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Implementation of Helsinki Final Act

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Chapter One

General Assessment of the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document

OVERVIEW

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) represents a framework for the 35 participating states to work to resolve the humanitarian, economic, political, scientific, and military issues that divide Europe. The Final Act underscores that each area is of equal importance to genuine security and cooperation in Europe. The Western objective has been to preserve and strengthen this process by a thorough review of implementation of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document and agreement on balanced and constructive steps forward.

The Final Act recognizes that followup meetings are essential for maintaining the Helsinki framework as a vigorous means of addressing problems in Europe. The Madrid followup meeting, the second such CSCE review conference, began on November 11, 1980, and came to a close on September 9, 1983. The Madrid Concluding Document confirmed and expanded upon the original Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It includes significant new provisions in the area of human rights, trade union freedoms, human contacts, free flow of information, access to diplomatic and consular missions, and measures against terrorism.

It also mandated seven follow-on "experts" meetings leading up to the next review conference, which will begin on November 4, 1986, in Vienna. The United States has participated actively and fully in these meetings, both as a means of assessing existing problems of implementation and seeking balanced progress in the CSCE.

This is the 21st semiannual report submitted by the President to the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe under the provisions of Public Law 94-304 of June 3, 1976. It surveys significant developments in the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document during the period April 1, 1986, through October 1, 1986. The purpose of the report is to assist the Commission in its task of monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki accords and the Madrid Concluding Document. These reports are themselves an important element of the U.S. Government's efforts to assess the progress and shortcomings in achieving the CSCE goals of strengthening security, expanding cooperation, building mutual confidence, and promoting human rights.

Review of Implementation

For most CSCE participating states, the status of implementation over the current reporting period did not change significantly from earlier periods. The overall record of compliance of the Warsaw Pact nations with their CSCE commitments remained seriously flawed. Although some positive steps were taken by these governments, the status of implementation over the current reporting period did not change significantly from earlier periods.

In the Soviet Union, leader of the Group To Establish Trust Between the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A., Vladimir Brodskiy, was released from labor camp 2 years early and allowed to emigrate with his family. In addition, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy's mother and brother and Trust Group activist Yuriy Medvedkov were allowed to emigrate to the West. Twenty-four hours after accused Soviet spy Gennadiy Zakharov was ordered expelled from the U.S., it was announced that Moscow Helsinki Group leader Yuriy Orlov would be permitted to come to the West. In a move unprecedented since the advent of U.S. divided family representation lists, the Soviet Union in late May and early June—at the Bern human contacts meeting—announced its decision to allow the emigration of 65 divided families with relatives in the U.S., comprising approximately 200 individuals. (By the end of the reporting period, however, roughly half of these had not yet received their exit documentation.)

Romania announced the resolution of a number of humanitarian cases during the CSCE Experts' Meeting on Human Contacts in Bern and substantially improved its handling of family reunification and binational marriage cases during this period. Further, Romanian authorities recently agreed to permit the printing of some 5,000 Bibles for Baptist churches in Romania in 1986, and released several long-term prisoners identified with issues of religious freedom as part of a recent amnesty.

On July 17, the *Sejm* (the Polish Parliament) passed a law permitting the release of both criminal and political prisoners under certain circumstances. On September 11, Minister of Internal Affairs Czeslaw Mkiszcak ordered the release of all political prisoners. Most Polish observers, including representatives of Solidarity and the Church, agree that, in fact, as of the close of this reporting period, all people considered to be political prisoners have been freed.

Hungarian compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document remained relatively good. Hungary has remained a relatively congenial place for Western business, and cooperation in the fields of culture, science, and technology continued to develop.

If present trends continue, the number of East Germans emigrating to the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) in 1986 will almost certainly equal the number of such emigrants in 1985, the G.D.R.'s second most liberal year for emigration since these reports began.

Although its performance on many freedom-of-movement issues leaves much to be desired, Czechoslovakia has maintained its relatively good record on the issue of divided families. Czechoslovakia and the United States signed a bilateral cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges agreement during the reporting period which sanctions free dissemination of some materials.

During the reporting period, Bulgaria resolved favorably most of the pending family reunification cases presented by the U.S. Embassy in Sofia and increased the number of Bulgarians allowed to visit relatives in the United States.

Negative developments in CSCE implementation continued, however. There were continued complaints alleging Romanian Government efforts to restrict cultural and educational activities of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Romania. The abrupt expulsion of two American visitors, continued efforts by the government to control and influence the writings of Western journalists, and objections to visits by outside legal and other experts concerned about human

rights raised further doubts about the seriousness of the Romanian Government's commitments to bettering human contacts. During the past 6 months, professional travel in general has become more difficult. Numerous academic experts have been refused exit permission, and the Romanian Government has reduced the number of individuals traveling on cultural exchange programs. The government has continued to implement rules reducing contacts between Romanians and foreigners, notably its additional restrictions on access by foreigners to Romanian industrial facilities. The sudden demolition in Bucharest of a Sephardic synagogue and the Seventh-Day Adventists' headquarters and church was of major concern to the United States.

In Poland, church-state relations remained cool. In September, Jozef Cardinal Glemp broke off negotiations for the creation of a church-sponsored agricultural fund because of Polish Government resistance in the talks, which had prolonged them for 4 years.

Hungary's record of compliance in many CSCE matters was marred by some negative developments. Implementation of the liberalized issuance of passports, for example, which began during the previous reporting period, remained spotty. Prominent philosopher and member of the "democratic opposition" Janos Kis, who traveled abroad last October for the first time in years, has been unable to secure another passport. In August, the Deputy Minister of Culture announced that prize-winning writer Istvan Csurka will no longer enjoy access to the established media as a result of his cooperation with "hostile forums" while in New York in March 1986.

The 25th anniversary of the Berlin Wall on August 13 and a rash of reported shooting incidents at the wall and inner-German border highlighted the continuing refusal of the G.D.R. to respect the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Contacts with westerners, family reunification, binational marriages, emigration, and travel to the West remain difficult for G.D.R. citizens. Emigration procedures remain arbitrary; only a fraction of those who desire to leave have been allowed to do so, and many emigration applicants face reprisals ranging from harassment to imprisonment. The G.D.R.'s borders remain as secure as ever, and escapes have steadily decreased since 1982. Desperate individual attempts, however, seem to have increased in recent months, and it is clear that G.D.R. border guards are instructed to use deadly force to prevent escapes. G.D.R. border guards fired on a truck driver, his fiancee, and their infant child during a spectacular escape through Checkpoint Charlie in early September. Another attempted escape ended tragically when, according to eyewitness reports, G.D.R. border guards continued to fire on an East German vehicle trying to pass through a border control point even after it had been brought to a stop. The driver was carried away from the car, apparently lifeless. This was the first apparent killing of a would-be escapee since November 1984.

While the number of trials in human rights cases in Czechoslovakia has remained comparable to what we observed during the previous period, the number of individuals in detention has risen significantly, and this may portend an increase in trials in the near future. Additionally, the authorities continue to resort to a variety of nonjudicial measures—including threats, interrogations, short-term detentions, job dismissals, and denial of passports and educational opportunities—to try to stifle any political, religious, or cultural activities that have not been organized by the Communist Party or affiliated institutions. On September 2, seven leaders of the Jazz Section, a group of some 7,000 Czechoslovak jazz amateurs and fans, were arrested and continue to be held in detention. Opportunities for Czechoslovak citizens to travel to the West remain extremely limited and the country's tight border controls are renowned as mortally dangerous to those who attempt to leave the country surreptitiously. Two separate occurrences during late September reveal Czechoslovak harshness in preventing unauthorized departures. In one instance, border guards reportedly pursuing Polish escapees shot and killed a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany on F.R.G. territory and held his body for 4 days, returning it in a condition that made the precise cause of death unclear. In a second incident, Czechoslovak guards seized an Austrian pensioner on Austrian territory and held him for 7 hours, forcing him to sign an untruthful and incriminating statement.

Bulgaria continued to pursue policies during the period that deny and suppress the ethnic identity of the country's Turkish minority, that inhibit the free practice of religion, and that discourage and penalize any dissent against the actions or nature of the regime.

In the international arena, continued Soviet prosecution of war against the Afghan people and its support of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and Vietnam's war against the Cambodian resistance were in flagrant violation of the basic principles guiding relations between states.

Persecution by the Soviet authorities of Soviet citizens who attempted to express themselves freely continued at an unabated rate during the 6 months under review. Religious believers, proponents of greater cultural and political rights for ethnic minorities, human rights monitors, and peace activists alike were subjected to harassment and often to arrest and imprisonment. Assertion of religious and cultural identity brought arrests to Jews, Ukrainians, Pentecostal Christians, Baptists, and others. An independent peace group was subjected to harassment, arrests, confinement to psychiatric hospitals, and expulsions.

Andrey Sakharov remained in isolation, apparently still confined to the closed city of Gorkiy. Yelena Bonner, his wife, returned to the U.S.S.R. after treatment in the West and rejoined Sakharov in exile. Most former Helsinki monitors remained in prison, labor camps, or internal exile. Several human rights activists confined in labor camps had their sentences extended shortly before their scheduled release on charges of violations of camp regulations. Some faced deterioration in their conditions of confinement: no family visits, no letters, punishment cells, beatings, and substandard surgical care for injuries sustained while in prison. Independent peace activists faced arrest, detention, and expulsion from the Soviet Union. Soviet abuse of psychiatry for political purposes continued unabated. Mark Morozov, a 54-year-old political prisoner, reportedly died in prison on August 3.

Despite commitments under the Helsinki Final Act to facilitate family reunification, the rate of emigration from the Soviet Union remained very low. Only 421 Jews left the Soviet Union from April 1, 1986, to September 30, 1986.

The Soviet authorities maintained their traditional strict control of information media, essentially denying Soviet citizens access to filmed, printed, and broadcast information which might call into question the tenets of Marxism-Leninism or the official line of the Communist Party. Substantial jamming of *Voice of America (VOA)* and *Radio Liberty (RL)* broadcasts in languages native to the Soviet Union continued. American journalist Nicholas Daniloff was arrested on trumped-up charges of espionage and held for a month in a Soviet prison.

The Stockholm CDE Concludes

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adjourned in Stockholm on September 19, 1986, with the adoption of a set of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) designed to reduce the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities taking place in Europe which could give rise to apprehension.

The CDE was created in 1983 by the Madrid CSCE followup meeting as a substantial and integral part of the CSCE process, with the aim to undertake, in stages, new, effective, and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament. The first stage of the conference, which opened in Stockholm in January 1984, was mandated to negotiate and adopt a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe and which would be of military significance, politically binding, verifiable, and would apply to the whole of Europe, as defined by the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document.

One week after the conference opened, the 16 NATO member states tabled the first proposal, consisting of specific, concrete measures designed to make the European military environment more predictable and stable. These proposals included exchange of military information on forces stationed in Europe, advance notification of major military activities, observation of all notified military activities, and inspection as the means of verifying compliance. Much later, the East offered six alternate and largely declaratory proposals, including a treaty on the non-use of force, a non-first-use of nuclear weapons pledge, creation of nuclear and chemical weapons free zones, and the reduction of military budgets. In the area of concrete measures, the Soviet Union further impeded progress by refusing to discuss CSBMs for land activities unless the notification of independent air and naval activities was also included—subjects inconsistent with the mandate of the conference.

The neutral and nonaligned (NNA) states took positions broadly complementary to the Western approach throughout the conference and, in November 1985, tabled their own package of concrete CSBMs.

The first 18 months of the conference were dominated by the debate between the Eastern and Western approaches to confidence and security building. Not until President Reagan's offer to discuss the Soviet's non-use of force proposal in return for their serious discussion of concrete CSBMs did substantive negotiations begin, slowly, to move forward. Even though the pace of the negotiations accelerated following President Reagan's and General Secretary Gorbachev's statement of commitment to a successful CDE outcome at the November 1985 Geneva summit, Soviet foot-dragging and counterproductive linkages delayed actual drafting until the spring of 1986, and the resolution of key issues until the summer of 1986.

The CSBMs eventually agreed to at Stockholm largely reflect the Western agenda and approach to confidence and security building. They include:

Notification: 42 days prior notification of military activities taking place within the whole of Europe whenever they involve a divisional structure or two or more brigades/regiments and at least 13,000 troops or 300 tanks.

Observation: Mandatory invitation of observers from all participating states to notified military activities above a threshold of 17,000 troops.

Forecasting: The exchange of annual forecasts of all notifiable military activities, with large-scale activities (over 40,000) announced a year in advance and activities over 75,000 prohibited unless forecast even further in advance.

Inspection: Onsite inspection from the air or ground or both as the means of verifying compliance with agreed measures, with no right of refusal.

The conference's reaffirmation of the non-use of force principle reflected the Western approach to security and included language on human rights, antiterrorism, compliance with international commitments, and denying the validity of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine.

The obligatory measures adopted in the Stockholm document mark a significant advance over the largely voluntary measures contained in the Helsinki Final Act and transform the concept of confidence building into practical procedures. The zone of application for CSBMs has been expanded to cover all Soviet European territory. The threshold for advance notification has been cut almost in half from that adopted in Helsinki (from 25,000 to 13,000), and elements of structure and equipment have been added to the numerical threshold to make it more militarily significant and verifiable. Observation has been made mandatory for activities over a given threshold. The most significant advance was the provision for inspection without right of refusal. This is the first undertaking in which the Soviet Union has agreed to inspection of military activities on its territory. In sum, if fully implemented by all parties, the detailed provisions of the Stockholm document can make military activities in Europe more predictable and inhibit opportunities to use military force for political intimidation.

However, the Stockholm document does not include everything the West aimed for, nor does it exhaust the potential for further work on CSBMs. On the issue of inspection, the East rejected the NNA's offer to provide neutral aircraft and crews. We continue to believe that either inspecting-state or neutral aircraft would produce a more effective form of verification than use of aircraft from the inspected state. And, while we can use this first experience with inspection with no right of refusal to help highlight ways in which the inspection regime can be enhanced, the CDE inspection provisions would not be sufficient for verification of any agreement involving limitation or reductions of military forces. We also did not achieve as much as we wished to in the area of informational exchange, which is basic to the type of openness the alliance sought in Stockholm and is seeking throughout the CSCE process. The future of the conference itself will be considered by the Vienna CSCE followup meeting as it reviews all fields of the Helsinki process. Of course, the success achieved in Stockholm has important implications for the CSCE process as a whole. By advancing the principle of openness in the military-security field, this accord can contribute to lowering the artificial and real barriers which divide Europe. But this advance in one area of the CSCE process also highlights the need for balanced progress on human rights and fundamental freedoms, where the East's complaince record is severely flawed.

The Bern Human Contacts Meeting

Delegations from the 35 CSCE participating states met in Bern, April 15–May 27, 1986, to discuss "the development of contacts among persons, institutions and organizations." Ambassador Michael Novak headed the U.S. delegation. Issues addressed included the reunification of families, family visits, binational marriages, freedom of movement (including emigration), contacts among members of religious faiths and national minorities, trade union contacts, the development of tourism, and youth and sports exchanges. Western countries paid particular attention to the obstacles that the Soviet Union and some of its

Warsaw Pact allies place in the way of human contacts, contrary to their CSCE commitments. The discussion of problems was direct, and the Soviet response to criticisms was not as confrontational as at previous meetings.

A variety of proposals for improving human contacts were introduced and considered at Bern, and the 17 Western countries (members of the NATO alliance plus Ireland) presented a draft concluding document recommending 20 practical steps for adoption. Negotiations with the East and neutral and nonaligned countries did not produce a concluding document that met U.S. goals. A compromise draft submitted by the NNA contained qualifications and loopholes which could have been used by some governments to justify noncompliance with existing commitments. The United States determined that agreement to the document might also have raised questions about the credibility of the CSCE process itself. Therefore, the United States withheld consensus from the compromise suggested by the NNA, while other participants—some expressing reservations—said they could agree to the document.

The United States has stressed that lack of a document at Bern should not obscure the meeting's accomplishments.

- There was a sustained, low-key, and effective review of Eastern compliance with Helsinki and Madrid commitments. Implementation failures and lapses, as well as examples of improved performance, were detailed. The review reinforced the idea of accountability in the CSCE process and provided the basis for consideration of new proposals.
- Many good ideas for easing, if not resolving, existing human contacts problems among the participating states were introduced and discussed. The draft concluding document tabled by the West provided a blueprint for the West's approach to human contacts issues at the Vienna followup meeting.
- There were many opportunities at Bern for bilateral discussion of human contacts cases. In some instances, these discussions produced progress, including the resolution of a considerable number of cases. Experts' meetings in CSCE thus have become a catalyst for productive bilateral business between some states.
- More generally, Bern demonstrated the force of European values and the common interest of all Western governments—both allied and NNA—in upholding them. The inherent attraction of these values compels the East to respond in the same humanitarian vocabulary and may—over time—actually affect Eastern behavior.

Chapter Two

Implementation of Basket I: Questions Relating to Security in Europe

The first section or "basket" of the Final Act has two main parts. The first part is the declaration of 10 principles guiding relations among states. It sets forth generally accepted precepts of international behavior which the CSCE participating states agree to observe in their relations with one another and with other states. The second part of Basket I is devoted to security issues. Here the participating states endorse certain confidence-building measures that are designed to remove some of the secrecy surrounding military activities; they also make certain more general pledges with respect to the importance of arms control and disarmament.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS AMONG STATES

Principle One: Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;

Principle Two: Refraining from the threat or use of force;

Principle Three: Inviolability of frontiers;

Principle Four: Territorial integrity of States;

Principle Five: Peaceful settlement of disputes;

Principle Six: Non-intervention in internal affairs;

Principle Seven: Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;

Principle Eight: Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

Principle Nine: Co-operation among States; and

Principle Ten: Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

The Madrid Concluding Document contains complementary principles which strengthen and extend the Final Act. These include pledges to take effective measures against terrorism; prevent territories from being used for terrorist activities; assure constant, tangible progress in the exercise of human rights; ensure the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and freedoms; ensure individual freedom to practice and profess religion; consult with religious organizations; favorably consider applications for registration by religious communities; ensure respect for the rights of workers freely to establish and join trade unions and the right of trade unions freely to pursue their activities and other rights.

Implementation of Principle Seven

The United States remains dissatisfied with the implementation record of the Eastern countries, particularly with respect to Principle Seven. This principle calls on the participating states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief, as well as the right to "know and act upon" one's rights.

The following section provides a detailed survey of implementation of the Helsinki principles and related provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document. It treats specific cases in an illustrative rather than comprehensive fashion. Lack of information detailing abuses in a given country may not imply their absence.

Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has continued to violate both the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Final Act principles. The Soviet Union persists in its occupation of Afghanistan and in efforts to eradicate national opposition there. In

conducting its ruthless war against Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has used chemical weapons, bombed civilian targets, used ground and air forces to destroy villages and crops, and employed weapons intended to cripple or maim noncombatants. The Soviet Union also supports the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and Vietnam's war against the Cambodian resistance. These actions are in direct and willful violation of the general principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act, including respect for the inviolability of frontiers, the territorial integrity of states, and the self-determination of peoples.

Soviet compliance with Principle Seven continued to be poor during this 6-month review period. Soviet persecution of dissidents, *refuseniks,* and religious activists continued unabated, as did suppression of national minorities and harassment of political prisoners and their families.

Andrey Sakharov remained in exile in the closed city of Gorkiy during the review period. After 6 months in the West for medical treatment, his wife, Yelena Bonner, returned to the U.S.S.R. on June 2. She reportedly has been unable to return to Moscow from Gorkiy, where she is still under sentence of internal exile. During the review period, Dr. Sakharov succeeded in having a letter published in the West from him to Gorbachev asking for clemency in the cases of a number of political prisoners.

Most former Helsinki monitors, including Nekipelov, Osipova, Kovalev, and Serebrov, remained in labor camps or in Siberian exile during the review period. Anatoliy Marchenko, who reportedly was beaten by guards at Chistopol prison, announced a hunger strike in August, demanding the punishment of the guards who attacked him.

Released on February 11, 1986, former political prisoner Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, who spent more than 7 years in prison on a fabricated espionage charge, devoted his first 6 months in freedom to pressing for exit permission for his mother, brother, and brother's family to join him in Israel. After months of bureaucratic delays, Ida Mil'Grom and Leonid Shcharanskiy and family left the U.S.S.R. on August 25. Trust Group members Vladimir Brodskiy and Yuriy Medvedkov were permitted to leave on September 20.

With only two exceptions (Meiman and Kallistratova), all former members of the Moscow Helsinki Monitoring Group have been either sentenced to terms in prison camp and/or internal exile or have emigrated to the West. Members of the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Armenian, and Georgian branches of the Helsinki Monitoring Group have suffered similar fates. Lithuanian Helsinki monitor Bulys Gajauskas, incommunicado for 3 years in a labor camp, was seriously injured in the camp this summer by a criminal prisoner and was in the hospital for 2 months.

Information about political prisoners is scanty because the authorities permit very little communication between them and the outside world. Rigid rules restrict family visits and the receipt of letters and packages, and these privileges can be withdrawn at the slightest infraction of camp or prison rules, such as praying or failing to remove one's cap at the approach of a camp official. Even those whose sentences are finished live under hardship. A new regulation prevents them from setting foot in Moscow, which cuts them off from friends, relatively comfortable housing, consumer goods, and travel via Moscow. The third violation of this rule is reportedly punishable by imprisonment.

The only reported death of a political prisoner during the review period took place on August 3 with the death of Mark Morozov, who was serving an 8-year sentence for authoring and distributing *samizdat* and for anti-Soviet agitation. Details on Morozov's death are not available, and reportedly his family did not hear of it until 3 days after it occurred.

Soviet Jews have suffered particularly severe treatment over the last several years with arrests, trials, and convictions of many Jews, especially those who actively pursue their own religious and cultural traditions. Moscow Hebrew teacher Aleksey Magarik, who was arrested in March at Tbilisi Airport, allegedly in possession of hashish, was sentenced on June 9 to 3 years in a labor camp. Moscow Hebrew teacher and labor camp inmate Yuliy Edelshteyn, who suffered a broken leg and torn urethra in a February fall and who had long been refused treatment in a regular hospital, was finally operated on in July and is slowly recovering. Moscow Hebrew teacher Iosif Begun has been denied visits by his wife and son for more than 1 year, and the authorities have refused to forward his letters to his family. Leningrad Hebrew teacher Vladimir Lifshits, who was sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp for "anti-Soviet slander," has suffered a serious deterioration in his health due to harsh prison conditions.

There have been no new arrests of Hebrew teachers reported during the period under review, though reports are beginning to surface in Moscow of a crackdown on several Jewish activists in the Ukrainian city of Cherkassy. A ritual bath (*mikva*) in Moscow's Mariana Rosha synagogue was reportedly destroyed by the Soviet authorities on September 26.

Harassment of Jewish *refuseniks* continued at a serious level during the review period. Leningrad *refuseniks* Boris and Margarita Yelkin and Yevgeniy Leyn were detained by the militia for several hours after a reception at the consulate in July. Six other Leningrad Jews were detained in April while on their way to a private exhibition of Jewish art. Periodic interruption of telephone service, occasional house arrest, and frequent detention by the militia for several hours, ostensibly for document checks, continue to be common forms of harassment.

Many other religious groups have suffered from continued persecution during the review period. Soviet law requires any religious group to register with the authorities and forbids religious indoctrination of children outside the home. Believers of any faith, therefore, face a choice between participating in a group controlled and closely monitored by the authorities or breaking the law by joining an underground religious group. Although some Baptists belong to the registered Baptist church, many others are members of unregistered groups which have been severely persecuted. During the 6-month period under review, Baptist leader Pavel Rytikov, who has already spent a total of 10 years in camps, reportedly was sentenced to 18 months in a labor camp for violations of parole. Six Baptist underground printers from Moldavia were sentenced in May for up to 2 years in labor camp for their printing activities. Unofficial activists of the Russian and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches and the Catholic Church continued to suffer severe repression during the reporting period. Moscow Catholic activist Kirill Popov was sentenced on April 18 to 6 years in a labor camp followed by 5 years of internal exile on charges of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Ukrainian Orthodox activist Pavel Protsenko was arrested in Kiev in June on charges of slandering the Soviet state and social system. He reportedly is still awaiting trial. Russian Orthodox activist Aleksandr Ogorodonikov, who has been in camps already for 8 years, was sentenced in April to an additional 3 years for violations of camp discipline. Russian Orthodox activist and former administrator of the Russian (Solzhenitsyn) social fund. Sergey Khodorovich, who has already served 3 years for "slandering the Soviet State," was sentenced to an additional 3 years in April for violations of camp regulations.

Orthodox activist Mikhail Bombin of Riga received a sentence of 2 years' "corrective labor" without imprisonment for deliberately disseminating "lies" derogatory to the Soviet state and social structure.

Pentecostalists throughout the U.S.S.R. continued to be severely harassed, with a number of new arrests and trials. Only a handful of the reported group of 30,000 Pentecostalists who have petitioned to leave the U.S.S.R. have received exit permission. Pentecostalist Bishop Vasiliy Boychenko was sentenced in March to 3 years in labor camp for anti-Soviet slander. The Pentecostalist community in Chuguyevka in the Soviet Far East has experienced continued KGB harassment during the review period. The entire adult community conducted a hunger strike during April in protest of the mistreatment of the eight members of their group who remain in labor camps after sentencing in early 1985. Several Pentecostalists in Vilnius, Lithuania, have been harassed by the local KGB authorities and threatened with imprisonment if they do not discontinue their efforts to emigrate. Moscow Pentecostalist Aleksandr Zaytsev was arrested in September and jailed for 15 days on charges of "petty hooliganism" after participating in a Moscow Trust Group seminar.

Even tiny religious groups were not immune to severe pressure. During the period under review, information was received on the harassment, arrests, and trials of Hare Krishna followers in the Baltic Republics, the Ukraine, Russia, and the Caucusus. Followers have been confined in psychiatric hospitals in Armenia and the Ukraine. Ukrainian Krishna activist Olga Sushchevskaya was sentenced to 3 years in a labor camp for "infringement of the rights of citizens under the guise of performing religious rites." Seventh-Day Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses also continued to encounter serious obstacles to the free exercise of their religion.

