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Central America

F-Catman

Contra victory doesn't defy definition

By Jose S. Sorzano

As the White House and Congress wrestle over the President's request for \$100 million in assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance, a principal argument of the opponents of aid is that the contras can't win. Even if they received appropriate military assistance, the argument goes, they could not hope to defeat the Sandinistas.

The issue partly revolves around what would be regarded as a contra victory. One interpretation would be to take the contras' stated objective of bringing the Sandinistas to the negotiating table through military pressure. There is no reason why such a limited objective is beyond their reach. Precedents are not lacking for negotiations brought about by violent means. If properly supplied, it is not implausible that the contras could succeed in forcing negotiations.

But it could be that the contras really aim at nothing less than implementing the original democratic promises of the Nicaraguan revolution through the overthrow of the Sandinistas. Do they have a reasonable chance of attaining this objective, if provided with adequate assistance?

The political dynamics of revolutionary guerrilla warfare are not fully understood, but some aspects are clearer than others. Students of the process have found that regimes overthrown by revolutions commonly retained, until the last minute, an overwhelming superiority of force over the insurgents. Fidel Castro's guerrillas did not militarily defeat the forces of Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista; nor, in Nicaragua, did the Sandinistas achieve a military victory over Somoza's army. The guerrilla victories were political, not military; the regimes collapsed when their authority evaporated and their political will disappeared. Military pressure, of course, contributed, but their collapse was a political phenomenon that oc-

curred despite the relatively intact state of their armed forces. For the contras to win, therefore, it is not absolutely necessary that they decisively defeat the Sandinistas militarily.

What is minimally required of the contras is to sustain and increase the level of hostilities, and in this—like insurgents elsewhere—they enjoy built-in advantages over their adversaries.

The element of surprise and the capacity to select highly visible targets are commonly recognized advantages of guerrillas. When he was a Sandinista fighting against Somoza, Eden Pastora [Commander Zero] spectacularly demonstrated the weakening and demoralizing effect of a single, headline-grabbing hostage taking. Although involving force, this type of action inflicts heavy political damage by shaking the regime's self-confidence and undermining its authority.

Guerrillas also have a decided motivational advantage, since normally they are volunteers. That explains their dedication, endurance and willingness to face seemingly insurmountable odds. Although the Sandinistas refer to the contras as "mercenaries," it is hard to imagine a peasant facing a Soviet-built helicopter gunship for purely financial reasons. There are other ways of making a living. By contrast, the troops of a regime are typically drafted or coerced into the armed forces and have a lower motivational level and zest for combat. This problem is compounded in Marxist regimes like Nicaragua's, where wholesale conscription and militarization are aimed more at maintaining domestic political control than at meeting defense needs.

Perhaps the most often overlooked advantage of guerrillas is the general ineptness of the opposing regimes. Let us not forget that these are underdeveloped nations that have great difficulty carrying out, even elementary tasks. They are no better at fighting guerrillas than, say, at delivering health care to the population.

Nothing is certain in guerrilla warfare, and it would be foolhardy to state categorically that the contras will or will not win. But the historical experience with such warfare suggests that, if properly supplied from the outside, the contras' chances of coming out on top are considerably better than they are judged to be by opponents of U.S. assistance.

Jose S. Sorzano, who recently served as deputy U.S. representative to the United Nations, is a professor of government at Georgetown University and president of the Cuban American National Foundation, an educational research organization.

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F-Cat

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
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1986

Dear Mr. Glass:

This is in response to your letter of July 14, 1986. My job responsibilities do not extend to the kind of issue that you raise. This office is simply not the appropriate forum for the resolution of personnel problems. I wish that I could be of more help.

Sincerely,



Max Green
Associate Director
Office Of Public Liaison

Steven Glass
Assistant Director
D.C.-Maryland Regional Office
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith
1640 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

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Program
THEODORE FREEDMAN

General Counsel
ARNOLD FORSTER

*Deceased



July 14, 1986

Mr. Max Green
Community Liaison
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Green:

We wish to bring to your attention a matter of concern regarding a civilian employee of NAV AIR and request your timely intervention in said matter. Mr. Abraham Silverstein (PMA 265-23) is presently a Financial Specialist (G.S. 13) under the supervision of Commander Donald Hempson.

It is our understanding that relations between Mr. Silverstein and Commander Hempson have deteriorated to a point where Mr. Silverstein is under the impression that Commander Hempson has instituted a campaign designed to culminate in the termination of Mr. Silverstein's employment with NAV AIR.

Mr. Silverstein has informed us that at one point he approached Commander Hempson regarding some questions he had as to an assignment given to him by Commander Hempson; to which the Commander replied, "I thought Jews were good at accounting and financing and I shouldn't have to tell you these things."

In February, Commander Hempson gave Mr. Silverstein a "Performance Improvement Plan" under which Mr. Silverstein was required to satisfactorily complete certain tasks, or failing such, would have his employment terminated. Mr. Silverstein feels that the improvement plan is impossible to complete in the time allowed, and was deliberately designed so as to insure his failure. To corroborate his evaluation of the Improvement Plan, Mr. Silverstein obtained several affidavits from individuals outside of NAV AIR who all attest to such facts.

Without commenting on the merits of Mr. Silverstein's complaint, we are concerned with Commander Hempson's remarks concerning Jews, as well as the implications flowing from the affidavits. Mr. Silverstein has commenced EEO proceedings; however, it will be some time before the issues are finally adjudicated.

Page Two

Long before the EEO proceedings are completed, the time limit for the improvement plan will have lapsed and Mr. Silverstein fears that his employment with NAV AIR will then be terminated. In light of our aforementioned concerns and the financial hardships which Mr. Silverstein will face between the date of termination through completion of his EEO complaint, it is our hope that Mr. Silverstein's tenure with NAV AIR could be extended pending the completion of said complaint.

To this end, your intervention and conferment of tenure upon Mr. Silverstein would be a benefit to all involved. We thank you for your time and attention to this matter. Should you have further questions, please don't hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Steven Glass".

Steven Glass
Assistant Director

SG:sc



SOVIET BLOC ASSISTANCE TO CUBA AND NICARAGUA

VERSUS

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AMERICA

For every dollar of economic aid provided by the United States to Central America during the 1980s, Cuba and Nicaragua received \$10 worth from the Soviet Union and its East European allies. Soviet Bloc military deliveries—weapons, ammunition, vehicles—exceed the cumulative value of U.S. military assistance by eight to one in the region.

Large and increasing amounts of Soviet aid to Nicaragua and Cuba have serious implications for their neighbors. Nicaragua's military buildup, which now includes 75,000 troops, is disproportionately large compared to neighboring countries, and its capabilities far exceed defense needs. Economic aid from the Soviet Bloc has enabled Nicaragua to prop up its economy while consolidating public control over the means of production.

Soviet military aid over the last 20 years has helped Cuba build an armed force of nearly 300,000, with almost 1,000 tanks, about 200 sophisticated fighter aircraft, and a navy that includes submarines, frigates, and high-speed torpedo-firing hydrofoil patrol boats.

The Soviet Union provides economic and military assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua for practical strategic reasons. Cuba is now a base for the Soviet Union in the Caribbean. At least 7,700 Soviet military and intelligence personnel are stationed there. Cuba also is the focal point for training and equipping guerrillas, especially from Latin America.

Nicaragua, like Cuba, has the potential to become a strategic asset

to the Soviet Bloc by providing seaports on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, a mainland base for military and intelligence networks, and a training and supply depot for Marxist-Leninist guerrillas seeking to topple democratic governments in neighboring countries.

How do Soviet Bloc and U.S. economic and security assistance compare?

The United States provides more economic aid worldwide than the Soviet Union—about one-third

more—but the value of military deliveries to developing countries by the Soviet Union is twice as great as U.S. military programs. Almost one-tenth of the military equipment exported to developing countries by the Soviet Union during the 1980s went to Cuba.

By comparison, the Central American nations of Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama received about five percent of the U.S. military aid to the developing world.

U.S. AID TO CENTRAL AMERICA
COMPARED TO SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN AID TO CUBA AND NICARAGUA
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
U.S. Economic and Military Assistance to Central America	418	704	1,017	1,135	1,133
Soviet-East European Economic and Military Assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua	6,585	5,935	6,570	7,340	8,030
U.S. Economic Assistance to Central America (a)	337	566	616	755	736
Soviet-East European Economic Assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua	4,775	4,465	4,880	4,940	5,930
U.S. Military Assistance to Central America (b)	80	138	401	380	397
Soviet-East European Military Assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua	1,810	1,470	1,690	2,400	2,100

(a) Data are "total official gross" disbursements as reported on a calendar-year basis by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in *Geographic Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries*. "Total official gross" disbursements is the Western measure most comparable to estimated Soviet economic aid deliveries.

(b) Data are for fiscal years and include deliveries under the following programs: Military Assistance Program, Foreign Military Sales, Military Assistance Excess Stocks, Military Construction Sales, Military Assistance Merger Funds, and IMET (training).

They accounted for about six percent of the total U.S. economic aid disbursed¹ worldwide.

Soviet Bloc economic assistance to Nicaragua and Cuba increased from \$4.7 billion in 1982 to \$5.9 billion in 1986, for a total of \$24.9 billion—more than eight times the amount of U.S. economic aid to Central America from 1982 to 1986.

Soviet Bloc Aid to Nicaragua

After 1980, Soviet and East European aid to the Sandinista regime increased substantially, although Nicaragua has received only a fraction of the assistance delivered to Cuba, the major beneficiary in the region. Bloc economic assistance levels to Nicaragua rose from about \$35 million in 1981 to more than \$500 million in 1986. Combined economic and military assistance increased nearly sixteen-fold, from \$70 million in 1981 to about \$1.1 billion last year. In recent years, Cuba has been providing some \$50 million in additional economic assistance to Nicaragua annually.

Nicaragua receives more than 90 percent of its military assistance from the Soviet Union and East European countries. Soviet Bloc military deliveries to Nicaragua began in 1980—before the United States began providing aid to the armed resistance.

Between 1980 and 1986, Nicaragua received more than \$1.6 billion worth of military deliveries from the Soviet Union and East European countries. In contrast, U.S. military aid to the six other Central American countries combined totaled \$1.4 billion.

Nicaragua's cache of Soviet-supplied military hardware has grown by 15,000 metric tons since

SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO NICARAGUA (in millions of U.S. dollars)


	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Economic Assistance *	180	275	325	450	585
Military Deliveries	160	260	320	300	590
from the U.S.S.R.	150	250	300	250	550
from Eastern Europe	10	10	20	50	40
Total Economic and Military * Assistance	340	535	645	750	1,175

*Includes economic assistance from Cuba.

January 1987. Among items received were six Mi-8/17 HIP helicopters, bringing the total in the Sandinista air force to 39. The Sandinista fleet also includes at least 12 Mi-24 HIND D attack helicopters.

The Sandinistas also have 150 medium and light amphibious tanks. Some 50 armored personnel carriers and reconnaissance vehicles were also delivered, increasing the total to 250.

U.S. vs. Soviet-East European Economic Assistance to Central America Region



Note: U.S. economic aid to Belize is not included due to scale.

U.S. Economic Aid to:

- Panama
- Guatemala
- Costa Rica
- Honduras
- El Salvador


Soviet Bloc Aid:

- Soviet Economic Aid to Cuba
- Eastern European Economic Aid to Nicaragua
- Soviet Aid to Nicaragua
- Cuban Aid to Nicaragua

¹The source for U.S. disbursements is the "total official gross disbursements" as reported by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This is the Western measure most comparable with estimates of Soviet economic assistance to less developed countries.

U.S. vs. Soviet-East European Military Assistance to Central America Region

Millions of U.S. Dollars



¹ Preliminary estimates for East European military deliveries to Cuba are not available for 1986.

² U.S. Fiscal Year

³ Soviet/East European Calendar Year

In 1985, the Soviet Union emerged as Nicaragua's major oil donor after it increased deliveries to compensate for Mexico's cutback. Soviet oil, estimated at 9,000 barrels a day in 1985, was valued at \$126 million. The value of oil deliveries fell to \$97 million in 1986, reflecting the drop in world oil prices, but the volume rose to an estimated 12,000 barrels a day, enough to meet most of Nicaragua's import requirements.²

Soviet Bloc Aid to Cuba

Cuba receives most of the Soviet Bloc aid to Latin America. It is mainly in the form of price subsidies—premiums that the Soviets pay for Cuban sugar and nickel and past discounts for Soviet oil. In 1986, Soviet aid rose nearly 19 percent to \$5.4 billion after remaining at about \$4.5 billion a year since 1981. During that period, the oil subsidy, which accounted for 36 percent of Soviet economic aid to Cuba in 1981, fell sharply as world oil prices fell and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)³ prices rose. The sugar subsidy, on the other hand, rose steadily from \$1.2 billion—some 42 percent of all Soviet aid to Cuba—in 1980 to \$4.7 billion, or 87 percent, in 1986. Although

² On August 29, 1987, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega made the following remarks to a student conference at the Olof Palme Convention Center in Managua: "The U.S.S.R., Nicaragua's main oil supplier, has already delivered its oil quota. The U.S.S.R. has already delivered 300,000 tons of oil [in 1987]. However, Nicaragua uses 765,000 tons of oil each year. . . .

"Other countries also supply us with oil. We also get oil from the GDR [Democratic Republic of Germany]; they gave us 90,000 tons of oil. Cuba gave us 60,000 tons of oil. We got oil from Bulgaria; they gave us 38,000 tons of oil. We got oil from Poland; they gave us 30,000 tons of oil. We got oil from Hungary; they gave us 10,000 tons of oil. These are the countries that delivered oil to us. . . . Comrade Fidel Castro recently delivered to us another 40,000 tons of oil. In other words, Cuba has given us a total of 100,000 tons of oil this year."

³Soviet Bloc common market.


SOVIET-EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CUBA (in millions of U.S. dollars)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
Soviet Economic Assistance	4,665	4,260	4,620	4,545	5,390
Development aid	975	1,070	1,000	895	600
Trade subsidies	3,690	3,190	3,620	3,650	4,790
Sugar	2,580	2,740	3,420	3,550	4,690
Petroleum	1,005	345	100	0	0
Nickel	105	105	100	100	100
Military Deliveries	1,650	1,210	1,370	2,100	1,510
from the U.S.S.R.	1,600	1,200	1,350	850	1,400
from Eastern Europe	50	10	20	1,250*	110
Total Economic and Military Assistance	6,315	5,470	5,990	6,645	6,900

*Reflects change in estimative process.

U.S. vs. Soviet-East European Military Assistance to Central America Region

Millions of U.S. Dollars



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Soviet oil is no longer subsidized, Cuba does not have to pay hard currency for the 200,000 barrels a day it receives from the Soviet Union. This oil, worth about \$1.5 billion in 1985 and \$1.7 billion in 1986 at CEMA prices, satisfies most of Cuba's oil requirements.

U.S. Aid to Central America

U.S. policy toward Central America is supported by a combination of military and economic assistance designed to help democratic regimes develop economically and defend themselves against internal and external threats. In 1982, the United States provided \$337 million in economic aid to the region. By 1986, aid had increased to \$736 million.

The United States also provided aid to Nicaragua immediately following the 1979 revolution that brought the Sandinistas to power. During the Sandinistas' first 18 months in power, the United States was Nicaragua's major bilateral donor, contributing \$118 million toward its development efforts. Within weeks of the Sandinista victory, U.S. aircraft arrived with food and medicine. The United States also supported the flow of \$1.6 billion from international financial institutions and Western democracies and the refinancing of Nicaragua's debt to private foreign banks. The United States sus-

pending aid in 1980 in response to Sandinista support for Communist guerrillas in El Salvador. Aid was reinstated in January 1981, but discontinued in April 1981 because of continued Sandinista support for the Salvadoran guerrillas and because of the Sandinista government's insistence that aid consist of cash instead of goods or U.S. programs.

