Scott JOC

ROBERT J. SAMUELSON

The American Job Machine

Contrary to what you may hear, it isn't producing only low-skilled and low-paying employment

One great strength of the U.S. economy—or so it has seemed—has been its ability to generate new jobs: about 12 million since late 1982. Now we're told it ain't so. Introducing his new trade legislation, Senate Finance Committee chairman Lloyd Bentsen of Texas recently embraced the new revisionism. Sure there are more jobs, he says, but they're lousy jobs. Nearly 60 percent of the new jobs in the past six years are low-skilled jobs paying less than $7,000 a year.

Welcome to Economics Propaganda 101. The notion that the U.S. economy is producing mostly low-paying, unskilled jobs is an economic fiction. Generally speaking, the mix between well-paid and poorly paid work is the same as in the 1970s. Creating the impression that it's otherwise is an exercise in statistical mythmaking designed to advance (as in Bentsen's case) a political agenda purporting to protect high-paying jobs. The danger in believing these myths and enacting policies based on them is that we will damage a job-creation process that, on the whole, has been a success.

The myths, of course, have an intuitive appeal. The spotty prosperity of the mid-1980s leaves many pockets of distress. In Bentsen's home state, the latest unemployment rate for Houston is 10 percent. Across the country, factory shutdowns have forced millions of workers into lower-paying jobs. Consider a Labor Department study of 5.1 million workers displaced between January 1979 and January 1984. Of those with full-time jobs by early 1985, nearly one-fifth had taken pay cuts of 20 percent or more.

These visible examples of downward mobility involve undeniable individual suffering. But in an economy of 111 million workers, their overall social significance is diluted. Countertrends go unnoticed or are underreported. The same study of displaced workers found that one-third of those re-employed had earnings gains of 20 percent or more. Extravagant theories of social change, such as the disappearance of the middle class, have been built on the misleading use of selective statistics.

The genuinely serious jobs problem lies elsewhere. Despite the new jobs, the civilian unemployment rate (6.7 percent in January) is undesirably high. Even at this level, though, most skilled workers can find jobs. Some unemployment reflects people—mainly women and younger workers—moving from home or school into jobs. The average jobless spell is now less than four months. High unemployment's real victims are the least skilled, poorest workers.

The dilemma is this: policies that help these workers also produce inflation. The 1960s' and 1970s' obsessive pursuit of "full employment" (usually defined as 4 percent unemployment) created enough demand to improve the job prospects of those at the bottom. Unfortunately, it also spawned an overheated economy and wage-price spiral. No one talks about the dilemma anymore because no one has a solution. The temptation is to find a new "problem" for which a new "solution" can be devised. The alleged proliferation of poverty-level jobs fills this void.

Bentsen's figure comes from a study done for the congressional Joint Economic Committee. The study defined low-income jobs as those paying half the median wage in 1973, adjusted for subsequent inflation. By 1984 a low-paying job meant $7,012 or less. A high-paying job paid more than twice the 1973 median, adjusted for inflation, or $28,048 in 1984. The study claimed that 58 percent of the new jobs between 1979 and 1984 were low paying.

In fact, this low-wage explosion is mostly a statistical illusion, reflecting the impact of inflation and recession on workers' earnings. Wage gains in the late 1970s temporarily rose faster than prices. A reversal occurred when inflation accelerated and the 1981-82 recession depressed wage gains. As "real" (inflation adjusted) wages dropped, some people moved from the study's "middle" to "lower" category while holding the same job. In the study this shift meant a new poverty-level job although the job hadn't changed.

Comparing 1979 (average unemployment: 5.8 percent) with 1984 (average unemployment: 7.4 percent) was also misleading. The study doesn't actually compare jobs but rather the wage and salary incomes of workers. The difference is important. In 1984 more workers with good-paying jobs were on layoff or between jobs, reducing their annual earnings—even if their salaries or wage rates hadn't changed. The study made it appear that they had simply gotten lower-paying jobs.

More gains: As the recovery has continued and "real" wages have slowly risen, the "low" category has contracted. An updating of the JEC study to 1985 puts 31.4 percent of workers in this group, the smallest proportion since 1973 except for two years (1978, 1979). And because the study measures annual earnings—not pay rates—roughly *nine-tenths* of the people in the low category either have part-time work (less than 35 hours a week) or, like students, work only part of the year. In 1986 the median annual earnings of full-time workers was $18,600 and rose 2.6 percent after inflation.

There's huge ferment in the job market. More women work, baby-boom workers face the competition of their own numbers and many industries have acute problems. Downward wage pressures exist, but the picture of a low-wage explosion is a vast exaggeration. Equally suspect are suggested policies—trade protection, restrictions on plant closings—to save high-paying jobs. Europe has embraced this approach by restricting the ability of companies to fire workers. Existing jobs are protected, but new ones discouraged. Companies hesitate to hire if they can't easily fire. Excessive wages cause firms to substitute machines for people and let attrition cut their work forces. Since 1970 Europe's jobless rate has risen from 2 to about 11 percent.

Our system is imperfect. "Hard core" unemployment is more unyielding than it seemed in the inflationary 1960s and 1970s. For other workers, some job security is lost in return for a flexibility that allows companies to hire, fire and reduce pay to adjust to changing circumstances. The process is messy and often cruel, but in a profit-making economy jobs cannot be saved by forcing companies to do unprofitable things. The American job machine has not created a utopia, but it works. Those who think they can make it work better bear a heavy burden of proof.

Gays in the Clergy

Churches are trying to confine the subject to the ecclesiastical closet

It is Saturday night in New York City and some 300 members of Dignity, a support group for gay and lesbian Roman Catholics, are gathered for their weekly mass. Among them are half a dozen homosexual priests—including the celebrant at the altar, Jesuit Father Robert Carter. A former seminary professor, Carter no longer hides his homosexuality. But since going public he has been forced to find a new career as a private psychotherapist. "For a gay priest," he says, "private psychotherapy practice is one of the few ways to earn a living." Among the others in the congregation is Father "Jim," who feels that the only way to maintain his standing as a pastoral counselor is to cloak his homosexual identity. "If I could come out, think what an inspiration that would be to gay people," he muses after mass. But, he says with a chop of his arm, his superiors "would cut me off like that."

Homosexual clergy: the subject itself is one that churches—Protestant as well as Catholic—are trying hard to confine to the ecclesiastical closet. But secrecy is no longer possible. With the increasing openness of homosexuality in society, the issue was bound to come up in the clergy. In the Roman Catholic Church there have been highly publicized cases of child molestation by priests. A handful of AIDS cases among priests and ministers is also opening a grim window into the gay clerical subculture, forcing church leaders to acknowledge that some of their members are not only practicing homosexuals but in need of church support.

There are no reliable statistics on the number of gay clergy. In one of the very few studies based on hard data—1,500 interviews between 1960 and 1985—Maryland psychologist Richard Sipe, a former priest, concludes that about 20 percent of the 57,000 U.S. Catholic priests are homosexual and that half of these are sexually active. But since 1978, Sipe believes, the number of gay priests has increased significantly; other therapists think the true figure today may be closer to 40 percent. Estimates for the much smaller Episcopal Church, by contrast, run as high as 50 percent of the clergy in such urban dioceses as San Francisco and New York. "The church needs to do a proper study of homosexuality among the clergy on a national scale," says Father James Harnen of the Shalom Center in Houston, which treats priests with psychological problems. "But I don't know if there is the courage to do it."

JAMES D. WILSON—NEWSWEEK

Separating chastity and celibacy: *Communion at a Dignity mass in California*

Most parishioners aren't aware of the gays among them. The minority who are homosexually active keep it well hidden and live in fear of being discovered by the laity they serve. "I would say that 99 percent of the people I deal with do not know," says Father "Peter," a Boston priest who, like most gay clergymen, prefers anonymity. "Most would find it very difficult to be ministered to by a gay priest." If they are discovered, active homosexual clergy—Protestant or Catholic—typically are removed from pastoral responsibilities.

The question of homosexuality is particularly sensitive for the Catholic Church because its priests are expected to be both chaste and celibate. In the other Christian churches, the majority of the clergy are married. And although the mainline Protestant denominations do ordain homosexuals—usually with considerable reluctance—gay and lesbian ministers are expected to lead celibate lives. Some Episcopal bishops, however, ordain acknowledged

GENE BAGNATO

'Bad psychology, bad theology': *McNeill*

Educ
Econ Soc

The Two New Agendas of Education Reform

A government education official sees "equity" and "content and character" as the two new agendas of the education reform movement.

Chester E. Finn, Jr.

The education reform movement in the United States has been working its way through a lengthy agenda of issues, problems, goals, and proposals, so lengthy that it is useful to think of this list as a *series* of agendas. Most evident in recent months – thanks in large part to the highly visible work of the Carnegie panel on the teaching profession, the somewhat slightly less visible work of the Holmes Group, and the powerful boost that the National Governors' Association has given to the Carnegie proposals – have been the issues surrounding teachers and other school professionals: where to find them, how to prepare and certify them, how to tell if they are good at what they do, how and at what levels to compensate them, how to make them more professional, how (if at all) to distinguish among them, what to do about bad ones, how teachers should relate to principals, and so forth.

These are important issues. A lot of good (and some less good) ideas are in circulation. Some have been tried, many have not. We are a long way from having completed the "professionalism" agenda.

But it wasn't the first. As I reconstruct things, professionalism came second. First came our obsession with student acquisition of essential skills. "Back to basics" was the dominant reform agenda of the late 1970's, well before *A Nation at Risk* and the other famous reports of the early 1980's. It produced minimum competency examinations for high school students, promotional gates programs (and other ways of enforcing minimum skill acquisition standards) for elementary students, renewed interest in methods of teaching the three R's. It even spilled over into the teaching profession with a set of basic literacy tests for teachers.

