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Disinformation

# DISINFORMATION

## *Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Forecast*

### 1988: MOSCOW MARKS RELIGIOUS ANNIVERSARY

**T**he year 1988 marks the one thousandth anniversary of the adoption of Christianity in Kievan-Rus', a medieval principality which was the first Slavic state on what is today Soviet territory. While this event would seem to have purely religious significance, Moscow has launched a campaign to exploit the anniversary both for domestic and international gain.

The millenium presents the Soviet leadership with risks as well as opportunities. Moscow cannot ignore such an important milestone. On the other hand, the Kremlin does not want to attribute too much significance to it. To do so would mean acknowledging the importance of religion—an awkward position for an avowedly atheist state which portrays religion as the “opiate of the masses” and the Church as a tool of reaction.

Moreover, the timing of the anniversary is particularly inopportune for

Moscow. Interest in religion appears to be growing among Soviet youth and intellectuals. Official observance of the millenium therefore risks promoting or sanctioning this development.

The difficult situation in which the Soviets find themselves has led them to a complex series of calculations with many subplots. We can expect to see the full panoply of active measures techniques employed: overt propaganda, exchanges and convocations, disinformation, rumor-mongering, and co-opting of well-intentioned Westerners.

The program for the celebration was outlined partially in a July press conference in Moscow, when Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Belorussia gave Soviet and foreign journalists details on preparations to mark the millenium. He reported that foreign guests of the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate will visit the ancient places of worship in Kiev, Moscow, and other cities. A “solemn ceremony” will take place in Moscow, and, “Its participants will be the representatives of religious organizations and social circles with which the Russian Orthodox Church has been cooperating for many years, and striving for peace and the preservation of the sacred gift of life on earth.”

—1988, continued on page 6

### AMERICANS UNINFORMED ABOUT ARMS ISSUES

#### *Vulnerable To Active Measures*

**R**ecent polling results suggest that Soviet efforts to influence American public opinion about arms control issues have not been successful. New data indicate that a majority of Americans are completely unfamiliar with the details of Soviet arms proposals. However, the Reagan Administration can take little comfort from this fact; the American people are just as uninformed about their own government's positions.

The polling was conducted in June 1986 and repeated in September by the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC), a non-partisan educational organization. The NSIC poll selected basic American and Soviet proposals on nuclear test bans and cuts in strategic weapons. Respondents in the sample

—ARMS ISSUES,  
continued on page 14

### US-USSR EXCHANGES

#### *Old Wine in New Bottles*

**A** key factor in Moscow's ongoing efforts to influence Western behavior are cultural exchanges, people-to-people meetings, tourism, and a range of other activities known collectively as “human contacts.” The West has long subscribed to the view that such exchanges are inherently valuable since their success can help minimize misunderstandings that lead to

conflict and perhaps even war. The Helsinki Accords of 1975 were intended to formalize and facilitate these aspects of international relations. In fact, in the decade since, Moscow has clamped down on all types of unauthorized contacts between East and West, and has sought to manipulate those which survive.

Carefully-controlled contacts with the US remain attractive to the Soviets because of the opportunities they provide to appeal directly to the American people, outside government-to-government channels, and, indeed, over the head of the US government. Just as importantly, on many issues such

—EXCHANGES,  
continued on page 10

#### INSIDE

- Kremlin Gambits In Socialist International
- Books and Film Highlight Targeting of Journalists
- Soviet and Western Diplomats—Differences





# CALENDAR

TARGETS FOR SOVIET  
ACTIVE MEASURES AND  
DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

1 9 8 6

O C T O B E R

- **World Peace Congress**, Copenhagen, Denmark, (October 15-19)—Major Soviet front activity, but Moscow has experienced difficulty in concealing its control. Several independent peace groups declined to participate, and attendance will be significantly smaller than projected.
- **UN Disarmament Week**, (October 24-31)—UN leaving major activities to Non-Governmental Organizations, providing Moscow and the international fronts with several opportunities. Soviets will try to pressure US to ban nuclear tests.



**The Copenhagen Congress, a major Soviet activity to exploit the UN International Year of Peace, 1986.**

N O V E M B E R

D E C E M B E R

- **Congressional Elections**, United States, (November 4)
- **Helsinki Review Conference**, Vienna, Austria, (November 5-?)—Five-year review conference will focus on military, economic, and human rights issues. Soviets will attempt to shift attention from human rights issues to US role in increasing the danger of nuclear war. East bloc delegates likely to attack COCOM (the multilateral NATO coordinating committee determining technology transfer to East bloc) and accuse the US of waging economic war against them.
- **12th General Assembly, World Federation of Democratic Youth**, Budapest, Hungary, (Date uncertain)—Soviet international youth front meeting.

- **5th Anniversary of Imposition of Martial Law in Poland**, (December 13)—Soviet bloc will be supportive of Jaruzelski regime. Attacks on US for supporting "counterrevolution" in Poland while simultaneously betraying Solidarity may be muted as Warsaw seeks to regain "Most-Favored-Nation" status.
- **Reagan-Gorbachev Summit?**

1 9 8 7

- **UN Year of Shelter for the Homeless**—Moscow likely to focus on poverty and unemployment in the West and the absence of "genuine" human rights under capitalism.
- **Soviet Moratorium on Nuclear Testing Expires**, (January 1)
- **Parliamentary Elections**, West Germany, (January 25)

1 9 8 8

- **One thousandth anniversary of the adoption of Christianity in Kievan-Rus'**—Moscow planning multi-faceted campaign for internal and external purposes. [See feature article in this issue]

## COMING IN NEXT ISSUE

- Soviet Priorities and Tactics in 1987: Special Section.
- Detailed Calendar for 1987

### *Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Forecast*

**Editor:** Roy Godson. **Advisory Board:** Alain Besançon; Ladislav Bittman; Ilya Dzhirkvelov; Sidney Hook; Stanislav Levchenko; Uri Ra'anani; Richard H. Shultz, Jr.; Adam B. Ulam.

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# SOVIET AND WESTERN DIPLOMATS

## *Important Differences*

**T**he role of Soviet and bloc diplomats in active measures has not yet been the subject of major study. Professor Alain Besançon, of the Institut des Hautes Etudes in Paris, and one of France's leading scholars on the USSR, has now pointed to the significant role Soviet diplomats play. First, about one-third of the Soviet diplomats posted in the West belong to the KGB or GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence). The other diplomats—that is two out of three serving abroad—in addition to normal diplomatic reporting and representational functions, work in tandem with the intelligence personnel and are subject to coordination by the CPSU International and Propaganda Departments. They also operate in close contact with KGB active measures specialists.

Besançon points out that Westerners frequently fail to understand that Soviet and Western diplomats are very different species. Westerners see diplomacy as a means of reaching mutually acceptable agreements through negotiation and compromise. The job of Western diplomats is to represent their country and to reconcile differences. But Communist governments consider themselves to be continually at war with the West. Soviet diplomats undertake all the usual chores of their profession, but it is their other activities which distinguish them from their Western counterparts. Moreover, Soviet diplomats enjoy unique advantages in what is essentially an uneven contest. Their capacity and the opportunities they have to influence people are far greater than those of Western diplomats in bloc countries.

A Soviet embassy official is almost always a member of the Communist Party. He is among the most able of Soviet officials, with years of careful training behind him. Usually, he speaks the language of his assigned country, and has studied its politics, history and culture. Years of residence will further deepen his knowledge. Finally, he is

buttressed psychologically by the monolithic teachings of Leninism. He believes that a world struggle is taking place, and unless he becomes disaffected, that he is playing a role in history, in which his side will emerge victorious.

On assignment in the West, he has virtual freedom of movement. Most importantly, he enjoys excellent access to all levels of society: officials of the host government, the country's opinion-forming elite, and the general population.

This treatment accorded him by the West opens up wide-ranging possibilities for influencing Western society. The Western news media, eager to gain further insights into the Soviet Union, will be happy to meet with him. He can float stories about the "liberalism" of the current Kremlin boss or about "factions," and hawks and doves in the Politburo. In speeches, convocations, seminars, exchanges, and private conversations with church groups and anti-nuclear organizations, he can promote the "peace-loving" image of the Soviet Union and emphasize the sincerity of Moscow's desire to end the arms race. When Soviet violations of human rights are raised, he can either defend the Soviet system, or he can claim he is part of the sophisticated younger generation that is trying to do away with such behavior—if only the West would cease its hostility and criticism.

Western diplomats in Moscow, by contrast, seem ill-prepared for their assignment. Few speak the language fluently, or have received prolonged, in-depth training. Moreover, many Western diplomats have been educated by Western political scientists, some of whom perceive Soviet society to be almost as pluralistic as the West. Given the usual brief tour for the average Western diplomat, and the difficulties of penetrating Soviet secrecy, it will be hard for him to significantly enlarge his understanding of Soviet politics.

Further, it will not be easy for the Western diplomat to undertake the everyday work of his profession, as conceived in the West. In the USSR, he is constantly under surveillance by both physical and electronic means. Living in

a diplomatic enclave, he has very little chance for contact with ordinary Soviet citizens. For the most part, he interacts only with specially-designated Party functionaries, whose assignment is to neutralize and manipulate him. After a time, the Western diplomat begins to long for non-official contact with Soviet citizens. The KGB now obliges him by providing such an outlet: "... most often it is a professor, an artist, or a cleric who appears to occupy a semi-dissident position, who appears to be suffering a certain persecution, and who, moreover, may indeed be persecuted. . . . Our diplomat is very proud to be invited to his home. He considers himself very courageous to invite him to receptions at the embassy."

This new friend provides not only new perspectives, but also serves as the source of news. He tells political anecdotes which are critical of the regime, and exposes a darker side of Soviet life to the eager Westerner anxious to learn about the "real" Russia. In fact, however, the new friend is part of a specialized milieu which targets all Western embassies and carries out the same function: to spread disinformation while gathering information.

Such behavior is a constant feature of Soviet diplomacy. But this sort of active measures operation takes on special importance during periods of unusual tension and uncertainty in East-West relations, such as crucial negotiations between the US and the USSR. It would be most surprising if there is not a flurry of rumors from "reliable, highly-placed Soviet sources" before, during and after future summits. ■

*Alain Besançon is a member of this publication's Advisory Board. This article draws on his recent writings which have appeared in the French journals Politique Internationale, Commentaire, and most recently in Est & Ouest, May 1986.*



# KREMLIN GAMBITS IN SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

**T**he Soviet Union is continuing its effort to influence the Socialist International (SI), the world body of Socialist, Social-Democratic, and Labor parties. Founded in 1864, and reconstituted in its present form in 1951, approximately 70 center and center-left parties around the world are affiliates of the London-based organization. In the 1950's and 1960's, the Socialist International and most of its member parties were pro-NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and supported the other alliances formed after World War II to protect allied countries. In the 1970's, several of the major SI affiliates in Europe and the South Pacific began to drift apart from the United States. More recently, there has been growing criticism of major aspects of US policy, as well as NATO policy and the ANZUS (Australian, New Zealand, United States) Alliance.

Through direct relations between Soviet bloc Communist parties and SI affiliates, as well as through agents of influence inside SI member parties, Moscow has had an impact on the organization by exploiting neutralist and/or pacifist tendencies, by working through proxies, and by infiltrating the SI Committees dealing with Latin America and the Caribbean.

Since Willy Brandt became president of the SI ten years ago, the organization has tried to break out of its European confines, admitting parties from Latin America, Asia and to a lesser extent, Africa. Nevertheless, the SI remains a predominantly European entity, with major issues and decisions determined by its European members. Almost all the funds are derived from Europe, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany. Given this European orientation, disarmament and arms control have been major SI concerns.

Almost all of the European member parties of the SI are either in power or constitute the major opposition party in countries which are key allies of the United States. Most of these countries belong to NATO. West Germany's SPD (Social Democratic Party), Spain's

PSOE (Socialist Workers Party), Italy's PSI (Socialist Party) and PSDI (Social Democratic Party), both of which are in the ruling coalition, and France's Socialist Party, for example, are all full members. Socialist parties from Sweden, Belgium, Austria, Portugal, Britain and the Netherlands are active participants in the SI.

The SI also has political clout outside Europe. Member parties such as the Australian and New Zealand Labour Parties (both currently in office), the Acción Democrática de Venezuela, and the Dominican PRD (Revolutionary Party), attend meetings regularly and help set policy. In turn, SI attitudes and resolutions exert influence on the policies of these parties.



While no Communist party can be a member of the SI, the CPSU, the Cuban Communist Party, and most recently, the Sandinistas have sought to play both an overt and covert role in the organization. They regularly send "observers" to lobby at SI meetings and at least one of their covert ploys, a secret caucus on Central America, has been exposed.

Some now maintain that in the last year Moscow's influence has diminished. They point to a shift at the SI Congress in Lima, Peru in June 1986. Nonetheless, the outlines of future Soviet themes and tactics were also visible. Moscow is likely to concentrate on disarmament, Central America, Third World development, and the debt crisis, in an effort to further alienate SI member parties from the US.

## Arms Control and Disarmament

Before the recent deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe, the activities of the SI's Disarmament and Arms Control Committee (SIDAC) drew the most attention from European member parties. With the missiles in place, and with SIDAC attracting more serious attention from Washington, interest has waned. The blatantly unbalanced rhetoric in official SI statements on this issue has also diminished. The southern European socialist parties, many of which are in power and favored deployment, played a key role in moderating the SI's language, with the French participants particularly insistent on changes.

But if current negotiations on arms control do not yield concrete results, Moscow may have an opportunity to regain the momentum. In any event, the Soviets will try to use the SI in their anti-US propaganda campaign, with the goal of pressuring Washington into an agreement or simply embarrassing the US for allegedly bargaining in bad faith.

In these efforts, Moscow will try to capitalize on policy differences between the US and Western Europe on arms control. For example, the French Socialist Party, which largely supports US defense policy, is nonetheless openly critical of the Reagan Administration's attitude toward SALT II, as well as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Other parties remain actively hostile to US strategic arms policies in general. The Belgian party has declared that it will try to have US missiles on its country's soil removed if returned to power. The SPD candidate for the German Chancellorship, Johannes Rau, recently stated that if his party wins the next German election in January 1987, it will act to remove NATO missiles and terminate US-German collaboration on SDI.

Such pronouncements offer Moscow inviting targets. If there seems to be no movement in arms negotiations, a strong Soviet effort to influence the debate could then have more impact. SI resolutions decrying US defense and arms control policies would create an image of solidarity between the USSR and the non-communist left, isolate the US, and intensify pressure on the Reagan Administration.