Between 1980 and 1986, the United States directed approximately \$1.4 billion in military aid to Central America. Although the type of assistance varied from country to country, its purpose was primarily for security assistance programs, including economic support; training; technical

assistance; maintenance and acquisition of military equipment; support for human rights efforts; and command, control, and communications improvements. In 1986, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica received approximately 95 percent of U.S. military assistance in the region. □

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U.S. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AMERICA BY COUNTRY (in millions of U.S. dollars)

	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986
U.S. Economic Assistance:					
Belize	1	6	5	13	14
Costa Rica	50	204	183	201	148
El Salvador	172	233	223	288	275
Guatemala	22	38	31	52	89
Honduras	71	67	125	161	179
Panama*	21	18	49	40	31
Total	337	566	616	755	736
U.S. Military Assistance:					
Belize	0.1	0.5	0.7	0.2	1.2
Costa Rica	2.2	3.6	12.1	28.8	11.1
El Salvador	60.9	89.4	276.3	240.8	230.9
Guatemala	1.4	0.7	0.6	1.7	6.4
Honduras	14.1	41.5	100.4	95.0	129.8
Panama	1.8	2.5	10.8	13.3	17.4
Total	80.5	138.1	400.8	379.8	396.8

PEACE AND DEMOCRACY WATCH BULLETIN

"Without democracy there can be no peace in Central America."—President Oscar Arias



REPORT FROM MANAGUA

by Leslie Hunter



Leslie Hunter, who has lived, worked and studied in Central America, has just returned from three weeks in Nicaragua as the Peace and Democracy Watch representative. Here is her final Report from Managua.

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Military Build-up Continues

Many U.S. observers argue that (in words ascribed to House Speaker Jim Wright by The Washington Post) "to talk about contra aid at this time is counter to the spirit of the Arias plan to 'give peace a chance.'"

What then does one make of the decision of the Sandinista government announced on October 13th to draft a massive 35,000 young Nicaraguans into their party-controlled army?

This announcement provoked a spirited editorial in La Prensa the day after it was made. The editorial noted that the Sandinista military build-up "has a profoundly negative impact on levels of production and scholastic performance." It asked, "militarism until when?"

In a televised interview on the day the new draft quota was announced, Nicaraguan Vice-President Sergio Ramirez explained that his government believes that it will require a large army even if the Central American Peace Plan leads to the dissolution of the Nicaraguan resistance forces. "If the contras are disbanded," Ramirez argued, "the United States will have no other option but to invade us. And we are preparing for it."

(Report, continued on p. 2)

THE ARIAS NOBEL: A PEACE AND DEMOCRACY PRIZE

Was the Nobel Peace Prize for Costa Rica's President Oscar Arias really "premature?"

Not if it is true that "ideas have consequences" -- a maxim once favored among those seeking to give greater strength to the democratic ideal in international politics.

The Central American peace process which President Arias has set in motion could, of course, end in failure. But even if that happens, he has an important achievement: he has reminded us of the necessary connection between peace and the democratic process, a connection that has been sadly neglected in the forums of international politics in recent times.

It is customary today for talk of the "peace issue" to turn to talk about the need for changes in human nature and human relations as we know them. For those with a more utopian cast of mind, peace will require something like the Marxist abolition of class struggle, or the advent of the Kingdom of God on Earth. The more pessimistically-inclined argue that achieving peace will oblige us to accept the unpleasant realities of injustice or totalitarianism, because to

(Arias, continued on p. 5)

(Report, from p.1)

Solidarity Against S.N.O.T.S.

Four of Nicaragua's independent trade union federations have united in a way not seen since the anti-Somoza struggle to press the Sandinista government to meet a new program of trade union freedoms. These include:

- 1) Restoration of the Christmas bonus (the so-called "thirteenth month"), a traditional right of Central American workers.
- 2) A price freeze on basic consumer goods.
- 3) The drafting of a new labor code, consistent with the International Labor Organization's charter of workers' rights.
- 4) Elimination of administrative corruption.
- 5) Elimination of the favoritism shown to government-controlled labor organizations.
- 6) An end to the 39-level wage and salary scale imposed by the Sandinistas in contravention of existing collective bargaining agreements and procedures.

The last point has a particular significance. Nicaraguan workers recognize that the rigid wage scale imposed by Sandinista fiat (the acronym for this system is actually S.N.O.T.S.) has so destroyed worker morale that productivity and quality control throughout the Nicaraguan economy have drastically declined.

Although the Sandinistas came to power promising to guarantee a minimum wage floor for all workers, the S.N.O.T.S. system is, in reality, a schedule of maximum wages.

Defector or Infiltrator?

The official Sandinista press devotes great attention to the government campaign to persuade the rebels to surrender their arms, and frequently contains reports of large-scale defections by contra units. One recent account -- which received some notice in the international press -- was the reported defection of what the official newspaper Barricada reported to be four hundred Miskito Indian fighters on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast. A public ceremony was held in the town of Puerto Cabezas at which Comandante Tomas Borge, Minister of the Interior, received the leader of the defecting contra band, a Miskito named Uriel Vanegas.

Miskito and other opposition leaders in Nicaragua strongly contested the claim that 400 fighters had defected, and noted that the

real number was no more than 20 to 30.

More striking, however, was a story that appeared in La Prensa on October 13th contending that the supposed contra leader Uriel Vanegas is actually a longtime agent of Sandinista State Security. La Prensa stated that "several persons of recognized credibility" had appeared at its offices to testify that Vanegas had arranged for their arrests or had kept them under surveillance in the past.

Conflict over "Local Peace Commissions"

As stipulated in the Esquipulas II Accords, the Sandinista government formed a four-member National Reconciliation Commission, whose purpose is to verify government compliance with the peace agreement. Three of the Commission members are considered pro-Sandinista, but the President of the Commission, Cardinal Obando y Bravo, is the most respected opposition figure in Nicaragua.

Fearing that the Cardinal could criticize Sandinista compliance with the accords, the government created some 200 "local peace commissions" in outlying municipalities in or near war zones and along the borders. Many of those serving on the local peace commissions are members of Sandinista mass organizations and the non-governmental "popular church." According to Father Osvaldo Mondragon, a highly respected Catholic leader, in some towns, where all of the priests and nuns of the "popular church" are foreign, there even are "internationalists" on the local peace commissions.

Rather than simply monitoring compliance with the accords, these local commissions are reported to be actively attempting to encourage resistance fighters to surrender. As Father Mondragon explained in an interview, peasants no longer trust the Sandinista government. These newly-formed commissions have therefore begun to take up where Sandinista officials have failed. One local peace commission, in Condega, Esteli, sent 1,000 letters to families of contra fighters exhorting them to convince their relatives to turn themselves in.

An article in Barricada on September 28 described a town meeting in Jinotega on September 27 at which a contra fighter turned himself in. Immediately thereafter, 19

(Report, continued on p. 5)

NICARAGUA'S DEMOCRATS NEED HELP

Nicaraguan opposition political parties, the church, labor youth and minority groups are gravely hampered by a lack of funds and basic equipment and supplies. We have received a number of requests from civic opposition groups in Nicaragua for specific items necessary for them to organize to fulfill the Central American Peace Plan.

Among the items requested are: **photocopiers, typewriters, printing presses, cameras, microphones, loudspeakers, video cameras, spare parts and paper.**

When the Sandinista government closed La Prensa last year, the editors sold much of their equipment to continue to pay their employees. According to its director, Violeta Chamorro, La Prensa is in desperate need of such items as: **pick-up trucks and other vehicles, cameras, typewriters, good quality newsprint, cash for equipment and maintenance to cover the monthly operating budget.**

Other opposition groups, such as the Center for Youth Formation and the 22nd of January Mothers of Political Prisoners Movement, are constrained by the lack of funds to pay rent for an office and for basic office equipment, to provide transportation and food for participants at their events, and to make banners and signs.

Miskito Indians who initially fled the Atlantic Coast after their villages were bombed or burned, have nothing to come back to. They request such basic items as **outboard motors** for transportation and construction equipment such as **chain saws** to rebuild their villages.

Because the Sandinistas deny employment to workers who refuse to join their state-controlled unions, independent labor union confederations in Nicaragua have the dual task of defending workers' rights and providing job training and employment. For this they need money to rent offices and workshops, and supplies for equipment and training.

Non-government organizations and individuals in the U.S. can help greatly both to relieve simple economic hardship and to build democracy by providing cash and in-kind donations for these organizations. Freedom House, a distinguished non-partisan democratic research and assistance organization, has established a "Peace and Democracy Fund" to receive tax-exempt financial and in-kind contributions for these purposes. Please contact Stephen Ginzberg, 48 East 21st Street, New York, NY 10010, (202)473-9691.

INSIDE THE SALVADORAN PEACE TALKS

As several thousand rebel sympathizers carrying nail-studded clubs and Christian Democrats waving white flags stood tensely outside, a Salvadoran government delegation lead by President Jose Napoleon Duarte and an FDR-FMLN delegation led by Shafik Handal met in early October for peace talks inside San Salvador's Vatican Embassy. The talks went on for over 22 hours: the atmosphere was electric but civil. Their meetings produced an agreement to create two small commissions: one to arrange a cease-fire between the Salvadoran armed forces and the guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, the other to seek agreements on a basket of issues including amnesty, democratic reform and guarantees of human and political rights.

But despite these initial achievements, both sides admit to being far apart on most key issues. The FDR-FMLN continues to insist that any participation by the guerrilla movement in the political life of the country hinges on the creation of a transitional "Government of Alliances" (a system of power sharing similar to that in 1980) which will do little more than organize a new presidential election. The Salvadoran Government insists that the Esquipulas Agreement obliges the insurgents to accept the existing constitutional framework, and to abandon their efforts to obtain power without elections. According to one government negotiator, President Duarte told the guerrillas, "you insist on a coup." Guillermo Ungo replied that a recomposition of the government is possible within the constitution, with Duarte still continuing as President. At that point, the more hard-line Handal (the leader of El Salvador's pro-Moscow Communist Party) interrupted, saying, "Napoleon, it is certain that we are going to overthrow you." Handal also informed Minister of Defense Eugenio Vides Casanova that the Soviet Union and Cuba have promised continued assistance to the guerrillas, and that new arms shipments have given them the potential to destroy the government's helicopters.

Salvadoran Catholic Church officials involved in the mediation process, as well as officials of the Jesuit-run University of Central America (UCA) have become quietly critical of the intransigence shown by the FDR-FMLN.

(Salvador, continued on p. 4)

(Salvador, from p. 3)

They point out that while the popularity of the government fluctuates according to the economic situation in the country, public opinion polls indicate that sympathizers with the FDR-FMLN within El Salvador are now distancing themselves from the guerrillas. President Duarte himself estimates that there is 5 to 10% support for those on the left, but many consider his estimate high. "FDR-FMLN expectations of popular support are dramatically at odds with the real polling results," said one high UCA official. He pointed out that guerrilla leader Joaquin Villalobos and other FMLN hardliners have so emphasized military struggle that they are now isolated from popular opinion, which favors peace.

FDR-FMLN officials in Managua were guarded in their expectations from further talks, but do hope for significant progress within a year. They stressed that progress had been made on issues such as economic sabotage, the use of land mines, aerial attacks on guerrilla encampments, the freedom of the people to live where they want to. But the FDR-FMLN noted that their proposals to "humanize" the war had been rejected. They believe that the Salvadoran government's willingness to join in negotiations demonstrates that its counterinsurgency efforts have failed, and that it will now have to make major concessions to achieve a political solution. For the guerrillas, such a solution continues to be power sharing, although that result is not called for in the Central American Accords. The guerrillas believe that the economic crisis in El Salvador and the costs to the United States of continuing its military assistance will lead to a return to the 1979 situation, when the forces now in the guerrilla camp did demand and obtain representation in the government.

On the military side, the FDR claims that Nicaragua now can comply with the provisions of the Peace Accord which require all the region's governments to cease aiding insurgent groups. This is possible, they argue, because the FDR-FMLN has taken steps to create a clandestine supply line to

the Salvadoran guerrillas through Honduras and other Central American countries. The Salvadoran rebels admit, however, that they still rely on Nicaragua for support in intelligence and communications. Latin American diplomats observe that the guerrillas were in constant contact with their Managua headquarters during the talks at the Vatican Embassy, and recently have received sophisticated computer-generated communications from Nicaragua.

The FMLN maintains that if it can hold on for six months, President Duarte then will have to de-escalate the war under the provisions of the Contadora Agreement which covers security matters. If the Cease-Fire Commission cannot reach an agreement by November 7th, the government will declare a unilateral cease-fire around the country. The government is also planning to announce a new amnesty law on November 4th.

This amnesty will be as broad as possible, and will not only bring the release of all imprisoned guerrillas, but will also free some army elements who committed crimes. While President Duarte speaks of an amnesty so broad as to include the kidnappers of his daughter, there is division within the government over whether or not also to release those responsible for such "death squad" crimes as the killing of the nuns and labor organizers Viera, Hammer and Perlman. This promises to be a difficult issue for the government.

Most observers believe the recent announcement by Rueben Zamora, leader of the pro-guerrilla Popular Social Christian Movement, that he plans to return from seven years of exile could lead to more participation in the democratic system by components of the FDR-FMLN. During the past several months some low-level officials of the FDR have returned home. While some components of the FDR-FMLN evidently plan eventually to form a Marxist-Leninist political party, they are working now chiefly to revive the so-called "popular organizations." So, as has been the case for most of this decade, El Salvador's politics are turbulent, a swirl of promise and danger.

—Bruce McCollm

(Report, from p. 2)

local political prisoners were released. There is speculation that the Sandinistas are deliberately encouraging resistance fighters to defect with the promise that this will bring the release of political prisoners.

Church and civic opposition groups alike have repeatedly denounced the misuse of local peace commissions by the FSLN to bring about the government's political objective. They insist that only a cease-fire negotiated between the government of Nicaragua and the leadership of the armed resistance can bring lasting peace. Monsignor Posco Vivas was recently moved to announce on Radio Catolica that the local commissions would be subordinate to the Regional Reconciliation Commissions headquartered in Jinotega and Matagalpa, and that those not answering to the Regional Commissions would be invalid.

—Leslie Hunter

(Arias, continued from p. 1)

resist such wrongs increases the risk of war. Either way, peace requires the suppression of human conflict and disagreement — and with that, the suppression not only of reckless ambitions and desires, but the surrender of certain of our most cherished values and political interests.

But President Arias and his fellow democrats from Central America have called us back to a more realistic and at the same time more honorable tradition of peace-making. They recognize that conflict is inescapable in the societies they seek to govern. They therefore do not attempt to evade or suppress conflict; they instead are seeking to provide non-violent mechanisms for the conduct of political conflict. They are telling their Sandinista neighbors that their efforts to impose a new order upon the Nicaraguan people by undemocratic means are a cause of war, and, as President Arias so often repeats, "without democracy there can be no peace in Central America."

The peace movements of our era have too often, either openly or by implication, urged some retreat by democracy as the price of peace. Here is someone telling us that the advance of democracy is the way to peace. He deserves a prize.

(This opinion column was contributed by Penn Kemble.)

CHURCH AND STATE IN NICARAGUA

Two authorities on freedom of religion visited Nicaragua from October 9th to 14th to assess the impact of the Central American Peace Plan on the uneasy relations between Church and State in what is generally acknowledged to be one of Latin America's most fervently Christian countries. Kent R. Hill, Executive Director of the Institute on Religion and Democracy and Alan Wisdom, the group's Research Director, interviewed Protestant and Catholic clergy from a variety of backgrounds and affiliations, both pro- and anti-government.

Hill and Wisdom report that while Radio Catolica does now broadcast, it is still denied the right to broadcast its news programs. Many priests report harassment, which they ascribe to government-directed hooligans: lights are turned off during masses, Church personnel are kept under surveillance, and religious workers are frequently hazed or beaten. Nevertheless, services in diocesan churches are well attended, while enthusiasm for the state-sponsored "popular church" has waned. An official of the Antonio Valdivieso Center, Nicaragua's "liberation theology" institute, complained to Hill and Wisdom that Nicaraguan youth were now turning away from the "popular churches."

The two IRD observers also report that, after a period of great reticence, an independent Protestant organization is beginning to raise its voice. The Nicaraguan National Council of Evangelical Pastors (CNPEN) a federation of some seven to eight hundred Protestant clergy, released a pastoral letter on October 7th calling on the government to end military conscription, establish a true amnesty, enter into direct talks with all its opponents, and guarantee full freedom of speech and the press.

The CNPEN maintains its independence from another Protestant body in Nicaragua, the Evangelical Committee for Development in Nicaragua (CEPAD), which is headed by Dr. Gustavo Parajon, a Baptist minister. CEPAD's annual budget of \$3 to \$5 million dwarfs that of the CNPEN, and a large portion of its funds come from Protestant churches in the U.S. Dr. Parajon was appointed by Nicaraguan President Daniel

(Church, continued on p. 6)

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For more information contact: 729 15th Street, NW, Suite 945,
Washington, DC 20005. (202) 347-3997.