We haven't completed the basic skills agenda, either. A number of young people – and, alas, some teachers – are not yet acquiring a decent minimum level of such skills, and this is especially vexing for minority groups. Anyone who thinks that we have done all we need in this domain should look again at the recent reports on reading and writing achievement by the National Assessment of Educational Progress. Unless your notion of a minimum is a whole lot lower than mine, you'll be dismayed by the results.

Hence we are still working on the basics, but that agenda is not so controversial any more. People know more or less what is wrong and more or less what must be done, at least by schools and colleges, to effect solutions. There are disputes about technique and resource allocation but not, I think, about the need to complete the basic skills agenda.

We are already well along on the third reform agenda, too. Some call it the "effective schools" agenda. It overlaps with the first two but is driven by an important, if self-evident, research finding, namely, that some schools are better than others. This has led to the wide-

spread and seemingly sensible conviction that we should somehow compel the less effective schools to emulate the practices of the more effective.

Typically, this has been done by state legislatures and other high-level policy-setting bodies adopting rules by which they seek to alter what schools do. These rules involve graduation requirements for students, homework assignments, discipline codes, the configuration of the school day and year, the nature of in-service training that teachers and principals must undergo, financial rewards for high-performing schools (and various other kinds of awards, recognitions, and citations for schools, teachers, and students), intervention schemes such that a low-performing school gets scrutinized by higher authority and may even get "taken over" by that authority, required kindergarten programs, testing and accountability arrangements, and much more.

The effective schools agenda isn't very tidy, and it harbors a fundamental paradox: the impossibility of *mandating* a number of the qualities that research has shown to be characteristic of the best schools: shared purpose, an ethos of achievement, team spirit, high-quality leadership. These subtler qualities, the ones you can't impose by edict, permeate the writings of Theodore Sizer and John Goodlad, but they frustrate most reformers precisely because you cannot wave a policy wand and make them come true. Still, most states and many localities are pounding away at the effective schools agenda and trying to make it mesh with the others.

All three of these reform agendas are legitimate, necessary, and, to my mind, overdue. We should complete all of them, though we also need to recognize that this isn't going to be easy. Fortunately, the public seems convinced of the necessity of all three; the profession is gradually assimilating the norms of all three; and the policymakers, bless them, seem willing to persevere with all three. (Though it wouldn't be honest to overlook some backsliding here and there as various requirements are delayed, standards eased, exceptions made, mistakes reworked.)

Now let's look ahead and try to predict what is coming. Let me first stipulate that the reform movement is already leaking out of the high school, which has been its stronghold, into both the elementary schools and colleges. All three of the aforementioned agendas, sometimes in modified form, are under way or at least under discussion at these other institutional levels of formal education, most recently in U.S. Secretary of Education William Bennett's new report on elementary education, entitled *First Lessons*.

I see two more reform agendas hard upon us, at more or less the

same time. A lot may rest on how we work our way through them and, especially, on whether we are able to pay due attention to both at once. This is going to be delicate, for these two are inherently more controversial than the three I have already described. In certain ways, the two new ones may conflict with the three older reform agendas. And, unless we are terribly careful, one of them is going to be seen as the connivings of liberals and educationists, while the other gets depicted as the wish list of conservatives and lay people.

The equity agenda

The first of the two new reform agendas – call it the "equity" agenda – does not, on initial inspection, look all that new. It concerns the education of minority and underclass children, of non-English speakers and the handicapped, of the children of teeming urban ghettoes and desolate rural expanses, of teenage mothers and drug-addicted seventh graders, of grown-up illiterates and semiliterates, and, of course, of dropouts, a category that overlaps the others but that – virtually everyone agrees – is larger than it should be for American society.

Indeed these concerns are not brand new. Observers of American education will note that they have been on the national agenda for more than two decades, at least since enactment of the Economic Opportunity Act (1964), the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965), and the Higher Education Act (1965). How many school systems today lack "dropout prevention" programs? "Compensatory education"? "Special education"? Why, then, do I suggest that the fourth agenda, the equity agenda, is in important ways a newcomer to the contemporary reform movement?

Because it is reappearing in substantially altered form. Until lately, the equity agenda was headed by a concern for access to educational institutions, and resources and services for minority children, handicapped children, impoverished and disadvantaged children – children who previously had skimpy education, maybe no education at all, or education that was well suited to someone else's circumstances but not to theirs. Access to services, delivery systems, sufficient resources – these occupied most of the equity agenda.

That is changing. Today we are more inclined to acknowledge that access, services, and resources do not necessarily translate into a satisfactory level of attainment for children we are concerned about. For this reason, the equity agenda is acquiring a considerable interest in standards, outcomes, and results; not in obliterating standards so that disadvantaged children cannot be said to fail, but just the opposite:

trying to determine just how we can organize ourselves so that the children we are concerned about actually do meet authentic, exacting standards of educational performance, just like everyone else.

In pursuit of this goal, we seem prepared to consider far more drastic interventions into the education system than have previously been palatable. Look, for example, at the recommendation of the National Governors' Association that states establish an "intervention procedure for cases of educational bankruptcy," whereby school systems that continue to fail to educate children will be taken over by the state. When New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean – whose state has pioneered this strategy, and who chaired the task force that recommended it – described it recently to the National Urban League, he received a standing ovation. "We are telling our urban school districts," Kean said, "that no longer will we turn our backs and tolerate mediocrity. We are no longer going to blame our children. We are going to fix the schools."

That is part of an equity agenda, all right, but it's a far cry from a conventional access-resources-services strategy. And it enjoys the support of the nation's governors and civil rights advocates alike.

Yet even with these bolder interventions into the education system itself, a perplexing challenge remains for shapers of the new equity agenda: the tools in their kit may still not prove powerful enough to solve the problems they are applied to. Trading up from a tackhammer to a sledgehammer is progress, but if the goal is to put a road through a mountain it may not be progress enough.

The essential difficulty is that while the problems to which the equity agenda is targeted are commonly described in terms of education, many of their roots lie well outside the education system. They intertwine with issues of social organization, income distribution, law enforcement, welfare policy, changes in family structure, employment, health, and others. They are not apt to be solved just by reforms undertaken within the formal policy structures and institutions of education.

That doesn't mean we won't try; everyone except the occasional grinch believes that an education of excellence should be the birthright of every American. But that also doesn't mean we know how to solve these problems, despite all the good will in the world, or that they ever can be solved with items found in the education policy tool kit alone. That, of course, is why Secretary Bennett urges that elementary education be deemed a "covenant" involving the entire "community of adults," not just educators, nor even just educators joined by parents.

The content and character agenda

Even as the redefined equity strategy looms ahead as reform agenda number four, a fifth agenda is bursting into our field of vision as well. Because it pertains to what young Americans should know and value and be like, upon arrival at the gates to adulthood, the "content and character" agenda is considered controversial. We are all different, people observe, and free to be that way, so there is no reason at all to suppose that our children should all know the same things, share the same values, or act like one another.

That is certainly how the controversy has begun to be framed. But we should back off from the rhetorical formulation for a moment and recognize that there is near unanimity already, and long has been, about many elements of this agenda.

Should young Americans, entering upon adulthood, know when the Civil War was fought, what the Bill of Rights provides, who Martin Luther King, Jr., was? Of course. Should they know the temperature at which water boils? The way an in-

ternal combustion engine works? Darned right. How to calculate the time of your arrival at Grandmother's if it's 230 miles away, you depart at 8:30, and you travel at an average speed of fifty miles an hour? To be sure. Should young Americans, entering upon adulthood, value honesty over lies? Prefer beauty to ugliness? Admire generosity over stinginess? Look beyond differences of ethnicity, gender, and age in judging people's qualities? Yes indeed.

What about their inclination to obey laws? To respect the rights and property of others? To fulfill obligations and repay debts? To volunteer their services to assist others less fortunate? To love and nurture their children? To have informed opinions about public affairs? To vote in elections?

In a free society, we do not, to be sure, *compel* people to possess all these skills, values, behaviors, and bits of information. Some, such as obeying laws and repaying debts, we *do* attempt to compel. We also create formal avenues of redress for intolerance, discrimination, and impediments to the rights of others. But when we are talking about educational desiderata – the qualities we would *like* our young people to possess upon entry into adulthood – I believe we have near-universal agreement that we want our educational arrangements to impart all or virtually all of the qualities and characteristics sketched above to all or virtually all of our youth.

There are points beyond which we do not have so much consensus. We have no general agreement that the educational system – at least the formal, institutionalized, publicly financed education system – should engender belief in God, that it should induce everyone to explain the causes of the Vietnam War the same way, that it should oblige everyone to memorize *The Divine Comedy*, that it should yield uniform opinions on myriad public and private policy matters.

So legitimate issues are associated with the "content and character" agenda. Can we determine where on these various continuums of knowledge, values, and behavior the consensus deteriorates concerning the proper goals and roles of formal institutions of education in producing reasonably uniform results among all our young people? Can we properly apportion responsibility for this agenda between formal education institutions and other powerful educative forces such as the family and the mass media?

Are we clear as to the *degree* of uniformity that is desirable in a large, diverse, and decentralized society such as ours? How much variation should there be between Arizona and Connecticut, between Portland, Oregon, and Portland, Maine, even between Portland, Oregon, and Eugene, Oregon? How much should there be between a

school that some families favor for its emphasis on mathematics and science and a school that other families prefer because it stresses the performing arts?

