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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Los Angeles, California)

For Immediate Release

August 25, 1987

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

We mourn the loss of Bayard Rustin, a great leader in the struggle for civil rights in the United States and for human rights throughout the world. He will be sorely missed by all those who shared his commitment to the twin causes of peace and freedom. As few men have, Mr. Rustin understood that the struggle for the two is inseparable; either we achieve them both or neither. Mr. Rustin held to this belief all his adult life.

This took great physical, intellectual, and, most of all, moral courage. He was denounced by former friends because he never gave up his conviction that minorities in America could and would succeed based on their individual merit. But, Mr. Rustin never gave an inch. Though a pacifist, he was a fighter to the finish. That is why over the course of his life he won the undying love of all who cherish freedom.

# # #



U.S. Department of Justice

Civil Rights Division

General

Washington, D.C. 20530

August 18, 1987

Civil  
Rights

Mr. Max Green  
Associate Director for Public Liaison  
197 OE0B  
The White House  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Max:

Mark Disler asked that, in his absence, I send to you the enclosed material on pending legislation to overturn the Grove City decision.

The material is testimony and other submissions to the Senate Committee in connection with hearings on S.557. There is an identical bill (less the amendments made at the Senate Committee markup) in the House, H.R. 1214. Also enclosed is a copy of the Administration-supported bill, introduced only in the House at this point, H.R. 1881.

Please let us know if you would like additional information.

Sincerely,

Michael A. Wermuth  
Legislative Counsel  
Civil Rights Division

Enclosures

# BAYARD RUSTIN

Civil  
Rights

Bayard Rustin has been active in the struggle for human rights and economic justice for over 50 years. Born in 1912, he was reared in West Chester, Pennsylvania where he was an outstanding student, athlete, and musician. He attended Wilberforce University, Cheyney State College, and the City College of New York, earning tuition at odd jobs and singing semi-professionally. A gifted tenor, he sang with Josh White's Carolinians, and also with Leadbelly at New York's Cafe Society.



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A Quaker, Mr. Rustin placed his religious convictions above his musical interests, and in 1941 began a long association with the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR). Serving as its Race Relations Secretary, he toured the country conducting Race Relations Institutes designed to facilitate communication and understanding between racial groups. He was active in A. Philip Randolph's March on Washington Movement, and became the first field secretary of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE). In 1942 he was dispatched to California by the FOR and the American Friends Service Committee to help protect the property of Japanese-Americans held in detention. In 1943, Mr. Rustin was imprisoned in Lewisburg Penitentiary as a conscientious objector.

In 1947, Bayard Rustin took part in a demonstration to test enforcement of the 1946 Irene Morgan case decision outlawing discrimination in interstate travel. Known as the "Journey of Reconciliation" this protest was a model for the Freedom Rides of the 1960s. Arrested in North Carolina, he served 30 days on a chain gang. His account of that experience, serialized in The New York Post, spurred an investigation which resulted in the abolition of chain gangs in North Carolina.

Mr. Rustin directed A. Philip Randolph's Committee Against Discrimination in the Armed Forces which was instrumental in securing President Truman's order eliminating segregation in the armed forces. At Mr. Randolph's request he was granted temporary leave from his position as Executive Secretary of the War Resisters League, to assist Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in the early days of the Montgomery Alabama Bus Boycott. His extensive background in the theory, strategies, and tactics of nonviolent action proved invaluable and were the foundation of his close association with Dr. King.

Mr. Rustin organized the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom in 1957, The National Youth Marches for Integrated Schools in 1958 and 1959, and was the Deputy Director and chief organizer of the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom which, at that time, was the largest demonstration in the nation's history. Thought by many to be the high point of the Civil Rights movement, the March on Washington created the political climate for the passage of the major civil rights legislation of the 1960s.

In 1964 Bayard Rustin helped found the A. Philip Randolph Institute, named for his mentor, the noted labor and civils rights activist. The Institute has over 180 local affiliates involved in voter registration drives and programs designed to strengthen relations between the black community and the labor movement. A long-time supporter of workers's rights, Mr. Rustin has participated in many strikes and was arrested in 1984 while demonstrating in support of the clerical and technical employees of Yale University. During the mid-1960s he participated in the formation of the Recruitment

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and Training Program (R-T-P) which successfully upgraded and increased minority participation in construction trades.

While working to promote democracy at home, Bayard Rustin has also supported human rights struggles worldwide. In 1945 he organized the FOR's Free India Committee which championed India's fight for independence from Great Britain. Following the examples of Gandhi and Nehru, with whom he consulted during visits to India, he was frequently arrested for protesting Britain's colonial role there. In the early 1950s, he was active in the fight to end colonial rule in Africa. He consulted with Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria. At home he helped organize the Committee to Support South African Resistance, later renamed the American Committee on Africa.

Mr. Rustin has a long involvement with refugee affairs. As a Vice Chairman of the International Rescue Committee, he has travelled the world, working to secure food, medical care, education, and proper resettlement for refugees. His several visits to Southeast Asia helped to bring the plight of the Vietnamese "boat people" to the attention of the American public. In 1980 he was part of an American delegation which took part in the international "March for Survival" on the Thai-Cambodian border. He was Co-Chairman of the Citizens Commission on Indochinese Refugees, a non-governmental advocacy group working to assist the refugees fleeing Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. In 1982, he helped organize the National Emergency Coalition for Haitian Refugees.

As Chairman of the Executive Committee of Freedom House, an agency which monitors international freedom and human rights, Mr. Rustin has observed elections in Zimbabwe, El Salvador, and Grenada, etc.

In 1975, Mr. Rustin organized the Black Americans to Support Israel Committee (BASIC). He has made numerous fact-finding visits to the Middle East and has written many columns and articles on that troubled area. He has worked for the freedom of Soviet Jews and was an early advocate for the Ethiopian Jews in their struggle to emigrate to Israel.

In 1983, Mr. Rustin and two colleagues made a fact-finding trip to South Africa. Their report, South Africa: Is Peaceful Change Possible? led to the formation of Project South Africa, a new program which seeks to broaden American's support of groups within South Africa which are attempting to bring about democracy through peaceful means.

A collection of Mr. Rustin's essays, Down the Line, was published in 1971. In 1976, he delivered the Radner Lecture at Columbia University which was published under the title Strategies for Freedom: The Changing Patterns of Black Protest.

Mr. Rustin is the recipient of numerous awards including The Murray/Greene/Meany award, The John LaFarge Memorial Award, and The Stephen Wise Award. He has been honored with more than a dozen honorary degrees including Harvard, Yale, Brown, and New York University. He currently serves as a member of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council.

Mr. Rustin currently serves as Co-Chairman of the A. Philip Randolph Institute and President of the A. Philip Randolph Educational Fund, a sister organization with an international human rights focus. He can be reached at: 260 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10010 Tel: 212-533-8000.