(Church, from p. 5)

Ortega to serve alongside Cardinal Obando y Bravo on the National Reconciliation Commission mandated by the Central American Peace Plan. Hill and Wisdom worry that Dr. Parajon may not have the appropriate objectivity for such a position: his actions, they contend, have consistently reflected his 1983 declaration that "we have seen the hand of God at work in the (Sandinista) government."

WITNESS TO DEMOCRACY

The presence of observers from the democratic societies of Europe, Latin America and the United States is seen by many as a factor of crucial significance to the fulfillment of the Central American peace process. Such visitors provide encouragement to democratic activists in the region, and can bear first-hand witness to their difficulties and to any wrong that may be done to them. Nowhere is this more important than in Sandinista Nicaragua.

Peace and Democracy Watch is encouraging individuals and delegations from many parts of the United States to visit Central America during the months ahead. These may be short trips, or longer periods for work as volunteers with the pro-democratic organizations with which we maintain contact.

People with experience in political campaigns, union organizing, civil rights or community work, printing and health, education, construction or agricultural services are especially needed.

While we can help with arrangements for visitors or volunteers in Central America, we cannot pay the costs of transportation or lodging. But enterprising fund-raisers will find that these costs are not high, and that support can be found in their communities.

If you would like to go to Central America in behalf of the Democratic cause, please contact Adrienne Doherty at (202)347-3997.

PEACE AND DEMOCRACY WATCH

BULLETIN

(Central American)

"Without democracy there can be no peace in Central America."—President Oscar Arias



GOVERNOR ROBB EXPLAINS "PEACE AND DEMOCRACY WATCH"

(On September 14th former Virginia Governor Charles S. Robb outlined the nature and purposes of a newly formed *ad hoc* committee, called "Central American Peace and Democracy Watch." Portions of his statement are printed below.)

"The effort we are undertaking here is an attempt to bring the strengths of the democratic center of our own moral and political life to bear in helping the peoples of Central America to fulfill the possibilities that the Central American peace process now holds out to them.

"...We must be entirely realistic about the challenges that we face.

"The next few months will be a time of great danger and difficulty for the people of Nicaragua, for the fragile democracies of the other Central American states, and for the United States itself. Yet alongside all the risks and burdens there is also a great possibility: that after years of war and injustice, the peoples of all of Central America will have a chance to enjoy democracy and peace. That is all this is -- a possibility. But it is a possibility that we ought to grasp with all the energy and imagination that we possess.

"The peace plan signed on the 7th of August by the five Central American Presidents contains many complex and difficult provisions. But none is more important, or more critical to the success of all the others, than the section which proposes to establish freedom of the press, freedom of movement and assembly, civil and political rights, free elections, and democratic government for all the peoples of Central America. It is equally significant that this plan also recognizes that these freedoms must be established according to a definite timetable, and that progress toward democratization must

(Robb, continued on p. 2)



Peace and Democracy Watch Co-Chair Charles S. Robb with John T. Joyce, President of the Bricklayer's International Union, at a Peace and Democracy Watch press breakfast on September 14th.

INSIDE

Governor Robb explains "Peace and Democracy Watch"

Mayor Koch: Freedom Rides Again

Report From Managua: Leslie Hunter

Nicaragua's Bishops on the Peace Process

AFL-CIO Warns of Salvadoran Court System

MAYOR KOCH: FREEDOM RIDES AGAIN

(New York's Mayor Ed Koch will travel to Central America in early November with a delegation of distinguished New Yorkers as part of the Peace and Democracy Watch. In a speech for the Judaic Studies Program on September 13th he explained his personal reasons for joining this effort. Here are some excerpts.)

"In 1964, as a young, idealistic, Jewish lawyer from New York, I was outraged by the fact that black Americans were still being denied their rights under the constitution. So I went to Mississippi.

(Koch, continued on p.5)

(Robb, continued from p.1)

be tightly linked to progress toward ending the armed conflicts that torment the region.

"But, as we know, treaties and diplomacy and the promises of governments are not enough to establish a people in their democratic rights. These rights have to be taken and held and exercised by the people themselves -- not just by a privileged few, but by ordinary citizens in their everyday lives -- before they can be real and lasting.

"Regrettably, we are all too familiar by now with the ways in which cynical governments allow their citizens some brief periods of relative freedom when it serves a temporary need to soften the disapproval of the democratic world. But no people can be free when its government reserves the power to revoke that freedom at its whim. Freedom must have strong and diverse roots. Freedom depends upon such institutions as an independent press, free trade unions and commercial associations, private property and the right of choice in the labor market, independent religious, educational, political, and ethnic organizations, and the other embodiments of 'peoples' power.'

"...Peace and Democracy Watch has three basic purposes:

- * To monitor the peace and democracy process in Central America so that accurate and detailed information can be available, especially here in the United States.
- * To assist supporters of democracy in the U.S. and in Central America to gain a first hand knowledge of one another, and one another's needs.
- * To offer some independent judgment on the success or failure of the process as it proceeds through its successive stages.

"One of the premises of the coalition we are working to assemble is that this group as such will in no way take up the issue of assistance to the armed Nicaraguan resistance. We hope very much that individuals from the full range of views on this matter will agree to join us.

"The structure of the group will be that of an ad hoc committee. One of the strengths we hope to draw upon is that there are in existence a number of organizations and activities which have for some time been underway to further the same broad goals as those set forth in the Central American peace proposal. Our ad hoc committee will attempt to provide a meeting place and a focus of public attention for those

involved in such efforts.

"One of the first activities we hope to encourage is travel by delegations of private U.S. citizens to Central America, especially to Nicaragua. There is no question that the Nicaraguan government is a central concern of our work: not because we wish to single out Nicaragua, but because the Nicaraguan government has singled itself out by its refusal to grant democratic rights to its citizens. We are inviting delegations of Americans to visit Nicaragua in the coming months, and not just to follow the well-traveled path through central Managua. We hope they will be able to go out into the provincial cities and rural areas, to see what is going on there and to encourage those who live there to claim their rights by showing that the whole world is watching.

"We are pleased that New York's Mayor Ed Koch has just agreed to lead our first delegation to Central America. We are also planning to encourage Nicaraguan democrats to visit the United States.

"I hope you will now permit me one point of somewhat personal political privilege. I am a Democrat, big 'D' as well as small 'd.' One thing that attracted me to the strategy and program that is represented in Peace and Democracy Watch is that while it must be a thoroughly bipartisan program, it nevertheless offers the Democratic Party an especially valuable opportunity. My party has been seriously divided over the issue of U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan resistance. Yet at the same time those on both sides of this issue profess in the strongest terms that we all share the same democratic (small 'd') goals. My hope is that the effort we are proposing here -- which includes a national campaign of assistance to the people of Nicaragua in their struggle to make real the democratic promise of the Central American Peace process -- is one that can unite my own party, at the same time that it captures the imagination of many others in our country and the world.

"Those of us who have pressed for efforts toward a diplomatic and political settlement of the Central American conflict now bear a special responsibility to bend our best energies to help this initiative toward an honorable conclusion. We cannot now simply sit back and criticize the performance of an Administration which we have pushed onto this path. If we do not do our part now, we will lose whatever credit we might otherwise be entitled to if this process succeeds. We will also reap our share of the blame if this process should fail."

REPORT FROM MANAGUA

by Leslie Hunter



Leslie Hunter (left) who has lived, studied and worked in Central America, is now representing Peace and Democracy Watch in Nicaragua. To her right is Dr. Virgilio Godoy, President of the Independent Liberal Party of Nicaragua, one of Nicaragua's important independent political groups.

NICARAGUAN RESPONSES TO THE PEACE PROCESS

After years of dictatorship, economic strain and war the Nicaraguan people are greeting the Esquipulas II Accord with guarded optimism. Despite considerable personal danger and scarce material resources, thousands of Nicaraguans in opposition political parties, labor unions, youth groups, religious groups, and business and professional associations are gearing up to test the democratic opening provided in the peace accords. Meetings and demonstrations are being held, newspapers, magazines and radio stations are preparing to open, and new organizations are being formed to test the limits of democratic life.

* At the close of the 14th Congress of the Social Christian Party on September 27th there was a march seven blocks long by as many as 18,000 people, mostly peasants and workers from all over the country, who carried placards demanding the lifting of the state of emergency and the restoration of civil liberties.

* CUS, an independent labor federation, will join with the CTN and other opposition unions in a press conference next week announcing marches, assemblies and a series of workers' demands. CUS plans to reopen its newspaper, Solidaridad, closed last year.

* The Centro de Formacion Juvenil (CEFOJ), a non-partisan confederation of opposition youth groups formed in July 1986 to provide leadership training to student, political, labor, church and peasant leaders, has been holding seminars around the country. On October 1st the groups formed a Youth Committee for Esquipulas II for the purpose of discussing the peace plan and presenting their demands. These include the abolition of military draft, lifting the state of emergency, removal of the Sandinista army from the schools and universities, and the reinstatement of civil liberties. The group plans to hold a demonstration of democratic youth from throughout the country on November 1st.

* Opposition parties and other democratic groups are planning to begin publishing newspapers and magazines. The Manolo Morales Foundation hopes to publish a weekly magazine, La Cronica, in November or December. It hopes to print 25,000 copies of the first issue, in which a variety of opposition views will be expressed. The Independent Liberal Party also hopes to publish a magazine, Paso a Paso.

* The Coordinadora Democratica, which includes 14 opposition parties, unions and professional associations, held a mass meeting and demonstration in Masaya on Sunday, October 5th. Over 1200 people participated. A similar event is planned in Matagalpa on October 10th.

* The Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH) has prepared a document on the peace plan and its implications for human rights. It plans, in cooperation with the Catholic Church, to gather together families of political prisoners in an assembly on October 23rd to publicize the situation of political prisoners.

* The PLI, the Liberal Independent Party, plans an assembly on October 23rd and 24th, and a series of four demonstrations and seminars in towns near the war zone during the month of November.

Many other groups are also reviewing the peace plan and planning a variety of responses and activities.

But lest this picture appear too rosy, all of the groups with whom I have spoken so far warn that past experience suggests that the Sandinistas may simply strive to derive the maximum propaganda benefits from the peace accord, while limiting as much as possible the actual implementation of democratic reforms.

This, opposition spokesmen claim, is what

President Daniel Ortega had in mind when he explained in a September 30th press conference that the regime aims to "comply with the peace accords without sacrificing the revolution."

Nevertheless, the opening of the independent newspaper La Prensa on October 1st and the first broadcast by Radio Catolica a few days later set off a tremor of jubilation and anticipation in Managua. Especially important was the tone of the first issue of La Prensa since it was shut down almost a year and a half ago: it was clear that the paper does not intend to acquiesce to any kind of government censorship without a tenacious fight.

But while these two media outlets are now open, opposition groups are quick to remind us that 22 radio stations closed by the Sandinistas in 1982 remain closed. Radio Corporacion, a private radio station, has been refused permission to have a news radio program since the signing of Esquipulas II. Opposition parties and the Church still have no access to TV.

Thousands of young people all over the country continue to be forcibly recruited for military service. There is great fear that, because the Sandinista Front, a single political party, controls the national army, the draft will be used to persecute and control independent political activity.

In addition, opposition groups assert that thousands of peasants, workers, opposition party members and union members remain in state security jails, most without charge, where they are denied due process and tortured until they sign confessions. In a press conference on September 29th, the January 22nd movement of Mothers of Political Prisoners announced the severe beatings on August 19th of 10 of their relatives who are being held incommunicado for so-called political crimes.

So while opposition groups do not trust the FSLN, they nevertheless view Esquipulas II as the beginning of a process which will require the maximum mobilization and coordinated action, both internally and internationally, if the Sandinistas are to be pressured to comply with the peace accords.

It should also be remembered that political life in Nicaragua has now been reduced to a very narrow sector of the population. Only the hardest and best organized independent groups are at this time even aware of the possibilities opened under the Peace Accords. The mass of the people, still demoralized after a combination of economic hardship and eight years of repressive government, remains on the sidelines.

-- L.H.

NICARAGUAN NATIONAL DIALOGUE BEGINS

On October 5th Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega made the opening speech to the convocation of the Nicaraguan National Dialogue, which is billed as a government-sanctioned effort to bring reconciliation and democracy to the country. But some opposition groups protest that participation in the national dialogue has been limited in ways which give a large advantage to the government and its allies.

So far, only four political parties and the Coordinadora Democratica have been invited to participate, while 10 pro-Sandinista groups have been invited.

The Coordinadora held a press conference on September 29th denouncing Sandinista non-compliance with the accords as manifested by their refusal to invite all the opposition labor, professional groups and political parties comprising the Coordinadora. An independent labor federation, CUS, was invited only as an observer to the national dialogue, and sent a strongly worded telegram to President Ortega protesting this rebuke.

The FSLN insists that the National Dialogue is a forum to discuss only the Esquipulas II Accords. The opposition maintains, however, that Esquipulas II has already been signed, and warrants no further discussion at the National Dialogue. The opposition hopes instead to discuss how the spirit of Esquipulas can be given practical application in Nicaragua; the latter course will involve such issues as the lifting of the state of emergency; the separation of the state, the party and the army; new municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections; constitutional reform; the national budget; the return of properties arbitrarily confiscated, and similar issues.

-- L.H.

PEACE AND DEMOCRACY FUND PLANNED

Years of hardship have left pro-democratic groups in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America so weakened that they have little capacity to grasp what opportunities have opened for fuller participation in public life. They badly need private assistance. Freedom House, a tax-exempt, bi-partisan organization in New York City, is planning a program of private aid to these embattled democrats. Both financial contributions and certain office and printing equipment will be needed.

For more information contact: Freedom House, 48 East 21st St, New York, NY 10010. (212)473-9691.

NICARAGUA'S CATHOLIC BISHOPS PRESS FOR GENUINE RECONCILIATION

On September 17 the Episcopal Conference of Nicaragua issued a Pastoral Letter which set forth standards to guide the process of political reconciliation among the contending forces in Nicaragua's civil war. The Bishops' letter also criticized government efforts to stack local commissions of reconciliation in its favor.

One week later a second communique was issued by the Bishops in recognition of at least one significant concession by the government to the Church.

Among the points made in the Bishops' letter of protest on September 17th were these:

"The formation of ad hoc commissions, called local peace commissions, which operate counter to the National Reconciliation Commission through the "mass organizations," do not constitute an authentic road to a total cease-fire agreed to between the belligerent parties. It would appear that what they seek is only surrender and the disarming of individuals....

"We believe that the Nicaraguans who have taken up arms against the government must participate in the dialogue. If this does not happen, there will be no possibility of a resolution, and our own people, especially the poorest, will continue to suffer or die.

"We ask, as a demonstration of its desire for life and peace, that the government of Nicaragua cease forced military recruitment of our youth....

"We believe it is necessary that the amnesty not be seen as merely an instrument to seek the surrender and disarming of those who have taken up arms, but rather as a forgetting of past offenses and bitterness...(It) would bring real relief to many families if the government would concede a wide amnesty to those who have been condemned by Ordinary or Exceptional Tribunals for common crimes committed for political ends...."

In the subsequent communique issued on September 24th, after a vigorous debate between Cardinal Obando y Bravo and President Ortega, the Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference announced that an agreement had been reached to restructure the regional reconciliation commissions to give a greater role to non-government interests. Members of these regional bodies, the Bishops explained, would now include the regional Catholic Bishop or his representative, as well as a delegate from the regional government, the Red Cross, and the opposition political parties.

(Koch continued from p. 1)

"The civil rights laws and the constitutional guarantees for blacks in America would be meaningless -- no more than paper rights -- unless those rights could be tested and exercised. A large group of Americans, black and non-black, went South to do precisely that, to test the system.

"Now, 25 years later, I have received a similar challenge. The Nicaragua question is vital to America's future, the Soviet Union is sending in substantial military assistance. But I don't think war is the answer. Neither is acquiescence or surrender.

"In my opinion, not only does the Arias Peace Plan make sense, it may be the only hope of breaking the stalemate between the left and the right.

"If the five Central American countries which signed the Arias Plan truly want peace and democracy, it will have the best chance to occur if world attention is focused on their efforts to achieve it. If the people of the region have the moral support they need -- much like the freedom riders provided to the civil rights movement of the '60s -- they will lay claim to their own rights.

"Treaties are not worth the paper they are written on if the parties to them don't fully exercise the provisions they contain. That is how the promises become living guarantees.

