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c. Type A Light Infantry Brigade

They shall be reinforced primarily by:

- 76 or 85 mm artillery
- antiaircraft artillery [consisting of] portable antiaircraft complexes
- SPG-9 antitank artillery
- substantially improved infantry and support weaponry

Its principal units shall consist of:

- four (4) light infantry battalions
- one (1) artillery group [consisting of] 76 or 85 mm guns
- one (1) antitank artillery group having 57 mm guns
- one (1) mixed antiaircraft artillery group having ZU-23-2 [units]  
and portable antiaircraft complexes

d. Type B Light Infantry Brigade

Its principal units shall consist of:

- four (4) light infantry battalions

Four (4) new infantry brigades will be formed. These will be distributed as follows:

- one (1) in the 1st MR
- one (1) in the 5th MR
- two (2) in the 6th MR

e. Local Forces (Sandinista People's Militias)

The principal standard unit will be the local forces battalion and its primary weapon will be the AKM rifle.

2. In the Air Force/Air Defense Forces

The principal units of these forces shall consist of:

a. Air Force

- a MIG-21B fighter/interceptor squadron
- air detachments comprised of:
  - squadrons of MI-25 fire support helicopters and MI-17 transport helicopters

- MI-17 transport helicopter squadrons
- a heavy transport squadron having AN-26 and AN-12 aircraft  
([or their] equivalent)

b. Radio Communications Troops

- radio communications centers
- a mobile radio communications company

c. Air Defense

- a self-propelled antiaircraft rocket regiment
- antiaircraft regiments [comprised of]:
  - 57 mm guns
  - 37 mm guns and ZU-23-2 [units]
  - small units armed with portable antiaircraft rockets

2. In the Sandinista Navy

- squadrons of armed vessels with displacements of up to 400 tons, ranges of 1200-1500 miles and artillery weapons no smaller than 57 mm
- squadrons of patrol boats with displacements of 40-50 tons
- squadrons of minesweepers composed of two (2) or three (3) vessels each
- squadrons of light hydrofoils composed of two (2) to three (3) vessels each
- radio communications complexes
- repair bases

C. The Concept of the Functional Composition of the SPA Over the Period 1991-1995

Taking into account:

- existing units at the end of the five-year period 1986-1990
- the principal development trends over the five-year period 1991-1995
- the national economy's forecasted capacities

the functional composition concept of the SPA's principal units, for the period 1991-1995, shall be the following:

1. In the ground forces

- a. Combat units from the reserves of the High Command

- one (1) mechanized infantry brigade
- one (1) rocket artillery regiment comprised of three (3) BM-21 groups
- one (1) antitank artillery regiment comprised of two (2) 100 mm (T-12A) gun groups
- one (1) antitank artillery group comprised of twelve (12) MALIUTKA [units]
- one (1) self-propelled antiaircraft rocket regiment

b. 1st Military Region

- one (1) permanent infantry brigade
- two (2) light assault battalions
- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- five (5) Type B light infantry brigades
- one (1) 0-122 mm artillery group
- one (1) mixed antitank group comprised of six (6) BRDM-transportable MALIUTKA [units] ([or their] equivalent) and six 100 mm (T-12A) guns
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group consisting of ZU-23-2 [units] and portable antiaircraft rocket units
- forty-two (42) local forces battalions (Sandinista People's Militias) distributed over all its territory

c. 2nd Military Region

- one (1) mechanized infantry brigade
- one (1) permanent infantry brigade
- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- five (5) Type A light infantry brigades
- one (1) field artillery regiment consisting of three (3) 130 mm gun groups
- one (1) BM-21 rocket artillery group
- one (1) antitank artillery group comprised of six (6) BRDM-transportable MALIUTKA [units] ([or their] equivalent) and six (6) 100 mm (T-12A) guns

- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group with ZU-23-2 [units] and portable antiaircraft rocket units
- seventy-three (73) local forces battalions (Sandinista People's Militias) distributed over all its territory

d. 3rd Military Region

- two (2) permanent infantry brigades
- one (1) regular infantry brigade (with the equipment of a permanent infantry brigade)
- six (6) Type A light infantry brigades
- one (1) field artillery regiment consisting of three (3) CO-152 mm gun groups
- one (1) BM-21 rocket artillery group
- one (1) antitank artillery regiment consisting of two (2) 100 mm (T-12A) gun groups and one (1) group of twelve (12) MALIUTKA [units]
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group equipped with ZU-23-2 [units] and portable antiaircraft rocket [units]
- one hundred twenty-three (123) local forces battalions (Sandinista People's Militias) within the city limits of the capital and over the rest of the territory of the 3rd MR

e. 4th Military Region

- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- five (5) Type A light infantry brigades
- one (1) 76 mm gun artillery group
- one (1) 57 mm gun antitank artillery group
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group equipped with ZU-23-2 and portable antiaircraft rocket units
- seventy-six (76) local forces battalions (Sandinista People's Militias) distributed throughout its territory

f. 5th Military Region

- three (3) unconventional warfare battalions

- four (4) light assault battalions
- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- two (2) Type A light infantry brigades
- four (4) Type B light infantry brigades
- one (1) 0-122 mm [gun] artillery group
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group equipped with ZU-23-2 and portable antiaircraft rocket units
- forty-two (42) local forces battalions (Sandinista People's Militias) distributed over all its territory

g. 6th Military Region

- three (3) unconventional warfare battalions
- four (4) light assault battalions
- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- two (2) Type A light infantry brigades
- five (5) Type B light infantry brigades
- One (1) 0-122 mm [gun] artillery group
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group equipped with ZU-23-2 and portable antiaircraft rocket units
- fifty-three (53) local forces battalions deployed throughout all its territory

h. 7th Military Region

- one (1) permanent infantry brigade
- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- one (1) Type B light infantry brigade
- one (1) 0-122 mm [gun] artillery group
- one (1) antitank artillery group comprised of six (6) BRDM-transportable MALIUTKA [units] ([or their] equivalent) and six (6) 100 mm guns
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group equipped with ZU-23-2 and portable antiaircraft rocket [units]

- twenty (20) local forces battalions (Sandinista People's Militias)  
deployed throughout its territory

## 2. SAF/AD

- one (1) MIG-21 fighter/interceptor squadron
- three (3) air detachments deployed as follows:
  - one (1) in the 3rd MR, comprised of four (4) helicopter squadrons
  - one (1) in the 5th MR, comprised of two (2) helicopter squadrons
  - one (1) in the 6th MR, comprised of two (2) helicopter squadrons
- one (1) heavy transport squadron
- two (2) antiaircraft artillery regiments
  - one (1) equipped with 57 mm antiaircraft guns
  - one (1) equipped with 37 mm guns and ZU-23-2 units
- one (1) C-125 antiaircraft rocket regiment
- radio communications troops
  - ten (10) radio communications centers
  - one (1) mobile radio communications company
- combat supply units
- one (1) technical services unit
- other units

## 3. The Sandinista Navy

- one (1) Pacific naval district
  - one (1) squadron of armed vessels with 400-ton displacements
  - one (1) minesweeper squadron
  - one (1) squadron of light motor launches, each displacing 40-50 tons
  - one (1) 85 or 100 mm [gun] antiaircraft artillery regiment
  - one (1) radio communications company
  - four (4) coastal surveillance posts
  - one (1) repair base
- one (1) naval sector in SAN JUAN DEL SUR

- one (1) radio communications company
- two (2) 85 or 100 mm antiaircraft gun batteries
- two (2) coastal surveillance posts
- one (1) Atlantic naval district
  - one (1) squadron of armed vessels, each displacing up to 400 tons
  - one (1) minesweeper squadron
  - one (1) light motor launch squadron, each vessel displacing 40-50 tons
  - four (4) coastal surveillance posts
  - one (1) radio communications battalion
  - one (1) repair base
  - two (2) naval infantry companies

D. PRELIMINARY GUIDELINES FOR THE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICO-MATERIAL SUPPORT OF THE SPA  
FOR THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD 1991-1995

1. Over the period 1991-1995, the principal efforts toward equipping the SPA with arms and technology shall be aimed at:

- introducing new weaponry and technical support responsive to SPA modernization and in line with its functional improvement over the period 1991-1995
- in keeping with scientific and technical progress in the fields of arms technology and equipment, continuing to effect [systematic] technical replacements in the SPA's main units
- on an annual or as needed basis, continuing the systematic replacement of arms and systems to be listed as real SPA losses, owing to their regular use or combat action
- continuing the development of the infrastructure, equipment and training of qualified personnel, thus enabling the ground forces and SPA armed forces personnel to continue consolidating and expanding the country's capacity to provide mid-level and general



technical maintenance and repair in the fields of weapons transportation, communications, [in the] Air Force and [in] the Navy.

-- the preliminary arms and technical support order, for the five-year period 1991-1995, resulting from the improvement and strengthening of the SPA is attached to and forms part of this document.

2. Stemming from the improvement of the SPA, over the five-year period 1991-1995, the following guidelines are established for supplying arms and technical support to the following specialties:

• a. Arms and Munitions

- infantry weapons

-- to maintain at base level, those weapon models in the inventory for the period 1988-1990, for the principal SPA units up to the level of a Type B light infantry brigade

-- in keeping with scientific and technical advances in the field of infantry weapons, to introduce [new systems] which, owing to their technical and tactical features, might be used by our special-purpose units, special forces and other SPA units

-- to introduce the AK-74 .545 cal rifle into the unconventional warfare units programmed for the five-year period 1991-1995 and into the special forces units

-- to introduce the RPG-9 antitank rocket launcher into the permanent SPA units operating in the Pacific Theater of Operations

-- to continue transferring older weapon models to local forces units

- land-based artillery weapons

-- to introduce new weapon models, from the stocks already extant within the SPA, such as:

- 122 mm self-propelled howitzers into the mechanized infantry brigades

- 130 mm guns for the artillery regiment of the 2nd MR
- to introduce the T-12A 100 mm antitank gun into antitank regiments and mixed antitank groups of the SPA's principal units
- to introduce MALIUTKA guided antitank missiles, to operate in conjunction with T-12A 100 mm gun antitank batteries and groups, into the antitank regiments and mixed antitank groups of the SPA's primary units
- to expand the number of BM-21 rocket artillery groups
- to increase the number of D30 122 mm howitzer groups
- for the five year period 1991-1995, to augment the antitank capability of the Type A light infantry brigades via the creation of D-48 85 mm or ZIS-3 76 mm [gun] antitank groups
- antiaircraft artillery weapons
  - to continue the introduction and wide distribution of new models of portable antiaircraft complexes
  - to create a medium-range self-propelled antiaircraft rocket regiment for the reserves of the High Command
  - to introduce C-10 rocket batteries into the antiaircraft artillery groups of the mechanized infantry brigades of the High Command's reserves and the 2nd MR
  - to enhance the antiaircraft capability of Type A light infantry brigades via the creation of antiaircraft artillery groups equipped with ZU-23-2 and portable antiaircraft rocket units
  - to enhance the antiaircraft capability along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts by employing 85 or 100 mm [gun] antiaircraft batteries
- infantry, land-based artillery, tank, antiaircraft artillery, aviation and naval munitions
  - for the period 1991-1995, to maintain the levels (in terms of

munitions units) established within the SPA for all components

b. Tanks and Transport Vehicles

- tanks and armored transports
  - to retain the T-55 tank during the functional improvement of the SPA, over the period 1991-1995
  - to increase the number of BTR-70PB armored transports in the rest of the SPA's mechanized and permanent infantry brigades
  - to shift existing SPA inventories of BTR-60PB and BTR-152 [vehicles] to the permanent infantry battalions
  - the quantities reflected in the draft of the preliminary order, for the five-year period 1991-1995, essentially refer to:
    - the T-55 tank companies operating alongside the mechanized infantry battalions
    - the BTR-70PB armored transport companies accompanying the T-55 tank battalions
    - the programmed rounding out of T-55 tank and BTR-70PB [armored transport inventories], as a result of the functional improvements over the five-year period 1991-1995
- transport vehicles, artillery-towing vehicles and vehicles for conventional technical support to construction and military engineering
  - during the five-year period 1991-1995, to continue the [systematic] replacement of the transport vehicle inventory
  - the introduction of new transport vehicle models into the SPA, such as:
    - the UAZ diesel-powered transport vehicle
    - the ZIL diesel-powered transport vehicle