Members of the Group To Establish Trust Between the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.—an independent group of concerned Soviet citizens whose nonpartisan, nonpolemical approach to the discussion on arms control and confidence building stands in sharp contrast to the statements of the officially sanctioned Soviet Peace Committee—were also subject to official harassment and arrests during the review period. Trust Group member Larisa Chukayeva was sentenced in July to 2 years in a labor camp on charges of "systematic falsification of official documents." Most Trust Group members have been briefly detained by the militia at least once during the review period for activities ranging from pro-peace demonstrations and distributing leaflets on the effects of the Chernobyl accident to attending Trust Group seminars. In September, three members were forcibly pulled out of such a seminar, arrested, and sentenced to 15 days in prison. Imprisoned Trust Group activist Vladimir Brodskiy was released 2 years early and allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. with his family on September 19. Yuriy and Olga Medvedkov, after a summer of harassment (during which Yuriy received one 15-day sentence for petty hooliganism), were allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. on September 19. The Zilbur family of Gorkiy left the country in August. Artist and Trust Group member Nina Kovalenko, who demonstrated on a Moscow street on September 20 in support of Nicholas Daniloff and environmental protection, reportedly was picked up on September 25 and taken to a psychiatric hospital, where she had already spent several months earlier in 1986. She was told that she could be charged with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda due to her activities.

The Soviet authorities maintained unabated their attempts to "Russify" the Ukraine. Like other non-Russians, Ukrainians are expected to learn the Russian language. Ukrainian cultural and historical objects have been neglected and, according to unconfirmed reports, Uniate churches in the past have been destroyed. Despite the imprisonment of Ukrainian Catholic activists Iosif Terelya and Vasyl Kobryn, the Catholic Church has reportedly continued with its underground "chronicle." Harassment of dissidents, *refuseniks*, Jewish Hebrew teachers, and cultural activists is more severe in the Ukraine than in most republics of the Soviet Union. Ukrainian Trust Group members, moreover, are among the most harshly persecuted Trust Group members in the Soviet Union.

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, whose forced annexation by the Soviet Union in 1944 has never been recognized by the United States, have long resisted assimilation of Russian language and culture. It is often difficult to distinguish readily between religious and nationalist dissent in the Baltic Republics. The Soviet regime is, however, equally sensitive to any form of independent expression. The review period has been marked by continued efforts of Lithuanian Catholics to recover use of several of their most venerated churches, which have been seized by the authorities. Many Baltic religious leaders remain in prison or exile, though there was no firm evidence of new arrests during the review period.

Georgian Helsinki monitor Tengiz Gudava was sentenced in late June to 7 years in a labor camp followed by 3 years in exile on conviction of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Emmanuel Tvaladze, a Georgian Jew and companion of Gudava, was sentenced on the same charge to 5 years in a labor camp followed by 3 years of exile. Two Georgian students were reportedly sentenced in July to up to 7 years in a labor camp for "nationalist activities."

The Soviet authorities continued to exert steady pressure to encourage Muslim inhabitants of Central Asia and Azerbaijan to abandon their religion, calling it backward and subject to manipulation by "foreign enemies." Very few mosques were open for use, and there were few officially recognized clergymen. Muslim clergy not sanctioned by the authorities were attacked in the official press as "shiftless vagabonds and religious charlatans." During the Muslim holy month of Ramadan in May, seminars and conferences arguing the cause of atheism were held throughout Uzbekistan.

Evicted from their homeland at the end of World War II, Crimean Tatars continue to insist on their right to return there. In the past, the authorities reportedly searched Crimean Tatar apartments in central Asia, confiscating documents on the subject of national identity. There have been prior reports of Tatar families who have tried to return to the Crimea to live and establish farms but who have been sent away again. Imprisoned Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev now faces a new term of imprisonment for disobeying camp authorities.

The Soviet authorities continued to abuse psychiatric facilities during the review period to control and suppress political dissent. Moscow Trust Group member Vladimir Smirnov has been confined to a psychiatric hospital since April 29 with no prospect of release. Russian dissident artist Aleksandr Kalugin was confined to a Moscow psychiatric hospital on July 7 and has been held there pending his trial on charges of "resisting the authorities." Seraphim Yevsyukov, the father of an imprisoned draft resister, was confined to a psychiatric hospital on July 19 while he was on his way to publicly demonstrate in support of his son. He reportedly has been given a prolonged treatment of injections. Many other political

and religious activists, including at least one member of the Moscow Trust Group, remained in psychiatric hospitals through the latest review period.

A new Ministry of Foreign Affairs Administration for Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs, with a separate office of human rights, was established in June, allegedly as the result of General Secretary Gorbachev's stated desire to deal seriously with humanitarian questions. In a related move in July, an "independent" commission on humanitarian affairs and human rights within the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation was established with the stated purpose of familiarizing the Soviet public with both Soviet and international law governing human rights, including issues of workers' rights and labor law. It is too early to judge whether these moves reflect only a Soviet attempt at window dressing or a more sophisticated and less polemical approach to human rights.

Independent labor unions are not allowed under the Soviet system. Existing "unions" are completely controlled by the party-state apparatus and serve largely to promote ideological indoctrination, work force mobilization, and labor discipline. Strikes are not permitted. Official unions are expected to respond rapidly to changing political priorities, as in the case of the current Soviet antialcohol campaign. Although some recent party documents call for an unspecified increase in worker participation in the U.S.S.R., this has not been reflected in the activities of official unions. Severe repression of past attempts to organize independent labor unions has been effective, as indicated by the lack of reports of such activity during the current review period.

Romania. The Government of Romania continues to highlight the first six Helsinki principles as key elements of its own national and foreign policy. Romania has sponsored and continues to work actively for creation of a new UN mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Another Romanian UN resolution would urge the application of "good neighborliness" in the settlement of disputes.

Romania's observance of basic human rights continues to be poor. While the Romanian constitution contains guarantees of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the same document, and Romanian law, either limits these guarantees or sets a standard of state control so vague as to make the guarantees meaningless. The constitution names the Romanian Communist Party as the guiding authority in the country, and the party, the government, and its internal security apparatus tolerate no significant opposition. All forms of mass media are tightly controlled, and freedom of conscience is seriously limited in a society where behavior is conditioned on the widespread belief that one out of four of one's neighbors is a police informant. Freedoms of association and assembly are limited by these same fears and by government policies that allow meetings and assembly only for officially approved purposes.

The practice of religion in Romania continues to be circumscribed by the government. Romania officially recognizes only 14 denominations in addition to the Roman Catholic Church, which enjoys de facto recognition. Among the denominations not recognized by the government are the Jehovah's Witnesses, Christian Scientists, Eastern Rite Catholics (Uniates), and the Nazarenes. The press campaign against religion in general continues, including attacks on these denominations.

Romania's 14 officially recognized religions are administratively supervised by the government's Department of Religious Affairs. Romanian control over clergy salaries, building permits, seminary admissions, and printing of religious materials is routinely used to limit the growth and breadth of activities of these organizations. Government actions restrict the evangelistic "neo-Protestant" faiths more than the Romanian Orthodox Church (to which a large majority of Romanians belong) or other long-established faiths such as the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Jewish, Islamic, or Reformed Hungarian Churches.

Romania's small remaining Jewish community has also encountered difficulties in the past 6 months. During that period, a historic and unique synagogue and a major Jewish community facility—an old-age home housing some 80 persons—were abruptly demolished to make way for urban renewal, despite earlier government assurances to the contrary. These actions led to considerable Western concern regarding the fate of other important Jewish facilities in Romania.

The Jewish community was also disturbed by an article seeking to show that the 1941 pogrom in Iasi, in which many thousands died, was an event of only minor significance and one for which Romanian authorities bore no responsibility. The Jewish community has protested vigorously, fearing this incident might foreshadow the reemergence of anti-Semitism in Romanian publications.

The growth of the fundamentalist churches in Romania during the last 15 years has led to continued friction with the government. Official attempts to discourage these groups more than others are stimulated by their faith in the primacy of religious belief over state authority in matters of conscience and by a stated government policy that the Romanian Orthodox Church has a special position in society.

In a major new development, Romanian authorities agreed to allow the printing of 5,000 new Bibles for the Romanian national Baptist organization, the first printing of the "Cornilescu" Protestant translation in Romania since the 1920s. These authorities also agreed that "several" thousand additional Cornilescu Bibles might be printed each year subsequently, depending on the need. This agreement, if implemented, will be a major step forward. While the initial 5,000 Bibles are only for the Baptists, Romanian authorities have implied that it may be possible for other denominations to receive Bibles in future years under the agreement.

During this period, there was no improvement in the government's performance on repair and construction of new churches. A large Seventh-Day Adventist church in Bucharest, located in a renovation zone, was demolished in August. The Romanian Government has now promised to allow the church to purchase a new building, but approval for a specific building is still awaited. Other churches also face legal action, possible demolition, or closure. Church attempts to replace structures previously destroyed by authorities have made little progress and have been frustrated by red tape and an unfriendly bureaucracy.

As a whole, religious activists, particularly devout and vocal Protestants, are kept under scrutiny by the secret police and are subject to loss of jobs and social benefits, police intimidation or arrest, and, in some cases, beatings. We are aware, for instance, of the case of one Baptist pastor who is unable to obtain a work permit in order to move to a church currently without a pastor.

Romania's minorities—Hungarians, Gypsies, Germans, and a number of other ethnic groups—live in a country infused with Romanian nationalism. School texts, history books, and mass media purvey a version of history which often ignores or belittles the role these minorities have played in Romanian history. Evidence continues to suggest that, despite public pronouncements to the contrary, the Romanian Government systematically seeks to integrate and

absorb these other minorities into one Romanian culture. Although some basic schooling still is available in minority languages, university-level education in minority languages now reportedly is available only in a few disciplines. New administrative measures continue to make it more difficult for minorities to enjoy more sophisticated forms of their own culture, generating discontent among Hungarians and Germans. There is little evidence of any economic discrimination; minorities have suffered along with all other Romanians.

Labor unions are integrated with and controlled by the party and state. Romanian President and Communist Party chief Nicolae Ceausescu is chairman of the national labor organization as well. In addition, two new "first deputy chairman" positions were created for the national labor organization, and these are filled by the prime minister and President Ceausescu's wife. The official labor unions are the only labor organizations permitted and are principally another organizational channel for imposing government and party doctrine upon the workers.

In discussing human rights, Romanian officials often assert that economic, "quality-of-life" benefits are the most significant human right. They say that, first and foremost, citizens have a right to the essentials of life: food, shelter, employment, and economic security. By implication, lesser standards of performance should be tolerated in the area of human freedoms in order to achieve rapid progress toward the primary goal. Romanian performance in the area of "economic rights," however, is poor by any European standard. Once a primary agricultural supplier, since 1980 Romania has become a country where many basic foodstuffs are rationed, variety has declined, and some foods are simply unavailable. This decline in living standard has continued in the present reporting period.

Poland. Polish sensitivity remains acute on the permanence of the postwar geographic configuration of Europe. Government statements supporting the peaceful settlement of disputes and deploring the use of force are similar to Soviet foreign policy positions. As in the past, Polish officials frequently expressed concern over what they considered to be regular interference in Polish internal affairs by Western governments in general and the United States in particular. Polish officials regularly criticize the Polish language broadcasting of *VOA, Radio Free Europe (RFE),* and other Western stations as interference, and jam some of these broadcasts.

Despite the release of all political prisoners and the claim that the situation in Poland is normalized, Polish authorities continue to restrict most forms of independent political, trade union, or professional association activities. Western publications are difficult to obtain, and the circulation of church-sponsored publications often fails to meet demand. During the reporting period, there were several political trials, and persons were sentenced to fines or imprisonment for what they considered to be the free expression of their ideas. Human rights activists, in particular, object to parts of the penal code that permit summary judgments for alleged crimes against the state or public order.

Recurrent complaints about prison conditions and a lack of appropriate care have been heard. Accusations were made, for example, that prominent Solidarity leader Wladyslaw Frasyniuk was beaten and that KPN (Confederation for Polish Independence) leader Leszek Moczulski was provided poor medical care for heart problems while in custody. The Polish authorities consistently deny any mistreatment. While it is clear that conditions in Polish prisons are sometimes harsh, Poland has no record of torture and has been known to release prisoners because of poor health.

Despite the restrictions on independent political activity, the Polish Government does permit a relatively free intellectual life within certain limits. Poles meet openly with Western diplomats and reporters and, among themselves, hold wide-ranging debates on religion, politics, and Polish society. The government strongly encourages public participation in state- and party-sanctioned consultations on a variety of issues and decisions, occasionally producing lively results. The underground press remains strong, and unofficial cultural events take place in churches and private homes around Poland.

The Polish Government allows a high degree of religious freedom, although it has maintained its long-term policy of restricting religious influence. Churches are free to preach and proselytize and, to a lesser extent, to build and publish. The Roman Catholic Church continues to broadcast Sunday Mass on state-run radio; the smaller Protestant groups do so on a rotating basis. The government also allows religious gatherings, such as pilgrimages and conferences, without significant interference. Nevertheless, the government makes clear that it expects the gatherings to maintain a purely religious nature. Although the vast majority of Poles are religious adherents, persons who openly profess religious belief usually find it difficult to rise to leading positions in government and industry, largely because these are party controlled. The government is continuing its attempt to introduce the study of religion into the elementary and high school curriculum, a measure opposed by the Roman Catholic Church, which sees the course as the propagation of atheism.

The Roman Catholic Church is the predominant religious force and the single largest independent social institution in Poland. A substantial majority of all ages and social groups participate regularly in Catholic religious services. The next largest community is the Orthodox Church, which claims approximately 800,000 adherents. Although there is some social prejudice against the Orthodox Church, this does not appear to be government inspired. Approximately a dozen other religious denominations exist in Poland, and the government allows them to practice their faiths freely as long as they avoid activities the government considers political.

The government bans labor union pluralism, and the officially sanctioned National Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ) continues to be the only legally recognized labor organization in Poland. The right to strike remains severely circumscribed. Authorities have fired, arrested, and imprisoned activists of the "delegalized" Solidarity trade union. Nevertheless, independent union activity enjoys worker allegiance. Solidarity supporters have remained active on many worker self-management councils, where they have achieved some successes in defending the rights of workers.

Despite its official imprimatur, the OPZZ has shown some opposition to the government's economic and housing policies, particularly in response to government decisions on pricing and working hours. Workers are often subject to pressure in the workplace to join the new unions. The OPZZ claims to have 6.5 million members and belongs to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). It has regular contacts with the trade union organizations of other communist countries. At the 10th Congress of the WFTU in East Berlin, OPZZ Chairman Alfred Miodowicz announced that the OPZZ had asked the Polish Government to take another look at its decision to withdraw from the International Labor Organization (ILO) effective November 1986.

The Polish Government officially subscribes to the principle of equality for

all citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious background, age, or sex, and generally adheres to this in practice. There is no officially sanctioned or institutionalized discrimination against any social group. Though generally ethnically homogeneous, Poland has some ethnic and linguistic minorities, most prominently Belorussians and Ukrainians. Many of these two groups are of the Orthodox faith. There are a number of small Protestant communities, as well as a very small group of Muslims and a few thousand Jews.

Hungary. During this reporting period, Hungary continued to enjoy a relatively good human rights record, although several negative developments also took place. Last March 15, one of Hungary's most famous writers and playwrights, Istvan Csurka, delivered a lecture in New York in which, *inter alia,* he appealed to Hungarians worldwide to "assume responsibility and make sacrifices with special attention to the fate of Hungarians beyond our borders who vegetate in the ancient Hungarian villages and towns of the Carpathian Basin under the condition of cultural and now also ethical liquidation." Because Csurka authorized a representative of *RFE* to broadcast his remarks, last July the authorities decided to bar Csurka from all access to the established Hungarian media. In response to the media ban, Csurka declared that he will not return to the publishing field until "those morbid circumstances which resulted in my suspension will be eliminated." In an unusual act, Hungarian Deputy Minister of Culture Gyorgy Vajda discussed Csurka's suspension in an interview carried in a government daily of August 9. Vajda claimed that Csurka failed to demonstrate "elemental loyalty" by cooperating with "propaganda centers" opposed to socialism and the Hungarian Government.

In the same interview, Vajda confirmed that the regional literary monthly journal *Tiszataj* had been suspended as of its June issue because of a "series of errors in publication policy (and) a lack of responsible and democratic workshop operations." The June issue included poems by controversial poet Gaspar Nagy plus commentary on the 1956 Hungarian uprising. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, *Tiszataj* had evolved into a forum for disseminating populist sentiment, i.e., of those who are primarily concerned with the fate of the greater Hungarian nation. In both the Csurka and *Tiszataj* cases, the authorities underscored the limits of acceptable political commentary.

Most of those Hungarians who had previously been barred from obtaining travel documents for political reasons continue to benefit from last October's liberalization. This rule has not, however, been uniformly applied. One member of the "democratic opposition," writer Janos Kis, for example, has been unable in recent months to obtain a passport to travel to the West. Another member of the same group, Laszlo Rajk, found himself out of work after returning from the United States but appears to enjoy continued use of his passport. Notwithstanding these exceptions, the bulk of those who took the opportunity to travel have not experienced any adverse repercussions after returning to Hungary.

The authorities' attitude toward *samizdat* has not changed during the reporting period. Despite periodic house searches and fines for distributing illegal publications, the regularity and variety of *samizdat* remains unchanged, and there has been no serious effort to bring a stop to *samizdat* operations.

A harmonious church-state relationship continued during the reporting period. All faiths which are willing to recognize the government and accept communism are officially recognized. This excludes only Jehovah's Witnesses and some very small sects which, on principle, will have nothing to do with the government. All the heads of recognized religions sit in Parliament. Roman Catholic and other conscientious objectors to military service continue to be tried and sentenced. We believe there are at least 115 individuals serving 3-year prison terms for refusing military duty. Catholics are discriminated against in the conditions of their imprisonment and are not offered the possibility of alternative service as are Nazarenes and Adventists, whose faiths specifically prohibit bearing arms. As a result of the death of Cardinal Lekai, the Roman Catholic Primate of Hungary, the Vatican must negotiate with the Government of Hungary to fill his seat as well as numerous other dioceses currently vacant or filled by retirement-age incumbents.

German Democratic Republic. The 25th anniversary of the Berlin Wall highlighted the continued refusal of the G.D.R. to respect four-power sovereignty over greater Berlin and the right of freedom of movement for all people through all sectors of the city. On May 26, the G.D.R. unilaterally imposed new passport and visa requirements for diplomats and non-allied military mission members in Berlin. This move to impede freedom of movement in the city appeared intended to establish the demarcation line between the Soviet and Allied sectors as an international frontier. As of June 15, however, the G.D.R. returned to procedures which had previously applied. In the summer, the G.D.R.'s practice of facilitating a heavy flow of Third World transit travelers (or so-called asylum seekers) through the Western sectors of Berlin became an issue of contention. In September, however, the G.D.R. announced that, as of October 1, 1986, it would no longer allow Third World travelers to transit the G.D.R. to the Western sectors of Berlin unless they had visas for an onward destination.

The G.D.R. continues to restrict the fundamental freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, and belief among its people. The activities of the Ministry of State Security's secret police are pervasive. Without judicial controls, the police may install listening devices, open private mail, or interrogate whomever they choose.

With the exception of church-sponsored events held on church grounds, groups are not allowed to organize events without official approval. Participants in some meetings on church grounds have encountered difficulties with G.D.R. authorities. G.D.R. church officials also complain that authorities have increasingly impeded contacts with West German church representatives.

In connection with the anniversary of the Berlin Wall, an F.R.G. Government agency which records G.D.R. human rights violations announced it had registered 24,716 prosecutions for political offenses in the G.D.R. over the past 25 years. Former G.D.R. border guard Bodo Strelow has been in solitary confinement for the past 6 years as punishment for a failed escape attempt which resulted in the loss of an eye and his hearing. A Warnemuende family was sentenced to prison because of an unauthorized visit to the F.R.G. permanent representative in East Berlin. The husband received a sentence of 5 years; the wife, 3 years, eight months; and the 18-year-old son, 15 months. In another violation of fundamental freedoms during this reporting period, the G.D.R. refused permission to author Lutz Rathenow to visit the United States at the invitation of the University of Texas and let it be known that only G.D.R. cultural figures who present a positive image of the G.D.R. will be allowed to travel abroad. The G.D.R. also recently reaffirmed a ban on Christian Scientists and Jehovah's Witnesses.

There have been some positive developments, however. As noted in Chapter One, emigration figures remain encouraging, and the G.D.R. is continuing its experimentation with travel relaxation. However, it appears that spouses are no longer allowed to travel together to the West for family visits, as was occasionally possible during the last reporting period. So far, the G.D.R. has not reacted negatively or repressively against a number of small human rights groups which occasionally send letters demanding greater human rights to G.D.R. leaders as well as to the Western press.

Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak performance in respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms remains unsatisfactory and has not improved over the past 6 months. Freedom of conscience remains severely restricted, and there has been an increase in reports of persecution of religious activists during the last 6 months. The government bans certain proselytizing groups outright (e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses) and intervenes arbitrarily in the operation of all other religious bodies. Religious education of children and intending clergy is strictly controlled, and unofficial gatherings such as privately celebrated masses, prayer meetings, or educational sessions are forbidden. Male religious orders have been banned since 1950, and women's orders are barred from accepting new members. All clergymen require state licenses, and all promotions must be approved by the authorities. Only a small number of new candidates is granted licenses. While it is true that, at least recently, there has been an increase in acceptances into theological seminaries, the resultant increase in the number of licensed Catholic clergy will not keep up with attrition within the population of priests. Also, a priest's license can be revoked at any time, without explanation. Clergymen who continue to follow their calling after losing their licenses are subject to criminal sanctions. The supply of religious literature is inadequate, and efforts to supplement it by "underground" printing or unauthorized imports are punished harshly.

Bystrik Janik, whose interrogation and harassment are described in the last report, has begun serving a 28-month prison term because of church activities he has pursued without a state permit. Jan Dus, formerly a licensed minister of the Evangelical Church, was detained on May 20 and charged with harming the interests of the republic abroad. The police searched his apartment for a 22-hour period, May 20–21, and confiscated tapes, typewriters, and correspondence. Pavel Dudr, Jaromir Nemec, Frantisek Adamek, and Augustin Navratil are awaiting trial on suspicion of printing and distributing religious literature following searches of their homes in 1985. No trial date has yet been set. Pavel Dudr and Jaromir Nemec were held in detention from the time of their arrest in November 1985 until May 1986. Augustin Navratil was also held in detention until March, when authorities moved him to a psychiatric facility for observation. According to informed sources, the state prosecutor appealed a court decision to release him from the hospital on September 19, and, as a result, Navratil remains at the hospital. Pavel Wonka, an "unofficial" candidate for office in this year's elections, was detained on May 26 with his brother, Jiri Wonka, because he tried to distribute his election material even though the Central Elections Commission rejected his candidacy. Pavel Horak was originally detained on January 23 in connection with distribution of leaflets announcing the exact times and places of church and graveside funeral observances for Nobel Laureate Jaroslav Seifert. Horak was charged with "incitement." Police searched his apartment and confiscated personal correspondence and duplicating devices, and he was sentenced by the District Court in Teplice to 14 months' imprisonment. The regional court in Usti Nad Labem increased the sentence on May 30 to 18 months.

The home of Catholic layman Michael Mrtvy, who has been in detention since July 24, was searched by police who confiscated a duplicating machine, stencils, paper, some Charter '77 materials, and religious literature. The state has instituted criminal proceedings against Mrtvy on the charge of incitement and held him in detention despite his reportedly ill health. Poet and Charter '77 signatory Herman Chromy was sentenced by the Prague Regional Court on July 25 to 2 years' imprisonment for subversive activities. Court proceedings were open to the public and were well attended. Chromy was prosecuted for statements he made at his place of employment, for distributing unauthorized literature, and for his criticism of officials of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in a letter one witness denounced as a forgery. Jaroslav Svestka appealed his April 28 conviction for subversion in August. Though the court upheld the verdict, it reduced his sentence somewhat. Svestka was brought to trial for allegedly sending a letter to a friend in West Germany containing comments on George Orwell's book *1984*. In November 1985, police seized religious literature and a copying device from the home of Eduard Banka. Banka was sentenced to 7 months in prison in August 1986, on charges of obstructing state supervision over churches and religious societies.

Additionally, the Czechoslovak police have taken steps to prevent contact between dissidents and U.S. officials. In July, a U.S. Senator was denied entry by Czechoslovak authorities to the home of Czechoslovak citizens whom he attempted to visit. Also in July, Czechoslovak police prevented Czechoslovak citizens from visiting the American Ambassador's residence for a reception.

Western press reports, which we have not been able to confirm, charge Czechoslovak security forces with having set dogs on pilgrims participating in a July 19 pilgrimage to a Marian shrine in Gaboltov in Eastern Slovakia.

Inside Czechoslovakia, implementation of the Final Act is monitored by a small group of private citizens who are signatories of Charter '77. An associated group, VONS, gathers and publicizes information concerning individual cases of human rights abuses. Charter '77 has existed for 9 years and VONS for 8, despite official persecution, but there is some concern that the human rights atmosphere in Czechoslovakia may be growing tense again. One constant feature of life for Chartists is discrimination against them and their families in employment and education. At present, four Chartists are serving prison terms ranging from 1 to 12 years (Eduard Vacek, Walter Kania, Frantisek Veis, and Jiri Wolf). Three other Chartists are imprisoned, but the judicial process in their cases is not complete (Peter Cibulka, Jan Dus, and Herman Chromy). Four other Charter signatories, who previously have served prison terms, are subject to "protective supervision" (Ladislav Lis, Jiri Gruntorad, Frantisek Starek, and Ivan Jirous).

Membership in the state trade union, the Revolutionary Workers' Movement (ROH), is virtually compulsory, and the ROH is controlled from the top. Independent trade unions are forbidden, as are strikes and other forms of independent labor activity. Intellectuals such as artists, writers, and others are organized in professional associations, which are under strict party control.

The government's unwillingness to tolerate independent initiatives on the part of its citizenry was demonstrated

during the reporting period. The most egregious instance involved actions taken on September 2 against the Jazz Section, which originally was a legally constituted association of some 7,000 jazz fans throughout Czechoslovakia. In March 1985, the Jazz Section was dissolved under a 1968 statute banning "counterrevolutionary activity," and leaders of the section were subjected to surveillance, interrogations, loss of employment, and other forms of harassment. Despite this pressure, the Jazz Section continued to function, at least partially, until September 2, 1986, when the police conducted searches of the offices of the Jazz Section and the houses and places of employment of the seven members of its steering committee. All steering committee members were arrested and eventually charged with "operating an unauthorized enterprise."