Those who will accompany Mayor Koch to Central America will include:

Harriet Richardson Michel, President
and CEO, New York Urban League

Mario Paredes, Executive Director,
Northeast Center for Hispanic Catholics,
Archdiocese of New York

Ronald Radosh, Professor of History, City
University of New York

Richard Ravitch, Chairman, Hower
Savings Bank

Isaura Santiago-Santiago, President,
Hostos Community College

Ted Sorenson, Senior Partner, Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison; former Special
Advisor to President John F. Kennedy

R. Peter Strauss, former Director, VOA;
former Assistant Secretary of State

Charles Hughes, President, Local 372,
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CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE AND DEMOCRACY WATCH

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*In formation (Organizations for identification purposes only)

For more information contact: 729 15th Street, NW, Suite 940, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 347-3997

AFL-CIO WARNS OF SALVADORAN COURT SYSTEM

A delegation of AFL-CIO union Presidents, led by Secretary-Treasurer Thomas R. Donahue, recently visited Central America to prepare a report on "Trade Union Rights, Peace and Democracy" for the coming AFL-CIO convention. The report includes a strong warning that weakness and corruption in the Salvadoran judicial system may block the implementation of peace agreements and democratization in that violence-torn country.

Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte and a delegation of leaders from the FMLN-FDR insurgents began face-to-face dialogue at the Vatican mission in the suburbs of San Salvador on October 4th.

The hope of a political solution in El Salvador hinges on the possibility that a significant number of guerrillas will rejoin civilian political life.

But the rank-and-file of the guerrilla movement must have assurances that if they return to non-violent political activity, they will be protected by constitutional authorities from the death squads which, while far less active than before, still remain a threat.

According to the AFL-CIO report, the Salvadoran judicial system, still dominated by Supreme Court justices appointed before Duarte's election, continues to show leniency toward high ranking military officers and members of the Salvadoran elite who have committed crimes.

Points made in the report include: there is little "protection for judges, jurors, and witnesses fearful of retaliation." "Land reform is adversely affected." "And, significantly for the peace process, the failure to prosecute alleged death squad leaders discourages some guerrilla followers from returning to civilian life, despite the improved atmosphere."

The report concludes that "until the method of nominating, paying and protecting judges is changed, democracy will be threatened in El Salvador."

A PERMANENT PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE, a 35-minute documentary film by the AFL-CIO about the struggles of workers and campesinos in Nicaragua and El Salvador for a better life, is available on Beta or VHS video cassette for \$12.00 from: AIFLD, c/o David Jessup, 1015 20th Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036.

LATIN AMERICAN REPORT

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American
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February, 1988

Argentine Jews Rally Against Anti-Semitism

An unprecedented number of Argentines, estimates range as high as 40,000, attended a "rally against anti-Semitism" on November 26 in Plaza Houssay, located in the Jewish quarter of Buenos Aires. Advertisements for the rally—four foot high wall posters and flyers—invited citizens to gather "in repudiation of Nazi fascism . . . and in support of the anti-discrimination law." Placards reading, "Let's get rid of anti-Semitism" and "Violence is the voice of ignorance," were carried by some of the participants.

Dr. David Goldberg, president of D.A.I.A., the Jewish community's representative body that organized the rally, told those who gathered that, "The Jewish community is meeting here to put a stop to the anti-Semitic violence which has given all Argentines a quota of disquiet and anguish." Key sectors of Argentine society were represented and expressed solidarity with the Jewish community. Among them were politicians of all parties, including the governor of Buenos Aires province, Antonio Cafiero. Union leaders, educators, human rights activists and Catholic clergy also attended and many who were unable to be there sent messages of support.

The outburst of anti-Semitic violence that triggered the rally came in the wake of the arrest, on November 14, of Nazi war criminal Josef Schwammberger, who was accused of responsibility for the murder of as many as 5,000 concentration camp inmates. He is listed in the United Nations War Crimes Commission archives in category "A" as commandant of the Rozwadow and Przemysl labor camps and director of the concentration camp at Mielec in Poland. The government of West Germany issued a request in 1973 for his extradition from Argentina where he had been living since 1950. The day after Schwammberger was detained at the request of West German authorities, a sophisticated bomb exploded outside a Sephardic synagogue in

Buenos Aires, wrecking the front of the building and blowing out windows in nearby shops, but causing no casualties.

Argentine Jews have been disturbed as much or more by written and verbal anti-Semitism as by the physical violence. Dr. Goldberg, the only speaker at the rally, said that the bomb attack was also the result of "slogans heard at rallies, football stadiums and from pulpits." He had in mind the anti-Semitic sermon, at a mass in Cordoba province on October 4, by Father Manuel Beltran who denounced the presence of too many Jews in the universities and "bad Jews who are surrounding the government." Father Beltran sought to bolster his argument by citing several classic anti-Semitic tracts that are readily available in newspaper stands throughout the country. Right wing extremists, dismayed by the relatively large number of Jews who hold elected and appointed office under the current Radical Party administration, have adopted the slogan, "Down with the Radical Synagogue."

Yet another factor that prompted Jews to rally against anti-Semitism was the discovery, in early November, of the bodies of Osvaldo Sivak and Benjamin Neuman who had been kidnapped in 1985 and 1982 respectively. Shortly before the discovery of the bodies, investigators learned that some police officials were involved in their kidnapping and murder; those police had also extorted large ransoms from the Sivak and Neuman families.

The massive gathering was held several days after Argentine B'nai B'rith leaders as well as D.A.I.A. representatives met with President Alfonsin. The principal objective of both meetings was to request that the president submit draft legislation that would outlaw racial and religious discrimination. A previous anti-discrimination bill that passed in the Chamber of Deputies, died in a Senate committee last year.

The rally inspired some young Jews to overturn a table of anti-Semitic literature and engage in a fist-fight with members of Alerta Nacional (National Alert), a right-wing neo-Nazi group led by Alejandro Biondini. They were distributing the group's anti-Semitic newspaper and pamphlets.

Anti-Semitism continues to be a very serious problem. In December, tombstones were desecrated in one Jewish cemetery and a bomb destroyed the gate at another Jewish cemetery in the city of Cordoba. That same month, approximately 50 members of the National Front of Peronist Loyalty commemorated "the Day of Sovereignty" by rallying in the Plaza de Mayo, in front of the presidential palace. The group, composed primarily of militants from Alerta Nacional, carried signs which read "Fatherland or Synagogue" and wore swastikas and emblems of the German SS on their clothing. At one point

a passerby yelled "Nazis" and a demonstrator responded, "with pride."

Anti-Semitic literature continues to proliferate in bookstores and newsstands. The booklet, "El Judaismo Desenmascarado a Traves del Zohar," (Judaism Unmasked by Means of the Zohar), asserts that "the Jews are not and cannot be our compatriots; they constitute the mortal enemies of the Argentine people." An "editorial" appeared in the magazine, *Cabildo* (11/13/87), with the title "Los Judios Nos Gobiernan" (The Jews Govern Us). The article addresses a "Jewish Problem" and states that "Argentina is on the road to substituting Judaism for Christianity, Israel for the Church, and the Bankers for the Bishops."

Legislation that would, in the words of Dr. Goldberg, "penalize and eradicate the poison of hatred" from Argentine society, is obviously needed now.

Colonia Dignidad

Mystery continues to surround the fate of Professor Boris Weisfeiler, who disappeared on January 3, 1985 while hiking in Chile. Weisfeiler is a Russian Jew who immigrated to the United States and taught mathematics at Pennsylvania State University. The Chilean embassy in Washington has not responded to ADL's inquiries on the status of the Weisfeiler case. APSI, a Chilean magazine (11/23/87), reported that he was last seen near the German colony called "Colonia Dignidad."

A West German investigative commission which arrived in Chile on December 13, 1987 was denied entry to the compound and returned home five days later. The commission was sent to investigate possible links between Colonia Dignidad and more than 30 children who disappeared in Bonn and Cologne; the Circle of Friends of Colonia Dignidad has offices near those West

German cities. When the founder of Colonia Dignidad, Paul Schaffer, left West Germany in 1961, he was reportedly being sought on charges of sexually abusing children at a youth home.

Residents of the area in which Colonia Dignidad is located reportedly told diplomats at the West German embassy in Santiago in November that the Colonia is a Nazi center used by government interrogators to torture and detain Chilean citizens. Observers have noted similarities between Colonia Dignidad and the theories of Aquiles Reid which called for the establishment of self-sustained German colonies throughout the world. Others have noted that the settlement's logo, a woman with a child in each hand, is reminiscent of Heinrich Himmler's "Fountain of Life" program for the reproduction of the Aryan race which separated about 150,000 children from their parents in Nazi Germany.

Argentina

Leaders of Argentina's leading political parties were feted by the Jarkow Institute for Latin America at ADL headquarters in New York, where they met representatives of major Jewish national and international organizations. The governor of Cordoba province, Dr. Eduardo Cesar Angeloz, was the guest of honor on November 2. Governor Angeloz, who is considered a possible presidential candidate of the Radical Party, said

that he had denounced the "fascist statements" made by Father Manuel Beltran at a mass in Cordoba.

The governor of Chubut province, Nestor Perl, led a Justicialist Party delegation that met with Jewish leaders on January 19. Governor Perl expressed hope that the Argentine Congress, with the support of the Justicialist bloc, will approve an anti-discrimination law this year. Rabbi Morton M. Rosenthal, director of the ADL Latin American Affairs Department, told the

guests that passage of the law would reduce anti-Semitism and improve Argentina's image in the media.

Several members of the delegation affirmed that the failure of the military uprising led by Lt. Col. Aldo Rico in January was due in large measure to the fact that both the Justicialist and Radical parties are united in their determination to maintain democratic government in Argentina.

Abraham H. Foxman, ADL's National Director, sent a letter to Argentine President Raul Alfonsin commending his government for Nazi war criminal Josef Schwammberger's arrest and urging him to deny haven to three other war criminals believed to be living in Argentina: Eiche Heinrich, Karl Kirchmann and Guido Zimmer.

Egypt and Argentina are engaged in a joint effort to produce a long-range land-based missile which could potentially change the military balance in the Middle East according to the Financial Times of London. Iraq may be financing part of the project.

The UCD political party (Union de Centro Democratico) stated that it supports the repeal of United Nations resolution 3379, which equates Zionism with racism because, "Zionism expressed the aspiration of the Jews to regain Zion as a homeland and therefore has no relation with the theories that sustain the preeminence of certain races above others."

Bolivia

Bolivian Foreign Minister Guillermo Bedregal has rejected demands that his government rescind diplomatic recognition of the PLO, which he recently granted, because it is a terrorist organization. The Foreign Minister said "the PLO cannot be considered on those terms. . . Bolivia supports its right to sovereignty and has established formal relations with that organization, led by Yassir Arafat." The Bolivian Chamber of Deputies recently approved a "declaration of support" for the PLO which urges the Executive Branch to broaden and consolidate its ties to the PLO.

Congressman Charles Wilson (D-Texas) told Congress on December 21 that Secretary of State Shultz informed Foreign Minister Bedregal that the PLO position in Bolivia was contrary to U.S. interests, and that the U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, Adyard Royall, had expressed "deep concern" to Bolivian President Paz. The

congressman warned that "If in the PLO Bolivia has found an alternative source of foreign aid, such that Bolivia's foreign minister can ignore our concerns, perhaps this Congress. . . should look into reducing or eliminating our aid to Bolivia. . . This is one elected official who will be watching carefully to see if Bolivia corrects its unwise foreign policy."

Brazil

Farid Sawan, the PLO representative in Brazil, is distributing sabotage manuals to members of the CUT union, (Central Unica dos Trabalhadores) and to the Communist party of Brazil. The weekly news magazine *Veja* also reported (11/4/87) that the Brazilian National Information Service (SNI) discovered that Sawan sent Brazilians to Lebanon for training in sabotage techniques. Sawan's predecessor, Ribhi Halloum, was arrested at the airport in Amsterdam with a bag containing arms and explosives.

Thousands of posters declaring "Brazil: Let's Free Lamia" were mounted in the major cities of Brazil, part of a campaign on behalf of Lamia Maraf Hassan, a Brazilian-Palestinian woman sentenced to life imprisonment in Israel for the kidnapping and murder of an Israeli soldier. Her family in Sao Paulo and their lawyer, former Congressional representative Airton Soares, are also using paid advertisements, direct appeals to state assemblies, posters, and T-shirts in their campaign to have the Brazilian Foreign Ministry demand that she be pardoned.

Anti-Semitic graffiti and swastikas attacking University of Sao Paulo rector Jose Goldemberg, were sprayed on a university building in late November. Department heads warned that the action "feeds a dangerous potential for prejudice against minorities."

Judge Bento Fernandez de Barros suspended construction of a monument to the Palestinian cause in the center of the city of Bage. Mayor Luiz Alberto Vargas decided to build the monument after he returned from the June meeting of the Palestinian Confederation of Latin America and the Caribbean (COPLAC) held in Lima last June (see LAR 10/87).

Brazilian trade with the Arab world is increasing. Libya and Brazil signed a US\$ 750 million five year trade agreement that will increase trade ten fold. . . . The Brazilian arms company, AVIBRAS, recently signed a US\$ 500

million contract with the government of Saudi Arabia for the Astro II anti-aircraft rocket which is already used by Iraq and Libya.

The Federacao Israelita do Estado de Sao Paulo recently called on the Jewish community to report any vandalism of "mezuzot" affixed to the door posts of Jewish homes. Damaging, burning, or stealing of the "mezuzot" has become a common occurrence in Sao Paulo and the seaside resort of Guarujá, although the number of reported cases has declined.

A plaque indicating the site of the first synagogue in the Americas was unveiled November 17 in Recife by Mayor Jarbas Vasconcelos. The synagogue of the Sephardic congregation "Zur Israel" was founded in 1636, when Recife was under Dutch control, and converted into a Catholic church in 1679, after the Portuguese-Brazilians gained control of the city.

Chile

The director of the Department of History of the Metropolitan University of Pedagogic Science in Santiago is a prominent Nazi named Edwin Robertson Rodriguez. He spoke at the rally in memory of Rudolf Hess where he was photographed offering the Nazi salute, standing at the side of Miguel Serrano, the most prominent Chilean Nazi. The Chilean newspaper *La Epoca* (10/16/87) reported that Robertson was also linked to terrorist bombings several weeks after the election of Salvador Allende in 1970 and he was also allegedly involved in the kidnapping and assassination of Chilean General Rene Schneider. University students held a public demonstration against Robertson, protesting a Nazi having a role in their education, "which must be oriented towards serving the people, not discriminating against them."

The brother of PLO leader Yassir Arafat, Dr. Fathi Arafat, participated in a ceremony commemorating the "International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People," November 29, in Santiago. The PLO representative in Brazil, Farid Sawan, and Lucia Pinochet Hiriart, the daughter of the Chilean president, sat next to Arafat at the ceremony. . . . Several pro-Palestinian groups in Chile, including the Palestine Federation, The General Union of Palestinian Students and the Palestine Information Office, carried out a "noisy demonstration" in Santiago on December 21, against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Palestine Federation of Chile organized a mass "commemorating the

massacre of Sabra and Shatila," held at the San Jorge Orthodox Church September 24. In his sermon, Bishop Gabriel declared that "throughout the world, there are always martyrs in the cause of independence."

Lubavitch activities with political overtones are causing uneasiness among many leaders and members of the Chilean Jewish community. Most recently, President Augusto Pinochet signed the "International Parchment of Honor," in homage to the leader of the Lubavitch movement, Rabbi Menachem Schneerson. At the private ceremony in "La Moneda," the presidential palace, David Feurstein, head of the Lubavitch Chabad in Santiago, praised President Pinochet's constant efforts to reinstate the Noachian principles in Chile which will result in "a better society, which is the pride of the world and for all of us who have faith and love liberty." Last year, representatives of the Lubavitch presented First Lady Lucia Hiriart de Pinochet two Sabbath candelabra in recognition of her "recognized moral and spiritual merit."

Costa Rica

Nazi war criminal Bohdan Koziy continues to live in Costa Rica because Soviet assurances that he would not be sentenced to death, required by the Costa Rican Supreme Court, were rejected by the Costa Rican Foreign Ministry. Koziy is wanted in the Soviet Union for the murder of a Jewish family, including a four year old girl, when he was a member of the Ukrainian police under German occupation. In 1984, Koziy was stripped of his United States citizenship and then fled to Costa Rica, where he was detained last March pending action on the deportation request of the Soviet Union. Koziy was released in June and given temporary resident status as his wife's dependent. The government agency that has jurisdiction over the status of foreigners in Costa Rica, the Costa Rican Tourism Institute (ICTI), is reportedly reviewing the status of Koziy's wife.