But we shouldn't shy away from this fifth agenda just because it portends serious discussion. The other four agendas did – and do – too. We don't want to shun these conversations. Besides, there is far greater consensus concerning most of the fifth agenda than most people – at least most educators – realize.

Implementing the "content and character" reform agenda, then, might be thought of as framing the overt curriculum and the hidden curriculum of American education. This task pertains to knowledge, values, and behaviors, to facts, attitudes, and habits, to character, citizenship, and content. And, inevitably, it pertains to the selection of materials and methods by which the overt curriculum and the hidden curriculum will be taught, to the construction of suitable measures and assessment devices by which to determine whether and how well they have been learned, and to the distribution of responsibility and accountability among various formal and informal institutions in this society.

These are not new issues, either. The fifth agenda, like the fourth, has a past. What may be new is that the mainstream education reform movement is beginning to place the content and character issues on its agenda even, as I have been suggesting, constructing a whole additional reform agenda around them.

Shaping the agendas

Many professional educators still seem a bit queasy about these matters, reluctant to take stands about what children should learn, uncertain about methods, unsure of the degree of consensus, timid about asserting leadership. But I don't believe the general public is queasy; rather, I think it is annoyed that the content and character agenda hasn't been better attended to in the past and impatient with those who are not eager to attend to it in the present.

This annoyance and impatience are turning up in the statements, recommendations, and actions of some policymakers, as well. Secretary Bennett writes of the importance of the "implicit curriculum," whereby schools demonstrate, by example more than by didactic instruction, what ethical behavior is, what morality is, what character is. New York Governor Mario Cuomo has urged greater attention in schools to teaching values and imparting character. California schools chief Bill Honig has catalyzed a thoroughgoing examination of the content of the curriculum in the public schools of our most populous state.

But the agenda is not yet fully shaped. The governors as a group have *not* paid attention to curricular issues, either explicit or implicit. Many of the nation's most prominent educators seem to believe that issues of teacher professionalism and school organization are virtually all that warrant attention at present.

Nor is the fifth reform agenda, once fully developed, going to be any easier than the fourth to work our way through, for here, too, we can't be sure our tools are powerful enough. Here, too, we recognize that many of the problems we would like to solve have their roots outside the schools and therefore cannot be entirely managed through unilateral action within the formal institutions of education. But, as with issues of equity, those of content and character surely will not be solved if our institutions are oblivious to them, reluctant to enter into them, or unwilling to shoulder portions of the responsibility for solving them.

I don't believe that content and character are properly thought of as a conservative ideology any more than equality is accurately labeled a liberal doctrine. The surest way to ensure that we don't get very far with either is to allow them to become polarized in that fashion.

Fortunately, few direct conflicts exist between the specifics of these two newest agendas, save perhaps the allocation of attention and resources. And the content and character agenda, so far as I can tell, will not require the expenditure of substantial sums of money beyond what we are already spending. It is much more a matter of choosing wisely.

The largest barrier to success for the content and character agenda is similar to the major impediment to attainment of the new equity goals, namely, the limited power of schools, colleges, and the policy structures associated with them to improve situations that transcend the formal education system. In that sense, the first three were more manageable. But these two newer ones are at least as important and, in my view, more important.

The fifth is in particularly urgent need of attention for the perverse reason that people think it is more controversial than it is and have therefore tended either to shun it altogether for fear of conflict or to choose up sides as if preparing for conflict.

Let's get about it, then, not as if we are girding for battle but on the assumption that there is a large consensus out there about content and character, and that it's time we se how far we can get on the basis of that consensus. □



Chester Finn, assistant secretary for educational research, U.S. Department of Education, delivered these remarks at the meeting of the NAIS board of directors on November 13, 1986.



THE URBAN UNDERCLASS

WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON

The social problems of urban life in advanced industrial America are, in major measure, associated with race. Urban crime, drug addiction, out-of-wedlock births, female-headed families, and welfare dependency have risen dramatically in the last several years and the rates reflect a sharply uneven distribution by race. There has been a reluctance on the part of liberal social scientists, policymakers, and civil rights leaders to underline the close association between these forms of social dislocation and race. Often discussions of such issues as crime and out-of-wedlock births deliberately exclude reference to race, or attempt to conceal the racial factor, or acknowledge the racial connection but only as a way to emphasize the deleterious consequences of racial discrimination or of structural inequality in American society.

Indeed, in an effort to protect their work from the charge of racism or of "blaming the victim," liberal social scientists have tended

This chapter is based on a larger study, *The Hidden Agenda: Race, Social Dislocations, and Public Policy in America*, to be published by the University of Chicago Press.

to avoid describing any behavior that could be construed as unflattering or stigmatizing to particular racial minorities. Accordingly, the growing problems of black crime, family dissolution, out-of-wedlock births, and welfare dependency tend not to receive careful and systematic attention.

But this has been true only of the last several years. In the mid-1960s these problems were readily discussed and analyzed by scholars such as Kenneth B. Clark, Lee Rainwater, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. They produced studies that examined in clear terms the cumulative effects of racial isolation and class subordination on life and behavior in the urban ghetto.[1] As Clark put it: "The symptoms of lower-class society afflict the dark ghettos of America—low aspiration, poor education, family instability, illegitimacy, unemployment, crime, drug addiction and alcoholism, frequent illness and early death. But because Negroes begin with the primary affliction of inferior racial status, the burdens of despair and hatred are more pervasive."[2] Whether the social and psychological dimensions of the ghetto were analyzed, as in the case of Clark's study, or ghetto family patterns were examined, as in the case of Rainwater's and Moynihan's studies, the conditions or realities of ghetto life "that are usually forgotten or ignored in polite discussions"[3] were both vividly described and systematically analyzed.

All of these studies closely tied their discussions of the experiences of inequality to their discussions of the structure of inequality. To put that in more concrete terms, they attempted to show the connection between the economic and social situations into which many blacks are born and their modes of adaptation to them. That included the creation of subcultural patterns and norms of behavior frequently taking the form of a "self-perpetuating pathology."[4] The works of Clark and Rainwater, especially, not only sensitively portrayed the destructive features of ghetto life but also comprehensively analyzed those structural conditions, including changing economic relations, that combined with race-specific experiences to produce these features.

If social scientists have lately shied away from this focus of research, they may perhaps cite the virulent attacks on the "Moynihan Report" on the Negro family in the latter half of the 1960s as one of the reasons.[5] There is no need here for detailed discussion of the

controversy generated by the report, which like so many controversies over social issues raged in large measure because of misinterpretations and distortions.[6] I would like, however, to point out that there was nothing new in the report. Various aspects of Moynihan's arguments had been raised previously by people such as E. Franklin Frazier and Bayard Rustin as well as Clark.[7] As had Rustin, Moynihan argued that as barriers to black liberty are eliminated by antidiscrimination legislation, attention will shift from issues of liberty to issues of equality; in other words, from concerns of freedom to concerns for equal resources enabling blacks to live in material ways comparable to whites. The simple removal of legal barriers will not achieve this goal, he maintained, because the cumulative effects of discrimination have created circumstances that make it very nearly impossible for a substantial majority of black Americans to take advantage of opportunities provided by civil rights laws. He pointed out, in this connection, that "the Negro community is dividing between a stable middle-class group that is steadily growing stronger and more successful, and an increasingly disorganized and disadvantaged lower-class group."[8]

Like Clark, he emphasized that the deterioration of the family—as reflected in the rising rates of broken marriages among urban blacks, out-of-wedlock births, female-headed homes, and welfare dependency—was one of the central problems of lower-class blacks. And like Frazier, Moynihan maintained that the problems of the black family, which create major obstacles to black equality, stem from previous patterns of inequality that originated with slavery and have been maintained and reinforced by years of discrimination. He concluded his report by calling for a shift in the direction of federal civil rights activities to "bring the Negro American to full and equal sharing in the responsibilities and rewards of citizenship" and thereby to enhance "the stability and resources of the Negro American family."[9]

The vitriolic attacks on the "Moynihan Report," attacks which paid far more attention to Moynihan's description of the black family than to his policy recommendations for an equality of outcomes,[10] helped to create an atmosphere that discouraged many scholars from exploring certain aspects of the lower-class black experience. This atmosphere was enhanced by the emergence of a black solidarity

movement in the latter half of the 1960s that, among other things, proffered a new definition of the black experience proclaimed as the "black perspective." This new definition was popularized by militant black spokespersons in the 1960s and was incorporated as a dominant theme in the writings of young black scholars and intellectuals by the early 1970s.[11] Although the black perspective represented a variety of views on matters of race, the assertions of black pride and black self-affirmation were characteristic features of the speeches and writings that embodied the intellectual component of the solidarity movement. Accordingly, the emphasis on the positive aspects of the black experience resulted in the uniform rejection of earlier arguments, which maintained that some features of ghetto life were pathological, in favor of those that accented black community strengths. And arguments extolling the strengths and virtues of black families replaced those that underlined the deterioration of black families. In fact, aspects of ghetto behavior described as pathological in the studies of the mid-1960s were reinterpreted or redefined as functional by some black perspective proponents because, they argued, blacks were displaying the ability to survive and, in many cases, to flourish in an economically depressed environment. Ghetto families were described as resilient and as adapting creatively to an oppressive racist society. In short, these revisionist studies, purporting to "liberate" the social sciences from the influence of "racism," effectively shifted the focus of social science writings away from a discussion of the consequences of racial isolation and class subordination to a discussion of black achievement.