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ADDENDUM TO BAYARD RUSTIN BIO

An outspoken proponent of democracy, Bayard Rustin was dedicated to the struggle against totalitarianism, be it from the left or the right. In the spring of 1981, he visited Poland, where he conferred with Lech Walesa, leader of the Solidarity free trade union, and other members of the Polish opposition. As Vice Chairman of the International Rescue Committee, he traveled to Southeast Asia to draw attention to the plight of Cambodian refugees living in Thailand. His most recent trip to the Thai-Cambodian border was in May of this year.

A member of the National Council of PRODEMCA, Mr. Rustin was part of a delegation that visited Paraguay and Chile in April 1987 to meet with labor leaders and monitor the human-rights situations in that country.

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ON SOCIAL INVENTION

Michael Novak

NOT FOR QUOTATION

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"One measure of a good society is how well it cares for the weakest and most vulnerable of its members."<sup>1</sup> Every society will have many such members.

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In every society, there will be a substantial proportion of the population in need of help from others, because they are unable to meet all their needs alone. The elderly, orphans and other needy children, the disabled, and those who through various circumstances (a nervous disorder, prolonged sickness, temporary misfortune, even an uncertain character or temperament) are necessarily dependent upon others for their financial needs. It is, therefore, no mark against any society that it has in its midst a substantial number of needy and vulnerable members. This will be especially true in modern societies, to which and within which there have been substantial migrations, and in which most citizens live beyond the traditional support systems of rural villages. It will be true, not least, in a large continental-sized, highly mobile society such as the United States.

Ironically, moreover, the more successful a society is in its health and welfare programs, the more such members it will also have, for two reasons. First, its elderly -- retired from employment -- will live longer and some of them will need more care. This outcome is the fruit of a great

human success. It is good, e.g., to see our parents live longer and in greater numbers than in any previous generation in history, even if those older than 80 (or even 70) are dependent on more assistance and for a longer time than ever before. Secondly, a dynamic, prosperous society is likely to set ever higher standards of well-being for those who do need care. This, too, is admirable. The official U.S. poverty line is higher by far than the income of the vast majority of the earth's people now or ever -- and this is a success, not a failure.

Nonetheless, there is today widespread dissatisfaction with modern welfare societies. The "needs" they attempt to meet are infinitely expandable. Even persons who are not strictly in need have also come to be included within government programs of assistance. Indeed, rather high proportions of government assistance end up not going to the neediest but to wide sections of the society; social security, e.g., goes universally to the elderly. Accordingly, government welfare programs seem to grow in cost for many reasons besides inflation. Such programs are, further, regularly criticized from all points of view for their inefficiency; so much so that some social thinkers as such Edward S. Shils have questioned whether governments are capable of managing the vast new obligations they have assumed. Tocqueville is again being quoted on "the new soft tyranny" of dependency. Hilaire Belloc's The Servile State and F. A. Hayek's The Road to Serfdom gain new adherents



daily. Yet the main sources of widespread discontent among intellectuals are probably less philosophical than practical: Do welfare states unavoidably injure themselves by taking on too much -- by inevitable mismanagement, by insuperable costs, and by the declining morale (and morals) of their citizens? Before giving up on some of the basic philosophical assumptions of the welfare state, however, we must at least try to improve the design of what we are doing, to see if the entire project can be rescued.

The model the U.S. has followed since "The War on Poverty," for example, had two parts: first, to remove barriers to opportunity; second, to accept those who could not, or did not, help themselves as dependents to whom government must minister. Nearly all the burden of this second task has fallen on government. Government has been allowed to become the chief agency for designing, administering, and funding social welfare programs. Although "society" and state" are not co-extensive, society has here ceded most of its responsibilities to the state.

Since the policies of welfare states necessarily alter rational expectations, it would seem naive to believe that such states do not change the ethos within which their citizens are prepared for reality. Risk of destitution being removed from citizens, are citizens thereby taught to shape in themselves a different sort of character? No system, of course, can totally remove the risks inherent in human liberty and diversity; and some persons are inevitably

so wounded that they are beyond ordinary language about character; they are, simply, in dire need.

Even leaving these questions aside, no one can doubt that the welfare state -- not only in the U.S., but also in Western Europe -- has reached an unstable plateau, both philosophically and in practice.

Consider solely the widespread dissatisfaction within the United States. In a recent poll commissioned by the Los Angeles Times and reported in Public Opinion, significant majorities both of the poor (56 percent) and of the non-poor (73 percent) hold that even with unlimited funds the government does not know how to help the poor. Barely 51 percent of the poor think the War on Poverty made things "better;" included were only 14 percent who said "much better." 56 percent of the poor, 59 percent of the non-poor, think anti-poverty programs have seldom worked. Only 5 percent of the poor think this was because poverty programs were never given enough money; 50 percent (63 percent of the black poor) said it was because the money never got to the poor.<sup>2</sup>

In my opinion, government should do more, if not monetarily at least with considerable social inventiveness, and not solely in the way government has been doing it. While the moral principles we hold will not allow us to do less -- not, at least, while the problems of the poor are so poignant -- we are now called to invent a better way. That a good society should help the needy, and that the government should have sound poverty programs is morally and

politically correct. The design of such programs should always be in question, in the light of their consequences.

For many years now, the thought has nagged me that our intellectual elites (in academia, journalism, and policy) are preoccupied with the two most original concepts emerging in modernity, the individual and the state. Yet in the actual social world in which most human beings live, neither our naked individuality nor our role as citizens actually dominates our concerns. Family life, in particular, and the smaller, more human-scale social worlds of our friends, associates, and neighbors, have far more to do with our daily happiness, welfare, hurt, and need. In short, "social" should not be confused with "state." Between the individual and the state, there are crucial social worlds -- mediating institutions -- in which we dwell as active social animals. My diagnosis is that, in neglecting those crucial social worlds and in concentrating on state assistance to individuals, our public policy is seriously out of touch with human reality. My suggestion is that a major shift in our public policy forms may be far less expensive and far more effective. In particular, I hold that family life is the best long-range focus of fruitful social policy, since the family is the most basic and indispensable social world of daily life.

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To begin with, then, we should question the images of poverty, on which government action has been based. Is

poverty something that can be "warred" upon? The suggestion is that poverty is a combatant and can surrender. Is poverty solely the opposite of monetary wealth, with no roots in culture and personal development, such that it can be defeated solely by infusions of money? Experience has shown these to be erroneous patterns of thought. Indeed, programs thought to be successful such as Head Start, tutorial assistance, and others, went beyond purely monetary conceptions.

