FMLN DEFECTOR BIOGRAPHIES

Napoleon Romero Garcia, (Miguel Castellanos)

On April 11, 1985, the Salvadoran National Guard arrested Napoleon ROMERO Garcia, more commonly known by his guerrilla pseudonym "Miguel Castellanos." After his arrest Romero decided to cooperate with the Salvadoran government and provided valuable information regarding the Salvadoran guerrillas' activities and their extensive links to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Romero's testimony corroborates that supplied by many former Salvadoran guerrillas which detailed Salvadoran guerrilla tactics as well as their ties with the Sandinistas. Until the time of his capture, Romero had been a high ranking member of the Salvadoran guerrilla movement, Secretary General of the Metropolitan Front of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), one of the groups forming the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). His position as the third-ranking commander of the FPL gave him access to highly sensitive information regarding the inner workings of the Salvadoran guerrillas.

As Secretary General, Romero provided overall orientation in both political and military activities in the Metropolitan Front in accordance with instructions he received from the general command of the FPL.

Romero says that the FMLN's principal target is the destruction of the Salvadoran economic infrastructure such as bridges, warehouses, and the telecommunications and electrical systems.

Romero has provided a wealth of information concerning the Sandinista regime's support for the Salvadoran guerrillas. He described the routes used to bring supplies into El Salvador from Nicaragua. He says that in 1983 as much as 50 tons of supplies were delivered every three months. Through 1983 the shipments were mostly weapons but, according to Romero, the guerrillas now have more weapons in storage than personnel to use them.

Romero estimates that the FPL receives approximately 80 percent of its monthly operating budget of U.S. $65,000-100,000 from the FPL National Finance Commission in Nicaragua. Managua is the collection point for all financial assistance obtained abroad by the FMLN/FDR solidarity groups.

Nelson Omar Guerra Trinidad, (Comandante Ernesto)

DOB: 10/22/64

Nelson Omar Guerra Trinidad (Pseudonym: Comandante Ernesto) was recruited by the people's revolutionary army (ERP) in 1970 but was not active in the group until he joined the student front of the ERP's LP-28 Movement in 1979. There he helped organize small groups dedicated to popular recruitment. Ernesto said he joined the guerrillas because of the institutionalization of repression, the economic and social crisis of the country, and the lack of an alternative.

In December 1979 Ernesto was called to work in a military squadron full time and in 1980 was assigned to a military urban commando unit. He was involved in kidnapping, murder and bank robberies. That same year he attended a course in San Salvador given by Sandinista Army members and participated in the attacks on major targets in the city such as the U.S. Embassy, the first brigade, national guard and air forces in 1950. When the "final offensive" of January 1981 failed, Ernesto withdrew with the other surviving guerrillas to the Guazapa region north of San Salvador.

In 1980 Ernesto went with seven other guerrillas to Honduras, where he spent three months working with the Honduran terrorist group "Cinchoheros." In 1981 he travelled to Cuba through Nicaragua, and there he took an intensive three-month course for the special forces command and received specialized training in preparation for the 1982 attack on the air force base at Ilopango. He then went to Nicaragua and took a course in demolitions. In December 1981 Ernesto returned to San Salvador via Mexico to prepare for the attack on the Ilopango air force base (1982) which was a success.

After further training in Honduras Ernesto was selected in 1982 to command the special forces units in Morazan. There he participated in the attacks on such strategic targets as the Microwave relay station and the cuscatlan and "Puente de Oro" bridges across the Rio Lempa.

In 1984 Ernesto left the special forces and became the Executive Officer of a western front battalion. Over the next two years internal problems with his association with the western front Commander Balta developed. Balta openly opposed Villalobos strategy of placing strategic forces where they had already been twice defeated. Contradictions between the theoretical struggle for the people and the actual behavior of the guerrillas became increasingly evident to Ernesto during this time.

In February 1986 the ESAF captured Ernesto who decided to collaborate with the ESAF and has since been actively denouncing the FMLN.

Marco Antonio Grande, (Comandante Jose)

DOB: 4/28/58

In 1979 Jose entered the Salvadoran Communist Party (PSC) while he was a student at the National University where he began his activities by distributing propaganda and painting slogans on walls. In 1980 he was offered a scholarship to study International Relations in the Soviet Union. After arrival in Leningrad in 1980, Jose found that instead of International Relations he would be studying scientific communism, which included studies in Marxist-Leninist theory, dialectic materialism, historical materialism, and political economic.

In 1982 he left the Soviet Union without completing his degree and went to Cuba where he studied to be a guerrilla company commander.

In 1983 Jose went to Nicaragua for a political training course and returning to El Salvador via Guatemala with false documents. Seeing what he believed to be the same repressive political system he went to work in Jucuaran, Usulutan. He was the political leader of the Jucuaran Platoon and the Chief Political Leader of the expansion project for the Jucuaran zone in the southeast front. Jose was also the Political Company Leader of the Paracentral Front.

Jose says that he saw the Salvadoran political system begin to improve with free elections held and Human Rights violations declining. Meanwhile, the guerrillas had become increasingly dogmatic. The FMLN had eliminated the option for a political solution and had itself violated Human Rights by using land mines, trying to destroy the country's infrastructure, and prolonging the crisis. Fearing that he was increasingly being considered a deviationist and that he would be executed for not following the party line as had been Roque Dalton (1975) and Ernesto Jovel (1980), he turned himself in to the ESAF in 1985.

Luz Janeth Alfaro, (Michelle Salinas) V

DOB: 10/27/63

Education: 1981 graduated from High School with a degree in Business Administration and Accounting.

In 1982 Luz Janeth Alfaro joined the Non-Governmental Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (CDHES) using the pseudonym Michelle Salinas. She hoped to learn more about the disappearance of her mother, who disappeared in June of 1981.

During the first year she worked in various positions within the legal and statistics sections of CDHES, where she altered the declarations of people who came to complain of violations,

and where reports from the guerrillas of their killed in combat were changed to show "civilians killed by the army."

In 1983 while part of CDHES she was recruited by the National Resistance (RN), the political arm of the armed forces of national resistance, one of the five guerrilla armies that make up the FMLN. She agreed to become a member of the RN because "of the regimes that my country had had" and because "there were no signs of democracy or pluralistic ideology."

In November of 1984 the CDHES held the "first congress of Human Rights in El Salvador," and following the event CDHES named her as the head of Public Relations of CDHES. In 1985 the RN assigned her to attend the meeting of the United Nations Commission for Human Rights in Geneva. CDHES is affiliated with the International Federation of the Rights of man, a consulting member of the United Nations, and this gave her official status to attend the conference to meet the delegates and lobby for condemnation of the government of El Salvador for its Human Rights violations. After the conference she toured Europe, visiting Sweden, Germany, Holland, Belgium and Denmark speaking with organizations about Human Rights violations and soliciting funding for CDHES. The funding provided by the organizations was used to support the political activities of the CDHES and also diverted to support the FMLN.

In August of 1985 she left the RN because she no longer supported the fact that as a member of the FMLN it "manipulated the pain of the Salvadoran people for economic gain." In December 1985 she asked to re-enlist in the RN "because of the non-existence of a democratic space for independent organizations that permitted me to work for my ideals," and in January 1986 she was allowed to rejoin CDHES.

When she rejoined, she was sent to the countryside to meet with the FMLN and receive instructions on the policies of the CDHES and conduct investigations for the CDHES to be used against the government. During her time in La Libertad, Chalatenango and Santa Ana Departments she observed the FMLN's use of minor children as combatants and to carry military supplies. She was "revolted" to see children used this way, and asked to be sent back to San Salvador. In April she returned to CDHES and was made head of Public Relations again.

On May 20, 1986 she was arrested by the Treasury Police in her home, who showed her proof of her membership in a terrorist organization, the RN. After reflecting on her situation for 8 hours she decided to cooperate and asked for the protection of the government, as "I am a target of the FMLN. Now I have renounced my membership in the organizations that make up the FMLN/FDR, but not my principles. I feel obligated to continue my struggle so that we have a real peace in El Salvador, based on democracy and respect for Human Rights."

Dora Angelica Campos, (Violeta)

Age: 32 years

Dora Angelica Campos joined the National Resistance in 1975. Her Husband, Ernesto Jovel, was one of the original founders of the National Resistance (RN), which was a splinter organization of the popular revolutionary army (ERP), the most militaristic of what now make up the five armies of the FMLN. In 1975 each guerrilla group operated independently. The split was not friendly, and several leaders were assassinated during the revolutionary argument. Dora says that after the public security forces massacred a group of students in front of the social security hospital in 1975 "in which they killed, arrested or caused to disappear hundreds of teen-agers, I was even more convinced of the urgency of deepening the illegal struggle, to finish a system of government that did not offer alternatives for political and socio-economic change for Salvadorans.

Between 1975 and 1980 the RN emphasized the "Politicization of the Masses," and infiltrated unions and other popular organizations. "The repression of the armed forces against the workers...brought as a consequence the repodiation of the Salvadoran people...as the number of deaths, prisoners and disappeared people climbed every day, causing pain and suffering in every Salvadoran family."

In 1980 the Cubans enforced the formation of a National Umbrella Guerrilla Organization, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), which was to unify the five groups under one revolutionary flag. Ernesto Jovel, Dora Angelica's common law husband, strongly opposed the entry of the ERP into the group, and was killed by other guerrilla leaders as a result of his resistence.

Dora Angelica was told that Jovel had disappeared in a plane crash. This situation almost drove me to insanity, believing that he was possibly still alive and 'disappeared' (by the army)...nevertheless, I justified the suffering as an offering to the revolutionary movement of my country, which would see a popular triumph with the taking of power by the dictatorship of the proletariat, which would once and for all change the climate of social injustice. After Jovel's disappearance Dora Angelica was not financially supported by the RN. She heard nothing further about the circumstances of his disappearance and had no contact with RN militants.