Also, consistent with the dominant focus on racial solidarity in the writings of the black perspective proponents was an emphasis on "we" versus "they" and "black" versus "white." Since the accent was on race, little attention was paid to the social-economic differences within the black community and the implications this has for different public policy options; and little discussion was devoted to problems with the economy and the need for economic reform. Thus, the promising move to pursue programs of economic reform by defining the problems of American economic organization and outlining their effect on the minority community in the early and mid-1960s was cut off by slogans calling for "reparations," or "black control of institutions serving the black community" in the late 1960s. This is why

Orlando Patterson was led to proclaim in a later analysis that black ethnicity had become "a form of mystification, diverting attention from the correct kinds of solutions to the terrible economic condition of the group," thereby making it difficult for blacks to see "how their fate is inextricably tied up with the structure of the American economy."[12]

Meanwhile, during this period of black solidarity, significant developments were unfolding in ghetto communities across the nation that profoundly affected the lives of millions of blacks and dramatically revealed that the problems earlier described by Clark, Moynihan, and others had reached catastrophic proportions. To be more specific, one quarter of all black births were out of wedlock in 1965, the year Moynihan wrote his report on the Negro family, and by 1980 over half (55 percent) were; almost 25 percent of all black families were headed by women in 1965, and by 1980 41 percent were; partly as a result, welfare dependency among poor blacks has exploded. And perhaps the most dramatic indicator of the extent to which social pathology has afflicted urban blacks is crime, especially violent crime, which has risen sharply in recent years. Finally, these growing social problems have accompanied increasing black rates of unemployment and decreasing rates of labor-force participation.

Although these problems are heavily concentrated in urban areas, it would be a serious mistake to assume that they afflict all segments of the urban black community. Rather, these are the problems that are identified with the urban underclass—that heterogeneous grouping of inner-city families and individuals who are outside the mainstream of the American occupational system. Included in this population are persons who lack training and skills, and either experience long-term unemployment or have dropped out of the labor force altogether; persons who are more or less permanent public assistance recipients; and persons who are engaged in street criminal activity and other forms of aberrant or antisocial behavior.

THE TANGLE OF PATHOLOGY IN THE INNER CITY

When figures on black crime, out-of-wedlock births, female-headed families, and welfare dependency are released to the public without sufficient explanation, racial stereotypes are reinforced. And the

tendency of liberal social scientists either to ignore these issues or to address them in circumspect ways does more to enhance than to undermine racist perceptions.

These problems cannot be explained simply in terms of racial discrimination or in terms of a culture of poverty. Rather, they must be seen as having complex sociological antecedents that range from demographic changes to problems of societal organization. But before turning to these explanatory factors, I should like to sketch the growing social problems of the inner city, beginning first with violent crime.

RACE AND VIOLENT CRIME

Only one of nine persons in the United States is black; yet in 1980 nearly one of every two Americans arrested for murder and nonnegligent manslaughter was black, and 44 percent of all victims of murder were black.[13] As Norval Morris and Michael Tonry point out, "Homicide is the leading cause of death of black men and women aged 25 to 34."[14] Furthermore, nearly 60 percent of all persons arrested for robbery and 36 percent of all persons arrested for aggravated assault in 1980 were black.[15] Moreover, the rate of black imprisonment in 1979 was eight and one-half times greater than the rate of white imprisonment.[16]

The disproportionate involvement of blacks in violent crime is most dramatically revealed in the data on city arrests collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Thirteen percent of the population in cities are black, but, as reported in Table 1, blacks account for almost half of all city arrests for violent crimes. In particular, more

TABLE 1. City Arrest, Percent Distribution by Race

Offense Charge	Percent Distribution*			
	WHITE	BLACK	AMERICAN INDIAN OR ALASKAN NATIVE	PACIFIC ISLANDER
Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter	43.8	54.8	.7	.7
Forcible rape	45.0	53.5	.8	.5
Robbery	38.0	60.8	.5	.7
Aggravated assault	58.3	40.1	1.0	.6
Burglary	65.6	33.2	.7	.6
Larceny-theft	65.7	32.3	1.0	1.0
Motor vehicle theft	64.7	33.3	.9	.3
Arson	75.3	23.9	.4	.4
Violent crime†	49.9	48.7	.8	.6
Property crime**	65.7	32.5	.9	.9
Crime total index	62.6	35.7	.9	.8

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, 1980* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981).

*Because of rounding, the percentages may not all total.

†Violent crimes are offenses of murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

**Property crimes are offenses of burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.

The 1970s was a violent decade for the city of Chicago. The number of violent crimes began to rise in the mid-1960s and reached record levels in the 1970s. The number of homicides climbed from 305

TABLE 2. Murder Rates and Ranks of 10 Largest U.S. Cities, 1974–1979

	Six-year Average†		1974		1975		1976		1977		1978		1979	
CITY*	RATE	RANK	RATE	RANK	RATE	RANK	RATE	RANK	RATE	RANK	RATE	RANK	RATE	RANK
Detroit	44.2	1	51.8	1	45.5	1	50.8	1	38.0	2	40.3	1	38.3	3
Cleveland	41.6	2	46.3	2	45.1	2	33.9	2	40.2	1	34.1	2	50.0	1
Washington	29.9	3	38.3	3	32.9	3	27.1	3	28.0	3	28.4	4	24.6	9
Houston	28.4	4	26.2	6	22.3	7	22.3	7	24.4	6	30.9	3	41.4	2
Baltimore	27.8	5	34.1	4	30.6	4	23.8	6	22.4	7	24.8	7	31.1	5
Chicago	27.5	6	30.8	5	26.4	6	26.5	5	26.9	4	26.0	6**	28.6	6
Dallas	27.1	7	22.5	8	27.4	5	26.7	4	25.5	5	26.0	5**	34.4	4
New York	22.4	8	21.4	9	22.6	8	20.9	8	21.7	8	21.8	9	25.8	7
Los Angeles	20.2	9	17.1	10	18.8	10	17.8	9	19.0	9	22.9	8	25.7	8
Philadelphia	20.1	10	22.8	7	19.4	9	17.5	10	18.1	10	20.1	10	22.9	10

SOURCE: *The Chicago Reporter: A Monthly Information Service on Racial Issues in Metropolitan Chicago*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 1981).
†Average of murder rates (murders per 100,000 population) for all years since 1974.
*Ten largest U.S. cities as of 1970 census.
**Chicago's rate was 25.98, Dallas's rate was 26.01.

victims. During the 1970s, eight of every ten murderers in Chicago were black and almost seven of every ten murder victims were black.[18] In 1979, 547 blacks, 180 Hispanics, and 120 whites (other than Hispanic) were murder victims; and 573 of the murders were committed by blacks, 169 by Hispanics, and 64 by whites. In 1970 only 56 of the murder victims were Hispanic as compared with 135 white and 607 black victims. Demographic changes in the Hispanic population accounted in major measure for their increased involvement in violent crimes (a matter that will be discussed later in greater detail).

It is significant to note that homicides in Chicago were overwhelmingly intraracial or intraethnic. In fact, throughout the 1970s, 98 percent of black homicides were committed by other blacks, 75 percent of Hispanic homicides were committed by other Hispanics, and 51.5 percent of white homicides were committed by other whites.

In examining the figures on homicide in Chicago it is important to recognize that the rates vary significantly according to the economic status of the community, with the highest rates associated with the communities of the underclass. For example, "In 1980, through mid-November, more than half of the murders and shooting assaults in Chicago were concentrated in seven of the city's 24 police districts. . . . These are areas with heavy concentration of low-income black or Latino residents. . . ."[19]

The most violent area is the heavily black Wentworth Avenue police district on the South Side of Chicago. Within this four-square-mile area an average of more than 90 murders and 400 shooting assaults occur each year; and one of every 10 murders and shooting assaults in Chicago occurred there during the 1970s. "Through mid-November of 1980, Wentworth saw 82 murders (almost 12 percent of the citywide total) and 309 shooting assaults (11.3 percent of the city total)."[20]

The Wentworth figures on violent crime are high mainly because the Robert Taylor Homes, the largest public housing project in the city of Chicago, is located there. Robert Taylor Homes includes 28 16-story buildings covering 92 acres. The official population in 1980 was 19,785, but, according to one report, "there are an additional 5,000 to 7,000 adult residents who are not registered with the housing authority."[21] In 1980, all of the more than 4,200 official households were black and 72 percent of the official population were

minors. Ninety percent of the families with children were headed by women. The median family income was $4,925. Eighty-one percent of the households received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).[22] Unemployment in Robert Taylor Homes was estimated to be 47 percent in 1980.[23] Although only slightly more than one-half of one percent of Chicago's more than three million people live in Robert Taylor Homes, "11 percent of the city's murders, 9 percent of its rapes, and 10 percent of its aggravated assaults were committed in the project."[24]

Robert Taylor Homes is by no means the only violent housing project in Chicago. For example, Cabrini-Green, the second largest, experienced a rash of violent crimes in early 1981 that prompted Chicago's former Mayor Jane Byrne to take up residence for several weeks to help stem the tide. Cabrini-Green consists of 81 high- and low-rise buildings covering 70 acres on Chicago's near-North side. In 1980, 13,626 people, nearly all black, were officially registered there; but like Robert Taylor Homes, there are many more who reside there but do not show up in the records of the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA). Minors were 67 percent of the official population; 90 percent of the families with children were headed by women. Seventy-eight percent of the 3,591 households were on welfare in 1980 and 70 percent received AFDC.[25]

In a nine-week period that began in early January 1981, 10 Cabrini-Green residents were murdered; 35 were wounded by gunshots, including random sniping; and more than 50 firearms were seized by the Chicago police, "the tip of an immense illegal arsenal," according to police.[26]

URBAN FAMILY DISSOLUTION AND WELFARE DEPENDENCY

What is true of Robert Taylor Homes and Cabrini-Green is typical of all the CHA housing projects. In 1980, of the 27,178 families with children living in CHA projects, only 2,982, or 11 percent, were husband-and-wife families. And 67 percent of the family households received AFDC.[27] But family dissolution and welfare dependency are not confined to public housing projects. Rather the projects simply magnify such problems, problems that permeate inner-city neighborhoods and to a lesser extent metropolitan areas generally.