Bulgaria. Bulgaria substantially conformed to its obligations under Helsinki Principles One through Six and Eight through Ten during the April–September 1986 period. Bulgarian government policies continue, however, to violate Principle Seven. The government's implementation of policies designed to suppress the ethnic identity of the country's Turkish minority, to inhibit the free practice of religion, and to discourage any dissent against official polities remained substantially unchanged from preceding periods.

While the reports of official violence that accompanied the "name-change" campaign of 1984–85 have not recurred, governmental repression in the ethnic Turkish areas of the country continues, and an atmosphere of fear and resignation prevails. Despite government actions to limit the access of independent observers to those areas, reports during the period by Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, and a few Western journalists temporarily able to elude regime controls confirmed embassy observations of the coercive nature of the government's policies. Still unconfirmed reports suggest that Bulgaria may have begun implementing an assimilationist program of forced resettlement of some ethnic Turks to non-Turkish areas of the country. Despite official denials that the use of the Turkish language in public is prohibited, numerous reports indicate that such a ban is broadly enforced. Embassy officers visiting Kurdzhali in June 1986, moreover, saw a sign posted in a cafe enjoining customers to socialize "only in the Bulgarian language." Restrictions on Islamic rituals traditionally followed by the ethnic Turkish population also remain in force. Many ethnically Turkish areas remained closed to diplomatic and other travelers without rarely granted special authorizations. Heavy surveillance and intimidation of potential interlocutors were the usual concomitants of diplomatic travel, even to normally "open" areas.

In August 1986, Halil Ibishev, a former member of the Bulgarian National Assembly, was able to reach Turkey and speak publicly on the situation of his fellow ethnic Turks in Bulgaria. The most prominent member of the Turkish minority yet to escape the regime's control, Ibishev confirmed the oppressive nature of the government's policies and the opposition to them on the part of the Turkish minority.

Parallel to the government's suppression of ethnic Turkish identity are its restrictions on the exercise of the Muslim religion. While some mosques have remained open—often only for Friday prayers—many others have been closed. Muslim rites (circumcision, weddings, burials) are restricted or forbidden. The Koran is not published locally and cannot be imported. Bulgarian Muslims are not allowed to participate in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

With an implicit focus on Islam (although with a more general application to all religions), the policy directives adopted at the Communist Party Congress in April called for an increase in "ideological work against religious anachronisms" in favor of a broader acceptance of "the socialist festive and ritual system." Shortly thereafter, an article in a May 1986 periodical published by the Bulgarian Communist Party Central Committee attacked Islam for "alienating its followers from their own homeland and people" and identified "the overcoming of Muslim superstitions, prejudices, observances, and traditions" as "a condition and a prerequisite for the acceleration of the regenerative process until the final consolidation of the descendants of the Islamicized Bulgarians into the Bulgarian Socialist nation."

The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, on the other hand, enjoys a relatively privileged status and, in return, loyally supports the government's domestic and foreign policies. Even so, the government's official policy is one of discouragement of religious practice, and it keeps a close watch on the church's activities. Attendance at Easter services at Sofia's Aleksandur Nevsky Cathedral, for instance, was restricted to those granted special "invitations," and police barricades prevented all others from approaching to within even a block of the cathedral. As with the Koran, the importation of Bibles is forbidden, and no Bibles have been printed in Bulgaria since 1982, when small numbers were produced. An embassy officer who sought to purchase a Bible at a "religious" bookstore in Sofia during the period was told that the store had no Bibles and did not expect to have any for sale in the future.

Armenian Christian, Jewish, Roman Catholic, and some Protestant denominations also exist in Bulgaria, with small numbers of adherents. While ethnic Armenians and Jews claim no conflicts with the government, the state's relations with Catholics and Protestant groups continue to be more strained. The inhospitality of the government to religious groups even further beyond the enforced "mainstream" of Bulgarian life is illustrated by an August 1986 news article that reported the discovery and suppression of a Hare Krishna group in Sofia and declared the regime's "uncompromising" attitude towards such "ideological sabotage."

Bulgaria remains a tightly controlled society in which all peaceful dissent or opposition to official policies is firmly suppressed. The government's approach appears to have been successful in preventing popular dissatisfaction from crystalizing into organized opposition or active dissidence on a wide scale. Those few dissidents known by name to the embassy remained either incarcerated or under close police surveillance and often in provincial isolation during the reporting period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PRINCIPLE VI AND ASSOCIATED MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT COMMITMENTS ON TERRORISM

Principle Six of the Helsinki Final Act commits the signatories to refrain "from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State." The Madrid Concluding Document contains language strengthening this commitment and expressing determination to "broaden and reinforce mutual cooperation to combat such acts." The participating states agreed to "take all appropriate measures" to, *inter alia*, "prohibit on their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of terrorism."

Compliance with the relevant Helsinki and Madrid commitments concerning the prevention and suppression

of terrorism by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies has been poor during the reporting period. Several of these states continue to have ties with terrorist organizations and are usually silent when a unified response to terrorist attacks is especially needed. Some limited positive trends were seen, but the East continues to muddy the issue of fighting terrorism by qualifying its statements on the subject with references to "national liberation movements" and the like.

The Soviet Union, through *TASS*, issued a statement in September condemning the Pan Am hijacking in Karachi, calling on all governments to join in effective cooperation against terrorism and expressing Soviet willingness to participate in "practical elaboration of active measures." In Eastern Europe, moreover, there may be growing recognition of the dangers of international terrorism and the need for international cooperation to counter it.

Failures in compliance continue, however. The involvement of the East Berlin Libyan People's Bureau in the bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin on April 5 called into question the effectiveness of G.D.R. and Soviet measures to prevent and suppress the preparation and organization of terrorist acts. The continued silence of the Bulgarian media on the 1985 Rome and Vienna airport bombings is indicative of an oft-repeated failure among some states to speak out against terrorist acts.

DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND CERTAIN ASPECTS OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

The signatories to the Helsinki Final Act are required by the act's Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament to give prior notification of "major military maneuvers exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with possible air or naval components." Notification is required for maneuvers that take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating state and must be made 21 days or more in advance of the start of the maneuver. The notification "will contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the maneuver, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, and the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. The participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces."

In addition, signatories are encouraged to engage in other confidence-building measures (CBMs) on a voluntary basis. These voluntary CBMs include the invitation of observers to maneuvers and prior notification of major military movements and of exercises involving fewer than 25,000 troops.

As noted earlier, signatories adopted a more ambitious and mandatory set of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) at the Stockholm CDE, which adjourned September 19. These CSBMs are designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation due to miscalculation or misunderstanding and, if fully implemented, can contribute to a more stable and secure Europe.

Implementation

The United States and its NATO allies continued their excellent record of implementation of the Helsinki CBMs, implementing not only the mandatory CBM requirement to notify but voluntary CBMs as well, such as observer invitations. The Federal Republic of Germany notified the major military maneuver "Fraenkischer-Schild," which took place September 15–26 on the territory of the Federal Republic. Approximately 50,000 troops, including soldiers from the United States, the F.R.G., and Belgium, participated in the area of the Main and Neckar Rivers. Norway also provided notification of the field training exercise "Blue Fox '86," which was held in Vestfold County, September 9–15. Observers were invited to attend both maneuvers.

Eastern implementation of CBMs, on the other hand, was largely limited to the "letter" of the Helsinki Final Act; rarely was the "spirit" implemented through application of voluntary CBMs. And Eastern notifications did not always provide the kind of information called for in the Final Act.

The Soviet Union provided notification of one major military maneuver. An exercise involving approximately 25,000 Soviet personnel took place in the vicinity of Gardelegen, Halle, and Cottbus in the German Democratic Republic, September 8–13. The U.S.S.R. provided notification of this exercise on August 18—3 weeks in advance of the exercise. While the timing of the notification was in accordance with the Final Act, no designation or name for the activity was given, as provided for in the Helsinki Final Act. Also, voluntary measures were not implemented inasmuch as observers were not invited. The G.D.R. also provided notification for the same exercise.

In addition, Soviet forces participated in a major Warsaw Pact military maneuver, "Druzhba '86," in September on Czechoslovak soil.

As in previous reporting periods, the Soviet Union did not provide voluntary notification of any smaller scale exercises. The only Soviet notification of an exercise involving fewer than 25,000 men came in 1983.

The Czechoslovak Government notified the United States and, reportedly, all other CSCE signatory states of a military exercise, called "Druzhba '86," held on Czechoslovak territory September 8–12. The United States and a number of other signatories were invited to send two observers.

Unfortunately, observers were not permitted to engage in the same level of comprehensive observation of the notified activity that their Czechoslovak counterparts enjoy during NATO maneuvers. Czechoslovak authorities limited actual observation time during the 3-day period to a total of about 3 hours. In addition to this general restriction, specific limitations on the use of personal binoculars, tape recorders, and cameras existed, affecting the ability of observers to judge the nature of the activity.

After discussions, the Czechoslovak authorities relented somewhat and permitted some use of recorders. They also supplied high-quality binoculars but remained adamant in their prohibition of photography. In spite of assurances to the contrary, the Czechoslovak hosts did not permit access to troops, unit commanders, or command posts. Western observers reported information gaps in briefings about the exercise. Unbriefed subjects included, but were not limited to, the location, size, and origin of participating units as well as basic questions of deployed equipment. Observers had at their disposal neither an overall printed scenario nor a list of attendees by country.

Generally, the East continued its practice of maintaining a very restrictive interpretation of its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act. As pointed out earlier, unlike the practice of the United States and its NATO allies, Soviet implementation of voluntary confidence-building measures has been the exception rather than the rule. Since 1980, the U.S.S.R. has invited observers from selected Western countries to only two military maneuvers—"Kavkaz '85" and "Dnestr '83." The latter, which involved less than 25,000 Soviet troops, was also the only exercise notified by the U.S.S.R. on a voluntary basis.

Chapter Three

Implementation of Basket II: Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment

The implementation of Basket II provisions by the Soviet Union and East European countries continued to show little improvement during the reporting period. The overall record, especially in the areas of business working conditions and economic and commercial information, remained poor. Balance-of-payments and other economic difficulties led to increased pressure for countertrade.

A major reorganization of the Soviet Union's economic and trade apparatus complicated Western business contacts with Soviet officials but may, in the future, provide more opportunities for businessmen. Pan American Airways resumed service to Prague for the first time since 1978 and is working to expand its modest presence there. At the same time, business conditions worsened in some other East European countries. The deteriorating economic situation and an unresponsive bureaucracy made Bulgaria a more difficult assignment for resident businessmen. Tightened access to Romanian plants for foreign businessmen continued to make operations there difficult, resulting in a number of lost potential sales. One U.S. firm closed its Bucharest office due to prohibitive operating costs.

The quality and quantity of economic and commercial information remained poor, although the Soviet Union published figures on agricultural production for the first time since 1979. In general, most statistical reports provided little useful information and had limited utility, especially for businessmen. Information in the foreign trade area was particularly insufficient for market research purposes, and many observers believe the published data were unreliable.

Joint ventures are being increasingly promoted in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. A review is underway to determine how Soviet law would have to be changed to permit joint ventures, and Western companies have reportedly submitted specific joint venture proposals for consideration. Industrial cooperation arrangements continued to be touted as the basis for Hungary's trade expansion program. Several East European governments increased their commitment to promote joint ventures by creating or amending joint venture legislation; however, improved business conditions are required prior to Western business participation in such ventures.

While difficulties such as visa restrictions remained, there were efforts to improve cooperation in science and technology. Many of the East European countries also showed a greater interest in the area of environmental protection. For example, Czechoslovakia has reached modest agreements with Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany (as well as with Poland) on environmental cooperation.

Soviet Union

General Assessment. Soviet implementation of Basket II provisions showed no signs of improvement and continued to be poor. General business conditions, especially for small and medium-sized firms, remained largely unchanged during the reporting period. Contacts with Soviet officials were complicated by a major reorganization of the government's economic and trade apparatus. For example, substantial turnover and reorganization in the Ministry of Foreign Trade has created problems in finding out who is in charge. Once the reorganization takes effect, there may be greater opportunities for closer cooperation with smaller, highly specialized, Western firms.

Business Working Conditions. In general, U.S. business representatives had few complaints of interference by UPDK (Soviet Diplomatic Services Bureau), Customs, or the Ministry of Finance in their office operations. Firms are still required to wait for UPDK to identify replacement office workers. Also, access to Soviet end-users in some industries showed no signs of improvement. The economic/trade reorganization has made it difficult for businessmen to maintain contacts and develop new working relationships with Soviet trade officials. U.S. firms generally reported fewer problems in obtaining inquiries from Soviet foreign trade organizations (FTOs) than before the May 1985 meeting of the joint U.S.-Soviet Commercial Commission.

At the end of the review period, there were 28 U.S. firms, plus the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, with accredited offices in Moscow.

High rents at the Sovincenter international trade complex continued to create serious difficulties for many small firms which have established nonaccredited offices in Sovincenter's residential wing. In the absence of other office options, these firms had to pay the high rates. Firms desiring to move from one location to another reported that waiting lists are up to 2 years long. As in the past, most nonaccredited firms continued to experience problems in meeting their requirements for office equipment, vehicles, and clerical support.

Hotel and housing conditions for businessmen did not change. Visiting businessmen generally were able to obtain suitable hotel accommodations. As a rule, housing remained satisfactory.

Travel and visa restrictions were essentially unchanged from the previous 6 months, with businessmen required to remain within the highway ring in the Moscow area. One problem noted was the delay in the renewal of a multientry visa for the permanent General Electric representative. Other than this recent problem, business representatives lodged few complaints about travel and visa restrictions.

Accredited representatives of U.S. firms, whether or not actually resident in Moscow, did not report difficulties in renewing their individual accreditations. Soviet authorities directly involved in accreditation processing have hinted that only the most serious companies should apply for accreditation due to the workload created for them by the process.

In the area of international communications, U.S. firms and most other Western firms which sought new telephone lines for direct dialing out of the U.S.S.R. received such service. Many continued to experience delays of up to 8 hours on incoming calls, however, and raised this problem with Soviet officials. The question remains whether companies with offices in Moscow should be liable for Soviet income taxes on incomes derived from

services provided by subsidiaries and affiliated companies without offices in the Soviet Union.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The availability of information on the economy remained limited, and the quality of data was often poor. Access to Soviet officials for discussion of current economic developments remained restricted. As noted, the Soviets did publish agricultural production figures for the period since 1979.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation. Soviet officials are encouraging U.S. firms to consider cooperation arrangements of all types. They are soliciting proposals from U.S. firms for industrial cooperation and joint venture type arrangements as a way of generating more hard currency and acquiring Western technology. A review is underway to determine how Soviet law would have to be changed to permit joint ventures, and many Western companies have reportedly submitted specific joint venture proposals for consideration.

Official Visits. During the reporting period there were two high-level official visits related to economic questions. In June, Under Secretary of Agriculture Amstutz conducted a round of semi-annual negotiations on the U.S.–U.S.S.R. long-term grain agreement. In September, Under Secretary of Commerce Smart attended the opening of the Inprodtorgmash '86 Food Processing Equipment Show in Moscow and met with various Soviet officials. This was the first U.S.-sponsored exhibition since 1979.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Soviet pressures on Western firms to link their prospects for sales to the Soviets to purchases of Soviet goods increased during the period as a result of the loss of hard currency revenues from lower oil prices.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Policies affecting small and medium-sized enterprises remained no different from those affecting other companies. The difficulties of doing business in the U.S.S.R., however, severely limits the prospects for small and medium-sized enterprises.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. U.S.-Soviet science and technology cooperation continued to expand during the review period. Positive steps included a new inter-academy agreement, a joint Atomic Energy Committee meeting (the first since 1978), two high-level visits to Moscow under the Bilateral Housing Agreement, an experts' meeting on reviving civilian space cooperation, and preparatory work for a study of the health effects of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident within the framework of more active bilateral health agreements. A post-Chernobyl reactor safety project was established under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Atomic Energy Agreement.

Without a doubt, the Chernobyl accident was the single most important event of the review period, damaging Soviet international prestige and causing enormous economic and environmental harm and unknown—but certainly severe—long-term public health effects.

The Soviets continue a long tradition of secretiveness in discussing science and technology advances by restricting the flow of information and direct scientist-to-scientist contacts. Moscow continues to host a variety of international conferences and presses the foreign delegations to make public statements and sign conference decrees supporting Soviet positions on arms control, particularly with regard to the Soviet-proposed nuclear testing moratorium and anti-SDI rhetoric.

In agriculture, a number of exchanges have taken place under the recently reactivated agricultural cooperation agreement. Fewer Soviet teams have applied to come to the United States than vice versa, due, perhaps, to bureaucratic problems resulting from the extensive reorganization of the Soviet agricultural bureaucracy. Whatever the cause, the imbalance in visits has created some tension. A visit by a team of Soviet specialists to the United States under the Young Agricultural Exchange Program took place, but a visit to the Soviet Union by a similar American team was canceled when the Soviet authorities refused to change the venue of the visit away from an area only several hundred kilometers distant from Chernobyl. Visiting U.S. teams have, in general, been satisfied with their access to the Soviet officials and information promised in their programs. As with other areas of dealing with the Soviets, however, efforts to arrange visits and contacts outside of the agreement have often proved frustrating, difficult, and time consuming.

Romania

General Assessment. Business conditions worsened as a result of a Romanian decree, introduced in December 1985, which considerably tightened access to Romanian plants for foreign businessmen. Romanian foreign trade policy, based on enlarging the trade surplus to build up foreign exchange reserves and retire foreign debt, limits hard currency imports and generally requires Western firms concluding sales contracts with Romania to accept payment in counterpurchase of Romanian goods.

The Government of Romania continued to stress the need to obtain advanced technology from abroad. Greater emphasis on scientific and technological exchange continued to be at the expense of exchanges in other areas, primarily the humanities. There are no known cooperative efforts by Romania in environmental protection.

Business Working Conditions. While U.S. Government officials and businessmen continue to have good access to Romanian Government officials concerned with U.S.-Romanian trade and economic relations, in early 1986 the Romanian Government began tightening considerably access of foreign businessmen to plants and projects. Access to protocol rooms of such facilities remains possible, but production lines can be visited only with express approval of respective ministries or foreign trade organizations. Western companies' experience since the new regulations were promulgated indicates this permission is denied in most cases. Romania has already lost potential sales of its goods to a number of American firms—reportedly worth $50 million—as a result.

During the review period, one U.S. firm closed its Bucharest office due to prohibitive operating costs. Authorities continue to take 6–8 months or longer to process Western firms' applications to open business offices. Commercial office space in one of the several downtown hotels in Bucharest is commonly offered to Western firms. Firms may also rent space on premises owned by the Romanian Government agency "Argus." Romanian employees of foreign business must be hired through "Argus." The cost of maintaining business offices in Romania is high. Rents charged by official Romanian agencies are comparable to market rates in major world commercial centers. The extremely high cost of telecommunications services is also an impediment to the development of commercial relations.

Acceptable hotel accommodations are available for transient businessmen, but at rates matching those in major commercial centers. As of July 1, hotel rates increased 13.6%–25%. Resident businessmen are referred to the national tourist office to locate housing. The search for adequate housing is difficult and time consuming. Prices for residential space are comparable to those in Western Europe, though furnishing and facilities are often inferior. Rental and utility charges have remained constant over the past few years.

Visa restrictions are minimal and business travel is not impeded.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Businessmen seeking Romanian commercial contacts find information readily available. Romania continues to distribute, in several languages, a range of information on doing business in the country. Romanian statistical data, however, are very poor and are noteworthy for their omission of basic statistical information common elsewhere. Organized data on the performance of the domestic economy are published only once a year, generally 12–14 months after the close of the year covered. Data often are not comparable from year to year, and indices are neither reliable nor adequately defined. As a result of debt rescheduling negotiations, Romania continues to provide more financial information to foreign banks, foreign governments, and international financial institutions than it provided in the past.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation. The Romanian Government promotes the concept of joint ventures and production collaboration. There are presently five U.S.-Romanian joint ventures, of which one operates in Romania and four in the United States. Romania remains interested in cooperation with American firms in third-country markets, particularly in the development of natural resources and large construction projects.

Official Visits. There were no high-level U.S. Government trade visits to Romania during the reporting period. An interim Joint American-Romanian Economic Commission (JEC) session was held in Washington, D.C., April 7–8. Major issues covered included efforts to increase bilateral trade, protection of patents in Romania and the United States, business facilitation in Romania, and exchanges of information and statistics. Both sides agreed to continue discussions on improving bilateral trade.

The last full JEC session was held in Washington in December 1984. The next full session of the JEC is scheduled for March 1987 in Bucharest and will be co-chaired by the Romanian Minister of Foreign Trade and the U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Romania employs a strict system of countertrade aimed at reducing its foreign debt. Romanian purchases of Western goods without countertrade have continued to decline significantly. Romanian enterprises routinely ask Western firms seeking to sell goods in Romania to take 100% payment in counterpurchases of Romanian-manufactured goods from the machine building and machine tools industry. In those few cases where U.S. firms buying Romanian goods have sought to pay through "barter" arrangements of their own products, Romanian organizations have refused, insisting on hard currency payment.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Romania trades regularly with small and medium-sized U.S. firms. Such companies are often represented in Bucharest by agency firms, which helps reduce the cost of establishing representation. Agency firms are also better able to deal with Romanian pressures for counterpurchase, which might otherwise force smaller firms out of the market.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The Governments of the United States and Romania signed an agreement of scientific and technological cooperation in 1979, providing for exchange visits by scientists, joint scientific projects, and exchange of information. There has not been a heavy volume of activity under this agreement, and, over the course of 1986, exchange visits have occurred at only half the rate for 1985. Arrangements for exchange visits and information in some fields under the agreement have never been implemented. In one field, cancer research, the U.S. has notified the Romanian Government of its intention to terminate an agreement for scientific exchanges because of lack of activity.

In addition to this low level of activity under the scientific and technological cooperation agreement, the United States and Romania have also maintained informal, *ad hoc* scientific contacts. In the wake of the Chernobyl accident, for instance, a group of U.S. radiation monitoring scientists visited Romania to consult with their Romanian counterparts.

Commercial, scientific, and technical exchanges are inhibited by the patent system in Romania, which does not allow for the granting of patents for chemical compounds to privately held corporations. Additionally, factors in the Romanian business climate, which are discussed elsewhere, inhibit commercial channels for cooperation in science and technology.

Poland

General Assessment. During the past 6 months, economic relations between Poland and several Western countries have improved. Economic mixed commissions between Poland and several Western governments have met, and some additional Western governments have offered Poland short-term credit guarantees in modest amounts, although arrears on Poland's official obligations have placed some of these offers in abeyance.

In a major move to permit foreign investment, the Polish Parliament in May passed a joint venture law. Although no joint ventures have yet been established, discussions aimed at establishing joint ventures have taken place between foreign firms and their Polish counterparts. However, difficult internal Polish economic conditions continue to restrain Western commercial interest in Poland.

In June 1986, Poland formally rejoined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). The Polish Government on several occasions has rescheduled maturities due Western governments and has initialed an agreement to reschedule due in 1986. The Polish Government has also rescheduled maturities due Western banks in 1986–87. With these reschedulings and admissions to the IMF and World Bank, Poland could eventually improve its credit reputation, but it is not likely that significant levels of new medium- and long-term foreign credits will be available from the West for some time.

Poland's difficult debt servicing outlook will limit Western business interest for at least the near term. There has been full cooperation in permitting travel of U.S. business, commercial, and agricultural representatives to Poland. After a brief interruption in the wake of

the Chernobyl accident, business travel has resumed its normal pattern and level.

Business Working Conditions. Access to Polish business contacts and commercial officials remains easy, with both private U.S. business representatives and U.S. Government officials able to arrange meetings directly with their counterparts, without brokering by protocol or foreign relations departments of the Polish organization. Factory visits are more difficult to arrange, depending on the sensitivity of the installation.

No new companies opened branch offices during the reporting period, but the Tandy Corporation opened a "Radio Shack"-type electronics store in downtown Warsaw. The outlet, run jointly with the hard currency chain "Pewex," stocks video games, VCRs, and other low-technology items. Polish policy toward Western offices remains largely unchanged, with a few companies still experiencing technical difficulty in maintaining information offices (as opposed to branch offices, which are required to pay a higher registration fee as well as 2.5% of invoiced sales to the Polish Government).

U.S. owners continue to operate "Polonia" businesses with varying degrees of success, depending on their rates of income taxation. The overall number of firms, about 700, has held steady, with 10% owned by U.S. citizens.

Hotel accommodations for visiting business representatives remain readily available, although at fixed rates five times higher than for Polish citizens. Permanent housing is generally available but expensive. There are no restrictions on business travel within Poland, and business visas are not difficult to obtain. Air service to and from Poland is adequate.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The Polish Government publishes regular economic statistics. Most of the disaggregated data are not current and do not contain enough detail to permit thorough economic analysis or adequate market research. Poland will now begin providing economic data based on UN standards following its recent readmission to the IMF.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation. Poland continues to seek foreign investment in underutilized or idle industrial capacity, and the passage of a joint venture bill to attract foreign investors indicates an additional emphasis on this goal. The new law governing the formation of joint ventures on Polish territory went into effect on July 15. The legislation provides that Polish capital participation must be at least 51%, although exceptions, in certain instances, are permitted. Licensing arrangements remain possible, as is joint production in and for third markets in goods and especially in services. There have been no new major cooperative arrangements involving U.S. firms during the reporting period, although several smaller cooperation agreements have been signed.