Consider how cheap it is, in purely monetary terms, to eliminate poverty. In 1984, there were 33.7 million persons counted as poor, by the measure of having an income (excluding noncash benefits) less than \$10,609 for a non-farm family of four.<sup>3</sup> As a thought experiment, suppose that these 33.7 million individuals were equivalent to 9 million families of four. Simply to have given each of 9 million families \$10,609 in 1984 would have cost only \$95 billion dollars. (Since we know that many of the poor already earn a substantial amount of income, but not enough to carry them above the poverty line, considerably less than \$95 billion would be needed; from the data supplied, the "poverty gap" can be calculated at about \$46 billion.)<sup>4</sup> Obviously, then, poverty is not a purely monetary problem. If it were, it could be eliminated simply by giving each person enough money to get each over the poverty line. And that, in the scheme of things, is not a very expensive proposition. Nonetheless, few of us would believe that the personal and

cultural vulnerabilities we also mean by "poverty" would go away if such gifts of money merely lifted every person, technically, above the official line. An "unemployable" twenty-two-year-old, even with money in his pocket, has not fully escaped from poverty.

How, then, can we reach a more helpful understanding of poverty, so as to arrive at less destructive and more creative social programs?

The first obvious step is to "disaggregate" the poor, simply by examining the various statistical profiles already available (and perhaps by thinking of even more penetrating statistics that might be gathered). The elderly poor will hardly be helped by job training; the poor under age 18 may have special educational needs; the disabled may need not only income maintenance but special care, etc. As matters stand, our official figures describe "the poor" by a uniform monetary measure. Still, they do help us to perform certain disaggregations, by age, sex, race, employment, etc. These statistical disaggregations help us to grasp the relative magnitudes of different groups (the elderly, the young) in different locations (rural, urban), and the like. These are extremely valuable, and often run counter to stereotypes. In 1966, for example, a far larger proportion of the poor were over age 65, as compared with 1984.<sup>5</sup>

Still, there are several crucial disaggregations it would be helpful to make. How many of the poor possess certain measurable skills or aptitudes, and how many need

help in that quarter? And how many of the poor would classify themselves as poor? Surely, not all the officially poor think of themselves as poor. Married graduate students in non-farm families of four living on far less than \$10,609 in 1984 probably did not think of themselves as poor; nor did many immigrants, arriving penniless but certain that they would not long remain so; nor did those persons who choose to live largely outside a cash economy, for reasons of self-sufficiency, etc. The human side of poverty needs more statistical attention.<sup>6</sup>

A second step is to begin thinking of poverty in terms of personal histories. Official income statistics class together an immense range of persons, who do not at all share the same characteristics. Not all persons officially classified as poor are, or think of themselves as, dependent upon government. Not all want, or need, assistance. Poverty is not solely a matter of income in a given year; to stretch for an ungainly metaphor, a given year is only a snapshot in a lifelong film. Behind and ahead of every unit of increase or decrease in the poverty statistics there is a human story. To be effective, offers of assistance must enter that story appropriately. Government cannot possibly know such stories. Typically, though, some persons or organizations close to those involved do know such stories. This is one of the reasons in favor of public policy centered upon existing mediating institutions, in which a powerful knowledge base already exists.

Helping people, even in one's own family, is a difficult art. (Recall Abraham Lincoln's wasted efforts to help his errant brother.) Human beings ought to respect that art. To do so is a characteristic of the mutual respect humans owe to one another.

A third step is to distinguish sharply between two categories of the poor. First, there is a substantial class that are dependent and are always going to be dependent, because they simply cannot (through age, disability, infirmity, etc.) care adequately for themselves. Such persons, simply, require social assistance, if not from other social bodies to which they belong, then from the state. Second, there are those who, if helped in the appropriate way, can become independent and keep themselves out of poverty. (This second category will include children and others who may be dependent on an income-producer.) Every reduction of poverty in this second category brings about two immensely significant social gains: the individuals involved achieve that sense of full dignity that comes from self-reliance and independence from the state, a sort of self-mastery and autonomy; secondly, public funds are made available for helping those who can never attain such self-reliance.

The fourth step concerns the need for fresh thinking about those young members of this second category who show every physical sign of being able to be self-reliant, but who from some sense of demoralization or self-injuring behavior continue to be dependent upon others. One thinks

of bold, strong ghetto youths, physically not only strong but superior, who find jobs but cannot hold them; or apply for openings and yet, for reasons short of discrimination (since others of the same characteristics take such jobs in their place), are thought to be unemployable. One thinks of those who choose a way of personal development inconsistent with economic self-reliance; as when abundant opportunities to teach oneself to read, and other similar skills, are scorned. One thinks, too, of teenage girls who become unwed mothers, and their children. In total numbers, those in this class may not be substantial; but, because of their youth and promise, they seem especially important to attend to. We will come back to them below.

Finally, we need fresh thinking about the role of the family in overcoming poverty. An intact (husband-wife) family is the best natural arrangements for staying out of poverty. In 1984, only 6.9 percent of married-couple families (including the elderly) were poor, still fewer if noncash benefits are included.<sup>7</sup> The reason appears to lie not solely in the possibility of two incomes instead of one, but also in the attentions, disciplines, and special teachings that two parents normally afford better than one alone. In preparation for a life of economic activism and self-reliance, the role of an attentive father seems especially useful to young men. There is a great deal of lore about the world of jobs, and about the handling of the turbulent



emotions young men are heir to, for which a confiding father seems to be an invaluable teacher.

I am far from certain about the differences in helping to prepare young females and young males for a productive working life. But it does seem that black females, e.g., enter the job market with higher confidence, ambition, and success than black males. Is this because in their mothers they have a closer role model? Is there something in the African or American past? Is there something about the wider society? Is there something in entry levels to the labor market more favorable to black females? Does male aggression in a setting led chiefly by females become confused? Are there expectations that if a male does not have a job, he is not eligible as a marriage partner, in a way that a female of the same age is? Male-female differences do seem to be highly significant, both in family life and economic life, especially among the young. More light in this area would be welcome.

Yet it is not only the immediate parents of an intact family, but also the two sets of extended relatives that a husband and a wife bring to the creation of a loving, supportive, and guiding family network for many a youngster.

One might object that, alas, poverty "causes" family break-up, not the reverse. Some may further object that persons living in female-headed households, who today constitute so large a proportion of the poor (49 percent in 1984),<sup>8</sup> don't so much "fall" into poverty as "stay" in it.

Indeed, the poverty statistics may then reflect two poor households, where before there was only one. My reply is that when Americans were far poorer, separation and divorce among the poor (not to mention birth out of wedlock) were not nearly so extensive as today. If financial standing were everything, couples in poverty would have strong reasons for staying together (life together is cheaper, two incomes are better than one, etc.). Clearly, the changing structure of the family is affected by many other than economic factors. This seems to be particularly true in our age of mass communications, and its rapidly shifting public ethos.