Israeli officials praised the selection of Costa Rican president Dr. Oscar Arias Sanchez as the recipient of the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir promptly congratulated President Arias in October saying that he was "pleased that the president of the friendly country, which we all respect and admire" is the recipient of this year's award. In a cable to President Arias, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres called Costa Rica "a beacon of the hope for peace and a

paragon of democracy." Costa Rica was the first country, in 1982, to return its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.

Mexico

At a demonstration to commemorate the anniversary of the September 1986 earthquake in Mexico City, several seamstresses accused their "Jewish bosses" of not doing enough to compensate the relatives of their co-workers who perished. Several radio commentators, including Tomas Mojarro, a leftist commentator on the National University's radio station, echoed the same charges. In the aftermath of the quake last year, several newspapers carried anti-Semitic cartoons and articles accusing Jews who owned clothing factories of being more concerned about salvaging their machines than for their employees' well being.

Following the death of Nazi war criminal Rudolph Hess, posters stating "Rudolph Hess: Martyr of Peace" appeared throughout Mexico City. A documentary on the life of Hess and the "injustice" of his prolonged incarceration was shown at several universities.

Nicaragua

The editor of *El Nuevo Diario*, Xavier Chamorro Cardenal, responded to ADL's protest against the newspaper's headline, "Like Jews They Crucify With Prices," by defending the appropriateness of the headline and launching into a sweeping attack against Israel. In a lengthy letter to ADL National Director Abraham H. Foxman, Chamorro asserted that the government of Israel is alienated from its citizens and "tries to emulate Nazism."

The Nicaraguan Jewish community in exile has accepted an offer by the Sandinista government to return the country's only synagogue, which it confiscated shortly after taking power in 1979. In a letter to the Nicaraguan ambassador in Washington, the congregation said that it was accepting the offer at this time because "we foresee the possibility of the resumption of Jewish communal life in Nicaragua." In offering to return the synagogue, the government said that it would be exempt from taxation and from confiscation in the future as provided for by the "law of associations."

Panama

General Manuel Antonio Noriega's decision to send a delegation to Libya seeking \$200

million in emergency assistance aroused anxiety in the Jewish community of Panama. Responding to concerns expressed by Panamanian Jews, General Noriega publicly assured "our Hebrew brothers" that there was "no threat of Libyan sabotage" in Panama. The National Council of Private Enterprise and the Union of Industrialists also expressed concern over the possibility of increased Libyan influence, which has diminished since the death of General Omar Torrijos.

The flurry of anti-Semitic flyers and phone calls, which began in June, has abated. The anti-Semitism was attributed to individuals who were attempting to pressure Jews who owned stores to close them as a protest against the Noriega government.

Peru

A study based on 2,460 articles which appeared in Peruvian newspapers and magazines from 1980 to 1986, has disclosed a persistent anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli tendency. The study, by Dr. Leon Trahtemberg S., found that when Jews are involved in positive developments, the tendency has been not to describe them meaningfully, but when the information involving Jews is negative, their Jewishness is emphasized. The study traces the roots of anti-Semitism in the Peruvian press to the 1970's when the nationalist and revolutionary government, led by General Velasco Alvarado, confiscated all newspapers and appointed "leftist and anti-Zionist journalist to run the papers."

The Jewish Association of Peru protested the publication of a virulently anti-Semitic article titled, "The Sinister Plans of Zionism," which appeared in the October 1 issue of the daily newspaper *La Voz*. In a letter to Dr. Efraim Ruiz Caro, the newspaper's editor, the Association denounced the "mixing of national problems with Zionism" and "a-zealous anti-Semitism" such as those written in "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion."

Puerto Rico

El Nuevo Dia, the newspaper with the largest circulation in Puerto Rico, has carried several articles accusing Jews of using the Holocaust "as a political weapon" and claimed that the destiny of many Palestinians today is not different than what the Jews experienced in Nazi Germany. A two hour radio program on Station WKAQ, "in commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the Sabra and Shatila massacres," provided several Palestinians a forum for charging

that the Jews controlled the world press, that an international Zionist conspiracy plans to dominate the capitalist and Communist worlds, and that "today's Jews are not the original descendants of Abraham and the first Hebrews, and therefore have no Biblical right to the land of Israel."

Suriname

Desi Bouterse, former leader of Suriname, admitted to reporters, on October 1, that since 1985, Libya had provided about \$30 million of economic aid to his country. Bouterse also admitted that he had discussed with Mouammar Qaddafi, when they met in August, the tension caused by the Libyans' presence in Suriname. France is reported to be especially concerned about Libyan presence because the largest rocket launching station of the European Space Agency is located only 150 km. away in French Guiana.

Uruguay

Hector Jose Paladino, a self-proclaimed Nazi who had displayed a Nazi flag and painted a large swastika on his Montevideo home, went on a shooting spree on December 21, killing two people, one of them a Jew, Simon Lasowsky Blockh; he also wounded one man. Two others whom he wanted to kill, including Jose Jerozolinski, who has a radio program and publishes a Jewish weekly, were unharmed. After the killings, more than a dozen members of the Jewish community received threatening telephone calls and Nazi graffiti appeared in several cities.

The Jewish Central Committee of Uruguay initiated legal proceedings shortly before the killings seeking a court order which would force Paladino to remove the flag and other Nazi propaganda from his home in downtown Montevideo. The Committee, lobbying for an anti-discrimination law, met with the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Culture to express their concern and to urge the government to outlaw incitement of racial and religious hatred. Although the media were supportive, the government's initial response was merely a disappointing promise to "study the matter." The Committee organized a public rally to mark the passing of 30 days since the bloody murders and to press its demands for a law against racial and religious discrimination. A few days before the rally, the government announced its intention to submit to the Congress a proposal for such a law.

Venezuela

The LaRouche sponsored, "Partido Laboral Venozelano" (PLV), announced in October that it plans to participate in the 1988 national elections. Alejandro Pena Esclusa, Secretary General of the PLV, called his group "the only organized moral force—besides the church and the armed forces—capable of providing the tools to reverse the destruction of Venezuela". . . . *Ultimas Noticias*, a Caracas daily which often serves as a conduit for LaRouche propaganda, printed a two-page article by Lyndon LaRouche concerning the financial crisis on Wall Street. LaRouche is described as a "prominent authority. . . whose economic predictions have been of unparalleled precision throughout the decade."

Soviet Jewry

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Latin America in October provided several Jewish communities in the region an opportunity to pressure the Soviet government to grant full freedom for Soviet Jews. Arriving at Ezeiza Airport in Buenos Aires, Argentina, he was met by members of the, "Youth Committee for Soviet Jewry," with placards declaring, "Let My People Go." The next day, 200 people demonstrated outside the Plaza Hotel while Shevardnadze met inside with Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo. D.A.I.A. had previously asked that Foreign Minister Dante Caputo and President Alfonsin raise the issue of Soviet Jewry in their meetings with the Soviet Foreign Minister. . . . In Montevideo, Uruguay, demonstrators were surprised when Foreign Minister Shevardnadze emerged from the Soviet embassy and crossed the street to meet with them. He spoke for about fifteen minutes with Dr. Pedro Sclofsky, president of the Comité Central Israelita de Uruguay, assuring him of the Soviet Union's "firm resolve to solve the problem of Soviet Jewish emigration." The Foreign Minister also invited Uruguayan Jewish leaders to send a delegation to the Soviet Union. . . . In August, a delegation of the "Uruguayan Committee for the Rights of the Soviet Jews," had presented the Soviet ambassador with a memorandum requesting permission for thirty-five "refuseniks" to emigrate. Among those who signed the memorandum were leaders of the "Broad Front," a leftist political coalition that includes the Uruguayan Communist party.

Efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews are continuing in many other countries. Christian and Jewish leaders in Chile signed a declaration in support of Soviet Jewry during an ecumenical "Day of Soviet Jewry." The declaration, sponsored by the "Organización Prodefensa Judios de la URSS," was sent to the United Nations representative in Chile to be delivered to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. . . . Yuri Edelshtern, a Soviet "refusenik" who recently emigrated to Israel, sent a letter to Dr. Ricardo Sanchez Serra, the editor of the Peruvian newspaper, *El Callao*, thanking him for participating in the struggle to free Soviet Jewry. Dr. Sanchez is a leader in the Peruvian "Committee for Human Rights for the Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union. . . . The Mexican Jewish community held a large demonstration in front of the Soviet embassy on the day Mikhail Gorbachev met with President Reagan in Washington.

Israel-Latin America

Foreign Minister Shimon Peres called on Brazil and Israel to open a "new page" in their relations. He made his remark during a visit to Uruguay and Brazil in December. His was the first visit to Brazil by an Israeli Foreign Minister in more than 20 years. At a luncheon he hosted, Brazilian Foreign Minister Roberto Costa Abreu Sodre expressed support for an international conference based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and for closer relations between Israel and Brazil. A senior Brazilian government official described the current status of bilateral relations as "at best, correct." There was no public mention during the Peres visit of an earlier report, attributed to Representative Bernardo Cabral, that the government of Brazil may be studying ways in which the United Nations vote equating Zionism with racism can be revised. Cabral told a reporter that "anti-Zionism is new clothing for an ancient prejudice."

Rio de Janeiro and Tel Aviv will become "sister cities." The mayor of Tel Aviv, Shlomo Lahat, is scheduled to visit Rio in January 1988, to coincide with the anniversary of the founding of Rio. . . . The Superior Institute for Study and Research of Salta, Argentina will send 100 young people to Israel for study in 1988; it plans to send 2,000 in 1989. . . . Former Israeli Finance Minister Yitzhak Moda'i met in Mexico City with Mexican economic experts to discuss the successful anti-inflationary measures implemented by the Israeli government.

. . . Israeli specialists in bone marrow transplants assisted in the treatment of victims of radioactive contamination in the Brazilian city of Goiania. . . . Three Israeli experts in cooperativism led a two week course in October for professionals and leaders of organizations connected with coffee growing cooperatives in Peru.

The Israeli labor union, Histadrut, is continuing to strengthen relations with its Latin American counterparts. The president of the Central General of Workers (CGT) of Brazil, Joaquin Dos Santos Andrade, in Israel as the special guest of the Histadrut, was reciprocating the visit to Brazil last year by Israel Keissar, the Histadrut secretary general. The CGT has 30 million members. . . . Celebrating 25 years of cooperation between Argentine and Israeli labor unions, Saul Ubaldini, secretary general of the Argentine CGT, and Abraham Alon, Secretary of International Relations of the Histadrut, called for the full participation of the workers in the economy, and discussed challenges facing labor in the future.

The Israeli ambassador in Uruguay, Eliezer Palmor, attended a reception in the embassy of the Soviet Union to mark the 70th anniversary of the Russian revolution. This was the first time since the two countries broke diplomatic relations in 1967 that an Israeli ambassador attended an official event in the Soviet embassy. . . . The Israeli and Cuban ambassadors in Mexico recently discussed the possibility of establishing informal relations between the two countries, especially in the fields of economics and trade.

Interfaith Activities

The Latin American Bishops Conference (CELAM), the University of Boston-Institute for the Study of Economic Culture and the ADL sponsored a conference on economic development and human growth in Latin America. The former President of Colombia, Dr. Belisario Betancur Cuartas, and several Latin American and North American economists were among the distinguished participants in the conference, which took place in Cartagena, Colombia, August 9-12.

The Dean of Faculty of the Evangelical Seminary of Puerto Rico, Prof. Luis Rivera, announced on August 17, that a new course on Judaism will be taught by Rabbi Alejandro Felch, of the Jewish Community Center of Puerto Rico. Dr. Rivera stated "today, we are making history in Puerto

Rico, bringing a better understanding of the Jewish religion and building a closer relationship and mutual respect, between both Judaism and Christianity."

Representatives of D.A.I.A. and the Argentine Catholic Church organized a conference, inspired by the visit of Pope John Paul II to Bahia Blanca, to unite the two communities at a time when waves of anti-Semitism threaten to divide the nation. Congregation Emanu-El and the Sisters of Zion, as well as various Catholic churches in Buenos Aires, joined in January for interreligious dialogue and an evaluation of the accomplishments of the past five years.

New ADL Publications In Spanish

- *El Judaismo: Una Introduccion* by Lawrence H. Schiffman. This 36 page book offers a concise overview of Jewish history and religion.
- *En Busca del Desarrollo* By Neal Futerfas. Survey of Israel's assistance programs in Latin American and other developing countries; 36 pages.

Both books can be ordered from the Jarkow Institute for Latin America of the ADL. Send \$2 per copy, for either book, to 823 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. Books will be sent post-paid, via surface mail.

The Latin American Report reflects information derived from a variety of sources as well as ADL's analyses of events that are of interest to the world Jewish community.

LATIN AMERICAN REPORT



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Our 75th Year



1913 - 1988

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ROGER MIRANDA BENGOCHEA

Before his defection in October 1987, Roger MIRANDA Bengoechea was a major in the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS), Chief of the Secretariat of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Defense, and member of the Sandinista Assembly (Central Committee).

During 1978 and 1979, Miranda fought in the Masaya region against the Somoza dictatorship, which was overthrown in July 1979. Miranda has served as Deputy Chief of the Sandinista Forces in Masaya, personal administrative assistant to Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega Saavedra, and aide to Chief of the General Staff Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo. Miranda became Chief of the Secretariat in early 1982. The Secretariat is the only entity that reports directly to Defense Minister Ortega, giving then Major Miranda more executive power than the Chief of the General Staff, who is a major general.

Miranda defected after visiting Nicaraguan battlefields where he says he noted that the resistance forces were not mercenaries but campesinos from the local population. "The Nicaraguan Resistance [forces] are the legitimate representatives of the interests and hopes of the Nicaraguan people," Miranda has said in an interview since his defection. He also says he was disgusted with the corruption that is "destroying the Sandinista cause." On October 25, 1987, accompanied by his wife Graciela, Miranda left Nicaragua for a medical examination in Mexico City, where he requested political asylum at the American Embassy.

Miranda was born October 2, 1953, in Granada, Nicaragua. He studied at the University of Chile in Santiago and the Autonomous University of Puebla in Mexico. He holds a bachelor's degree in economics.

Since his defection, Miranda has provided new information on the following topics:

Military Subjects

- Sandinista strategy for a continuing military build-up in the 1990's
- Cuban and Soviet advisors in Nicaragua
- The structure of the Sandinista Defense Ministry
- The Directorate of Military Intelligence (DIM)
- Sandinista Army equipment, organization, communications, and tactics
- Sandinista Air Force inventory and maintenance agreements with the Soviet Union
- New equipment in the Sandinista Navy
- Sale of North Korean weapons to Cuba

- Communications and information systems of the Defense Ministry
- Wiretapping capability in Nicaragua
- Sandinista support for the Salvadoran guerrillas

Political Subjects

- Biographic and lifestyle information on middle- and high-level Sandinista officials
- Business activities of Sandinista comandantes

Major Revelations

CONTINUED MILITARY BUILD-UP THAT CALLS FOR INCREASED SOVIET-BLOC MILITARY AID OVER THE NEXT SEVEN YEARS

- o The Soviet Union has promised the Sandinistas MiG-21 high-performance fighter aircraft, but has yet to deliver. The MiGs are now expected sometime after 1991. The Sandinistas also have requested more Mi-25 HIND-D helicopters, Mi-17 HIP helicopters, and an AN-26 transport aircraft.
- o The Sandinistas intend to build an army and militia totalling 500,000 men.
- o Many more armored personnel carriers, self-propelled howitzers, antitank weapons, surface-to-air missiles, and antiaircraft guns are expected or already have been delivered.
- o Three new 400-ton naval vessels are expected from the Soviet Union.
- o Miranda: The Sandinista comandantes "think that the only way of guaranteeing the development of their Marxist program in Nicaragua is to construct a powerful army. One can sign agreements, one can appear to be more flexible in the political system, but what they will never negotiate is the development of the Sandinista army. They know that their power rests, in the long run, in the size of that army."
- o Miranda: The Sandinistas "don't have any desire to negotiate the size of the army that they plan to have in Nicaragua. Yes, they are going to sit down to talk. But after months of discussion they are going to say that they didn't arrive at any agreement. I think that is the most vulnerable point--where they show the least desire to reach a peace in Central America."

CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS

- o According to Miranda, the Sandinista have continued to support the Salvadoran insurgents, in spite of the Central American peace plan.
- o At the request of guerrilla leader Joaquin Villalobos, Humberto Ortega agreed in September 1987 to provide training in the use of surface-to-air missiles to Salvadoran guerrillas.
- o In late October 1987, 15 Salvadoran guerrillas completed a 35-day course in using a variety of surface-to-air missiles. The training, conducted in Managua, was approved by the Sandinista comandantes.
- o This entire weapons-supply operation is handled by a clandestine entity known as "The Bureau," which is run by Comandante Bayardo Arce. Weapons bound for Salvadoran, Costa Rican, Colombian, and other Latin American guerrilla groups arrive on commercial flights or ships from Cuba and are stored in Managua.