The increase in the number of families headed by women was dramatic during the 1970s. Whereas the total number of families grew by 12 percent from 1970 to 1979, the number headed by women increased by 51 percent. Moreover, the number of female-headed families with one or more of their children present in the home increased by 81 percent. If the change in family composition was notable for all families in the 1970s, it was close to phenomenal for black and Hispanic families. Whereas families headed by white women increased in number by 42.1 percent, families headed by black and Hispanic women increased in number by 72.9 and 76.5 percent respectively.[28]

In 1965, Moynihan expressed great concern that one quarter of all black families were headed by women. That figure had increased to 28 percent in 1969, to 37 percent in 1976, to 39 percent in 1977, and finally to a staggering 42 percent in 1980. By contrast, only 12 percent of white families and 22 percent of Hispanic families were maintained by women in 1980 even though each group recorded a significant increase in female-headed families during the 1970s.[29]

It is important to point out that in 1979, 73 percent of all female householders lived in metropolitan areas, with 41 percent living in central cities and 32 percent in the adjacent suburbs; moreover, of those who were black and Hispanic, 80 and 90 percent respectively resided in metropolitan areas, with 64 percent of each group living in the central city.[30] It is also significant to note that the women are younger than in previous years. For example, from 1970 to 1979, the number of female heads of families 45 years or older increased by 525,000 (17 percent), while those under 45 years of age increased by 2.3 million (96 percent), resulting in a decrease in the median age from 48.2 years in 1970 to 42.0 years in 1979. This represented a change in median age from 50.2 to 43.7 for white women maintaining families, from 41.3 to 37.9 for black women, and from 40.2 to 36.1 for Hispanic women.[31]

Even if a female householder is employed full time, her earnings are usually significantly less than a male worker's and are not likely to be supplemented with income from a second full-time employed person in the household. The economic situation of women heads of families who are not employed, including those who have never been employed or have dropped out of the labor force to become full-time

mothers or are employed only part time, is often desperate.[32] In 1980, the median income of female-headed families ($10,408) was only 45 percent of the median income of married-couple families ($23,141).[33] And the median income of families headed by black women ($7,425) was only 40 percent of the median income of married-couple black families ($18,592).[34] In 1978, roughly 3.2 million families received incomes of less than $4,000 and more than half (54 percent) of these families were headed by women.[35]

The association between level of family income and family composition is even more pronounced among black families. As shown in Table 3, whereas 80.3 percent of all black families who had incomes under $4,000 were headed by women in 1978, only 7.7 percent who had incomes of $25,000 or more were maintained by women; in metropolitan areas, the difference was even greater: 85.1 versus 7.6 percent. As shown in Table 3, the relationship between level of income and type of family is much stronger for blacks than for whites.

Economic hardship has become an even greater problem for black female-headed families: only 30 percent of all *poor* black families were headed by women in 1959, but by 1978 the proportion reached 74 percent (though it dipped to 71 percent in 1980). By contrast, 38 percent of all poor white families and 48 percent of all poor Hispanic families were headed by women.[36]

The proportion of black children in husband-wife families consequently dropped significantly, from 64 percent in 1970 to 56 percent in 1974 to 48.5 percent in 1978. Moreover, 41.2 percent of black children under 18 years of age and 42.5 of all those under six years of age were living in families whose incomes were below the poverty level in 1978 (Table 4). Even more astonishing, 32.1 percent of all black children under 18 years of age and 33.6 percent of those under six years of age were living in poor, female-headed families in 1978.[37]

The rise of female-headed families among blacks corresponds closely with the increase in the rate of out-of-wedlock births. Only 15 percent of all births to black women in 1959 were out of wedlock; roughly 25 percent in 1965 were; and more than half (53 percent) in 1978 were out of wedlock, six times greater than the white ratio of 8.7.[38] Indeed, despite the great difference in total population, the number of out-of-wedlock black births (293,400) actually exceeded

TABLE 3. Proportion of Families by Race, Income Level, Female Head, and Metropolitan Residence 1978

Subject	All Families (%)	Female Heads (%)	Families in Metropolitan Areas (%)	Metropolitan Families with Female Heads (%)
Black				
Under $4,000	15.9	80.3	71.1	85.1
$4,000 to $6,999	16.2	63.8	74.7	71.2
$7,000 to $10,999	18.3	46.2	74.8	50.7
$11,000 to $15,999	16.7	28.9	76.3	31.8
$16,000 to $24,999	19.2	15.3	82.7	15.4
$25,000 and over	13.4	7.7	88.5	7.6
White				
Under $4,000	4.3	42.1	53.3	50.2
$4,000 to $6,999	4.7	27.6	56.2	33.7
$7,000 to $10,999	12.7	19.5	57.7	21.8
$11,000 to $15,999	16.9	13.4	59.9	16.7
$16,000 to $24,999	28.8	7.2	66.0	8.5
$25,000 and over	29.5	2.9	75.4	3.1

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports,* Consumer Income, Series P-60, No. 123 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980).

TABLE 4. Percentage of All Related Children in Families Below the Poverty Level by Race and Family Type

SUBJECT	White Families			Black Families		
	MALE HEADED (%)	FEMALE HEADED (%)	TOTAL (%)	MALE HEADED (%)	FEMALE HEADED (%)	TOTAL (%)
Related Children Under 18	5.9	5.1	11.0	9.1	32.1	41.2
Related Children Under 6	6.8	5.6	12.4	8.9	33.6	42.5

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Consumer Income, Series P-60, No. 124 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980).

the number of out-of-wedlock white births (233,600) in 1978. Although the proportion of black births that are out of wedlock is, in part, a function of the general decline in marital fertility among blacks (a point which is further discussed below), it is also a reflection of the growing prevalence of births among black teenagers outside of marriage. In 1978, 83 percent of the births to black teenagers (and 29 percent of the births to white teenagers) were out of wedlock. Teenagers accounted for almost half (45.8 percent) of out-of-wedlock births in 1978.[39]

Again we may focus on Chicago to see the dimensions of this problem in a large, northern urban area. In 1978 almost 42 percent of the births in Chicago were out of wedlock, more than twice the percentage of 1968; 76 percent of the 12,008 babies born to Chicago teenagers in 1978 were outside of marriage. Just as in other cities across the country, out-of-wedlock births in Chicago are closely related to race. In 1978, 67 percent of the black births in Chicago were outside of marriage (in contrast to 17 percent of the white births); more than 80 percent of Chicago's total out-of-wedlock births were to black women.[40]

These developments have, to repeat, significant implications for the problems of dependency. In 1977 the proportion of families receiving AFDC who were black (43 percent) slightly exceeded the proportion who were white other than Spanish (42.5 percent) despite the far greater white population.[41] It is estimated that about 60 percent of the children who are born outside of marriage and are alive and not adopted receive welfare.[42] A 1979 unpublished study by the Department of City Planning in New York found that 75 percent of all the children born out of wedlock in that city during the previous 18 years are AFDC recipients.[43] And a study by the Urban Institute reported that "more than half of all AFDC assistance in 1975 was paid to women who were or had been teenage mothers."[44]

I focus on female-headed families and out-of-wedlock births because they have become inextricably connected with poverty and dependency. The sharp rise in these and other forms of social dislocation in the inner city (including joblessness and violent crime) presents a difficult challenge to liberal policymakers. Because there has been so little recent systematic research on and a paucity of thoughtful explanations of these problems, racial stereotypes of life and be-

havior in the urban ghetto have not been sufficiently rebutted. The physical and social isolation of residents in the inner city is thereby reinforced. The fundamental question remains: why have the social conditions of the urban underclass deteriorated so rapidly since the mid-1960s?

TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE EXPLANATION OF URBAN SOCIAL DISLOCATIONS

There is no single explanation for the racial or ethnic variations in the rates of social problems I have described. But I would like to suggest several interrelated explanations that range from those fairly obvious to students of social science to ones that most observers overlook altogether. In the process, I hope to be able to show that these problems are not intractable, as some people have suggested, and that their solution calls for imaginative and comprehensive programs of economic and social reform that are in sharp contrast to the current approaches to social policy in America based on short-term political considerations.

THE EFFECTS OF HISTORIC AND CONTEMPORARY DISCRIMINATION

Discrimination is the most frequently invoked explanation of social dislocations in the inner city. However, proponents of the discrimination thesis often fail to make a distinction between the effects of historic discrimination, that is, discrimination prior to the mid-twentieth century, and the effects of contemporary discrimination, that is, discrimination after the mid-twentieth century. They therefore find it difficult to explain why the economic position of the black underclass actually deteriorated during the very period in which the most sweeping antidiscrimination legislation and programs were enacted and implemented.[45] And their emphasis on discrimination becomes even more vulnerable in light of the economic progress of the black middle class during the same period.

