co-operation machinery for the planning, programming and implementation of multi-sectoral investment and trade promotion projects.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Central American countries, with the participation of the countries in the Contadora Group, have begun negotiations with the aim of preparing for the conclusion of the agreements and the establishment of machinery necessary to formalize and develop the objectives contained in this document, and to bring about the establishment of appropriate verification of monitoring systems. To that end, account will be taken of the initiatives put forward at the meetings convened by the Contadora Group.

Panama City, 9 September 1983

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Annex 3

Summary of Key Issues

1. ISSUE: Simultaneity: timing of entry into force of key provisions.

September 7 (Revised Draft Agreement): Obligations come into force following ratification by all parties, except: prohibition on international military exercises is effective 30 days after signing; arms freeze beginning 30 days after signing continues until agreement on arms ceilings is reached. Elimination of foreign bases, schools effective 6 months after signing.

October 20 (Tegucigalpa Draft Agreement): Calendars for adviser drawdown, dismantling of foreign military bases and schools, and adjustment to limitations on arms, troops and military installations would be implemented after ratification.

2. ISSUE: Arms negotiations.

September 7: Provides for 90-day, three-stage negotiation to begin 30 days after signing. First stage would freeze ceilings reached. Ceilings on arms and troop levels would be agreed to in second and third stages. Any other matter could be raised in a fourth and final stage; explicit provision is also made for extending the period of negotiations. Key criterion for negotiation is that no armed institution have as a "political objective" the pursuit of hegemony over the armed forces of the other countries considered individually.

October 20: Post-signature negotiation is retained. Negotiation stages are reduced from four to two. Following an initial 30-day period during which inventories are to be submitted, substantive negotiations on arms, troop levels and military installations occur in a second (30-day) stage period with an Ad Hoc Disarmament Group playing role that September 7 draft assigns to Commission on Verification and Control (CVC). Freeze to be limited, to end 60 days after signature, whether or not negotiations have been successfully concluded. (El Salvador reserved on this provision.) Key criterion for negotiation is that no armed institution have the capability to impose its hegemony over the armed forces of the other countries considered individually.

3. ISSUE: Foreign military and security advisers.

September 7: Parties submit census to CVC 30 days after signing. CVC submits recommendations to parties, which then "establish" (i.e. negotiate) calendar for withdrawal. Provision that advisers engaged in training and operations leave immediately once calendar is agreed is pre-determined.

CVC would suggest limits on advisers involved in installation and maintenance of military equipment.

October 20: Calendar for withdrawal to be agreed no later than 90 days after signature and implemented after ratification. Predetermined provision concerning advisers involved in training and operations is eliminated but only installation and maintenance advisers are expressly permitted to stay, subject to limits to be determined. Distinction drawn between advisers involved in installation and maintenance of military equipment and those "likely to participate in military, paramilitary and security activities."

4. ISSUE: Relocation of irregular forces.

September 7: No provisions.

October 20: Provides for CVC to relocate irregular forces outside the region, once they have been disarmed.

5. ISSUE: Military exercises.

September 7: Proscribes foreign military exercises, effective 30 days after signing. Subjects national military exercises to series of tension-reducing restrictions.

October 20: Subjects foreign military exercises to the same restrictions applicable to national military exercises.

6. ISSUE: Foreign bases.

September 7: Foreign military bases or schools, as defined in the Annex, would be proscribed and any existing bases and schools dismantled within six months of signature. "Foreign military installations" are to be treated in post-signature negotiations on military installations.

October 20: Calendar for dismantling any foreign bases and schools to be agreed within 90 days of signature.

7. ISSUE: Protocol.

September 7: Would be open to signature by all states. Required signatories to respect aims and purpose of treaty, and to cooperate with the Central American states on the terms they mutually request to achieve the purpose of the treaty.

October 20: Notes that an alternative protocol for "guarantor states" is under development.

8. ISSUE: Establishment of and participation on verification commissions.

September 7: Contadora group proposes membership for acceptance by parties; CVC comes provisionally into being 30 days after signature.

October 20: Would create special Ad Hoc Disarmament Group to provide support to post-signature negotiations. CVC would be restructured and elaborated to provide in detail for international corps of inspectors. Financing to be provided prior to signature. CVC would come into existence upon entry into force.

9. ISSUE: Enforcement.

September 7: CVC may make recommendations in cases of accusations of non-compliance with security provisions; political/refugee and economic/social committees may make proposals in periodic reports. Disputes are to be considered by the five foreign ministers; failing their unanimous decision, disputes are referred to Contadora Group foreign ministers for good offices, who in turn can recommend other means of resolving disputes in accordance with UN and OAS charters.

October 20: Provision for unanimous vote by five foreign ministers to resolve disputes is changed to provide for decisions by "consensus." Appeal would then go to the nine foreign ministers instead of only the Contadora Group foreign ministers.

1. The first part of the report is devoted to a general description of the project and its objectives.

2. The second part of the report describes the methodology used in the study, including the selection of the sample and the data collection procedures.

3. The third part of the report presents the results of the study, including the description of the sample and the data analysis.

4. The fourth part of the report discusses the conclusions of the study and the implications for future research.

5. The fifth part of the report contains the references and the appendix, which includes the questionnaire used in the study.

6. The sixth part of the report is the conclusion, which summarizes the main findings of the study and the implications for future research.

**For further information
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