## Latin America

Through the Cuban Communist Party and its effect on some elements in SI member parties, for a time Moscow was able to exert considerable influence on the SI's Latin American Committee (SILAC). Papers found in Grenada following the demise of Maurice Bishop revealed the existence of a secret SI caucus directed by Cubans and Sandinistas—although they are not officially affiliated to the SI—specifically to affect SILAC. This caucus had mapped out strategy on SI policy relating to Grenada, Nicaragua, Cuba and El Salvador. Enemies of “progressive forces” within the SI, as well as friends and potential sympathizers, were targeted. The caucus included Guillermo Ungo's MNR (National Revolutionary Movement) of El Salvador, Michael Manley's PNP (People's National Party) of Jamaica, the Radical Party of Chile and Maurice Bishop's New Jewel Movement of Grenada, all then member parties of the SI and very active in SILAC.

Discovery of these papers, along with events in Grenada, El Salvador and Nicaragua in recent years, undermined the influence of the Caucus. Moscow will probably attempt to recoup some of these losses.

The Soviets may try to regain control of SILAC by using “divide and conquer” tactics. In this scenario, they would try to split the Committee into two sub-regional groups, one dealing with Central America and the Caribbean, the other with South America. This would allow the Cubans to exert intense pressure on the Central America-Caribbean group. More moderating influences would largely be confined to South American questions, which are considerably less controversial at present. However, the South America sub-regional group will take on added importance if the situation in Chile deteriorates further.

The chances of success for this particular strategy are unclear. Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela is the *de facto* head of SILAC, and will not take lightly attempts to undermine his authority. South American parties may fear that the issues most important to them will be shunted aside in favor of the more immediate crises in Central America. Others, outraged by the evidence of Communist infiltration in SILAC, may well oppose a scheme that would enhance the position of a group heavily influenced by outsiders.

Nonetheless, Soviet-Cuban ambitions for SILAC will lead them to devise other tactics if the “divide and conquer” strategy fails.

Chile is a potential opportunity. If General Pinochet remains intransigent or becomes more repressive, the Soviets are likely to exploit this in the SI. They could use legitimate concerns about repression and the lack of democracy to gain endorsement for more radical Chilean opposition elements who are not committed to democracy.

The situation in Nicaragua has many facets which lend themselves to Soviet tactics and themes. At a minimum, they will seek to focus negative attention on the Contras and the supporting role of the US, by invoking the emotionally-charged issue of “Yankee intervention”

## Third World Debt and Development

Another theme Moscow is seeking to exploit is the economic crisis in the Third World, especially the international debt situation. The underdevelopment of most of the Third World will not be overcome in the near future. The debt crisis adds urgency to the issue. Both provide an opportunity to attack Western financial and business interests, which Moscow will not pass up.

Moscow can safely exploit issues like Third World development and the debt crisis and at the same time be assured of substantial returns. Raising these matters enhances the USSR's image in developing countries, even as Moscow devotes the bulk of its attention to arms

**Poster promoting objectives of secret SI caucus. Shaking hands are Michael Manley (Jamaica) and the late Maurice Bishop (Grenada).**

## Towards the Caribbean Revolution



### MARCH 1980

JOINT ENDEAVOR TO INTEGRATE  
THE REGION AND UNITE OUR PEOPLES



### GRENADA

REVOLUTIONARY AIMS  
OF THE PEOPLE'S  
REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT

in the internal affairs of small nations. Moscow will also try to play on Latin American sentiments of solidarity, as well as the residual hostility toward an activist US foreign policy which exists in most northern European parties.

At all costs, the Soviets want to deflect attention from the situation inside Nicaragua. But if Sandinista repression continues, this tactic may wear thin. As long as the Sandinistas are not completely discredited within the SI, they will continue to be invited as observers to meetings. There they will both operate on the issue of Nicaragua *per se* and strive to influence the SI on other questions.

control and US-Soviet relations, and provides aid almost exclusively to client states. However, if Cuba is forced to take more drastic action to handle its debt problems, the whole question will come to the forefront in various forums, including the SI.

The once supportive relationship between the SI and the US has eroded. However, recently the Socialist International has also become less receptive to Soviet influence on a number of key issues. Yet, the SI remains an important arena, composed of many significant political parties. Moscow almost certainly will continue to devote considerable overt and covert resources to further weaken ties between the SI and the US.



—1988, continued from page 1

The Metropolitan's words (quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report-Soviet Union, July 15, p. R8) are instructive, indicating the Kremlin's intention to use the anniversary to increase its influence in religious circles in the non-communist world, as well as to deflect criticism of its anti-religious policies at home. The active measures components of this strategy are also apparent. Apart from trying to capitalize on the inroads it has already made with mainstream clerics in various parts of the world, Moscow hopes to enlist Western religious leaders in promoting Soviet peace policies.

### Fear of Ukrainian Nationalism

What the Metropolitan did not discuss is also important. A major target of Moscow's campaign is Ukrainian nationalism both at home and abroad. On the domestic front, this means ignoring or denying the Ukrainian aspects of the anniversary. Organizing the celebration under the exclusive aegis of the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate is intended to demonstrate the unity of all Soviet Slavic peoples who share the traditions of Orthodox Christianity. Abroad, Moscow will try to discredit and sow conflict among Ukrainian and other emigré communities opposed to Soviet power.

The danger of fostering Ukrainian nationalism is very real for the Kremlin. Kiev, where the first baptism took place, is the capital of the Ukraine. Ukrainian nationalists inside the USSR and abroad see Kievan-Rus' as the first Ukrainian state. They attach national as well as religious importance to the millenium. Russian nationalists, on the other hand, see Kievan-Rus' as the birthplace of Russian nationality and statehood—a view largely supported by the Soviet regime.

The growth of nationalism in the multinational Soviet empire is a threat the Kremlin has long tried to control. Given current demographic trends in the USSR, any spur to increased Ukrainian nationalism would be particularly unwelcome. At present, only about 50% of the population is Russian and their birth rate is declining. The birth rate of non-Slavic peoples, on the other hand, is rising. Together, Russians and Ukrainians would constitute approximately 70% of the population.

Any manifestation of Ukrainian separateness threatens to splinter the alleged unity of this Slavic bloc, and undermine Moscow's consistent efforts to stifle all expressions of Ukrainian distinctiveness. For example, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church was absorbed into the Russian Orthodox Church in the 1930's. The Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church was abolished by Stalin, and is still banned today.

None of this, however, has succeeded in extinguishing national consciousness among Ukrainians. Ukrainian Catholics have been especially obstinate bearers of national identity. Despite the KGB's efforts to uproot and even liquidate them, an underground movement exists, and indications are that it is growing.

This group poses a special dilemma for Moscow in planning for the millenium. The Kremlin would like a high-level representative of the Catholic Church present at the celebration, but the Vatican, under John Paul II, has come out strongly in support of Ukrainian Catholic rights.

### Moscow's Likely Strategy

How can Moscow cope with such conflicting priorities? It will tailor a campaign designed to address all these concerns. The first priority will be staging a spectacle to persuade the West that believers in the USSR enjoy freedom of worship.

This task has been assigned to the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate, which has long since been subordinated to the CPSU. Moscow has given the Patriarchate permission to organize a large-scale celebration, and has even provided a base of operations. In a gesture the like of which has not been seen since World War II, the Party has returned to the Church the Danilovsky Monastery, one of the oldest and largest in Moscow. This unusual "gift" may indicate that the Kremlin leadership is willing to go to some lengths to ensure the success of the operation.

The Patriarchate's task will be to divert attention from anti-religious policies in the Soviet Union by stressing the Church's artistic achievements.

Their own modern publishing facilities will produce lavish books on iconography and architecture—a rare capability in a country where printing facilities are very strictly controlled. Recordings of liturgical music will also likely appear. Churches which have been allowed to decay for decades are already being spruced up. We can also expect arranged pilgrimages to the holy sites of Orthodoxy.

All this, of course, is for "export." And to drive the point home, the celebration will be as ecumenical as possible. The Patriarchate will invite representatives of major Christian denominations in the West. It is unclear whether the Vatican will send a high-level representative. John Paul is under pressure from certain factions in the Church to improve relations with the Orthodox, and we can expect Moscow to offer inducements.

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### The Metropolitan on Peace

Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Belorussia, a member of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, has often been a spokesman for Soviet peace proposals. On September 1, he appeared on the nightly Soviet news broadcast "Vremya" [Time] and offered the following thoughts.

"A recent message from the holy synod of our church about war and peace in the nuclear age says: Nuclear war is a terrible sin before God, a sin to avert that is a burning and pressing task of the churches and mankind. That is why we welcome the program for preventing nuclear catastrophe rendered by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev . . . and patiently await the time when the ill-fated nuclear explosions in the United States of America, which rock the bowels of the earth, the depths of the ocean, and the vaults of heaven, come to an end." [Quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Daily Report, Soviet Union, September 3, p. AA8]



## NEW BOOKS AND FILM HIGHLIGHT TARGETING OF JOURNALISTS

**T**he body of information on active measures continues to grow. New books published in France by a Bulgarian defector and a French journalist, a recent German book about *Stern* magazine and a Canadian documentary are particularly noteworthy.

A theme common to all of these is Soviet targeting of Western journalists. The first book on active measures written by a Bulgarian intelligence defector, *Vladimir Kostov*, describes how Soviet bloc intelligence carefully surveilled and assessed between one-third and one-half of the professional journalists in Paris in the mid-1970s for active measures purposes. Kostov, who spent nine years in the Bulgarian service, also claims that in the mid-1960's, the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Bulgarian intelligence controlled the activities of UPI's correspondent in Sofia.

In 1978, Kostov sought political asylum in France and, shortly afterward, survived an attempt to kill him with rare toxins of the sort that took the life of Georgi Markov in London. Kostov's memoirs have just been published in French as *Le Parapluie Bulgare*, (*The Bulgarian Umbrella*) (Paris, France: Stock, 1986).

Under the cover of a TV and radio correspondent, Kostov was posted to Paris in 1974. The head of the *Rezidentura* there educated him about the aims and techniques of active measures: "Our principal goal is the destabilization of Western governments and regimes. . . ." The media, continued his supervisor, offer the best field of action.

Kostov's responsibilities centered on journalists. He selectively sought out those who might be willing to cooperate. Venality by itself was not highly prized, the *Rezident* explained: "We need journalists convinced of their independence and moral and professional integrity. And who, at the same time, serve our interests."

Kostov was instructed to meet as

many journalists as possible, and to maintain professional and friendly relations with them. A good way to attract their attention, he was taught, was to flaunt his "realism" and independence of spirit. Voicing careful, but non-provocative criticism of Bulgarian policies would disarm them. The first priority was gaining their esteem; money would come later.

Following these guidelines, Kostov soon acquired a fund of knowledge about his "colleagues" in the Western press corps. He reports that many other East bloc operatives were simultaneously engaged in the same activity, compiling dossiers on as many as four to five hundred French and foreign journalists in Paris in 1975-1976.

Kostov maintains that the KGB coordinates this recruiting effort, which is so intense that the various bloc intelligence services have to avoid stepping on each other's toes. Kostov says he once began to recruit a journalist who, it later turned out, was already on the Soviet payroll. He was ordered to sever all relations with his greedy contact. But other ventures bore fruit. For example, Kostov arranged an inexpensive vacation in Bulgaria for a journalist who then published positive articles about the country and its government.

The KGB's focus on Western journalists is also described in *Thierry Wolton's* best-selling *Le KGB en France* (Paris, France: Grasset, 1986). Wolton's book consists mostly of original information on Soviet bloc scientific and technological espionage in France and successful French counter-measures. But there is also a chapter on disinformation and the use of journalists as agents of influence.

The West German weekly *Stern* recently achieved notoriety for printing Hitler's Diaries, which later proved to be fakes. This is not the first time that *Stern* has been in the negative spotlight. A recent book by *Wilfried Ahrens*

discusses *Stern* and its longtime editor Henri Nannen. It reviews earlier allegations that the publication is pro-Soviet and has been influenced by East bloc intelligence services.

*Herrn Nannens Gewerbe* (Mr. Nannen's Shop, Sauerlach/Arget, FRG: Ahrens Verlag, 1984) outlines why many believe the magazine has been used for active measures purposes. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, for example, the newspaper alleged that underground Czech radio broadcasts protesting the invasion originated in West Germany rather than Czechoslovakia. Nannen later admitted the claim was false. But the East bloc media picked up this story and used it as confirmation of their own assertions that the broadcasts came from West Germany.


In 1971, when Solzhenitsyn was under attack in the USSR, *Stern* ran stories attacking his reputation. These articles, too, were later replayed in the Soviet press.

Ahrens' book is based on *Stern* stories, interviews, court documentation, and the work of Western experts on disinformation. The author has chosen his words with care. As for *Stern's* editor, Ahrens writes: "Either Nannen has not understood the essence of East bloc disinformation actions, or he pretends not to."

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continued on page 8







**New book and film  
on active measures.**

—**NEW BOOKS,**  
*continued from page 7*

KGB manipulation of Western journalists receives prominent attention in a new documentary. **"The Deception Network"**, the first one-hour film on Soviet active measures, drew very good reviews when shown recently on Canadian television.

The theme of the documentary is that the International Department of the CPSU coordinates a vast overt and covert apparatus that operates in many non-communist countries. Several major active measures techniques are highlighted: agents of influence in Western media and governments; and control of international fronts, particularly the World Peace Council.

"The Deception Network" contains noteworthy interviews with alleged agents of influence in the media, (Pierre-Charles Pathé in France, and Arne Petersen in Denmark), and in the fronts (Ramesh Chandra, president of the World Peace Council). In the film they explain their positions, namely, that they act independently of Soviet control. By interviewing former Soviet bloc active measures practitioners, Western experts and other witnesses, the film provides substantial contrary evidence.

The interview with Pathé—the only interview the convicted spy has given—is especially illuminating. Pathé acknowledges receiving KGB funds for many

years to help produce specially-targeted newsletters. But he claims "never to have acted against the interests of France."

The film provides substantial documentation to demonstrate that the International Department does more than help create and finance pro-Soviet publications like Pathé's newsletter. It also uses agents of influence in established newspapers. Nor are the vehicles of such active measures only left-wing publications. In Japan, for example, the KGB managed to influence a conservative newspaper.

The organizer of this operation was Stanislav Levchenko who, until his defection in 1979, was the KGB active measures specialist in Japan. Levchenko, a member of this publication's advisory board, is interviewed in the film. He names Takuji Yamane as his most successful recruit. In 1982, Yamane became managing editor of *Sankei Shimbun*, Japan's most popular conservative daily. Pro-Soviet themes began to appear in *Sankei's* editorials. Levchenko's defection and subsequent revelations led to Yamane's resignation.