Official Visits. There were no official visits during the reporting period.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. The Polish Government officially neither encourages nor discourages countertrade, though several U.S. firms have been pressured to countertrade by individual foreign trade organizations. The frequency and nature of these countertrade requests vary and generally are possible only in products of which Poland possesses an oversupply.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises have not experienced any particular problems during the reporting period, with the exception of certain firms operating under the "Polonia" law. The Polish Government levies up to 85% income tax on earnings of these firms, thus making it difficult for many of them to operate profitably. Despite these obstacles, many Polonia firms continue to prosper, and their existence enjoys official backing when their operations help fulfill Polish Government economic aims. Firms which would compete directly with a Polish enterprise or exporting agency are usually denied permission to operate. During the reporting period, there has been no new legislation affecting these small and medium-sized enterprises' participation in trade and industrial opportunities.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The Polish Government seems to have stopped any interference with visits by U.S. scientists to Poland. Visas for such visits seem to be granted without delay. During 1986, Polish institutions issued invitations to dozens of U.S. scientists to participate in scientific conferences and meetings organized by the Polish Academy of Sciences and other science-related institutions. The invitations usually include a subsistence allowance to cover expenses in Poland. During the summer of 1986, scientists affiliated with the University of Texas were able to work with their counterparts in Krakow without any interference. In addition, 45 physicians have freely attended a series of medical seminars and conferences held at the Childrens' Hospital in Krakow in August and September 1986.

Polish scientists who have received invitations from U.S. colleagues and universities and from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) are receiving their Polish passports without significant interference. This is a definite improvement over the situation last year when approval to accept such invitations was not always forthcoming.

The Polish Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources (MOSZN) has responded favorably to a proposal from the EPA to initiate a dialogue which may eventually lead to a memorandum of understanding between the two agencies for cooperation in environmental research and development. The MOSZN has been a willing and active participant in Economic Commission for Europe efforts to combat air and water pollution. MOSZN's chief represented Poland at President Mitterrand's Silva Conference last year. The ministry is engaged in intense discussions with the Austrian, Swedish, West German, Czechoslovak, and East German ministries of environmental protection.

Problems of pollution are discussed openly; an environmental protection movement has been allowed to develop, and its leaders are enlisted in official efforts to arrest pollution. In Krakow, a heavily polluted city and one designated by the United Nations as having special cultural and artistic worth, environmental groups have been allowed to exist openly, and at least one of these is developing contacts with similar groups in the West. Additionally, the press is becoming more vocal about environmental abuses.

The Ministry of Health (MZOS) has expressed its willingness to intensify cooperation with U.S. couterpart agencies in health sciences. It approves and finances visits of Polish medical scientists and clinicians to congresses in their disciplines all over the world. For example, about 50 Polish cardiologists were allowed to participate in the September 1986 World Congress of Cardiology in Washington, D.C. U.S. health scientists are welcomed warmly; Polish Government institutions issue invitations for individual visits and finance their subsistence in Poland.

Hungary

General Assessment. While general implementation of Basket II provisions remains unchanged, there are several economic factors which could affect future compliance. Hungary continues to borrow heavily in short- and medium-term markets, reflecting difficulties with its hard currency earnings. External factors such as the continued drought, the Chernobyl accident, and the see-saw petroleum market have all added to lost earnings. The prospects for improved markets and prices for agricultural products, metals, and light industrial exports continue to be discouraging. The economic climate also has been worsened by the Hungarian Government's inability to deal with economic and reform issues decisively. The need to stem the economic current account deficit before it drains exchange reserves is likely to lead to new economic austerity measures before year's end.

A corporate bankruptcy law and stricter worker discipline measures introduced in mid-1986, as well as greater emphasis on unemployment benefits, point to the likelihood of more management independence in the future, although there is a concern about the level of unemployment benefits in the implementation of the bankruptcy law. A side effect of increased prices resulting from austerity measures could well be further popular distrust of the government and its policies, although this continues to remain nothing more than louder grumbling.

Business Working Conditions. Working conditions for Western businessmen remained satisfactory during the reporting period. Business access remains generally good, and access to end-users is not a problem. The number of enterprises with foreign trading rights has now grown to approximately 300, and development of contacts within these enterprises occurs without governmental interference. Opening of representational offices requires compliance with formal procedures which are lengthy and often bureaucratic. Nevertheless, applications for such offices are often encouraged, and recently an application submitted by a U.S. subsidiary of a British software marketing company was approved. Hiring of local personnel in Hungary to represent Western business interests has recently been liberalized, although the scope of activities which these representatives can perform remains limited.

Deluxe and first-class hotel accommodations for business travelers, as well as for convention and tourist purposes, are quite good and reasonably priced. Most first-class hotels also offer business services, including typing and translation. The availability of medium-level, medium-priced hotel accommodations is also good and continues to expand. Office space available to Western firms is expected to increase with the implementation of plans to construct a second office building along the lines of the Budapest International Trade Center which opened last year.

No restrictions are placed on legitimate business travel, and business visas can be obtained without difficulty at airports and border crossings. Businessmen, however, continue to be hampered by the need to work through a Hungarian Government "facilitative" office which remains highly bureaucratic and ineffective. Costs of operations remain high in comparison to Austrian and local standards; delays continue to plague requests for telephone and telex services, both of which remain below Western standards.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Business and commercial information, while only sporadically available in forms such as Western-style annual reports, is disseminated fairly freely in newspapers, journals, and specialized economic publications. Enterprise and plant visits continue to provide detailed information, since Hungarian commercial representatives and managers have shown a disposition to discuss matters freely when specific questions are posed. Government economic indicators and other data are widely available and reasonably accurate.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation. The number of active cooperation arrangements between U.S. and Hungarian firms remains about 60. Western companies are encouraged to explore new ways of doing business beyond traditional buying and selling and one-time-only commission work. Industrial cooperation arrangements continue to be touted as the basis for Hungary's trade expansion program. The Hungarian Government has increased its commitment to promote joint ventures by issuing an amended joint venture law in January 1986, which provided greater tax incentives and more flexible operating rules. The law reduced profit tax on joint ventures and, for the first time, codified the prior practice of providing tax holidays for new joint companies. The number of joint ventures registered in Hungary doubled between 1983 and 1985, and now stands at more than 50. Given the new joint venture law, this number is expected to grow further, particularly in the industrial sectors designated for expansion.

Official Visits. Minister of Industry Laszlo Kapolyi's September visit to the United States was the high point of the U.S.-Hungarian commercial relationship. The minister's visit included meetings with Vice President Bush and leading industrialists.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Hungarian enterprises continue to require substantial countertrade arrangements for almost all new business, although banking and official Hungarian sources downplay countertrade arrangements as true business enhancers. Movement toward a convertible *forint* is still the government's official policy, but adverse economic conditions make it unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Official Hungarian policies toward small and medium-sized enterprises do not differ significantly from the general pattern of commerce described above. The preference of Hungarian enterprises, however, continues to be toward working with large multinationals which can provide opportunities for cooperation in production and marketing.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The exchange of publications in respective science and technology activities between U.S. and counterpart Hungarian agencies is on the increase. For example, NASA officials visited Hungary in February 1986, and U.S. astronauts will participate in a congress to be held by the Association of Space Explorers in Budapest in October 1986.

Domestic dissemination of scientific and technical information has expanded substantially. Hungary, on a monthly basis, under license with *Scientific American,* in 1985 inaugurated the publication of *Tudomany* (*Science*), which essentially is a Hungarian-language reprint of articles from the American publication.

Hungary hosted the 14th International Cancer Congress in August which was attended by more than 8,000 delegates from 84 countries, including 1,200 scientists, physicians, clinicians, and cancer researchers from the United States. This was one of 18 international medical conferences to be hosted by Hungary in 1986.

The U.S.-Hungarian exchanges agreement on cultural, educational, and scientific-technological cooperation was renewed in January 1986.

The Hungarian Government attaches a high priority to the environment under its current 5-year plan. Reducing air pollution, improving the quality of water, and the safe disposal of hazardous wastes are the target areas. The Hungarian Government in 1975 created the National Authority for Environmental Protection and Nature Conservation and, in 1986, approved legislation assigning ministerial responsibilities in the above sectors to set lower levels for pollution and to assess fines. The Government of Hungary participates in international conferences on environmental affairs and is currently considering the possibility of adhering to the International Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer.

German Democratic Republic

General Assessment. There has been no significant change over the past 6 months in the G.D.R.'s cooperation in implementing provisions of Basket II.

Business Working Conditions. American businessmen's access to G.D.R. trade officials and enterprise managers has improved slightly in 1986, although there is still considerable room for more improvement. The G.D.R. often requires that its citizens obtain prior approval for contacts with Western businessmen. The requirement that foreign businesses deal through G.D.R. foreign trade service organizations also limits access to managers at the enterprise level.

Operating conditions for establishing business offices in East Berlin remained unchanged. Five U.S. companies have offices there; three are staffed by G.D.R. citizens, one by a West German national, and one by a Swiss national. Western firms wishing to establish an office in East Berlin are required to rent space either in the International Trade Center, which has strict access control, or in a building which is only for the use of the firm.

Visiting business representatives must normally stay in expensive hotel accommodations which require payment in convertible currencies. In cities without such hotels, accommodations are less expensive, and payment may be made with G.D.R. marks. Subject to these conditions, however, travel is otherwise virtually unrestricted. No U.S. business representatives have complained about unavailability of hotel accommodations.

Resident business representatives are allowed to rent, but not buy, housing in the G.D.R.. Available housing is usually expensive, and standards vary, although some is quite good. All housing services must be obtained through a state-operated agency which determines the rent as well as the location of housing for foreigners.

The U.S. Embassy in Berlin is not aware of any problems caused by restrictions on travel and visas for foreign business representatives. Persons in possession of G.D.R. hotel vouchers are generally issued visas upon arrival at border-crossing points. In addition, visas for day visits to East Berlin are obtainable at designated Berlin sector-sector crossing points with little delay. Western business representatives residing in or maintaining offices in the G.D.R. are often issued multiple-entry visas valid for 1 year. Nonresident business representatives generally receive one-entry visas unless multiple-entry visas have been requested on their behalf by a G.D.R. trading partner.

As is the case for virtually all visitors to the G.D.R., nonresident foreign business representatives are required to exchange approximately $12.50 per day into G.D.R. marks during their visits. Of this sum, any unspent marks cannot be converted back into Western currency upon departure but must be either forfeited or deposited in a special account for use upon the visitor's return.

G.D.R. customs regulations prohibit the importation of printed material with the word "German" in the text or in the address. This has continued to create certain problems when business literature containing this word arrives and cannot be distributed.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The type, quality, and timeliness of economic and commercial information released by the G.D.R. remains unsatisfactory to Western business. The main source of G.D.R. economic data is the annual statistical yearbook published by the Central State Administration for Statistics. The yearbook is not published on a timely basis, appearing about 10 months after year's end. The small portion of the report devoted to foreign trade usually lumps export and import figures together in one number. Thus, the user normally knows only the total amount of trade between two countries, not how much the G.D.R. purchased or how much it sold. Furthermore, Western business representatives and economists often question the reliability of the figures given.

There has been no improvement in the G.D.R. Foreign Trade Bank's annual report, which offers only highly aggregated information on the hard currency value of G.D.R. imports and exports and provides no specifics on G.D.R. foreign debt. In general, it does not serve the needs of banks and firms seeking to evaluate potential business relationships. Moreover, the G.D.R. does not provide information on total balance of payments, aggregate net and gross foreign debt, cash flow projections, and statements of sources and uses of funds.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation. Joint ventures, in the sense of joint membership within the G.D.R. and foreign ownership of business undertakings, are not permitted under G.D.R. law. Although the G.D.R. has entered into a few cooperative production agreements with Western firms, it has shown less interest in developing these cooperative ventures than most other Eastern countries.

Official Visits. There were no significant visits during the reporting period.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Often, the G.D.R. will purchase goods from abroad only on the condition that it will pay for at least part of the imported goods with G.D.R. goods rather than with hard currency. Also, cooperation agreements for production within the G.D.R. are often coupled with countertrade or "buy-back" features. Aside from opposing countertrade as a matter of principle, most U.S. firms are also inhibited from such arrangements by difficulties in obtaining the quantity and quality of goods desired, limitations on what the G.D.R. can or is willing to supply, and the unmarketability of some G.D.R. products offered.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. In general, small and medium-sized enterprises are treated no differently from larger enterprises.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The G.D.R. continues to be extremely interested in sending scientists and technical experts to the United States for advanced training, but it has shown much less enthusiasm for promoting reciprocal exchanges. There are also few areas in which G.D.R. science and technology are sufficiently advanced to make research in the G.D.R. interesting to U.S. scientists.

Due to the G.D.R.'s increasing use of lignite as the primary source of energy,

the G.D.R. is the largest producer of sulfur dioxide in Europe. Despite recent approval of a $60-million desulfurization facility at a small powerplant in Berlin, the G.D.R. has taken virtually no significant steps to improve air quality. Nor does there seem to be much hope for a change in the problem of air pollution, given the G.D.R.'s concentration on economic growth at the expense of environmental quality. It seems unlikely that the G.D.R. will satisfy its previous commitment to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions by 30% by 1990.

Preliminary steps have been taken to reduce water pollution. An important motive in this regard is the extremely low supply of fresh water per capita in the G.D.R. However, much further work can be done to remove phosphates from southern rivers and streams.

Czechoslovakia

General Assessment. Czechoslovak cooperation with other CSCE signatories in the implementation of Basket II remains overwhelmingly focused on the Soviet Union and other member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (CEMA). About 80% of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade is conducted with CEMA countries, and the CEMA long-term program for scientific and technological development and various bilateral science and technology agreements will likely preoccupy a considerable portion of Czechoslovakia's applied science resources. However, Czechoslovakia has reached modest agreements with Austria, Poland, and the Federal Republic of Germany on environmental cooperation.

The eighth 5-year plan (1986–90) calls for an acceleration of economic growth. It foresees a restructuring of the Czechoslovak economy away from high energy and raw material use and toward production which emphasizes technology and research-oriented production. Though emphasis on trade with the Soviet Union and CEMA countries will continue, imports from the West and other nonsocialist countries are expected to increase—by almost 16% in 1986 alone. This may signal a trend toward increasing trade with the West.

Czechoslovakia's strained political relations with the United States continued to have a negative effect on bilateral trade in the reporting period. In the first half of 1986, trade totaled $73 million, down 3.4% from the first half of 1985. However, the United States and Czechoslovakia continued to conduct a significant amount of trade through Austria, West Germany, Switzerland, and other Western countries. Czechoslovak officials continued to raise with U.S. officials the issue of most-favored-nation tariff status.

Contacts between foreign businessmen and their counterparts in this country remained under the control of the central authorities. Foreign businessmen often report difficulty in establishing contacts and locating accurate information about investment plans, hard currency, spending priorities, and economic performance. Countertrade, commonly 25%–40% or more of the value of the original sale, is a consistent and probably growing feature of Western trade with Czechoslovakia.

Business Working Conditions. While the number of American business offices did not change during this period, Pan American Airways resumed service to Prague for the first time since 1978 and is working to expand its modest presence. U.S. firms with representation in Prague appear to have adequate space, but one business has spent months trying to identify more appropriate office space, without success. This experience appears to be typical for Western firms. There are no resident American businessmen in Czechoslovakia. Foreign businessmen in Prague appear to have suitable housing obtained through official channels or arranged privately.

Considering the shortage of tourist and visitor facilities in Prague and other major Czechoslovak cities, foreign businessmen report relatively few problems with hotel accommodations or other impediments to visits there.

Visas for foreign businessmen are generally not a problem and are rarely denied. The only exceptions usually involve individuals born in this country who were once recognized as Czechoslovak citizens but who subsequently left. Some foreign businessmen complain that they cannot obtain multiple-entry visas and must apply for a reentry visa each time they plan to travel outside Czechoslovakia.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Many foreign businessmen regard as inadequate the extent and timeliness of economic and commercial information available in Czechoslovakia. Monthly statistical reports provide little useful information and have limited utility for businessmen. Information in the foreign trade area is particularly insufficient for market research purposes, and many observers believe the data published by the Czechoslovak authorities are unreliable.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation. Virtually all foreign trade must be conducted through one of a number of foreign trade organizations, each of which enjoys a monopoly over both imports and exports for particular product lines. In addition, there are a number of foreign trade representation firms which handle local representation for Western companies. While there has been discussion about modifying this system of foreign trade monopolies—and, in fact, several domestic firms have received foreign trade privileges—these changes remain more a potential than a reality.

In mid-1985, the Czechoslovak Government made a decision to allow the formation of joint venture corporations with Western companies, and the first joint venture agreement was signed in August 1986 with a Danish electronics firm. Czechoslovak officials claimed to have had discussions with as many as two dozen other Western companies about the possibility of forming joint ventures and, while both the Czechoslovak authorities and representatives of Western companies remain cautious, it appears likely that at least one or two more joint ventures will be formed within the next 12–18 months. These joint ventures will be formed within the framework of existing laws, although officials have indicated that a new joint venture law will be introduced after an initial trial period has been completed.

In the context of its efforts to modernize and speed economic development, Czechoslovakia expects to increase the purchases of Western technology via licenses. A fairly large number of license production agreements exists, including two fairly recent ones with U.S. firms for refining oil and manufacturing color television tubes. At least one U.S. drug manufacturer has a coproduction arrangement in this country, and a few U.S. construction engineering firms have contracts with Czechoslovak firms—for the supply of generator turbines and other heavy machinery, for example.

Official Visits. During the reporting period, several technical-level economic and trade meetings took place. In May, the Executive Committee of the U.S.-Czechoslovak Economic Council met in Prague, and U.S. members met senior

officials at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Czechoslovak Chamber of Commerce. In June, trade negotiators from both countries met in Geneva to negotiate an agreement on textile imports to the U.S. Later that month, aviation officials of both countries met for consultations on the 1969 bilateral Air Transport Agreement and agreed to begin negotiations in October regarding modifications to that agreement.

During her April 1986 visit to Czechoslovakia, Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway proposed formation of a bilateral working group to facilitate development of business and economic ties, in tandem with a similar working group on humanitarian issues. As of late September, Czechoslovakia had yet to respond to these proposals.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Czechoslovakia appears to have no specific legislation concerning countertrade arrangements, but the demand on Czechoslovak trade partners for countertrade is consistent and widespread. Countertrade demands commonly run about 25%–40% of the value of the original sale. Some businessmen report having been quoted a "new regulation" putting countertrade demands at 40% for their industries and also spelling out both the categories of goods and the FTOs from which the Western firm must purchase. U.S. and other Western firms report that the main problems with countertrade concern product quality and availability.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. Czechoslovakia and the United States signed in April an agreement for exchanges in culture, education, science, technology, and other fields. This agreement contains general provisions about exchanges and cooperation in science and technology which subsequent agreements between the U.S. implementing agencies and their Czechoslovak counterparts should spell out.

All bilateral science and technology cooperation takes place under the strict control of the Czechoslovak Government, and most of it takes place in the context of agreements negotiated between such institutions as the Czechoslovak and the U.S. National Academies of Science. Private contacts, especially on the part of Americans in Czechoslovakia, are rare. However, the Academies of Science exchanges, which have been taking place for many years, provide for fruitful cooperation in a wide variety of fields. Further development of cooperation is foreseen under the exchanges agreement, as well.

Bulgaria

General Assessment. Impeded by deteriorating trade balances with the West, a sharp drop in world oil prices that resulted in lower revenues derived from the reexport of refined petroleum products, and modest levels of capital investment, the Bulgarian economy grew at a slow pace during the first half of 1986. Despite slower growth, Bulgaria's trade with Western countries continued to grow, as Bulgaria sought Western technology, capital goods, and services. Business conditions for Western businessmen remained difficult, and access to information was often limited. Countertrade pressures from the Bulgarian side increased, as hard currency for the acquisition of Western technology declined. Scientific exchanges with the West continued to grow.

Business Working Conditions. Although the bulk of Bulgaria's foreign trade is with the Soviet Union and other CEMA countries, Bulgaria has sought increased trade and investment from the West for the technology and know-how needed to increase productivity. Western businessmen generally have ready access to authorized business contacts and trade officials. All foreign trade is channeled through foreign trade organizations. Over the past 6 months, a number of major reorganizations have been announced in the trade sector, but so far, these changes have had no noticeable impact on the conduct of foreign trade. Visiting businessmen have reported no problems with respect to hotel accommodations or restrictions on business travel.

Housing remains inadequate by Western standards. Due to the deteriorating economic situation exacerbated by an unresponsive bureaucracy, Bulgaria has become a more difficult assignment for resident businessmen. Visiting businessmen have to pay high hotel fees for generally mediocre accommodations as the Bulgarian Government seeks to bolster hard currency earnings.

Western airlines receive cramped space at Sofia airport but are required to pay fees similar to those charged at large, modern, Western airports.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Bulgaria regularly publishes economic performance data and foreign trade figures. However, information is reported selectively and often in insufficient detail for meaningful economic analysis. For example, percentages are often given in lieu of raw data, and bases for comparisons are carefully selected to enhance the presentation of current figures. Officials are reluctant to share their opinions and are prone to hide negative information from Western businessmen.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation. The Bulgarian Government actively courts Western firms to establish joint venture projects in Bulgaria. Such arrangements would provide Bulgaria with modern equipment and technology, trained management, and Western expertise with minimal hard currency outlay. Most U.S. businessmen complain that the Bulgarians provide only vague information on how hard currency earnings will be repatriated. A Western business is likely to have more success and fewer problems in negotiating a licensing agreement with the Bulgarians.

Official Visits. Bulgaria receives, and prominently publicizes, a steady stream of official visitors and delegations in the trade and economic field. A majority of these visitors are from Third World nations or the communist bloc. There were several exchanges of experts between Bulgaria and the United States during the first half of 1986 in connection with a bilateral program in the agricultural sector. These visits were not directly trade related but, in a few instances, led to subsequent commercial transactions.

Policies Toward Countertrade Agreements. Pressure for countertrade has continued as the Bulgarian Government seeks to acquire new technologies with minimal hard currency expenditure. The Bulgarians have little to offer by way of countertrade, although Western businessmen will sometimes accept the often inferior merchandise as a way to establish a niche in the Bulgarian market. One Western businessman reported the requirement of accepting Bulgarian merchandise equaling 30% of the value of the Western import. After considerable difficulties in negotiating the "value" of the virtually unsaleable Bulgarian goods, his company simply disposed of the unwanted items in Bulgaria since the cost of transporting them abroad and finding markets for them would have exceeded their commercial value. The cost of accepting and disposing of the unwanted Bulgarian

merchandise was built into the Western supplier's selling cost. As hard currency reserves deteriorate further and as Bulgarian Government requirements for expensive Western technology increase, especially in priority sectors, even more countertrade demands are expected.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. In a reversal of previous policies, the Bulgarian Government now officially recognizes the potentially valuable contributions of small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly in the service sector and in the production and merchandising of consumer goods. However, these enterprises have not fared well, so far, under the new policies. Some small enterprises have complained that they are effectively excluded from the central planning process and, therefore, encounter difficulties in dealing with large suppliers and buyers. However, it is still early to assess the impact, if any, of new policies and incentives intended to decentralize economic planning and management and to promote the growth of such enterprises.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The intercourse between Bulgarian scientists and their counterparts abroad is carefully controlled. International cooperative efforts in science and technology and, in particular, with the United States and other Western nations, have been allowed to expand somewhat in recent years. This increased cooperation stems from the Government of Bulgaria's emphasis on integrating scientific and technological advances into the economy. In addition, increased scientific exchanges open avenues of access to high-technology systems, processes, and methods which are otherwise limited by Western export restrictions.

In the period under review, Bulgaria hosted numerous international scientific conferences, as well as funding (in part) exchange visits by Western scientists in a number of fields—notably cancer research, mathematics, and thermodynamics. Through joint research projects with Western counterparts, a number of Bulgarian scientists have made significant contributions in their fields. An exchange agreement between the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and its Bulgarian counterpart was augmented during the reporting period by 50%. In December, the Bulgarian Academy is set to sign an exchange agreement with the U.S. National Institutes of Health in the field of biomedical research. Other agreements with the National Science Foundation and USDA are still in force and fully subscribed.

The controlling bodies of scientific and technical institutions are staffed by party officials who place concern of national prestige or state security ahead of purely scientific ones. Researchers who enjoy world-class reputations or receive funding from international organizations comprise a privileged class of scientists, while their less exalted colleagues must scramble for funding or permission to travel. Even if a middle-ranking researcher possesses the funds to pay his own way to an international congress, he may find it impossible to obtain the clearance to travel.

Chapter Four

Implementation of Basket III: Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Basket III contains specific measures to foster human contacts, improve access to information, and promote cultural and educational exchanges. Basket III and Principle Seven of Basket I, strengthened by provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document, constitute the principal human rights provisions of the Helsinki process.

HUMAN CONTACTS

In the Final Act, participating states commit themselves to facilitate family reunification and meetings, marriage between citizens of different states, and expansion of contacts and travel, especially in the areas of tourism, business, sports, and among young people.

In addition, the Madrid Concluding Document contains a number of provisions that strengthen and extend the human contacts commitments in the Final Act. The participating states have pledged: to deal favorably with applications for family meetings, reunification, and marriage; to decide upon marriage and family reunification applications within 6 months; to ensure that rights of applicants for family reunification are not prejudiced; to provide necessary forms and information to applicants for emigration; to reduce emigration fees; to inform emigration applicants of decisions expeditiously; to assure access to diplomatic missions; and to facilitate contacts among representatives of religious faiths.

Family Visits

To some extent, the Helsinki process has led to freer travel policies in the East, but much remains to be done to achieve CSCE goals. In general, Eastern countries maintain a policy of limiting and controlling their citizens' movement abroad. It should be noted that the U.S.S.R. and other Warsaw Pact countries have ratified the UN Charter and other international documents on human rights, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in which the right to leave one's country and return thereto is enumerated. But in practice, the Soviet Union denies its citizens this right. Restrictive practices in the countries of Eastern Europe vary considerably.

Soviet Union. Permission for private visits to the U.S. continues to be granted selectively to Soviet citizens, usually to those who have close family members in the U.S. A typical visit to the United States by a Soviet family would exclude at least one family member. The few Soviet citizens allowed to make multiple trips to the U.S. may do so only at 2- or 3-year intervals. Our information on Soviet families denied exit permission for visits is extremely limited: Soviets without foreign travel passports are denied entry to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow by Soviet guards,

and it is difficult for them to communicate with the embassy by mail or telephone as well. The embassy continues to receive complaints that Soviet citizens with close relatives in the U.S. are denied permission to travel for family visitation, even in medical emergencies. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow issued approximately 1,050 visas to Soviet citizens for private visits to the United States during the reporting period.