In a fluid, individual-centered era of analysis such as ours, some wish to imagine that there are "alternatives" to the "traditional married-couple family." Some propose as alternatives the extended family of a single-parent or a tight-knit "community" operating together as a family. Such are the hazards of human life that all sorts of substitutes have of necessity been introduced to do what married-couple families do. I applaud every sort of help from extended families and close communities. Yet for the intensity of family life within the home -- monitoring a child's study habits, choosing a diet, teaching habits of impulse-restraint and hard work, showing techniques of using hammers, pens, typewriters, and personal computers -- it is hard to imagine substitutes for father and mother,

especially if the latter are clearly friends, reaching across the gender line. What human arrangement is superior to that?

The single-parent household, in any case, faces several disadvantages. Permit me a personal example. When my wife is away on a trip, minding the kids is far more difficult for me; and the same for her, when I am away. In many family responsibilities, two parents together (even if the sexes were interchangeable, as they are not) are clearly better off than one alone. This truism concerns far more than the family's immediate financial condition. Bringing up sons and bringing up daughters are two quite different projects, and the sex of the parent respecting each is often of considerable moment. One must have the highest admiration for single parents, knowing how many failures one has oneself as but one of the two parents in a couple, and Kondratas states that many single parents do, in fact, succeed remarkably well. Both financially and -- I stumble for the correct word -- psychologically, or emotionally, or as a sex-role model for growing children, or whatever it is that in sex is not interchangeable, the intact husband-wife family has clear advantages in staying out of poverty. Common sense used to recognize this. It shows up clearly in today's statistics.

In intellectual discourse today, I recognize that the mention of "family" rings many ideological bells. Some associate family with "bourgeois," "traditional,"

"unenlightened," "private property," "Victorian," the ancien regime. It is a critic's task, however, to cut through ideology. My proposal is that strengthening the married-couple, intact family is good public policy, insofar as it helps to keep many out of poverty and, perhaps, even to help others to escape from poverty. Since poverty is far more than an economic condition, but a tangle of human elements, and since all of these elements are touched by family life, concentration upon the family is highly instructive.

Given such considerations as these, what suggestions might be made toward sounder welfare policies in the future?

Concerning category one (those who are and will remain dependent): The conundrum government assistance must solve is how to help those who must be helped, without distorting factors of supply and demand in such ways that costs become staggering. Human beings are such that they seem to take advantage of the public treasury, in ways in which they would not if responsibility were purely personal. Even among highly trained health care professionals, health costs soar when an institutional third party (public or private) foots the bill. One of the nation's truly great and effective welfare programs, medicare, has suffered under this price distortion, even though various new methods are being tried to overcome this.<sup>9</sup>

Concerning category two (those who can move from dependence to independence): It is here that social intervention is most called for. In 1962, President Kennedy

announced that the chief purpose of his welfare reform (a tiny seed of the Great Society) was to maintain "the integrity and preservation of the family unit." If we look at the American family twenty years later, in 1982, and especially at those portions of the population most affected by welfare, it cannot be said that President Kennedy's primary aim was fulfilled. In Washington, D.C., 56 percent of all births in 1983 were to unwed mothers, many of them teenagers. In Chicago, New York, and elsewhere, the figures are comparable -- or higher.<sup>10</sup> There seems to be a rising coincidence between populations on welfare and unwed motherhood. Poverty alone cannot be said to lead to unwed motherhood, for under conditions of greater poverty than today the incidence of the latter was far lower, and among some groups in poverty it still remains low. Given the patterns of slavery in the American South, in which blacks were purposefully kept dependent, it may be that circumstances of dependency, recreated by contemporary welfare policy, evoke a special kind of suffering among blacks. (Still, it seems clear that slavery did much less harm to the black family than did circumstances after about 1950.) It may be that high joblessness among black male teenagers and young men brings such dependency to a painful pitch. The period of high welfare coincides with unprecedentedly high patterns of unwed motherhood. Why? How? We need to understand that -- and much else -- far better than we do.<sup>11</sup> For the costs it

inflicts on this and the next generation are painful to contemplate.

To repeat, the actual number of unwed young mothers nationwide is not large (approximately 300,000). It is not easy to believe, however, that their children will get a good economic start toward self-reliance. The youth and promise of those involved call for something new, something better.

Is our capacity for social invention such that we can think of nothing to do? For government, the problem is delicate. The choice to have children -- and there is no question that many young mothers want these children -- is a personal one. Since the young mothers are not in a position to provide for these children alone, however, the problem becomes one of public policy.<sup>12</sup>

Several years ago, the Federal Government conducted a massive social experiment in which the high hopes of many were invested. Figures as diverse as Milton Friedman and James Tobin had supported the basic idea, which seems to make eminent sense: Simply to give a large number of poor families a minimum income, sufficient to bring them over the poverty line. One unexpected result of the Seattle-Denver experiment was that in a higher proportion of the subsidized families -- 42 percent higher among blacks, 36 percent among whites -- husbands and wives separated, than in the unsubsidized control groups.<sup>13</sup> From the standpoint of the individual couples, this may (or may not have been) a happy result.

But, despite tentative theories, we do not fully know why this happened. (Precisely how were self-images and behaviors affected? Did the husbands lose self-esteem? What did the wives experience?) From the standpoint of public policy, however, the experiment suggested that, far from diminishing poverty, this particular incomes program seemed to broaden it. Far from strengthening families, this program seemed somehow to promote their dissolution, for reasons not at all obvious. Since reducing poverty and strengthening families were two of the major aims intended by reformers, the actual results brought unhappy tidings. Once again, economic factors seem to have been over-rated.<sup>14</sup>

Human beings are creatures of unbelievable complexity, native shrewdness, and resilience. However noble the intentions of government, by the time a program meets the bewildering reality of concrete personal motivations, perceptions, and calculation of opportunities, the actual consequences of government programs affect values and behaviors in ways typically unforeseen. That is why in politics a sense of irony is an exceedingly useful analytic habit.

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Today, then, the nation is confronting "a new poverty," which grows in major part out of a massive change of ethos, in which major demographic changes and changes in family structure have played significant roles. It is, in a sense, a poverty that springs unwanted from personal choices about

family life made upon quite other than purely economic grounds. Thus, some writers have suggested that a special problem for today's poor arises from the unprecedented experience of mass communications. Television, in particular, arrived upon the national (and world) scene during precisely the period of massive welfare reform (roughly 1960-1985). As a result, the ethos that prevailed during the days of our youth (at least of those of us born prior to World War II) no longer prevails; it is contested daily on the little blue screen in our own family rooms. To spell this out, one needs first to recreate the recent past.