In March of 1984 she recontacted friends in the RN, "motivated by 1) a desire to find out more about my husband's death, 2) my weak but still existing belief in the revolutionary struggle, and 3) the fact I had two children whom I could not support because I was a woman and was unskilled, due to my years with

the guerrillas." She was contacted by representatives of the RN who suggested she work for co-madres, "the committee of Mothers of the Disappeared", where her husband's disappearance could be put to good use. She worked in a "closed" or clandestine office in charge of "propaganda" and was given the pseudonym "Violeta Jovel", in honor of her husband. She wrote radio programs, bulletins and press releases denoucing human rights violations.

In December 1984 she was authorized to join the propaganda commission of the party, which was the preparation phase for her appointment in May 1985 to head the co-madres. As head of co-madres she was responsible for: The Propaganda Commission, The Public Relations Commission (to deal with funding organizations and people important to the cause), The Organization Commission (charged with mobilizing people for marches and recruitment for the RN), The Documentation Commission (in charge of statistics and files of affiliated members).

Part of the co-madres' duties were to visit the prison every day to collect statistics on prisoners held, charges, and conditions. These were used for denunciations of illegal arrests for political activities. At the same time, the co-madres prison visitor collected and passed to Dora the "grade of militancy," i.e. which guerrilla group the person belonged to and his rank. This Dora passed on to her superior in the RN for internal guerrilla purposes.

At the end of 1985, Dora was also given the responsibility for finances for the solidarity committee of the RN, of which co-madres was one organization. Her job was to collect funds from International Organizations that donated to the co-madres and others. She was also responsible for coordinating the activities of RN members in the Non-governmental Human Rights Commission (CDHES).

At the instruction of the general command of the FMLN, the different Mothers Committees renewed their coordination meetings to achieve their goals. The two other "Mothers Committees", were run by the Popular Liberation Forces and the Popular Revolutionary Army, while the Communist Party had a support committee that also cooperated.

In May 1985 she was still unhappy, despite her responsibilities. She still had no logical explanation for her husband's death, although she had heard rumors that he had been "purged" (killed) by the party for his radical maoist tendencies. She was opposed to the co-madres technique of conditioning material and economic aid to the poor to attendance at marches, and she thought that there should be room for peaceful and legal movement, rather than a continued military strategy of the guerrilla groups.

On 29 May 1986 she was arrested by members of the treasury police who showed her proof of her membership in the RN. After some interrogation she was left alone to think over her situation, and she decided to leave the movement "as I honestly was no longer in agreement with the policy of the RN." She agreed to talk to the press "to explain to the other members of the co-madres how they were being used, because the committee used the denunciations in marches, but never resolved the cases (brought to its attention)."

On June 13 she was released "which surprised me. Later they (the treasury police) explained that the decision was made because I had made declarations against the FMLN/FDR, which put me in danger if I was sent to prison, where there could be an attempt to kill me. Besides, my confession was taken as a sign of rejection of the guerrilla movement and incorporation into the democratic process..."

United States Department of State

The Guerrilla Movement in El Salvador

(Central America)

Contents

July 1987

This document was published by the
Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean,
Room 5917, Department of State, Washington, DC 20520;
Telephone (202) 647-6752.

Department of State Publication 9608
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin American
and the Caribbean

Released July 1987

The Guerrilla Movement in El Salvador

The FMLN: An Outgrowth of Terrorism

The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), formed in November 1980, united five rival Marxist factions operating in El Salvador throughout the 1970s. This guerrilla umbrella organization grew out of a May 1980 meeting in Havana, Cuba, at which time Salvadoran guerrilla leaders, with help from Cuban President Fidel Castro, established the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU).* The five guerrilla groups belonging to the FMLN are the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), the Armed Forces of the National Resistance (FARN), the Central American Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRTC), and the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES). The Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) is the political and diplomatic arm of the FMLN.

All of the guerrilla factions, with the exception of the Salvadoran Communist Party, grew out of the complex evolution of Marxist political activity in El Salvador beginning in the late 1960s. The hierarchy of the Communist Party pursued the electoral path to power ever since its insurrectional strategy failed in the bloody uprising of 1932. However, many rank-and-file members became impatient with the strategy to gradually assume power. Spurred by the increasingly repressive nature of military regimes in El Salvador, examples of successful violent Marxist revolutions elsewhere, and a more radical outlook, disaffected Communist Party leaders and younger members

*Information on meetings is contained in Salvadoran Communist Party documents and People's Revolutionary Army documents obtained by the State Department in November 1980 and January 1981.

broke with the Communist Party in the early 1970s and formed the new Popular Liberation Forces and People's Revolutionary Army, both dedicated to revolutionary violence. Personal rivalries and ideological differences continued to surface, and two other radical Marxist groups—the Armed Forces of the National Resistance and the Central American Revolutionary Workers' Party—formed in 1975 and 1976, respectively. The new groups increasingly gained support from a network of politicized civil and labor associations and radical clergy.

Beginning in 1977, the guerrilla groups, with the exception of the Communist Party, pursued terrorist strategies aggressively by kidnapping and murdering diplomats and businessmen from Japan, Europe, the United States, and El Salvador. This activity sparked similar acts of terrorism from the right.

The Sandinista victory in neighboring Nicaragua in 1979 boosted the revolutionary expectations of the radical left in El Salvador. The leadership of the Communist Party was advised by its Soviet and Cuban mentors to join the incipient Salvadoran insurgency, and, over the next year, Fidel Castro attempted to forge a unified military leadership among the different revolutionary factions, resulting in the formation of the FMLN in November 1980.

The FMLN military alliance gave the guerrilla factions the organizational scope to launch formally a full-fledged insurgency in January 1981. Logistical support was provided by Cuba and the Soviet Union through Nicaragua. The number of guerrilla combatants grew from 2,000 to 3,000 in 1981 to as many as 12,000 in 1982–83. Since late 1983, however, the improved field performance of the expanded Salvadoran Armed Forces, the consolidation of a democratic regime, and the dramatic decline in human rights abuses have robbed the insurgency of most of its appeal. As of May 1987, the number of active guerrilla combatants ranged from 5,000 to 7,000, according to U.S. Government estimates.

The unity imposed by Castro in 1980 has not always been evident. Although the Salvadoran Communist Party has remained the central point for contacts with Cuban and Soviet suppliers, the individual guerrilla factions often have pursued separate field strategies. In 1985, however, the FMLN reacted to its dwindling resources and drew up a blueprint for greater operational and ideological unity among the insurgent factions. Since then, guerrilla leaders frequently have spoken about forming a single Marxist-Leninist party to be the vanguard of the revolution. Militarily, the factions appear to have agreed to implement a strategy of "prolonged popular war," designed to wear down and eventually overthrow the democratic government through a combination of military operations, extensive sabotage of economic infrastructure, and terrorism.

Democracy Takes Hold in El Salvador

The March 1985 elections for legislative assembly deputies and local government officials marked a major step of a 4-year process to bring democratically elected government to El Salvador. In 1982, over 80 percent of the eligible voters had gone to the polls to elect a Constituent Assembly, which in turn produced a democratic constitution in 1983. On June 1, 1984, after two rounds of elections, Jose Napoleon Duarte was inaugurated as El Salvador's first popularly elected civilian president in more than 50 years. Each of these elections was monitored by international observers and judged free and fair. The current government—with the Christian Democratic Party in power and a multi-party Legislative Assembly functioning—is the most democratic government El Salvador has ever had.

Under President Duarte, the government has worked to strengthen the reforms of the late 1970s and early 1980s, particularly the agrarian reform that radically changed patterns of land tenure in El Salvador's predominantly agricultural society. The government has succeeded in dramatically reducing human rights abuses committed by its armed forces and is committed to further improvements in this area. The press operates freely, and participants in the democratic process freely express their views. Guerrilla front groups frequently express their views in the local dailies by purchasing advertising space. Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR) leaders have appeared on local radio stations in tape sessions. New political parties of the left and right have been formed. Many mid-level members of FDR leader Ruben Zamora's Popular Social Christian Party have returned to the country and have not reported security problems. Labor groups—including those tied to the FMLN—are allowed to operate freely, except when reliable evidence indicates that individuals are members of guerrilla organizations. Even the guerrillas themselves have benefitted: wounded guerrillas have been allowed to leave the country for treatment, and suspected guerrilla members in prison have been released in prisoner exchanges; many have resumed their activities on behalf of the FMLN. The government has introduced legislation to release hundreds of suspected guerrillas now in prison awaiting trial.

To be sure, El Salvador's democratic government is confronted by serious problems. The economy—beset by low commodity prices for exports, lack of investor confidence, the results of the October 10, 1986 earthquake, and the destruction caused by the war and guerrilla sabotage—is in desperate shape. The judicial system requires a major overhaul. The inefficient government bureaucracy must do a better job of delivering essential services to the people. And a way must be found to convince the guerrillas to renounce violence and reincorporate themselves into political life within the democratic process.

Nevertheless, El Salvador has made great strides since the dark days of the early 1980s. Already, political parties are preparing for the 1988 legislative assembly elections and the 1989 presidential election. As in previous elections, the guerrillas and their FDR allies have the choice to renounce violence and compete peacefully for power in 1988 and 1989.

The Five Guerrilla Factions of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front

The Suicide of Salvador Cayetano Carpio

Melida Anaya Montes, known as "Ana Maria," second-in-command of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), was murdered in Managua, Nicaragua, on April 6, 1983. She was stabbed with an ice pick dozens of times, and her throat was slit. Her murderers were lieutenants of her boss, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, known as "Marcial," then the most important leader of the FMLN and the father of the revolution in El Salvador. When Cayetano Carpio, who was in Libya soliciting assistance from Muammar Qadafi, returned and discovered who was responsible for her death, he reportedly committed suicide. Cayetano was buried in Nicaragua, but the violent revolution in El Salvador continued despite the death of its principal advocate.

Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)

The Popular Liberation Forces was founded by Salvador Cayetano Carpio, known as "Marcial," in 1970. It has been led by Leonel Gonzalez since Marcial's suicide following an internal dispute in which his second-in-command, Melida Anaya Montes, known as "Ana Maria," was assassinated in Managua in 1983. The FPL once was the largest guerrilla faction, but now its 1,500 to 2,000 combatant force lags behind the People's Liberation Army (ERP). Its Central Command is made up of more than 25 commanders. Troops are organized in elite "vanguard" units, less skilled rural "guerrilla columns," and "urban front" commando groups. An urban front commando took responsibility for the first killing of an American official on May 25, 1983.

The FPL was responsible for much of the urban terrorism in El Salvador occurring after 1977. In fact, FPL leader Leonel Gonzalez defended urban terrorism and the war of attrition against the government in interviews with Western reporters in December 1985. That year, the FPL attacked a number of poorly defended villages, including Santa Cruz Loma where 22 civilians were killed.

Leonel Gonzalez

Leonel Gonzalez became head of the FPL after the death of "Marcial" in 1983. Little is known about his background, but he is a committed Marxist-Leninist and revolutionary. In an interview with western journalists in late 1985, he stated the insurgents' intention to form a single Marxist-Leninist party to lead the revolution. He defended guerrilla terrorism as a part of their "prolonged popular war" strategy, defended the killing of U.S. Embassy marine security guards, and said that Embassy personnel were legitimate targets for assassination.

People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)

The People's Revolutionary Army, which was formed in 1972 as a university-based organization made up largely of Marxist student radicals, has the greatest military strength of the guerrilla factions, with approximately 2,000 armed combatants. Its leader, Joaquin Villalobos, is considered the insurgents' most able and ruthless tactician. In 1985, the ERP was responsible for many mayoral kidnappings that stripped much of the eastern region—where it maintains a stronghold—of its democratically elected officials.

Unlike the Popular Liberation Forces, the ERP traditionally has eschewed "political" work—organizing and influencing groups of people—in favor of military operations as a means of toppling the government. Consequently, the ERP does not have a base of popular support and is only marginally involved in the operations of FMLN labor, student, and human rights front groups in San Salvador. The ERP operates Radio Venceremos, one of two clandestine stations broadcasting insurgent propaganda.

Murders (of Dalton and Jovel)

In 1975, the Salvadoran ERP underwent a bitter factional power struggle. The climax came on May 10,1975, when Roque Dalton—poet, committed revolutionary, and leader of the losing faction—was executed. His murderer was Joaquin Villalobos, according to an interview with Ernesto Jovel in the Mexican newpaper *Proceso*, October 6, 1980.

In the wake of Dalton's assassination, his faction split from the ERP to form the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN). Its leader, Ernesto Jovel Funes, almost immediately was the target of an assassination attempt. He died in 1980 under mysterious circumstances.

Joaquin Villalobos

Joaquin Villalobos, the reported murderer of Roque Dalton, was born on June 27, 1951, in San Salvador. As a university student, in 1971, he became a member of the executive council of the General Association of Salvadoran University Students (AGEUS). A number of FMLN members formerly belonged to AGEUS, which continues to be a leading instrument for FMLN destabilization actions against the government.

Villalobos was an early member of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), founded in 1972 by radical university students. After the murder of Dalton in 1975, Villalobos, the unchallenged ERP leader, planned and participated in dozens of kidnappings, murders, robberies, bombings, and other acts of terror.

He was the principal architect of the guerrillas' strategy of repudiating the civilian-military junta, formed after the coup against President Romero in October 1979. Villalobos saw that fundamental political, economic, and social reforms enacted by the junta endangered the revolutionary movement. Therefore, he directed ERP urban cadres to promote violence provoked by government repression. It was a strategy that, although very costly in terms of lives, contributed to the destruction of the junta, casting doubt on the possibility of non-violent reform, and bringing thousands of new recruits into the guerrilla movement. In a very real sense, Villalobos is personally responsible for the destruction of the political center in El Salvador in the early 1980s and the resulting unrestrained violence from both the far right and far left.

With the suicide of Cayetano Carpio in 1983, Villalobos assumed the mantle of the supreme leader of the FMLN. He remains the most powerful guerrilla leader and is the alliance's principal strategist and spokesman.

Ferman Cienfuegos

Jose Eduardo Sancho Castaneda, better known as "Ferman Cienfuegos," was born on March 6, 1947. An early advocate of violent revolution, he spent his student years organizing clandestine student, worker, and peasant revolutionary cells in San Vicente, El Salvador's fourth largest city. In 1971, he became a director of "The Group," an early revolutionary organization that obtained arms, vehicles, and money for the revolutionary cause.

During the mid-1970s, he worked with FARN leader Ernesto Jovel to build the FARN's military and political organization. He assumed the mantle of FARN leadership in 1980, following the death of Jovel under mysterious circumstances.

Roberto Roca

Francisco Jovel Urquilla, better known as "Roberto Roca," was born on February 14, 1948, in Usulutan, El Salvador. Like many of his fellow FMLN leaders, he became involved in the radical movement while attending the National University, eventually becoming a vice president of the General Association of Salvadoran University Students (AGEUS).

Throughout the early 1970s, he worked to form the nucleus of what later became the Salvadoran chapter of the PRTC. He has been the PRTC's leader since 1976.

Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)

The Armed Forces of National Resistance, founded in 1975 by dissident ERP members after the murder of poet and revolutionary Roque Dalton by the ERP leadership, is one of the most politically sophisticated factions. Today, Jose Eduardo Sancho Castaneda, known as "Ferman Cienfuegos," commands the FARN and its political wing, the National Resistance (RN). The FARN has 1,000 combatants, but its strengths are infiltrating and controlling labor, student, human rights, and other civic organizations.

Central American Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRTC)

The Central American Revolutionary Workers' Party began as a regional movement in Costa Rica in 1976. The Salvadoran branch has been the most active. Francisco Jovel Urquilla, known as "Roberto Roca," has been the only leader of the PRTC, the smallest of the guerrilla groups with an estimated 500 or fewer combatants in its armed wing, the Armed Forces of Revolutionary Popular Liberation (FARLP). The PRTC does not appear to be an effective military force, but it has a high profile because of its terrorist activities. On June 19, 1985, urban cadres of the PRTC murdered 13 people at a sidewalk cafe in San Salvador, including two private U.S. citizens and four U.S. Marine security guards from the U.S. Embassy. In 1985, the PRTC's third-ranking leader, Nidia Diaz, was captured but later freed as part of the exchange for the kidnapped daughter of President Duarte.

Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES)

The Communist Party of El Salvador and its military wing, the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL), is one of the most important guerrilla factions because of its close ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba. During the 1960s and early 1970s, the Communist Party did not advocate revolutionary violence, but changed its policy in 1979 at the urging of Cuban and Soviet advisors. Its chief, Shafik Handal, is the oldest insurgent leader, a political spokesman for the FMLN in communist countries, and apparently a key strategist on political matters.

The FAL only has some 500 combatants, but it is active, assuming responsibility for the late 1985 kidnappings of President Duarte's daughter, Ines, and Civil Aviation Director Colonel Omar Napoleon Avalos. Handal was a leading figure in procuring arms for the failed January 1981 "final offensive."

Shafik Handal

Shafik Handal is the long-time General Secretary of the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES). He also is the unchallenged leader of the PCES's military wing, the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL). Handal was born in Usulutan, El Salvador, on October 13, 1930. In 1950 he joined the PCES, eventually becoming General Secretary in 1970.

Handal follows the line laid down by the Soviet Union in its relations with the international communist movement. For example, through most of the 1970s, Handal espoused non-revolutionary change and communist participation in diverse political systems. During this time, although the PCES was outlawed in El Salvador, it participated in electoral politics through its front, the National Democratic Union (UDN).

In 1979, Handal and Soviet leaders realized that, with revolutionary political activity increasing in El Salvador and the armed guerrilla/terrorist movement gaining momentum, the PCES was in danger of being rendered politically irrelevant. The decision was made to form the Armed Forces of Liberation, and the PCES entered the armed struggle against the government.

Although the FAL remains one of the weakest of the insurgent armies, the PCES/FAL is one of the most influential factions because of Handal's—and the party's—close contacts with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. It was Handal who, in the early 1980s, succeeded in acquiring significant amounts of arms and ammunition from communist states such as Vietnam and terrorist movements around the world.

Today, Handal is probably the second most influential leader in the FMLN. He is unquestionably now irrevocably committed to the violent overthrow of the Government of El Salvador.

Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR)

The Revolutionary Democratic Front is the political front of the FMLN. The FDR was established in April 1980 by non-Marxist political leaders, who built an international image for the new party as an acceptable political alternative for El Salvador. The non-Marxist groups also make up a coalition called the Democratic Front (FD). The FDR grew out of the small Salvadoran social democratic movement that evolved in the late 1960s and has been headed by non-Marxist Guillermo Manuel Ungo since November 1980 after former junta minister Enrique Alvarez Cordoba and five other prominent FDR leaders were murdered by right-wing extremists. (Ungo was a civilian representative on the junta that took power in October 1979 following a reformist military coup.) After the murders, the balance of FDR leadership shifted openly to individuals affiliated with the FMLN guerrilla factions.

In January 1981, the FDR formally allied itself with the FMLN. A Political-Diplomatic Commission (CPD) was formed to coordinate relations between the two groups and direct the alliance's international diplomatic offensive.

Ungo and Ruben Zamora, a leader of the Popular Social Christian Movement, an offshoot of the Christian Democratic Party, proved effective emissaries for the insurgent cause. France and Mexico, for example, recognized the FMLN/FDR as a "representative political force," and Ungo was named vice president of Socialist International.

During the past several years, however, the FDR's influence within the alliance has steadily eroded. With the election of President Duarte and continuing improvements in the human rights situation, FDR diplomacy has suffered serious reversals, including the restoration of diplomatic relations between El Salvador and Mexico and France in 1985. The Socialist International also has been less supportive of Ungo.