Soviet authorities often arbitrarily refuse visas to U.S. citizens seeking to visit relatives in the U.S.S.R. During the period covered by this report, at least five Americans were denied the opportunity to visit their Soviet spouses and fiances. Several binational marriages were blocked during the last 6 months by Soviet visa refusal. Naturalized U.S. citizens who were born in the Soviet Union find it particularly difficult to obtain visas. For those who had exit permission for Israel and then settled in the U.S., Soviet permission to return for a family visit is seldom granted.

Romania. The Romanian Government issued an increased number of exit permits for visits to family members in the U.S. during this reporting period. Visits by American relatives to family in Romania are generally encouraged, although former Romanian citizens have encountered difficulties. The U.S. Embassy in Bucharest issued roughly 1,575 visas to Romanian citizens for visits to relatives in the United States in the reporting period, about the same number issued for the same period last year.

Opportunities for travel abroad for most Romanians remain strictly limited, with passport issuance procedures arbitrary, unpredictable, and expensive, and only those persons approved by the party-controlled "Worker's Committees" are allowed tourist passports. Those who receive tourist passports often do so only after months or years of waiting. Rarely are entire families issued passports at the same time for a visit abroad; usually at least one member of the immediate family must remain behind. Those Romanians who leave on tourist passports but remain permanently abroad typically must wait years before their families are allowed to join them. Family members left behind often endure considerable pressure to divorce or renounce those who have left and are harassed if they refuse. Americans generally encounter few problems in obtaining visas to visit relatives in Romania, unless they themselves are former Romanians who left the country illegally or are considered "undesirable" for other reasons. Most Americans arrive at Romanian frontiers without visas and receive entry permission on the spot. Immediate relatives of Romanian citizens are exempt from the normal requirements to stay at government-run facilities and to purchase $10 of local currency for every day of the anticipated stay. There have been several incidents during the reporting period, however, when Americans were not granted this exemption. The law on this point states only that persons of "Romanian origin" are exempted, and at times this has been interpreted to exclude persons of Hungarian background or Jewish religion. Occasionally, problems arise for persons of Romanian ethnic origin as well.

In addition to these currency exchange problems, U.S. citizen travelers arriving at Romanian entry points sometimes find themselves refused entry and turned away without explanation, despite possession of valid visas issued by a Romanian Embassy. When such cases occur at Bucharest's international airport, persons excluded often experience hours of detention until a departing flight can be arranged. During that time, sometimes overnight, such persons are denied consular access and are held in unsanitary and uncomfortable conditions. The U.S. Embassy in Bucharest is aware of six such cases during the current reporting period, though there were probably others that went unreported.

Poland. The Polish Government has a relatively liberal passport issuance policy, and most people who apply for passports eventually obtain them. Polish tourists applying for a passport must present a letter of invitation signed by a relative or friend abroad and notarized by a Polish consulate. This letter of invitation is considered valid for 6 months from the date of notarization. Trained professionals such as engineers, doctors, and skilled artisans are considered essential personnel and sometimes cannot obtain passports for personal travel.

The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw and its constituent posts issued approximately 32,500 visas to Polish citizens for family visits during the reporting period. They estimate that the Polish Government issued about 43,000 exit permits during the same period for travel to the U.S. The Embassy knows of no restrictions or significant difficulties experienced by Americans visiting their relatives in Poland.

Hungary. Hungarian citizens enjoy a relatively liberal travel policy which allows them, by law, to visit the West at least once each year if financial support is available. Hungarians can purchase hard currency for four family visits every 3 years. The length of exit permission is limited by the the amount of leave time authorized by the place of employment; permission is usually issued in increments of 30 days, with 30 and 90 days being the most common. The U.S. Embassy in Budapest issued 4,808 visas to Hungarian citizens for family visits to the United States during the reporting period, a number slightly lower than that for April–September 1985. Many exit permits are denied, usually for those who have traveled in the previous year, those who cannot prove financial support for their visit, draft-age men whose service requirement is due to start within 6 months, and relatives of those who left Hungary illegally.

Visas are seldom denied to Americans for family visits to Hungary. The Foreign Ministry never supplies reasons for the five to six such refusals annually of which the Embassy is aware. Most cases involve people prominent in the 1956 uprising.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. continues to limit severely travel by its citizens to the West for family visits unless the applicant is retired. Although the G.D.R. has not formally expanded its narrow criteria for approving family visitation travel, since early 1986 G.D.R. officials have displayed greater laxity and liberality when considering applications to travel to visit relatives in the F.R.G. A record 107,000 such visits occurred in the first 7 months of 1986, a 180% increase over the same period in 1985. In all cases, the applicant wishing to travel in the West must provide documentation confirming both the relationship with the person abroad and the purpose of travel.

The G.D.R.'s eased travel restrictions also seem to apply to travel to the United States. During this reporting period, the U.S. Embassy in Berlin issued 1,104 visas for family visits (including 384 to nonpensioners), almost double the figure for the same period last year.

The total number of applications submitted and denied is not publicly available, but there are many cases of applicants who are refused permission to travel. G.D.R. citizens in positions deemed "sensitive" by their government may not be visited by or even maintain contact with close relatives who live in the West. Emigrants from the G.D.R.

must generally wait 5 years before they can return to the G.D.R. to visit relatives.

Czechoslovakia. Travel of Czechoslovak citizens to the West continues to be severely restricted. The number of visas issued by the U.S. Embassy in Prague for visits to family members in the U.S. was 3,245 for the reporting period. This represents an increase of 22% over the same period a year ago. The majority of Czechoslovak citizens who are allowed to travel to the U.S. to visit relatives are retired and elderly. Persons in the work force are not normally allowed to travel abroad with all members of their immediate family.

Most U.S. citizens obtain visas to visit Czechoslovakia without difficulty, often in 1 day. However, many U.S. citizens of Czechoslovak origin continue to be refused visas with no explanation given, sometimes after having received several visas in the past. The embassy has made representations to the host government on behalf of 13 such citizens during this reporting period.

Bulgaria. The record of the Bulgarian Government in allowing Bulgarian citizens to visit relatives in the U.S. historically has been poor. The process for obtaining passports and exit visas is very bureaucratic, slow, and sometimes arbitrary. The authorities may deny passports and exit visa applications without explanation and, in some instances, have even refused to receive application forms.

During the reporting period, however, the Bulgarian Government appears to have relaxed somewhat its restrictions on travel to visit relatives abroad. The U.S. Embassy in Sofia issued approximately 260 nonimmigrant visas for family visitation during the April–September 1986 period, and the Bulgarian authorities permitted an increased number to visit family members in the U.S. without the U.S. Embassy having to intervene on their behalf. Government-imposed restrictions on access to the embassy by Bulgarian nationals, however, prevents the embassy from estimating reliably how many additional Bulgarians may have sought unsuccessfully to obtain exit permission to visit family members in the United States.

The Department of State received a small but steady stream of complaints during the period from Americans of Bulgarian origin who had been denied visas to visit family members in Bulgaria.

Family Reunification

Because of its restrictive definition of family reunification, bureaucratic roadblocks for intending emigrants, and generally arbitrary practices, Soviet performance in the family reunification area is unsatisfactory. Some of the states in Eastern Europe are as restrictive as the Soviet Union, while others pose fewer obstacles to allowing their citizens to emigrate to join family members abroad.

The U.S. Government regularly intercedes with Eastern governments on behalf of relatives of American citizens who have been refused permission to emigrate to the United States to join their families. The accompanying table shows the number of such cases being monitored officially by the United States as of October 1, 1986.

Soviet Union. International attention focused on the issue of family reunification during and immediately after the Bern human contacts meeting in the spring of 1986. Between November 1985 and June 1986, the Soviets promised to resolve over 90 family reunification cases from U.S. representation lists. This was the first time in the 20-odd-year history of the representation list that so many cases had been offered as "resolved" by the Soviets at any one time. At the end of the reporting period, in only about half of these cases had exit documentation actually been issued. Despite assurances through diplomatic channels in December 1985 and January 1986 that several dual citizenship and a larger number of family reunification cases would be resolved, the individuals involved still face bureaucratic hurdles to their emigration. In one family's case, local visa authorities have since January required a seemingly endless series of hard-to-obtain official records. In several other cases, Soviet citizens were pressured by local authorities into undertaking the time-consuming (3–6 months or longer) and expensive process of renouncing their citizenship.

Only immediate family members receive exit permission to emigrate. The same narrow criteria are applied to dual nationals, whose second, U.S. nationality is not recognized by the Soviets. Soviet officials continued to use the reason that an applicant had more relatives (including in-laws) in the Soviet Union than in the U.S. to deny emigration applications. A Soviet law restricting emigration for those deemed to have had access to "state secrets" continues to be used in a broad and arbitrary way. In one case, a Soviet Jew who had been previously refused emigration to Israel 12 times with no mention of access to "state secrets" was told after her second unsuccessful application for permission to join her American citizen husband that she had had access to "secrets." In the past several years, a number of applicants were refused exit permission on the grounds of the "difficult state of international relations" or on the grounds that their emigration was "undesirable" or "unfeasible."

During the reporting period, persons who received exit permission to emigrate to the United States reported that the process took from 1 month to several years. On the average, however, Soviet authorities responded either positively or negatively to applications for exit permission within 2–4 months.

Previously, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow noted an increase in reported incidents of Soviet citizens in Armenia being required to sign pledges not to invite relatives for permanent residence in the U.S. before receiving Soviet external travel passports. The embassy believes this practice continues. Another tactic that has come to our attention is the strong pressure brought to bear on

Divided Family Cases

	Nuclear Families		Non-Nuclear Families	
	Cases	*Individuals*	*Cases*	*Individuals*
Soviet Union	95	217	23	114
Romania	86	122	718	1,597
Poland	57	117	189	573
Hungary	0	0	0	0
G.D.R.	0	0	8	17
Czechoslovakia	4	5	1	4
Bulgaria	7	13	3	3

some applicants (for instance, brothers or sisters of U.S. citizens or permanent residents) to renounce Soviet citizenship before being permitted to reside abroad. While this procedure has been used for years for Soviet Jews and occasionally for prominent dissidents who are allowed to leave the U.S.S.R., these are the first cases involving other nationalities. Soviet officials have maintained that local emigration officials have no legal basis upon which to do this and have denied that it is taking place.

Persons applying for Soviet exit permission continue to experience reprisals in the form of loss of employment, demotions, or harassment by employers or the police. During the reporting period, there were more than half a dozen incidents in which Soviet citizens desiring to emigrate—most of whose situations were well known to U.S. Embassy officers—were questioned or told they had no business at the embassy by the embassy's Soviet guards. These individuals required an American officer escort to enter the chancery. In several cases, Soviets were prevented from entering the embassy altogether.

From April 1 through September 19, 1986, 56 Soviet nationals received U.S. immigrant visas for family reunification. In addition, 117 Soviet citizens with first-degree relatives in the United States were processed under the accelerated third-country processing program for refugees. It is difficult to estimate the number of Soviet citizens who are refused exit permission. Previous inquiries indicate that roughly 1,000 families are interested in emigrating from the Soviet Union to the United States. Undoubtedly, the actual figure is much higher because many individuals either feel it is hopeless, in the current climate, to plan to emigrate or are afraid to contact the embassy for fear of harassment.

Romania. Romania's performance on family reunification was unchanged since the last reporting period. A large number of family reunification cases brought to the Romanian Government's attention by the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest are still unresolved. The average waiting period from initial application for emigration to final approval continues to be well in excess of the 6 months envisaged in the Madrid Concluding Document. The embassy estimates that 1–1½ years are required in the average case.

The Romanian Government officially opposes emigration but allows a substantial number of departures under the rubric of family reunification. It continues, however, to hinder even these persons in order to discourage overall interest in emigration. It allows relatively large numbers of ethnic Germans to emigrate to West Germany and of Romanian Jews to emigrate to Israel.

Roughly 702 Romanians qualifying for entry into the United States made application for U.S. entry documents in order to be reunited with their families there. This figure compares with 695 such applications in the previous 6-month period. The U.S. Embassy in Bucharest issued approximately 185 immigrant visas, seven humanitarian paroles, and 381 visas to relatives of refugees and asylees in the United States between April 1 and October 1, 1986. Additionally, approximately 321 persons were issued third-country processing (TCP) refugee documents during the same period, about 100 of which were for family reunification.

The U.S. and Romanian Governments last year agreed to new procedures for processing persons seeking to emigrate to the United States. These procedures have substantially reduced the hardships faced by Romanians allowed to emigrate to America, but the regime remains officially hostile to emigration, and application for emigration still carries a stigma.

At the end of the reporting period, the U.S Embassy in Bucharest had 317 cases on its consolidated representation list. Additionally, some 800 pending TCP cases are for family reunification. Romanian authorities have been only partially responsive to the embassy's representation lists. Of the 519 cases on our embassy's April 1986 representation list, 264 remain unresolved.

The cost of Romanian exit documents is high in relation to the Romanian worker's average monthly income. A Romanian citizen who has obtained a stateless passport, renounced his citizenship, and waited 2 months for departure (not an unusual situation) will have paid the equivalent of about $500.

Poland. During the reporting period, 756 immigrant visas were issued by the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw for the purpose of family reunification. Additionally, the embassy issued travel documents to 451 spouses and children of asylees and refugees in the United States for family reunification.

While the precise impact of embassy representation is difficult to assess, it appears to be helpful in many divided family cases. Polish officials have resisted attempts by the embassy to represent individual cases and follow their progress through the Polish system. Increasingly, it seems that recent instances of family reunification have been the result of the relaxation of Polish Government policy on passport issuance rather than any consistent effort by the Polish authorities to unite families. Poland's high birthrate and declining economy will probably assure a liberal emigration policy in the future.

Hungary. Hungarian performance continues to be good. The U.S. Embassy in Budapest issued 63 immigrant visas for family reunification during the reporting period. At the end of the reporting period, the embassy had only one family which had been unsuccessful in its application to emigrate for family reunification. Since the number of cases refused exit permission is so small, we can discern no particular pattern, except to note that permission to emigrate is usually received within 2 years, even to those initially refused.

Forty-five immigrant visas were issued to Hungarian spouses of American citizens and legal residents by the U.S. Embassy during the reporting period. None were refused exit permits or delayed for more than 6 months, and there has been no need for U.S. intervention in this reporting period.

German Democratic Republic. During the first 7 months of 1986, 14,113 G.D.R. citizens were granted exit visas to emigrate to the F.R.G. The G.D.R. has continued to issue approximately 2,000 emigration visas per month between April and October, as well. This rate is higher than the 600–1,000 visas per month issued in recent years, excepting 1984, when the G.D.R. allowed an extraordinarily large number of citizens to emigrate (about 35,000). Many of these people left for family reunification, others for economic and political reasons. Only a fraction of those desiring to leave the G.D.R. has been allowed to do so; reliable Western sources estimate that as many as 300,000–500,000 applications are still pending. An October 1983 G.D.R. law on emigration addresses only emigration for the purpose of reuniting with "first-degree" relatives (parents and children) or a spouse. However, some applicants with no first-degree relatives in the West have been allowed to emigrate, and there are indications that this number is increasing. It is still too early to tell whether a true, sustained trend toward liberalization has developed.

The experiences of exit visa applicants vary. In some cases, applicants wait at least a year for exit permission from the G.D.R., but some cases have taken 3 or more years. While some East Germans have been able to lead normal lives after submitting an exit visa application, others have been subjected to reprisals of varying degrees of severity. Applicants have lost their jobs or have had to take menial work. G.D.R. authorities sometimes visit the homes of exit applicants to try to intimidate them into withdrawing their applications. Occasionally, their children face discrimination and harassment in school. Successful applicants must usually renounce their G.D.R. citizenship and accept a stateless passport.

West German human rights groups as well as the F.R.G. Government seem to agree that half of the political prisoners in the G.D.R. were imprisoned after filing for exit permission or attempting to leave the G.D.R. illegally; however, estimates of the number of political prisoners in the G.D.R. vary widely.

G.D.R. officials commonly tell applicants that it is "not possible" to submit an exit application, but if applicants persist with submission of a written statement, it will generally be accepted by G.D.R. authorities as a de facto application. Denial of the application is given orally without explanation. Some people thus refused are advised that any future applications could lead to difficulties with the police or worse.

The continued G.D.R. practice of severely limiting access to Western missions has inhibited potential emigrants from inquiring about emigration. Virtually all nonofficial visitors to the U.S. Embassy in Berlin can expect to be stopped by G.D.R. police, have identification cards checked, and possibly be detained. Many East Germans have been warned to have no contact with Western missions under threat to their well-being, and some have been required to sign a document acknowledging that visiting a foreign mission without permission is a violation of G.D.R. law which makes them subject to prosecution.

The U.S. Embassy in Berlin makes representations to the G.D.R. by periodically presenting them a list of cases of direct interest to the U.S. Lists given to the Foreign Ministry during the last reporting period included 11 cases of people who wished to go to the U.S. for family reunification. Emigration fees are not burdensome; a passport with exit visa costs about $7.50.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak record on family reunification is generally poor, but spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens usually have less trouble than others. The Czechoslovak Government does not regard married sons and daughters or siblings of U.S. citizens as part of the basic family unit.

During this period, the U.S. Embassy in Prague received 35 new immigrant visa applications (15 more than last year). The embassy also received three new "visas 93" (family of refugees) applications, compared to 12 cases during this period last year. The embassy issued 27 immigrant visas to family members of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens during this period (an increase of six from a year ago.) Also, eight relatives of refugees were processed.

Czechoslovak policy discourages emigration of the work force. Adult sons and daughters, married sons and daughters, or siblings of U.S. citizens frequently experience great difficulty in obtaining exit documents and often must wait many years before receiving exit permission. Decisions on exit documentation often seem arbitrary and as dependent on where the application is made as on the merits of the case. The U.S. Embassy in Prague has 246 pending immigrant visa cases but has had no word from most of those concerned since they were notified of their petition approval, presumably because of the difficulty in obtaining exit documentation. Families of refugees can expect lengthy waits.

Assembling the documents needed to apply for emigration usually takes a minimum of 6 weeks. Processing of an emigration application takes from 6 weeks to 6 months from the date the completed application is submitted, although the average time is 3 months. If the applicant is refused, it is possible to file an appeal within 15 days. If it is refused a second time, the applicant must wait 3 months before submitting a new application. Often people are told it is useless to reapply, but it is rare that a new application is not accepted. An emigrating Czechoslovak's largest expense is often the education payment levied, in theory, to reimburse the government for university and postgraduate education. Some applicants have had to pay up to the Czechoslovak crown equivalent of $1,000 (equal to 6 months of the average wage).

Bulgaria. The Bulgarian record during the reporting period in family reunifications was relatively good by historical standards. Of the eight cases which the government promised in March 1986 would be resolved favorably, six have been successfully resolved, and two others were expected to be resolved as of the end of the reporting period. The other four family reunification cases that were pending at the beginning of the period and on which the government held out some hope of favorable resolution remain without progress, however.

The U.S. Embassy in Sofia issued nine immigrant visas in family reunification cases during the period and processed an additional seven reunification cases for relatives of refugees. The embassy has learned, during the period, from relatives in the U.S. of approximately a dozen new cases of Bulgarian nationals reportedly unable to secure permission to emigrate to the U.S. for the purpose of family reunification. The number of additional casesof this type that have not come to the embassy's attention cannot be reliably estimated.

Binational Marriages

In accordance with the Final Act, the participating states pledged to consider favorably applications for entry or exit permits from persons who have decided to marry a citizen of another participating state. In the Madrid Concluding Document, the participating states committed themselves to deal favorably with binational marriage applications and to decide on applications normally within 6 months. There is a mixed record of implementation of these commitments by the Soviet Union and the East European countries. The following chart indicates the number of cases the United States was monitoring as of October 1, 1986.

Binational Marriage Cases

Soviet Union	28
Romania	23
Poland	0
Hungary	0
G.D.R.	7
Czechoslovakia	0
Bulgaria	2

Soviet Union. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the consulate general in Leningrad approved 33 U.S. immigrant visa petitions filed by American citizens on behalf of their Soviet citizen spouses

during the review period. Of the approximately 39 spouses of American citizens and permanent resident aliens whose applications were processed by the embassy during the review period, 28 received Soviet exit permission on the first application. Nine had been previously refused at least once, and in one case, the Soviet citizen had been applying to leave for 10 years. No data were available for two cases.

Americans who marry Soviet citizens are not required to register with U.S. authorities. We generally learn of binational marriages when an American files an immigrant visa petition for the Soviet spouse or asks embassy or consulate officers to notarize a statement to register the marriage. Approximately 61 such statements were notarized for American citizens and permanent resident aliens during the reporting period by the embassy and the consulate general in Leningrad. Approximately 39 persons were issued immigrant visas or other entry documents to join American citizen or resident alien spouses in the United States.

The U.S. Government maintains a representation list of Soviet citizens who have repeatedly been denied permission to join their American citizen spouses. During the reporting period, of 21 cases listed, only two individuals received Soviet exit permission, and one separated spouse case was added to the representation list. The embassy intervened in at least four "blocked marriage" cases in which either an American fiance was refused a Soviet visa to register his/her marriage to a Soviet citizen or in which the American citizen entered the U.S.S.R. but was prevented from marrying. In one case, an American, who has been engaged since 1979, was again denied permission to enter the Soviet Union. In another case, a Soviet fiance was threatened with military induction and later detained by Soviet police in the second attempt by Soviet officials to block his marriage to an American. One American was physically removed from a Moscow-bound train and expelled from the country and thus missed his wedding to his 8-months' pregnant fiancee. In each case, the embassy intervened with Soviet officials but never received any response.

Romania. Marriage to foreigners is officially discouraged, and obtaining approval is difficult. Although most applicants are eventually successful, securing official approval is a trying and time-consuming undertaking which typically requires a wait of 8–16 months. The number of approvals of binational marriages increased during the reporting period, however, with Romanian authorities approving 30 binational marriages. The total number of exit permits issued to Romanian spouses for family reunification after binational marriages was also 30. The U.S. Embassy in Bucharest's monthly representational list to the Romanian Government also includes binational marriages where the Romanian spouse is unable to obtain exit permission. Of the 23 cases currently on the list, 12 have been listed for more than 6 months.

Poland. There are fewer bureaucratic hurdles for American citizens if they marry Polish citizens in the United States rather than in Poland. Polish court permission is required for marriage in Poland, and court procedures can last as long as 4 months. One difficulty an American faces in a Polish court is convincing the court that he or she is free to marry, as the U.S. Government does not issue documentation to that effect. In addition, as the Polish Government does not recognize U.S. divorces involving Polish nationals, a divorce promulgated in the U.S. must be repeated in a Polish court, a process which can last 6 months. A treaty addressing legal services, which could reduce or even eliminate these difficulties, is currently under consideration. During the reporting period, the embassy issued 133 visas to Polish citizens for the purpose of binational marriage. During the same period, Polish authorities issued an equal number of exit permits to Polish nationals for binational marriages.

Hungary. Hungarian performance with regard to binational marriages continues to be good. During the reporting period, the U.S. Embassy in Budapest received or approved 46 petitions for immigrant visas filed by American citizens and permanent resident aliens on behalf of their Hungarian spouses. The Hungarian authorities granted exit permits in all of the cases, and none was pending for more than 6 months. There has been no need for U.S. intervention in the reporting period.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. appears to be following the letter of the October 1983 law which provides that applications for binational marriages will be settled within 6 months of a completed application. The G.D.R. does not consider an application to have been made until all required documents have been presented, and assembly of documentation in requisite formats can cause significant delay. Once the documents are accepted, permission to marry and emigrate is generally granted within 6 months, provided the couple marries in the G.D.R. Of the nine binational marriage cases on the U.S. Embassy in Berlin's list during the reporting period, six cases were resolved. Five additional cases came to the embassy's attention during this period, one of which has been resolved.

Czechoslovakia. Although the processing of the marriage application is lengthy (3–6 months), the Czechoslovak record on binational marriages is generally good. The Czechoslovak Government holds that marriages must take place in Czechoslovakia. In the past there have been cases of U.S. citizens of Czechoslovak birth being refused an entrance visa and the Czechoslovak fiance being refused an exit visa for the purpose of marriage. During this period, one U.S. citizen of Czechoslovak ancestry was refused a visa despite having obtained approval for his marriage prior to his application. After the U.S. Embassy in Prague intervened on his behalf, a visa was issued. During this reporting period, the embassy issued 15 U.S. immigrant visas to Czechoslovak citizens for travel to the U.S. to join their American citizen spouses.

Bulgaria. Bulgarian citizens may marry foreigners only after obtaining government approval. Preparing the necessary paperwork can be a time-consuming process, but most binational marriage cases are resolved without difficulty. There were eight such cases during the reporting period, of which seven led to the issuance of exit permits and U.S. visas. There were no known cases of the authorities having denied exit permits for Bulgarians or entry visas for Americans for the purpose of binational marriage in the last 6 months.

Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons

Although the Final Act signatories agreed to facilitate travel for personal or professional reasons, the Soviet Union and most other East European states basically do not permit such travel except under conditions of strict government control. While they generally encourage visitors from the West, those who attempt to see dissidents or who bring in religious or literary materials are subject to harassment.

Soviet Union. The Soviet Union generally encourages tourism by

westerners as a source of hard currency and in order to promote the Soviet system. Relatively inexpensive rates are offered to large groups, which are easier to control than individual tourists, who pay premium prices for their solitude. Soviet authorities seek to define tourism in an increasingly narrow way which rules out contact with Soviet citizens other than in officially arranged meetings. As in previous reporting periods, Western tourists were occasionally detained and/or expelled for contacting Soviet citizens who had been denied permission to emigrate or for bringing "undesirable" gifts such as Russian-language Bibles.

On April 29, 1986, the Soviet tourist organization's expectations of increased American tourism were shattered by the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear plant in the Ukraine. Hundreds of American tourists canceled their bookings as the seriousness of the accident became known. Soviet tourist representatives confirmed that this has been a terrible summer for American tourism to the Soviet Union. Travel within the Soviet Union by American tourists and all other foreigners is extremely restricted. Large portions of the country are closed entirely to foreigners, and virtually all tourists must plan their itineraries and pay for transportation, accommodations, and meals in hard currency before a visa is issued. Changing an itinerary once a visa has been issued is extremely difficult. Further barriers to normal tourism are imposed by strict and often harshly applied customs regulations.

Approximately 1,053 visitor visas to private Soviet citizens and 3,207 visas to official Soviets were issued by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the consulate general in Leningrad during the reporting period. The number of visas issued to private persons is nearly a 50% increase over the same period last year.