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The immense prosperity of the postwar period entailed a singular demographic shift: Until the Second World War, by today's external measures very nearly a majority of Americans were poor. Many who were not poor (including intellectuals) lived very modestly indeed. By 1960, however, only 22 percent of Americans were poor, and one could (and did) write plausibly about the "affluent society," only thirty years after the Depression. Perhaps more important was a corresponding change in the public image of poverty, and even in the psychological self-image of the poor. When a majority was poor, many who would today be officially described as poor did not feel poor; and they were not officially and publicly so described. (Even today many deeply resent being referred to as poor, solely because of their annual cash flow.)<sup>15</sup> More than that, frugal habits, hard work, and study seemed the lot of everyone. And, given



the incredible economic expansion of the postwar decade, such habits clearly and dramatically paid off. So rapid was the upward mobility of millions that in the lifetime experience of most adult Americans living today, poverty is a monetary (but perhaps not psychological) condition they remember having lived through. They remember well the way they thought, felt and behaved.

In the new age of mass communications, however, mainstream consciousness is no longer the consciousness of poverty. Not only is most advertising (of which the average television viewer watches at least an hour a day) couched in "upscale" images.<sup>16</sup> In addition, most scenes in popular entertainments suggest a most unrealistic affluence even in the portrayal of "average" families. Furthermore, whereas the culture of poverty used to be (and still is, most conspicuously among new immigrant families) a culture of considerable impulse-restraint, of frugality, hard work, and careful budgeting; and whereas there were then no mass media to teach one differently; today the ethos suggested by trend-setters in the media is one of impulse-gratification, of consumer debt, of low savings and high consumption. To be poor in 1930-1945 (and in the longer sweep of history before that) was a qualitatively different experience from being poor during 1970-1985. No longer are the poor part of a majority, but a minority. No longer are the same virtues celebrated by the common ethos. On the contrary, this

nation has experienced one of the most extensive and intensive shifts in fundamental ethos since its founding.

How can we be surprised, then, when our assumptions about how poor people will behave, assumptions rooted in our own personal experience, turn out today to be false? Those who remember what a prize a first pair of Keds gym shoes once was, and recall how long they had to last, are not in the same psychological world as those poor youngsters whose footwear they observe on the playgrounds of the poorest sections of our urban slums today. In public ethos and in personal psychology, the world has changed a great deal during a single lifetime. Furthermore, even poor households today may not feel special when furnished with some "big ticket" items that once were occasions of considerable family pride and celebration: a refrigerator, a first family car, a television set. Today's poor, in a sense, carry heavier cash obligations. For everyone, expectations of what is to be considered "normal" have risen dramatically. (Even more than I marvel at the high tuitions paid by college students today, I marvel at the immense cash outlays made by their families in automobiles jamming college parking lots and the electronic gear crowding dormitory rooms.)

Thus, those writers who call attention to the "standards" set by mass advertising, standards of "the good life" aimed indiscriminately at the population as a whole, rich and middle class and poor alike, are making a serious point. Not only the poor, all Americans seem to be less inclined to

save, and more inclined to acquire immediately the "normal" goods of daily living, and, often, enough, to "splurge," through popular instruments of consumer debt. In such circumstances, to be poor today is to inhabit a world significantly different from that of the poor of 1930-1945.

Today's world is, in many ways, a much better world. Yet it does confront us with an ethos not nearly as well suited to a rapid advance out of poverty as was the ethos it replaced. I do not mean that Americans are less willing to work. To the contrary, a higher proportion of American adults between ages 18-65, just over 60 percent, are now employed than at any time in American history.<sup>17</sup> Nor do I mean that the millions of immigrants still streaming to these shores are no longer finding ours to be a land of opportunity; quite the opposite. Rather, I mean that the ethos of sacrifice, frugality, contentment with a little, hard work, excitement about small gains, and a fierce sense of personal achievement is as difficult to conjure up for one's own children as the memory of a grandparent of theirs they never knew. I think I would know how to educate my children to cope with poverty (as I was educated); I have been quite uncertain about how to educate them to cope with affluence. And it seems that some of the poor of today -- not so much the immigrant poor, for instance -- are no longer sure that the old rules for coping with poverty apply, once their children at school begin to mix with the more affluent. Being squeezed between one ethos and another

is sometimes more painful than getting a hand squeezed by the edge of a revolving door, when one does not know whether to go forward or back, or how to get the door stopped long enough to decide.

The Census Bureau reports that, for all married-couple families, the poverty rate in 1984 was (as we have seen) 6.9 percent, and significantly lower when noncash benefits are counted. (It is important for those who favor government assistance to the poor to insist that these noncash benefits, the largest the government distributes to assist the poor, do show important results and do, in fact, considerably reduce poverty. It is exceedingly poor politics to say, "Non-cash assistance doesn't really help; do more of it.") In short, the best single road for staying out of poverty is the married-couple family. During the past twenty years, the dramatic reductions in poverty among the elderly and among married-couple families have been great success stories. These successes deserve great emphasis.

By contrast, in 1959 only 8 percent of all Americans were living in female-headed families, no husband present, whereas in 1984, this percentage had grown to 13.2; that is, from 14.2 million to 30.8 million persons.<sup>18</sup> Most of this change results not from widowhood but from personal choice: divorce, separation, and abandonment.

To be sure, divorce and separation arise from myriad personal reasons. To urge one's fellow citizens to stay together "until death doth them part" would represent a very

strong value judgment, indeed. From the standpoint of public policy, however, one is obliged to point out that the contemporary ethos of divorce and separation carries with it social costs, some of which third parties (including taxpayers) are expected to bear. No doubt, the option of divorce and separation is fixed in our social mores. No doubt, too, tax laws favor divorce. (See Appendix, Table 4.) Still, one can imagine that cultural institutions might do more, on several grounds, to dissuade citizens from too swift an exercise of that option -- and from too casual a decision to marry in the first place. One can also scrutinize those legal forms and incentives, such as AFDC requirements in some states, that penalize couples that would otherwise stay together. Government can and should do little in this area of personal choice. But those relatively few persons who help to shape the national ethos in a time like our own can perhaps turn their attention to the costs, as well as the benefits, of our present customs in these respects.

On a somewhat different but related matter, unprecedented numbers of young males are abandoning teen-age and other young women with children without benefit of any marriage at all. In these cases, family "break up" is not in question, since no intact married-couple family was ever formed. In these cases, again, it is not clear that both parties clearly consent both to the pregnancy and to the subsequent separation.

Together with divorce and separation, the sad result is that the largest single bloc of poor American families now consists of female-headed households and their dependents: some 11.8 million persons, nearly 35 percent of all poor persons.<sup>19</sup> As fast as the Republic has made progress in reducing poverty among the elderly and among married-couple families, it has watched with shock as the numbers of the poor in female-headed households with young children grow even faster.