- to forecast the introduction of artillery-towing vehicles, commensurate with their delivery, for the five-year period 1991-1995
- special-purpose vehicles and mobile workshops
- to continue supplying the SPA and rounding out its inventories with new models of special-purpose and mobile workshop vehicles for various specialties

#### c. Military Engineering

Over the period 1991-1995, the principal guidelines concerning the engineering and chemical services troops will be:

- special-purpose and conventional engineering technical support
  - to continue furnishing the SPA's principal permanent units with special-purpose and conventional engineering and chemical services technical support which, in line with technological advances, is responsive to key missions involving engineering and chemical services technical support in conventional and unconventional warfare
  - to furnish the principal engineering units with tracked and wheeled bulldozers
  - to introduce improved MTU-20 bridge-laying units into the mechanized units
  - in the principal engineering units of the SPA, to increase [available] means for negotiating PTS-type obstacles
- engineering munitions
  - to continue supplying SPA units with plastic engineering munitions with safety mechanisms for their installation
  - to supply the SPA with antitank and antipersonnel mines, enabling it to increase obstacle density to 1-1.5 at the principal territorial defense sites
  - to continue supplying special-purpose and unconventional

warfare units with special-purpose mines of all types as well as with industrial demolition charges

- to introduce the OMP-25000 jet-propelled flamethrower into the prime combat units in the Pacific sectors
- engineering and chemical services equipment
  - to increase the amount of individual protective gear so as to achieve a 50% level of gas mask supply
  - to increase the amount of skin protection gear so as to achieve a 10% supply level
  - to introduce explosive substance detectors into the small engineering units
  - to introduce low-yield [ordnance] detonators, equal to or better than existing ones (KPM-3)
  - to replace existing camouflage netting with plastic camouflage netting [TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Cf., "enmascaramiento" - "camouflage"]
  - to introduce surveillance devices with greater range (PIR-20)
  - to replace obstacle set up and clearance systems with more technologically advanced ones
  - to supply engineering units with water storage gear having greater capacity and constructed of better material

d. Communications

- in the small communications units, to maintain, at base level, those items reflected in the supplemental order for 1988-1990
- in line with the technological development of means of communication, over the five-year period 1991-1995, to introduce new systems which, owing to their specific characteristics, can be adapted to the missions carried out by the SPA's principal, permanent, light, unconventional warfare and special-purpose units

- to increase the use and supply of R-125 radio communications stations as well as E-350 mobile workshops
- to expand clandestine telephone and telegraph communications networks at the level of the military regions and Type A and B light infantry brigades
- to continue building the infrastructure for regional workshops and the equipment and training of technical personnel and qualified engineers, thus enabling this specialty to develop the capacity for maintenance and mid-level and general repair of communications gear in SPA units

e. Rear Guard Services

- Over the period 1991-1995, the principal efforts of material, technical and medical [support] shall be aimed at:
  - continuing to raise the levels of support in the following areas:
    - clothing
    - provisions
    - fuels and lubricants
    - medical services
    - transportation
    - [support] for the units of the SPA
  - continuing and, in some cases, initiating the buildup of different reserves of materiel and medical supplies
  - continuing the [systematic] upgrade of the rear guard services and transportation specialties
  - continuing the creation of the infrastructure, the equipment and the training of personnel for:
    - the central fuels laboratories as well as for [the fuel laboratories of other] armed forces units
    - the clothing and footwear manufacturing workshop

- the workshops for the maintenance and repair of  
special-purpose equipment and rear guard transport vehicles
- continuing the construction of storage facilities in the units  
of the SPA, at various levels, and for the diverse goods of  
the rear guard service units.

# Central America UPDATE



BULLETIN EDITION

Contact: Jeanne Guttman  
647-6779

August 18, 1987  
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

## THE UNITED STATES BI-PARTISAN PLAN vs. THE CENTRAL AMERICAN PLAN: SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES

On August 7, 1987, the presidents of Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala and El Salvador signed a regional peace agreement at the end of a two-day Central American peace summit in Guatemala City. While there are many similarities between the Central American peace proposal and the U.S. bi-partisan plan, there are some significant differences. Both plans place strong emphasis on internal democratization in Nicaragua, but split widely on the security issues of Soviet assistance to the Sandinista Marxist government, the size and strength of the Sandinista army, and the treatment of the Nicaraguan Resistance.

### SOVIET AID TO SANDINISTAS

- The U.S. bi-partisan plan calls for the simultaneous suspension of U.S. assistance to the resistance and Soviet, Cuban, and Communist bloc aid to the Sandinistas.
- The Central American plan calls for the unilateral suspension of U.S. aid to the freedom fighters without any requirement that the Soviets and their allies cease assistance (including military) to the Sandinistas.

### PARTICIPATION OF RESISTANCE IN NEGOTIATIONS

- The U.S. bi-partisan plan calls for national reconciliation and dialogue among all "citizens of Nicaragua", with amnesty for former combatants and "equal rights to participation in the political process."
- The Central American proposal provides for talks only with "unarmed political groups of internal opposition, and with those which have taken advantage of the amnesty."

### ELECTIONS

- The U.S. plan provides that "a timetable and procedures for all elections....will be established within 60 days,"
- The Central American plan calls for elections for a Central American Parliament within the first six months of 1988, and municipal, legislative and presidential elections according to each country's constitutions. (In the case of Nicaragua, elections for president are not scheduled until 1991.)

### REMOVAL OF FOREIGN MILITARY PERSONNEL, REDUCTION OF ARMS AND SIZE OF ARMIES

- The U.S. plan calls for negotiations on these issues to begin after a cease fire is in place and a "regional agreement on security issues" to be completed within 60 days. As a



demonstration of good faith, the U.S. would suspend combat maneuvers in Honduras after the cease fire is put in place.

-- The Central American proposal stipulates that the Central American countries "will continue negotiations on the pending points of agreement regarding security, verification, and control in the draft of the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America."

#### CEASE-FIRE

-- The U.S. plan calls for negotiations on a cease-fire in place to begin immediately. Cease-fire is subject to verification by the OAS or another international body.

-- The Central American proposal urges a cease-fire upon signing and calls for a full cease-fire by end of 90-day period. Cease-fire is subject to verification by the International Commission for Verification and Follow-up.

#### DEMOCRATIZATION

-- The U.S. plan calls for the suspension of emergency law and full restoration of civil and political rights immediately.

-- The Central American plan allows 90-days to create a "genuine political opening" and lift the state of emergency.

Department of State, U.S.A.  
Washington, D.C. 20520

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# Central America UPDATE



NICARAGUA ROUND-UP  
September 10, 1987

Contact: Jeanne Guttman  
647-6751

NICARAGUA MILITARY BUILD-UP: According to recent estimates, Soviet-bloc arms shipments to Nicaragua this year topped 34 by August 1, accounting for 18.5 metric tons of military equipment valued at more than \$425 million. As of the same date, Sandinista active-duty forces numbered some 74,500 troops. Meanwhile, the Sandinista equipment inventory included about 150 tanks, 250 armored vehicles, 37 fixed-wing aircraft and some 50 helicopters. During 1983, the total number of Soviet-bloc arms shipments to Nicaragua stood at 25, accounting for approximately 13.9 metric tons of military equipment valued at about \$250 million. During the same year, active-duty military forces numbered about 46,000. There were approximately 50 tanks, 90 armored vehicles, 44 fixed-wing aircraft and 15 helicopters. In 1980 there were no Soviet-bloc arms shipments to Nicaragua. At that time, active duty forces neared 24,000. The Sandinista equipment inventory included 3 tanks, 31 armored vehicles, 38 fixed-wing aircraft and 8 helicopters.

SANDINISTAS BREAK UP DEMONSTRATION, ARREST CIVIC LEADERS: August 15--Sandinista police broke up a peaceful demonstration by the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinadora, a coalition of Nicaraguan opposition groups. Security forces used dogs, night sticks, cattle prods, and government-organized mobs (turbas) to suppress the coordinadora group. Two prominent civic leaders were beaten and arrested. Lino Hernandez, executive director of the independent Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights (CPDH), and Alberto Saborio, president of the Nicaraguan Bar Association, were arrested and sentenced to 30 days in jail. Hernandez is not a member of the coordinadora. He was invited to address the rally marking the opening of the organization's new headquarters. The arrests came just 8 days after the Sandinistas signed the Central America Peace Agreement in Guatemala binding them to democratic reforms within 90 days.

BOMB EXPLOSION AIMED AT U.S. PERSONNEL: August 23--20-25 armed soldiers placed an explosive device in the driveway of a house leased by the U.S. Embassy. After the bomb exploded, the men planted another device, which failed to go off. The house had been vacated by a telecommunications officer 3 days before the incident. No one was injured.

PRESIDENT DUARTE REQUESTS ORTEGA RELEASE ARRESTED CIVIC LEADERS: August 24--Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte sent a letter to Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega asking him to release Lino Hernandez and Alberto Saborio, two prominent civic leaders who were arrested by Sandinista police on August 15 and sentenced to 30 days in jail during a peaceful demonstration by the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinadora. According to the Spanish News Service, President Duarte asked Ortega "to mediate" with the respective authorities to obtain the release.

ORTEGA ALLOWS EXILED CLERGYMEN TO RETURN TO NICARAGUA: August 25--President Ortega announced that as a gesture of good faith, the Sandinista government would permit two exiled Roman Catholic clergymen to return to Nicaragua. Father Bismarck Carballo, a former spokesman for Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo and head of the Church's radio station, Radio Catolica, was barred from re-entering the country last year after a trip abroad. Also permitted to return was Bishop Pablo Antonio Vega, vice president of the Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference and one of the most conservative of Nicaraguan bishops. The government accused him of unpatriotic and criminal behavior and deported him after he said publicly that the Sandinistas were responsible for a totalitarian system Nicaraguans did not want.



SANDINISTAS ADMIT HELICOPTER WAS SHOT DOWN: August 29--The Sandinista newspapers Barricada and El Nuevo Diario admitted that a Sandinista air force M-17 helicopter was shot down by resistance forces on August 28. The downing of the helicopter reportedly resulted in the death of 11 Sandinista soldiers on board. Nine others were injured, and the crew apparently escaped unharmed. The report confirmed earlier resistance reports that a helicopter had been downed. Later that day, President Daniel Ortega told the 11th National Union of Students Conference in Managua that the resistance had "already shot down 20 helicopters."

NICARAGUA RELEASES 2 JAILED CIVIC LEADERS: September 8--After appeals by Central American and U.S. leaders, President Daniel Ortega released two jailed civic leaders, Lino Hernandez and Alberto Saborio, according to a United Press International report. Hernandez, executive director of the independent Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights and Saborio, president of the Nicaraguan Bar Association were arrested by Sandinista police on August 15 during a peaceful demonstration by the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinadora, a coalition of opposition groups. They were sentenced to 30 days in jail, and on August 26 began a hunger strike in protest.