Americans applying for visitor visas must wait varying lengths of time for their Soviet visas. Often the traveler only learns of the Soviet consulate's decision on the eve of departure. U.S. visitor visas for Soviet citizens are generally issued on the day of application for private family visits. To reciprocate for the Soviet practice of charging a $10 fee for tourist and business visa applications, the U.S. charges $10 for the same types of visa. Soviet citizens must pay 200 rubles for a foreign travel passport. This compares to an average monthly income of about 250 rubles.

Romania. While Western tourists are encouraged to visit Romania, opportunities for Romanian citizens to travel abroad for tourism remain restricted. Tourist visas were issued to 1,573 Romanians in the reporting period, about the same number as last year's summer period. U.S. tourist visas are normally issued to Romanian applicants the same day, with the fees reciprocating Romanian nonimmigrant visa fees of approximately $19 for a single-entry visa and $49 for a multiple-entry visa. Romanian Government policy is to encourage tourism, and visas are granted both at embassies abroad and at Romania's frontiers.

The time required for Romanians to complete exit formalities for private travel to the West varies from months to years. The total cost for a new tourist passport with exit visa is approximately $31, and of an exit visa alone, approximately $7.

Official Romanian sources reported approximately 10,000 arrivals by American citizens in Romania during the reporting period, down from 15,500 in the same period last year. These figures count actual arrivals, and the number undoubtedly includes some multiple entries by the same individuals. American tourists generally encounter few restrictions on their movement within Romania, although new, more stringent restrictions on contacts with foreigners seek to limit their access to Romanian citizens, factories, and homes.

Poland. The Polish Government actively promotes tourism from the United States as a source of hard currency. American tourists in Poland during the reporting period generally experienced no difficulties with local authorities, other than problems involving customs or currency regulations.

The U.S Embassy in Warsaw and constituent posts in Krakow and Poznan issued approximately 32,500 nonimmigrant visas during the reporting period, a 25% increase over the same period 1 year ago. The U.S. Embassy usually processes a nonimmigrant visa application within 1 day at a cost (based on reciprocity) of $16. Waivers of ineligibility, if needed, normally require 10–15 days for processing. The average duration of exit formalities for tourist travel is 2 months. The estimated average total cost is equal to about $30.

The estimated average duration of the visa application process for Americans visiting Poland is 2 weeks, and the cost is $16. American visitors to Poland are required to exchange $15 per day at the official rate of exchange. There are no restrictions placed on American citizens for travel within Poland, other than the notification requirements for U.S. diplomats.

Hungary. Hungarian performance continued to be good. The Chernobyl accident had a significant effect on travel to Hungary, but the volume of tourism was, nonetheless, substantial. More liberal provisions for Hungarians to work abroad have been in force since 1983, part of a program designed to meld with the European guest worker system. Several hundred applications for the program were approved during the reporting period, according to the press. The U.S. Embassy in Budapest issued approximately 10,000 nonimmigrant visas to Hungarians in the reporting period, a small increase over the same period last year. Seventy percent of Hungarian applicants received visas in 1 or 2 days. Thirty percent, for whom waivers of ineligibility were required, received visas within 2 weeks. U.S. nonimmigrant visa fees for Hungarians (based on reciprocity) are $9 for single entry and $40 for multiple entry. Generally, a 30-day period is necessary for Hungarians to receive a tourist passport for travel to the West. Tourist exit permits, together with a passport, cost less than $10.

Hungary has no currency conversion requirement for U.S. visitors. There are no travel restrictions except for military areas, which are also barred to most Hungarians. The only significant problem experienced by Western visitors to Hungary is the delay in granting new exit permits to foreigners who lose their passports in Hungary. An average wait of 3 working days is required before a visa and exit permit are issued. Hungarian consular establishments in the United States and elsewhere generally issue visas within 1 or 2 days to nonofficial visitors. Visas are available at Hungary's frontiers, but the U.S. Embassy in Budapest is aware of 5–6 refusals annually to Hungarian-Americans.

German Democratic Republic. Most working-age G.D.R. citizens are unable to travel to the West. Exit formalities for those who can travel abroad usually take 4–10 weeks, with the cost running about $7.50. Severe currency exchange restrictions have the effect of discouraging travel to the West by G.D.R. citizens. Those traveling to the West may exchange only 15 marks a year for Western currency at the G.D.R.'s official rate of exchange, and they may not

export or import G.D.R. currency. Currency exchange restrictions are more relaxed when travel is within socialist-bloc countries; however, G.D.R. citizens still complain that the 30 marks a day they are allowed to exchange for such travel only barely meets the cost of accommodations and meals. The U.S. Embassy in Berlin issued 1,228 tourist visas to G.D.R. citizens during this reporting period. That number included 34 visas issued to a G.D.R. youth tourist group. This is the first instance of G.D.R. citizens traveling to the United States for tourism (i.e., not to visit family members) since the opening of the U.S. Embassy in 1974. U.S. tourist visas are issued within 1 working day, except for cases which require waivers of ineligibility. A U.S. visa costs $8 for single entry and $16 for two entries.

Westerners can generally obtain visas to visit the G.D.R. without difficulty, with the exception of those who recently emigrated from the G.D.R. G.D.R. processing of Western tourist and business visa applications takes 6 weeks or less. Day visas for Berlin only and certain other visas applied for in West Berlin can be obtained even more quickly. G.D.R. single-entry tourist or business visas cost about $7.50 and multiple entry about $20. In addition, there are high ($22–$30) handling fees and minimum currency exchange requirements ($12.50 per day for most visitors). Currency exchanged cannot be reconverted into hard currency or taken out of the G.D.R. U.S. visitors are prohibited from traveling in areas adjacent to G.D.R. military installations, and permission must be obtained for travel within 5 kilometers of the G.D.R. border, except when entering or leaving the country.

Travel and tourism in the G.D.R. is not without risks. During this reporting period, the embassy assisted one U.S. citizen involved in a traffic accident while transiting the G.D.R. from the F.R.G. to West Berlin. G.D.R. authorities allege that the U.S. citizen caused a traffic accident in which the man's U.S. citizen spouse was killed. Authorities jailed the man for approximately 3 weeks before releasing him on $20,000 bail. The U.S. citizen has been warned to expect a 2-year jail sentence, should he return to the G.D.R. Other diplomatic missions and unofficial East German sources have confirmed that it is common G.D.R. practice to demand excessive bail from foreign travelers arrested in the G.D.R. and impose more severe prison sentences on them than on G.D.R. citizens. G.D.R. police also enforce speed limits on foreign travelers more rigorously than on their own citizens and require that traffic fines be paid on the spot in hard currency.

Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak citizens can apply to travel to the West every year, but most are unsuccessful. In addition to applying for passports and exit permission, persons desiring to visit countries outside the Warsaw Pact must submit an application for a hard currency allocation in January of the year in which they wish to travel. The maximum allocation is currently $400. To obtain hard currency, Czechoslovaks must pay 25 Czechoslovak crowns for each dollar, a rate which is close to the free market price but more than twice the current "official" rate given to U.S. tourists in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovaks applying to travel also need permission from their employer and a police certificate. Czechoslovak citizens, in theory, are allowed to travel to the West once every 3 years, but in practice, while a few Czechoslovaks are able to travel to the West every year, others are granted exit documentation once in a lifetime or never. The U.S. Embassy in Prague issued 4,057 tourist visas during this period, a modest increase over the same period last year.

Tourism to Czechoslovakia, in general, is encouraged, although former Czechoslovak citizens frequently experience difficulties in obtaining entry visas. Tourists are not restricted in their travel around the country, although certain localities, for example, around military establishments, are declared off limits. If a tourist loses his travel and identity documentation, he usually has to wait 3–5 days before he receives exit permission. Embassy efforts to assist in such cases have met with very limited success. Currency exchange regulations are strictly enforced, and the embassy frequently receives telephone calls during peak travel months from American tourists who failed to exchange enough money or allowed their visas to lapse and found that Czechoslovak hotels were not allowed to house them.

The Czechoslovak borders are closely patrolled by border guards armed with automatic weapons and instructed to shoot individuals attempting to leave the country illegally. We have no estimates on the number of persons killed or wounded while trying to escape, although Austrian and West German residents living in the border area report that they regularly hear gunshots on the Czechoslovak side of the border. There are no public government statistics on the number of persons serving prison sentences for attempting to leave Czechoslovakia without official permission, but this was one of the few "crimes" that was specifically omitted from the May 1985 amnesty. VONS estimates that there are about 1,000 prisoners currently imprisoned on such charges.

Bulgaria. Bulgarian performance in this area was mixed, with a welcome increase in the number of Bulgarians allowed to visit the U.S. but continuing reports of difficulties for Americans visiting Bulgaria. The U.S. Embassy in Sofia issued approximately 310 tourist visas to Bulgarian nationals during the period. The cost of Bulgarian exit documentation for private visitors to the U.S. is 100 *leva* (approximately $100 at the official exchange rate).

Conversations with Americans who were successful in obtaining Bulgarian entry visas suggest that some have waited up to a month. A number of Americans of Bulgarian ethnic background, with relatives still living in Bulgaria, have complained to the State Department about Bulgarian denial, without explanation, of their tourist visa requests. Tourist visas for Americans cost $14. A frequent problem for Americans visiting Bulgaria continued to be the Bulgarian requirement—often not made clear to visa applicants—that a special visa is necessary to stay with a relative or friend, instead of the normally required hotel room paid for in hard currency. One case reported to the embassy during the period involved an American of Bulgarian origin who complied with the requirement to book a hotel room but stayed for one night with relatives; a 200-*leva* fine was imposed for the infraction. Minimum currency exchange rules also apply to tourists, and the loss of a "statistical card" (issued upon entry into Bulgaria without explanation of its significance) or its improper stamping by hotels can result in fines of up to 200 *leva*. In theory, travel throughout Bulgaria is unrestricted for tourists, but it is, in fact, subject to governmental regulation without prior notification.

Religious Contacts

In signing the Madrid Concluding Document, the 35 CSCE states agreed to implement further provisions of the Final Act so that religious faiths and their representatives can "develop contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information." As noted

elsewhere in this report, however, religious contacts and information exchange are actively suppressed in the Soviet Union and in some East European countries.

Soviet Union. The Soviet Government continues to allow contacts with religious groups from the West as long as only approved representatives of officially registered churches participate on the Soviet side. The Russian Orthodox Church continues to be an active propagandist for official Soviet policy. Russian Orthodox and some other church representatives were allowed to travel abroad in the reporting period. All were careful to echo official Soviet propaganda in their dealings with foreign leaders.

It is not uncommon for Soviet church leaders to invite individual Western clerics to the Soviet Union. In addition to introducing such guests to places of religious and historical interest, church leaders emphasize the familiar Soviet "peace" theme, which places all the blame for world tensions on the West. Soviet authorities discourage and oftentimes directly interfere with meetings between Western visitors and unofficial religious figures. There are continuing incidents of religious materials being confiscated at the border when Soviet authorities consider the quantity to be in excess of what is required for personal use.

Romania. Officially recognized leaders of Romanian churches are generally allowed to travel to the West to meet or attend conferences with their coreligionists. While some visas are denied visiting clergy to Romania, most are allowed to enter the country to meet with church leaders and attend church services. In some cases, the desire of visiting clergy to address regular church services or to see "unofficial" or embattled clergy has been discouraged or prevented by Romanian authorities.

The ability of religious visitors to Romania to "exchange information" is severely hampered by strict Romanian border controls. It is extremely difficult to bring religious materials into Romania and many visitors report that Bibles—even single copies for personal use—and other religious literature continue to be seized by border authorities.

Poland. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw frequently issues visas to members of the clergy, as most Polish clergymen seem to have no difficulty in obtaining passports for travel abroad. The embassy believes, moreover, that representatives of U.S. religious denominations have been able to travel to Poland without Polish Government interference.

Hungary. Hungary has a good record in this field. There are substantial contacts, and travel is considerable in both directions. The U.S. Embassy in Budapest is not aware of significant problems with religious contacts for any denomination.

German Democratic Republic. Contacts between churches in the G.D.R. and affiliated churches in other countries are relatively good. The majority Evangelical Church enjoys close ties with its counterpart in the F.R.G. and receives considerable material assistance from F.R.G. church bodies. However, members of G.D.R. church organizations have complained of late that G.D.R. authorities were hampering contacts at the local level with coreligionists from the F.R.G., refusing to grant them visas to visit affiliated congregations in the F.R.G.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak record on facilitating travel by religious officials to and from Czechoslovakia remains spotty. When a proposed visit takes place between an officially recognized institution in Czechoslovakia and its counterpart outside, visas are often granted. In the case of the Catholic Church, however, the government has followed an extremely restrictive policy. Pope John Paul II has not been permitted to visit Czechoslovakia, despite an invitation by Cardinal Tomasek and petitions signed by thousands of Czech and Slovak Catholics. Similarly, Catholic priests and other religious leaders who manifest too much independence are frequently denied permission to travel outside Czechoslovakia.

Unofficial or unsanctioned travel by religious groups, or the importation of religious literature and similar activities, is severely punished.

Bulgaria. During the reporting period, the U.S. Embassy in Sofia issued approximately a dozen visitor visas to Bulgarian Orthodox priests for travel to perform religious music in the U.S. At least one U.S. religious representative did visit Bulgaria during the period and was able to contact the Bulgarian religious leaders he wished to meet.

Alarmed by reports of the Bulgarian Government's campaign of forced cultural assimilation directed at the ethnic Turkish minority, the Organization of Islamic Countries named a commission to investigate the situation of the Muslim population in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government refused, in May 1986, to accept an official visit by the commission on the grounds that the status of Muslims in Bulgaria was strictly an internal affair. The Bulgarian authorities, however, reversed their decision in September, offering to accept such a visit, but the group has yet to travel to Bulgaria.

INFORMATION

The Final Act signatories agreed to facilitate wider and freer dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage cooperation in the field of information and exchange of information with other countries, and to improve the working conditions of journalists. The Madrid Concluding Document contains a number of provisions which strengthen the Final Act. Included among these are provisions that commit the participating states to: encourage the sale and distribution of printed matter from other states; decide journalists' visa applications without undue delay; grant permanent correspondents and their families multiple-entry and -exit visas valid for a year; provide more extensive travel opportunities for journalists; increase possibilities for foreign journalists to establish contacts with sources; and allow journalists to carry with them reference materials and personal notes.

Dissemination of Information

Soviet Union. While there is certainly no change in the established pattern of government and party dominance over and censorship of all information and media outlets, there have been isolated instances of greater access for Soviet citizens to American and Western perspectives. Such instances include Soviet coverage of the Chautauqua conference in Latvia in September and participation by Western officials in televised news interview programs. With the exception of rare copies of American communist newspapers, American publications are not available at Soviet newsstands. American noncommunist periodical publications are circulated only among a few westerners and a select Soviet elite. Much the same is true of publications from other Western countries. The Soviet state organization which makes newspaper and magazine subscriptions available to the public lists for the United States only technical, scientific, and communist periodicals, at costs considerably higher than for domestic and East European journals.

The USIA-produced magazine, *America Illustrated,* remains very popular in the U.S.S.R., but it is only available in extremely limited quantities for subscription and newsstand sales. A large number of copies of each issue are returned to the embassy as unsold.

A number of American films are shown to Soviet audiences, but the selection of films is tightly controlled by government censors, and films released domestically tend to reinforce distorted, government-fostered stereotypes of the U.S. All *Voice of America* broadcasts in languages native to the Soviet Union, *Radio Liberty* broadcasts, and *Radio Free Europe* broadcasts continue to be jammed.

Romania. The government seeks total control over dissemination of information in Romania. All media are rigidly controlled and used primarily as vehicles for government and party propaganda. Foreign and even local news items are carefully selected. As a result, domestic media reports are widely ignored or treated with extreme skepticism. An active and imaginative "rumor mill" fills in much of the news gap. Foreign radio broadcasts are not jammed and are a major source of both foreign and domestic news for many Romanians. Romanian libraries carefully control access to information, especially to historical source materials.

In this reporting period, there were no Western periodicals or publications sold to the general public in Romania, although a variety of technical journals and other Western publications, in limited quantities, are available to selected government and party officials, academicians, and scientific researchers. There are no American or other Western books or periodicals sold at Romanian newsstands, even in those hotels used primarily by foreigners. Although Romanian efforts to limit their access were apparent during the reporting period, some Romanians continued to gain access to Western publications through foreign missions' information centers and libraries. A few Romanians have subscriptions to Western periodicals, usually individually purchased during foreign travel. The Romanian Government does not grant permits for its citizens to use foreign exchange for Western periodical subscriptions. American books, usually out-of-date scientific or technical works, are sometimes available in secondhand bookstores.

The severe energy and hard currency shortages faced by Romania have cut down on both the purchases of foreign productions and the total air time of Romanian national television. As a result, opportunities for the airing of American productions have remained few. A limited number of American television shows were broadcast, however, in the reporting period. Older American films are shown commercially on a regular basis in Romanian theaters and on Romanian television.

Poland. Although it is not as open as during the Solidarity period of 1980–81, the Polish media remain the least shackled in the Warsaw Pact. The press continues to be a forum for lively debate on domestic issues, with a relatively wide diversity of philosophical positions maintained by individual publications. They can all be expected to present contending views on economic reform, party ideology, cultural issues, and the role of the church, as well as social and family problems, housing conditions, drug and alcohol abuse, and many other subjects. Newspapers that are not party organs contain a considerable amount of information on cultural events and sociological developments in the United States. Even within the sphere of international issues, and specifically those involving East-West relations, the Polish media contain a handful of well-known journalists who frequently treat individual subjects, such as arms negotiations, by focusing on the facts and eschewing the usual public propaganda lines. Many journalists who, during martial law, were dismissed or who resigned in protest are active again in a variety of smaller circulation, but widely read, publications. Despite occasional, highly publicized crackdowns on individual underground publishing operations, the underground press continues to thrive, churning out leaflets, books, and videotapes on a variety of subjects. During the reporting period, satellite television has been widely discussed by the Polish media, which considers satellite viewing in Poland as inevitable. Approximately 300 persons in the Warsaw area alone reportedly now have the necessary equipment to receive direct broadcasts from the West.

The more orthodox party and government officials attempt to retain tight control over the most influential print and electronic media, aiming at single-minded adherence to the prevailing government line. Poland is a country, however, where the editors of individual publications can and do wield significant influence. Press censorship is practiced, and many articles are self-censored before they reach official eyes. The worth of an editor in chief is measured by his ability to run interference for his staff to get what is considered important in print. Within the parameters of official press policy, the Polish audience is exposed both to ideas and to means of handling controversial issues which would receive little or no public exposure in most other East European countries. The weekly press conferences of government spokesman Jerzy Urban with foreign journalists, which often include pointed questions and detailed information on domestic and foreign policy issues, are given extensive coverage in the official Polish media.

No American periodicals or books are sold publicly in Poland, but personal and institutional subscriptions to some titles are possible, depending on the availability of hard currency. The USIA-produced *Ameryka* and *Problems of Communism* continue to be banned from distribution. Some U.S. news weeklies are found in public reading rooms, and books published in the U.S. can occasionally be found in used book stores. Public and university library purchases of new books and periodicals from the U.S. are severely limited by lack of hard currency. We have received no reports of removal of books from library shelves. Thus, American books and periodicals already in library collections—principally university libraries—remain available to users.

While the Government of Poland facilitates private subscriptions to periodicals from communist countries by permitting subscribers to order them through the Polish central subscription office, control of hard currency expenditure outside of Poland makes it almost impossible for an individual to subscribe to an American periodical.

At the end of the reporting period, seventeen American films were playing in Warsaw's cinemas, including "Cotton Club," "Prizzi's Honor," and "Terms of Endearment." A recently published list of the 10 most popular films in Poland during the first half of 1986 was dominated by six American titles. Although the lack of hard currency has made new acquisitions extremely rare, Polish television recently broadcast several U.S.-produced series and films.

Approximately 75% of *VOA* Polish service shortwave broadcasts and 80% of Polish *RFE* broadcasts were jammed during this period. No *VOA* Polish medium-wave broadcasts have been jammed, and reception on this band continues to be good.

Hungary. Western publications have long been available for purchase in *forints* at major international hotels in Hungary and, since last November, at newsstands throughout the city, although publications that have "embarrassing" articles do not appear. Hungarian citizens can subscribe to Western periodicals, paying in *forints*.

Hungarian media stepped up the coverage of the Chernobyl reactor accident after initial, minimum reportage. TV programs featured panels of scientists, film clips, and interviews with officials responsible for Hungary's reactor at Paks. Hungarian authorities provided the U.S. Embassy in Budapest with information on radiation levels on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis for 3 months following the accident.

In March 1986, the Hungarian Government passed a new press law which set forth the rights and duties of the news media. The impact of the law, in effect only since September, remains to be seen. Neither the official press nor the *samizdat* publishers expect the laws to affect their operations significantly one way or another.

The U.S. Embassy library receives a full range of U.S. newspapers and magazines, but these are read mostly by younger people, few by older, more established Hungarians. The embassy deals with over a thousand readers every month, and the post's Table-of-Contents Service continues to be popular and well used. Hungary translates and publishes the works of several science essayists and regularly laments the fact that the number of titles it translates is not matched by the number of Hungarian titles the U.S. translates into English.

Hungarian media faithfully hew to the Soviet foreign policy line and often quote *TASS* as a means of registering Hungarian disapproval of U.S. policies. Information from media meetings with American policymakers or spokespersons seldom finds its way into reporting. Though it typically refrains from anti-American diatribe, Hungarian-generated comment regarding American policy can often become harsh, such as the party daily's vicious attack on the U.S. air strike against Libya. Personal relations with media representatives remain cordial. For the most part, Hungarians listening to or watching Western radio or television are unimpeded. As a rule, Hungary does not jam *RFE, VOA,* or other Western stations. In contrast to the highly selective jamming of *RFE* in 1985, the embassy is not aware of any jamming during this reporting period.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. Government attempts to control as much of the information available within its territory as possible. The official purpose of the media is to reinforce the values and beliefs professed by the G.D.R. leadership and inherent in its social system. As a result of this policy, states with differing social systems are routinely represented in the worst possible light. G.D.R. coverage of U.S. foreign and domestic affairs continues, for instance, to quote negative comments from the U.S. press out of context and presents distorted pictures of life in the United States.

Print media within the country are effectively controlled, and the import of foreign publications is tightly restricted by postal regulations and border controls. The U.S. Embassy has been able to distribute a variety of printed materials, including *Dialogue* and other USIA-produced magazines. These publications usually reach their recipients, whether mailed or delivered by hand.

G.D.R. broadcasting stations are state owned and directed, but television and radio from abroad cannot be easily controlled. About 80% of G.D.R. households receive television from the F.R.G., and practically every household receives Western radio stations. The state does not try to discourage receipt of foreign broadcasts but finds it necessary to counter criticism in foreign newscasts with stories in its own programming.

Aside from U.S. Communist Party publications, U.S. magazines, newspapers, and books are not available to the general public. The small number of books, magazines, journals, and newspapers received by libraries and institutes are circulated only among a select group. Only a very few researchers and scholars receive subscriptions to U.S. publications. Although that is due, in part, to the difficulty of paying for them in hard currency, it also reflects official roadblocks to receiving such material through the mail. Small numbers of the *International Herald Tribune* and other Western papers are also sold, upon request, for hard currency to foreigners in a few hotels catering to Western visitors.

About 30 U.S. titles each year are translated and printed by government-owned publishing companies, but the printings are small and the books often hard to obtain. The embassy sends books to recipients in the G.D.R. and has exhibited books both in the embassy library and in the book fair in Leipzig. G.D.R. law states that books "whose content violates the preservation of peace or in some other way is counter to the interest of the socialist state and its citizens" may not be distributed. There is no encouragement of any kind for wider usage of U.S. books and periodicals.

Certain visitors are, on occasion, permitted to visit the embassy library for special events. The same people would not, however, be allowed to enter for routine use of the library.

G.D.R. television purchases some U.S. feature films for broadcast. Some films are obviously chosen for their entertainment value, others only because they represent a negative view of U.S. society. Western radio broadcasts (such as *RIAS, VOA, RFE,* and *BBC*) are not jammed.

Czechoslovakia. The poor performance of the Czechoslovak Government concerning the dissemination of printed, filmed, and broadcast information continued during the reporting period. Although information originating from socialist countries is prominently published and broadcast, information from the United States and Western Europe is hard to obtain and restricted by the Czechoslovak Government.

No American publications are sold openly in Czechoslovakia, except for a few copies of the U.S. Communist Party newspaper *Daily World,* which are seen on newsstands irregularly. Only rarely and haphazardly are a few nonpolitical Western publications sold in Czechoslovakia. During the reporting period, the Government of Czechoslovakia did not interfere overtly with the operation of the American Embassy library in Prague, which makes its nearly 5,000 American books and 114 current U.S. periodicals in the English language accessible to the public daily. However, access to the library is clearly discouraged by the presence of armed Czechoslovak guards outside the embassy and the widespread fear among Czechoslovak citizens that they will have difficulties should they visit the library. Our embassy's press and culture section distributes 164 subscriptions to American periodicals (105 titles) to Czechoslovak citizens and institutions under our periodical presentation program, but we continue to receive complaints that subscriptions are often interrupted.

Some American books and periodicals are available on a restricted basis in technical and university libraries. English departments at the major Czechoslovak universities maintain collections of American literature, but

these contain many gaps, particularly in recent American fiction and criticism. Moreover, the departmental libraries are generally open only to faculty members and students majoring in English. The 1983 Czechoslovak Government directive that changes the terms of payment for periodical subscriptions from "non-socialist countries" from Czechoslovak crowns to U.S. dollars or other convertible currency is still in force. Since hard currency payment by individuals and institutions is a real burden, the long-term result of the directive probably is a substantial reduction in the number and variety of foreign publications purchased from the West.

While the Czechoslovak State Library spends some $10,000 annually on U.S. books, they are mainly of a technical nature and are available only to selected institutions and individuals.

American films make up a larger percentage of films shown commercially than films from any other Western country. Among the U.S. films screened in Prague during the reporting period was the long-awaited "Amadeus" by Czechoslovak expatriate Milos Forman. Most U.S. films are at least several years old and contain nothing that could be considered offensive to socialism or to the Czechoslovak Government. American films rarely appear on Czechoslovak television.