As "The Deception Network" makes clear, the KGB spreads its nets wider than journalists. Government officials also are recruited. Arne Treholt, whose story is reenacted in the film, is a notable recent example. While serving as Norway's deputy minister of Foreign

Affairs in the late 1970's, he was also working with Gennadi Titov, the KGB Chief in Norway. According to the film, Titov was promoted to the rank of General in the KGB for recruiting Treholt.

If true, this promotion was well deserved. Treholt apparently was a great asset to the Kremlin. For example, when Norway and the USSR were negotiating their territorial dispute over the "grey zone" in the Barents Sea, Treholt gave Titov information which allowed Moscow to gain enormous concessions. Further, Norwegian journalists questioned in the film report that Treholt tried to float pro-Soviet, anti-American stories to them.

"The Deception Network" also focuses on the largest and most influential Soviet front group: the World Peace Council (WPC).

Ramesh Chandra, WPC president, denies vehemently in the film that the Council is a front organization. However, he is contradicted by two knowledgeable former Soviet officials. Professor Michael Voslensky, who was a senior official of the WPC and now lives in West Germany, says the main aim of the World Peace Council is "... to disseminate Soviet propaganda under the Soviet slogan of peace." Chandra's assertions are also countered by Arkady Shevchenko, former Soviet under secretary general of the United Nations. He claims that Soviet officials in the WPC's secretariat give Chandra instructions. While Shevchenko was at the UN, Moscow told him to arrange meetings between Chandra and the UN secretary general.

The film also discusses Moscow's financial support of the WPC. A former translator for the Council claims that the organization had two budgets: the official one, and the real one.

"The Deception Network" visually illustrates documentation found in published works and also provides new information. The film may be broadcast in the US on the Public Broadcasting Service. Further information can be obtained from Stornoway Productions, Inc., 59 St. Nicholas St., Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4Y1W6. Telephone: (416) 923-1104. ■



—1988, continued from page 6

In the Soviet Union, these invited religious leaders will take part in services organized by the Patriarchate, to the accompaniment of overt propaganda channeled to foreign audiences. The spiritual message, however, will be interspersed with one of a more timely temporal nature. We can expect Soviet Christian leaders to proclaim the sanctity of life on earth, and denounce the arms race, inviting foreign guests to join in the call for peace. The Party will thus seek to co-opt the religious celebration to achieve a dual purpose: the presence of internationally-known clerics will lend legitimacy to the Kremlin's "toleration" of religion, and the celebration of the anniversary will become a propaganda plus for Soviet arms control positions.

At the same time, within the USSR, the campaign against religion will intensify. More books and articles will appear on "scientific atheism." The KGB will probably step up its harassment of believers. In any event, they will not be allowed to disrupt the festivities by making embarrassing claims

about religious persecution. As we have seen before, on occasions such as the World Festival of Youth in 1985 and the Olympic games in 1980, those with dissenting views will be kept out of sight for the duration of the celebration.

The Ukrainian problem rates special measures. To deflect the impact, the celebration will be held in Moscow, not Kiev where the first baptism took place 1000 years ago. But Ukrainian Catholics are likely to increase their activities as the millenium approaches, probably drawing a particularly harsh and repressive response from the KGB. The objective of this KGB campaign will be to decapitate the movement by arresting the leaders and frightening followers into submission. The old claim that the Ukrainian Catholic Church "voluntarily" opted for its own abolition will be repeated to discredit and undermine their leadership.

Emigré communities in the West will also be the target of special active measures. There are substantial Ukrainian communities in, for example, New York, Chicago and Toronto. Moscow can anticipate that both the Orthodox and Catholic emigrés will organize their own celebrations, and that these will include loud protests about the USSR's policies on religion.

## *Moscow plans to influence mainstream clerics in the West and deflect criticism of Soviet anti- religious policy*

Moscow will likely retaliate along national lines. The Russian Orthodox abroad will draw the "carrot and stick" approach. On the one hand, the Soviets will accuse them of being reactionary religious obscurantists. But at the same time, they will use their agents of influence in these communities. Their task will be to point out that the regime is celebrating the anniversary in Moscow, that the Russian Orthodox Church in the USSR has received new privileges, and that Moscow is favoring the Orthodox over the Catholics.

The brunt of Moscow's counterattack will fall on Ukrainian emigré groups. They, too, will be depicted as obscurantist reactionaries, and Moscow will play on the differences between Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic communities. By sowing discord between them, Moscow hopes to fracture the emigré groups, deflect attention from anti-religious policies in the USSR, and undermine the anti-Soviet coalition at home and abroad.

Soviet efforts to exploit the millenium have already begun. As Moscow grapples with the unfamiliar task of celebrating a religious anniversary, their campaign will probably take unexpected twists and turns. Nonetheless we can expect to see some familiar tactics. ■

**Pictured standing is Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk and Belorussia, who outlined Moscow's plans for celebrating the Millenium.**





as the reunification of divided families, uniting spouses of bi-national marriages and releasing dissidents such as Anatoly Shcharansky, the Soviets can depend on wide coverage by the American media. Soviet behavior in these instances, Moscow believes, can be used to affect the perceptions of the American people.

## Two-Track Approach

To this end, the Soviets have sought to capitalize on the new cultural agreements signed by Reagan and Gorbachev last November in Geneva. Washington hoped the accord would make it possible for Soviet and American citizens to travel to each other's countries, live with local families, and gain first-hand knowledge about their respective societies. In this way, the cultural agreement would produce "non-political" people-to-people contacts. There are two components in this program. First, the US government seeks to develop genuine two-way citizen-based exchanges. Moscow is supposed to do the same. Second, private American


**Cruising for Peace: *Pravda* illustration commemorating last summer's Mississippi River Peace Cruise.**

organizations arrange their own exchanges with the Soviet Union. There is no equivalent private sector in the USSR. All Soviet exchanges are controlled by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

To coordinate the increased level of US government-assisted exchanges arising out of the Summit and to facilitate exchanges between private American groups and Soviet organizations, the US Information Agency (USIA) has established a new office, the President's US-Soviet Exchange Initiative. The director of this program is Ambassador Stephen Rhinesmith, an experienced specialist in the management of international organizations.

His counterpart in the Soviet apparatus is Yuri Kashlev, the head of the USSR's new Department for Humanitarian and Cultural Ties in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1971, Kashlev was expelled from Britain on charges of espionage. According to a Radio Liberty report, Kashlev holds official rank in the KGB.

The privately-sponsored exchanges with American groups hold special attraction for the Soviets, providing as they do enormous opportunities for direct communication with the American people and their media. This has been demonstrated recently by the contacts the Soviets have established with many American peace groups. By capitalizing on American public interest in the peace issue, the Soviets are often able to promote their own positions on disarmament, and attract widespread publicity. A case in point was the August 1986 "Mississippi River Peace Cruise." (For more information see the Summer 1986 issue of *Forecast*.) The American sponsor of the "Peace Cruise" was an organization called "Promoting Enduring Peace," which also arranges trips by Americans along the Volga River. It is likely we will see more "Peace Cruises" and even "Bike Races for Peace."



Moreover, specially-selected Soviet teenagers are now in the US to participate in events organized jointly by Moscow and American peace groups.

The Americans who take part in such events do so voluntarily. They are, for the most part, motivated by a genuine desire for peace and the opportunity to learn. In no way would they view their involvement as facilitating Soviet propaganda activities. This is in sharp contrast to their Soviet counterparts who are sent by the Party. The Soviet exchange visitors and tourists have primarily a political function, to spread Soviet peace propaganda in the West. The pro-peace sentiments they express during such outings may well be sincere, but they are also rehearsed. The entire program is for external consumption. (Inside the USSR, those peace activists not organized by the Party are subject to harassment and arrest.)

## Soviets Well-Rehearsed

Soviet "tourists" in the West have a job to perform. Soviet citizens can see the West only if the Party believes that they will further its goals. Those who receive permission to travel to the US undergo screening beforehand. The KGB tries to ensure they will not do or say anything to embarrass the state. Compliance is often assured by reminding the "tourist" that his or her family remains in the Soviet Union. Visas are rarely granted for all family members.

Soviet travelers also receive briefings on what to say and how to behave in the West. They will invariably echo the current Party position on almost all issues, and may retreat behind ignorance on issues which are especially difficult for them to handle, such as Afghanistan. American visitors in the USSR by contrast are under no obligation to support US government policies. Americans (and other Westerners) who visit the Soviet Union do so for a variety



of reasons. They may be businessmen seeking new markets, scholars, scientists, journalists, or just tourists. In any case, most travel on their own initiative. They are free to voice opposition to Washington's policy. However, it will be difficult for them to find "ears" that are not listening on behalf of the Soviet government.

Occasionally, special opportunities call for special tactics. Samantha Smith, the New England schoolgirl who wrote to General Secretary Andropov about peace and was subsequently invited to visit the USSR, provided the Soviets with an unexpected propaganda bonanza. Ms. Smith died later in a plane accident. However, the Soviets dispatched an eleven-year-old schoolgirl to the USA to continue the quest for peace. It should have come as no surprise that Katerina Lycheva was concerned not only to promote the Soviet desire for peace but also to criticize US moves to "militarize" space—a key Soviet propaganda plank. No ordinary schoolgirl, but in fact a professional actress, Ms. Lycheva shied away from questions about human rights issues in the USSR. Soviet active measures planners now are devising new programs showcasing children as spokesmen for Soviet proposals.

### Opportunities for Espionage

Moscow also has a special interest in scientific exchanges with the US. Such programs give the USSR legitimate opportunities to obtain vital technology. Moreover, they provide opportunities for espionage. David Major, the National Security Council's director of Intelligence and Counterintelligence Programs, recently put it this way: "The KGB will ask the traveling scientist to collect information about the individuals and/or facilities they visit while in the US. Upon their return, the Soviet scientists are required to prepare a report. This report includes detailed personality assessments on individuals with whom they had contact. If these reports are not acceptable to the KGB, they probably will not be given future exit visas."

The Soviet leadership uses human contacts to appeal to Western publics on other levels. For instance, sending the USSR's artistic virtuosos to the West serves several purposes. Not insignificantly, their performances bring in badly-needed hard currency. More

## *The KGB requires Soviet scientists in exchange programs to prepare personality assessments of the Western scientists they meet*

importantly, they foster the image of the USSR as a developed, sophisticated state which values culture for its own sake and promotes its advancement. Such spectacles are aimed at creating and deepening goodwill in the West towards the USSR and masking the hidden Soviet agenda. However, this

strategy is not entirely risk-free for the Soviets. Over the years, there have been several spectacular defections by leading Soviet artists, Mstislav Rostropovich and Mikhail Baryshnikov among them, motivated by a desire to enjoy more artistic freedom.

In addition, there have been numerous examples in recent years of Moscow's willingness to exploit, for political purposes, emotional issues involving the reunification of families and spouses of bi-national marriages. The Kremlin calculates that gestures aimed at ameliorating the human suffering in these cases will enhance the USSR's image abroad. In this way, they also hope to create favorable conditions for achieving foreign policy objectives. Naturally, such demonstrations of "liberalism" are carefully timed for maximum public relations effect. A particularly opportune moment is before negotiations with Western states,

—EXCHANGES,  
continued on page 12

"VISUAL PROPAGANDA, in particular the political poster, plays a special role in mass propaganda. Posters, just as other forms of visual propaganda, are based on visual images, which have an enormous emotional impact on man." Quoted from *Social Psychology and Propaganda*, a Soviet text published in Moscow in 1985, pp. 220-221.



**WARNOGRAPHY:** The caricatures are typical of how the CPSU leadership depicts the US and its NATO allies. The caption on this poster reads: "NATO - A Tool of Imperialist Aggression." It comes from a set of posters about NATO. Many others are widely available in special poster shops and bookstores in the USSR. Their theme: the demonic portrayal of the US military, dragging along its allies in the fulfillment of its "imperialist" goals.



—EXCHANGES,  
continued from page 11

especially superpower summits. Moscow hopes general audiences in the West will take such moves as evidence of reform in the USSR and pressure their governments to come to terms.

We can expect the USSR to make maximum use of cultural exchanges and human contacts—especially given the Helsinki Review meeting in November, and the maneuvering surrounding the second Reagan-Gorbachev Summit. Some celebrated *refuseniks* may receive permission to emigrate. The Kremlin may give the nod to increased family reunification. And, of course, appropriate publicity will attend these gestures.

Similar Strategy in  
Europe and Asia

Nor is the US the only target. The latest Soviet worldwide diplomatic offensive has emphasized expanding human contacts and cultural exchanges as a means of reinvigorating detente. In talks with West European leaders, Moscow has called for greater interaction between Western and Soviet citizens. Gorbachev has made similar overtures to Japan, which would involve technological cooperation. Ultimately, the Kremlin hopes to convene a Pacific regional conference, similar to the Helsinki meetings.

In the past, cultural exchanges have often served as a barometer of US-Soviet relations. These programs have, at times, been canceled after particular Soviet actions, such as the invasion of Afghanistan, engendered worldwide indignation. But unless Moscow blunders into repelling the intended Western targets of these active measures—by arresting American journalists or visitors on trumped-up espionage charges, for example—we can expect people-to-people exchanges and other human contacts to play a large and growing role in Soviet influence campaigns. ■

## RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISM, SOVIET-STYLE

A favorite Soviet technique is recycling disinformation appearing in non-Soviet newspapers and broadcasts. This allows Moscow to disseminate an attack on the US while disclaiming responsibility for it.

A recent example occurred on May 6, 1986, when, according to *New Times* "Vremya," the nightly Soviet TV news program, reported a story ostensibly originating in South Yemen which alleged that the CIA had arranged the April 5th bombing of the LaBelle discotheque in West Berlin. [This act of terrorism led directly to the US bombing raid on Libya.]

Shortly after, Richard E. Combs, Jr., chargé d'affaires at the US embassy in Moscow, wrote to Alexander Aksyonov,

chairman of the USSR's State Committee for Radio and Television, protesting the Soviet broadcast of this accusation.

The June 30 edition of *New Times*, a Soviet English language weekly, printed Mr. Combs' letter along with Mr. Aksyonov's reply. We reprint here the text of both letters as they appeared in *New Times*. ■

Dear Mr. Aksyonov:

I regret I must draw your attention to a particularly offensive and false item which was broadcast during the *Vremya* news programme this last May 6th. I am referring to the broadcast of the TASS report from Aden, the supposed "Commentary of the ANA Agency," which stated that the CIA arranged the April 5th bombing of the LaBelle discotheque in West Berlin. That the article itself is disgusting goes without saying, but of course what the South Yemen press writes lies outside the control of your State Committee. However, it is within your power to control what appears on your television programmes. Thus I am astonished that GOSTELERADIO would allow *Vremya* to give credence to such lies as this by broadcasting them to the Soviet people, particularly at a time when both of our governments are endeavouring to increase media exchange activities.