Within the alliance, the FMLN has increasingly pushed its FDR allies to one side as it pursues its long-term war of attrition, whose brutal nature has tended to undermine the insurgency's internal and international standing. Today, the FDR appears to have minimal influence on important military and political decision-making within the FMLN.

ARA/LPD
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

BULK RATE
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Permit No. G-130

AT EASE IN BRAZIL

The prominent scholar and Jewish historian meets with a little-known and well-entrenched community south of the border

The Sephardic Foothold Renewed

With his sallow complexion and comfortable belly, Isaac Athias could have passed for a river planter whose best years of dissipation were behind him. Dignified in his late 70s, monolingual in Portuguese, he bore little resemblance to the stereotypical European Jew, living on his nerves and his languages. Athias was as indigenous to this vast Amazonian behemoth of a nation as any *seringueiro* plantation owner. He was born in the interior of Pará at the opening of the century, 16 miles from the town of Belém, at the juncture of the Atlantic Ocean and the Amazon's southern estuary. With its population of nearly 300,000, Belém was a substantial, if rather somnolent, community. Once it had served as a major rubber center, the inducement that had brought Athias's father from Morocco as a young man and provided him with his livelihood as a broker of raw gum extract from the jungle's interior.

Other Sephardic Jews had long since found their way to Brazil. The connection was resumed as early as 1822, when the country achieved its independence from Portugal. Two years later, Brazil's first constitution proclaimed toleration for all non-Catholics, and a marrano group in northern Pará thereupon declared its Judaism openly and established a synagogue in the town of Manaus, the nation's rubber capital. In time, new Sephardic immigrants arrived, many of them settling in the northeastern provinces, and particularly in Belém. A synagogue was erected in Belém, and here the Athiases worshiped, amid a local population of Portuguese, blacks and mestizos. When his family moved later to a smaller community, Isaac Athias, his brothers and his sisters were sent upriver for their schooling in the town of Breves. There the proprietor of a Jewish boardinghouse gave the youngsters afternoon lessons in Hebrew.

Some 500 Jewish families lived in the vicinity in those early years, almost all of them Moroccan Sephardim, almost all as forthrightly Jewish as the Athiases. Yet they mixed freely with non-Jews, as well, for Brazil by the 20th century was an easygoing blend of meridional and African languor. So it was–and is–in Belém and Manaus; in Recife, the capital of Pernambuco, where 200 Jewish families currently live in a flourishing city of nearly a million; and in Salvador, the capital of Bahia, supporting 170 Jewish families in a population of 740,000. Predominantly Sephardic even now, the Jews of Belém and Manaus sustain their traditions of Iberian piety and dignity.

Isaac Athias would have found it unthinkable to abandon those traditions. As an adult, working first as a bookkeeper, then as a traveling salesman for a paint company, he followed the dietary laws even in the isolated towns and villages of the interior. Settling later in São Paulo, with its much larger Jewish population, Athias thereafter regarded observance as a matter of convenience no less than of principle. Here he opened a furniture store in partnership with one Moisés Hakim, an Egyptian Jew married to Athias's distant cousin. "We were proud of our Sephardic heritage," Athias recalled, "but we were never snobs. We intermarried." "Intermarriage" then signified a wedding of Sephardim and Ashkenazim. Athias himself married Amelia Dimanstein, an ophthalmologist of Polish extraction–upon satisfying himself first that she was prepared to maintain a strict Jewish home. In this racially open society, ethnicity was less important than observance. Indeed, Athias and his friends conceded that they had more in common with the early Ashkenazic settlers than with many of the second wave of Moroccans.

These latter arrived in the post-World War II era. Numbering perhaps 2,000, the Moroccans tended to bypass São Paulo in favor of Rio de Janeiro, their Brazilian Casablanca.

Howard Sachar is a professor at George Washington University and author of a number of books, including The Course of Modern Jewish History.

"Family integrity," asserted Salama. "That is where we can still teach the Ashkenazim a thing or two. We'll intermarry with them now, but not with the Gentiles."

Awaiting them on the Copacabana's Rua Barata Ribeiro was a magnificent Sephardic synagogue, founded decades earlier by immigrants from Turkey, Greece and Rhodes. Their children had gone to university, and not a few later prospered. Rio was a lure that frightened Athias. Childless, he watched in dismay as six of his nephews flourished there–and eventually married non-Jews. Was it the wave of the future? Not if he could help it. For nearly 50 years he had devoted a major portion of his leisure time to his Moroccan-Sephardic *kehillah*, with its own social welfare fund, its own four synagogues. "But we aren't snobs," he emphasized again. Balkan and Italian Sephardim were welcome in the Moroccan congregations. In recent decades, they intermingled freely. If Syrian and Egyptian Jews did not join, that was by their own choice.

"Our tradition is a very old one, you see," explained Marco Farhi, in his pellucid French. Sixtyish, with finely chiseled features, he was as lean as Athias was portly. "We think it's even older than the Moroccan tradition." Farhi was born in Damascus, moved to Beirut as a youth, then emigrated to Brazil in 1961. Like many of his compatriots, he was drawn initially to the easygoing ambience of Rio. Nearly 200 Lebanese Jewish families had settled there as early as the turn of the century, discerning in Brazil a country with a need for a commercial class. Five decades later, that need remained. Sentient to the usefulness of enterprising foreigners, the government reopened its doors to immigration and cordially received a second, larger wave of Lebanese-Syrian Jews.

This time, most of the newcomers were Aleppines. While Aleppo remained the poorest Jewish community in the Near East, its emigrés later became westernized as they passed through the alembic of Beirut before traveling on to the New World. "We were jewelry merchants in the old country," remarked Albert Jamus, a clone of Farhi in age and appearance. "We arrived after 1956, when Israel's campaign in the Sinai shook up our part of the world." Ultimately, some 3,000 Syrian-Lebanese Jews made their homes in Rio and São Paulo, where they prospered as merchants and small manufacturers. Farhi owned a chain of clothing stores. Jamus owned a large textile factory. One of their number, Edmond Safra, now owned the twelfth-largest bank in Brazil. Here as elsewhere, they maintained separate communities, synagogues and philanthropies. Perhaps they no longer drew narrow distinctions between Aleppines and Damascenes in this multiracial society, between Turkish, Balkan, Egyptian or Moroccan Jews. They would intermingle, even "intermarry." But they would never compromise their Jewish loyalties. Fully 30 percent of their children attended the Jewish day schools, a ratio much higher than among the "European" Jews. Observance of Jewish traditions, the dietary laws, attendance at synagogues, all remained a central feature of their existence.

"I corroborate that," declared Ibram Salama, vice-president of Brazil's Egyptian Jewish community council. A dark, heavyset man, he wore a pinstriped cashmere suit. In his native Alexandria, one did not dissemble about wealth, and his family had it. They owned a large cotton gin and a flour mill. A spacious home, servants, private schooling and European vacations were their way of life. Then, in 1957, Nasser liquidated the totality of Jewish holdings. It was the Salamas' good fortune, as that of other Jews in Egypt, to claim a variety of nationalities–Italian, Spanish, Turkish. Israel's doors were open, to be sure, but the prospect of life in another poor country was not enticing. Salama's brothers and two of his sisters ended up in France. He was attracted to Brazil, by its vast resources, and by President Juscelino Kubitschek's proclaimed desire for immigrants with entrepreneurial experience. Tens of thousands of Syrians and Lebanese of all religions were pouring into Brazil. Some nine thousand Egyptian Jews now joined them. "We were not beggars," Salama insisted. "We had a little money laid by in Europe. We purchased our own tickets to Brazil."

Arriving with his wife and two children in São Paulo, where his in-laws had settled four years earlier.

Salama quickly got the lay of the land. With a bank loan, he opened a small workshop to manufacture clothing labels. Within 10 years, the workshop grew into a small factory employing 100 workers. Five years after that, it employed 300 and was the largest producer of labels in Brazil. A millionaire again, Salama reappraised his opportunities. Since the mid-1960s, the government had imposed import quotas on foreign automobiles and automobile parts. Accordingly, Salama sold his label company, bought control of an automobile parts factory–and soon became a millionaire twice over.

"Mine is hardly a unique success story," he admitted. "After all, we Egyptian Jews bring special advantages with us. We spoke French or Ladino at home, and so we had no difficulty with Portuguese afterward. With our linguistic skills and business experience, we could always count on salaried jobs. Many of our people have become managers of banks, insurance companies, import-export houses. My son, Eric, has a fine executive position at the Bank Safra. My daughter, Maureen, had an excellent position in an import house before she married."

"Whom did she marry?"

Salama nodded. "Ezekiel Shalom is his name. From Aleppo." He had anticipated the question. "I'm not complaining. We're not snobs. Their culture may be lower than ours, but they're hard workers and even richer than we are. Ezekiel is a factory representative." Salama allowed himself a complacent smile. "He's done well enough to afford four apartments. One of them is next to ours in Garujá–at the seaside."

Like their Syrian, Moroccan and Turkish predecessors, the Egyptians founded their own congregation, Mekor Chaim. Established in 1948, it eventually became the second-largest congregation in Brazil. In later years, many Syrian and Rhodian Jews availed themselves of its ample facilities and well-trained Egyptian and Lebanese rabbis. "We're probably not quite as devout as the Syrians," Salama confessed. "Our people received a much wider cultural training, after all. But we stick to the straight and narrow. Our children attend the day schools here. We're active in our Jewish community. Our social life is exclusively among our own."

It is an opulent social life. Parties, weddings, bar mitzvah receptions are lavish. Handsome apartments and seaside villas are the norm. But the Sephardim also remain generous to Jewish charities. One of these, São Paulo's Jewish old age home, is a facility worth seeing. A complex of eight buildings, some of them 10 floors high, it is all but a four-star hotel in comfort and decor. In proportion to their numbers, the Sephardic communities have matched the Ashkenazic Jews cruzeiro for cruzeiro in support of this institution. It is a matter of caring for family.