Radio Free Europe is jammed heavily in Prague and other cities, but it is often possible to receive its transmissions in the countryside or, by changing frequencies, to pick it up in the big cities. The *Voice of America* is not jammed.

Bulgaria. Strong communist party control of the Bulgarian media continues. No Western periodicals, with the occasional exception of those published by Western communist parties, are made available to Bulgarian citizens. When foreign publications are provided for visiting westerners, Bulgarian citizens are denied access to those publications.

Western films and, in particular, American films are regularly shown in Bulgarian cinemas. "Tootsie" and "Frances" are recent examples. The national film archives—open to the public—continue to show an American film every Monday and Friday. During the past 6 months, Bulgarian television has shown Western programs on a regular basis. Many Western plays are performed at Bulgarian theaters, and Western music is regularly heard on Bulgarian radio.

Working Conditions for Journalists

Soviet Union. During this reporting period, harassment of foreign journalists continued. Moscow-based American correspondents continue to be attacked in the Soviet media for allegedly tendentious reporting. In July, one Moscow-based American correspondent was detained at Moscow airport, and manuscripts were confiscated by Soviet authorities before he was allowed to proceed on his trip.

Nicholas Daniloff, the Bureau Chief for *U.S.News & World Report,* was arrested on August 30, charged with espionage on September 7, and was awaiting trial at the end of the reporting period. His eventual release came only after prolonged, intense pressure from the U.S. Government and elsewhere. He was entrapped by Soviet authorities and was being used as a hostage in an attempt to force the release of a Soviet UN employee arrested and indicted for espionage in the U.S. 3 days before Daniloff's arrest.

Since the last report, the Soviet authorities have approved the application of the *Wall Street Journal* to open a Moscow Bureau. Approval is still being withheld, however, for a *Washington Times* bureau.

For the first time in recent memory, the Soviets issued temporary accreditations to *VOA* correspondents. Clearly test cases, four *VOA* journalists were approved to cover the Tchaikovsky Competition and Goodwill games. On the other hand, the Soviets denied a visa to one of three *VOA* correspondents scheduled to cover the Chautauqua conference in Jurmala, Latvia.

During the reporting period, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow issued 34 visas to Soviet journalists for permanent accreditation and shorter professional visits. No visas in this category were refused, nor were there any delays in issuance. A number of other Soviet journalists received U.S. visas as members of official delegations visiting the United States for other purposes, for example, to participate in meetings or sporting events.

Romania. Romania openly seeks to manipulate and control journalists. A lecture from Romania's National Press Agency on the need for more objective reporting is standard procedure for all incoming journalists. Although the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest has vigorously complained when visas were not forthcoming, a number of U.S. journalists experienced difficulties in getting visas in the reporting period. Western journalists can obtain government-arranged interviews and occasionally manage to make unofficial contacts with Romanian citizens, but, by and large, they depend heavily on diplomatic and Western business contacts as sources of information.

There are no permanently accredited American journalists resident in Romania. Approximately 20 single-entry visas per year are granted to visiting American journalists. Three nonresident American journalists are accredited in Bucharest, but they, too, are granted only single-entry visas.

Journalists from *Time* magazine and the *Christian Science Monitor* who wrote critical articles on Romania did not receive visas the next time they applied, though their requests never were officially rejected. Program deadlines forced a CBS "60 Minutes" team also to cancel a planned visit when their request for visas remained unanswered for several months. While no American journalists have been expelled from Romania in recent years, a number have been denied reentry, evidently due to Romanian Government displeasure over previous reporting. Only one Romanian journalist has traveled to the U.S. in the past 12 months.

The Romanian Government provides opportunities for journalists to travel under controlled conditions, usually only to government-approved destinations and with official escorts. Foreign journalists, may, however, travel unescorted, by rental car or public transportation. Unofficial contact by journalists with individual Romanians is discouraged by a Romanian law, which requires its citizens to report contacts and the substance of conversations with any foreigner. Romanian stringers hired by American and Western news agencies must have Romanian Government approval.

During this period, there were no problems getting Romanian authorization for radio and television journalists to bring their own technicians, equipment, and professional reference materials into the country. There is meticulous recording of serial numbers, however. In the case of typewriters, a sample of the typeface must be submitted as well.

American and other national press centers are allowed for certain events, such as the 1985 visit of Secretary of State George Shultz. Events at the Romanian Foreign Press Club are very rare.

Poland. Although interviews with government officials must be officially arranged, resident and visiting American journalists rarely report any difficulty in obtaining access to important sources. The Polish Government spokesman's weekly press conferences for foreign correspondents are well attended and often include newsworthy announcements and considerable give-and-take. Foreign journalists may travel freely without prior permission, although many have been stopped by provincial authorities for document checks and car searches.

Technical equipment is imported without restriction, but technical assistance is not. Film crews and other technical personnel must be hired locally and be approved and registered with the Foreign Ministry. The authorities continue to harass some news organization bureaus in Warsaw by refusing to allow selected employees of these organizations to continue working and rejecting work permit requests for others. We have heard no reports of either visiting or resident journalists being denied access to reference material for professional use.

While no new permanent accreditations were granted to U.S. media representatives during this reporting period, the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw estimates that 19 visas have been granted to U.S. journalists not permanently accredited. The only visa refusals that the embassy is aware of involve a *Voice of America* correspondent who has been denied twice in the reporting period and a *Newsweek* reporter who was denied a visa because he interviewed Solidarity leader Bujak while he was still in hiding. No American journalists have been expelled from Poland during the reporting period, and we know of no delays in issuing visas for visiting correspondents. There are now 16 U.S. journalists and two television producers permanently accredited in Poland. They and their families have multiple-entry visas which must be renewed every year. There are no travel restrictions in Poland for resident or visiting foreign journalists.

Although the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw issued no visas for permanent accreditation to Polish journalists during the reporting period, six visas were issued for shorter visits. None were delayed or denied.

The Interpress press center in Warsaw is open to both national and foreign correspondents.

Hungary. American journalists generally have no difficulty getting visas for Hungary. The official press center, Pressinform, assists foreign as well as national journalists. By appointment, foreign journalists also have access to the press center of the Hungarian Journalists' Association. Several U.S. journalists enter Hungary on multiple-entry visas approved in 1982. The U.S. Embassy in Budapest knows of no American correspondents who have been expelled from the country.

Radio and television journalists can bring their own technicians and equipment into Hungary, provided advance notification is given and the items are registered with Hungarian customs authorities. They can also take with them reference materials for professional use without any difficulty. The embassy is not aware of any difficulties imposed on foreign journalists who seek to establish and maintain personal contacts and communications with either official or nonofficial sources, and there are no areas closed to travel in Hungary.

During the reporting period, a PBS TV crew from KCET-Los Angeles spent 6 weeks taping a 1-hour special on the Hungarian revolution and its 30-year aftermath. Although the topic was sensitive, the project—including spontaneous interviews with everyday Hungarians—went forward as desired by the TV crew.

During the reporting period, U.S. visas were granted to two permanently accredited Hungarian journalists and their families, and 13 were issued to Hungarian journalists for shorter periods. No such visas were refused or delayed more than 6 months.

German Democratic Republic. While foreign journalists are generally treated correctly by G.D.R. officials, their ability to report on events in the G.D.R. is severely limited by laws restricting travel, information, and the ability to meet with officials and individuals. Although accredited journalists are sometimes able to circumvent these laws, visiting journalists are required to follow a strictly orchestrated, escorted program organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and are issued visas only for the period of the program.

AP and the communist *Daily Worker* are the only U.S. organizations with resident permanent accreditation in the G.D.R. Their representatives, and their families, have multiple-entry visas valid for 1 year. The 11th SED Party Congress and the 25th anniversary of the building of the Berlin Wall account for the small reported increase in temporary visas for U.S. journalists in the reporting period.

The G.D.R. continues to deny approximately 100 American journalists visas per year. The U.S. Embassy in Berlin has received a number of complaints from American journalists of delays in responding to their requests to come to the G.D.R. No U.S. journalists have been expelled in the reporting period.

All travel outside of Berlin must be approved by the Foreign Ministry. This regulation is seldom enforced and is used by the authorities as a legal basis for harassment when one is desired.

Access to information and people remains carefully controlled by G.D.R. laws limiting the ability of journalists to meet contacts and the ability of private G.D.R. citizens to speak with foreigners.

Authorization for radio and television journalists to bring their own technicians and equipment into the G.D.R. has generally been granted. While G.D.R. authorities insist that foreign journalists, like other foreigners, are subject to restrictions on the printed material they can bring into the G.D.R., journalists generally have had no trouble in bringing in needed materials. An international press center with facilities open to foreign journalists is located in Berlin and, during the fairs, in Leipzig.

No U.S. visas were issued to official G.D.R. correspondents in the reporting period.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government's generally poor handling of Western journalists in Czechoslovakia has continued. Foreign press centers in Prague and Bratislava provide little useful information. Access to government officials and "newsworthy" data are sharply restricted.

The U.S. Embassy in Prague reports that at least two Czechoslovak visas for permanent accreditation were granted during the reporting period, as well as about two dozen short-term visas, mainly to journalists covering the Women's Tennis Federation Cup in July. To the embassy's knowledge, no applications were refused during the reporting period, and no American journalists were expelled. In July, however, a *Washington Post* correspondent was interrogated for 40 minutes by police after he completed an interview with the mother of defector Michal Pivonka, now a U.S. hockey player.

Eleven American journalists are permanently accredited to Czechoslovakia at the present time, representing the Associated Press, *Detroit Free Press, Financial Times,* ARD, *New York Times,* Reuters, Time-Life, *U.S.News & World Report,* UPI, the *Voice of America,* the *Washington Post,* and others. CBS and ABC TV correspondents are currently waiting for permanent nonresident accreditation. In August, the bureau chief of ABC News Warsaw applied for nonresident accreditation but, in general, the Czechoslovak Government has been reluctant to grant permanent accreditation to U.S. television representatives.

There are no travel restrictions for accredited journalists, except in security areas; however, Czechoslovak authorities have not undertaken to improve their travel programs for foreign journalists.

The Czechoslovak Government permits radio and television journalists to bring their own technicians and equipment but encourages use of locally supplied technical personnel and equipment. Journalists are permitted to carry professional reference material with them, but it is usually scrutinized by border guards and customs officials on entering and leaving Czechoslovakia.

One U.S. visa was granted to a Czechoslovak correspondent for permanent accreditation and a number of visas were issued for shorter visits during the reporting period. At present, there are three accredited Czechoslovak journalists in the U.S.

Bulgaria. Poor working conditions and occasional harassment of foreign journalists persist in Bulgaria. Journalists who seek out news and report it as they find it, regardless of whether or not it is favorable to the government or obtained from official sources, often are frustrated by the authorities. While all areas of Bulgaria are theoretically open to journalists, Western journalists are actively discouraged from visiting ethnic Turkish areas, except as part of officially sponsored tours.

There are no resident and six nonresident American journalists accredited to Bulgaria. Radio and TV journalists and film crews are permitted to bring their equipment into the country. The government organization which is responsible for visiting journalists charges a fee to nonaccredited journalists for making appointments with officials and others in Bulgaria. The average cost for this service is $200 for 3 days' work, and more if the journalist stays longer.

COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE FIELDS OF CULTURE AND EDUCATION

This section of Basket III commits the signatories to facilitate cultural and educational exchanges, improve access to cultural achievements, expand contacts between educational institutions, increase international scientific cooperation, and encourage the study of foreign languages.

General Considerations

Exchanges are an integral aspect of relations among the participating CSCE states. The examples listed in this section are only a partial accounting of the exchanges and the state of cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union and East European countries. The highlights are indicative, however, of the scope of exchanges and cooperative ventures—both publicly supported and sponsored and strictly private in nature—initiated or in progress during the reporting period.

The following table shows the number of lecturers and researchers exchanged during the reporting period under the Fulbright and International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) programs with the Soviet Union and East European countries.

Fulbright and IREX Programs

Fulbright	From U.S.	To U.S.
Bulgaria	2	5
Czechoslovakia	5	3
G.D.R.	0	0
Hungary	10	16
Poland	15	18
Romania	7	0
Soviet Union	6	6
IREX	**From U.S.**	**To U.S.**
Bulgaria	9	2
Czechoslovakia	6	12
G.D.R.	5	11
Hungary	3	7
Poland	3	5
Romania	0	2
Soviet Union	52	46

Soviet Union. The major development of this reporting period was the initial implementation of exchanges following the signing of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. General Exchanges Agreement in November 1985 in Geneva. President Reagan's initiative to promote people-to-people exchanges has raised hopes for increasing contacts between private groups and individuals in the two countries.

Since the signing of the new exchanges agreement, there has been an increase in activity in the field of culture, although, as in the previous reporting period, many projects remain under discussion. There were several American art exhibits in the U.S.S.R. during the period. The U.S. National Gallery and the Hermitage and Pushkin Museums exchanged exhibits of the French impressionists. The Armand Hammer collection of great masters toured several cities in the U.S.S.R. A USIA-sponsored exhibit of American woodcuts was shown in Moscow and Leningrad.

The United States designated as official exchanges two tours by American performers during the period. In April, pianist Vladimir Horowitz gave recitals in Moscow and Leningrad. Horowitz's concerts were the the cultural event of the year in the U.S.S.R. In September, the Paul Winter Consort gave a series of jazz concerts to enthusiastic audiences in Irkutsk, Moscow, and Leningrad. During the same period, the Soviet Union sent a number of performing arts groups to the U.S., including the Kirov Ballet, the Moiseev Dance Ensemble, the Ganelin Jazz Trio, and the the Moscow State Children's Musical Theater.

Despite these and other promising developments, imbalances in the number of performing arts exchanges remained in U.S.-Soviet cultural relations, with more Soviet groups coming to the U.S. than U.S. groups touring the U.S.S.R. This imbalance may be alleviated as more U.S. groups schedule performances in the U.S.S.R. The cultural atmosphere in the U.S.S.R. has become more receptive to exchanges, but Soviet bureaucratic inertia is still such a major factor that long delays in planning, organization, and programs are common, and some projects remain unrealizable.

Programs for Russian-language study between American colleges and universities and Soviet academic institutions such as Moscow's Pushkin Institute and Leningrad State University remain active. American students travel to Leningrad State University for language study under the auspices of the Council on International Educational Exchange (CIEE). The American Council of Teachers of Russian (ACTR), Ohio State University, and Middlebury College provide opportunities for American college students to undertake advanced language study programs in Leningrad,

as well. Approximately 280 Russian-language students from the U.S. will take part in these programs during the coming year, a slight increase over participation in previous years. Ambitious plans by U.S. organizers for dramatic increases in participation were not realized in 1986–87, since Soviet host institutions claimed they were unable to accommodate many additional language students, given limitations of facilities and teaching staff.

Promising developments in people-to-people exchanges included the Chautauqua town meeting in Latvia, where a U.S. delegation of nearly 200 persons interacted with a Soviet audience of over 1,000 persons over a period of 5 days. Also, the Soviet sister-cities organization signed an agreement in April with Sister Cities International, initiating 16 U.S.-Soviet sister-city links.

A small number of Soviet English-language and American Russian-language teachers were exchanged between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the reporting period, as part of both government-supported and private exchanges. The American Field Service-Ministry of Education exchange of high school language teachers, which had been canceled after the Soviet shootdown of KAL Flight 007 in 1983, was renewed in 1986–87, and the Ministry of Education expressed interest in expanding the program from 6 to 10 participants annually from each side.

The number of participants in official exchange programs, including those administered by IREX and the Council for International Exchange of Scholars (CIES), increased slightly (from 60 to approximately 70 for each side), although minimum numbers outlined in the new cultural agreement were not achieved. Improvements in Soviet performance were noted, as the Ministry of Higher Education brought its procedures for nominating, placing, and informing scholars of archival access and other pertinent data in line with specific timetables outlined in the new agreement. Archival access granted to scholars also appeared to be more extensive than that given to exchanges in the last academic year, but the access has yet to be put to the test by scholars, who arrived in the U.S.S.R. only in September. Improvement was also noted in placement of American scholars, the majority of whom were assigned to institutions they specifically requested. There were no serious cases of misassignment, and the availability of data on archival access, approved research travel, etc., suggested that all U.S. exchanges would probably have the minimum conditions necessary for successful program completion. Soviet sponsors continued to have difficulty in getting Soviet clearances for their own grantees to travel, although the number of last-minute withdrawals and postponements was much smaller than in recent years, and more Soviet scholars traveled in the fall semester than had recently been the case.

The Fulbright lecturer program appeared to have benefited from the improved administrative procedures adopted by the Ministry of Higher Education. U.S. lecturers still, however, lacked information on faculty consultants assigned to help them and on specific courses they would be required to teach. No visa denials were noted for U.S. exchangees. Six out of eight Soviet lecturers expected to travel in the fall semester of 1986 did, in fact, arrive in the U.S., which was a substantial improvement over previous years, when last-minute postponements and withdrawals were the rule.

Romania. Visits, exhibits, film showings, book fairs, magazine exchanges, and performing arts exchanges all come under the U.S.-Romanian Cultural Exchange Agreement or the agreement which originally established the American and Romanian libraries in the two countries. Film showings are a regular feature of the program of the American Library in Bucharest, and various exhibitions have been held at the library in the past 6 months. Access to these showings, and the library generally, is basically unimpeded, though frequent visitors may be questioned and discouraged by the authorities. Invitees to film showings cannot attend unless they receive explicit approval from authorities. Since implementation of the law limiting contacts with foreigners, some Romanians report they have been told they should not come to the American library. Major U.S. film and art exhibits are scheduled in the next fiscal year in Bucharest and a number of other cities. American speakers on all topics continue to draw good audiences, both at Romanian institutions and at the American center. Programs have included a seminar on arms control, a specialist on East-West affairs, and several economists.

Most other Western countries report shrinkage of cultural exchange programs, with some longstanding activities eliminated. Financial restrictions typically are cited by Romanian authorities as the reason. Romanian priorities appear to exclude academic exchange in nontechnical areas. East Germany and Yugoslavia also have suffered major reductions in their cultural exchange programs with Romania.

Romanian compliance with the Final Act's provisions on translation, publication, and dissemination of written works from other states remains poor. Although the Romanian-Hungarian cultural exchange agreement provides for the importation of a large number of Hungarian-language books into Romania each year, authorities have interdicted nearly all such imports. The U.S.-Romanian cultural agreement calls for increased exchange of materials for translation and publication, but interest in a seminar on the subject, initially proposed by the Romanians, seems to have disappeared. The Government of Romania has shown no inclination to promote dissemination of and access to books, films, and other forms of cultural expression. Foreign exchange shortages and rigid ideological controls have made it unlikely that this situation will change.

The Romanian Ministry of Education maintains correct relations with U.S. authorities but, too often, seems reluctant to deal with the needs and requirements of American scholars. Approval has been granted for only 6 of the 10 American Fulbright professors proposed for this year. American researchers continue to experience unreasonable delays in getting access to research and archival materials. There are no open-access libraries (other than small neighborhood libraries) in Romania, except those associated with diplomatic missions. Foreigners, other than official grantees, usually are not allowed to use library or archival facilities.

The number of Romanian professors who have taken up Fulbright professorships in the U.S. has gradually declined from ten in 1982–83 to five in 1985–86. Six have been promised, but none have yet been named for the 1986–87 academic year. This number stands in stark contrast to 10 years ago, when the Romanians were sending as many as 35 research scholars per year to the U.S. The principal reason given for this decline is that the teaching load and rules governing extended absences do not allow sufficient time for most professors to undertake lengthy research projects abroad. A new 2-year cultural agreement will be renegotiated in December 1986.

Poland. There are no official bilateral exchanges between the U.S. and Poland. The Government of Poland continues to send orchestras, art

exhibits, and other such attractions to the United States, but these activities are commercial undertakings, not government-to-government programs. Various American musicians and artists continued to visit Poland under private arrangements during the reporting period, most notably poet Allen Ginsberg and composer Elliot Carter. A favorable development in August-September was the USIA-facilitated exhibit of photographs by American photographer Paul Caponigro in Warsaw and Krakow galleries. A lack of hard currency, rather than any concerted attempt to exclude Americans, keeps the number of visiting American artists at a modest level.

Polish publishers continue to publish translations of Western authors, although much of what is currently in print results from contracts signed several years ago. The lack of hard currency and ideological pressures to publish more works from "fraternal socialist countries" contributes to the shortage of Western books, magazines, films, and other sources of information.

The Polish Government's cultural policy toward Poland's minorities can be described as benign neglect. Although there has been a great deal of public attention to the importance of Poland's Jewish cultural heritage, official attempts to preserve it have been limited and archival in nature. Plans are underway, however, to establish an institute for the history and culture of Jews in Poland at Jagiellonian University. Other small national minorities, such as Ukrainians, Belorussians, Tatars, etc., maintain their cultural identity almost exclusively through their own efforts.

Both government-to-government and private academic exchanges continue, although the Government of Poland inhibits USIA's International Visitors (IV) Program by forbidding private Poles to accept official invitations from the U.S. Government. During the reporting period, however, a Polish scientist from the Ministry of Environmental Protection was officially invited and took part in the International Visitors Program. This represents the first official Polish acknowledgment of the IV program in 4 years.

The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw is aware of no problems regarding access to archival material experienced by IREX scholars.

Hungary. Cultural relations between Hungary and the U.S. continue to expand. "Filmmaking in America" finished a very successful tour of four Hungarian provincial cities. Directors of the cultural centers who hosted the exhibit competed with each other for the highest attendance figures. In return, Hungary began a 2-year tour in the United States of its "Gold and Silver" exhibit.

Over the past 6 months, 19 Hungarians have traveled to the U.S. as International Visitor grantees, providing some of Hungary's most promising politicians and professionals contacts with counterparts in the U.S. The program continues to expand well beyond the 20 stipulated in the bilateral agreement. Hungarian participants are most interested in business management, energy, and agriculture.

The Salgo chair in American studies is in its fourth year at the Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest. The Fulbright program remains at four lecturers and six researchers in each direction each year. Additionally, six Fulbright graduate students are beginning studies in both countries in the fields of literature, drama, music, economics, medicine, and sociology. The universities in Pecs and Szeged continue to ask for American lecturers, and we will place an American literature specialist in Szeged this academic year. A new lectureship in economics opened up at the Karl Marx University, and several American universities have sent representatives to Hungary to develop private exchange programs. Hungarian students at all levels are interested in studying in the U.S., particularly in fields where the U.S. is prominent or for which there is little opportunity to study in Hungary. Currently there are many solid university-to-university relationships. The major problem is money, and Hungarian students must have complete funding from American universities if they hope to study in the U.S. Currently, five students, both undergraduates and graduates, are beginning studies in the United States.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. continues to maintain rigid control over access to its institutions, and all cultural proposals must be submitted through the Foreign Ministry. The process of internal review is painfully slow and creates confusion and delays. People are discouraged from cooperating with the U.S. Embassy in Berlin directly and are denied any freedom of action. The G.D.R. continues to assert that cultural relations should be arranged only under a bilateral cultural agreement, and ad hoc arrangements outside of such an agreement remain difficult to arrange. Certain programs proposed could readily have been arranged by the G.D.R. but were refused for political reasons. Private exchanges are discouraged by the G.D.R., unless they bring hard currency earnings to the country. During the reporting period, G.D.R. writers invited to American universities and certain artists nominated for participation in the Embassy's International Visitor Program have been denied permission to travel.

The G.D.R. views culture as a means of propagating communist ideology. The state carefully considers every cultural program in the light of political and ideological considerations. Except for cultural programs transmitted from abroad via television or radio, which by their nature cannot be controlled at the borders, all cultural offerings must be approved by state authorities before being made available to local audiences. The circulation of all unapproved books, films, publications, and other forms of cultural expression is forbidden. The government makes available those elements of foreign culture which it considers favorable to its world view by providing subsidies and arranging publication and distribution of materials. All other cultural products are not only discouraged but actively proscribed. Invitational film showings in the U.S. Embassy in Berlin are open only to individuals who receive permission to attend from the authorities.

The United States has had only limited success in setting up and maintaining exchanges in the reporting period. U.S. cultural figures have not been able to address G.D.R. audiences or to lecture at G.D.R. universities except under ostensibly private university-to-university agreements in which the embassy's role was indirect. The U.S. has regularly assisted with the scheduling of lectures for G.D.R. writers, filmmakers, and musicians in the U.S.

Approval has been given for a major U.S. film exhibit requested by the embassy in 1984, and arrangements are nearing completion for a spring 1987 showing. There is occasional commercial American participation in G.D.R. cultural festivals, and while there are no existing performing arts exchanges, some travel of performing artists is arranged through the U.S.-G.D.R. Friendship Society. Several institutions exchange publications under nongovernmental (at least on the U.S. side) programs.

Bilateral relations in the field of education have remained relatively constant over the reporting period. Although there are no governmental

programs, academic exchanges in the G.D.R. are organized under the IREX program, as direct university-to-university programs, or under the limited National Academy of Sciences exchange agreement. The several American institutions involved have indicated interest in expanding the scope of these programs but have been critical of G.D.R. efforts to keep American participants in the G.D.R. institutions as separate as possible from colleagues and distant from students. Exchanges are underway between Johns Hopkins and Humboldt, between Kent State and Leipzig, between Brown and Rostock, and between Colby College and Schiller University. The G.D.R.-U.S. Friendship Society also has a limited number of scholarships for U.S. students.

IREX provides 60 man-months of exchanges in each direction. In general, the G.D.R. side has provided access to library and archival material requested, except in the case of archives under the control of the Ministry of the Interior, which has major historical holdings. Scholars not under the IREX program or a university-to-university program seldom can arrange access to G.D.R. materials or obtain permission to interview individuals. In general, however, after an academic or research program has received the necessary clearances, the G.D.R. authorities are scrupulous in assisting the scholar in carrying it through.

The G.D.R. has recently accepted the proposal of the U.S. Embassy in Berlin's to establish a modest Fulbright Exchange Program. Decisions concerning implementation are currently being negotiated.

Czechoslovakia. Overall bilateral relations in the field of culture and education have shown some improvement during the reporting period. On April 15, 1986, the Czechoslovak Government and the U.S. signed their first Bilateral Exchanges Agreement and Program Document. The agreement has expanded exchanges in the fields of social science and the humanities as well as in science and technology. Despite some strain in implementation, there will be 11 American Fulbright scholars in Czechoslovakia by January and an equivalent number of Czechoslovak exchangees in the U.S.