There is no doubt that contemporary discrimination has contributed to or aggravated the social and economic problems of poor blacks. But is discrimination greater today than in 1948 when, as shown in Table 5, black unemployment was less than half (5.9 per-

TABLE 5. Unemployment Rates by Race for Persons Sixteen Years and Over, 1948–1980

YEAR	Unemployment Rate: BLACK AND OTHER RACES*	Unemployment Rate: WHITE	RATIO OF BLACK AND OTHER RACES TO WHITE
1948	5.9%	3.5%	1.7
1949	8.9	5.6	1.6
1950	9.0	4.9	1.8
1951	5.3	3.1	1.7
1952	5.4	2.8	1.9
1953	4.5	2.7	1.7
1954	9.9	5.0	2.0
1955	8.7	3.9	2.2
1956	8.3	3.6	2.3
1957	7.9	3.8	2.1
1958	12.6	6.1	2.1
1959	10.7	4.8	2.3
1960	10.2	4.9	2.1
1961	12.4	6.0	2.1
1962	10.9	4.9	2.2
1963	10.8	5.0	2.2
1964	9.6	4.6	2.1
1965	8.1	4.1	2.0
1966	7.3	3.3	2.2
1967	7.4	3.4	2.2
1968	6.7	3.2	2.1
1969	6.4	3.1	2.1
1970	8.2	4.5	1.8
1971	9.9	5.4	1.8
1972	10.0	5.0	2.0
1973	8.9	4.3	2.1
1974	9.9	5.0	2.0
1975	13.9	7.8	1.8
1976	13.1	7.0	1.9
1977	13.1	6.2	2.1
1978	11.9	5.2	2.3
1979	11.3	5.1	2.2
1980	12.3	5.9	2.1

SOURCES: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1974," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-23, No. 48 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975); and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1980*, (101 ed.), (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980).

NOTE: The unemployment rate is the percentage of the civilian labor force that is unemployed. The black/white employment ratio is the percentage of blacks who are unemployed divided by the percentage of whites who are unemployed.

*"Black and other races" is a U.S. Census Bureau designation and is used in those cases where data are not available solely for blacks. However, because about 90% of the population designated by "Black and other races" is black, statistics reported for this category generally reflect the condition of the black population.

cent) of the rate of 1980 (12.3 percent), and the black/white unemployment ratio (1.7) was almost a quarter less than the ratio of 1980 (2.1)? Although labor economists have noted the shortcomings of the official unemployment rates as an indicator of the economic well-being of groups, nonetheless these rates have generally been accepted as one significant measure of relative disadvantage.[46] It is, therefore, important to point out that it was not until 1954 that the two-to-one unemployment ratio between blacks and whites was reached, and that since 1954, despite shifts from good to bad economic years, the ratio between black and white unemployment has shown very little change. There are obviously many reasons for the higher levels of black joblessness since the mid-1950s, but to suggest contemporary discrimination as the main factor is to obscure the impact of demographic and economic changes and to leave unanswered the question of why black unemployment was lower not after but prior to 1950 (see Table 5).

The question has also been raised about the relationship of contemporary discrimination within the criminal justice system to the disproportionate rates of black crime. An answer was provided by Alfred Blumstein's important study of the racial disproportionality of America's state prison populations.[47] Blumstein found that 80 percent of the disproportionate black incarceration rates throughout the decade of the 1970s could be attributed to the disproportionate number of blacks as arrestees; and that the more serious the offense, the stronger the association between arrest rates and incarceration rates (for example, 97.2 percent, 84.6 percent, and 94.8 percent of the disproportionate black incarceration rates for homicide, aggravated assault, and robbery could be accounted for by the differential black arrest rates). He points out, therefore, that discrimination very likely plays a more important role in the black incarceration rates for the less serious crimes. He also notes that, "Even if the relatively large racial differences in handling these offenses were totally eliminated, however, that would not result in a major shift in the racial mix of prison populations."[48]

However, is the racial disproportionality in United States prisons largely the consequence of black bias in arrest? Recent research demonstrates consistent relationships between the distribution of crimes by race as reported in the arrest statistics of the *Uniform Crime Reports* and the distribution based on reports by victims of assault, robbery, and rape (where contact with the offender was direct).[49] "While these results are certainly short of definitive evidence that there is not bias in arrests," states Blumstein, "they do strongly suggest that the arrest process, whose demographics we can observe, is reasonably representative of the crime process for at least these serious crime types."[50]

It should also be pointed out that, contrary to prevailing opinion, the black family showed signs of deterioration not before but after the mid-twentieth century. Until the publication of Herbert Gutman's impressive historical study on the black family, it had been widely assumed that the contemporary problems of the black family could be traced back to slavery.[51] "Stimulated by the bitter public and academic controversy" surrounding the Moynihan Report,[52] Gutman produced data that convincingly demonstrated that the black family was neither particularly disorganized during slavery nor during the early years of their first migration to the urban North, thereby suggesting that the present problems of black family disorganization are a product of more recent forces.

But are these problems mainly a consequence of contemporary discrimination or are they related to other factors that may have little or nothing to do with race? If contemporary discrimination is the main culprit, why has it produced the most severe problems of urban social dislocation, including joblessness, during the 1970s, a decade which followed an unprecedented period of antidiscrimination legislation and which ushered in the affirmative action programs? The problem, as I see it, is unraveling the effects of contemporary discrimination, on the one hand, and historic discrimination, on the other.

The argument I would like to advance is that historic discrimination is far more important than contemporary discrimination in understanding the plight of the urban underclass, but that a full appreciation of the legacy of historic discrimination is impossible without taking into account other historical and contemporary forces that have also shaped the experiences and behavior of impoverished urban minorities.

One of the major effects of historic discrimination is the presence of the large black underclass in central cities. Whereas blacks were 23 percent of the population of central cities in 1977, they constituted 46 percent of the poor in these cities.[53] In accounting for the histori-

cal developments that contributed to this concentration of urban black poverty, I would like to draw briefly upon Stanley Lieberson's recent and original study, *A Piece of the Pie: Black and White Immigrants since 1880.*[54] On the basis of a systematic analysis of early U.S. censuses and other sources of data, Lieberson concluded that in many areas of life, including the labor market, blacks were discriminated against far more severely in the early twentieth century than were the new white immigrants from southern, central, and eastern Europe. Disadvantages of skin color, in the sense that the dominant white population preferred whites over nonwhites, is one that blacks shared with Chinese, Japanese, American Indians, and other nonwhite groups. But skin color per se "was not an insurmountable obstacle."[55] Changes in immigration policy cut off Asian migration to America in the late nineteenth and earlier twentieth century, and the Japanese and Chinese populations, in sharp contrast to blacks, did not reach large numbers and, therefore, did not pose as great a threat to the white population. Lieberson was aware that the "response of whites to Chinese and Japanese was of the same violent and savage character in areas where they were concentrated," but he noted that "the threat was quickly stopped through changes in immigration policy."[56] Furthermore, the discontinuation of large-scale immigration from China and Japan enabled those already here to solidify networks of ethnic contact and to occupy particular occupational niches.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FLOW OF MIGRANTS

If differences in the size of the population account for a good deal of the difference in the economic success of blacks and Asians, it also helped to determine the dissimilar rates of progress of urban blacks and the new Europeans. The dynamic factor behind these differences, and perhaps the most important single contributor to the varying rates of urban racial and ethnic progress in the twentieth century, is the flow of migrants. Changes in immigration policy first halted Asian immigration to America and then curtailed the new European immigration. However, black migration to the urban North continued in substantial numbers several decades after the new European immigration ceased. Accordingly, there "are many more blacks who are recent migrants to the North whereas the immigrant component of the new Europeans drops off over time."[57]

The sizable and continuous migration of blacks from the South to the North coupled with the cessation of immigration from eastern, central, and southern Europe created a situation in which other whites muffled their negative disposition toward the new Europeans and focused antagonisms toward blacks; "the presence of blacks made it harder to discriminate against the new Europeans because the alternative was viewed less favorably."[58]

The flow of migrants also made it much more difficult for blacks to follow the path of both Asian Americans and the new Europeans in overcoming the negative effects of discrimination through special occupational niches. Only a small percentage of a group's total work force can be absorbed in such specialities when the group's population increases rapidly or is a sizable proportion of the total population. Furthermore, the continuing flow of migrants has had a harmful effect on the earlier-arriving or longer-standing black residents of the North. Lieberson insightfully points out that:

> Sizable numbers of newcomers raise the level of ethnic and/or racial consciousness on the part of others in the city; moreover, if these newcomers are less able to compete for more desirable positions than are the longer-standing residents, they will tend to undercut the position of other members of the group. This is because the older residents and those of higher socioeconomic status cannot totally avoid the newcomers, although they work at it through subgroup residential isolation. Hence, there is some deterioration in the quality of residential areas, schools, and the like for those earlier residents who might otherwise enjoy more fully the rewards of their mobility. Beyond this, from the point of view of the dominant outsiders, the newcomers may reinforce stereotypes and negative dispositions that affect all members of the group.[59]

In sum, because substantial black migration to the cities continued several decades after the new European and Asian migration ceased, urban blacks, having their ranks constantly replenished with poor migrants, found it much more difficult to follow the path of both the new Europeans and the Asian immigrants in overcoming the effects of discrimination.[60] The pattern of rural black migration to industrial centers has in recent years been strong in the South. In

Houston and Atlanta, to illustrate, the continuous influx of rural southern blacks, due in large measure to the increasing mechanization of agriculture, has resulted in the creation of large urban ghettos that closely resemble those in the North. The net result in both the North and South is that as the nation entered the last quarter of this century, its large urban areas continued to have a disproportionate concentration of poor blacks who have been especially vulnerable to recent structural changes in the economy.