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PLAN AS A WEAPON TO DISARM THE RESISTANCE

- o The Sandinistas have no intention of complying with the Guatemala peace accords.
- o Cuban and Soviet advisors have told the Sandinistas to talk of "democracy," "pluralism," and "reform." The goal of building a "Marxist state" is to be downplayed.
- o Miranda: "They [the Sandinistas] do not have the will to achieve that peace....They had already made an agreement with the Soviets and the Cubans the plans for the [Sandinista] army for the next eight years....With what desire, then, are they going to talk of peace when at the same time in the back of their minds they are thinking about creating one of the most powerful armies in Latin America--with an armament that few other armies in Latin America have? We are talking about self-propelled artillery, we are talking about MiG-21s, we are talking about new 400-ton ships for the navy--that no other Central American country has."
- o Miranda: The Sandinistas "have begun to recognize that the resistance enjoys a base of support in the countryside--an important social base. In fact, it is one of the fundamental facts that permits one to explain why after so many EPS [Sandinista Popular Army] offensives, they are still out there. The resistance in the Nicaraguan countryside is like a fish in the water."

PLANS TO INVADE COSTA RICA AND HONDURAS, AND CAPTURE U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY IN RESPONSE TO ANY DIRECT U.S. MILITARY ACTION.

- o In the event of direct U.S. intervention in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas will attempt to regionalize and protract the conflict by sending helicopters and troops to invade Costa Rica, destroying infrastructure targets and the U.S. Embassy in San Jose. A Sandinista battalion will simultaneously attack Honduras.

[Note: Quotes taken from an interview conducted by the Department of State on December 8, 1987.]

BENCHMARK FOR DEMOCRACY IN NICARAGUA

Central American

On December 8, 1987, the U.S. House of Representatives, by a vote of 346-58, called upon Nicaragua's Sandinista government to undertake reforms "in order to bring about lasting peace, pluralism, and democracy."* The following is a report on actions in Nicaragua since the signing of the Central American peace plan August 7. These events measure the commitment of the Sandinistas to the democratic principles endorsed by the House.

*The House adopted this language as an amendment to H.R. 3100, the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1987, which was approved by the House on December 10.

1. General

"(A) Ensure freedoms of expression, association, assembly and movement, religion, and education."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress
		✓	

The state of emergency, imposed over five years ago, nullifies or restricts basic civil liberties, including freedom of expression, the right to habeas corpus, the right to assemble, the right to strike, the right to privacy and the inviolability of home and communication, protection against secret arrest and arrest without warrant, protection against arrest without charges, trial, or sentencing, and other fundamental rights. The state of emergency is still in effect.

Although the Sandinistas allowed La Prensa and Radio Catolica to resume operations without censorship in October 1987, censorship decrees have not been revoked and licenses for other radio programs and an independent television station have been refused. Newspapers and television and radio stations confiscated by the government continue to operate as government or pro-Sandinista organs.

The government has permitted opposition street rallies but prohibits marches without prior approval. On August 15, 1987, an opposition rally was disrupted by Sandinista mobs, and human rights activist Lino Hernandez and bar association president Alberto Saborio were beaten and arrested by police. On September 27, 18 youths attending a Social Christian Party rally were arrested. On October 22, members of the January 22 Movement of Mothers of Political Prisoners were attacked by a Sandinista group. President Daniel Ortega said in a news conference in New York on October 8 that mass organizations such as the turbas divinas (divine mobs), which are used for intimidation and harassment, would not be disbanded.

"(B) Restore rights to security of person and home and freedom from unjustified arrest."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress ✓
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In recent weeks, since the signing of the Central American peace plan, Sandinista authorities have arrested and jailed participants of political rallies, reporters and distributors of La Prensa, a human rights leader, the president of the Nicaraguan bar association, and several youths distributing political leaflets. In several cases, persons were jailed without charges and released only after the cases were publicized.

"(C) Stop coercive pressure to join Sandinista party groups."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress ✓
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Sandinista mass organizations continue to work in combination with official government entities to broaden Sandinista control over Nicaraguan society and undermine independent labor and political organizations. For instance, the turbas divinas (divine mobs) -- which have recently been used to attack government critics and disrupt political meetings -- are controlled by the Interior Ministry's Department F-8. Also, the distribution of food ration cards through the Committees for the Defense of Sandinismo (CDS) apparatus is one way the Sandinistas continue to coerce public participation in government-sponsored groups.

"(D) Stop discriminatory and punitive application of military conscription."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress ✓
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On several occasions since the Central American peace plan was signed, the Sandinistas have justified the arrest of young political activists by charging draft evasion. In the past, the government has seized youths through house-to-house sweeps, roadblocks, and roundups at public places, such as movie theaters, dance halls, and ball parks. There is no evidence that these practices have been halted.

"(E) Allow all citizens, including refugees and exiles, to return to Nicaragua."	Significant Progress	Little Progress ✓	No Progress
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The Sandinistas have allowed a few expelled Nicaraguans and other exiles to return to the country. However, recently the government has repeatedly refused to admit Nicaraguan Resistance leaders to return until they accept a government amnesty, an act the rebels believe would be an unjustified admission of wrongdoing.

Two Catholic priests who had been expelled by the government have been allowed to return. However, they are only two of the 20 priests expelled.

The government has sponsored "family reunions" on the Honduran and Costa Rican borders with the declared intention of encouraging the repatriation of Nicaraguan refugees. These reunions were cancelled, and both borders were closed after two separate incidents, the first on October 18, in which over 600 more Nicaraguans fled the country.

"(F) Reinstate due process and fair trials and release those imprisoned without charge, trial, or due process, including <u>campesinos, Creoles, and Indians.</u> "	Significant Progress _____	Little Progress _____	No Progress _____✓
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"Serious human rights violations" are still being committed by the Sandinista justice system, the U.S.-based Lawyers Committee for Human Rights reported in November 1987. The group estimated that about 3,000 Nicaraguans had been detained and 1,118 faced charges for alleged anti-Sandinista activity. The security police continue to use death threats and psychological coercion to obtain confessions, the committee said.

In mid-December, three of Nicaragua's seven Supreme Court justices resigned, charging contempt on the part of the Sandinista government and a breakdown in legality.

"(G) Abolish extraordinary tribunals and the powers of police forces to conduct trials, decide appeals, and sentence individuals to prison terms."	Significant Progress _____	Little Progress _____	No Progress _____✓
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The partisan Sandinista "tribunals" continue to prosecute hundreds of cases beyond the bounds of the Nicaraguan justice system and constitutional protections. The forces of the Ministry of Interior retain special police powers that have produced documented abuses of civil liberties and human rights over the past seven years.

"(H) Permit independent human rights observers, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, to meet and travel freely and to visit prisoners, prisons, and tribunals."	Significant Progress _____	Little Progress _____✓	No Progress _____
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The Sandinistas maintain "model prisons" that are shown to international observers. Other prisons, including those in

which many of Nicaragua's estimated 8,000 to 9,000 political prisoners are still held, are not open for routine inspection by humanitarian groups. The Sandinistas have apparently not cooperated with any such monitoring efforts. For instance, in late September they promised to provide the Nicaraguan national reconciliation commission with a list of political prisoners, according to The New York Times (October 30, 1987). That list has never been produced.

"(I) End all forms of torture and conditions of confinement which constitute torture and end the practice of holding prisoners incommunicado."	Significant Progress _____	Little Progress _____	No Progress <u>✓</u>
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Nicaraguan refugees and defectors have testified to torture by Sandinista officials and abuse in government prisons. No human rights group has been allowed to inspect prisons or has documented any improvement in the Sandinista human rights record.

2. Political Process Reforms

"(A) Allow political parties and the democratic opposition to meet and march publicly, publicize meetings, and meet with and utilize the media."	Significant Progress _____	Little Progress <u>✓</u>	No Progress _____
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The state of emergency, which still is in effect, grants the Sandinista government authority to undertake actions against the internal opposition to silence dissent that otherwise would be deemed unconstitutional. The Sandinista government has made some concessions since signing the peace plan such as permitting opposition street rallies, but prohibits marches without prior approval. In recent months, marches have been attacked by Sandinista mobs.

Sandinista leaders have lodged relentless verbal attacks on the internal opposition. On Oct. 17 Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge accused members of the democratic opposition of being "servile" to U.S. "imperialism" and being enemies of the fatherland, according to Managua Domestic Radio Service. On October 20, Comandante Bayardo Arce said that the opposition had committed a "grave error" by believing that the national dialogue (required by the regional peace plan) was a "forum of equals" rather than a government versus its opposition, reported Barricada.

On December 2, Virgilio Godoy, then president of the Liberal Independent Party, described government efforts to subvert his political organization. (Godoy's statements were part of Radio

Catolica's first news broadcast since the Ministry of Interior blocked airing of the news program on October 19.)

"(B) End jailing of opposition party activists and the drafting of opposition party activists and their children in reprisal for non-violent political activity."	Significant Progress 	Little Progress 	No Progress
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On November 27, 1987, the Nicaraguan police arrested two youths who were distributing leaflets for the Liberal Independent Party; one of the boys was beaten by police. In an earlier example of reprisals by authorities, Tomasa Hernandez, formerly a prominent Sandinista, resigned from the January 22 Movement of Mothers of Political Prisoners after being warned by state security police that her 14-year old son would be drafted if she continued her work with the organization.

A November 1987 report by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (a U.S. group) reported that 3,000 Nicaraguans had been detained and 1,118 faced charges for alleged anti-Sandinista activity, according to the New York Times.

"(C) Abolish the role of the Committees for the Defense of Sandinismo (CDS) and other party organizations in dispensing rationing cards and government services."	Significant Progress 	Little Progress 	No Progress
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The CDSs, called the "eyes and ears of the revolution" by Interior Minister Tomas Borge, are charged with reporting suspicious or "counterrevolutionary" activity and enforce various government decrees. They control the distribution of ration cards needed to purchase basic goods and are authorized to assign rights and privileges such as medical care, employment, and travel. The CDSs continue to perform these functions. President Daniel Ortega said on October 8 on Managua Domestic Radio Service that these mass organizations would not be disbanded.

"(D) Conduct free and open presidential, legislative, and municipal elections by December 31, 1990, as specified by current Nicaraguan law."	Significant Progress 	Little Progress 	No Progress
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The Sandinistas have promised to allow free elections as scheduled in their constitution. However, in a speech at a trade union assembly in Managua on December 13, President Daniel Ortega said that if the Sandinista Party were to lose the

elections, it would "turn over the government, but not the power."

"(E) Repeal the suspension provisions of the Nicaraguan constitution."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress ✓
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Under the Sandinista constitution, the president can invoke a state of emergency that suspends basic civil liberties. The state of emergency has existed in Nicaragua for the past five and one half years and is in effect today. On November 13, the Sandinista government announced in a unilateral cease-fire proposal that it will not lift the state of emergency until all aid to insurgent forces ceases.

The internal opposition recently proposed the repeal of the power to suspend basic civil liberties; progress on this and other constitutional reforms has been blocked by the Sandinistas.

"(F) Separate the armed forces from any political party."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress ✓
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The Sandinistas have refused to forward to the National Assembly a constitutional amendment proposed by the opposition calling for separation of the armed forces from any political party.

3. Press and Media Rights

"(A) Allow an uncensored, free press."	Significant Progress	Little Progress ✓	No Progress
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Despite the return of one independent newspaper and one independent radio station, 16 radio stations, two television stations, and a newspaper have never been restored to private operation. Censorship decrees still are in effect. The only two independent news outlets operating today are not censored. However, Sandinista leaders have made clear that the media must "respect the desires the revolution." (President Daniel Ortega, November 23, and Interior Minister Tomas Borge, September 23)

On October 22, La Prensa reporter Carlos Ampie Calero was beaten by three men who said, "You people are out of line and the revolution isn't going to allow that." On November 11, Guillermo Amador Chavarria, who was selling copies of La Prensa in Boaco, was arrested by a Sandinista army patrol and held for several days. On December 1, Julio Jacamo Ledesma, La Prensa correspondent in the town of Rivas, was arrested without charges and later released.

"We are sort of hostages whose tongue of freedom of expression can be yanked out if a foreign congress does something that displeases the emperor," a La Prensa editorial said on November 13.

"(B) End newsprint restrictions and allow private newsprint sales."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress 
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La Prensa continues to depend on the Sandinista Party newspaper, Barricada, for newsprint supplies.

"(C) Allow the full spectrum of private television and radio broadcasting."	Significant Progress	Little Progress 	No Progress
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Radio Catolica's independent news broadcast was initially blocked by the government until the Ministry of Interior licensed the program. Other broadcast license applications have been refused or no action has been taken. The Sandinistas also have rejected an application by a private business group to establish an independent television station.

4. Labor Rights

"(A) Ensure the right to strike and to publish by independent unions."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress 
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There is no evidence that the Sandinistas have taken steps to ensure these rights. Strikes are banned under the state of emergency, which is still in effect. The newspaper of the independent Confederation of Trade Union Unity (CUS), Solidarity, which was closed by the government, has not been reopened.

A recent report by a delegation of U.S. union leaders that visited Nicaragua in September 1987 said, "Several unionists told us that those who refuse to join the Sandinista Workers Central suffer reprisals: takeovers of CUS offices, denial of ration cards, arrests and imprisonment of members and leaders, attacks on members' homes by Sandinista mobs, closure of union publications, and denial of legal recognition of CUS unions."

"(B) Release those imprisoned because of non-violent union activities."	Significant Progress	Little Progress 	No Progress
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The total number of political prisoners being held in Nicaragua, including trade union activists jailed by the government, is

difficult to verify. Since agreeing to Esquipulas II, which requires that decrees of amnesty be issued by signatories, the Sandinista government has pardoned 985 political prisoners in partial compliance with the regional accord. Those released are believed to account for about one-tenth of the independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights' estimate of 9,000 political prisoners.

5. Religious Freedoms

"(A) Allow the Catholic Church to reopen its social welfare, human rights, and publication offices."	Significant Progress _____	Little Progress _____	No Progress _____✓
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On September 22, the government announced that Radio Catolica, silenced by the government since January 1986, could begin transmitting its "religious and pastoral messages to the people." On October 19, the government blocked Radio Catolica's news program, ruling that the station must obtain a license for such a broadcast. On December 2, Radio Catolica's news program, "Iglesia," was broadcast.

The Catholic Church newspaper, Iglesia, closed by state security personnel in October 1985, has not been reopened. COPROSA, the Catholic Church's social welfare organization which was declared illegal by the Sandinista government in April 1986, has not reopened.

"(B) Allow Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo to resume his televised Sunday Mass."	Significant Progress _____	Little Progress _____	No Progress _____✓
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Cardinal Obando's celebration of Mass has not been televised.

"(C) Allow the return of all expelled Catholic priests."	Significant Progress _____	Little Progress _____✓	No Progress _____
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On September 14, Father Bismarck Carballo, former director of Radio Catolica, and Father Benito Petito, a parish priest, were allowed to return to Nicaragua. However, these are only two of the 20 priests who have been expelled by the Sandinistas.

"(D) Allow religion courses to be taught in private schools."	Significant Progress _____	Little Progress _____	No Progress _____✓
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"Sandinista Patriotic Education" is still required today in private religious schools. In a recent speech, Comandante Tomas Borge said that private schools are a threat to the revolution.

"(E) Allow Protestant evangelicals to preach and conduct meetings."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress
	_____	_____✓_____	_____

Protestant churches in Nicaragua, like their Catholic counterparts, have suffered from Sandinista persecution and divisionist tactics. In February 1984, Prudencio Baltodano, a farmer and Pentecostal lay preacher, survived the brutality of Sandinista soldiers who cut off his ears, slit his throat, and left him to die. Other Christians have been branded "theologians of death" or "pharisees" by Sandinista block committees.

The United Methodist Reporter on November 15, 1985, reported the harassment of church workers, including "arrests in the middle of the night; interrogation sessions lasting 6 to 12 hours, often while church workers stood naked in "refrigerator" rooms; attempts to secure signed confessions of involvement with rebels; efforts to entrap church workers in what would appear to be sexual improprieties; and warnings not to criticize the government, not to oppose the military draft, and not to preach the Gospels to people outside church buildings."

There is no evidence that conditions have improved for Protestant evangelicals living in Nicaragua today.