Several embassy-sponsored American exhibits were mounted with the cooperation of Czechoslovak authorities. In the spring, "Architecture Today" was hosted by organizations in Bratislava and Prague. In April, Kosice was the venue for a major fine arts exhibition by American Indian artists Allen Houser and Dan Namingha. A large English-teaching materials book display, "TEFL/TESL," was seen by teaching specialists in Bratislava and at three English-teaching summer seminars. In addition, the Czechoslovak Government has agreed to host two major USIA exhibits, "American Woodcuts" and "American Theater Today."

American performers continue to appear in Czechoslovakia on a commercial basis, most notably during the annual Prague spring festival. In June, the Czechoslovak authorities programmed "American Ambassador" pianist Stephen Drury, the first official embassy-sponsored concert in cooperation with the Czechoslovak Government since 1978.

Czechoslovak authorities have shown interest in several visits by Czechoslovak specialists to the U.S. under the International Visitors Program. Five Czechoslovaks traveled to the U.S. in the reporting period for programs in literature, dramatic arts, library science, and environmental protection, and one noted translator and author attended the Iowa Writer's Workshop. One film director attended a multiregional project on film, and yet another specialist will attend a project on the teaching of English as a foreign language during this reporting period.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Czech and Slovak Ministries of Education have been a bit less reluctant to accept embassy programming of American specialists in American literature and other fields at Czechoslovak institutions, although many embassy letters regarding the possibility of programming these speakers still go unanswered. Nevertheless, some of the eight speakers the embassy managed to program during the reporting period were also programmed at the American Embassy Library in Prague, and authorities did not object to attendance at these lectures by Czechoslovak citizens.

While the Czechoslovak Government undertakes to disseminate and translate written works from socialist countries, American literature in translation, found at many bookstores, seems chosen with an eye to its negative view of American society rather than for its literary merit. A number of quality U.S. bestsellers do get translated, nevertheless, and American fiction is translated quite regularly in the magazine *World Literature*. Customs duties have not been lowered to promote the dissemination of and access to books, films, and other forms of cultural expression from the U.S.

During the reporting period, four American Fulbright scholars arrived to take positions in Czechoslovak institutions. By January, the nearly full complement of 11 scholars will be in place in each country. This summer, there was no expansion in the English-teaching seminars held in Czechoslovakia, in which four American lecturers participated with embassy support, although the new exchanges agreement allowed for up to 10 specialists to participate each summer. Exchanges under the IREX Program have not increased during the reporting period, but some progress was seen in direct university affiliations.

The embassy received no complaints during the reporting period from U.S. grantees regarding access to archives or libraries.

Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government continues to construe the U.S.-Bulgarian Bilateral Cultural Agreement narrowly in an attempt to limit the access of the U.S. Embassy in Sofia to Bulgarian media and cultural institutions.

Popular demand for the USIA Bulgarian-language publication *Spectur* is growing, and embassy distribution of *Spectur* has risen from 6,000 to 8,000 copies per quarter.

Bulgarian authorities have, to an extent, relaxed bureaucratic blocks in the way of the USIA-sponsored visitor's program. The embassy was able to place four such visitors in FY 1986, as opposed to only one in FY 1985. A performing arts group, the first USIA-sponsored group in several years, and two U.S. exhibits were presented to Bulgarian audiences during the reporting period, as well. ■

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Vienna CSCE Followup Meeting October 1986

Background: On November 4, 1986, in Vienna, the 35 states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will meet to review implementation of commitments undertaken when their governments signed the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. The Final Act established a code of conduct for participating states' behavior and outlined practical steps for reducing the barriers dividing Europe. It also created a forum in which the states of Eastern and Western Europe, as well as the US and Canada, discuss security, economic, and human rights issues. Two followup meetings have already been held in Belgrade (1977-78) and Madrid (1980-83). These meetings, in turn, mandated periodic meetings of experts on particular aspects of the Final Act. Most recently, experts from CSCE states have met to discuss human rights (Ottawa, 1985), cultural freedom and cooperation (Budapest, 1985), and human contacts (Bern, 1986).

Progress to date: Although the CSCE balance sheet shows mixed results to date, the basic fact of the CSCE process has been the failure of the Soviet Union and, to varying degrees, its East European allies to comply with their Helsinki and Madrid commitments. As Secretary Shultz stated in 1985: "Ten years after the signing of the Final Act, no one can deny the gap between hope and performance. Despite the real value of the Final Act as a standard of conduct, the most important promises of a decade ago have not been kept."

Egregious new compliance failures occur and old ones continue. The Soviet Union still occupies Afghanistan and imprisons and otherwise penalizes its own citizens for exercising the rights and freedoms promised in the Final Act. Despite the recent resolution of several cases, many Soviet citizens married to Americans are cruelly separated from their spouses by official denial of exit permission. The number of Soviet Jews allowed to emigrate, mainly for family reunification, has fallen drastically from the levels permitted in the late 1970s. The same is true for Soviet citizens of German and Armenian nationality. Recently, US reporter Nicholas Daniloff was taken hostage on fabricated charges of espionage--in flagrant violation of CSCE pledges concerning the treatment of journalists.

Over the years, however, there has been some progress in CSCE. Some Warsaw Pact states have taken steps toward fulfilling their Helsinki and Madrid CSCE commitments, and a few notable cases involving human rights activists and divided families have been resolved. Under the CSCE umbrella, contacts between the peoples of Eastern and Western Europe have multiplied. At the Stockholm Conference on Security- and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE), the 35 participants concluded more than two and one-half years of negotiations in September 1986 with agreement on specific measures to reduce the risk of war through miscalculation. The agreement, which enters into effect in January 1987, extends Helsinki provisions

concerning the notification and observation of military activities from the Atlantic to the Urals. For the first time, the East accepted challenge inspection of such activities by other states.

US objectives: For the US and its NATO allies at Vienna, the primary aim is to improve significantly Eastern compliance with all the principles and provisions of the Helsinki and Madrid documents. At the outset, the West will review thoroughly Eastern performance since the close of the Madrid meeting, raising specific problems in conference sessions and bilateral meetings.

Another important aim is to promote balanced progress among the different dimensions of the CSCE process to ensure human rights are given at least equal weight with other CSCE elements. Balance is critical to promoting the Final Act's goals of security and cooperation. The successful outcome of the Stockholm security talks highlights the need to address human problems--human rights, basic freedoms, and humanitarian cooperation. Tangible steps in these fields are necessary if the CSCE process is to advance. It is important that new steps forward be based solidly on significant improvement in compliance with existing commitments.

Considerable interest has been expressed in encouraging compliance and cooperation on economic, environmental, and scientific matters. The meeting also will review the future of the CDE conference in the context of the broader CSCE process.

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Author's original

WHITE SOUTHERN PUBLIC OPINION AND DESEGREGATION

A LONG LOOK BACK

by

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In 1942, only two percent of white Southerners responding to a survey by the National Opinion Research Center said that black and white children should attend the same schools. The proportions in favor of desegregating public transportation and neighborhoods were almost as small: 4% and 12%, respectively.[1] This was, for all intents and purposes, unanimity. White Southern opposition to desegregation was widely regarded as simply an immutable fact, one that would have to be reckoned with by anyone concerned to improve Southern race relations. It appeared to be true, as U. B. Phillips had written fourteen years earlier, that a determination that the South "be and remain a white man's country" was "the cardinal test of a Southerner."[2] It went without saying, of course, that "a Southerner" was white.

It is true that white Southerners who supported segregation in 1942 were merely endorsing the existing state of affairs: in the case of schools and public transportation, arrangements required by law in most of the South. But in 1956, two years after Brown v. Board of Education, only 14% of Southern whites favored school desegregation. Reporting a study conducted as late as 1961, Donald Matthews and James Prothro concluded that "only a significant change in white racial attitudes, awareness, and expectations" could ensure "the prevention of a racial holocaust and the preservation of political democracy in the South."[3]

Nineteen years after that, however, in 1980, only one white Southern parent in twenty objected to sending a child to school

with "a few" black children -- supported school segregation, that is, *in principle*.[4] It is now impossible to find any body of respectable opinion willing to express support for *de jure* segregation.

This does not reflect a general increase in social liberalism. To take only one striking example, a study of 41 fundamentalist ministers in North Carolina, 35 of whom favored Senator Jesse Helms in the then-current senatorial election, classified three-quarters of them as "liberal" or "moderate" in their racial views. Most supported racial equality as a "Christian goal" and only a bare majority even opposed affirmative action (as a form of discrimination against whites). Several volunteered that they had come to admire Martin Luther King after disliking him in the 1960s, and three independently admitted that they occasionally rewrote Dr. King's sermons and preached them (presumably without their congregations' knowledge).[5]

Even if there is an element of hypocrisy in these survey responses and these testimonials, even if people say what they think they ought to say and not what they really believe, it is significant that white Southerners now believe they ought not to object to desegregation. That itself is a change no one would have predicted in 1942.

Andrew Greeley has argued that this breaking up of an orthodoxy -- not just the destruction of a consensus, but the emergence of a new, contradictory one -- is "one of the most

impressive social accomplishments of modern times."[6] Certainly it is at least one of the most complete turnarounds in the history of public opinion polling. Moreover, in historical and comparative terms, it happened very quickly, and it can be argued that it came about at remarkably little cost.

How did it happen? A closer examination of public opinion data allows us to locate the change more precisely in time. Table I shows the responses of white Southern parents to a question often repeated by the Gallup Poll between the late 1950s and 1980: "Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where a few of the children are black?"[7]

As the 1950s ended, white Southern support for school segregation was decreasing, although very slowly. In the late fifties, three-quarters of white Southern parents still told the Gallup Poll that they did not want their children in school with even "a few" black classmates.[8] By 1963, that figure had decreased somewhat, but three out of five still objected.

In the three years from 1963 to 1966, however, the rate of change increased abruptly. Southern white parents' opposition to the presence of black children in their own childrens' schools decreased by 12 or 13 percent a year. In 1963, 61% were opposed; by 1965 only 37% -- and by 1966 only 24% -- were. Put another way: each year for three years, roughly a quarter of all remaining opponents dropped their opposition, and hard-core opposition to school desegregation became a minority view in the South as a

whole.[9] After 1966, the rate of change slowed, in part because there were so few supporters of outright segregation left who could change. But change merely slowed to something like its earlier rate; it did not stop altogether.[10]

There are two separate phenomena here to be explained: first, the gradual, long-term erosion of support over the entire 40-year period; second, the abrupt collapse in the mid-1960s. Jim Crow's illness, that is, was chronic before it became acute, and terminal.

The long-term change in white Southern racial attitudes was slow (painfully slow, for those who desired it), but like a glacier: inexorably, year after year, it moved in the same direction. One reason for this, as Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley observed in 1963, is that the trend was produced in part by massive economic and demographic changes taking place in the South. In 1942, support for segregation was virtually universal among white Southerners: no particular kind of white Southerner was much less likely to support it than any other kind. By the 1950s, however, support for segregation had become less common among educated Southerners, less common among urban Southerners, less common outside the conventionally-defined "Deep" South, less common among those who had lived outside the South or were often exposed to the mass media -- less common, in short, among the kinds of Southerners whom urbanization and economic development were producing in ever-larger numbers.[11]

Also contributing to the trend was what is known as "cohort succession" -- a polite way of saying that some people were dying and being replaced by other people, with different attitudes. Beginning in the 1950s, each new wave of young white adults adhered less staunchly to white Southern racial orthodoxy than the preceding generation (in part, but not entirely, because they were better-educated, more urban, and so forth).[12] Most young people shared their parents' views; but when there was inter-generational disagreement it was nearly always in the same direction. Just as it was difficult in the 1950s and 1960s to find young Southerners with fewer years of schooling than their parents, so was it hard to find ones more committed to the defense of segregation. The cumulative effect over thirty or forty years was considerable. Even if no individual Southerner had ever changed his mind, white Southern public opinion as a whole would have changed.

Tidal processes like these cannot be expected to produce rapid change, and they did not. But the consequent erosion of support for de_jure segregation anticipated the collapse of that support and may have made it possible. By the early 1960s, white Southern opinion was not unanimous (as it had been, virtually, twenty years before). A minority, substantial in some localities, favored desegregation or at least were resigned to the prospect. Even the opposition, although widespread, was no longer monolithically determined. Relatively few segregationists were willing (as their opponents in the civil rights movement were willing) to risk their

lives, their freedom, their jobs, or even their comfort on behalf of their views. For many segregationist Southern whites, commitment to other values -- to law and order, to the good repute of their communities, to economic development -- interfered with their commitment to the preservation of racial segregation. Not many were willing to give up a great deal to preserve it.

For others, fatalism may have had the same result. A common cultural value among both black and white Southerners, fatalism has been most common among rural, poorly-educated, older people: in those sectors of the population who, if white, were most likely to oppose desegregation.[13] Confronted with the prospect of change, many segregationists believed their cause was lost whatever they might do. They may not have been happy about what was going to happen, but did not believe they could prevent it.

During Little Rock's troubles, one observer noted, 124,500 of the city's 125,000 citizens went about their business, then went home at night and watched the other 500 on television.[14] The political importance of ambivalence, resignation, and indifference should not be underestimated.

In fact, support for segregation was hollow at the core, and ready to be kicked over. This is, of course, much clearer in retrospect than it was at the time. We should not forget the ever-present atmosphere of violence; the beatings, bombings, and murders, and the constant threat of more, and worse. The Mississippi "Freedom Summer" of 1964 alone saw 80 beatings, 35

shootings, 35 church-burnings, 30 house-bombings, and six murders. Nor should we forget the courage it took to confront this sort of thing.[15] Civil rights workers and organizers were men and women who were willing to give up a great deal for their beliefs.

But we should also recognize that violent resistance came only from a small minority of the opposition -- one, moreover, that did not receive the unqualified and near-unanimous support from the white community that the equivalent (and almost certainly larger) minority did during Reconstruction. This relative absence of community support is reflected both in the different casualty rates and the different outcomes of these two periods of acute racial conflict in the South. Richard Maxwell Brown, a distinguished historian of American violence, emphasizes that the violence deployed against the civil rights movement, though brutal and terrifying (as it was meant to be), was seldom fatal.[16] The massive structure of Jim Crow law -- designed to fix the shape of Southern race relations forever -- was utterly destroyed at a cost, Brown estimates, of 44 people killed during the entire course of the civil rights movement. Those killings must be added to Jim Crow's shameful due bill, but they must also be assessed by comparison to over 3700 earlier deaths by lynching, not to mention the ghastly toll exacted by intercommunal violence elsewhere in the world.

Strategically, most white resistance to change in the South amounted to a holding action. White supremacy had not been an active, expansionist ideology for nearly a half-century. For the

most part, whites who opposed desegregation tried merely to hold their ground, not to roll back change that had already taken place. Their response was seldom counter-attack, and it soon shifted from hard-fought defense to strategic withdrawal -- retreat -- to private schools, to private clubs, and the like.[17] This could be fairly characterized as a "no-win" strategy; it could even be argued that by removing the most vociferous opponents of desegregation from the public arena where desegregation was taking place it allowed the process to proceed more smoothly. (In some communities that withdrawal has now proven to be temporary, although in others of course it appears to be more or less permanent.)

The hollowness of much pro-segregation sentiment was also indicated by how quickly a great many segregationists changed their minds. As the 1960s began, most white Southerners apparently did favor state-supported segregation; in much of the white South, that was the only acceptable position. Yet five or six years later, only a minority of white Southerners supported "strict segregation" -- Jim Crow -- and such support was well on the way to being the exclusive property of the white-supremacist lunatic fringe.

If attitudes are deeply rooted, embedded in a supporting ideology or serving important psychological functions, that sort of change does not take place readily. But Thomas Pettigrew argued as early as 1959 that most white Southerners' segregationist attitudes were not of this sort, that they reflected instead simple

conformity to community norms.[18] The rapidity of the subsequent change suggests that Pettigrew was right: those views were, for many, conventional, unstudied, and subject to change in reponse to experience, new knowledge, and new circumstances.

Obviously, the early years of the civil rights movement in the South presented Southern whites with a great deal of new knowledge and experience to assimilate, and rapid attitude change soon followed. It seems unlikely that the movement's moral appeals persuaded many supporters of segregation to rethink their position. But one thing the movement undeniably did teach white Southerners was that Southern blacks were united in their opposition to Jim Crow. It may be hard to believe at this remove, but many Southern whites had persuaded themselves and each other -- they sincerely believed -- that black Southerners did not object to segregation, even that they preferred it. In 1963, for example, only 35% of white Southerners believed that "Most Negroes feel strongly about [the] right to send children to the same schools as whites."[19] In the face of local demonstrations, often led by local ministers, it became more difficult (although demonstrably not impossible) to persist in that belief. Supporting segregation could no longer be seen as a matter of endorsing a polite bi-racial consensus; it became more clearly support for the naked imposition of inferior status on an unwilling people. Some did not shrink from that view of what they were about; others did.

In addition, courteous, non-violent, but courageous and firm

insistence on the rights of American citizens demonstrably won for the civil rights movement the overwhelming support of non-Southern public opinion. With that support behind it, the federal government began increasingly to offer carrots and to brandish sticks, especially in the major legislation of the first two years of the Johnson administration. As the depth and consistency of the federal commitment grew, even those segregationists who were not initially fatalistic and resigned to change came to realize that they were simply outgunned (sometimes, as at Ole Miss, literally so). Quite late in the game, there was much disagreement among Southern whites about whether the changes taking place were a good thing or not, but by the middle 1960s there was little disagreement about their inevitability.[20] Part of the change in public opinion in the 1960s no doubt reflects simply increasing, if grudging, acquiescence.

Finally, the actual changes brought about by the activities of the federal government and the civil rights movement undermined opposition. As the Israelis are fond of putting it, these changes "created facts." The destruction of an established and taken-for-granted social order is a disconcerting prospect at best; it can be a relief simply to have matters settled. Once desegregation had taken place, <u>opponents</u> were the ones who wanted change -- and whatever contribution temperamental conservatism had made to the defense of segregation, it now made to the defense of a new status quo. That, at least, is one interpretation of the

frequent finding in the survey data that those who had experienced desegregation were least likely to oppose it.[21]

Moreover, the new status quo was one that white Southerners usually discovered that they could live with. Desegregation was simply not as bad as many had feared it would be. It helped that desgregation usually proceeded by degrees. When desegregating public accomodations (usually the first step) turned out to be fairly painless, the prospect of school desegregation became somewhat less threatening.

It bears emphasizing that desgregation could not have been as bad as some feared. Howard W. Odum's Race and Rumors of Race is an instructive compilation of what many white Southerners believed about their black neighbors in the early 1940s.[22] Many of those beliefs were still at large some years later, which helps to make sense of the fact (otherwise hard to credit) that the Brown decision apparently produced a measurable deflection in the white Southern birthrate.[23] Many Southern whites were simply frightened by the prospect of an end to segregation -- an end, after all, to the South as they knew it.

Without painting over the very real problems of human relations that remain in the South, it is certainly no exaggeration to say that the dismantling of de jure segregation has worked out far better than many -- probably most -- white Southerners feared it would. The situation is far from ideal, but it can be argued that black-white relations in the South are now different only in

minor degree from those in any other part of the United States with a significant black population -- and that they are as often better as worse.[24]

As for school desegregation specifically, in both urban and rural areas with black majorities or near-majorities (as in many cities elsewhere), the schools are essentially still, or once again, segregated. But to deny that segregation de facto is preferable to segregation de jure is, if nothing else, to reject the reasoning of Brown v. Board of Education. Moreover, in most parts of the South, in towns and rural areas where blacks are a significant presence but a minority, desegregation is an accomplished fact which no one seriously proposes to undo, and few would undo even if they could. On a day to day basis, race relations are among the least of the problems most of these school systems face.

Speculation about the reasons for this success (and we should not hesitate to call it that) would have to include such factors as the community pride, athletic fanaticism, and traditions of civility common to many Southerners, both black and white.[25] In addition, many have suggested, the cultural gulf between blacks and whites may be smaller in the South than elsewhere in the United States. Similar accents, similar tastes in recreation, similar forms of Evangelical Protestantism -- these commonalities and others certainly do no harm, and their absence can. Ironically, it may even be that the South's tradition of color-conscious policy

has helped it to deal with post-civil-rights era realities. White Southerners, after all, have never even pretended to be color-blind; where desegregation has worked well, it has been attended by sensitivity to group interests, even by racial quotas (in such symbolically vital matters as selecting cheerleaders).

It is often said that morality cannot be legislated, and the example of Prohibition is usually adduced to prove it. But here is a case in which, to put it bluntly, a fundamental change in behavior was successfully imposed on a largely recalcitrant population. The happy outcome has been that most have decided the change was for the best.

Paul Sheatsley wrote in the mid-1960s that most white Americans know "that racial discrimination is morally wrong and recognize the legitimacy of the Negro protest." "In their hearts," he concluded, "they know that the American Negro is right."[26] Sheatsley was writing about white Americans in general: it is unlikely that many white Southerners in fact knew anything of the sort at the time. But they know it now. Whatever else the civil rights movement may have accomplished or failed to accomplish, that achievement will stand.

Notes

1. Data in this paragraph and the next are from Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes toward Desegregation," Scientific American, July 1964, 16-23. "White Southerners," for purposes of the survey, included residents of Maryland, Delaware, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia. See also Paul B. Sheatsley, "White Attitudes Toward the Negro," in Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (eds.), The Negro American (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 303-324; and Mildred A. Schwartz, Trends in White Attitudes Toward Black People (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, 1967).

2. Ulrich B. Phillips, "The Central Theme of Southern History," American Historical Review 34 (October 1928), 31.

3. Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), 365.

4. Here and elsewhere, figures for white Southern parents (a less inclusive and a younger group than the NORC's general population sample) are taken from The Gallup Report, no. 185 (February 1981), 30. (Gallup's "South" includes only the eleven former Confederate states plus Kentucky and Oklahoma.) In the South, as elsewhere in the United States, white parents express greater opposition to sending children

to schools where half or, especially, more than half of the students are black.

5. Joseph E. Schneider, "Support for New Christian Right Ideology Among Fundamentalist Ministers in North Carolina," paper presented to Southern Sociological Society Annual Meeting, Charlotte, N. C., 1985.

6. Andrew M. Greeley, Building Coalitions (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), 307.

7. In earlier surveys: "colored" or "Negroes." These data are presented because they cover a longer period, in more detail, than other trend data available, but other data show much the same pattern. See, for instance, Andrew M. Greeley and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes toward Racial Integration," Scientific American, December 1971, 13-19, and Merle Black, "The Modification of a Major Cultural Belief: Declining Support for 'Strict Segregation' Among White Southerners, 1961-1972, Journal of the North Carolina Political Science Association 1 (Summer 1979), 4-21.

8. The difference between the 72% who did so in 1959 and the figure for non-Southern white parents -- seven percent -- must be one of the largest regional differences (if not the largest one) ever recorded by a public opinion poll.

9. It had done so some time earlier in the rest of the United

States. The 1942 NORC survey reported in Hyman and Sheatsley, op. cit., showed only 40% of non-Southern whites believing that black and white children should go to the same schools, but the percentage had increased to 61% by 1956, and 74% by 1963.

10. And for the "white backlash" that received much media attention in the mid-1960s there is no evidence whatsoever. See Sheatsley, op. cit.; Greeley and Sheatsley, op. cit.

11. Hyman and Sheatsley, op. cit. See also Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., 342-357.

12. Matthews and Prothro's data, like Hyman and Sheatsley's, revealed a modest reversal for the very youngest cohort in the early 1960s -- that is, for the last pre-integration wave of Southern young people. In retrospect, it is plain that this was merely an inconsequential blip in an otherwise consistent pattern.

13. Matthews and Prothro, op. cit., 358-359, indicate that segregationist whites expected expected more change, faster, than other whites. John Shelton Reed, Southerners: The Social Psychology of Sectionalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), examines the correlates of a constellation of "traditional Southern values" that includes both fatalism and white supremacist ideology.

14. George McMillan, quoted in Richard Maxwell Brown, "Southern Violence vs. The Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968," in Merle Black and J. S. Reed (eds.), Perspectives on the American South: An Annual Review of Society, Politics and Culture, vol. 1. (New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1981), 65.

15. Ibid., 54. Brown cites Robert Coles's observations of the resulting "battle fatigue."

16. Ibid., 52. This total is also testimony to the wisdom of the civil rights movement's adoption of nonviolence: who can doubt that a violent movement would have evoked much more counter-violence?

17. David Nevin and Robert E. Bills, The Schools That Fear Built: Segregationist Academies in the South (Washington: Acropolis Books, 1976).

18. Thomas F. Pettigrew, "Regional Differences in Anti-Negro Prejudice," reprinted in John C. Brigham and Theodore A. Weissbach (eds.), Racial Attitudes in America (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 162.

19. Sheatsley, op. cit., 317. Much larger proportons (around 80%) recognized by 1963 that blacks "felt strongly" about voting rights and employment discrimination.

20. In 1971, for instance, a substantial majority of white North Carolinians supported desegregation, but over 60% felt that "The integration of schools is doing more harm than good." (Data from the Survey of North Carolina, conducted by the Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.) The swing group was made up of those who hoped desegregation would be best in the long run or believed it was the right thing to do, bad effects notwithstanding.

21. See, for example, Sheatsley, op. cit., 321.

22. Howard W. Odum, Race and Rumors of Race (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943).

23. Ronald R. Rindfuss, John Shelton Reed, and Craig St. John, "A Fertility Reaction to a Historical Event: White Southern Birthrates and the 1954 Desegregation Decision," Science 201 (14 July 1978), 178-180.

24. John Shelton Reed, "Up From Segregation," Virginia Quarterly Review 60 (Summer 1984), 377-393.

25. William Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).

26. Sheatsley, op. cit., 323.

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Table I. Southern white parents objecting to desegregated schools, 1958-1980. (Responses of non-Southern white parents presented for comparison.)

"Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where [a few] of the children are colored/Negroes/black?" (percent "yes")

Year	South	Non-South
1958	72	13
1959	72	7
1963	61	10
1965	37	7
1966	24	6
1969	21	7
1970	16	6
1973	16	6
1975	15	3
1978	7	4
1980	5	5

[Source: The Gallup Report, no. 185 (February 1981), p. 30.]

[END]