Knowing that the U.S. government informed your government in advance that a Libyan-sponsored terrorist attack was imminent only magnifies the irresponsibility of this broadcast. The U.S. government, and I personally, find the broadcast of this item an obvious attempt to score cheap propaganda points at the expense of truth and dignity. It is insulting, unprofessional, and highly unacceptable.

I would hope that you, as the person responsible for what is broadcast on Soviet television, would direct that a disavowal of these lies be broadcast on *Vremya* at the earliest opportunity.

Sincerely,

Richard E. COMBS, Jr., Chargé d'Affaires U.S.

Dear Mr Combs,

Your letter amazed me. It was strange, to say the least. Why? First, it was strange that an official American representative should complain about the television of a sovereign country broadcasting a report circulated by the news agency of another sovereign country.

Second, are not passions running rather too high over the content of the above-mentioned report? And this at a time when the press and the television and radio networks of the United States are full of fabrications, slander and the most ridiculous inventions about the Soviet Union, its people, and its foreign and domestic policy. There is no dearth of examples of this: the false accusation of support for terrorism levelled against the U.S.S.R., the amoral and essentially anti-human propaganda orgy around the accident in Chernobyl, and, finally, the latest outrageous statements and writings concerning the status of the sovereign Baltic Union Republics of our multinational state.

Third, it is strange that you should continue to harp on the assertion that the U.S. government informed the Soviet government in advance that a terrorist attack was in preparation in West Berlin. I shall not go into that again. Sufficiently clear explanations have been given on this score and are known to the world public.

Fourth, the tone and peremptory nature of the demands contained in your letter are surprising. After all, you are not dealing with a TV channel in some provincial U.S. state, but with the national television of a sovereign country. In general, if you are sincerely interested in improving relations between our countries, please do not ever adopt such a tone in communicating with Soviet people and official organizations.

Please forgive me for my frankness and also for having been too busy to reply to your letter earlier.

Sincerely,  
Chairman, U.S.S.R. State Committee for Radio and Television  
Alexander AKSYONOV



# WHY AND HOW THIS FORECAST

**A**lmost all publications dealing with Soviet behavior confine themselves to study and analysis of past and current developments. Few seek to project such behavior into the future. Moreover, contemporary studies focus on internal political developments, and when concerned with Soviet foreign policy, they seek to assess important traditional instruments of Soviet statecraft such as military power, negotiations, diplomacy and economic assistance programs. However significant these elements, there is another dimension of Soviet policy that rarely has been addressed in such publications, namely, the use of the unique Soviet instrument of **Active Measures** and **Disinformation** to affect Western perceptions and decisionmaking. *Forecast* will attempt to **describe trends** and **anticipate** major Soviet active measures and disinformation campaigns directed against the United States and its allies. Extended definitions of the terms "active measures" and "disinformation" appeared in our Fall, 1985 and Winter, 1986 issues, respectively.

## Methods

The methods employed here are an outgrowth of the techniques and sources used by researchers who have been studying past Soviet behavior, supplemented by new sources and techniques: the reports and files of Western intelligence agencies which have become increasingly available to the public; the trials and activities of convicted Soviet agents of influence; and, perhaps most importantly, information and analysis from former Soviet bloc practitioners now living in the West.

Based on studies of past Soviet activities, we have concluded that it is possible to study and extrapolate trends, to identify at an early stage major Soviet active measures campaigns, and to anticipate some aspects of their evolution.

To accomplish this, we regularly monitor: (1) Public statements of Soviet leaders and daily press of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and

particularly the overt publications of the organs responsible for active measures; (2) Related activities and statements of Communist Parties in the Soviet bloc and Western Europe, the US, Asia and Latin America; (3) Related activities, statements, seminars, and press of the thirteen major and many lesser Soviet front groups regularly receiving instructions from the Soviet Union; (4) Exposed agent of influence operations designed to support Soviet policy objectives; and (5) Documented instances of disinformation designed to deceive and manipulate, such as forgeries or covertly placed media articles that are later uncovered.

## Advisory Board

Academic specialists on Soviet foreign policy, former senior active measures practitioners, and experts on communist party political campaign activity in Europe, Asia and Central America serve on our Advisory Board, and as consultants, provide their informed analysis of what we can expect from the Soviet leadership. The Advisory Board includes: **Alain Besançon**, professor at the Institut des Hautes Etudes in Paris, and a columnist for *L'Express*; **Sidney Hook**, Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution on War Revolution and Peace; Professors

**Uri Ra'an** and **Richard Shultz** of the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, who specialize in Soviet decisionmaking and the use of active measures and disinformation; and Professor **Adam B. Ulam**, director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. Three former Soviet bloc active measures practitioners also serve on the Advisory Board: **Ladislav Bittman**, who was a Czech intelligence officer and deputy director of the Czech Disinformation Department; **Ilya Dzhirkvelov**, who served in the KGB's First and Second Chief Directorates, and was deputy general secretary of the Soviet Organization of Journalists; and **Stanislav Levchenko**, who worked with the CPSU's International Department and as an active measures specialist in the KGB's First Chief Directorate. The editor of *Forecast* is **Roy Godson** professor of government at Georgetown University, who studies and teaches about international security affairs, propaganda, active measures and disinformation as elements of statecraft.

Extrapolating trends and forecasting of any kind is extremely difficult. We will be refining our techniques constantly, and we welcome readers' comments and suggestions. ■

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## DISINFORMATION

*Soviet Active Measures and  
Disinformation Forecast*





—ARMS ISSUES,  
continued from page 1

were asked first, if they had heard of these proposals, and second, if they could identify the sponsoring country.

Most were unaware of the proposals, and either could not identify, or misidentified the sponsor. Men, those with a college degree or higher, and self-described liberals in the sample were slightly better informed. In June, between 62% and 85% of those surveyed were unable to identify which country put forward specific arms control proposals. Only between 5% and 13% of all respondents were able correctly to identify the sponsor with certainty.

The results of the September poll indicate little has changed. For example, as compared to the June survey, slightly fewer respondents (27% versus 30%) correctly identified the USSR as the author of a proposal to ban all nuclear testing. Further, a larger number (52% compared to 39%) either had not heard of the proposal or did not know its sponsor.

Still more revealing in the June poll was the lack of awareness about US proposals which called for effective verification procedures. Between half and two-thirds of the respondents either had not heard of or did not know which

country sponsored proposals which included the term "verification." In reply to a separate question on this subject, however, a majority favored an arms control agreement with the USSR *only* if Soviet compliance could be fully verified.

This confusion is also evident in relation to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Various polls indicate that between 60% and 70% of Americans believe SDI is worthwhile. But almost two-thirds of those surveyed in June said they would support a peace petition which advocates a comprehensive moratorium on all nuclear testing, including a freeze on weapons in space.

These latest results supplement and confirm earlier polling data showing a lack of familiarity with American and Soviet positions on strategic defense. According to a March 1986 NSIC survey, 87% of the public believes the US wants to develop strategic defense. However, in spite of Soviet efforts to develop strategic weapons over the last twenty years, only 27% of Americans believe the Soviet Union is engaged in this build-up.


While the Kremlin's campaign to sway the American public has yielded few recent results, American unfamiliarity with US and Soviet positions creates targets and opportunities for Soviet propaganda and active measures. ■

## New US Government Information on Active Measures


The first of two new sources of documentation on recent Soviet active measures has been released. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 12 and 13, 1985, contain the testimony of high-ranking CIA, State Department, and USIA officials on Soviet campaigns in the 1980's, as well as providing examples of recent forgeries. Also included in the publication are the short reports on Soviet active measures which have been distributed by the US government since 1981. The Hearings are available from the Committee and the US Government Printing Office.

A second new source of US government documentation is a report requested by the Congress which is expected to be released later this fall.


## CAN AMERICANS CORRECTLY IDENTIFY THE SOURCE OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS?




(USSR) Eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000



(USSR) Ban all nuclear testing



(US) 50% cut in arms with verification



(US) Nuclear test ban with verification



# DISINFORMATION

## *Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Forecast*

### SOVIET PRIORITIES IN '87

The following special section focuses on three Soviet active measures priorities in 1987:

(1) strategic defense; (2) detente; and (3) Moscow's Asian gambit. Soviet objectives, themes, and targets for each priority are analyzed.

In the short term, the Soviets' top objective will be to prevent the US from actually starting to produce strategic defensive weapons during the last years of the Reagan presidency. At the same time, Moscow is pushing harder than ever to promote "detentist" attitudes among American and other Western elites to create more favorable conditions for furthering its own policies.

During 1987 the Soviets will intensify their drive to weaken the United States' position in Asia. This will lead to continued efforts to improve Soviet relations with China and Japan, and weaken American ties there. Simultaneously, the Soviets will try to undermine the relationships between the United States and countries in Southeast Asia, especially the Philippines; in the South Pacific, notably the ANZUS countries and the Island states; and in South Asia, particularly India.

At the same time, there will be no let up in the Kremlin's pursuit of its familiar long-term goals: discrediting and isolating the United States; breaking up the NATO Alliance; and maximizing the prestige and influence of the Soviet bloc.

### STRATEGIC DEFENSE

Moscow's major concern in 1987 is that US and European talk about strategic defenses will turn to serious action and become a real part of United States national security policy. The US, from the Soviet perspective, is now moving toward institutionalizing strategic defense. The Soviets fear the US will actually assign anti-missile defense to some part of the US military, and commit itself to building a mix of offensive and defensive power, as the Soviet Union has done. The Reagan administration is under pressure to go beyond the research program of SDI and deploy quickly those anti-missile systems it can, deploying more

—STRATEGIC DEFENSE,  
continued on page 6

### AMERICANS BELIEVE KREMLIN DEVELOPING "STAR WARS"

#### *But Most Think United States Is Ahead*

While accusing the US of "militarizing space," Moscow has long been masking its own strategic defense program [see *Forecast*, Winter 1986]. However, new polling data reveal that the great majority of Americans believe the Soviets are working on anti-missile systems. At the same time, most think the USSR trails the US in technologies related to missile defenses.

These are among the results of the latest public opinion poll conducted by the National Strategy Information Center, a non-partisan educational organization. The November 1986 poll questioned Americans about various national security issues after the US-USSR meeting in Reykjavik.

The survey shows that 80 percent think the USSR is engaged in research

—POLLING RESULTS,  
continued on page 18

### "AIDS: MADE IN THE USA"

#### *Moscow's Contagious Campaign*

Moscow has unleashed a complex, worldwide campaign to blame the United States for the AIDS epidemic. What do the sophisticated new Soviet leaders, the practitioners

of *glasnost*, struggling against entrenched bureaucrats from the Brezhnev era, believe they can gain from such crude disinformation? Moreover, will anyone take this kind of outrageous charge seriously or will the campaign, like some Soviet forgeries, fall on deaf ears? The new Soviet leaders clearly have calculated that the short and long-term benefits of the "AIDS: Made in the USA" campaign are well worth the costs.

—"AIDS,"  
continued on page 16

### INSIDE

- 1987 Calendar of Active Measures
- Agent of Influence in the Media
- Major New Government Report on Active Measures



# CALENDAR

*Targets for Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation*

## 1987

- **UN Year of Shelter for the Homeless**—Moscow will try to divert attention from human rights issues in the USSR by focusing on poverty, homelessness, and unemployment in the West.

## MARCH

- **Delegation from Soviet Peace Committee to visit US**, (March 1-15)
- **Congressional Telebridge**—First of six scheduled televised exchanges between the US Congress and the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, with the theme "New Thinking in the Space Age."

## APRIL

- **Delegation of USSR religious leaders to visit US**, (April 13-27)—Delegates' Easter message to US religious groups will stress halting the arms race on earth and especially in the heavens.
- **First Anniversary of the nuclear accident at Chernobyl**, (April 26)—Moscow will stress inherent unreliability and danger of nuclear technology, and emphasize "candid" Soviet handling of the Chernobyl accident.

## MAY

- **Soviet Committee on Science and Technology visits US businessmen**, (May 21-30)
- **15th Anniversary of 1972 ABM (and SALT I) Treaty**, (May 26)—Soviets will claim that the narrow interpretation of this Treaty is correct and crucial to the future of mankind.

## JUNE

- **World Women's Congress**, Moscow—In addition to feminist issues, major focus will be on Soviet peace proposals and national liberation struggles.

## AUGUST

- **Hiroshima and Nagasaki Days**, (August 6 and 8)—Organized demonstrations in various world capitals. Possible presentation of People's Peace Treaty signatures at the UN.
- **40th Anniversary of India's Independence**, (August 15)—Accusations again will surface about US attempts to destabilize India and undermine the Non-Aligned Movement.

## SEPTEMBER


- **5th Anniversary of KAL 007 shootdown**, (September 1)—Soviets will renew claim that the plane was on a spy mission.
- **New Zealand Elections likely**—Labour Party government has forbidden nuclear-powered US warships to dock in New Zealand ports. Soviets will support nuclear-free zone in South Pacific and claim US is "bullying" its allies.

## OCTOBER

- **30th Anniversary of Sputnik**, (October 4)—Soviets will hail their own "Star Peace" exploration of space in contrast to U.S. "Star Wars" program.

## NOVEMBER

- **70th Anniversary of Bolshevik Revolution**, (November 7)—Major propaganda spectacle. Soviets will portray themselves as a powerful, peace-loving society, which has made mistakes but is now evolving into a more humane system. Western and Third World guests will be invited to pressure Washington to be "reasonable" on arms issues and the need for a new detente.



## LIKELY EVENTS

(dates unavailable)

### THE TRAVELS OF GORBACHEV

- Gorbachev to visit Europe (Italy), Asia (Japan) and Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico and Nicaragua) in 1987. He is also scheduled to host foreign leaders.
- Another US-Soviet summit?

### SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL (SI)

- The SI's Latin-America Committee will meet in the first and second half of 1987. Cubans and Nicaraguans will try to divert attention from Managua's repression, focus on US support for the Contras, and appeal for Latin American solidarity against US imperialism. The SI Council is also to meet in Europe and Africa in the spring and fall. [see *Forecast*, Fall 1986]

### NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM)

- Ministerial-level meeting on economic cooperation scheduled for Pyongyang, North Korea.
- Meeting of NAM Coordinating Bureau, Georgetown, Guyana. ■



# NEW GOVERNMENT REPORT ON ACTIVE MEASURES

In late 1986 the US government completed its most in-depth public report on active measures since the House Intelligence Committee Hearings in 1980 and 1982.\* The report is useful both to specialists and to those wishing to familiarize themselves with this element of Soviet behavior.