COSTA RICAN VESSEL SEIZED IN OWN WATERS--PROTEST NOTE TO NICARAGUA: September 2--Two Sandinista patrol boats entered Costa Rican waters and captured a Costa Rican Civil Guard vessel near the Atlantic coast community of Barra del Colorado today. The Nicaraguan boats also fired for 20 minutes at an onshore police post, but there were no reported injuries. No explanation for the action was given, and the Costa Rican vessel and four-man crew were returned 12 hours later.

On September 7, Costa Rican Foreign Minister Rodrigo Madrigal sent a formal protest note to Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto demanding punishment for the Sandinista naval officers who seized the boat and fired on the security post. The note also warned that Costa Rica considered the incidents "grave acts" at a moment when all five Central American countries have signed a regional peace plan.

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United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

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# Central America UPDATE



September 15, 1987  
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs

Contact: Jeanne C. Guttman  
647-6751

## SECRETARY TESTIFIES BEFORE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON, September 10--Secretary of State George Shultz testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee today on U.S. policy in Central America. He reaffirmed the Administration's support for the Guatemala peace process and its commitment to the Reagan-Wright peace plan. He also emphasized that the goals of the Guatemala accord signed on August 7 could not be secured without continuing aid to the Nicaraguan Resistance. He said the Administration would ask for \$270 million in further assistance for the next 18 months.

The Secretary compared the Central American democracies with Nicaragua, stating that "El Salvador, Honduras, and now Guatemala have freely elected governments....We can be proud of our country's role in this progress. The blatant exception to the new democratic tide is Nicaragua." The Secretary said that in the past Nicaragua has been "an obstacle to Central American unity, a threat to its neighbors, and the vehicle for bringing East-West rivalry onto the American mainland."

The Secretary stated that "over the past summer, three developments have come together to shape an important opportunity for peace."

--"First, putting the national interest above partisanship, President Reagan and Speaker Wright demonstrated that the leadership in this country agrees on basic U.S. security objectives in Central America:

--"Second, the increasing success of the democratic forces of the Nicaraguan Resistance has turned them into a serious challenge and potential political alternative to Nicaragua's Communist regime.

--"Third, Central America's democratic presidents affirmed their belief that, with our continued support, peace and democracy are attainable in the entire region."

Discussing the two recent peace proposals, the Reagan-Wright peace plan and the Guatemala agreement, the Secretary said, "We cannot place our security interests at risk in the hope that positive internal changes will take place in Nicaragua. It is



our responsibility to insist, as does the Reagan-Wright peace plan, that there be no Soviet or Cuban military presence in Nicaragua and that Nicaragua pose no military or subversive threat to its neighbors or the region."

The Secretary said that the Guatemala agreement, however incomplete, is a good beginning. "Since the signing of the August 7 agreement, we have intensified our diplomatic consultations in Central America--both with our allies and within our own foreign affairs community. The President has just named Morris Busby, a distinguished career member of the Foreign Service, to serve as a roving Ambassador and to tie together the efforts of our Chiefs of Mission in each country there....

"The conclusion is inescapable. Unless the Guatemalan agreement is implemented in a way that secures a negotiated cease fire, a democratic opening in Nicaragua, and accommodation of the basic national security interests affirmed in the Wright-Reagan Plan, the United States must continue to furnish support to the Freedom Fighters."

The Secretary stated, "Our present intention is to request \$270 million for a period of 18 months. The amount of money is calculated at a rate of \$180 million a year. It is what the Resistance needs--for training, equipment, and other support for their political and military quest for freedom--no more, no less."

The Secretary concluded saying, "President Reagan welcomed the Guatemala agreement. We support it. We are committed to working with its signatories to strengthen it, to deal with issues not covered in the agreement, to help gain broad support for its purposes and provisions. At the same time, we know that it is simply not in our national interest to leave the Sandinista regime unconstrained by credible Resistance forces on the basis of a hope or a promise."

ARA/LPD  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

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# Central America UPDATE



Central America Update  
November 18, 1987

Contact: Jeanne C. Guttman  
647-6751

## CENTRAL AMERICAN PEACE PLAN COMPLIANCE UP TO NOVEMBER 5:

On August 7, all five Central American countries agreed to comply with commitments regarding democratization, a cease-fire, amnesty, and a cessation of aid to insurgent forces within 90 days. On November 5, here's how each country stood.

**Democratization--"...effective participation by the people in the decision-making process...free access to fair and regular elections...complete freedom for television, radio, and the press... state of seige or state of emergency..."**

Nicaragua: Permitted the newspaper La Prensa and Radio Catolica to reopen. Has permitted opposition street rallies, but prohibits marches without prior approval. Other radio stations seized by government not returned. Censorship decrees 511 and 512 still in effect. Radio Catolica cannot broadcast news. Opposition marches attacked by Sandinista mobs. Sandinistas say they will not lift state of emergency until all aid to resistance ceases.

El Salvador: State of emergency ended in early 1987. Guerrilla views and communiques permitted in a free press.

Guatemala: In compliance.

Honduras: In compliance.

Costa Rica: In compliance.

**Cease-Fire--"...a cessation of hostilities be arranged in those states in the area currently experiencing the action of irregular or insurgent groups."**

Nicaragua: Announced a unilateral cease-fire. At first, refused to talk directly with resistance leadership about an end to hostilities, but on November 5 said indirect negotiations would be possible. (On November 9, the Sandinistas suspended unilateral cease-fire and launched a new offensive against the contras. On November 13, following meetings with U.S. Congressional representatives, President Ortega proposed an 11-point cease-fire plan to the resistance leadership through Cardinal Obando y Bravo.)



El Salvador: Dialogue between the government and leftist guerrillas began again on October 4. Broken off by the insurgents October 29 following the death of human rights activist Herbert Anaya. However, President Duarte announced a unilateral cease-fire on November 5.

Guatemala: Discussed cease-fire directly with guerrillas in Madrid; no agreement reached.

Honduras: Not applicable.

Costa Rica: Not applicable.

Amnesty--"...decrees of amnesty shall be issued, which shall establish all the provisions to guarantee the inviolability of life, freedom in all its forms, property, and the security of the persons to whom such decrees apply."

Nicaragua: Pardoned and released 16 foreign prisoners September 13. On November 4, said about 1,000 political prisoners (about 10 percent of those believed held) would be released soon. (Later, there were reports that persons who were about to complete their sentences, some who had been previously pardoned, and some members of the Sandinista army arrested for misconduct would be included in that number.)

El Salvador: Announced it would release about 1,000 political prisoners. Legislature approved a broad amnesty October 27. Guerrillas released one prisoner.

Guatemala: Submitted amnesty law to national assembly, passed October 28.

Honduras: Will study amnesty unless verification commission determines otherwise.

Costa Rica: Same as Honduras.

Aid to Irregular Forces; Use of Territory--"...Central American States shall request governments in the region or those outside it...to cease such aid as an essential requirement for achieving a stable and lasting peace in the region. The five governments...reiterate their commitment to prevent the use of their territory...for groups seeking to destabilize the governments of the Central American countries."

Nicaragua: No visible measures to cut support for Salvadoran or Guatemalan insurgents.

El Salvador: Claims this provision does not apply.

Guatemala: Not applicable

Honduras: Says it will not cut ties to the Resistance until there is democracy in Nicaragua.

Costa Rica: Severed ties with the Nicaraguan Resistance in 1986.

#### OTHER COMMITMENTS:

National Reconciliation--"...shall initiate dialogue with all domestic political opposition groups that have laid down their arms and with those that have accepted the amnesty."  
(A four-member National Reconciliation Committee was to have been selected within 20 days of the signing of the accord.)

Nicaragua: Established a commission on August 25, headed by Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo.

El Salvador: Established a commission on September 7. No dialogue between government and rightist opposition.

Guatemala: Established a commission September 9.

Honduras: Established a commission mid-October.

Costa Rica: Established a commission September 21.

Elections--"Once the conditions inherent in any democracy have been created, free, pluralistic, and fair elections shall be held...elections (for the Central American Parliament) shall be held simultaneously in all the countries of Central America during the first six months of 1988."

All countries: reached agreement on October 1 to delay elections until late 1988.

Arms Limitations; Security Verification--"The governments of the five Central American states, with participation by the Contadora Group...shall proceed with negotiations...in matters of security, verification, and control under the draft Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America...(and) shall also cover measures for the disarmament of those irregular forces that are willing to accept amnesty decrees."

All countries: Negotiations to continue.

International Verification--International Verification Commission formed on August 19. Joint UN/OAS team visited Central America October 21-27 to assess requirements for verification.

ARA/LPD  
United States Department of State  
Washington, D.C. 20520

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## The Nicaragua chronicles

Major events in American-Nicaraguan relations since 1985 illustrate how American policymakers have overlooked (and possibly facilitated) the systematic construction of an armed communist state in Nicaragua.

### 1985

April 23: Senate passes \$14 million in non-lethal aid for Nicaraguan resistance.

April 24: House rejects aid proposal 213-215 after President Reagan chooses not to advocate aid in national speech and talks instead about the deficit.

April 28: Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega flies to Moscow, meets with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. (Mr. Ortega gets \$400 million in Soviet aid.)

April 30-May 10: Daniel Ortega visits Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Berlin, gaining an additional \$200 million in aid.

June 6: Senate votes 55-42 for \$38 million in non-military aid to Nicaraguan resistance over two years.

June 10: Daniel Ortega offers a cease-fire, an end to press censorship and the lifting of the state of emergency if the United States does not aid the democratic resistance.

June 12: House votes 248-184 for \$27 million in humanitarian aid to resistance.

June 13: Daniel Ortega promises to "redouble efforts to crush the mercenaries."

Dec. 31: Soviet bloc military aid for the year to the Sandinistas totals \$280 million.

### 1986

March 20: House defeats aid to the resistance 210-222; House Speaker Tip O'Neill leads opposition.

March 22-24: Two Sandinista battalions invade Honduras with heavy artillery and Soviet-built helicopter gunships, penetrating 11 miles to attack a resistance training camp.

March 25: Mr. O'Neill, comments on Sandinista invasion. Calls Daniel Ortega "bumbling, incompetent, Marxist-Leninist communist."

June 25: House passes \$100 million in aid for the freedom fighters, 221-209.

June 26-July 4: Sandinistas shut down the independent newspaper La Prensa, clamp down on the church, exile two important church figures. Pope John Paul II deplors actions as from the "dark ages."

Dec. 31: Soviet bloc military aid to the Sandinistas for the year totals \$600 million.

### 1987

July 14: Support for Nicaraguan resistance grows following Oliver North's testimony in the Iran-Contra hearings.

July 24: President Reagan says tide has turned in favor of contras.

Aug. 4: White House unveils Wright-Reagan plan, which offers Sandinistas a cease-fire and negotiations in exchange for democratic reforms and removal of foreign troops. If Sandinistas fail to comply, administration will request and House will vote on new aid after Sept. 30 deadline.

Aug. 7: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua sign the Arias plan, a regional settlement termed fatally flawed by President Reagan because it required a cutoff of American aid to the Nicaraguan resistance prior to democratization

and without elimination of Communist bloc military aid to the Sandinistas. Arias plan calls for democratization, amnesty, cease-fires and internal dialogue and reconciliation. Compliance date of Nov. 5 is set.

Aug. 9: Speaker Jim Wright abandons Wright-Reagan plan, endorses Arias plan.

Aug. 15: In Nicaragua, democratic groups hold march to test Sandinista willingness to open up political system. A leader of human rights commission and a leader of democratic opposition are jailed.

Oct. 31-Nov. 4: Daniel Ortega flies to Moscow, with stopover in Cuba to meet with Fidel Castro. He sits with Warsaw Pact leaders at official celebrations of Soviet Union's 70th anniversary, meets with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to discuss new Soviet aid package for Sandinistas. He gives speech in Moscow declaring that "the October [1917] victory made the scientific theory of Marx and Engels a reality, executed by the creativity, audacity and firmness of Lenin's genius.... The tractors, the medicines, the food, the oil and the weapons which you send us form an integral part of the defense of revolutionary power in Nicaragua."