6. Campesino Rights

"(A) End preventive detention and forcible resettlement of campesinos and allow those who have been displaced to return."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress
	_____	_____✓_____	_____

The Sandinista government has uprooted tens of thousands of peasants to remove them from areas of the country where they were suspected of lending support to the Nicaraguan Resistance. In addition, in January 1982, about 10,000 to 12,000 Miskito Indians were uprooted from their homes near the Coco River and marched into crowded government relocation camps west of Puerto Cabezas and north of Jinotega and Matagalpa. Some Miskitos have been allowed to return since then.

"(B) Cease aerial bombing attacks against civilians and their properties."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress
	_____	_____	_____✓_____

There are reports that the Sandinistas resorted to indiscriminate bombing and shelling of civilian targets in southeastern Nicaragua. On November 17, a rocket launcher

deployed by the Sandinista army hit civilian houses in the southeastern countryside. On September 14, two Sandinista helicopters bombed the civilian hamlet of Casa de Tablas. "They (Sandinista troops) are like wild beasts when they go through this wilderness," said campesino Cesar Perez. "They don't come into the bush just to look for the enemy--for the people who are armed--but to hunt down civilians who don't have any way to defend themselves."

The Nicaraguan Resistance has reported that, on December 24, the government bombed the civilian villages of Santa Marta, Cuatro Esquinas, El Castillal, and Mesa Redonda in Jinotega province. The resistance also reported that Sandinista troops carried out reprisals against civilian populations near Siuna, Bonanza, and Rosita.

"(C) Cease the destruction of peasant farmlands."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress 
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There have been many examples of expropriation of farmlands. For instance, in July 1981, the government instituted the law of absentee owners, under which anyone who remained outside the country for over six months could be declared absent and their property could be claimed by the state. Although the law was rescinded on September 22, 1987, it was not retroactive, and no property has been returned. The government also has enacted decrees establishing grounds for confiscation, although authorities do not need a legal basis for seizing property. On some occasions, the military or government officials simply arrive at a farm and announce they are taking over.

"(D) End pressure to join Sandinista farming cooperatives."	Significant Progress	Little Progress	No Progress 
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The Sandinistas continue to use economic and military pressure on civilians to join cooperatives, many of which are used for military purposes. Access to farm loans, scarce tools, fertilizer, and seed is completely controlled by the state and is used to pressure individual farmers into joining cooperatives. These military/agricultural cooperatives provide a military presence in a contested area, provide intelligence collection points, and serve as garrisons.

Sandinista agricultural cooperatives are being used as military facilities. Entire farm families have been and continue to be relocated by the army from single family farms to these strategically located cooperatives. The Sandinistas have relocated thousands of people by force. Valle Ducuali, Nueva Guinea, and Abisinia are three examples of military installations combined into a military farm project.

Around Nueva Guinea, massive relocation has taken place, and there is continuing pressure on individuals in Jinotega, Matagalpa, Bocao, and Chontales. Sandinistas have been forcing peasants to take up arms and defend the cooperatives, and peasants who refuse are denied agricultural credits or ration cards.

The Nicaraguan Resistance has successfully attacked several agricultural cooperatives/garrisons inflicted casualties on Sandinista troops. On May 26, 1987, a combined force from several resistance units attacked a garrison/agricultural cooperative near Mancotal in Jinotega. The base was occupied by civilian workers and at least 48 Sandinista soldiers. Recovered were 26 AK rifles, one PKM machine gun, 42 RPG 7 grenades, 25,000 PKM rounds, 40 AD magazines, and other supplies.

7. Indian and Creole Rights

"(A) Permit Indian and Creole residents to freely travel, assemble, speak, publish, broadcast, and maintain cultural beliefs and practices."	Significant Progress 	Little Progress 	No Progress
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On October 29, the Nicaraguan government rejected a negotiated settlement with the Miskito Indian officials and other indigenous peoples of Nicaragua. The government had previously appeared willing to allow 10 exiled leaders of the Atlantic Coast indigenous communities to return to Managua, without conditions, to discuss a proposal to end the six-year conflict. The government changed its mind at the last moment and insisted that the Indian leaders accept an amnesty before traveling to Managua.

"(B) End forcible detention and relocation of Indian and Creole residents and allow them to return to their home communities."	Significant Progress 	Little Progress 	No Progress
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In June 1985, some 12,000 Miskitos and Sumo Indians were released from internal relocation camps at Tasba Pri to return to their Coco River communities under a short-lived autonomy plan. Some 8,000 other Indians and ladinos remained in camps near Jinotega and Matagalpa. Since then, about 4,000 Indians have been transferred to the Tasba Pri camps. None have been allowed to return since the signing of the peace plan.

"(C) Cease aerial bombings and attacks on Atlantic Coast civilians and their properties."	Significant Progress 	Little Progress 	No Progress 
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As recently as the last two weeks of December 1987 there were credible reports that Sandinista troops burned homes and

arrested Indian inhabitants in communities between Puerto Cabezas and the Honduran border. There have also been unconfirmed reports of executions. Earlier that month, a large number of military-age males were detained by security forces in Puerto Cabezas during resistance attacks against the Sandinistas.

"(D) Allow Indians and Creoles to engage in traditional farming, fishing, hunting, and necessary subsistence activity."	Significant Progress 	Little Progress 	No Progress
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In an area that never knew hunger before Sandinista rule, the Atlantic Coast has suffered periodic food shortages because of frequent government restrictions on farming, hunting, and fishing. These policies have been known to change from one day to the next in zones under Sandinista control. The Coco River communities, lately under the control of the Indian resistance, have begun to produce sufficient amounts of staples to feed local residents.

Department of State
7 January 1988

THE NICARAGUAN MILITARY BUILD-UP

The Military Build-up in Nicaragua is the Result of Soviet and Cuban Aid.

Soviet and Cuban support to Nicaragua is greater than previously believed. According to Major Roger Miranda's information, the Soviets have assisted Nicaragua at a strategic level with arms and logistical assistance allowing their Cuban allies to deliver the materiel and equipment and to advise at the tactical level, in an effort to establish a Marxist-Leninist state in Central America and that the Sandinistas have and will continue to support the interests of Soviet foreign policy. Furthermore, Miranda has said that they are likely to play an even greater role in the future.

Major Roger Miranda

Prior to his October 1987 defection, Major Roger Miranda was the chief of the Secretariat of the Ministry of Defense. The secretariat is basically the registry and control point for the Ministry of Defense. His position gave him peer status with the Sandinista Army Chief of Staff, Major General Joaquin Cuadra. As such, he worked directly for the Nicaraguan Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega.

Miranda defected to the United States on October 25, 1987. He brought with him a wealth of information that documents the structure, operations, and future intentions of the Sandinista Ministry of Defense. The following points illustrate the structure and intentions of this Central American military force.

Sandinista Popular Army - 1987

A. Ground Forces

According to official Sandinista Government documents, the current strength of the ground forces of the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) is 165,000. Just under 80,000 of these are presently on active duty. The ground forces have two missions: to defend the country against counterinsurgency and to defend the country against a possible invasion. The army is already larger and better equipped than the army of any other Central American country. In fact, it is larger and better equipped than the sum of the armies of all other Central American countries. The army of Mexico, at its current strength of 105,000 active troops is not much larger.

B. Navy

The current strength of the Sandinista Navy (MGS) is 6500 men with 26 naval vessels. Their missions include the patrol of their coastal waters, naval air defense, coastal surveillance, and to assist local ground forces units in counterinsurgency efforts.

Visiting Soviet Navy and Air Force officers performed a survey of the Sandinista Navy and Air Force in late 1987. This survey resulted in a meeting with the Sandinista Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega. The Soviet Navy officers advised Ortega to increase the size and capabilities of the Sandinista Navy. Presently, the navy has a limited operational capability and is mainly used for coastal defense. In the past it has provided operational support to resupply operations for the Salvadoran insurgents (FMLN).

C. Air Force/Air Defense

The current strength of the Sandinista Air Force/Air Defense (FAS/DAA) is 3200 with 72 aircraft. Their missions are to provide air support (in the form of air transport, MEDEVAC, and close air support) to counterinsurgency forces and air defense. Presently, the Sandinista Air Force/Air Defense has limited transport assets but an evolving intercept capability. Their inventory of surface to air missiles (SAM) is growing and requests for newer and more sophisticated systems have already been made. The Chief of

the Air Force requested from the Chief of Staff of the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS) that Soviet helicopter pilots with experience in low intensity warfare be brought into Nicaragua to train their pilots and crews and to ask the Soviets for immediate resupply of helicopters.

Sandinista Popular Army - 1995

A. The Plans

For a Central American country, an active army of 80,000 troops is considerable. According to the information obtained from Major Miranda and corroborated by the Ortega brothers, the growth of the Sandinista Armed Forces over the last eight years has been the result of a series of relatively short-term plans. However, in 1985, a five-year plan was negotiated and agreed upon in Havana, Cuba during a Cuban/Soviet/Nicaraguan tripartite conference. This plan, named Diriangen I, covers the 1986 to 1990 timeframe and calls for both qualitative and quantitative additions and improvements throughout the Sandinista military establishment. Diriangen I is only the first in what may prove to be a series of five-year plans. Evidence indicates that Diriangen I is not merely a concept, but rather has been in motion for the last two years and is proceeding well. There is also information indicating that Diriangen II, the plan covering the 1991 to 1995 timeframe was probably negotiated in November, 1987, and that Diriangen III and IV probably are already in conceptual stages.

B. Diriangen I (1986 to 1990)

In the first two years of Diriangen I communist countries provided more than \$1 billion in military aid to the Sandinistas. To date, this aid accounts for the two highest annual dollar amounts of military aid ever given to the Sandinistas. This plan, negotiated and agreed upon in 1985, calls for the introduction of nine major Soviet weapons systems into Nicaragua by 1990. After only two years of Diriangen I, five of these nine systems have already been delivered. These five new Soviet-made systems have significantly increased the Sandinistas' antitank and air defense capabilities. Within the next three years, the plan also calls for the creation of five new helicopter squadrons and an SA-3, low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air missile regiment. (48 launchers)

Quantitatively, Diriangen I outlines the creation of 6 new infantry brigades and 100 new reserve infantry and militia battalions. So far, 2 of the new brigades and at least 23 of the new battalions have already been formed. In less than two years the Sandinista Popular Army will be 375,000 men, three times their present strength. Diriangen I also calls for the introduction of naval diving platforms and diving equipment that may enable the navy to conduct underwater construction activity.

C. Diriangen II (1991 to 1995)

Three years from now the Sandinistas will begin their second five-year plan, Diriangen II. This plan will last from 1991 to 1995, and makes the previous plans pale in comparison. According to Major Miranda, this plan was probably negotiated in November 1987, also in Havana, Cuba, by the same Cuban/Soviet/Nicaraguan tripartite conference. It provides for an unprecedented increase in personnel, enlarging the ranks of the Sandinista Armed Forces to 600,000 by 1995. This figure of 600,000 was publicly admitted by Nicaraguan Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega and substantiated by the Sandinista documents the U.S. Government now has. Ortega claims that a 600,000-man army will be necessary to defend Nicaragua against an invasion by Central American forces and the United States. Costa Rica (Nicaragua's neighbor to the south) has no army and Honduras (Nicaragua's neighbor to the north) has a military force that numbers only 22,000. By 1995, Nicaragua's projected population growth will be 4.48 million. A 600,000-man armed force would place every eligible male in Nicaragua between the ages of 15 and 39 under arms and military control.

Diriangen II also provides for a substantial increase in, and the introduction of new Soviet weaponry. By 1995 the Sandinistas will have 1038 artillery pieces, 980 armored vehicles, 1491 antiaircraft artillery pieces, and 1872 man-portable surface-to-air missiles. Nicaragua is a country approximately the size of Iowa. The following is a breakdown:

- Artillery

- . They will have 738 antitank guns. This is in a region where only about 200 non-Nicaraguan, Central American armored vehicles exist. Less than 25 of these are actually tanks.
- . The Sandinistas will also be obtaining self-propelled artillery, increasing the mobility of their artillery support, and long-range field artillery, increasing their capability to fire upon targets from greater distances.

- Armored Vehicles

- . They will be obtaining 78 more T-55 medium tanks, upgrading their total tank inventory to 230; a 10 to 1 advantage over all other Central American tanks.
- . They will obtain 311 additional armored personnel carriers, 218 of which are an improved version (BTR-70PB).
- . They will be increasing by 300% their current inventory of Soviet armored reconnaissance vehicles. Many of these will be armed with wire-guided antitank missiles--accounting for even more antitank weapons in addition to the aforementioned 738 antitank guns.

- Air Force/Air Defense

Diriangen II will upgrade air defense capabilities, improve air transport and close-air-support capabilities, and add a high-performance fighter intercept capability. To accomplish this, the plan calls for:

- . Doubling their total helicopter inventory.
- . Increasing the Sandinista total inventory of man-portable surface-to-air missiles from 589 to between 1500 and 1600.
- . Introduction of low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air missiles, such as SA-3s, SA-6s, and SA-13s. This will extend the Sandinistas' air defense umbrella to an altitude of 18,000 meters (58,500 feet) and a range of 60 kilometers.
- . Introduction of a squadron of 12 MiG-21s. The information obtained from Major Miranda indicates that the Sandinistas are still planning on obtaining MiG-21s from the Soviets.

- Navy

The Sandinista Navy will more than double their current inventory of patrol craft and minesweepers. This includes the introduction of a new, larger class of naval vessels into Nicaragua. These new vessels have a displacement of 400 tons, 57mm or larger armament, and a range of more than 1500 nautical miles. Although Major Miranda's documents do not specifically name the type or class of this new naval vessel, it would most likely be a large patrol combatant or a submarine chaser.

D. Diriangen III and IV (Beyond 1995)

Miranda stated that after Diriangen I and II there would most certainly be a Diriangen III and IV, and these subsequent plans would probably call for, among other things, the introduction of missile patrol boats and submarines.

On different occasions, Cuban, Soviet, and Nicaraguan personnel have discussed/surveyed the possibilities of constructing submarine bases at least in three separate areas on both the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, and Diriangen I already gives the Sandinistas some underwater construction capabilities. The establishment of submarine bases along these coastlines would represent a potential threat to vital commercial shipping lanes for the United States, the security of the Panama Canal, Caribbean waterways crucial to U.S. wartime contingency support to European Allies, and the Pacific coastline of North America.

Support to Regional Subversive Movements

The Sandinistas provide guerrillas throughout the region with arms and training through a clandestine government agency known as "the Bureau." This entity is directed by Bayardo Arce, one of the nine ruling Sandinista comandantes. Miranda stated that until 1985, he (Miranda) personally coordinated maritime deliveries of military materiel to the Salvadoran guerrillas and over the past six years, Salvadoran guerrillas have lived, trained, worked, and rested in Nicaragua. They have also used Nicaragua as a transit point to Cuba for additional, more intensive, and specialized training. In October 1987, the Sandinistas provided training in Managua to 15 Salvadoran guerrillas on the use of man-portable surface-to-air missiles, such as the SA-7, SA-14, and U.S. REDEYE. In December, the Sandinistas offered 10,000 automatic assault rifles (GALIL, FAL, M-16, and G-3) to the Salvadoran guerrillas from Nicaraguan Ministry of Interior inventories.

Elsewhere in the region, the Sandinistas have provided training and arms to left-wing political groups from the neighboring countries of Honduras and Costa Rica. According to Miranda, the Sandinista leadership feels that these groups cannot be counted on to accomplish all of their insurgent-related tasks. Because of this, the Sandinistas have planned to immediately attack both of these countries in case of United States military intervention in Nicaragua. This will be done in order to regionalize any conflict involving Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have also supplied weapons, ammunition, and equipment to other insurgent and terrorist groups, such as the Colombian M-19.