*Active Measures: A Report on the Substance and Process of Anti-US Disinformation and Propaganda Campaigns* is a 250-page examination of the gamut of Soviet influence operations. It concludes that active measures, as an important instrument of Soviet policy, have in no way diminished since the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev. Indeed, the personnel and organizational changes which have since taken place in the active measures apparatus indicate a renewed emphasis on such operations, and "...perhaps an increase in both quantity and quality of active measures for the foreseeable future."

The report, the product of an interagency effort, was requested by Congress in 1985. It contains chapters on:

- the Soviet propaganda apparatus, plus an appendix on the Soviet anti-SDI campaign
- active measures in the US
- forgeries
- agents of influence
- Soviet front groups.

Also included are presentations by scholars, journalists, and former Soviet bloc intelligence operatives who participated in State Department-sponsored seminars on active measures.

\* "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, February 6, 1980; "Soviet Active Measures," Hearings Before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, July 13, 14, 1982.



**Sampling of selected Soviet front publications aimed at specific audiences.**

The section on Soviet overt propaganda is the most extensive and up-to-date treatment of the subject currently available. It reports that by the end of 1985, Moscow's international radio broadcasting totalled 2,215 hours per week in 82 languages. The section concludes that the quality and effectiveness of Soviet propaganda have also improved in recent years as Soviet spokesmen have made greater use of press conferences and the Western media to publicize their viewpoint. These improvements are in part attributed to Gorbachev's personal style and his restructuring of the propaganda apparatus.

The enormous Soviet investment in propaganda indicates Moscow's appreciation of its potential to influence foreign targets. The report projects more radio and TV broadcasting, more publications directed at the Third World, and propaganda more carefully tailored for specific countries in the future.

Materials on Moscow's anti-SDI campaign note that Soviet fronts and non-ruling communist parties have made US strategic defense their primary target since 1984. Also discussed are the fronts' attempts to

—continued on next page

## STATE DEPARTMENT'S NEW OFFICE FOR ACTIVE MEASURES

A permanent Office of Active Measures Analysis and Response with a full-time staff was recently created by the US Department of State.

The new office has three major areas of responsibility: (1) to issue regular reports on active measures to the public; (2) to provide regular briefings for US and foreign governmental and non-governmental bodies; and, (3) to respond to Soviet active measures, both unilaterally, and in concert with friendly governments.

The new office supplements the government's Interagency Active Measures Working Group, established in 1981 and chaired by the State Department's Office of Intelligence and Research (INR).

Reports issued by the permanent Office of Active Measures Analysis and Response can be obtained from Publishing Services, FAIM/PS, Room B-844F, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.



turn Western professional groups, scientists, academics, physicians, businessmen, and others against SDI.

The report on Soviet active measures in the United States details efforts by the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA) and one of its main front groups in the US, the National Council on American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF), to influence American peace organizations. Their methods include organizing demonstrations against US defense policies and drumming up

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*Recent CPSU  
personnel and  
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active measures*

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support for public petitions which support Soviet objectives, such as the People's Peace Treaty. The NCASF also is active in arranging "goodwill tours" to the US for Soviet groups. Such organized visits provide additional opportunities for Soviet spokesmen to address Americans directly. This section notes that active measures in the US are increasingly targeting religious groups, especially more conservative ones.

The chapter on recent forgeries designed to discredit the US includes the "Kirkpatrick Speech," intended to damage US-Indian relations. This forgery is alleged to be the text of a speech made by Jeane Kirkpatrick (former US Ambassador to the UN) in 1982. It suggests that the US planned to use food-aid as a weapon in the Third World and to destabilize certain regimes there. Even more inflammatory is the claim that Washington backed separatist movements in this volatile region, and favored the "Balkanization" of India.

New information is provided on the very sensitive subject of agents of

influence. The report discusses Soviet recruitment of government officials (such as Arne Treholt in Norway) and journalists (such as Pierre-Charles Pathé in France, and Arne Petersen in Denmark) who have already been identified as working for Moscow. It also lists several new agents of influence not previously named publicly, including details of attempted Soviet penetrations of ruling and opposition parties in Japan and Egypt. The report also reveals that the political secretary to Malaysia's deputy prime minister was arrested in 1981 (shortly before his superior became prime minister) and subsequently convicted as a Soviet agent. Another disclosure concerns a Japanese journalist previously identified by Stanislav Levchenko as a KGB "trusted contact"; in 1984 he published a story supporting the Soviet version of the KAL 007 shootdown.

Soviet use of front organizations receives close examination. The report analyzes recent organizational changes in the World Peace Council (WPC), arguably Moscow's most influential "non-governmental" organization. It concludes that the appointment of a Finnish communist to the newly-resurrected post of WPC secretary general and the "promotion" of WPC president Romesh Chandra indicate a shift in the focus of WPC activities towards East-West relations and away from Third World issues. The report includes histories of the fronts and traces Soviet use of such organizations to the early years of the Bolshevik regime. It analyzes the relations among the various front groups and maintains that the CPSU's International Department controls them through personnel placements and funding.

The report documents the historical evolution of active measures, citing the use of forgeries, agents of influence, and other types of influence operations as routine instruments of Soviet statecraft in the 1920's and 1930's. It demonstrates the strong historical links between today's KGB and its earlier incarnations, and discusses the practical applications of Leninist exhortations to use any means to gain revolutionary objectives.

Publication of the report is expected in 1987. ■

## BURCHETT: AGENT OF INFLUENCE IN THE MEDIA

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**W**ilfred Burchett, the Australian journalist who died recently, had a controversial career. His admirers in the US and Europe thought him "inspired by an uncommon moral passion"; to others, he was a communist agent of influence. Robert Manne, in a scholarly article "The Fortunes of Wilfred Burchett," in the August 1985 issue of the Australian journal *Quadrant*, uses Burchett's own letters and declassified archival documents in an attempt to demonstrate that the celebrated correspondent was a paid

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*Identifying agents of  
influence is difficult  
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clear cut*

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agent of influence. Rebutting articles claiming Burchett was the innocent victim of right-wing paranoia, Manne cites Burchett's correspondence with his father and testimony by a Soviet defector which disclose that Burchett received financial support from the Chinese, the KGB, and the North Vietnamese.

Burchett was a correspondent for the *Daily Express* (London) in the 1940's. During the Korean War he wrote propaganda materials and made pro-Chinese and North Korean radio broadcasts. He spread disinformation about North Korean treatment of prisoners, once likening a POW camp to "a holiday resort in Switzerland." According to Manne, a declassified



US intelligence report, based on information from a former North Korean officer, states that the North Korean Ministry of Culture and Propaganda actually wrote some stories that appeared in Western publications with Burchett's byline. Burchett also tried to indoctrinate POWs and even helped write and edit false confessions by captured US pilots about American use of germ warfare.

According to a Soviet defector, Yuri Krotkov, Burchett was given an apartment by the KGB while he was in Moscow in 1956. Colonel Barsegov, who headed a KGB section which attempted to manipulate foreign correspondents, was in charge of Burchett's "journalism." Krotkov also relates that Burchett claimed membership in the Australian Communist Party, though neither he nor the party publicized it.

Burchett's influence reached its height during the Vietnam War. He was considered an objective and knowledgeable observer of the Asian scene. However, according to Manne, Burchett's coverage of the war was designed to prove that the National Liberation Front was a southern-based political movement, independent of Hanoi, and nationalist rather than communist.

In 1981, his memoirs, *At the Barricades* (Time Books), received favorable reviews. *The New York Times* reviewer, for example, noted Burchett's "uncommon honesty" and called the book "a unique and valuable contribution to the history of our time."

Identifying agents of influence, particularly in the media, is difficult and controversial. In the case of Wilfred Burchett, however, the evidence is becoming more and more clear-cut. ■


## RED ORCHESTRA

In 1983, in an address to the Central Committee, Konstantin Chernenko, then General Secretary of the CPSU, likened the USSR's "ideological work" to an orchestra, with harmony achieved by skillful conducting. A new publication highlights the role of the Soviet Union as the "conductor" and selected Third World governments and "national liberation movements" as the "musicians," by explaining their apparatus and methods as well as by providing case studies. This book is

*The first in a series  
on Moscow's  
orchestration of its  
own and its allies'  
active measures  
resources*

the first in a series to be published by the Hoover Institution on Moscow's orchestration of proxy assets to increase its influence in geo-strategic regions.

Part one of *The Red Orchestra* describes the principal instruments of Soviet policy. These include diplomatic activity for overt and covert objectives; political action coordinated with the cooperation of foreign communist parties and front



groups; external combat forces from non-Soviet sources (e.g. Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam); overt and covert active measures campaigns using the media and intelligence assets; and, the transfer of arms, supplies, cash, and credit.

The second part focuses on three countries in Latin America and the Caribbean in which the use of these mechanisms is especially well documented, with contributions on Cuba, Grenada, and Central America.

The series was designed by Henry Rowen of Stanford University; Paul Seabury, University of California, Berkeley; Charles Wolf of the Rand Corporation; and Dennis Bark of the Hoover Institution. The volume, edited by Dennis Bark, is entitled *The Red Orchestra: Instruments of Soviet Policy in Latin America* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution, 1986). The next volume, on Soviet involvement in Africa, is scheduled for publication in the fall of 1987. ■



## —STRATEGIC DEFENSE

*continued from page 1*

advanced strategic defense systems as they are developed.

From Moscow's viewpoint, the institutionalization of US strategic defense might become inevitable if the US announced that it would no longer be bound by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. When the US ratified this Treaty, it was expected that the US would not develop and deploy strategic defensive systems, and indeed, essentially the US has not done so. But because American policymakers believe that the Soviet buildup of strategic defenses together with more accurate and powerful Soviet offensive forces leaves the US vulnerable to a disarming first strike and subsequent blackmail, the US has become increasingly interested in acquiring strategic defensive systems. Although the ABM Treaty allows limited anti-missile defenses, many now believe that effective protection for US retaliatory forces, command and control centers, or American cities, requires the US to go beyond the limits of the ABM Treaty. Hence, they conclude if the administration is serious about strategic defense, it must either renegotiate the Treaty, or give six months notice in accordance with legal obligations, that it will no longer be bound by its terms. Should the US take this step, it is likely that strategic defense would become an integral part of future US strategy.

However, if major decisions are not made in 1987 to move in this direction, there is a good chance that the decision will not be made until 1990, if at all. The following year, 1988, is a Presidential election year, and 1989 the first year of a new administration and Congress, which may or may not be disposed to seek deployment.

From the Soviet point of view, 1987—to use a football metaphor—is a goal line stand. If they can prevent a touchdown in the next few plays, they will be at a decided advantage for some time to come. However, whether or not the US scores in 1987 the game will NOT be over. One "touchdown," and even key decisions in 1987 to deploy US strategic defenses will not win what Zbigniew Brzezinski recently termed the "endless game." In the military sphere alone, the balance of power is

dependent on both offensive and defensive forces. The "game," whether or not the US makes the key decisions in 1987, will go on for years if not decades. Nevertheless, Moscow may well perceive 1987 to be unusually important.

The Soviets' major objective: to prevent a US decision to abandon the ABM Treaty and actually start



Soviet cartoon on SDI: "The Pentagon's Space Fist" (*Red Star*, November 16, 1986).

producing defensive weapons. If successful, then, as Central Committee advisor Academician Primakov put it, referring to SDI, "We are confident that it will die of its own accord."

There are several reasons behind Soviet anxiety about US strategic defense and SDI.

(1) The most important is **the strategic calculus**. Though it has loudly claimed that defending against ballistic missiles is infeasible, Moscow's actions indicate it believes otherwise. By concentrating on SDI, Moscow has implicitly acknowledged that were the US to begin deploying such defenses, it could well thwart Soviet efforts to obtain politically useful strategic power in the 1990's, i.e., if the US continues to refrain from building anti-missile defenses,

Moscow will have the capability to credibly threaten nuclear war, while Washington will not.

Over the last two decades, the Soviet Union has engaged in an enormous buildup of offensive forces, along with a major effort in ground-based strategic defenses, as well as research and production of exotic and space-based weapons. It would be reasonable for the Kremlin to calculate that unless the US engages in a massive offensive build-up—which is not likely—or puts some elements of strategic defense into production before the late 1980's, it will not be possible to catch up with Soviet advances in both offensive and defensive systems in the 1990's. [For more detailed discussion of Moscow's probable calculus of the strategic equation in the 1990's, see the Winter 1986 issue of *Forecast*.]

(2) Moscow is also worried about the military, economic, and technological spin-offs of SDI. As Academician Primakov recently stated, the program "makes it possible to attain breakthroughs in various areas." Most alarming for the Soviets are, of course, the military implications of US advances. But they also hope to keep the US lead in high technology, which has both military and economic implications, from widening further.

(3) From the Soviet perspective, SDI also threatens greater integration of US-European-Japanese technological and economic development. This, in turn, promotes both economic synergism and political cohesiveness between America and its allies. Soviet writers have noted the rise of "international military-industrial complexes" in the West. Their emergence is worrisome for the Kremlin because they tend to "reduce the contradictions in the capitalist world" thus complicating the task of weakening NATO and detaching the US from Japan.

For all these reasons, US strategic defense will be Moscow's main target in 1987. The Soviets may moderate their demands. **But since Moscow sees the time factor as crucial, it will step up its diplomacy, propaganda, and active measures in an attempt to restrict US efforts to strategic defense research, while continuing to encourage the US**



**to speak well of the ABM Treaty. Above all, Moscow seeks to prevent US production and deployment of strategic defenses.**

## TARGETS

Soviet targets for active measures are usually determined, in large part, by Moscow's perceptions of Western political vulnerabilities. As several former senior active measures practitioners on this publication's advisory board have pointed out, Moscow looks for the "seams" or weak joints in the structure of Western policy and seeks to pull them apart. To exploit Western political vulnerabilities, Moscow need not be consistent. Themes and tactics targeted at Europe or an individual country need not coincide with those aimed at the United States, for example.

It is evident, based on discussions in the Soviet media, that Moscow knows the "correlation of forces" between the President and Congress will be different in the coming year. Reagan's political influence will be diminished. The Congress, now firmly in Democratic hands, will be assertive, with its power enhanced because of the Iran-Contra controversy. However, public opinion, as the Soviets are also aware, is sympathetic to US strategic defense (as opposed to other issues, such as support for the Contras).

In this context, Moscow probably saw—even before the Iran-Contra controversy arose—that its best chance to stop US defensive plans lies in exploiting the contradiction between the attachment of many in the Congress and the Administration to arms control and the public popularity of SDI. The seam is probably obvious to Soviet analysts of American politics: allow Americans to claim the political and bureaucratic benefits of both SDI and arms control via an arms control agreement or "understanding" that in fact limits SDI to research, however defined.