This fact becomes clearest if we project what poverty would have looked like in 1984, if the structure of American families had remained as it was in 1959. In that earlier year, twenty-five years ago, only 8 percent of Americans lived in female-headed families. If that percentage had held constant, rather than climbing to 13.2 percent, then in 1984 there would have been only 18.7 million persons in female-headed families, not 30.8 million. If the poverty rate of persons in female-headed families held at 1984 levels (38.4 percent), this would have meant 7.2 million poor persons, rather than the 11.8 million actually registered in 1984. There would have been some 4.6 million fewer poor persons. (If one looks at female-headed households, a larger class than female-headed families, the numbers are more dramatic. See Appendix, Figures 1 and 2.)<sup>20</sup> To be sure, all those additional poor persons represent only a fraction of the poor. But this group, unlike some others, seems less necessary and more painful.

With good reason, then, the attention of those who would launch a new assault upon poverty is now drawn to its fast-growing and single largest segment, the 35 percent of the poor who live in female-headed families (11.8 million), no husbands present. (Another 4 million unrelated individuals also live in poor female-headed households.) Here is the "new poverty" most in need of rapid reduction. But how?

Stronger economic growth clearly helps. In 1984, the real median income of female-headed families rose by 3.8 percent. The number of female-headed households in poverty (most of these with children over 18) actually declined slightly, by 74,000.<sup>21</sup> Clearly, though, many young mothers with small children (especially when the mothers are themselves teenagers) are likely to remain for a while outside the labor force. And 1984's poverty level for a household of four (\$10,609) is about \$4000 higher than the annualized minimum wage (approximately \$6600). So even if the economic system were functioning at full employment, high real median wages, and low inflation, still, some large proportion of female heads of households would remain in poverty. What is to be done?

It is worth noting that of the 7.3 million families in poverty in 1984, virtually the identical number were female-headed as married-couple families (about 3.5 million each). Of poor black families, alas, only 479 thousand were married-couple, compared to 1.5 million female-headed, families.<sup>22</sup> There are some hopeful factors, though. Over a

million of all poor families fell short of the poverty line by only \$999 or less. Roughly another million fell short by an additional \$1000 or less.<sup>23</sup> So also for another million families. Therefore, even relatively small amounts of additional income would significantly reduce the numbers of the poor. It is important to see this. Indeed, noncash benefits (totalling \$113 billion from the federal government alone in 1984), are intended to make up such income deficits. While, as we have seen, poverty involves considerably more than monetary matters alone, it is good for national morale (and willingness to help) to see that the monetary dimensions of the problem are far from staggering.

Another point should be stressed. For the sake of simplicity, suppose that on average each poor family has two children. If one can help a million married couples with two children to break out from poverty, the net poverty figure is reduced by about 4 million. For each million female-headed families helped, it is reduced (on average) by about 3 million. The more children per family, of course, the larger the amount needed to get over the poverty line. To help families, nonetheless, is to help several persons at once and, in that sense, is a very efficient way of reducing poverty. (In 1984, furthermore, only 6.6 million of the poor were "unrelated individuals.")<sup>24</sup>

Consider two strategies, then. (1) For married-couple families, it would be neat if someone could conceive of a



"reward," a social incentive, that would encourage the formation and the perseverance of married couple families. Such families perform indispensable services for the common good. Not least, some 93 percent of such families maintain themselves above the poverty line. They teach the next generation productive habits. The Reagan Administration has proposed raising the deduction for dependents to a high enough level to eliminate the federal income tax for poor and near-poor families. Since the official poverty line is a pre-tax figure, that in itself would not reduce the gross numbers of the poor. But it would significantly change the actual meaning of the poverty numbers, freeing significant funds for personal use. (It is quite striking that, in 1984, 295,000 poor families were only \$250 below the official poverty line, and 594,000 only \$500 short of it.)<sup>25</sup>

Special employment programs for married spouses might also be designed, to assure full-time employment for at least one spouse. In addition, child-allowances might be supplied for at least the first two children, increasing slightly for each year of marriage maintained.

The public policy problems involved in helping married-couple families are intriguing, if quite straightforward.

(2) For female-headed households, no husband present, the social dilemma is more complex. Incentives that would lead to the creation of more such households would be self-defeating. While the freedom of persons who choose such a station must be respected, there are sound public

policy reasons for at least not encouraging the break-up of couples, and for positively discouraging the abandonment of unwed mothers by males. (The burden placed upon the public by such personal choices is one such reason.) Thus, two contrary goods must be met at once: To help those genuinely in need, without establishing incentives that invite yet higher frequencies of need.

Distinctions should perhaps be made regarding the origin of the female-headed household. Typically, that change of circumstance arrives with some suddenness; there has been little or no time to prepare for it. Widowhood, desertion after marriage, separation, divorce, and abandonment by a male apart from marriage may all be alike in generating financial need. They may not be alike in their consequences for the woman involved, with respect to her need for financial assistance. Some women may need quick and substantial help, but only for a short time. Others may need modest help for an extended period. In designing programs that really help, one must take into account differences in the age, work experience, and education of the women involved. It is conceivable that a system of credits, allowing a woman to borrow as needed from some fixed sum at low interest, at her own pace, might allow for maximum program flexibility. Then, later, when she is entirely back on her feet and the children are grown, she would find repayment easier. Such a program might be self-financing.

It might also engender in those who participate a feeling of control over their own destiny.

A second suggestion is some form of Separation Insurance, to which married couples might contribute, to protect the financial needs that often arise (temporarily in many cases) from sudden separation or divorce. Two out of every three couples who pledge to stay together "until death..." in fact do so. The often-cited figure -- "one out of every two marriages today ends in divorce" -- is misleading, since one person may be involved in more than one divorce, and in that sense inflate the sum of divorces counted, whereas every permanent marriage is counted only once.

Realists will quickly detect weaknesses in such schemes. Government credit programs, both for students and for farmers, have been subject to some abuse. Insurance programs, public or private or mixed, incur their own difficulties. The task, however, is not to create a perfect program but one that, on the whole, achieves its purposes with limited costs and risks, and with sufficient checks and balances to prevent the worst abuses.

With respect to teen-age mothers, abandoned without marriage, one circumstance in particular may suggest a clue. Many such young women are clustered in urban neighborhoods. This circumstance suggests that, rather than giving support to each individual, support might instead be offered in the form of social centers, at which meals would be served, childcare provided, the skills of childrearing taught, and

classes held toward the completion of the mothers' education and in preparation for their later economic self-reliance. Providing help in a social context might go far toward reducing a sense of isolation, as well as toward meeting non-monetary human needs. Some of this is already occurring under private auspices. Government funding of single mothers -- at least the youngest among them -- should encourage such humane social contacts, rather than encouraging isolation and the stresses of independence through grants directly to individuals.