Sandinista Objectives

According to Miranda, the Sandinistas hope that their arms build-up will help them accomplish the following:

- Defeat the rebels by 1990
- Militarization of Nicaraguan society
- Consolidate their revolution
- Continue supporting other regional insurgent movements
- Interfere, subvert, and destabilize area democracies to further communist goals
- Upgrade and improve their military arsenal
- Make a U.S. intervention too costly, both militarily and politically for the U.S. to consider

Soviet Goals

The Soviets recognize the geopolitical and economic value of Latin America. Therefore, the Soviets will exploit every opportunity to pursue and establish a communist base in America's mainland. A Soviet presence in Nicaragua would have serious implications for regional stability and U.S. national security. In return for the \$2.6 billion of military aid that the Soviets have provided Nicaragua since 1982 they possibly will realize various strategic returns such as:

- Nicaraguan surrogates that can project military power to other areas of the world similar to Cuba's military activities in Africa, or replace/supplement surrogates already in place throughout the world.
- A country which can host increasing numbers of regional guerrilla movements and international terrorists for training and safe haven. With this additional support, these groups will be more capable of disrupting regional democracies.
- Establishment of operation centers and intelligence/reconnaissance bases within Nicaragua in order to extend aerial and maritime surveillance along the Pacific Coast of North America.
- Improved Sandinista capabilities to monitor the movements and activities of Central American military forces as well as U.S. military forces within the United States itself, thus undermining the element of surprise from U.S. contingency operations.
- Possibly establish bases for naval forces and use them in conjunction with airfields for Cuban and Soviet reconnaissance and offensive units. This will threaten vital Caribbean sea lanes through which more than half of U.S. oil imports and nearly half of U.S. exports and imports transit.
- Major hostilities in Central America could be used to divert U.S. attention and to draw its quick reaction forces into a regionalized conflict. Miranda said that in case of U.S. military intervention, Sandinista forces will attack Costa Rica and Honduras, as well as activate insurgent/subversive movements within various Central American countries in an attempt to make intervention by the United States even more costly, both politically and militarily. Plans for such action have already been discussed, approved, and coordinated so that they will be triggered and executed automatically. If such a conflict were regionalized, it would impact on the abilities of key U.S. military forces to react to primary strategic missions elsewhere in the world.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 20, 1988

*Central
America*

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATION SPOKESPERSONS

FROM: MARION C. BLAKEY *mcb*
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Revised Issue Brief on Continued Aid to the
Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance

Attached for your information and use is a revised White House Issue Brief, appropriate for public distribution, on the Reagan Administration's call for continued aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance. The materials have been revised to cover the events of this past weekend at the summit meeting of the Central American presidents.

If you have any questions concerning these materials, please feel free to contact the White House Office of Public Affairs at (202) 456-7170.

Thanks very much.

THE CASE FOR CONTINUED AID
TO THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE

On February 3rd and 4th, Congress will consider President Reagan's request for continued assistance to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters. Most of the aid the President is requesting will be for economic and humanitarian purposes.

The votes cast in the House and Senate will determine the fate of democracy throughout Central America. Meanwhile, the threat posed by a Marxist beachhead on the North American continent grows more serious each day.

The U.S. actively supports a negotiated peace in the region, but Sandinista actions undermine the Guatemala Accord.

U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters supports the objectives of the Guatemala Accord. Pressure from the Resistance, in fact, is essential for the ultimate success of the Accord.

Nicaragua's intransigence has been the primary obstacle to peace. Its failure to comply with the Guatemala Accord's provisions on democratization and national reconciliation blocks progress in other areas. This was the position taken by the presidents of the four Central American democracies at the January 15-16 Central American summit meeting.

The steps announced at the summit meeting by Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega to comply with the Guatemala Accord were steps that should have been taken within 90 days of the signing of the Accord in August. His January 16 announcement was an admission that he had failed to live up to the Accord. Only the prospect of continued U.S. aid to the Resistance pressured Ortega to announce these steps.

Ortega's announced lifting of the State of Emergency and his willingness to enter into direct cease-fire negotiations with the Resistance could be significant steps for peace and democracy, if carried out in good faith as promised. However, Ortega has yet to demonstrate whether he is committed to peace and democracy -- or merely to having Congress cut off aid to the Resistance, leaving the Sandinistas to consolidate their power unchecked.

The Sandinistas have a record, beginning with promises to the Organization of American States in 1979 and continuing through the Guatemala Accord of August 7, 1987, of making promises of democracy and freedom they do not keep.

At the very time Ortega was making his promises at the Central American summit meeting, the Sandinistas' internal security forces executed a wave of arrests and interrogations of leading members of the surviving democratic political elements in Nicaragua.

Moreover, while Ortega demands unilateral termination of support for the forces of freedom in Nicaragua, the massive flow to the Sandinistas of Soviet bloc arms continues unabated.

The Nicaraguan government plans to boost the ranks of its armed forces to 600,000 (one of every five Nicaraguan citizens) by 1995 under a defense agreement with the Soviet Union and seeks to acquire advanced Soviet-made MIG fighter planes, missiles and artillery.

The Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance has repeatedly demonstrated its viability as a fighting force. A preemptive cutoff of U.S. aid would undermine the Agreement by making serious negotiations, democratization, and national reconciliation far less likely. Daniel Ortega's words are not enough to justify ending U.S. support of the Resistance. The Sandinistas must implement their promises of democracy.

The four Central American democracies agree that democratization in Nicaragua is essential for peace and security in the region. The Guatemala Accord calls for negotiations -- not surrender.

As President Reagan said on December 19, 1987:

"The Freedom Fighters brought the Sandinistas to the negotiating table; only the Freedom Fighters can keep them there.... Making sure the Freedom Fighters remain a viable force in Nicaragua is the only way to make the peace process go forward -- to give peace and democracy a chance..."

I. THE GUATEMALA ACCORD
AND U.S. AID TO THE RESISTANCE

- o On August 7, 1987, Daniel Ortega and the four other Central American presidents signed the Guatemala Accord -- a vision of regional peace based on freedom and democracy.
- o The five presidents agreed to initiate a process of democratization within 90 days of signature, including complete freedom of the press, full political pluralism, and the lifting of all states of emergency.
- o At the time it was signed, the four Central American democracies -- El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala -- were already in substantial compliance with the Accord. But Nicaragua lagged far behind them.
- o President Reagan regards the Guatemala Accord as a reasonable framework for bringing about needed change and supports the Accord's goals of peace and democracy in Central America.
- o The Reagan Administration is actively trying to make the Guatemala Accord work:
 - Secretary Shultz met with the foreign ministers of El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and Guatemala in November 1987.
 - Special Envoy to Central America Morris D. Busby has made numerous trips to the region since the Accord was signed.
 - The President has offered to include Nicaragua in regional security talks, once serious direct Sandinista-Resistance cease-fire talks are underway and making progress.
- o U.S. aid to the Democratic Resistance in Nicaragua supports the provisions of the Guatemala Accord. Democracy is the Accord's bottom line. Democracy is what the Resistance seeks.
- o Pressure from the Resistance is essential for the ultimate success of the Accord. It is that pressure -- and only that pressure -- that brought the Sandinistas to the negotiating table. It is our best insurance policy for eventual Sandinista compliance.

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- o Current U.S. policy provides Central America's democracies with the "breathing space" they need to deflect attacks from the left and from the right.
 - o El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have made tremendous progress in the last few years. Their freely-elected governments are in office today because the previous military rulers of these countries were persuaded by the depth and durability of the U.S. commitment to democracy in the region.
 - o U.S. policy has successfully prevented further polarization between left and right extremists in Central America and has strengthened the democratic center. The vicious circle of leftist guerrilla violence followed by military seizures of power and crackdowns has been held at bay.

II. SANDINISTA NONCOMPLIANCE

- o The Sandinistas are not complying with the Guatemala Accord. Their goal is to go through the motions in an effort to induce Congress to defeat the Resistance for them.
- o Sandinista concessions to date are largely cosmetic -- and easily reversible. Consider:
 1. The Sandinistas failed to lift the State of Emergency within 90 days as provided for in the Accord. President Ortega did finally lift it as of January 18. But by waiting until two weeks before Congress votes on aid to the Resistance, he raises serious questions about his commitment to reform.
 2. The broad amnesty envisioned in the Guatemala Accord has not been granted. Only 986 individual pardons have been granted -- while more than an estimated 9,000 political prisoners remain jailed. Ortega announced a provisional amnesty plan on January 16, but at present this is only a promise.
 3. Press freedom has not been restored. While the newspaper La Prensa and Radio Catolica have been reopened, dozens of media outlets remain closed. Sandinista officials have publicly warned La Prensa that it can be closed quickly. Other media outlets confiscated by the government continue to act as Sandinista organs.
 4. Harrassment of opposition and human rights groups continues. On August 15, 1987, an opposition rally was disrupted by Sandinista mobs and human rights activist Lino Hernandez and bar association president Alberto Saborio were beaten and arrested by police. On October 22, members of the Movement of Mothers of Political Prisoners were attacked by a Sandinista group.
- o Until now, The Sandinistas have refused to negotiate directly with the Democratic Resistance in order to achieve a cease-fire agreement. In contrast, the governments of Guatemala and El Salvador have met their insurgents face-to-face.
- o The Sandinistas agreed only to "negotiate" through a mediator, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo. But they rejected the Cardinal's interim cease-fire proposal and cancelled a second round of discussions on short notice. Their proposals have been little more than invitations for the Resistance to surrender. There is no evidence to suggest that they will be any more serious about direct negotiations than they were about their indirect "negotiations."

III. THE SANDINISTA MILITARY BUILDUP

- o There is no longer real debate about Sandinista intentions or support for subversion in Central America.
 - Several years ago, much opposition to U.S. policy centered around disagreement over the nature of the Sandinista regime, its relationship to the Soviet bloc, and its support for subversion.
 - There is a growing consensus in Congress that a consolidated communist regime in Nicaragua represents a threat to the democracies in the region and to the United States.

The Soviet-Cuban Connection

- o With Soviet bloc aid, the Sandinistas have already equipped Nicaragua with the largest and most powerful armed force in Central America.
- o The total Sandinista military force has about 120,000 regulars, reserves, militia, and security forces -- nearly as large as the forces of the four Central American democracies combined (152,600).
- o Since 1979, the Sandinistas have received nearly 120,000 metric tons of military equipment from the Soviet bloc.
- o Between 1979 and 1987, Soviet bloc credit and aid amounted to over \$2 billion, nearly \$1.1 billion in 1986 and 1987 alone.
 - Currently in Nicaragua there are between 1,500-2,000 Cuban military advisors, 50-75 Soviet advisors, and perhaps 200 more from Eastern European nations.
 - Periodically, advisors appear from Third World countries, such as Libya, and from terrorist organizations such as the PLO.
- o Soviet and Soviet bloc economic assistance to Nicaragua and Cuba has been five times greater than U.S. aid to all of Central America between 1979 and 1987.

Miranda's Revelations

- o Last month, Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega confirmed the startling revelations of former Chief of the Defense Ministry Secretariat, Major Roger Miranda, who defected to the United States in October, 1987.
- o The Nicaraguan government will boost the ranks of its armed forces to 600,000 (one of every five Nicaraguan citizens) by 1995 under a defense agreement with the Soviet Union and seeks to acquire advanced Soviet-made MIG fighter planes, missiles and artillery.
- o Humberto Ortega said "several thousand" Nicaraguan soldiers are taking courses in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to learn to operate these new weapons systems.
- o The Sandinistas are developing facilities which could significantly expand Soviet and Cuban military power in the Western Hemisphere and directly threaten the United States.
- o With these new facilities, the Soviets could:
 - Attack targets with tactical fighter-bombers in Central America and the Caribbean, including the Panama Canal and the Gulf of Mexico, which are vital to U.S. defense of Europe and the Persian Gulf;
 - Threaten Hemispheric shipping lanes and the continental U.S. with intermediate and long-range bombers such as the TU-95 BEAR;
 - Fly reconnaissance missions along the U.S. Pacific Coast, just as they use Cuba to fly such missions along our Atlantic Coast;
 - Expand communications interception capabilities to include the West Coast and the Mid-Western United States; and
 - Severely complicate U.S. defense planning, forcing us to divert resources from other high priority areas such as the Far East, Europe, and the Persian Gulf, and threaten U.S. ability to respond to crises throughout the world.
- o Clearly a consolidated, militarily-powerful Sandinista regime in Nicaragua will represent a serious threat to the democracies in the region.

- o A consolidated communist regime in Nicaragua would be free to destabilize the neighboring new democracies.
 - Social and economic problems and weak political systems could be easily exploited.
 - Governments would be less able to withstand subversion in the absence of clear U.S. resolve.
 - If they feel threatened by increased leftist violence at home, the probability of right-wing military coups is high in the absence of strong U.S. commitment.

IV. THE RESISTANCE IS A VIABLE FIGHTING FORCE,
HAS ATTRACTED POPULAR SUPPORT

- o The Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance forces have now increased to some 16,000 Freedom Fighters inside Nicaragua. They have demonstrated that they are a potent military force capable of exerting pressure and attracting popular support.
- o The Nicaraguan people support the Resistance in the areas where the Resistance now operates. There is reason to expect that people will support the Freedom Fighters wherever they operate in the future.
- o The large operations conducted recently, which featured several thousand troops traveling great distances over 15 days, could not have been carried out successfully without popular support.
- o Last month, in the Las Minas operation, the Resistance coordinated a number of units and simultaneously attacked three Sandinista-held towns, successfully destroying radar installations, petroleum tanks, munitions warehouses, and Sandinista army headquarters'.
- o For the past year, the Resistance has been operating in nearly all provinces of Nicaragua and has been effectively engaging Sandinista troops.
- o Skillful use of anti-aircraft fire has largely neutralized Sandinista air superiority. The U.S. can confirm the destruction of more than a dozen helicopters, including some MI-25s, the infamous "flying tank" used by the Soviets in Afghanistan. Sandinista defectors now talk of fear among Sandinista pilots before each mission.
- o The combined military, political, and economic pressure has given heart to the internal opposition, which has become bolder with the emergence of a genuine challenge to the Sandinista regime.
- o As President Reagan has said,

"With their blood and courage, the Freedom Fighters of Nicaragua have pinned down the Sandinista army and bought the people of Central America precious time. We Americans owe them a debt of gratitude. In helping thwart the Sandinistas and their Soviet mentors, the Resistance has contributed directly to the security of the United States."

V. A DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION BETRAYED

- o The Marxist Sandinista government in Nicaragua has been the primary source of instability in Central America, virtually from the time it overthrew the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza in July, 1979.
- o The Sandinistas promised the Organization of American States, in writing, to establish a genuine democracy, hold free elections, and respect human rights.
- o Barely two months after assuming power, however, the Sandinista leadership met secretly to draft a report, later known as the "72-Hour Document," outlining a blueprint for establishing communism in Nicaragua and spreading subversion throughout the region.
- o Nicaragua, indeed, became the Marxist totalitarian regime envisioned in the "72-Hour Document," abusive of human rights and seeking to destabilize the emerging democracies in the region. The Sandinista regime has refused to hold free elections, has militarized the nation, and has supported armed insurrection in other countries in ways that serve the Soviet goals of destabilization and conflict.
- o Economic mismanagement, human rights violations, and abuse of government authority have driven some 250,000 Nicaraguans into exile. By 1982, many had taken up arms against the Sandinista regime as freedom fighters in a democratic resistance movement dedicated to fulfilling the original promises of the anti-Somoza revolution.
- o The Sandinistas suspended all civil liberties in October 1985. Last year a "new" Nicaraguan constitution was created -- then immediately suspended.

VI. SELECTED QUOTATIONS

"Communist domination in this Hemisphere can never be negotiated."

--- President John F. Kennedy
Inaugural Address
January 20, 1961

"The day the Sandinistas or another political movement are chosen freely in elections accepted by all Nicaraguans, there will be no more reason for violence."

--- President Oscar Arias
of Costa Rica
quoted in The Washington Post
February 1, 1987

"Gorbachev and company will certainly be observing the President, Congress and the American people as we debate the proper national response to the events in Central America. It is imperative that we act with full confidence in democracy's robust ability to meet the Sandinista challenge."

--- Rep. Richard A. Gephardt
quoted in The Washington Post
March 6, 1986

"This country will never vote for any party other than the Sandinista Liberation Front. But in the hypothetical case that Frente Sandinista lost an election, the Frente Sandinista would hand over the government, not power."

--- President Daniel Ortega
of Nicaragua
quoted by Reuters
December 13, 1987

"With what (military strength) we have now, the gringos will have something to think about."

--- Defense Minister Humberto Ortega
of Nicaragua
quoted in The Washington Times
December 14, 1987

"Our revolution's moral imperative and historical character make it inevitable that the energies released here will be universal in all Central America."

--- Interior Minister Tomas Borge
of Nicaragua
quoted in U.S. News and World
Report, June 1, 1987

...Daniel Ortega declared that the Sandinistas were "profoundly anti-imperialist, anti-Yankee and Marxist-Leninist." Elections, added Ortega, "will in no way, like a lottery, decide who is going to hold power. For this power belongs to [us]."

--- U.S. News and World Report
June 1, 1987

And former House Speaker Tip O'Neill has declared Daniel Ortega a "Marxist-Leninist communist" intent on provoking a "revolution without borders."

--- Detroit News
April 16, 1986