In Europe and Japan, Moscow has little hope in the short run of influencing governments to oppose SDI. However, there is an obvious pressure point. The administration sold SDI to Europe primarily as a research program. When it did so, the US government purveyed an agnostic attitude to deployment. The European

attitude to deployment, therefore, can still be influenced and shaped.

For the immediate future, many in Europe and Japan can be counted on to oppose even limited deployment or termination of the ABM Treaty. So Moscow will ask any and all Europeans it can reach (governing and opposition parties, the non-governmental sector—labor, media, professional organizations, youth) to

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*Moscow looks for the "seams" or weak joints in Western policy and seeks to pull them apart*

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pressure the White House, the State Department, and the Congress not to deploy strategic defense or to come out against the ABM Treaty. Moscow will seek to portray these voices from Europe as the voice of Europe.

## THEMES

### United States

The campaign in the US will pursue some familiar themes, but introduce new twists. Soviet spokesmen will depict US attachment to "Star Wars" as the major obstacle to a lasting peace in a world that would otherwise be "nuclear-free." They will continue to accuse the US of creating a very dangerous situation by insisting on acquiring space-based weapons that could be used for a first strike. Further, they will claim that high technology is unreliable and dangerous. SDI, if deployed, would place fateful decisions in the hands of machines, which, as a leading Soviet commentator put it, would lead to "a sky that will consist not of twinkling peaceful stars, but of flying weapons of death."

When addressing US audiences, Soviet propagandists will claim that deploying SDI will, over the long term, impose unbearable burdens on

US taxpayers. Moscow will continue to charge that SDI promotes the interests of the military-industrial complex while impoverishing and jeopardizing the general population. Finally, Soviet spokesmen have begun a campaign (echoing the arguments of some American opponents of SDI) to demonstrate that the USSR can easily find inexpensive military responses to SDI.

### Western Europe

In Western Europe, the Kremlin will accuse the US of missing an "historic opportunity" to rid the continent of nuclear weapons. Moscow will claim that Washington is more concerned with the interests of the American military-industrial complex than ensuring Europe's security. Further, to uninformed European audiences, the Soviets will assert that strategic defense would in any case cover only the US, leaving Europe vulnerable. Moscow will charge that Washington wants to exploit European scientific and financial resources. Specific themes will be tailored to individual countries: for example, Britain's economy will suffer if it allocates funds for strategic defense. For France, the Soviets will claim that US strategic defense plans will provoke Moscow into developing its own capabilities, rendering the *force de frappe*, France's nuclear deterrent, useless.

The Soviets will warn the major European countries, whose governments endorse SDI research, that they are damaging their relations with the USSR, and undermining their own security. Soviet spokesmen will claim that Western Europe can derive no economic benefits by cooperating with the United States as Washington will not share secrets with its allies, and will monopolize any technological breakthroughs. Indeed, Soviet officials will recycle the analysis of those Western economists who claim that the Europeans are actually paying for US defense. The Soviets also will attempt to damage the reputation of European firms working on SDI, alleging in Germany, for example, that "the same firms which built instruments of death for Hitler" are now collaborating with the US.

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## Japan

Capitalizing on special Japanese sensibilities, Moscow will attack the US-Japan agreement to cooperate on SDI by arguing that Washington is leading Tokyo into risky militarist adventures. The Soviets will stress the sanctity of Japan's nuclear-free status. We will see ominous references to World War II, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and "what happened the last time Japan engaged in aggression."

Soviet spokesmen will charge that Japan can gain no economic benefits from such collaboration. They will point out that Japan's economic success has been based on investing heavily in the non-military sector, and any reorientation towards defense would endanger continued prosperity.

## TACTICS

This is an important campaign and Moscow can be expected to carry the message to a wide variety of audiences in the US, Western Europe and Japan—government officials, legislators, political parties, the media, business, labor, professional and religious groups, and public opinion. More and more, however, the Soviet leaders seek a broader base of support in organizations that they have not been able to mobilize or exploit for active measures purposes until recently.

### United States

In the United States, Moscow's principal target is likely to be Congress—although the White House and State Department also will receive attention from Soviet active measures practitioners. Even before the plunge in Reagan's popularity and the Democratic victory at the polls in November, Gorbachev was pinning his hopes on the US legislature. Briefing reporters after failing to reach agreement with Reagan at the Iceland summit, Gorbachev said, "The President probably needs to consult Congress, political circles and the American people. Let America ponder on all that." To assist in these deliberations, a veritable army of permanent and visiting Soviet officials will be dispatched to Capitol Hill. They will seek to persuade Congressmen, Senators, and their staffs—subtly and otherwise—that

Gorbachev's willingness to undertake radical reductions in offensive forces and his *Glasnost* (policy of openness) have endangered his standing among Kremlin "hardliners" and the Soviet military. They will subtly stress the USSR's economic difficulties and portray Gorbachev as a moderate reformer. His program to modernize the Soviet industrial infrastructure and loosen curbs on private enterprise



**Alexander Yakovlev, Gorbachev's new propaganda czar, became a CPSU secretary in 1986 and in early 1987 a candidate member of the Politburo.**

will be emphasized. The release of key dissidents, and especially Gorbachev's personal role in these cases, will be described as a precursor to even greater political liberalization. But to overcome resistance from the entrenched Soviet reactionaries, these Soviet spokesmen will hint that Gorbachev needs an agreement with the US that keeps SDI in the laboratory.

Intensive Soviet efforts, possibly including concessions and diplomatic initiatives, are likely before votes on the US defense budget. (They also will be designed to appeal to moderates in the White House and the State Department.) The campaign to portray Gorbachev as a "moderate" will take a variety of forms. "Informed sources," some of whom will have had private talks with Soviet leaders, will indicate that some members of the Politburo are dissatisfied with Gorbachev's initiatives. Documents will also surface "confirming" this. Members

of Soviet "academic" institutes will confide privately that the General Secretary is sincere about reducing spending on defense but that he is running into opposition inside the Kremlin. All such ploys will be aimed at convincing Congress (and those in the White House and the bureaucracy who Moscow believes are susceptible) that real progress on arms control is possible, but the US must seize the opportunity before it slips away—which it surely will, as the US exceeds the limitations of the unratified SALT II Treaty, and considers abandoning the ABM Treaty.

We will see a stepped up campaign to publicize Soviet arms proposals and to coordinate action with US peace groups, especially those which have not been involved with Moscow until quite recently. Professional organizations of US doctors, scientists, religious leaders, labor leaders, and businessmen will remain high-priority targets. Their Soviet "counterparts" will attend their conferences and invite them to meetings and exchanges in the Bloc.

American affiliates of Soviet fronts will continue to coordinate their activities with Moscow's overt propaganda themes on SDI. They will help organize marches, petition drives, and anti-nuclear demonstrations. Soviet international fronts for women, students, and teachers will appeal to US groups to work together to bring pressure on Washington. But Moscow's main thrust, more and more, will be toward direct contact with Americans who do not usually become involved with Soviet fronts.

Active measures planners will pay special attention to religious organizations, and Soviet officials will stress Gorbachev's new tolerance towards religion. For example, last fall, the Chairman of the USSR's Council on Religious Affairs, Konstantin Kharchev, visited representatives of Christian denominations, as well as Jewish leaders in the US, to persuade them that under the new leadership, the Soviet Union is neither anti-religious nor expansionist. The Soviet objective here is to enlist the support of these organizations against SDI. The Soviet-controlled Christian Peace Conference

—continued on page 11



# OUR TRACK RECORD

In 1986, *Forecast* was able to anticipate Moscow's major active measures objectives, themes, targets and tactics. Although many of our predictions became conventional wisdom by year's end, we thought it interesting to note that it was possible to anticipate major aspects of Moscow's international behavior months, if not years, in advance.

- The Winter 1986 issue predicted that Moscow's major priority throughout the year would be derailing US strategic defense.

During 1986, most communist parties and the major Soviet fronts attacked SDI and a massive, world-wide overt and covert campaign was waged against the program. Soviet behavior at the Reykjavik Summit in October demonstrated that for Moscow, stopping US strategic defense was more important than major offensive arms reduction agreements.

- Our Summer 1986 issue featured the shake-up in the Soviet active measures apparatus. We said that the new key players would be two new CPSU Secretaries, Anatoliy Dobrynin (head of the CPSU International Department and previously long-time ambassador to Washington) and Alexander Yakovlev (head of the Propaganda Department), both of whom would bring increased sophistication to Kremlin tactics.


At the October Reykjavik meeting, for example, Reagan's most important advisers were Secretary of State Shultz, White House Chief of Staff Regan and then National Security Adviser Poindexter. Gorbachev's were Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Dobrynin, and Yakovlev.

In December, we saw an example of Moscow's increasingly innovative overt propaganda tactics: (1) the release (from internal exile) of Andrei Sakharov, followed by his press conferences and interviews with the Western media; and, (2) the orchestrated return to the Soviet Union of 50 emigres, apparently dissatisfied with life in the US.

*Forecast's* Summer 1986 issue reported that Moscow and the National Council of Soviet-American Friendship (NCSAF) were initiating a petition—"People's Appeal"—to promote Soviet arms control positions in the United States. Although they are having some trouble getting this campaign off the ground, in

November, we received a copy of the final draft of the petition and a partial list of endorsers. The petition is to be presented in Moscow and New York (at the UN) to coincide with Hiroshima and Nagasaki Days in August 1987.

The text of the petition and partial list of endorsers follows:



## A People's Appeal for Peace

Whereas the nuclear arms race brings the world closer to war, and both President Reagan and Secretary-General Gorbachev have declared, "Nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought," and

Whereas the destructive power of nuclear weapons makes war suicidal and war is no longer a means of settling international disputes, and

Whereas strict observance of existing arms control agreements (such as SALT II and ABM) and new practical steps to limit and reverse the arms race are urgently required, and

Whereas development and deployment of space-based weapons would be a mortally dangerous escalation of the arms race,

Now, therefore, We the people of the United States and the Soviet Union, in order to advance peaceful relations between our peoples and improve the security of our countries and of the peoples of the entire world urge

- ☐ A verifiable comprehensive nuclear test ban
- ☐ A freeze, phased reduction and eventual elimination of all nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
- ☐ A transfer of resources from military to human needs
- ☐ An increase of people to people contact

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

1. \_\_\_\_\_

**Initial National Endorsing Organizations**

Christian Peace Conference

Clergy and Laity Concerned For a SANE Nuclear Policy

Committee in Solidarity with Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos

Fellowship of Reconciliation

Gray Panthers

National Council Of American-Soviet Friendship

New Haven Board of Aldermen

Peace and Solidarity Alliance

Promoting Enduring Peace

US Peace Council

US Peace Veterans

**Individual Endorsers**

Rev. Daniel Berrigan

Rep. George W. Crockett, Jr., Michigan

Ossie Davis

Ruby Dee

Miriam Friedlander, Member, New York City Council

Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, President, Pax Christi USA

Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen, Seattle, Washington

Dr. Robert Kurtz, Chairman, New York Physicians for Social Responsibility

Bill Perry, President, International Longshoremen's Association, Local 6 New York

ПРЕСЛА НАРОДОВ К МИРУ

Поскольку гонимые ядерным вооружением приближают мир к войне, а президент Рейган и Генеральный секретарь Н.С. Горбачев совместно заявили, что "Ядерная война не может быть выиграна, а мир не может быть победоносным", и

Поскольку разрушительная сила ядерных вооружений превращает войну в самоуничтожение, и она, таким образом, не может являться средством урегулирования международных споров, и

Поскольку необходимо неотложно соблюдать существующие соглашения о контроле над вооружениями (такими как ОСВ-2 и Договор по ПРО) и предпринимать новые практические шаги, чтобы остановить и обратить вспять гонимую вооружения на Земле, и

Поскольку разработка и размещение вооружений космического базирования ведет к опасной эскалации гонимой ядерным вооружением


Мы, народы Соединенных Штатов и Советского Союза, для развития мирных отношений между нашими народами, для укрепления безопасности наших государств и народов всего мира настоятельно просим

☐ добиться всеобъемлющего запрета на ядерное вооружение

☐ заморозить, поэтапно сократить и в конечном итоге ликвидировать все ядерное, химическое и биологическое вооружение

☐ перенести ресурсы с военной на гражданские нужды

☐ увеличить контакты между людьми



## A People's Appeal for Peace

United States

- The Fall 1986 issue stressed Moscow's stepped up attempts to affect the US political process, by expanding cultural exchanges and human contacts.

Gorbachev, in a moment of candor

after Reykjavik, stated that Moscow was seeking from the US Congress (in the fall 1986 elections) and from the West Europeans more than he could get from Reagan. Yakovlev and

—continued on next page



Dobrynin have certainly quickened the pace of US-Soviet exchanges. They are currently laying the groundwork for even more extensive contacts both through the media and through face-to-face dialogue. Legislators, women's groups, scientists, businessmen, academics, and radio and television reporters will be deeply involved in these programs in 1987 and 1988.

- *Calendar* — we were able to anticipate Soviet attempts to influence

Western governments and political parties, as well as exploit sports events (e.g. "peace" at the Goodwill Games), and international organizations (e.g. the anti-US gambits at the Socialist International, "AIDS" at the Non-Aligned Movement, and peace campaigns taking advantage of the UN Year of Peace).

★ ★ ★

We did fail to anticipate the heavy emphasis the Soviets would place on their unilateral moratorium on

nuclear testing in 1986. Communist parties, fronts, agents of influence, international exchanges, and considerable overt propaganda resources were mobilized for this large-scale effort. As we pointed out in our Fall 1986 issue, however, this campaign had little impact on US public opinion, and on the Reagan administration—though the House of Representatives was much more ambivalent.

We welcome readers' comments and suggestions. ■

## WHY AND HOW THIS FORECAST

**A**lmost all publications dealing with Soviet behavior confine themselves to study and analysis of past and current developments. Few seek to project such behavior into the future. Moreover, contemporary studies focus on internal political developments, and when concerned with Soviet foreign policy, they seek to assess important traditional instruments of Soviet statecraft such as military power, negotiations, diplomacy and economic assistance programs. However significant these elements, there is another dimension of Soviet policy that rarely has been addressed in such publications, namely, the use of the unique Soviet instrument of **Active Measures** and **Disinformation** to affect Western perceptions and decisionmaking. *Forecast* will attempt to **describe trends** and **anticipate** major Soviet active measures and disinformation campaigns directed against the United States and its allies. Extended definitions of the terms "active measures" and "disinformation" appeared in our Fall, 1985 and Winter, 1986 issues, respectively.