Nov. 5: Sandinistas fail to meet deadline for compliance with Arias plan; deadline is pushed back to January. Daniel Ortega promises liberalization.

Dec. 12: Sandinista Defense Minister Humberto Ortega reveals plans for a massive military buildup in Nicaragua, including advanced MiG fighter planes, artillery missiles, tanks and armored vehicles, and a 600,000-man army. He says Nicaragua has hundreds if not thousands of officers being trained in Soviet bloc countries. The defense minister's aide, Maj. Roger Miranda, had previously revealed these plans. Mr. Miranda said that in the event of an American invasion the Sandinistas would regionalize the war by (among other things) dropping bombs on Costa Rica. Plans also called for the Sandinistas to sign new military agreements with the Soviets in the new year. Mr. Miranda was kept under wraps by the Reagan administration during the summit — which produced no breakthroughs on the issue of regional conflicts — so as not to disturb Reagan-Gorbachev talks.

Dec. 13: Daniel Ortega gives speech saying that even if the Sandinistas lose an election, "the Sandinista Front will hand over government, not power."

Dec. 14: Mr. Wright, angered by the remarks of the Ortega brothers and noting a shift in Congressional attitudes toward the resistance, remarks that "the Sandinistas have had a history of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory."

Dec. 15: The president jeopardizes chances for passage of \$9 million in humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters by mentioning unofficial and unconfirmed assurances by General Secretary Gorbachev that the Soviet Union will stop sending military aid to Nicaragua.

Dec. 16: Congressional conferees discuss a "compromise" agreement to send \$5-6 million in humanitarian aid to the resistance, with a stipulation that the CIA send no weapons secretly. Soviet bloc military aid to the Sandinistas totals \$425 million for the year, \$2.1 billion since 1979.

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## Central America: US Policy

November 1987

Background: Central America comprises Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. (Historically Panama and Belize have not been included with the other five isthmus countries.) US policy there embodies the goals President Reagan enunciated to Congress on April 27, 1983: to support democracy, reform, freedom, human rights, and equitable economic development; to promote dialogue within and among Central American countries in order to resolve differences peacefully; and to support the region's security against those who seek to spread tyranny by force.

National Bipartisan Commission on Central America: In 1984 this Presidential commission concluded that the region's crisis was acute, resulting from indigenous historical factors, and that internal reform, even revolution, did not threaten the US, although outside intervention had added a threatening East-West dimension; that the US had a strategic and moral obligation to support democratic development there; that the crisis must be addressed at once in all its social, economic, political, and external subversion aspects; that we should help, but the Central Americans must find their own solutions; and that we must make a long-term, bipartisan commitment to a coherent policy. These conclusions have been embodied in legislation reflecting wide bipartisan support and remain valid today.

Central America Democracy, Peace, and Development Initiative: This 1984 initiative implements the commission's recommendations through executive, legislative, and private sector actions. Congress has approved funding at levels close to the commission's recommendations and Administration requests to support social, economic, and political development together with the necessary security.

Social development: We have worked with friendly governments to promote greater human rights observance. Although abuses are declining, the objective of both US and Central American democrats is to eliminate them completely. Our Administration of Justice Program is helping to strengthen judicial systems and to promote equity, efficiency, and human rights. Other US programs promote land reform and help to meet housing, education, and health needs.

Economic development: The economies of the Central American democracies have stabilized since suffering severe declines between 1979-82. The Nicaraguan economy continues to deteriorate. High levels of US economic assistance to the democracies--more than \$1 billion in 1987 alone--contributes to stabilization and recovery. US assistance supports comprehensive economic adjustment programs that set the stage for sustained per capita growth.

Security: Although only about 20% of US aid to Central America is for military purposes (in 1987, \$190 million), security assistance is essential to defend friendly governments from subversion, originating

in or aided by Nicaragua and encouraged and assisted by Cuba and the Soviet Union. One use of such military funds has been the training of public security forces. This program is successful in professionalizing the security forces of the recipient countries and in instilling greater respect for human rights.

Movement toward democracy: Promoting democracy is the primary objective of US policy in Central America, and US policy, programs, and official statements have contributed to the resurgence of democracy in the region. Specific programs have helped to support democratic leadership training, intercountry cooperation among democratic political parties, educational exchanges, and scholarships. The most encouraging developments have been the strengthening of democratic institutions and growing cooperation among the democracies. Four out of the five countries now enjoy democratic government, and all of those countries share the US view that democracy is essential to peace, security, and stability in Central America.

Guatemala Agreement: With the unveiling of Costa Rican President Arias' proposals for peace in February 1987, the peace process in Central America picked up momentum. This led to the eventual signing of the Guatemala Agreement on August 7 by all five Central American presidents. The agreement calls for the simultaneous implementation of a series of mutual obligations: cease-fire, democratization, non-use of territory for attack on other states, amnesty, and cessation of aid to irregular forces. Security issues will be considered under the 1983 Contadora Act; the National Reconciliation Commissions and Verification and Follow-up Commissions are responsible for certifying compliance.

The US supports this movement toward peace in the region, but the true test will lie in the agreement's implementation. Only if the signatories are held to a simultaneous implementation of all commitments--including democracy in Nicaragua--will the agreement bring peace and democracy to the region.

Nicaraguan resistance: Nicaraguan resistance forces have been able to apply substantial pressure on the Sandinistas in recent years. This pressure, combined with the economic turmoil experienced in Nicaragua, brought the Sandinistas to the bargaining table. Continued pressure is essential to force the Sandinistas to comply fully with the agreement. Nicaragua has served as a destabilizing force since the Sandinistas came to power in 1979, and destabilization in Central America is a security threat to the US.

Cont'd Article

2/3/88

H. J. RES. 444 (211-219)  
ASSISTANCE TO THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE

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Grant (FL)  
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Tauke (IA)

No Vote

Biaggi (D-NY)  
Daniel (D-VA)  
(deceased)  
Jones, E. (D-TN)  
Lightfoot (R-IA)

REFERENCE NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE  
20 JANUARY 1988  
BY  
CLYDE FARNSWORTH

J-415

J-415

The New York Times story is grossly inaccurate and misrepresents the reports in question.

The U.S. Government is opposed to Soviet membership in GATT, IMF, and other free world economic institutions because Soviet policies and practices are fundamentally incompatible with and hostile to the purposes of those institutions. We do not see such changes in Soviet policy that would persuade us to consider a change in our own. Both reports state this policy clearly:

1988 report -- "Market economies only flourish where freedom and individual rights are encouraged . . . the Soviet economic system remains at this point fundamentally incompatible with participation in free-world institutions. Policy statements must be translated into positive actions before such participation can be considered."

As to the relationship between Soviet human rights conditions, such as refusal to allow freedom of emigration, and our economic policies toward the USSR, a clear linkage exists in our law and in our policy. This has not changed and will not change.

State - innocent  
No change in <sup>color</sup>Admitted position  
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Peter, Paul and Mary, hammering out a Central American special

## Out of tune in Central America

**T**he van bounces down a dirt road, past bleached white houses and barefoot peasants.

"I was not prepared," says an unseen woman, her voice quivering.

"I had read all the briefing books, but I was not prepared."

"You don't know what's happening in a complicated situation such as exists in Nicaragua and El Salvador," says a man.

"Look into their eyes," says another man, his voice bleeding. "Sense their hopes, share their fears."

Cut to a concert scene — the graphic reads, "Managua: June 26, 1986" — where these funereal voices are striking a familiar chord.

"The answer, my friend, is blowin' in the wind, the answer is blowin' in the wind. . . ."

Peter, Paul & Mary are blowin' in the wind, wafting back onto public television tonight in an hourlong gust of pro-Sandinista propaganda.

"Heartstrings: Peter, Paul & Mary in Central America" airs tonight on WETA, Channel 26, at 11, starring the '60s troubadours last seen swooning over the Viet Cong.

A press release — put out by Fenton Communications, mouthpiece of the U.S.-based pro-Sandinista solidarity network — calls the film a "powerful" chronicle of the trio's 1986 "concert/fact-finding tour" to El Salvador and Nicaragua.

After the opening concert tease in Managua, the trio turns up in El Salvador.

They begin to find "facts" in a refugee camp.



# TRIO

From page E1

"Over a million people have been forced to leave their homes since the war between the government and the guerrillas began six years ago," says one of the trio. "The government's policy is to drive the people out of their villages because it suspects them of being guerrillas."

**Grainy file footage** — purportedly of a Salvadoran government Operation Phoenix assault against Marxist guerrillas — shows a couple of planes flying low over some hills, possibly firing at something.

Peter, Paul & Mary interview a young boy who says his father was killed by government troops, and his mother imprisoned.

Images of the boy — running, in slow motion — will recur throughout the broadcast.

The boy tells his story in Spanish. A foreign woman translates his story into English.

It soon becomes evident that this is a translator with extraordinary extrasensory talents.

Astonishingly, she is able to hear the boy's voice even when he is not speaking, adding neat little atrocities in English he neglected to mention in Spanish.

Cut to the Managua concert, where PP&M are wailing about the poor and downtrodden.

PP&M find out more "facts" from members of the Christian Base Community in San Salvador.

"Why doesn't the president do something about stopping the military and the death squads from making these assassinations, disappearances and murders?" Mary asks.

But the answer — a catalog of death-squad crimes — seems to be a spliced-in response to a different question. The president isn't mentioned.

PP&M want to see if any of the more than \$2.5 billion in U.S. aid to the government and military of El Salvador was spent "improving the living standards of the poor."

Predictably, the answer — in the form of a poverty-stricken mother and her eight children — is a resounding "no."

More stirring music from the Managua concert. More grainy file footage from Operation Phoenix.

For balance, PP&M visit with a man they identify as an army colonel whose troops have participated in Operation Phoenix. He reads aloud from a laundry list: how many guerrillas captured, killed, etc.

PP&M ask him if U.S. military aid "is the most important thing."

"It's the most important thing," he says.

The camera cuts to PP&M's faces, indicating an edit has been made.



Peter, Paul and Mary, folksingers from the 1960s, have found a 1980s topic.

1/2★

**WHAT:** "Heartstrings: Peter, Paul & Mary in Central America"

**WHERE:** WETA-Channel 26

**WHEN:** Tonight, 11 to 12

**MAXIMUM RATING:** FOUR STARS

## ■ Peter, Paul & Mary . . . in an hourlong gust of pro-Sandinista propaganda.

"I am sure that if we didn't have the support of the United States in the area of the economy. . . ." the colonel is continuing.

The translator's voice, drowning out the colonel's completely, adds, "... militarily we would lose."

On to Nicaragua, where the music is upbeat and people are smiling and vibrant, and everyone is ecstatic with the Sandinista utopia.

"Nicaragua is also desperately poor and it's also fighting a war," says one of the trio. "But somehow there's a sense of excitement and energy that we felt right away."

There is a meeting at President Daniel Ortega's house, complete with common-law wife Rosario Murillo and their lovable, laughing children. A brief glimpse of a room gives a hint of luxury, but the film offers no street scenes for comparison.

The images of Managua are sanitized: no food lines, or tin-shanty shacks, or black-marketeers.

The trio has promised to ask the Nicaraguan president some "tough questions."

Mary, looking rather tense, asks Mr. Ortega, "Why have you closed down [the opposition newspaper] La Prensa, and what is the future of dissent in Nicaragua?"

"You have to understand," says Mr. Ortega, "that this newspaper

are softballs about the Contras. Mr. Ortega seems bored; he's used to batting against big-league pitchers.