A cause for optimism is that black migration to urban areas has been minimal in recent years. Indeed, between 1970 and 1977, there was actually a net outmigration of 653,000 from the central cities.[61] In most large cities the number of blacks increased only moderately and in some, in fact, declined. As the demographer Philip Hauser pointed out, increases in the urban black population during the 1970s "were mainly due to births."[62] This would indicate that for the first time in the twentieth century, the ranks of blacks in central cities are no longer being replenished by poor migrants. This strongly suggests that, other things being equal, the average socioeconomic status of urban blacks will show a steady improvement, including a decrease in joblessness, and with this a decrease in crime, out-of-wedlock births, single-parent homes, and welfare dependency. In other words, just as the Asian and new European immigrants benefited from a cessation of migration, so too is there reason to expect that the cessation of black migration will help to improve the socioeconomic status of urban blacks. There are other factors that affect the differential rate of ethnic progress at different periods of time, such as structural changes in the economy, size of the population, and discrimination. But I am saying that one of the major obstacles to urban black advancement—the constant flow of migrants—has been removed.[63]

Hispanics, on the other hand, appear to be migrating to urban centers in increasing numbers. The comparative status of Hispanics as an ethnic group is not entirely clear because there are no comparable figures on their types of residence in 1970. But data collected since 1974 indicate that their numbers in central cities are increasing rapidly, as a consequence of both immigration and births. Indeed, in several large cities, including New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, Phoenix, and Denver "they apparently outnumber American blacks."[64] Although the Hispanic population is diverse in terms of nationalities and socioeconomic status—for example, in 1979, the median income of Puerto Ricans ($8,822) was significantly less than that of Mexicans ($12,825) and Cubans ($15,326)—they are often identified collectively as a distinct ethnic community because of their common Spanish-speaking origins.[65] Accordingly, the rapid growth of the Hispanic population in urban areas, accompanied by the opposite trend for black Americans, could contribute significantly to different outcomes for these two groups in the last two decades of the twentieth century. More specifically, whereas blacks could very well record a decrease in their rates of joblessness, crime, out-of-wedlock births, single-parent homes, and welfare dependency, Hispanics could show a steady increase in each. Moreover, whereas blacks could experience a decrease in the ethnic hostility directed toward them, Hispanics, with their increasing visibility, could be victims of increasing ethnic antagonisms.

However, Hispanics are not the only ethnic group in urban America experiencing a rapid growth in population. According to the Census Bureau, Asians, who make up less than two percent of the nation's population, were the fastest-growing American ethnic group in the 1970s. Following the liberalization of immigration policies, the large influx of immigrants from Southeast Asia and, to a lesser degree, from China and South Korea has been associated with reports of increasing problems including anti-Asian sentiments, joblessness, and violent crime.[66] There are reports that the nation's economic woes have exacerbated the situation, as the newcomers compete with black, white, and Hispanic urban workers for jobs.[67] Moreover, the steady inpouring of immigrants from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China has upset the social organization of "Chinatowns." Once homogeneous and stable, Chinatowns are now suffering from problems that have plagued inner-city black neighborhoods, such as joblessness, violent street crimes, gang warfare, school dropouts, and overcrowding.[68]

THE RELEVANCE OF CHANGES IN THE AGE STRUCTURE

If the flow of migrants is associated with the concentration of urban ethnic poverty and its social ramifications, it also has implications for the average age of an ethnic group. The higher the median age of a group, the greater its representation in higher income and

professional categories. It is, therefore, not surprising that ethnic groups, such as blacks and Hispanics, who average younger than whites, also tend to have high unemployment and crime rates.[69] As revealed in Table 6, ethnic groups differed significantly in median age in 1980, ranging from 23.2 years for blacks and Hispanics to 31.3 years for whites. Moreover, only 21.3 percent of American whites are under age 15 as compared with 28.7 percent of blacks and 32 percent of Hispanics.

In the nation's central cities in 1977, the median age for whites was 30.3, for blacks 23.9, and for Hispanics 21.8. One cannot overemphasize the importance of the sudden increase of young minorities in the central cities. More specifically, the number of central-city black youths aged 16 to 19 increased by almost 75 percent from 1960 to 1969, compared with an increase of only 14 percent for white teenagers of the same age. Furthermore, young black adults in the central city (aged 20 to 24) increased in number by two thirds during the same period, three times the increase for comparable whites.[70] From 1970 to 1977 the increase in the number of young blacks slackened off somewhat but it was still substantial. For example, the number of young blacks, age 14 to 24, in the central cities of metropolitan areas of more than 1,000,000 increased by 22 percent from 1970 to 1977, and the number of Hispanics by 26 percent, while whites of this age group decreased by 7 percent.[71]

On the basis of these demographic changes alone we would expect blacks and Hispanics to contribute disproportionately to the increasing social problems of the central city such as crime. Indeed, in 1980, 55 percent of all those arrested for violent and property crimes in American cities were under 21 years of age.[72]

TABLE 6. Age Structure of Racial and Ethnic Groups, 1980

	Under Age 15	65 and Over	Median Age
United States	22.6%	11.3%	30.0%
White	21.3	12.2	31.3
Black	28.7	7.9	23.2
Spanish Origin	32.0	4.9	23.2

SOURCE: Philip M. Hauser, "The Census of 1980," *Scientific American* 245 (November 1981), p. 61.

Age is not only a factor in crime, it is also related to out-of-wedlock births, female-headed homes, and welfare dependency. Teenagers accounted for almost half of all out-of-wedlock births in 1978; moreover, 80 percent of all out-of-wedlock black births in 1978 were to teenage and young adult (20 to 24) women;[73] furthermore, the median age of female householders has decreased significantly in recent years. In 1970, black female householders, age 14 to 24, were 30.9 percent of all black women householders with children under 18, and by 1979 their proportion had increased to 37.2 percent; there were increases from 22.4 to 27.9 percent for comparable white families and from 29.9 to 38.3 for Hispanics.[74] And finally, the explosion of teenage births has contributed significantly to the increase in the number of children on AFDC from 35 per 1,000 children under 18 in 1960 to 113 per 1,000 in 1979.[75]

In short, the increases in crime, out-of-wedlock births, female-headed homes, and welfare dependency is, in part, related to the sheer explosion of young people, especially young minorities. However, as James Q. Wilson has pointed out in his analysis of the proliferation of social problems in the 1960s, a decade of general economic prosperity, "changes in the age structure of the population cannot alone account for the social dislocations" of that decade.[76] He argues, for example, that from 1960 to 1970 the rate of serious crime in the District of Columbia increased by over 400 percent, and unemployment rates by 100 percent, yet the number of young persons between 16 and 21 years of age increased by only 32 percent. Also, the number of murders in Detroit rose from 100 in 1960 to 500 in 1971, "yet the number of young persons did not quintuple."[77]

Wilson notes that the "increase in the murder rate during the 1960s was more than ten times greater than what one would have expected from the changing age structure of the population alone" and that "only 13.4 percent of the increase in arrests for robbery between 1950 and 1965 could be accounted for by the increase in the numbers of persons between the ages of ten and twenty-four."[78] Speculating on this problem, Wilson advances the hypothesis that the abrupt increase in the number of young persons has an "exponential effect on the rate of certain social problems."[79] In other words, there may be a "critical mass" of young persons such that when that mass is reached or is increased suddenly and substantially, "a self-sustain-

ing chain reaction is set off that creates an explosive increase in the amount of crime, addiction, and welfare dependency."[80]

This hypothesis seems to be especially relevant to densely populated ghetto neighborhoods, and even more especially to those with large public housing projects. Opposition from organized community groups to the building of public housing in their neighborhoods has "led to massive, segregated housing projects, which become ghettos for minorities and the economically disadvantaged."[81] As Robert Taylor Homes and Cabrini-Green in Chicago suggest, when poor large families were placed in high-density low- and high-rise housing projects in the inner city, both family and neighborhood life suffered. Family deterioration, high crime rates, and vandalism flourished in these projects. In St. Louis, for another example, the Pruit-Igoe project, which included about 10,000 children and adults, developed serious problems five years after it opened "and it became so unlivable that it was destroyed in 1976, 22 years after it was built."[82]

Wilson's critical mass theory would seem to be demonstrated convincingly in densely populated poor neighborhoods with a heavy concentration of teenagers and young adults. As Oscar Newman has shown, the population concentration in these projects, the types of housing, and the surrounding population have interactive effects on the occurrence and types of crimes.[83] In other words, the crime problem, generally high in poor minority neighborhoods, is exacerbated by the conditions in the housing projects. Additionally, as Lee Rainwater has suggested, the character of family life in the federal housing projects "shares much with the family life of lower-class Negroes" in other parts of the city.[84] The population explosion of young minorities in the already densely settled ghetto neighborhoods during the past two decades created a situation whereby life throughout ghetto neighborhoods came close to approximating life in the housing projects.

In both the housing projects and other densely settled ghetto neighborhoods, residents have difficulty recognizing their neighbors. They are, therefore, less likely to be concerned for them or to engage in reciprocal guardian behavior. The more densely a neighborhood or block is populated, the less contact and interaction among neighbors and the less likely that potential offenders can be detected or distinguished. Events in one part of the neighborhood or block tend

to be of little concern to those residing in other parts.[85] And it hardly needs further emphasizing that these conditions of social disorganization are as acute as they are because of the unprecedented increase in the number of younger blacks in these neighborhoods, many of whom are not enrolled in school, are jobless, and are a source of delinquency, crime, and unrest.

The cessation of black in-migration to the central cities and the steady out-migration to the suburbs[86] will help to relieve the population pressures in the inner city. Perhaps even more significant is the fact that there were 6 percent fewer blacks in the age cohort 13 and under in 1977 than in 1970; in metropolitan areas there were 6 percent fewer blacks in that cohort and in the central cities 13 percent fewer. White children in this age category also decreased from 1970 to 1977 by even larger percentages: 14 percent overall, 17 percent in metropolitan areas, and 24 percent in the central cities. By contrast, Hispanic children, age 13 and under, *increased* during this same period by 18 percent overall, by 16 percent in metropolitan areas, and by 12 percent in the central cities. Thus, just as the change in migration flow could affect the differential rates of ethnic involvement in certain types of social problems, so too could changes in the age structure. In short, whereas whites and blacks—all other things being equal—are likely to experience a decrease in problems such as joblessness, crime, out-of-wedlock births, family dissolution, and welfare dependency in the near future, the growing Hispanic population, due to the rapid increases in births and migration, is more likely to show increasing rates of social dislocation.