Again, with respect to all poor persons, it is important to study the success stories. Every year, a great many individuals, households, and families do escape from poverty (even as others, through various misfortunes, take their places). The annual poverty aggregates do not capture the same individual persons. There is considerable individual mobility and flux. The study of how the successful ones exit from poverty might offer us many creative clues. The study of the causes of escape from poverty is far more likely to lead to programs that decrease the incidence of poverty than is the study of misfortunes. Too much of the literature of poverty is a recitation of pathology, too little a discovery of human resilience, will, and inventiveness. It would be marvelous if the media approached poverty less with the censorious, puritanical intention of making the affluent feel guilty, and more with the humane intention of helping the needy learn from the methods and

skills that worked for many in their midst. Rising from poverty was once the chief American story line. For millions, it still is. There is as much heroism and lore to it as in the Leatherstocking Tales.

Finally, some forms of poverty do not spring principally from political or economic causes; some spring from moral and cultural causes. Accordingly, leaders of our moral and cultural institutions -- the media, the universities, independent scholars, the churches, political leaders of all parties, trend-setters, opinion leaders, film-makers, celebrities and, not least, talk-show participants -- ought to think conscientiously about their impact on the national ethos. They might, for example, do more to encourage the married-couple family (surely in need of social sustenance), and to express disapproval of those males who without so much as marriage abandon young women with children they have fathered. This last is not merely an acute moral disorder, commanded by neither nature nor nature's God, but also a profound social disorder, of great cost to the Republic. To believe that the national ethos has no effect whatever upon personal behavior would be a grave mistake. Meanwhile, those responsible for public policy need to evaluate its pattern of incentives and remedies, to see whether these cannot be changed in the direction of a sounder social order, particularly with regard to families.

\* \* \*

We are not, in a word, any less capable of social invention than our forebears were. In reducing poverty, this nation of immigrants and (alas) former slaves has had no historical peer. If one translates the official U.S. poverty level into British pounds, Italian lire, French francs, Soviet rubles, and the rest, it will be found that the official U.S. measure of poverty will appear to the vast majority of humans on this globe, even in developed countries, a generous sum. Yet we know we can do better.

In monetary terms, as we have seen, simply getting everyone over the poverty line is not a large proposition. We already spend considerably more than that, much of it to good effect. With some of our programs, however, we seem to be -- in the phrase borne out by many indicators -- "losing ground." Until 1984, the "new poverty" was growing faster than the "old" was being reduced. We are certainly losing ground through our recent national preference for a new family structure. For the nation as a whole, the new family structure has become expensive, indeed. It is the main "structural" cause of "new poverty."

With classic American can-do, however, and a burst of social inventiveness, we should be able during the coming ten years to reduce that form of poverty, too. It is still our motto, what the Great Lady in New York harbor says to us: "Send me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free."

Michael Novak holds the George Frederick Jewett Chair in Religion, Philosophy, and Public Policy at the American Enterprise Institute, where he and Leslie Lenkowsky began the Social Invention Project to investigate new possibilities in social policy.

NOTES

1. Toward the Future: A Lay Letter on Catholic Social Thought and the U.S. Economy (New York: Lay Commission on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy, 1984), p. 58.
2. See I.A. Lewis and William Schneider, "Hard Times: The Public on Poverty," Public Opinion, June/July 1985, pp. 1-7, 59-60. A hopeful finding: Only 23 percent of all the poor (but 53 percent of the black poor) say that "Government is responsible for the well-being of all its citizens and has an obligation to take care of them." A large majority of all the poor (69 percent) holds, rather, that "People are responsible for their own well-being and have an obligation to take care of themselves." See Appendix, Table 1 for selected questions from this poll.
3. U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 149, Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1984 (Advance Data from the March 1985 Current Population Survey), (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 31; hereafter cited as Money Income and Poverty Status 1984.
4. Calculated from Money Income and Poverty Status 1984, Table 19.
5. Ibid., Table 15. The percentage of the poor who were 65 years old or older was 18 percent in 1966 as compared to 10 percent in 1984.



6. Anna Kondratas argues that the "Census Bureau officially defines poverty on the basis of cash income only, even though common sense would indicate that poverty -- the opposite of wealth -- is a function not only of income, but also of assets and investment in human capital. Thus, a middle-class student who has moved out of his parents' home and is subsisting on scholarships is likely to be defined as 'poor' even though he has his parents' income to fall back on and his 'poverty' is a normal step in a successful economic life cycle. An elderly couple in their own home and with considerable assets can still be classified as poor, if their retirement income is sufficient for their ordinary needs and they can cash in some assets to cover emergencies. A self-employed businessman whose earnings fluctuate widely can be officially poor in a year of low earnings, even though he has a savings cushion from previous years for just this purpose and even though his business may be worth a great deal." "Poverty and Equity: Problems of Definition," Journal of the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies 9 (Winter 1985):40. 7. Using the market value method of valuing noncash benefits, only 6.4 percent of married-couple families were poor. See U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Technical Paper 55, Estimates of Poverty Including the Value of Noncash Benefits: 1984, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), Table 2. See also Appendix, Table 2.

8. Money Income and Poverty Status 1984, Table 15. Table 2 in our Appendix shows the effect of family structures on poverty. Whereas only 6.9 percent of all persons in married-couple families are poor, 34 percent of persons in female-headed households, no husband present are poor. Moreover, while the latter accounted for only one-quarter of all poor persons in 1960, in 1984 they accounted for half of the poor.

9. For a good analysis of health care policy and medicare, see Jack A. Meyer, ed., Incentives vs. Controls in Health Policy: Broadening the Debate (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1985).

10. See Judith Cummings, "Breakup of Black Family Imperils Gains of Decades," New York Times, 20 and 21 November 1983. Since 1950, the illegitimacy rate has doubled from 14.1 babies born (per 1000 unmarried women) to a staggering 29.4 births in 1980, nationally. See Appendix, Table 3. Such an enormous increase in the illegitimate birth rate is reflected in the comparable growth of persons in female-headed families with no husband present. The number of such persons rose from 14.2 million to 30.8 million between 1959 and 1984. See n. 20, infra.

11. Charles Murray argues that "the context in which the illegitimacy rate among poor women increased cannot be understood without understanding as well the importance of changes in crime, education, and status rewards -- an interactive system...." "Have the Poor Been 'Losing

Ground'?" American Political Science Quarterly, 100 (Fall 1985):442-443.

12. Surprisingly, 58 percent of poor blacks and 70 percent of poor women chose "often" to go with the sentence, "Poor young women have babies so they can collect welfare." The non-poor said "seldom" (51 percent). Los Angeles Times poll, in Public Opinion, op. cit. See also Appendix, Table 1.

13. James Q. Wilson and Richard J. Herrnstein briefly summarize these findings in Crime and Human Nature (Simon and Schuster: New York, 1985), p. 480, with reference to J.H. Bishop, "Jobs, Cash Transfers, and Marital Instability: A Review and Synthesis of the Evidence," Journal of Human Resources 15:312-321.