"Family integrity," asserted Salama. "That's where we can still teach the Ashkenazim a thing or two. We'll intermarry with them now, but we'll not intermarry with the Gentiles." He paused. "I don't say that we may not lose a few of our people to intermarriage"–here plainly he was speaking of marriage between faiths–"but hardly to the extent that the Ashkenazim do. We flatly will accept no converts." His face became hard. "In our synagogue, no man who marries a Gentile will ever be called to the Torah. Loyalty, pride of peoplehood–we don't compromise there." It is a fact. Numbering 30,000 now, over a fifth of Brazilian Jewry, these Sephardic communities from the Balkan and Moslem worlds serve as the conscience of their fellow Jews.

n 3 ulvocal Velcome Europeans

One gains some insight into the expansion of this giant southern domain, as large as the continental United States, with room for another Texas, by appreciating that its population has quintupled since World War I, and that, until very recently, its rate of economic growth has consistently surpassed that of the United States. European Jews were slower than the Sephardim in grasping its potential. Only a few hundred of them arrived in the 19th century, essentially technicians, mining engineers, businessmen from Germany. Then, in the early 1900s, attracted at last by the nation's evidently limitless supplies of rubber, diamonds and timber, immigrants from throughout Europe suddenly began pouring into Brazil at the rate of about 100,000 a year. Among these were some 2,000 Russian Jews.

Most of them were brought over by the renowned Bavarian Jewish philanthropist Baron Moritz de Hirsch, an enormously wealthy financier, builder of the Trans-Balkan railroad, who settled them on his farm colonies in the southern Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul. Known as Philipson and Quadro Irmãos, the two colonies were an extension of a much larger project de Hirsch was underwriting for Jews in neighboring Argentina–and they proved even less enduring than their Argentine counterparts. The Jewish farmers soon began wandering from the soil to the cities. By the eve of World War I, the Jewish population of Brazil reached 7,000, almost equally divided between Europeans and non-Ashkenazim. The influx gained momentum after 1921, once the United States restricted immigration. For East European Jews, fleeing the crypto-fascist regimes of postwar Romania and Poland, the Caribbean basin and South America emerged as major sanctuaries. By 1933, Brazil's Jewish population had climbed to 42,000.

Leon Feffer remembers. A slim, quietly dressed little man of 80, he sat in his modest office in downtown São Paulo and reminisced about the early years. His father had arrived from the Ukraine in 1912 in search of a foothold for his wife and children. As a retailer of paper goods in São Paulo, he did well enough to send funds home regularly. Then, with the outbreak of the World War, his family was left on its own and nearly perished in the upheavals of transplantation, revolution and civil war. The ordeal ended only in 1920, when a letter arrived from the father, containing funds for boat tickets to Brazil. The voyage consumed a full month; the ship dropped anchor in Rio de Janeiro in late January 1921. The father was waiting. That night the Feffers left for São Paulo by train.

As drab as Rio was glamorous, São

In 1937, the Vargas regime introduced severe restrictions on immigration–at the very moment that Jewish refugees were turning to Brazil for sanctuary.

Paulo was even then the locomotive pulling Brazil. By 1921, it accounted for half the nation's industrial output and was on the threshold of even more impressive growth. The Feffers could sense it. Like most of their fellow Jewish immigrants, they rented a flat in the lower-middle-class Bom Retiro quarter. The father was earning a tolerable livelihood in his paper products trade; but Leon, who mastered Portuguese within a year, was chafing to be on his own. With two other young immigrants, he opened a small distributorship, buying paper from factories, selling it to wholesalers and retailers. He did not work on commission, as his father had, preferring instead to rely on the market for his profits. The enterprise went spectacularly well. By 1930, he was able to buy out his partners. By 1939, with its 200 employees, Leon Feffer & Cia. had become the largest wholesale paper company in São Paulo, and one of the three largest in Brazil.

Years later, Feffer asked himself how he could have missed. He had arrived in this abundant, easygoing land with a fanatical determination to succeed, and with a family legacy of mercantile experience. Others of the Jewish immigrants brought skills as spinners and weavers, as tailors and seamstresses, as shoemakers and furniture-makers. Working from dawn to dusk in their tiny stores or workshops, they almost invariably saved enough to open larger retail establishments or small factories. From then on, growth was exponential. By 1939, Jews owned several of the nation's largest textile mills, many of the largest wholesale distributorships, retail shops and department stores. Even smaller businessmen were earning livelihoods that permitted a certain leeway for relaxation. In Leon Feffer's case, his free hours were spent at the Círculo Israelita do São Paulo, a social club that had sprung up among the immigrant children of Bom Retiro. There he met his wife. Like him, Antoinette Tepperman was reared in an observant home. After their marriage in 1925, they resolved to maintain that tradition. It was still the widely held expectation of their generation.

The world depression struck Brazil hard. The international market for coffee diminished sharply. Exploiting the crisis, Getúlio Vargas, a wealthy landowner and president of the state of Rio Grande do Sul, seized control of the nation's presidency in 1930. In the following years, Vargas silenced opposition through censorship, arbitrary arrest, torture and assassination. While not overly anti-Semitic himself, the President tolerated Jew-baiting to placate his right-wing landowner and lumpenproletariat supporters. Many of the latter gave their support to the Integralista Party, a collection of green-shirted ruffians who drew their inspiration from Italian and Portuguese fascism. With the tacit support of important church leaders, the Integralistas devoted an entire branch of their secret service organization to the surveillance of Brazilian Jewry. Not since the Inquisition had Jews faced such organized hostility in this land. The danger proved to be short-lived, however. Vargas began to have second thoughts about flagrant pro-Axis propaganda on Brazilian territory, and in 1935 he suppressed the Integralistas. Three years later, in an effort to combat Nazi influence among the large German enclave in the Rio Grande do Sul province, the Brazilian dictator curtailed foreign-language schools and cultural activities, and eventually banned foreign-language periodicals–German, Italian, Japanese among them.

The Jews drew an uncertain reassurance from these measures. Much of their press was still Yiddish, and was disallowed with the other foreign-language publications. Their libraries and schools were also tightly circumscribed. More ominously, in 1937 the Vargas regime introduced severe restrictions on immigration–at the very moment that Jewish refugees from Hitler were turning to Brazil for sanctuary. No more than 14,000 Central European Jews entered before the outbreak of war, and afterward perhaps 4,000 others made their way from neighboring countries. It was by no means a negligible total, and in time German-speaking immigrants comprised a fourth of São Paulo's Jewish population. But their early years were hard. Most of the newcomers gained admission only by

other cities soon afterward, and finally a national Confederation of Brazilian Jewish Communities. Feffer was a pioneer in these unifying ventures, and he and his associates did not have an easy time at first. Dr. Ludwig Lorch, doyen of the German Jewish community, was opposed to the notion of an umbrella body in which German efficiency would be subordinated to *ostjüdisches Politik* (and, he feared, to East European Zionism). Eventually, he was outvoted. To no one's surprise, Feffer was elected chairman of the federation, and in later years he remained one of its permanent vice-chairmen. Since then, elections have taken place biennially. Once they were vigorously contested, with candidates running on Zionist-style party lists that were replications of the Knesset electoral system in Israel–and evidence of the enormous impact of Zionism on the Diaspora (precisely as Lorch had anticipated). But since the 1970s, elections have become somewhat perfunctory, with fewer than five thousand local Jews voting. The number is even smaller in Rio. There is no mystery to the dropoff. Brazilian Jews have long since developed political and social interests beyond their own community.

For decades, the bedrock of Jewish ethnicity lay in education. "The *Deitcher* [German Jews] didn't always agree," Feffer recalled, with some amusement. "Their children were sent to the state schools or the English-language private schools. But that was not our way, or the way of the Sephardim." Between the 1920s and 1950s, nearly half the Jewish children in São Paulo and Rio received their primary education in a cluster of privately funded Jewish day schools, where the level of study was reasonably high. Yet, in ensuing years, there has been a decline in both the quality of teaching personnel and the quantity of students. With the exception of the more recent Sephardic immigrant groups, Jewish parents discern little need any longer to "ghettoize" their children. Currently, less than 20 percent of the Jewish students in São Paulo attend the community's seven day schools; although in Rio the proportion remains closer to 50 percent.

Within the University of São Paulo, meanwhile, efforts to establish an "Interdisciplinary Center for Jewish Studies" have been less than successful. Few Jewish students have been induced to attend. Dr. Walter Rehfeld, an early faculty member, put the issue succinctly: "We have thousands of Jewish students at the universities, hundreds of Jewish faculty, even a few deans. They're quite unself-conscious as Jews. But as intellectuals, they tend to gravitate to 'progressive' social causes. There's no middle ground here in Brazil. I don't suggest that they move to the radical Left," he added quickly. "That period in our history ended in the 1930s. But they simply can't be indifferent to the horrifying economic inequities in our society. In the university context, unfortunately, those issues claim most of their extracurricular time. Jewish cultural activities come in a poor second." Among students in any Diaspora community, they usually do. Rehfeld's discouragement notwithstanding, Jewish culture is far from moribund in this land. The various federations, congregations and Zionist organizations sponsor lectures, art festivals, occasional theatrical performances. In Rio and São Paulo, several publishing houses have intermittently brought out translations of well-known Jewish volumes. Israeli ensembles perform quite often, before large audiences, and local Jewish groups enthusiastically participate in festivals with Israeli themes–particularly in Chanukah and Purim celebrations.

There are alternate routes to identification, beyond schools and institutes. Interestingly enough, synagogue attendance is one of them, and it has as little to do with religiosity in Brazil as in other Western communities. The Sephardic synagogue, Mekor Chaim, is a spacious building, constructed in the traditional Near Eastern manner, with the dais in the center of the sanctuary. The Sabbath morning I walked in, nearly every seat was filled. Crowned with an imposing silk biretta, the rabbi was intoning the week's scriptural portion. Congregants circulated, shaking hands with friends, chatting in a low undercurrent of mild cordiality. Wives and other womenfolk in the balcony murmured cozily to each other. The atmosphere was warm, homey, yet without the chaotic lack of decorum often encountered in Orthodox Ashkenazic synagogues.