### Methods

The methods employed here are an outgrowth of the techniques and sources used by researchers who have been studying past Soviet behavior, supplemented by new sources and techniques: the reports and files of

Western intelligence agencies which have become increasingly available to the public; the trials and activities of convicted Soviet agents of influence; and, perhaps most importantly, information and analysis from former Soviet bloc practitioners now living in the West.

Based on studies of past Soviet activities, we have concluded that it is possible to study and extrapolate trends, to identify at an early stage major Soviet active measures campaigns, and to anticipate some aspects of their evolution.

To accomplish this, we regularly monitor: (1) Public statements of Soviet leaders and daily press of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and particularly the overt publications of the organs responsible for active measures; (2) Related activities and statements of Communist Parties in the Soviet bloc and Western Europe, the US, Asia and Latin America; (3) Related activities, statements, seminars, and press of the thirteen major and many lesser Soviet front groups regularly receiving instructions from the Soviet Union; (4) Exposed agent of influence operations designed to support Soviet policy objectives; and (5) Documented instances of disinformation designed to deceive and manipulate, such as forgeries or covertly placed media articles that are later uncovered.

### Advisory Board

Academic specialists on Soviet foreign policy, former senior active measures practitioners, and experts on communist party political campaign activity in Europe, Asia and Central America serve on our Advisory Board, and as consultants,

provide their informed analysis of what we can expect from the Soviet leadership. The Advisory Board includes: **Alain Besancon**, professor at the Institut des Hautes Etudes in Paris, and a columnist for *L'Express*; **Sidney Hook**, Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; Professors **Uri Ra'an** and **Richard Shultz** of the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, who specialize in Soviet decisionmaking and the use of active measures and disinformation; and Professor **Adam B. Ulam**, director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University. Three former Soviet bloc active measures practitioners also serve on the Advisory Board: **Ladislav Bittman**, who was a Czech intelligence officer and deputy director of the Czech Disinformation Department; **Ilya Dzhirkvelov**, who served in the KGB's First and Second Chief Directorates, and was deputy general secretary of the Soviet Organization of Journalists; and **Stanislav Levchenko**, who worked with the CPSU's International Department and as an active measures specialist in the KGB's First Chief Directorate. The editor of *Forecast* is **Roy Godson** professor of government at Georgetown University, who studies and teaches about international security affairs, propaganda, active measures and disinformation as elements of statecraft.

Extrapolating trends and forecasting of any kind is extremely difficult. We will be refining our techniques constantly, and we welcome readers' comments and suggestions. ■



## —STRATEGIC DEFENSE

*continued from page 8*

also will continue appealing to major religious leaders. The preparations for celebrations of the Millennium of Christianity in Kievan-Rus', in 1988, will give them an opportunity to reach a broad range of religious organizations [see Fall 1986 *Forecast*].

Throughout 1987, the Soviets will try to affect the US political process. They will argue that neither the US nor the USSR can afford even current levels of armaments, let alone an extended race in space. Soviet spokesmen will explain Moscow's "reasonable" position on US television, radio, and in the press. US Sovietologists who stress Moscow's economic problems will be cited (selectively) as proof of the Kremlin's desire to halt the arms race.

In an attempt to reach the American public and the Congress, there will be "telebridges"—televised discussions between Congressmen and Soviet officials, and between ordinary Americans and not-so-ordinary Soviet citizens. Their goal: to persuade American audiences that "we are all alike," all wanting peace, but that US hardliners have exaggerated and distorted Soviet reality. The same purpose will be served, from Moscow's perspective, by increased cultural exchanges, spectacles such as US-USSR "marathons for peace," sister-cities campaigns, and visits by Soviet officials to American municipal and civic groups.

Moscow may be tempted to use forgeries, possibly even in the United States. One theme that may surface would be "acknowledgements" by US experts or unnamed intelligence specialists that the USSR is well behind the US on strategic defenses—which the US public believes to be true. Another possible target of forgeries will be government and private sector specialists who try to expose Moscow's active measures tactics. They will be accused of working at the behest of the CIA, or spreading disinformation about Soviet military programs for ideological reasons or personal aggrandizement.

**Western Europe**

In Western Europe the Soviets will use many of the same tactics employed in the US, but with a

specific spin for those audiences. As Gorbachev put it after the Reykjavik Summit, "I am especially hoping for wisdom and a sense of responsibility on the part of politicians and peoples of Europe."

The Soviets realize that they will be hard put to dissuade the European governments from supporting SDI research, so they will stress that any change in the ABM agreement which permits US deployment will doom all

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*Moscow's new  
emphasis will be  
aimed at direct  
contact with  
Westerners not  
usually involved  
with Soviet fronts*

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hope of arms control. Moscow expects that West European governments will carry this message to US ambassadors, senior US officials, the Congress and the White House.

Delegations from the USSR's Supreme Soviet will visit and host members of parliaments from individual European countries and from the European Parliament—which is taken much more seriously by Moscow than by Washington. As in the US, they will explain Gorbachev's need for an arms agreement which limits the SDI program, so that he can remain in power and implement domestic reforms.

Agents of influence in European political parties and the media will carry the same message, albeit more subtly. Agents in government will urge that pressure be brought on Washington not to deploy in the next few years or to abrogate the ABM Treaty. Those in the European opposition parties will urge their

countrymen to reject cooperation with Washington on SDI, and question the value of NATO in the nuclear era. Front groups will organize petitions against SDI and in favor of nuclear-free zones and cities. Active measures operatives will urge professional and religious groups to denounce US militarization of space. We can also expect to see forgeries which purport to be statements by US officials concerning attempts to influence European elections, or about abandoning the European allies in case of conflict with the USSR.

The United Kingdom will be a key target of opportunity. Elections must be held before June 1988. Moscow will refrain from openly supporting the opposition Labour Party, lest this lead to counterproductive charges of Soviet interference in British politics. But Soviet agents of influence will attack Conservative Party leaders for slavishly supporting Washington and neglecting Britain's economic situation.

Special targets in Europe will be Social-Democratic, Liberal, Socialist, and Labour parties, particularly in Northern Europe. Soviet bloc delegations will urge them to denounce nuclear weapons and adopt "passive defense" strategies. Recently the West German Social Democrats and East German (Communist) Social Unity Party jointly called for a nuclear-free corridor in Europe. Moscow will press other West European parties to support this idea.


Some West European analysts believe that the East European regimes could serve as valuable proxies for Moscow in this effort. In a recent article on Moscow's current active measures campaign in Europe, Francoise Thom, one of France's best analysts of Soviet affairs, maintains that Moscow is consciously coordinating and exploiting its "little brothers" in an effort to influence Western governments. Their most valuable role will be striving to reinvigorate detente. Some East European regimes will appear to distance themselves from Moscow, and even from each other. Hungarian officials in particular will claim that they received information independently from their meetings with the Soviets that reinforces the message Moscow wants delivered to Washington. ■

## THE NEW DETENTE

**M**oscow has been pushing for several years for a return to detente—what the Soviets still call the "Spirit of Geneva," referring to the first Reagan-Gorbachev summit. This goal has not been achieved. Hence, the Kremlin has designed a new set of themes and tactics.

While there were disadvantages for Moscow in the kinds of relationships with the West that existed in the 1970's, the Kremlin seeks a restoration of detente, as a more favorable environment for achieving Soviet domestic and foreign policy aims [see the Winter 1986 issue of *Forecast*]. Certainly in recent years, Moscow has not been able to achieve as much as it did in the period of detente. Moreover, Western states responded to the growth of Soviet

Peace marchers in Moscow denounce the arms race while calling for detente. (New Times is a Soviet weekly in nine languages produced by the Central Committee.)



power by modernizing nuclear and conventional forces. They have increasingly integrated their economies, (which, from the Soviet perspective, means their political cohesion) to build SDI and high technology spin-offs. Western governments have also tried to curtail exports of technology to the USSR and to help anti-Soviet resistance movements in Asia, Africa and Central America.

For Moscow, the old detente is therefore preferable to Western policy in recent years. But Moscow wants not just a restoration of the *status quo ante*; it seeks a new detente—one which offers the advantages of the Brezhnev era while avoiding the type of Soviet behavior which also led to Western reaction in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

Perhaps most importantly, Moscow wants to minimize US hostility to the Soviet system, and reduce the US presence in Europe and Asia. This will undermine "anti-Soviet" alliances, assure the USSR dominance on the Eurasian continent, undercut the growing integration of the Western economies, and turn the economic, and technological resources of major geostrategic regions—particularly Western Europe and Japan—in the direction of the Soviet Union.

## UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT

Perhaps the most important theme which the Soviets have developed to promote this goal is: the USSR is no longer what it was in the Brezhnev era, so a new detente will lead to a better world. This idea can be summed up in the Soviet leaders' current catch phrase, "a new way of thinking." Among the key sub-themes which can be found in overt as well as covert Soviet propaganda are:

- Moscow seeks to portray the Soviet Union as becoming de-ideologized. The new Soviet leaders are the "pragmatists." In fact, they suggest it is the Reaganites and Thatcherites who are the ideologues, clinging to their cold war stereotypes and "zero sum" view of world politics. As

*Moscow wants not just a restoration of the status quo ante, but rather a new detente*

CPSU Secretary Dobrynin put it, "A new mode of thinking and a new approach to world problems are coming into being and striking root before our eyes."

- The Soviet Union, Moscow implies, is becoming a state like other nation states. It has its weaknesses and imperfections, its "hawks" and its "doves," but the USSR is pursuing its national interest, and seeks accommodations with likeminded "progressive" elements in other states.
- The Soviet Union uses the same political instruments as other states, public relations, information programs, economic and military assistance, and diplomacy. Moscow maintains that the Soviet Union is opposed to terrorism or other forms of political extremism. The Soviet leadership claims that it does not seek to export revolution, engage in assassinations, active measures and *dezinformatsia*.
- The new Soviet leaders, it is suggested, are too busy with reform and overcoming bureaucratic resistance to engage in adventurist foreign policy. Indeed, they would like to retreat from Brezhnev's mistakes such as military involvement in Afghanistan.
- Soviet leaders say they cannot be bullied, blackmailed or bribed by the West. They are intent on changing the Soviet system, on making it more efficient, less repressive, less adventurist, but they can neither be intimidated nor



bought off by promises of goods and technology. Instead, they suggest that by cooling Western rhetoric and anti-Sovietism, bargaining in good faith on trade, creating normal state-to-state relations and recognizing that Soviet institutions are different, but not hostile, the West can reduce tension and the arms race, which otherwise will lead to holocaust. Also, it is implied, the West can in this way bring about some change in the Soviet domestic system.

In Western Europe, Moscow will use somewhat different sub-themes. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of the new active measures apparatus is the use of different themes in different regions, in different countries, and even with different audiences in the same country.

- We Europeans, (in this context, Soviets, East Europeans and West Europeans) they say, have a common destiny. We are different from the Americans. We know the costs of war. We have historical wisdom and sophistication. The Americans are crude, messianic, and Rambo-like. We Europeans can work out our own new European "mode of thinking."
- Normal relationships between Western and Eastern Europe, they suggest, are possible and desirable. The East European states have considerable autonomy, so long as there are no attempts to undermine their friendly relationships with the Soviet Union. Trade, cultural, and

political discourse are natural between Eastern and Western Europe.

- Western Europe, they maintain, is overarmed and unnaturally divided by anachronistic tension. There would be little need for high Western defense expenditures and NATO if the Soviet Union did not feel threatened. If Western Europe were demilitarized, nuclear and chemical-free, Soviet forces could be withdrawn and Europe's unnatural divisions overcome.
- The USSR, they repeat over and over, is not seeking to drive a wedge between Europe and the US. Still, Europeans should realize that Washington does not treat its allies as full partners, but rather as appendages, thus "reducing their sovereignty to zero."

## TARGETS AND TECHNIQUES

The search for the new detente will be widespread. Moscow will target both the very governments it claims are reactionary and anachronistic (particularly the Reagan and Thatcher administrations), as well as progressive forces which understand the necessity for "a new way of thinking."

There will be diplomatic offensives which target presidents, prime ministers and ministers. Western ambassadors and diplomats in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Western Europe and the Third World will hear the same themes both from their official Soviet bloc interlocutors, "well-informed sources" inside the Soviet system, and from some Western Sovietologists granted special access to Soviet officials.

Western businessmen, labor leaders, journalists, and academics will hear the same refrain in their visits to the Soviet bloc and from Moscow's East European "little brothers" who have been asked to pass along the same message.

Moscow has been seeking new avenues of influence in addition to its traditional use of fronts and communist parties. Among the new targets are:



- Professional associations—physicians, scientists, businessmen, lawyers.
- Local governments—particularly those local administrative bodies that are interested in establishing sister-city relationships and nuclear-free zones.
- Academic institutions—establishing joint projects with universities, professional associations, curriculum development centers, peace studies departments, science and engineering schools.
- Churches—almost all major denominations, Christian, Jewish, Islamic, and almost every subgroup within each denomination will receive attention.
- Emigres—cultural and other organizations for emigres from the USSR and Eastern Europe will be used to carry Soviet themes.
- Peace groups—even those not under Communist control or influence can still play a role in raising Western concern with the "imminent danger of war." Moscow will seek to enhance their prominence without discrediting them by financing them or embracing them too warmly.

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*Gorbachev's men  
seek to give the  
impression that there  
must be a "new way  
of thinking"*

- (g) Human rights groups—Moscow will try to neutralize their complaints. A variety of techniques will be employed—among them, the "release" of selected dissidents like Shcharansky, and Sakharov, and the reunification of some families.

Moscow is well aware that once organizations or individuals become involved in "bridgebuilding," breaking down "stereotypes," "preventing wars," and so on, it becomes much more difficult to criticize the Soviet bloc, at least publicly—both for professional reasons (one wouldn't want to lose one's visa and hence one's "expertise") and for altruistic reasons (it's rude to criticize one's host). Moscow hopes to convince Westerners that the new way of thinking, *Glasnost*, and the new detente are much more fruitful than confrontation.

Those Westerners who oppose the new detente and reject the new Soviet way of thinking as old wine in new and maybe better looking bottles will draw a variety of Soviet responses. First, they will be asked to become new interlocutors with Soviet officials. They will be courted and invited to participate in conferences, visits, joint publications, and exchanges with Soviet or East European representatives.

If they do not succumb to these blandishments or are judged too recalcitrant, they will be denounced for being "self-styled experts" who are ignorant, out-of-date, or right-wing paranoiacs, who are financed or, to use a recent Soviet phrase, "protected" by the CIA or the military-industrial complex.