14. An April 1985 Los Angeles Times poll found that 60 percent of all poor persons and 61 percent of all nonpoor persons think "almost always or often" welfare encourages husbands to avoid family responsibilities." See Appendix, Table 1.

15. See Michael Novak, "Is Poverty in the Eye of the Beholder?" Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 12 May 1985.

16. The average American watched 7 hours of television per day in 1983, up from 5.1 hours per day in 1960. U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), Table 924.

17. Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Indicators, September 1985, p. 11. When we expand the ages to 16-25, the percentage of employed persons nears 70 percent for October 1985. Unfortunately, while national employment rose by 5 percent between 1972 and 1985, black employment fell by 6 percent during the same period. Since 1980, however, black employment has remained steady at 56 percent. See Appendix, Table 5.

18. Calculated from Money Income and Poverty Status 1984, Table 15.

19. Calculated from *ibid.*

20. Calculated from *ibid.* The gap is dramatic when seen over time and reveals the potential positive impact on poverty of "traditional" family structures. See Appendix, Figures 1 and 2.

21. Median income for female-headed families in 1984 was \$12,803, up from \$11,769 in 1983. See *ibid.*, Table A. Table 15 (*ibid.*) records the change in the number of female-headed households.

22. *Ibid.*, Table 15.

23. See *ibid.*, Table 19.

24. *Ibid.*, Table 15.

25. *Ibid.*, Table 19.

## APPENDIX

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TABLE 1

## Opinions on Poverty

(all numbers in percent)

<u>Question</u>	<u>Persons In Poverty</u>	<u>Persons Not in Poverty</u>	<u>National</u>
Some people think welfare encourages husbands to avoid family responsibilities because it's easier for wives to get aid for children if father has left.			
Almost always or often	60	61	61
Seldom or almost never	32	34	33
Don't know	8	5	6
Poor young women have babies so they can collect welfare			
Almost always or often	64	44	48
Seldom or almost never	23	51	46
Don't know	13	5	6
Anti-poverty programs have worked			
Almost always or often	31	33	32
Seldom or almost never	56	59	58
Don't know	13	8	10
When poverty programs failed, it was because			
Never given enough money	5	6	6
Money wasted on unhelpful projects	30	41	39
Money never got to poor	50	40	42
Don't know	13	11	11
Greatest responsibility for helping the poor should be upon			
Charities	4	8	7
Churches	24	16	17
Families and relatives	5	13	12
The government	34	33	34
The poor themselves	28	20	21
Other	0	0	0
Don't know/all about equally	4	9	8
Even if government were willing to spend whatever is necessary to eliminate poverty in the United States, does government know enough about how to do this?			
Yes, we know how	28	22	22
No, we don't know how	56	73	70
Don't know	15	4	7

SOURCE: Los Angeles Times poll, April 21-25, 1985; published in Public Opinion, June/July 1985.

TABLE 2

Persons Below the Poverty Level (with poverty rate) by Family Status

(in thousands of persons, except poverty rate percentages in parentheses)

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1984</u>
All persons	39 851 (22.2)	25 420 (12.6)	29 272 (13.0)	33 700 (14.4)
In female-headed households, no husband present	10 663 (49.5)	11 154 (38.2)	14 649 (33.8)	16 440 (34.0)
Householders	7 247 (42.4)	1 951 (32.5)	2 972 (32.7)	3 498 (34.5)
Related children under 18	4 095 (68.4)	4 689 (53.0)	5 866 (50.8)	6 772 (54.0)
65 years and older	(NA)	2 511 (41.1)	2 308 (27.8)	2 001 (22.1)
Unrelated individuals	3 416 (50.9)	3 652 (38.4)	4 118 (27.4)	4 035 (24.4)
In all other households	29 188 (18.5)	14 266 (8.2)	14 623 (8.0)	17 260 (9.3)
Householders	6 288 (15.4)	3 309 (7.2)	3 245 (6.3)	3 780 (7.2)
Related children under 18	13 193 (22.3)	5 546 (9.2)	5 248 (10.4)	6 157 (12.5)
65 years and older	(NA)	2 198 (16.7)	1 563 (9.5)	1 329 (7.5)
Unrelated individuals	1 510 (36.1)	1 438 (24.0)	2 109 (17.4)	2 575 (18.7)
In married-couple families	(NA)	(NA)	3 032 (6.2)	3 488 (6.9)

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 149, Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1984, Table 15; and and ibid., No. 127 (1980), Table 16.

TABLE 3

Out-of-Wedlock Births  
(per 1000 unmarried women)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Blacks &amp; others</u>	<u>National</u>
1950	6.1	71.2	14.1
1960	9.2	98.3	21.6
1965	11.6	97.6	23.5
1970	13.8	89.9	26.4
1975	12.4	79.0	24.5
1980	17.6	77.2	29.4

SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985, Table 94.



TABLE 4

Family Status of Adults  
(in millions, except percents)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Single</u>	<u>Married</u>	<u>Widowed</u>	<u>Divorced</u>	No. of Divorces per 1000 <u>Persons</u>
1960	125.5 (100)*	27.7 (22)	84.4 (67)	10.6 (8)	2.9 (2)	2.2
1970	132.5 (100)	21.4 (16)	95.0 (72)	11.8 (9)	4.3 (3)	3.5
1980	159.5 (100)	32.3 (20)	104.6 (66)	12.7 (8)	9.9 (6)	5.2
1983	167.1 (100)	35.9 (22)	106.7 (64)	12.8 (8)	11.6 (7)	(NA)

\*numbers in parentheses represent the percentage of the total population

SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1985, Tables 44 and 120.

TABLE 5

Employment for 16 - 65 Age Group

(in millions, except percents)

	1972			1980			Oct. 1985		
	<u>Total Adults</u>	<u>Employed</u>	<u>% of Adults Employed</u>	<u>Total Adults</u>	<u>Employed</u>	<u>% of Adults Employed</u>	<u>Total Adults</u>	<u>Employed</u>	<u>% of Adults Employed</u>
ational	124	79	64	143	94	67	152	105	69
Whites	109.6	70.7	65	124.1	85	68	129.6	92.2	71
Blacks	12.9	7.5	62	15.8	9.1	56	17.5	10.3	56

SOURCE: Telephone inquiry to Bureau of Labor Statistics, November 8, 1985.

FIGURE 1

Persons below the Poverty Line  
IN FAMILIES of Female-headed house-  
holds, with No Husband Present





FIGURE 2

Persons below the Poverty  
Line in Female-headed HOUSEHOLDS,  
with no Husband Present

Number of  
Persons  
(in Millions)



— Actual Numbers

-- Hypothetical numbers, holding constant at the 1959 level (12%) the percentage of population living in Female-headed households, no husband present.

Figure 1-7

Figure 1

Section below the lowest  
line in Figure 1-7 (see  
also on Figure 1-7)

Jan. 1951 night - time

home by 6:45