PP&M interview a pair of anti-Sandinista businessmen, whose comments — despite their disclaimers — somehow end up sounding like endorsements of former dictator Anastasio Somoza.

They visit the countryside "to get a sense about how the Nicaraguan people feel about this revolution."

There is much palaver about "Contra counter-revolutionaries" and "unimaginable atrocities."

More facts.

Their fact-finding mission concludes at a farming cooperative recently attacked by Contra troops.

A weeping mother tells her tale — the Contras murdered her youngest daughter.

Again, a different translator shows signs of telepathic talent, seeming to hear more in Spanish than meets the ear.

Soon the translator — an American woman — is sobbing more hysterically than the Nicaraguan mother.

It turns out, Paul tells us somberly, the trio learned that morning the woman had also "lost her husband" to the Contras.

"If I had a hammer, I'd hammer in the morning. I'd hammer in the evening, all over this land. . . ."

The executive director in charge of all this hammering was Margery Tabankin, better known as executive director of the Arca Foundation, a key cog in the pro-Sandinista propaganda machine than as a journalist.



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The translator's voice, drowning out the colonel's completely, adds, "... militarily we would lose."

On to Nicaragua, where the music is upbeat and people are smiling and vibrant, and everyone is ecstatic with the Sandinista utopia.

"Nicaragua is also desperately poor and it's also fighting a war," says one of the trio. "But somehow there's a sense of excitement and energy that we felt right away."

There is a meeting at President Daniel Ortega's house, complete with common-law wife Rosario Murillo and their lovable, laughing children. A brief glimpse of a room gives a hint of luxury, but the film offers no street scenes for comparison.

The images of Managua are sanitized: no food lines, or tin-shanty shacks, or black-marketeers.

The trio has promised to ask the Nicaraguan president some "tough questions."

Mary, looking rather tense, asks Mr. Ortega, "Why have you closed down [the opposition newspaper] La Prensa, and what is the future of dissent in Nicaragua?"

"You have to understand," says Mr. Ortega, "that this newspaper

are softballs about the Contras. Mr. Ortega seems bored; he's used to batting against big-league pitchers.

PP&M interview a pair of anti-Sandinista businessmen, whose comments — despite their disclaimers — somehow end up sounding like endorsements of former dictator Anastasio Somoza.

They visit the countryside "to get a sense about how the Nicaraguan people feel about this revolution."

There is much palaver about "Contra counter-revolutionaries" and "unimaginable atrocities."

More facts.

Their fact-finding mission concludes at a farming cooperative recently attacked by Contra troops.

A weeping mother tells her tale — the Contras murdered her youngest daughter.

Again, a different translator shows signs of telepathic talent, seeming to hear more in Spanish than meets the ear.

Soon the translator — an American woman — is sobbing more hysterically than the Nicaraguan mother.

It turns out, Paul tells us somberly, the trio learned that morning the woman had also "lost her husband" to the Contras.

"If I had a hammer, I'd hammer in the morning. I'd hammer in the evening, all over this land. . . ."

The executive director in charge of all this hammering was Margery Tabankin, better known as executive director of the Arca Foundation, a key cog in the pro-Sandinista propaganda machine than as a journalist.

## White House Official, Citing Sandinista Ties With PLO, Fears Fallout For Jews In Region

By Arnold Fine

Max Green, Associate Director of Liaison at the White House, in an interview at THE JEWISH PRESS last week claimed, "There is concern in Washington that the American Jewish community is not as concerned as they should be about the consequences for Jews in Nicaragua since the Sandinistas have a direct tie to the PLO."

We asked, "Although there was once some 70 Jewish families in Nicaragua, there are none living there now. Why should American Jews be so concerned?"

"If the Sandinistas consolidate their hold over Nicaragua, they will be exporting a similar revolution to all of the Central American countries. Nicaragua can turn out to be a harbinger of how other Central American countries under communist regimes will react."

Mr. Green claimed a Sandinista victory in Nicaragua would spell doom to almost all the Jews in Central America. "The Sandinistas voted for every single resolution that sought to expel Israel from the United Nations. Whenever an Israeli gets up to speak at the United Nations -- they walk out. They are part of that effort in the world to delegitimize Israel. If they win and the revolution is exported to other countries, the same thing will be true in the other Central American nations."

Mr. Green pointed out that the only two countries

in the world that have their embassies in Jerusalem are El Salvador and Costa Rica. "In general, these Central American countries have been supportive of Israel. If the communists take over, this could reverse itself," he claimed.

We asked, "Why has the administration been quiet all along concerning the Jews in Central America and now since the Congress has been asked to vote on aid to the Contras this argument surfaces. I repeat there are no Jews in Nicaragua."

"The Jews in Nicaragua had to run. Should Jews be put into a position of always having to run?" he replied. "There are communities that are destroyed. There is property which was confiscated. Besides, we know the PLO is training the Sandinista troops. There is a hand-in-glove relationship with the PLO and other terrorist groups. Yassir Arafat made a visit there a short time ago. In fact, they have an official PLO office there. In addition, to show how close their relationship is, the Sandinistas named a power plant after one of the PLO terrorists who was killed in an attempt to bring down an El Al airliner. There is massive documentation about the Sandinistas working with the PLO and other terrorist organizations."

We asked Mr. Green, "How can the Reagan administration come to the Jewish community, especially after the U.S. delegate to the U.N. voted for the

condemnation of Israel because they deported four terrorists who had served long jail terms? How can the President ask the Jewish community now for their support?"

"The leaders of the State of Israel did not consider that a slap in the face. The United States saw to it that before they voted on that resolution it was watered down to nothing and it meant nothing."

We asked, "How about the other Central American nations, once they realize that the American Jewish community is getting active in support of the Contras, couldn't that signal a new problem in Central America?"

"The Jewish communities in Central America have already put themselves on the line as being opposed to any leftist takeover in their countries. If movements of the Sandinistas were to take over any of those countries the Jews would have to flee as fast as they could. There would be no place in that society for Jews. This administration is sending over to Israel three billion dollars a year deepening the strategic cooperation between the two countries. The United States stands for freedom throughout the world. And in Nicaragua you have people fighting for their freedom. That's why we have to support them," Mr. Green concluded.



The Cubans and Nicaraguans have used a variety of secret means to funnel weapons, ammunition, and supplies to their Communist allies. The refrigerated trailer truck shown below with a hollow roof was used to smuggle more than 100 rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition. The truck was intercepted in Honduras in 1981, en route to El Salvador from Nicaragua. Seaborne supplies from Nicaragua are clandestinely off-loaded on the El Salvadoran coast, and then transported by mule train to supply caches farther inland.



This photo of a U.S.-made machine gun being loaded onto a mule was developed from a roll of film taken from a dead guerrilla.



### ***In Their Own Words, Captured/Defected Salvadoran Guerrilla Leaders Speak Out***

"I had the central files with plans, projects, and reports from all areas. . . . all this revealed the work of the organization, the ideas of the FMLN. There were basic documents, war plans, overall plans. . . . Our structures and everything have been compromised, but since I have not talked, this was due to the (captured) documents."

#### ***Nidia Diaz***

Head of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee Secretariat of the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC)

"We began to plan the attack on the (Salvadoran army) Fourth Brigade in Cuba, where they took 28 men to train specifically for the operation. . . . I was one of the 28 men being trained in Cuba to carry out this operation against the Fourth Brigade. We even had combat exercises using a mock-up of the garrison. I took part in the leadership of the group. Together we discussed the plans with the Cuban instructors and the men going on the operation how the attack would be carried out. Besides the training, they gave us all the material to use against the Fourth Brigade. The explosives, machine guns, and ammunition were sent from Cuba. Nicaragua was only the conduit or staging point. There arrangements were made. The material was then funneled to the guerrillas in El Salvador. This was Nicaragua's role."

#### ***Adin Ingles Alvarado***

A captain in the Special Forces of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)

"Having established the subjection of the FMLN to the tactical and strategic control of the Cubans and Sandinistas, plans for arms shipments began to be implemented. First it was an airlift from Nicaragua to San Vicente (El Salvador). . . . A new route was started by sea. This was to supply most of the weapons. . . . Another type of aid provided by the Cubans to the FMLN on condition the FMLN follows Cuban instructions is personnel training and preparation of military leaders that are sent to Cuban camps by way of Managua and Havana. . . . Both the Sandinistas and the Cubans have set up special organs in Managua for political and logistical matters."

#### ***Miguel Castellanos***

AKA: Napoleon Romero

A member of the Central Committee of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)



## ***COMMUNIST SUPPORT FOR SUBVERSION IN CENTRAL AMERICA***





This display has been developed to show how the Soviet Union and its allies, including Cuba and Nicaragua, are actively promoting and supporting Communist guerrilla movements in Central America. Their goal is to help these guerrillas seize power and establish governments similar to those in Cuba and Nicaragua: one-party Communist dictatorships maintained in power by military force and political and psychological intimidation.

The principal battle is being fought in El Salvador, but Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica have also been targeted, with arms supplied to guerrillas in these countries. Communist guerrillas from all over Central America have received military training in Cuba. Captured documents reveal that Salvadoran guerrillas have also been trained in Bulgaria, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.



Salvadoran guerrilla holds Soviet-designed RPG-2 rocket launcher. (photo taken from videotape)



This map depicts the probable journey of a U.S.-made AR-15/M-16 rifle, serial number 1125455. It was shipped from Dover Air Force Base in Delaware on 1 July 1968, to the 506th Field Depot in Saigon, Vietnam. After the fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975, thousands of U.S.-made weapons fell into the hands of the North Vietnamese army. In June 1980, the Secretary General of Vietnam's Communist Party promised his counterpart from El Salvador large quantities of these captured U.S. weapons. Documents uncovered by the Salvadoran armed forces and guerrilla leaders who have been captured or who have defected indicate that weapons were shipped from Vietnam to Cuba, then to Nicaragua and into El Salvador clandestinely via Honduras.


As of August 1985, two-thirds of the AR-15/M-16 rifles, either captured from the guerrillas or known to be in their



M-16 rifle, serial number 1125455.

possession from captured guerrilla property records, have been traced to shipments originally made to Vietnam. The weapon shown was captured in El Salvador on 27 July 1984, sixteen years after it started its odyssey to Vietnam.

This notebook was taken from the body of a Salvadoran guerrilla squad leader intercepted and killed on 28 March 1983 by the Honduran security forces in southern Honduras.



The notebook contained compass headings, codes, and 125 place names, with coded identifiers to facilitate the secrecy of the guerrillas' movements. When plotted on the map below, these locations trace a 15-kilometer corridor from Nicaragua to El Salvador.



Map from codebook.

The Sandinistas have placed Czechoslovakian anti-personnel land mines, such as the one shown below, along the Honduran border. At least seven unmarked mine fields have been set up in populated areas in Honduras itself. Civilians have been killed or wounded by these mines.

These mines, which are intended to kill or maim, slow the exodus of Nicaraguans fleeing the Sandinista regime.



Czechoslovakian-made anti-personnel land mine.

This mortar sight, manufactured in North Vietnam in the late 1970s, was captured in El Salvador in May 1984. The markings on the box indicate that the sight had been modified to fit the U.S.-made 81-millimeter mortar.






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## Salvadoran Students Insult Duarte, Burn U.S. Flag

United Press International

**SAN SALVADOR, Nov. 11—** University students today hurled rocks and insults at President Jose Napoleon Duarte, burned Uncle Sam in effigy and set fire to a U.S. flag in one of the nation's strongest anti-American protests in years.

"Duarte, murderer," shouted about 500 students of the National University.

Duarte was visiting the university to evaluate damage to the campus in last month's earthquakes, but the visit was cut short when the disturbances began.