Less than three blocks away, on Rua Antonio Carlos, services were being conducted at the Congregação Israelita Paulista. I strolled over. The building was modernistic and vast, seven stories high. It was a community center, after all. Here, too, the sanctuary was all but filled; at least a thousand congregants were present. The CIP remained the prestige address for Brazil's Ashkenazic Jews. Unlike the Sephardic congregation, formality was the rule here. The ambience was cordial, but restrained. There was no chitchat. On the dais–this time at the front of the sanctuary–Chief Rabbi Emeritus Pinkuss was enthroned, flanked by three younger associate rabbis. One of the latter was an American with blond, modishly long hair. Plainly quite taken with himself, he was delivering the sermon in a Portuguese insipid enough even for me to grasp, and as readily to forget. It was all very comfortable. The turnouts I had seen that morning were not unusual, friends assured me later. Brazilian Jewry is gregarious. Sabbath services are friendly social occasions.

One cannot predict how long even this free and easy, typically Brazilian, version of social Judaism will survive. The reservoir of Portuguese-speaking rabbis is limited for São Paulo's 30 synagogues, Rio's 12 synagogues. Few Americans can be induced to serve here. Nor would they deal any longer with a captive constituency. Between them, the CIP and Rio's ARI temple alone perform over 100 conversions a year, even convert children of mixed marriages to enable them to have bar mitzvah ceremonies. However enlightened the practice, the sheer number of conversions is evidence of a rising wave of intermarriages (most of them, no doubt, unaccompanied by conversions) that would have been unimaginable a generation earlier. Hard statistics on mixed marriages are nonexistent, but estimates range

Most Brazilian Jews remain suspicious of populist democracy. They take no position against social change–or for it. Most of them prefer to avoid the risk of ending up in the wrong camp.

between 25 and 30 percent. As elsewhere in the West, exogamy is the price Jews and other ethnic minorities pay for an open society.

As in other countries, too, the more isolated Jewish communities–Belém, Belo Horizonte, Pôrto Alegre–are dying on the vine for lack of spiritual or cultural leadership, even for lack of Jewish contacts. Their association with the major Jewish organizations in São Paulo or Rio is limited to periodic confederation or B'nai B'rith meetings. Emissaries from the larger cities tend to be fundraisers, hardly ever teachers or rabbis. "Why don't our fellow Jews follow the example of the Catholic Church, which sends missionaries here?" lamented Raoul Doctorchik, a B'nai B'rith officer from Recife, in a letter to the *International Jewish Monthly*. "What will happen to our children in this Jewish cultural wilderness?" No doubt they would undergo the fate of small-town Jews in any other Western country. Some unquestionably would be lost. Some would not. And, generations later, some would revert. All is comparative. Brazil's Jewry is still of more recent vintage than Argentina's. With few exceptions, even the most acculturated Brazilian Jew remains closer to his Jewish roots than his second-generation Argentine Jewish counterpart.

The Accommodation of Congeniality

Devotion to Israel meanwhile remains as powerful a gravitational field for Brazilian Jewry as for any community in the Diaspora. Between 1948 and 1983, 3,000 Brazilian Jews settled in Israel. Still others maintain apartments in Israel and live there part of the year. Israeli themes remain central to Jewish communal and cultural life in Brazil–as evidenced (we recall) in the Knesset-style party lists for the federation elections. "This is a Zionist community," insisted Fiszel Czeresnia, chairman of Brazil's Zionist Organization. "Zionism animates every Jewish institution we have in this country. It's the link with Israel that has kept Brazilian Jewry from expiring as a community."

Czeresnia's view was too draconian. Ethnic gregariousness alone probably would have done the job. In São Paulo, as in Mexico City or Buenos Aires, a major focus of Jewish identity is a luxurious sports facility-country club-community center. Located in the affluent Jardim America quarter, the center encompasses a 2,000-seat auditorium, a theater, ample classroom and office space, an indoor swimming pool, two outdoor swimming pools, a score of tennis courts, as well as picnic and playground areas. Like its model in Buenos Aires, it is called Hebraica, and its Hebraic dimension typically may be identified less in its occasional Hebrew or Yiddish lectures, or performances of Jewish or Israeli music, than in the scope of its Jewish membership. On a summer Sunday, as many as 10,000 Jewish Paulistas can be seen decked out here in swimming or tennis garb. In the later hours, entire families, or the younger Jewish smart set, will have their dinners served in one or another of the Hebraica's dining rooms, then dance to fashionable society orchestras. Not to be outdone, the Jews of Rio have constructed their own modern Hebraica building on the prestigious Rua des Laranjeiras. A seven-story building, it is equipped with comparable facilities.

Undoubtedly, these luxurious monuments to Jewish success, love of comfort and gregariousness serve their purpose in allowing young Jews to meet under convivial surroundings. They are hardly a Jewish innovation in hedonism. Germans, Japanese, Italian and other ethnic communities similarly maintain their own community center-country clubs. A respectable number of cultural activities do in fact take place within the Hebraica's premises. Yet it is questionable if the club's charter members (Feffer, of course, preeminent among them) anticipated that this *palácio* ultimately would transcend the synagogue, federation, school or university classroom as the single most tangible manifestation of Jewish identity in Brazil, other than Zionism. In earlier years, during the crest of the Brazilian economic boom, the effulgence of Jewish communal life tended to blend with a more widely diffused prosperity. Yet even during the afflu-

United States Department of State

Latin America DISPATCH

VICTIMS OF GUERRILLA LAND MINES IN EL SALVADOR

The guerrillas continue to use land mines even though hundreds of civilians have been wounded.

Military strategists know that a maimed soldier or civilian creates a greater economic and social drain on a country than one killed outright because the country not only stands to lose the productive capacity of the wounded individual, but in many cases assumes the recurring costs of treatment and rehabilitation. The communist-backed insurgents in El Salvador have exploited this maxim by using land mines and booby traps that maim soldiers and innocent civilians.

As many as 1,800 people—1,500 military and 300 civilians—had limbs amputated during the past 2½ years as a result of the land mines planted by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), the umbrella organization representing Salvador's five guerrilla forces, according to U.S. Government officials. The casualties are mounting, especially among the civilian population, as the militarily inferior guerrillas rely increasingly on mines, booby traps, and attacks on vehicles in an attempt to undermine the country's social and economic fabric.

As many as 20 civilians and 60 soldiers are injured by guerrilla-

Unsuspecting children and adolescents account for ¼ to ⅓ of the civilians injured as a result of the indiscriminate use of land mines by Salvadoran guerrillas.

placed land mines each month, although the number fluctuates greatly depending on guerrilla military activity, according to Salvadoran and U.S. officials. About ¼ to ⅓ of the wounded civilians are children and teenagers.

"The sight of young men gravely wounded while fighting the Marxist guerrillas reminds me that the struggle for democracy has a tremendous cost," says U.S. Ambassador Edwin G. Corr, who has made it a practice to visit mine victims in the military hospital. "Even more heart-wrenching is a teenage girl or an old man—limbs blown off by mines, their lives destroyed. And all because a relative handful of men and women is determined to achieve power by violence and force of arms rather than incorporate themselves into the constitutional democratic process and seek political power by peaceful means."

Although the exact number of civilians killed and wounded by the mines is difficult to verify, it has increased dramatically during the past 2½ years, according to press reports, human rights commissions, and U.S. and Salvadoran government sources. In 1986, 62 civilians were killed and 221 injured, compared to 42 deaths and 96 injuries in 1985, according to the Salvadoran governmental Human Rights Commission. Between January and May 1987, 23 civilians have been killed by land mines, and 126 civilians have lost limbs, reports the Salvadoran Council of Minors, a joint public-private sector organization that has launched a civic campaign to publicize and warn against terrorist mines.

"For a country this size (5 million people) to have an amputee population that large is significant and will have long-term social implications," explains U.S. diplomat David Dlouhy. "The option of being a farmer is no longer viable for these people. We've got to think about their long-term future. Twelve months ago, the problem of civilian amputees wasn't in the realm of social awareness; today, a number of Salvadoran organizations are focusing considerable attention on it."

Although both the armed forces and guerrillas use mines, almost all civilian casualties are caused by guerrilla mines, according to mine victims, government spokesmen, and several human rights organizations. Jose Antonio Pastor Ridruejo, the Special Rapporteur of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, for example, endorses this conclusion, recommending in his February 2, 1987, report that the FMLN forces should "refrain from placing mines which can kill or seriously injure the noncombatant population."

The *New York Times* reported on August 10, 1986, that while the guerrillas have not admitted that they deliberately use mines against civilians, they have declared the mines, which they call "popular armament," part of their revolutionary strategy.

"The guerrillas are using mines as an offensive weapon with the objective of affecting the morale of the troops, preventing them from guarding the territory, and affecting the economy by preventing people from working in the fields," explains Gerardo Le Chevallier, Director of the Information Center of Central America and Panama

Although efforts are under way to treat and rehabilitate mine victims, the waiting list for artificial limbs is long.



This land mine is made out of a cardboard soap container with two wires connected to brass plates taped inside. The mine—which is less than 4" long— is activated when the package is crushed.

(CICAP), a Salvadoran government press office.

The guerrillas plant the mines in coffee plantations, near fruit trees, along village trails, and in flat fields used as shortcuts by *campesinos* (peasants). Many incidents occur along geographic corridors where guerrillas smuggle weapons into the country from Nicaragua.

Noe Baires Rivera, 17, had his leg blown off on May 17, 1987, in Samoria, Jucuaran. Baires was picking fruit with three other people, including a child who also was hurt in the explosion. "I didn't know the mines were there. I was blown up in the air and put over a wall by the explosion," he says. Baires was transported first to a military hospital then to the new 800-bed San Juan de Dios hospital in San Miguel by an armed forces helicopter.