Soviet fronts, communist parties in the West, and Soviet bloc intelligence services will be more hard hitting. They will use forgeries, and other forms of *dezinformatsia* to discredit Western politicians, non-governmental specialists, and activists opposed to the new detente. ■

## THE ASIAN GAMBIT

**W**hile the main focus of Soviet foreign policy will remain detente with the US and

Western Europe, Gorbachev's new thrust also focuses on Asia, and on polycentrism in general. Soviet commentators have repeatedly stressed the increasing role of other important regions, particularly Asia.

This idea has been expressed in the Soviet media as follows:

"Europe's walk toward detente was long and difficult. In Western Europe the military bloc of NATO was formed primarily at the United States instigation . . . This negative experience must be taken into account when we consider the future development of the countries of Asia and the Pacific. It is important that the immense creative potential of the nations which have entered a kind of renaissance should not be lost on military spending and on the creation of military blocs." (*Pravda*)

Thus, while engaged in a considerable military build up in the Far East, Soviet leaders are trying to avoid past mistakes. They seek to forestall the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc or coalition on their long Asian frontier and to isolate each of the major powers in the region from each other and from the US. Moscow hopes not only to de-militarize large regions of Asia, but also to acquire its vast financial resources and technology to help develop the Soviet Far East. To achieve these ends, Gorbachev in a speech last July, often cited by Soviet spokesmen, announced a new Asian initiative, including plans to convene a future conference for Asian states along the lines of the 1975 Helsinki conference in Europe.

## SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

In the short term, Moscow hopes to improve relations with Beijing and undermine China's *de facto* alliance with the US. Furthermore, a relaxation of tensions with the PRC would help the Soviets appear more reasonable and pragmatic to the rest of the world.



**Gorbachev's Asian Gambit:** International Union of Students (Soviet front group) poster—driving a wedge between US and Asian allies.

Moscow's long-range plans are framed in the larger context of a new "Asian-Pacific security zone." To enhance its dominance over Asia, Moscow would like to ensure that China is encircled by pro-Soviet neighbors including Vietnam, North Korea, and India.

The Soviets also hope to weaken ties between the US and Japan and turn the attention of resource-poor Japan toward developing resource-rich Siberia. Moscow wants to dissuade Japan from cooperating with the US on SDI research. It is equally anxious to obtain Japanese technology and investment. Moscow also wants the Japanese to spend less on defense, and not to enter into a formal military alliance with the US.

A major Soviet goal in the Philippines is removal of US military bases there—which would considerably reduce American power on the Asian mainland. The treaty between Washington and Manila allowing US bases in the Philippines expires in 1991. The Kremlin will try to ensure that it is either not renewed or renewed under terms much less favorable to the US, which might lead to US withdrawal.



Finally, Moscow seeks to destroy ANZUS and create a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. US-New Zealand relations suffered a serious blow when New Zealand barred US nuclear powered warships from docking in its ports. The Soviets want Australia to do the same.

## THEMES AND TACTICS

Soviet overt and covert activities will emphasize the past era of fraternal ties and economic assistance between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, stressing that "the two largest socialist states have a historic mission to carry out." Moscow will offer to discuss outstanding disputes over the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Through stepped up cultural exchanges and economic relations, they will try to reassure Beijing about their intentions.

At the same time, Soviet propagandists will try to exacerbate tensions between the US and China. The Taiwan issue will receive greater attention, with the Soviets claiming that Washington's continued ties with Taiwan represent a strategic threat to the PRC. They will try to undermine Chinese confidence in the US by emphasizing that at the Reykjavik talks, Washington was ready to let Moscow leave 100 medium-range missiles aimed at China.

In Japan, the Soviets will try to raise hopes of economic windfalls from better relations with the USSR. But these benefits will be conditional on ending collaboration with the US on SDI and other defense priorities. If the Japanese prove unyielding, Moscow will emphasize their proximity to the USSR, and argue that Japan's close ties with the US by no means guarantee security.

Soviet spokesmen also will concentrate on disputes between Washington and Tokyo over US access to Japanese markets and the balance of trade. They will assert that the US is bullying Japan into propping up the faltering American economy at the expense of its own well-being. Such arguments will be especially loud should the Congress engage in "Japan bashing."

## *Moscow seeks to isolate the major Asian powers from each other and from the US*

Active measures specialists will organize anti-American demonstrations to denounce US-Japan cooperation on SDI. The Japanese Communist Party, which is frequently critical of the Soviet Union, is being wooed by Moscow with some limited success. Moscow hopes to use this party to gain access to elements in Japan and abroad who otherwise would be difficult to reach. Soviet fronts will arrange meetings and conferences about Washington's exclusive responsibility for the arms race. They will praise Soviet arms control proposals and Gorbachev's Asian initiative, while attacking any government requests for increased defense spending. Agents of influence will add their voices to this chorus, and support the idea of nuclear-free zones in the Pacific.

We can expect much the same in Australia and New Zealand, where the Soviets will also offer to improve economic ties. They will use the full panoply of active measures possible in an open society, emphasizing cultural and trade union exchanges, goodwill tours, and academic conferences, among other tactics.

In the rest of Asia, the Soviets will promote the idea that the USSR is also an Asian nation. Last June, for example, a Soviet parliamentary delegation visited Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand.

The head of the delegation stressed the "common Asiatic heritage" of the Soviet Union and Southeast Asia. He urged countries in the region to resist American and Japanese pressure to build a "military axis" there.

Moscow's claim of increased religious tolerance will also be a prominent theme in Asia. Last October, a three-day international Islamic conference met in Baku (the capital of Soviet Azerbaijan, where most of the USSR's Shi'ites live). The conference called upon Muslims to support the cause of peace and a nuclear-free world. The Soviets will direct this campaign towards Asia's large Muslim population, for example, in Malaysia and Indonesia.

Soviet propaganda throughout Asia and the Third World will continue to vilify the US, while painting the USSR as a staunch supporter of the sovereignty of small states and national liberation struggles. Moscow will continue to accuse the US of racism and colonialism, and of keeping Third World countries economically dependent and backward. A major theme in this campaign will be the international debt problem. In overt propaganda, international forums like the UN, meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement, and conversations between Soviet and Third World officials, the Soviets will try to heighten Third World nationalism and resentment of the West, particularly the US. They will encourage resistance to austerity policies demanded by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Simultaneously, Moscow will claim that the arms race—for which the US bears exclusive responsibility—is a wasteful diversion of resources away from programs to eliminate world poverty. ■

— "AIDS,"

*continued from page 1*

At least five political and strategic objectives are discernible in this latest disinformation campaign:

- discredit the US by falsely claiming that AIDS originated in CIA-Pentagon experiments;
- discourage undesirable political contact with Westerners, who are portrayed as potential carriers of the disease;
- create pressure for the removal of US military bases overseas on the grounds that US service personnel spread AIDS;
- undermine US credibility in the Third World by maintaining that hypotheses about the African origin of AIDS are an example of Western, and especially American, racism;
- divert attention from Soviet research on biological warfare and genetic engineering, and neutralize accusations that the USSR has used bio-chemical agents in Asia.

Until last fall, allegations of US responsibility for the creation of AIDS surfaced mainly in Soviet or pro-Soviet publications as well as through Soviet covert propaganda outlets. But then the allegations also started appearing in the non-communist press. A major breakthrough came on

**Pravda cartoon (October 31, 1986) shows doctor being paid by US military officer for producing the AIDS virus. The caption claims several Western scientists believe AIDS was created in Pentagon labs.**



October 26, 1986, when the mass circulation, conservative *Sunday Express* of London carried a front-page exclusive charging that "The killer AIDS virus was artificially created by American scientists during laboratory experiments which went disastrously wrong—and a massive cover-up has kept the secret from the world until today." Major news outlets all over the world then replayed the story. Moscow is now recycling its own original allegations but no longer needs to rely on obscure Third World or communist newspapers as sources.

*On a winter day in early '85, the KGB began a worldwide campaign to blame the US for the AIDS epidemic*

What do the new Soviet leaders hope to gain from this campaign?

AIDS is presently incurable, and there are fears it has already reached epidemic proportions. Soviet accusations that the United States created AIDS are intended to heighten anti-American feelings, and are another example of a favorite and long-time Soviet ploy to portray the United States and its political system as the source of the world's major economic, political, and social troubles.

Fostering fear of the disease is also used to discourage "undesirable" political contact with Americans. As several observers have noted, Moscow has gone to considerable lengths to prevent unwanted fraternization with Westerners during recent political festivals and sports



**Sunday Express front-page "exclusive" of October 26, 1986.**

events. During the April 1985 Festival of Democratic Youth in Jamaica, as well as at the July 1985 Youth Festival and the 1986 Goodwill Games, both held in Moscow, young people were warned to stay away from Americans and other Westerners, from whom, it was alleged, they could contract AIDS.

The Soviets also have more specific strategic objectives in their US equals AIDS campaign as the British publication *Soviet Analyst* has pointed out. In late 1985, broadcasts by Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress to Asia claimed that outbreaks of AIDS "are as a rule registered in the areas near American war bases." A Soviet broadcast in Turkish urged NATO countries to close US bases because of the "devastating danger of an epidemic of AIDS. . . ." Moscow's overall objective here, which is but one component of a much larger campaign, is to weaken the US military position overseas by spreading panic in countries where American bases are located, and by encouraging calls for their removal. In this sense, the AIDS campaign is a low-risk, potentially high-payoff operation.



Special targets are the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece, and the Philippines, all of which are considering restrictions on the American military presence in their countries. The Washington-Athens Agreement on Defense and Economic Cooperation, for example, expires in 1988. Soviet active measures practitioners are undoubtedly busy trying to block renewal of the treaty. Disinformation about AIDS will be a useful theme in a NATO country where the government and public opinion have moved in a neutralist direction. The *Sunday Express* AIDS

*The new CPSU  
secretaries  
responsible for  
disinformation,  
Dobrynin and  
Yakovlev, ordered the  
campaign stepped up*

accusation has already been reprinted by *Ethnos*, now the second largest circulation Greek daily and repeated on Greek radio.

The Third World, particularly Africa, is especially fertile ground for the Soviet AIDS campaign and there are already signs of specifically targeted active measures there. At the major meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Zimbabwe last August, the Harare *Sunday Mail* reported the distribution of a pamphlet, allegedly written by two "French" biologists, *AIDS: USA Home-Made Evil, Not Made in Africa*. The 50-page mono-

graph, purportedly backed with scientific arguments, charged that the virus was created in 1977 at the US research facility at Fort Detrick, Maryland. According to the identified authors (who actually reside in East Germany), hypotheses that AIDS originated in Africa are a racist alibi to conceal US plans for waging bacteriological warfare.

In October the *Sunday Express* story appeared and was picked up by literally scores of newspapers all over the globe. Moscow then began to recycle the story in the Third World, citing respectable non-communist sources. For example, TASS reported in November that the major Indian newspaper *Hindustan Times* had been using the information supplied by the "French" scientists, and Soviet broadcasts in English have cited an Irish newspaper as "confirming" the reports of the "French" professors that AIDS is an American creation.

The "racism" angle has surfaced in other guises as well. The US has been accused of collaborating with South Africa on the development of "ethnic bombs" which are lethal to Blacks, but spare whites! Such tales may strike Americans as absurd, but they are not necessarily incredible in other cultures.

The AIDS campaign is also a diversionary tactic against claims that the USSR has used bio-chemical weapons in Cambodia, Laos, and Afghanistan and is engaged in genetic weapons research. The US State Department, for example, has alleged that the Soviets used "yellow rain," a potent toxin, in the region until 1983. There have also been persistent charges of Soviet use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan. The Soviets' stock response is to turn on the accusers whom they link to the CIA, and to claim that the United States supplies chemical weapons which are employed against Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Given the special horrors evoked by both chemical warfare and



**Demonstrators protesting against US bases in the Philippines—stirring up local opposition to US bases is a major goal of Moscow's AIDS campaign. (Reuter's/Bettmann)**

AIDS, active measures practitioners almost certainly hope to link the two and muddle the debate, turning the allegations against the US. Moscow may also be trying to sidetrack the modernization of US chemical weapons and neutralize Western charges of a major Soviet genetic engineering research program.

The effectiveness of crude anti-American disinformation is sometimes downplayed in the West. Some argue — "AIDS,"

*continued on page 18*

*Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Forecast*

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—POLLING RESULTS,  
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
on an anti-missile defense system. Of this group, 44 percent believe the Soviet program is "somewhat behind" the US effort, while 19 percent see the USSR as "significantly behind."

### US/USSR Disinformation

The November poll also asked a representative sample of 2,000 Americans whether the US and the USSR are likely to use disinformation. This is part of an ongoing research project and builds on data obtained from a March 1986 NSIC survey. Results indicate that a very high percentage of Americans continue to believe that the USSR "deliberately uses false or misleading information to deceive other nations' leaders or people": 94 percent in March, and 93 percent in November. Almost as many still think the USSR "manipulates information it gives to the public": 89 percent in March, and 90 percent in November.

However, there has been a major shift in public perceptions of US government practices. In March 1986, 34 percent of the public believed that their own government practices disinformation. By November, this figure had risen to 45 percent. US government credibility at home has also suffered. In March, 49 percent of Americans surveyed believed the government manipulates information it gives to the public. In November, after revelations of US arms sales to Iran, that percentage had risen to 56 percent. The controversy which arose

### Public Perceptions of Disinformation Percent Believe US/USSR Likely To . . .



last fall regarding a National Security Council memo about the use of disinformation against Libyan leader Qaddafi may have also contributed to this significant change in Americans' attitudes about their own government.

These latest polling results indicate

that while a consistently high percentage of Americans distrust Moscow, the recent decline in Washington's credibility offers foreign governments additional opportunities for propaganda and active measures directed at the US. ■

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that disinformation is carried mainly in pro-Soviet media, and does not deal with significant issues. Others maintain that it is often not believable and has little or no influence on public perceptions and political debate. But the initial Soviet success in getting the US equals AIDS message picked up indicates otherwise. This particular campaign is now tied to important global issues such as the US military presence abroad and perennial controversies about racism.

The US government started to

expose the Soviet AIDS campaign last year, and some newspapers that carried the Soviet disinformation have printed retractions. Arthur Hartman, US Ambassador to Moscow, also protested against the intentional Soviet falsification last summer, but the new CPSU secretaries responsible for disinformation, Anatoliy Dobrynin and Alexander Yakovlev, apparently ordered the campaign to be stepped up. Given Soviet objectives, the growing worldwide fear of AIDS, and the early success of their disinformation campaign, Moscow is unlikely to cease and desist on this one anytime soon. ■

**Ethnos, major Greek Daily, reprinted in full the Sunday Express AIDS story.**