Duarte is one of Central America's staunchest U.S. allies. The government receives \$1.5 million a day in U.S. military and economic aid.

As Duarte and his entourage left the campus, a small band of students shouted, "Duarte, you have hurt the university more than the earthquake did."

Duarte was president of a ruling junta when security forces closed and looted the university in 1981. It reopened in 1984.

Meanwhile, two human rights groups reported that soldiers took away 10 villagers after an Army colonel forced children to identify the voices on a tape confiscated from foreign reporters.

The tape was played to the children in the school at San Jose las Flores, in northern Chalatenango province, by the local commander, Col. Jesus de Natividad Caceres, on Nov. 3, they said.

Seven men suspected of having links with leftist guerrillas were taken away that day and three more

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**PANAMA:** Nicolas Arango Barrienta, who won the country's first direct presidential elections in 16 years, was forced to resign last year 11 months after taking power. His successor, President Eric Arturo Delvalle, has been increasingly overshadowed by military commander Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega.


**ECUADOR:** Nearly a decade of rule by military governments during the '60s and '70s ended with the adoption of a new constitution in 1978. Conservative President Leon Febres-Cordero took office in Aug., 1984.

**PERU:** President Alan Garcia, inaugurated in July, 1985, became the country's first elected president to take power from another elected leader in 40 years.

**PARAGUAY:** No effective challenge to the rule of President Gen. Alfredo Stroessner, who assumed power in May, 1954.

**CHILE:** Ruled by military junta. President Augusto Pinochet assumed power Sept., 1973. State of siege reimposed Sept. 7, 1986.

Compiled by James Schwartz



consolidated their power and taken control of the government.

**VENEZUELA:** President Jaime Lusinchi won the 1983 presidential election with the largest electoral majority in the country's 25 years of uninterrupted constitutional rule.

**COLOMBIA:** Politically moderate Virgilio Barco Vargas elected May 25, 1986. Recent rise in violence both by and against the leftist opposition.

**BRAZIL:** Ruled by military leaders from 1964-1979. Political liberalization extended by Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo, 1979-1985. Direct elections not permitted when electoral college chose president in 1985. Constitution now amended to provide for popular election of president.

**BOLIVIA:** Social reformer Victor Paz Estenssoro sworn in Aug., 1985, the first time in more than 20 years that power changed hands from one constitutionally elected government to another.

**URUGUAY:** Ruled by civilian-military governments during the 1970s. Armed forces announced a new plan for civilian rule following a plebiscite in 1980. President Julio Maria Sanguinetti elected in 1984.

**ARGENTINA:** President Raul Alfonsín began a six-year term in Dec., 1983, ending seven years of rule by a military junta. The junta was discredited because of alleged corruption, human rights abuses and the failure of the Falkland Islands campaign.

WASHINGTON POST

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
Seven men suspected of having links with leftist guerrillas were taken away that day and three more on Nov. 5, according to signed statements gathered from residents by the Catholic University Human Rights Group and the Archbishop's Legal Aid Office.

Colonel Caceres confirmed the statements, but denied that the children made to listen to a tape.

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# CONTRAS...CONTINUED

(Cont.) America



Raymond F. Burghardt, (not pictured), former political officer in the U.S. Embassy in Honduras during the time the contra program was growing, is the senior National Security Council staff aide for Latin American programs.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



WASHINGTON POST 19 NOVEMBER 1986 Pg. 26

# As Aid Resumes, U.S. Hopes Contras Can Be 'Viable Alternative'

By Joe Pichirallo  
Washington Post Staff Writer

With resumption of U.S. military aid to Nicaraguan rebels, State Department officials have expressed optimism that the counterrevolutionaries, or contras, can establish a "viable alternative" to the leftist Sandinista government.

Over the next year, the contras' military arm must break down into small guerrilla bands that can strike throughout Nicaragua, and the political wing must get its message across inside and outside the country, U.S. officials said in interviews on the insurgents' short-term goals.

"Up to now, no one really believed they had a chance of forcing change in Nicaragua," said a State Department official.

Congressional critics, however, said they view the new \$100 million contra aid package as increasing the possibility of direct U.S. military intervention. The critics also said that the contras' image here may be difficult to improve while several military command positions are held by officers of the late Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza's National Guard.

State Department officials said the administration must keep its goals realistic and persuade Congress and the public that fundamental governmental change in Nicaragua will take years.

The administration's long-range goals are to force the Sandinistas to relinquish control or democratize the government, halt repression of the media and allow political opposition.

With the prospect of another congressional debate on additional contra aid next spring, officials said they realize that tangible results must be produced quickly.

State Department officials said

that, during the next year, the contras must increase the size of their military force, demonstrate skill as guerrilla fighters, present a unified political front and show that they can operate in wider areas of the country, including the cities, rather than along just the southern and northern borders.

"This is a political struggle . . . the Nicaraguan people will not take chances until they know there is an alternative," a department official said. "Military success is a crucial part of that. [But] the resistance has to project a vision of the future of Nicaragua to the Nicaraguan people."

The centerpiece of the renewed push is the \$100 million aid package recently approved by Congress. It has \$70 million for weapons and other military assistance and \$30 million for nonlethal aid.

The law establishes new ground rules for U.S. involvement with the insurgents. Until it took effect late last month, the U.S. government, including the Central Intelligence Agency, had been prohibited for two years from providing military aid or direction to the contras.

The controversy surrounding the downing Oct. 5 of a C123K cargo plane over Nicaragua, which led to the capture of American crew member Eugene Hasenfus, centers on whether administration officials violated the ban on military aid to the contras then in effect.

Administration officials have said that the U.S. government was not involved with the downed plane or the secret contra resupply network of which the plane was a part.

While government officials are reluctant to provide specific details about the mechanics of delivering or administering the new aid, offi-

cials said the CIA has been given responsibility for day-to-day program management.

By law, the State Department is in charge of supervising and coordinating the policy; Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams will direct the program.

At least two interagency groups, consisting of representatives of the CIA, the State and Defense departments and the National Security Council, have been established to coordinate the policy.

In addition, officials said, the Defense Department is expected to provide personnel to help train the rebels and could be asked to provide planes and other equipment to enable the CIA to ferry supplies to contras in Central America.

Abrams' aide, Robert Kagan, is to work closely with the United Nicaraguan Opposition, the main contra alliance, in helping to minimize internal strife among top contra leaders and to devise a coherent political strategy.

Kagan also is to chair a department working group that will help administer \$3 million allotted for supervision of contra observance of human rights standards.

"The days of shooting prisoners are over," a State Department official said. In addition, the official said, the resistance fighters when they go into various parts of the country must treat the people well.

State Department officials said most of the aid will be provided to the rebels as weapons and supplies and in the form of training. Large amounts of cash will not be given to the contras, U.S. officials said.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



SATURDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1985

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America

### 'An Apologist' (Cont'd.)

Rabbi Balfour Brickner claims ["The Walls Are Not Smeared With Anti-Semitic Graffiti," *Free for All*, Sept. 21] that the Jews who left Nicaragua were not driven out by anti-Semitism. Rather, as he wrote last year, the worst that can be said of the Sandinista regime is that it "sometimes expels those who . . . conduct counter-revolutionary activity."

Never mind the fact that the Sandinista-approved newspaper, *Nuevo Diario*, has referred to Jewish places of worship as "synagogues of Satan" and denounced Jews "who . . . used the myth of God's chosen people to massacre the Palestinian people without mercy." Never mind that the same paper revived the ancient calumny that "world money, the banks and finance are in the hands of descendants of Jews, the eternal protectors of Zion." Never mind that in 1978 Sandinista gunmen threw a firebomb at the Managua synagogue while Jews were at prayer and forced those who tried to escape back into the burning building.

To Rabbi Brickner this is not anti-Semitism. To him, it represents, at worst, the actions "of a small gang of excited supporters of the revolution out on their own . . . caught up 'in the mob frenzy of the moment.'"

Never mind that the PLO—a terrorist organization and not (lest anyone doubt it) a sovereign government—is allowed by the Sandinistas to maintain a fully accredited "embassy" in Managua. Never mind that the Sandinistas provide PLO members with Nicaraguan passports with which to travel freely around the world as they plan and execute terrorist attacks. Never mind that Sandinista gunmen participated in PLO terrorist attacks against Jews in Israel and Europe during the 1970s. Rabbi Brickner believes that such actions are, well, somehow excusable.

Why does Rabbi Brickner choose to take the word of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, who (understandably) denies allegations of anti-Semitism, rather than that of the many Jewish victims of Sandinista persecution who have fled Nicaragua? He does so because he has dedicated himself to causes of the radical left rather than to Judaism and the Jewish people. He has cast off his Jewish mantle, donning, instead, that of an apologist for the overt and irrefutable anti-Semitism of a regime which he admires but which most other Jews have learned to fear.

—Richard J. Fox

*The writer is chairman of the National Jewish Coalition.*

## STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

### WHAT WE BELIEVE

The friends of democracy are gaining strength in Central America, and they need and want our help.

Many in our country have too long believed that the only choice for the people of Central America is between traditional, authoritarian systems and a violent, repressive new revolutionary order. But during recent years it has become clear that there is a powerful desire for democracy among the peoples of this region. This aspiration is increasingly reflected in their institutions.

In El Salvador, huge numbers of citizens turned out in four elections since 1982. They elected Jose Napoleon Duarte as the country's new President — a President who has vowed to protect the rights of his people, and has taken important steps to do so.

Democracy has taken hold in Honduras and Panama. In these countries, and in El Salvador, the military increasingly accepts the principle of civilian government and has worked to strengthen the processes of civilian, democratic rule. Even Guatemala, which has had some harsh military regimes, has shown recent signs of progress toward democracy, including a peaceful Constituent Assembly election with a large turnout in 1984. And Costa Rica has for many years been among the few fully democratic societies outside of the industrialized world.

But many threats still cloud the prospect of progress. Poverty, illiteracy and disease are still widespread, and for some time to come will create a desperation that is easily exploited by violent and extreme forces. In some countries, remnants of the older order and its henchmen use violent and unjust means to try to retain their power. Even more dangerous is the threat from the local totalitarian left in Central America which, with Soviet and Cuban support, is now tightening its hold on Nicaragua, carrying out guerrilla and terrorist attacks in other countries of the region, and building unprecedented military forces.

We believe that the citizens of the United States have a profound moral and strategic stake in the victory of democracy in Central America. We believe that either democracy will overcome this challenge, or the region will sink back into repression and violence. If the hope for democracy is extinguished, the result will be more brutality and repression than the region has yet known. This in turn will threaten the security and the values of all Americans.

How can we best respond to these dangers? Among us there may be differing views over how our social and economic assistance to the region should be employed — but we all agree that significant amounts of such aid are needed. There may be differences

over the ways in which U.S. military assistance should be implemented — but we agree that unless the security of these societies is defended, social and economic assistance is futile.

We all agree that the democratic forces of the region must be encouraged and assisted. For too long Americans have debated economic and military strategies while neglecting the political dimension of the problem.

It is not difficult to determine who is to be included among those democratic forces. They now include the governments of Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador and Panama, and the democratic political forces of Nicaragua. They include independent businessmen and their organizations, workers affiliated with free unions, the Roman Catholic Church and other religious groups, professional and other private sector groups. They include the political parties that have participated in democratic elections and accepted the results. These are tested opponents of totalitarianism and oligarchy, and this list is only a beginning.

### WHAT WE DO

We are joining the debate in the United States, which has too often been swayed by those who believe that the region is not ready for democracy, or that the United States cannot act constructively in the region.