"I know the guerrillas placed the mines because only they mine the zone, and now was a good time because the armed forces were in the area. Nobody knew the guerrillas had put mines there, and people walked in the hills. Now they know, they have experience with me. Now they'll be afraid to work in the hills. If nobody works, we cannot get corn, beans," he says.

In the war against the guerrillas, government forces use U.S.-supplied M–14 and M–26 contact-detonated mines, marked by standard NATO warning signs, to protect military installations and encampments, according to Salvadoran and U.S. officials. The Salvadoran military also uses command-detonated Claymore mines, which cannot be accidentally set off by civilians. The FMLN guerrillas, on the other hand, do not provide adequate warning, or, in

"The guerrillas plant mines in coffee plantations, near fruit trees, and along village trails."

A campaign is under way warning people not to touch explosives.

Noe Baires Rivera, 17, lost his leg when he stepped on a land mine while picking fruit near his home.

This mine, believed to be a Soviet MUV–2, can be detonated instantly using the pull-release igniter, but the fuse also contains a 15-minute delay feature.

some cases, peasants collecting food and firewood do not heed warnings.

In an ironic twist, the guerrilla mining has worked to solidify support for the government in the countryside. The army has launched a program that includes medical evacuation of land mine victims, as well as distribution of food, clothing, and basic goods in rural areas.

"Casualties are picked up at mine sites, given emergency medical care, and transported to regional hospitals for long-term care. Initially, mine victims had to find their own way to civilian hospitals, and delayed treatment often complicated injuries," explains a Salvadoran army officer.

"We follow the same procedure, whether a soldier, a civilian, or a guerrilla has been wounded," he notes. Careless handling of the homemade devices, inexperienced explosive handlers, and lack of coordination among the five guerrilla groups cause frequent mishaps.

The helicopter brigade, for example, flew 18-year-old guerrilla combatant Juan Pepeyra Ramirez to the San Juan de Dios hospital for emergency treatment. Pepeyra, who was conscripted into the FMLN's Armed Forces of the National Resistance, says he suspects that a mine planted by the People's Revolutionary Army, another guerrilla unit, mutilated him, although he notes the El Salvadoran Armed Forces also were in the area. Pepeyra lost both arms, an eye, and some hearing. "The mines are not fair. They harm animals and children," he says.

The med-evac program has been so successful that the armed forces encourage villagers to call upon them for other emergency medical needs. "We've evacuated pregnant women and snakebite victims," explains the Salvadoran Army officer. "More than once, a helicopter medic has 'adopted' a child he has saved and has visited the child in the hospital." Soldiers also have contributed prosthetic devices to some of the wounded they've helped rescue.

"The armed forces used to be an occupation army, long considered the internal enemy. Now the armed forces have a totally different attitude, which is extremely positive. The U.S. military advisors are contributing more than just military training. They are teaching respect for human rights. This improvement in the treatment of civilians justifies the presence of U.S. military advisors in El Salvador," adds CICAP Director Le Chevallier.

Julio Cecil Ramos Hernandez, 33, a farmer and father of four daughters ranging in ages from 2 to 11, also was evacuated from the scene of an accident by an army helicopter. On May 15, Ramos was searching for his cow along the banks of the Quebrada Seca River near Jucuaran, Usulutan, when he stepped on a mine. The mine that claimed Ramos's leg was planted by guerrillas, he says. "The guerrillas suspect the armed forces walk in this place, but they do not walk there," he says.

Two friends took him to a village where the military flew him first to a military hospital for blood

A Salvadoran military helicopter flew civilian Julio Cecil Ramos Hernandez to San Miguel's new hospital after his leg was mangled by a guerrilla land mine in Jucuaran. Ramos, a farmer and father of four young daughters, says, "I know my life will be changed because my work now will be less than before."

transfusions then to the San Juan de Dios hospital, one of four regional hospitals receiving civilian and guerrilla mine victims. The hospital's director, Dr. German Roberto Garay Barahona, estimates that the hospital has treated 80 victims since 1984, but notes that the hospital records the type rather than cause of the wound.

Civilian amputees face greater hardships than soldiers, who are able to retain their active duty status after injury. Rehabilitation services for civilians are extremely limited. About 300 civilian amputees, including 100 children, may wait as long as 4 years for fittings for prosthetic devices.

The disabled tend to become isolated within their villages. Employment opportunities are limited. The cost of $750 for an artificial limb is beyond the means of most of the victims, and because they mainly live in rural areas, the difficulty and recurring costs of transportation and accommodations in cities where treatment and training are available also create hardships.

The Salvadoran Institute for the Rehabilitation of the Handicapped (ISRI), a semiautonomous govern-

Guerrilla combatants, including Juan Ramirez, also sustain injuries as a result of careless handling of their own land mines and lack of coordination between the different guerrilla groups.

"The mines are not fair. They harm animals and children."

Children are fitted for temporary prostheses under a pilot project carried out by the Salvadoran Knights of Malta with support from the U.S. Agency for International Development. The Washington, D.C., chapter of the Knights of Malta is donating the prosthetic devices. Some 300 civilian mine victims will receive temporary artificial legs under the $500,000 AID grant.

ment agency, is responsible for the rehabilitation of civilian amputees. ISRI, which operates five centers for the handicapped in San Salvador, provides only limited occupational and vocational therapy. Its prosthetics workshop, where production is extremely slow, was virtually destroyed by the October 10, 1986, earthquake. Last year, for example, only 18 artificial legs and 7 temporary leg fittings were produced. The Social Security Institute, another public health provider, purchases prostheses from one of the country's two private prosthesis workshops, which charges $1,000 on up for an artificial leg. Limited services also are available to amputees through other public and private groups.

U.S. concern for the well-being of civilian amputees has led to two short-term programs and the planning of a long-term program to improve public and private rehabilitation services available to the civilian casualties. In April 1987, the Agency for International Development (AID) made a $500,000 grant to the Salvadoran Knights of Malta, a private nonprofit organization, to help provide temporary artificial legs for up to 300 civilian mine victims. The temporary devices are being donated by the Washington, D.C., chapter of the Knights of Malta.

AID funds will be used to support the local costs of this program, including a census of amputees, transportation and medical screening, and assistance to the three multi-purpose rehabilitation centers built for ISRI by the Telethon Foundation. It is expected that approximately 800 civilian amputees, including people who lost limb for reasons other than land mine injuries, will be identified through the census, of whom 300 will receive a temporary artificial limb.

Under the AID grant, a pilot project in which 26 people were fitted with temporary artificial legs recently was carried out by the Knights of Malta. These temporary devices later will be replaced with more permanent prostheses made in El Salvador."Most of the victims have suffered a double trauma," says Gerard T. Coughlin, president of the El Salvador Association of the Knights of Malta. "A person loses both a limb and his capacity to work in the fields." Coughlin notes that incorporated into the census are questions on the education and employment history of the victims so that they can be retrained for suitable employment.

AID and Project HOPE also are collaborating on a project that will provide timely medical treatment in

Many of the people fitted with artificial legs under the AID-supported pilot project had not walked for more than 2 years.

the United States to civilian land mine victims, especially children, and to other civilians with complicated war-related injuries that require treatment or surgery unavailable in El Salvador.

"A medium-term objective is to encourage the reintegration of the handicapped into Salvadoran society," explains Patricia S. Gibson, acting director of the Office of Health at the AID mission in El Salvador. "With new limbs, children who would otherwise be ostracized in schools will be able to live up to their mental capacity, which may not have occurred otherwise.

"Working with Salvadoran and U.S. private and public groups, we plan to help get an effective workshop going so that there will be a permanent source of prosthetic services for these victims," she says.

Wounded soldiers receive treatment and rehabilitation through programs sponsored by the armed services.

Some 229 soldiers injured as a result of guerrilla land mines were treated at the military hospital in San Miguel between January 1986 and May 1987. There is an even greater number of soldiers at the military hospital in San Salvador, where 466 soldiers were treated during the same period. That hospital is crowded, unsanitary, and understaffed. Patients there face a 50 percent risk of surgical infection.

Ricardo Antonio P., an explosives expert, lost his arms while trying to disarm a mine on July 27, 1986. Seven days after the accident, leg wounds became infected resulting in a third amputation. A year later, he still is confined to a hospital.

"It is a very effective terrorist tactic," says Major Paul B. Mouritsen, executive officer of the

A Salvadoran Armed Forces explosives expert (left), lost both arms and a leg while detonating a guerrilla land mine. He is receiving medical and physical therapy at the military hospital in San Salvador. His artificial arms were made at the Center for Professional Rehabilitation of the Armed Forces (CERPROFA) where double amputee Juan Carlos Cerrites Pareda (above) is being fitted for a temporary artificial leg.

U.S. Army Medical Mobile Training Team. "You step on a mine, you lose a limb, and that has an impact on the whole unit."

To improve the army's ability to provide limbs to the amputees, the U.S. Army Mobile Medical Training Team helped the Salvadoran military establish the Center for Professional Rehabilitation of the Armed Forces (CERPROFA) in 1985 to manufacture prosthetic devices and train Salvadorans to fabricate the artificial limbs. As of May 1987, 371 soldiers have been fitted with prosthetic devices, six have completed training, and 11 are being trained to make prostheses at CERPROFA. This year, about 360 of the 1,500 soldiers awaiting artificial limbs will receive them. In addition, to reduce the backlog, 600–700 soldiers will be fitted with prosthetic devices manufactured in the United States under a Department of Defense contract.

"At the same time we're producing, we're also teaching," explains Javier DeAnde of the U.S. Army. DeAnde oversees the workshop and trains the students. Five of the new students are amputees. "Getting a prosthesis isn't a one-time thing," says DeAnde. "It requires several fittings, and can hurt the patient if it is not properly fitted. Technicians who are amputees are very good with patients. They know how it feels. Their first assignment was to make their own legs," he says.