We distribute facts and information about the democratic struggle in the region and in specific countries, through:

- Mail campaigns to build a grass-roots network throughout the United States to use our materials and speakers in local communities;
- Pamphlets, articles, educational materials, films;
- Press conferences and briefings on current developments and issues of timely interest and concern;
- Visits by Central American leaders to speak to public gatherings, the media, the Congress and government officials, organizations and religious groups, at the national and local level;
- Visits to Central America for first hand observation and study by U.S. citizens and leaders who talk and write about their experiences in their communities, organizations and the media;
- Special events — conferences, forum meetings, teach-ins;
- A Speakers' Bureau, making available informed spokesmen to organizations, churches, schools and universities;
- Special briefings for the media, organizations, Congressional representatives and staff, government officials, and national leaders.

Strong citizens' groups are a hallmark of our democracy. Our goal is to inform and mobilize the public so that our government will stand firm for the democratic ideal.

### HOW WE OPERATE

Our Committee is composed of individuals from all sectors of American life, who represent no partisan special interests. We welcome the participation of Democrats, Republicans and independents, of liberals and conservatives, of supporters and opponents of the present Administration and its policies.

All of our Council members and officers serve as individuals and not as representatives of any other organizations with which they may be affiliated. Our activities are financed by voluntary contributions from individuals, corporations and foundations. We are incorporated in the District of Columbia as an educational non-profit organization. Contributions to the Committee are tax deductible under Section 501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.

We are governed by the National Council at annual meetings. Between Council meetings the Executive Committee is responsible for the organization and has full power to act for the Council. Members of the Council are consulted informally by the staff and the Executive Committee about policies and programs.

We call upon people from all walks of life — business, labor, public affairs, education, the professions, religious groups — to join with us in this program, to contribute generously and to carry the message to your own friends, organizations and community.

Friends of the Democratic Center  
in Central American (Prodemca)  
200 Park Avenue, Suite 303 East  
New York, NY 10166  
212-818-0420

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☐ I would like to help in my community

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Central American

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(in formation)

Angier Biddle Duke  
*Chairman*

Morris Abram  
*Attorney, New York*

Philip Baum  
*American Jewish Congress*

John M. Bennett\*  
*San Antonio, Texas*

Nicholas D. Biddle  
*San Jose, Costa Rica*

Linden Blue  
*Denver, Colorado*

Vladimir Bukovsky  
*Hoover Institution, Stanford, California*

Francis R. Carroll  
*Small Business Service Bureau*

Kevin Corrigan\*  
*Corporate Executive, New York*

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*American Institute for Free Labor Development*

John C. Duncan  
*Consultant, St. Joe Minerals Corporation*

Maurice A. Ferre  
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*Coalition for Democratic Majority*

Elie Wiesel  
*Author*

Mary N. Temple\*  
*Executive Director*

\* Member of the Executive Committee  
(All affiliations are for identification purposes only.)

Friends of the Democratic Center  
in Central America (PRODEMCA)  
200 Park Ave., Suite 303 East  
New York, NY 10166

# FRIENDS of the DEMOCRATIC CENTER

## Statement of Purpose

200 Park Ave., Suite 303 East  
New York, New York 10166 (212) 816-0420

A nonprofit, nonpartisan educational organization formed by  
private citizens who support democracy, human rights and  
social justice in Central America.



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For Your Information

*Perlmutter*

*Centd  
America*



April 8, 1986

*Centd  
America*

Dear Representative:

While the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith takes no position on the legislation providing for \$100,000,000 of aid to the Contras, we do very much have a point of view on whether anti-Semitism has marked the Sandinistas.

The enclosed White Paper is a bill of particulars which should lay to rest any lingering doubts as to whether the Sandinistas have been guilty of anti-Semitism. Clearly, they have been.

We are also enclosing Mr. Perlmutter's April 5, New York Times letter and another letter, from a Nicaraguan Jewish leader. Both take issue with those who have denied Sandinista anti-Semitism.

We believe that the issue facing you -- that of voting on the administration's request for \$100,000,000 for the Contras -- is a very important issue, a very sensitive issue, and one which should be decided on its own merits. Just as hyperbole can obscure an issue, so is an issue misrepresented by selective indifference.

With all good wishes,

*Kenneth J. Bialkin*  
Kenneth J. Bialkin  
National Chairman

*Nathan Perlmutter*  
Nathan Perlmutter  
National Director

KJB/NP:sv  
Enclosures

## A WHITE PAPER ON THE SANDINISTAS AND JEWS

published by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith  
March 19, 1986

### INTRODUCTION

Members of the Jewish community-in-exile came to the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith to tell of their experience of Sandinist anti-Semitism in Nicaragua and seek assistance. In 1981, a League representative raised this issue in New York with Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto. Despite assurances that the government would investigate, the ADL received no reply to queries about anti-Semitism, the status of the synagogue and private properties.

In May, 1983, after 19 months of futile quiet diplomacy, the ADL publicized the plight of Nicaraguan Jewry. Only then did the government of Nicaragua react. It denied charges of anti-Semitism, and falsely claimed that four cabinet members are Jews. It also claimed that the synagogue was a private home, legally confiscated. When ADL provided documents proving that the synagogue was built by the congregation, the government offered to return the building.

At that time only two or three members of the congregation were still in the country. The small Jewish community, its members fearing for their lives, had fled in the face of anti-Semitic threats and harrassment.

Since then, various individuals and organizations have attempted to distort the facts and deny that Jews, as Jews, had reason to fear or flee the country. This paper sets forth basic facts about the Sandinistas and Jews.

### ANTI-SEMITISM

"Anti-Semitism was one of the major factors, though not the only one, which caused the Nicaraguan Jews to leave Nicaragua."

Marcel Ruff, President

Federation of Jewish Communities of Central America (FEDECO), May, 1984

\* \* \*

Nuevo Diario, a Managua newspaper which closely adheres to the government line, charged (July 17, 1982), that "the world's money, banking and finance are in the hands of descendants of Jews, the eternal protectors of Zionism. Consequently, controlling economic power, they control political power as now happens in the United States."

\* \* \*

"I remembered that it was the Levites in the synagogue who crucified our Lord."

Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto  
Washington Post 1/27/85

### THE SYNAGOGUE

The synagogue in Managua was firebombed in 1978 while the congregation was worshipping inside. When congregants attempted to flee, they were confronted with armed Sandinistas who ordered them not to leave the burning building.

\* \* \*

"I remember one day, one evening, on a Shabbat evening while we were singing, two bombs hit the door. We had a big wooden door in the synagogue, where a big Star of David was, and all of a sudden, the whole place was on fire.

"I remember running, getting the fire hose, and started running to the entrance of the synagogue, when I stopped because two other members that used to be in concentration camps in Europe, they had already reached the outside of the synagogue. We were met by a jeep and another small car with eight members that had handkerchiefs on their faces, and they identified themselves as members of the FSLN, means the Sandinista movement, guerilla movement. They said that they were the FSLN and the PLO and that they were going to burn all the Jews. So we were forced back into the synagogue."

Oscar Kellerman, Washington, July 20, 1983

\* \* \*

Mauricio Palacio is a non-Jew who lived among the Jews and served as a Sandinista informant.

"I let them know where....the Jewish people would gather so that a little burning of the cars of these Zionists could be done and tell them all "JEWS GO HOME."

Mauricio Palacio  
Managua, March 3, 1980

"The purpose of this operation, was intended to intimidate the community and, in that way, to stop the flow of arms from Israel. It was determined that the best place to carry out the operation was the synagogue....the synagogue was attacked and they attempted to set fire to the doors; a verbal message was given to the congregation...."

Mauricio Palacio  
Chicago, April 15, 1986

### THREATS AND INTIMIDATION OF INDIVIDUAL JEWS

"I, together with my brother-in-law, Mr. Saul Retelny, ran a complex of factories manufacturing textiles and candy which employed at peaks, over 1,200 heads of families. For a period of 18 months prior to July, 1979 anonymous

callers would contact Mr. Retelny and threaten his life and that of his wife. These calls came to his business office and to his home, now also confiscated, at all hours of the night. One favorite tactic was to call around three in the morning and tell my brother-in-law that I had been shot and killed! At the same time, I would get a telephone call claiming that my brother-in-law was shot and killed.

"In addition, there were writings on the walls inside and outside the factories: 'Death to the Jews; Isaac will be killed. Beware of Sandinista Justice.' Dry runs of abduction attempts were made. In one instance, I was stopped, with my son inside the car, and at gun point my life was threatened. I was warned that my businesses were to be taken over when the Sandinistas came to power. Although Mr. Retelny and I were both born in Nicaragua, we never participated directly or indirectly, in politics."

Isaac Stavisky, Washington, July 20, 1983

\* \* \*

"Three times I was followed, and they tried to kill me three times. With gasoline, they tried to burn the car. Other times, I did not take the path or the road that they thought I was going to take, because every day we would take a different road. We knew already that we were being followed. We were all receiving, not only myself, but the rest of the Jewish families, receiving harassment, threats, phone calls. And all this made us little by little, one by one, leave Nicaragua."

Oscar Kellerman, Washington, March 14, 1985

#### CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY

The government of Nicaragua informed the ADL in December, 1983 that only two members of the Jewish community faced the possibility of criminal charges, but that 17 had had their properties confiscated by decrees. The others are caught in the "Catch 22" situation of being out of the country for fear that their lives are in danger and, therefore, falling under the Nicaraguan law providing for the confiscation of property of those who remain outside the country for more than six months.

#### SANDINISTAS' RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

After coming to power in 1979, the Sandinistas maintained minimal relations with the State of Israel, never permitting the Israeli ambassador to present credentials. In 1982, the Nicaraguans broke relations with Israel.

Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto, in a speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations announcing that his country was breaking relations with Israel, used the Israeli move into Lebanon as a pretext for that action. He told

re Lebanon

the U.N. body, "Never since the time of Hitler has such mass genocide been witnessed...." D'Escoto said that his government, since it came to power, had "suspended all contact with the Zionist regime...all that remained was to break off diplomatic relations formally."

In the last two sessions of the General Assembly, Nicaragua has actively supported efforts to expel Israel from that world body.

#### SANDINISTA LINKS TO P.L.O.

The P.L.O.-Sandinist relationship involved P.L.O.-supplied weapons, training and funds. Sandinist guerillas and P.L.O. terrorists have also fought side by side. Jorge Mandi, a Sandinist spokesman, told a reporter for the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Watan (Aug. 7, 1979), "There is a longstanding blood unity between us and the Palestinian revolution....Many of the units belonging to the Sandinist movement were at Palestinian revolutionary bases in Jordan. In the early 1970's, Nicaraguan and Palestinian blood was spilled together in Amman and in other places during the 'Black September' battles."

In August, 1980, the Kuwaiti press reported that P.L.O. members had gone to Nicaragua to supervise military training. This was done in accord with an agreement reached with Yasir Arafat, the P.L.O. chieftain, who had gone to Managua in July to celebrate the first anniversary of the revolutionary Government. The Sandinists paid their debt by authorizing the opening of a P.L.O. "embassy" in Managua.



# The New York Times

SATURDAY, APRIL 5, 1986

## So Are the Sandinistas Anti-Semitic? Of Course, They Are

To the Editor:

Your March 20 editorial observes: "Of the millions who heard Mr. Reagan describe the 'desecrating and fire-bombing' of Managua's only synagogue, how many will catch up with the rejoinder, by Rabbi Balfour Brickner of the Stephen Wise Free Synagogue? He says the building was abandoned during street fighting in 1978, a year before the Sandinistas seized power. The rabbi's own investigation in Nicaragua failed to sustain Mr. Reagan's charge of virulent anti-Semitism."

One wonders how many will catch up with the rabbi's questionable assertion given such amplification in your editorial, yet.

When is anti-Semitism heaping "catsup and snake oil into the dish of disputation," as you assert, and when is anti-Semitism plain anti-Semitism? We submit that President Reagan was accurate in his characterization of the Sandinista Government as anti-Semitic.

It is anti-Semitism when the Sandinista Foreign Minister, Miguel D'Escoto, publicly declares, "I remembered that it was the Levites in the synagogue who crucified our Lord." Bibli-

cal rhetoric? It's the very rhetoric that historically has fueled pogroms.

It is anti-Semitism when Nuevo Diario, the Managua newspaper, which adheres closely to the Government's line, charges "the world's money, banking and finance are in the hands of descendants of Jews, the eternal protectors of Zionism."

"Consequently," Nuevo Diario continues, "controlling economic power, they control political power, as now happens in the United States." How is that different from the anti-Semitism that Goebbels broadcast and which today echoes in the Soviet Union?

It may not be overt anti-Semitism when early on in their victory the Sandinistas invited Yasir Arafat to Managua, where he promised that the "way to Jerusalem lies through Managua." Jews have, however, sadly learned to hear the sound of danger in such messages.

An extensive citation of anti-Semitic statements and acts of Sandinistas is available from the Anti-Defamation League, including corrections of your statement that the Managua synagogue was abandoned a year before the Sandinistas seized power. Your

sources to the contrary notwithstanding, Marcel Ruff, president of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Central America, said in May 1984, "Anti-Semitism was one of the major factors, though not the only one, which caused the Nicaraguan Jews to leave Nicaragua." What makes the New York-based Rabbi Brickner a more compelling witness than the Jewish presence in Nicaragua and Central America?

The terms "major factor" and "though not the only one" merit attention. Why? Because anti-Semitism aside, Jews are, like all people, multidimensional. And so they left Nicaragua because being Jewish was dangerous; and they left because free speech, too, is dangerous in Nicaragua, and they left Nicaragua because businessmen there are an endangered species. In short, they left because freedom is a risky business in a Marxist-Leninist society.

So are the Sandinistas anti-Semitic? Of course, they are, and anti-other forms of civilized life as well.

NATHAN PERLMUTTER  
National Director, Anti-Defamation  
League of B'nai B'rith  
New York, March 24, 1986

(OVER)

★  
ANTIDEFAME NYK

MSG 13

ATTN: R. MORTON ROSENTHAL

PLS.RCV.COPY OF MY "LETTER TO THE EDITOR" ADDRESSED TO THE NYTIM  
TLX 420401 THE 03/20/86 AT 18.15 HOURS.:

"ATTN: TO THE EDITOR: THE NEW YORK TIMES TREATMENT OF THE  
SUBJECT OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN NICARAGUA WAS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH  
THE EDITORIAL'S TITLE, "MAKING BAD THINGS WORSE." (MARCH 20,  
1986).

YOUR FIRST MISTAKE WAS TO REPORT AS FACTS THE DISINFORMATION  
WHICH RABBI BRICKNER HAS BEEN DISSEMINATING ON BEHALF OF THE SANDI-  
NISTA CAUSE. YOU COMPOUNDED THE SITUATION BY USING THE FALSE  
INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY THE "EMINENT NEW YORK RABBI" AS THE  
BASIS AND SUBSTANCE OF YOUR EDITORIAL.

ONE FACT WILL SUFFICE. THE COMMUNITY'S ONLY SYNAGOGUE HAD TWO  
TORAH SCROLLS. THEY WERE REMOVED FROM THE BUILDING AND TAKEN OUT  
OF THE COUNTRY DAYS BEFORE THE FALL OF SOMOZA IN JULY 1979.

ONE OF THOSE TORAH SCROLLS WAS BROUGHT PERSONALLY TO MIAMI BY ONE  
OF

THE SPIRITUAL LEADERS OF THE COMMUNITY AND IS NOW IN A NORTH MIAMI  
SYNAGOGUE. THIS HAPPENED EXACTLY JUNE 6, 1979.

THE SECOND TORAH SCROLL WAS BROUGHT TO SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, BY  
ANOTHER MEMBER OF OUR CONGREGATION, AND IS NOW IN THE TEMPLE OF THE  
COSTA RICAN COMMUNITY.

IT IS, THEREFORE, INCOMPREHENSIBLE FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES TO  
STATE EDITORIALLY THAT "THE BUILDING WAS ABANDONED DURING STREET  
FIGHTING IN 1978, A YEAR BEFORE THE SANDINISTAS SEIZED POWER."

WE DID NOT ABANDON THE SYNAGOGUE BUILDING, WHEN THE CONGREGATION  
LEFT NICARAGUA, BECAUSE OF SANDINISTA ANTI-SEMITISM. WE LEFT BEHIND  
TWO PAID CARETAKERS WHO WERE LIVING IN THE BUILDING. ONE OF THEM  
WAS THE LIFELONG CARETAKER OF THE SYNAGOGUE MR. LUIS ZAMBRANA. THEY  
WERE BOTH "TAKEN CARE OF" BY THE SANDINISTAS WHO FORCED THEM OUT  
OF THE BUILDING, SO THEY COULD CLAIM THE BUILDING AS "ABANDONED"  
AND USE IT FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES.

FRED LUFT

MIAMI

PERSONAL NOTE TO THE EDITOR: THE INJUSTICE AND FALLACY OF THE  
STATEMENTS BY RABBI BRICKNER CRY TO THE HEAVENS. PLEASE BE FAIR AND  
MAKE THIS RECTIFICATION PUBLIC THIS TIME. FRED LUFT, 2505 NW 74  
AVE. MIAMI FLORIDA, TEL. 305-591-3740

P.S.: FRED LUFT CAME TO NICARAGUA AS A POST WAR REFUGEE IN 1948 AND  
LEFT NICARAGUA IN 1979, AND DURING MUCH OF THIS TIME SERVED AS  
SECRETARY AND HISTORIAN OF THE JEWISH CONGREGATION OF NICARAGUA,  
NOW IN EXILE.

153412 PEIKARD

★  
ANTIDEFAME NYK

# FRIENDS OF THE DEMOCRATIC CENTER IN CENTRAL AMERICA (PRODEMCA)

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202/347-1006

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Linda Chavez  
Special Assistant to the President  
Office of Public Liaison  
2nd Floor, West Wing  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Linda:

I called, but I know how hard it must be for you to find phone time.

Jeane Kirkpatrick has just finally committed to do a fund-raising event for Prodemca in Miami on November 21st.

Because we are bi-partisan in character -- although not at all ambivalent in policy -- Congressman Claude Pepper will share the honors with her.

You and Max Green could be very helpful by:

- 1) Calling Jeb Bush, Chairman of the Miami Republican Committee, to enlist his assistance for us. Would you give us a list of people to invite? Will he come? Will he send a note or make some calls?
- 2) Get us some support among pro-Administration Jewish leaders. (There is a Cadillac dealer in Miami who comes to mind. There may be others.)
- 3) Giving us any other suggestions you may have about possible sources of help on this.

I have attached a copy of the invitation text which gives further details. *not attached*

Many thanks too, for your note to Jeane.

I'm sure it helped.

Best,



Penn Kemble

\* Member of the Executive Committee  
(All affiliations are for identification purposes only.)

# Revelations Spark Panama Revolt

By JONATHON T. STRIDE

Media carriage of accusations against the Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, chief of the Panama Defense Forces, by his just-retired top aide, will have been a decisive factor if the country's aroused populace and political parties are able to put reins on the wily strongman who has been virtually above the law.

While the powerful army that Noriega heads was expected to be able to suppress street rioting and calls for work stoppages that virtually shut down Panama City last week, he may have a more difficult time enforcing a decree suspending human rights, especially freedom of speech.

Noriega's former chief of staff, Col. Robert Diaz Herrera, 49, broadcast his confession and charges by radio and television and released scripts to the newspapers. Diaz alleged on Panama City Radio Continents June 8 that Noriega "was involved in the murder" of opposition leader Dr. Hugo Spadafora, whose decapitated and castrated body was found in a U.S. mailbag Sept. 14, 1985, just across the Panama border in Costa Rica.

Diaz also said Dr. Arnulfo Arias Madrid, was president three times "and three times we ousted him with coups." In 1984, when it appeared Arias would win Panama's first free presidential election in 16 years, Noriega stopped the balloting and named Nicolas Ardito Barletta president. He made Barletta resign later, elevating the vice president, Eric Arturo Delvalle, to president.

Diaz told of knowing about the death of Noriega's powerful predecessor, Gen. Omar Torrijos, in a 1981

plane crash. Diaz said Col. Alberto Purcell, now assistant chief of staff to Noriega, in 1981 was head of the Panamanian air force and was paid \$250,000 to permit a bomb to be put on Torrijos' aircraft.

Diaz said he gave his charges to Archbishop of Panama Monsignor Marcos Gregorio McGrath, who broadcast on June 9 that he had "documents that are proof of what he has said" and which "will be kept in a sealed envelope . . . until charges are formally presented. In this way, they will be safe."

Diaz said he recently tried to get an audience with Vice President George Bush through a courier, Baby Alfredo Aleman, to "help Vice President Bush so they could see I am not an enemy of the United States . . . I wanted to help so there would be no revenge for the death of Torrijos, Spadafora, or any other person."

He said Bush and General Wallace Nutting, then head of the U.S. Southern Command (defense) in Panama, "as well as a U.S. Air Force Lt. Colonel and a Cuban CIA agent," know "something" about Torrijos death. On Panama City Panavision TV June 9, Winston Spadafora, brother of Hugo, said he met with Diaz "two hours" June 8 and compared notes, and concluded that Noriega gave the order for Hugo's murder to assistants, Maj. Cordoba and Capt. Mario Del Cid, before Noriega went to Switzerland. He said the actual killers were "the three people accused in the brief improperly compiled by the nation's Attorney General's Office, and then illegally stayed."

Diaz said Noriega even made a game of the murder, "attempting to tell the opposition that I was responsible

for planning this. However, the Spadafora family is in my house right now, and this belies that."

Diaz, who said the order was issued June 3 to kill him and that a dossier was being compiled to try to prove he is insane, also said he was "deeply afraid for my family, my wife," but he and he alone was responsible for his "political life."

He said there is \$12 million in Switzerland which Gen. Torrijos left, apparently from the late Shah of Iran, and that \$1 million was earmarked for him. Diaz said his own house, worth millions of dollars, is "half stolen. I built it with the money of the people who came from Cuba, with the money they paid for their visas." This refers to Noriega's arranging with Cuban dictator Fidel Castro to charge Cubans whatever they could pay to obtain visas to leave Cuba for Panama.

Regarding "the fraud" of Barletta's taking office, Diaz said it took place in his own house along with "Romulo Escobar, Jorge Abadia, Gen. Noriega, and Col. Marcos Justines" and was carried out by "electoral magistrates, Yolanda Pulice and Rolando Murgas Torraza." Obviously, "legally," Arias is president, he added.

Meanwhile, Escobar, president of the National Executive Committee of the ruling Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), said the Diaz charges were "defamatory and slanderous," that Diaz was "angry about his retirement" and was being used as part of "U.S. reactionary forces" and others "against our relations with Cuba and Nicaragua" and as an attempt to evade the commitments of the Torrijos-Carter treaties to turn the Panama Canal over to Panama in 12 years.

## On Soviet MiG-21s:

## Nicaraguan Pilots Train In Cuba

The Miami Herald reported Sunday that Nicaraguan pilots are training in Cuba. Miguel Obando y Bravo, who was accused in a Newsweek magazine article of receiving \$100,000 from the CIA.

## Vietnamese Grads Walk Out On Hayden

By DEBORAH LAMBERT

Former anti-war activist Tom Hayden, who had cancelled his plans to give the commencement address at California's San Jose City College last

ate without the threat of violence and disruption."

But when Hayden appeared