CERPROFA trainee laminates an artificial leg. The trainee, who was wounded by a guerrilla land mine, made his own prosthesis.

While these efforts promise to help make a difference in the lives of many civilian and soldier amputees, the best insurance for a healthy future is a halt to the insurgency and the indiscriminate use of land mines by the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in El Salvador. □

Sharon Isralow is the editor for the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean in the State Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. This report is based on a recent fact-finding trip to El Salvador.

Photo credits: Frederick Downs, Jr., pp. 1, 5 (left, right), 6; Sharon Isralow, pp. 3 (left), 4, 5 (center), 7, 8.

Latin American Dispatch is published by the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, Room 5917, Department of State, Washington, DC 20520; Telephone (202) 647–6752.

Department of State Publication 9554
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean

Released July 1987

ARA/LPD
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

BULK RATE
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Permit No. G-130

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300

MR. MAX GREEN
OFFICE OF PUBLIC LIAISON
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BUILDING
ROOM 196
WASHINGTON DC 20500

United States Department of State

Central America UPDATE

CENTRAL AMERICA UPDATE
October 8, 1987

Contact: Jeanne C. Guttman
647-6751

HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP APPEALS TO CENTRAL AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

September 28--The independent Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights (ANPDH) issued a public statement addressed to the five Central American presidents who signed the Guatemala peace accord, expressing the Association's "faith and optimism" in efforts to achieve peace and democracy in Central America. At the same time, the Association pointed out necessary steps to safeguard the rights of any returning Nicaraguans in view of the amnesty provisions in the Guatemala peace agreement. A translation of the text follows:

--"Annulment of decree no. 996 that establishes a state of emergency, and suspends all rights and guarantees of the Nicaraguan people. This undoubtedly is incompatible with the objectives of Esquipulas II.

--"Repeal of the Law of Public Security and Maintenance of Order and its amendments.

--"Repeal all laws and decrees impeding and restricting freedom of speech and freedom to be informed. This means the immediate reopening of all communication media that have been closed to date.

--"Annulment of the Anti-Somocist Popular Courts.

--"Annulment of the consequences of all guilty verdicts of such courts and, therefore, freedom of all individuals in prison as a result of such courts.

--"Repeal jurisdictional functions of the Sandinista Police, which are allowed to condemn any person for political reasons and without due process of law and the consequent liberation of all those still kept in prison as a result of these actions.

--"Liberation of all individuals convicted by any court as a result of the enforcement of the Law of Public Security and Maintenance of Order, and restitution of their properties, confiscated as a result of such verdicts.

--"Cessation of using the military draft as an instrument of repression against young people not affiliated with the Sandinista front; the regulation of enforced military service must be established once the army is separated from the political party of the Sandinista front.

"On the other hand, we feel it is also important to make the following provisions in order to guarantee the security of all the Nicaraguan people:

--"To abolish the authority recognized by the Nicaraguan government, without any legal base, to the comites de Defensa Sandinista (Sandinista Defense Committees) as instruments of political control and repression, as paramilitary and unilateral institutions, and as controllers of food quotas, free circulation and job recommendations.

--"Stop all government subsidies to all organizations of the masses affiliated with the Sandinista front and respect of the will of those individuals who do not wish to be affiliated with such organizations, especially government employees and teachers.

--"Cancel the decree by which the term "Sandinista" can only be applied to government institutions now confused with the political party of the Sandinista front, such as the army, the police and other official structures.

--"Comply with all international treaties which concern Nicaragua and which are contained in the 87 and 98 conventions of the International Labor Organization regarding freedom of labor unions, collective negotiations, and the right to strike.

--"Revise all confiscations, interventions and expropriations carried out after November 21, 1979, when decree 172 became effective establishing their suspension. Cancellation of any subsequent decree which opposes decree 172.

--"Absolute respect for the institution of "habeas corpus," annulling any laws or decrees that may annul or restrict it in any way in its effects.

-"-Recognition and respect of all cultural, religious, and organizational values of all ethnic groups, such as Miskitos, Sumos, Creoles and Latinos."

RESETTLEMENT AND THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS

Latin America DISPATCH

Documents captured during an ambush of Salvadoran guerrillas reveal that the Communist-backed insurgents have launched a program to repopulate an area in eastern Chalatenango Department with displaced Salvadorans thought to be sympathetic with the guerrillas. In a move to institutionalize guerrilla control in the conflict area, the documents describe a plan to repopulate and control a number of villages there. The plan calls for establishing a secret government, information and intelligence networks, and secret militias, and for conducting a campaign to indoctrinate the repopulated communities in Marxism-Leninism.

These documents shed new light on repopulation activities dating back to June 20, 1986, when the repopulation of San Jose Las Flores was inaugurated with a march by 131 displaced Salvadorans and approximately 30 international supporters from the United States and Europe. The march was described by participants as a spontaneous demonstration by displaced persons frustrated with government policies.

According to the captured documents, however, the repopulation effort "falls within the general plan of the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] general command in preparing the conditions to launch the strategic offensive or counteroffensive. Within the preparational conditions are found policies, and it is precisely here that the organization plays an important role—orienting and mobilizing the masses which have repopulated these zones so that they can put themselves forward and play the role which corresponds to them within the strategic offensive."

The resettlement effort is being sponsored by the National Repopulation Coordinator (CNR), a Salvadoran group that has been identified as a guerrilla front organization by defector Luz Janeth Alfaro, former director of the FMLN-controlled, non-governmental Human Rights Commission of El Salvador (CDHES). According to Alfaro, the CNR is made up of the Committee of Settlers of Displaced of El Salvador and the Christian Committee of the Displaced of El Salvador, which also was identified as a guerrilla front group by high-ranking Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) defector Miguel Castellanos.

Several hundred pages of working documents were captured March 8, 1987, when a Salvadoran Armed Forces patrol ambushed a group of guerrillas at El Zapotal, killing five armed insurgents. Two of the dead were women, identified only by their noms de guerre, "Roselia" and "Cycebel," whose documents linked them to the high command of the FPL, one of five armed guerrilla groups comprising the FMLN.

Among the papers was an eight-page, handwritten document entitled "General Work Plan of the 'Cacho' Leadership Team from 15 February to 15 August 1987" that described a repopulation effort in eastern Chalatenango Department. Although the documents do not specifically name the villages involved in the repopulation program, U.S. Government analysts believe that "Cacho," which means "slice" or "piece" in Spanish, is the code name for the major repopulation area located in and around San Jose Las Flores. Other documents found among the hundreds of captured pages frequently mention the repopulation of Las Flores, Arcatao, and Las Vueltas.

The plan outlines general and specific objectives, resources, and secret and open activities. These objectives and activities clearly show that the FPL has masterminded the resettlement effort to further its political and military agenda.

The five general objectives are: "Organize our work for its best development and results; organize and mobilize the repopulation masses; control, orient, and direct the work in the most efficient manner; prevent and combat or discover whatever intent of the enemy to take advantage of the repopulated to implement its United To Reconstruct Plan (UPR), and better the living conditions of the repopulation." The UPR is a nationwide Salvadoran Government program extending essential services and security to former combat zones.

Specific objectives include formulating and consolidating "the internal structures of the party that assure the adherence to party lines." Another objective is to "form information and intelligence nets and secret militias which ensure our control of the repopulation and discovery of possible enemy networks."

According to the captured work plan, international support for the repopulation is essential to ensure the consolidation of guerrilla control and to denounce and discourage attempts by the government to thwart the FMLN plan. Two of the seven specific objectives are to "obtain national and international solidarity in order to have an effective channel for publicizing our fight" and "consolidate the legalization of the repopulation—national or

international." To support these objectives, the document lists national and international delegations as well as national and international groups and institutions as resources needed to consolidate the project.

Clandestine activities outlined in the work plan provide the means to consolidate power. The document calls for forming secret bodies headed by three-member leadership teams. The teams would meet periodically and would meet their counterparts from other repopulations and their "directives channel," according to the document. Other "secret activities" enumerated in the general work plan call for biweekly party meetings and working meetings with the "Cacho" leadership collective.

Another captured document, entitled "report on 'Cacho' work," says that more follow-up and consolidation (of the repopulation) is needed. It further notes that the leadership team is in session regularly, but that "secret groups [are] functioning irregularly due to the suspended attention of the operatives."

In addition to controlling the repopulation, the guerrillas seek to convert any unindoctrinated settlers to Marxism-Leninism and to reinforce orthodoxy among the believers. The captured documents call for regular political consciousness-raising sessions for the peasants. Other "FMLN open activities" noted include an FMLN agitation meeting, leadership team visits to the homes of the repopulated, display of propanganda materials, activities oriented to the open groups, and visits to the village's churches, school, clinic, and cooperatives.

According to the "report on 'Cacho' work," the settlers' dispositions have improved toward community work,they are beginning to take an interest in the cooperative work, and "there is greater sensitivity to the needs of FMLN comrades."

In this section entitled "Judgments," the FPL also notes that "a propitious moment exists now for beginning more offensive organizations for the mobilization, there are solid possibilities for forming the information network, and the population is conscious how the enemy pursues it with its United To Reconstruct plan." It further points out that the meetings serve to elevate the political consciousness and urges that the sessions be held often. The document also states, "We lack enough comrades to form more collectives."

The repopulation program is one part of the guerrillas' strategy to overthrow the democratically elected Government of El Salvador. Guerrilla-controlled groups such as the National Repopulation Coordinator and other organizations have portrayed the repopulations of San Jose Las Flores, Arcatao, and San Antonio Los Ranchos as spontaneous movements of displaced Salvadorans back to their homes. These documents make clear, however, that the militarily and politically weak guerrillas are continuing to mislead and manipulate the people of El Salvador and well-meaning foreigners to advance their subversion.□

Latin American Dispatch is published by the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, Room 5917, Department of State, Washington, DC 20520; Telephone (202)647-6752.

Department of State Publication 9554
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean

Released September 1987