THE IMPACT OF BASIC ECONOMIC CHANGES

If historic and contemporary discrimination, the flow of migrants, and demographic changes have accounted in significant ways for the social dislocations of the urban underclass, its problems have also been profoundly exacerbated by recent structural changes in the economy. The population explosion of young minorities in recent years has occurred at a time when changes in the economy pose serious problems for unskilled workers, both in and out of the labor force.

Urban minorities are particularly vulnerable to structural eco-

nomic changes, such as the shift from goods-producing to service-producing industries, the increasing separation of the labor market into low-wage and high-wage sectors, technological innovations, and the relocation of manufacturing industries out of the central cities. These economic shifts serve to remind us that nearly all of our large and densely populated urban centers experienced their most rapid development during an earlier industrial and transportation era. Today these metropolises are undergoing an irreversible "structural transformation from centers of production and distribution of material goods to centers of administration, information exchange and service provision."[87] The character of the central city labor market has been profoundly altered in the process. As John D. Kasarda has put it: "The central cities have become increasingly specialized in jobs that have high educational prerequisites just at the time that their resident populations are increasingly composed of those with poor educational backgrounds. As a result, inner-city unemployment rates are more than twice the national average and even higher among inner-city residents who have traditionally found employment in blue-collar industries that have migrated to suburban locations."[88]

The extent to which white-collar jobs are replacing blue-collar positions in the central cities is illustrated by the data in five selected occupational categories in 18 older northern cities (Table 7). Whereas the professional, technical, and clerical employment increased by 291,055 positions from 1960 to 1970, blue-collar employment—craftsmen, operatives, and laborers—decreased by 749,774. And the overwhelming majority of the jobs lost were the higher paying blue-collar positions (craftsmen and operatives). There is also some indication that the blue-collar jobs decline in large northern cities has accelerated. During the decade of the 1970s Chicago lost more than 200,000 jobs, mostly in manufacturing. New York City lost 600,000 during the 1970s, despite the fact that the number of white-collar, professional, managerial, and clerical jobs increased in Manhattan.[89]

Roughly 60 percent of the unemployed blacks in the United States reside in central cities, mostly within the cities' low-income areas. There is much more dispersion among unemployed whites, as approximately 40 percent live in suburban areas and an additional 30

TABLE 7. Number of Jobs in Five Occupational Categories in Eighteen Northern Cities, 1960–1970

Occupation	1960	1970	Change
Professional and technical	1,018,663	1,222,650	203,987
Clerical	1,833,483	1,920,551	87,068
Craftsmen	1,099,584	904,231	— 195,353
Operatives	1,673,811	1,188,200	— 485,611
Laborers	320,074	251,264	— 68,810

SOURCE: Adapted from John D. Kasarda, "Urbanization, Community, and the Metropolitan Problem," in *Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life,* ed. David Street (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978).

NOTE: "Figures are for eighteen SMSA central cities in the Northeast and North Central regions that had populations of at least 50,000 each before 1900 and did not annex more than 5% of their population between 1960 and 1970. The data were computed from metropolitan place-of-work reports from the 1960 and 1970 censuses" (Kasarda, "Urbanization, Community, and the Metropolitan Problem").

percent reside in nonmetropolitan areas. Furthermore, the proportion of black men employed as laborers and service workers is twice that of white workers. The lack of economic opportunity for lower-class blacks means that they are forced to remain in economically depressed ghettos and their children are forced to attend inferior ghetto schools. This leads into a vicious cycle, as ghetto isolation and inferior opportunities in education reinforce their disadvantaged position in the labor market and contribute to problems of crime, family dissolution, and welfare dependency.

Indeed, the problems of joblessness among blacks, especially poor blacks, are more acute than those of any other large ethnic group in America. Heavily concentrated in inner cities, they have experienced a worsening of their economic position on the basis of nearly all the major labor-market indicators. Four of these indicators are presented in Tables 8 through 11, and they indicate the percentage of persons *in the labor force* who are without a job (Table 8); the proportion who are in the labor force (Table 9); the fraction who are employed *including those not in the labor force* (Table 10); and the percentage who have work experience (Table 11).

More black workers are unemployed. As set out in Table 8, the unemployment rates for both black men and black women from 1955

TABLE 8. Unemployment Rates by Race, Sex, and Age, Selected Years, 1955–1978 (%)

Race, sex, and age	1955	1965	1973	1983*
White men				
16–19	11.3	12.9	12.3	18.7
16–17	12.2	14.7	15.1	22.6
18–19	10.4	11.4	10.0	16.4
20–24	7.0	5.9	6.5	10.9
25 and over	3.0	2.5	2.4	6.4
White women				
16–19	9.1	14.0	13.0	13.6
16–17	11.6	15.0	15.7	15.9
18–19	7.7	13.4	10.9	12.1
20–24	5.1	6.3	7.0	7.6
25 and over	3.7	3.6	3.7	5.5
Black and other men				
16–19	13.4	23.3	26.9	41.5
16–17	14.8	27.1	34.4	49.2
18–19	12.9	20.2	22.1	38.2
20–24	12.4	9.3	12.6	26.9
25 and over	8.0	5.5	4.2	13.1
Black and other women				
16–19	19.2	31.7	34.5	43.9
16–17	15.4	37.8	36.5	46.5
18–19	21.4	27.8	33.3	42.9
20–24	13.0	13.7	17.6	26.1
25 and over	6.9	6.4	6.1	13.1

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, *Monthly Labor Review* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1979), and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1984).
*December 1983.

to December 1983 have evidenced a far greater increase at all age levels than those of whites, with black teenage unemployment showing the sharpest increase (from 13.4 percent in 1955 to 41.5 percent in 1983 for men, and from 19.2 percent in 1955 to 43.9 percent in 1983 for women). The unemployment rates of blacks aged 20 to 24 also reached very high proportions in 1983 (26.9 percent for men and 26.1 percent for women), extending a trend of increasing joblessness that began in the mid-1960s. The significant rise in unemployment for younger blacks

contrasts with the change in the rate of unemployment for blacks aged 25 years and over. Older blacks did not experience a sharp increase in unemployment until after 1973. Nonetheless, since 1955 their rates have been substantially higher than those of comparable whites.

Blacks, especially young males, are dropping out of the labor force entirely. The severe problems of joblessness for black teenagers and young adults are also seen in the data on changes in the male civilian labor-force participation rates (Table 9). The percentage of blacks who were in the labor force fell from 45.6 in 1960 to 21.1 in December 1983 for those age 16 and 17, from 71.2 to 50.3 for those age 18 and 19, and from 90.4 to 74.0 for those age 20 to 24. Even blacks age 25 to 34 experienced a decline in labor-force participation; however, the drop was not nearly as steep as that recorded by younger blacks (from 96.2 percent to 88.0 percent). Whereas black males began dropping out of the labor force in significant numbers as early as 1975, white males either maintained or increased their rate of participation until 1977, followed by sharp declines in all the age categories, except 24 to 34, from 1977 to December 1983—a period marked by a deep recession.

But even these figures do not reveal the real depth of jobless-

TABLE 9. Male Civilian Labor-Force Participation Rates for Persons 16 and Over by Race and Age for Selected Years

Age	1960	1965	1968	1970	1973	1983*
White males						
16–17	46.0	44.6	47.7	48.9	52.7	39.0
18–19	69.0	65.8	65.8	67.4	72.3	65.4
20–24	87.8	85.3	82.4	83.3	85.8	82.9
25–34	97.7	97.4	97.2	96.7	96.3	94.2
Black males and other males						
16–17	45.6	39.3	37.9	34.8	33.4	21.1
18–19	71.2	66.7	63.3	61.8	61.4	50.3
20–24	90.4	89.8	85.0	83.5	81.8	74.0
25–34	96.2	95.7	95.0	93.7	91.7	88.0

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, *Employment and Training Report of the President* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1984).
*December 1983.

TABLE 10. Employment-Population Ratios of Civilian Black and White Males for Selected Years

Age	1955	1965	1973	1983*
Black males				
16–19	55.7	39.4	33.9	20.9
16–17	41.7	28.8	22.0	10.7
18–19	66.0	53.4	27.9	31.1
20–24	78.6	81.6	71.4	54.1
White males				
16–19	52.0	47.1	54.4	45.5
16–17	42.0	38.0	44.8	33.2
18–19	64.2	58.3	65.1	57.3
20–24	80.4	80.2	80.2	75.3

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Labor, *Monthly Labor Review* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1979), and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1984).
*December 1983.

ness among younger blacks. *Only a minority of out-of-prison black youths are employed.* As shown in Table 10, the ratio of the employed civilian population to the total civilian noninstitutional population among young black males has shown a steep and steady decline since 1955, whereas among white males it has increased slightly for teenagers and virtually not at all for ages 20 to 24 until 1978. However, the years of recession after 1978 took their toll on white workers, as seen in the noticeable increase in joblessness for all the age categories by December 1983. The fact that fewer than 21 percent of all black male teenagers were employed in December 1983 and only 54 percent of all black young adult males (age 20 to 24) reveals a problem of joblessness for young black men that has reached catastrophic proportions.

Finally, the bleak employment picture for young blacks is further demonstrated by the data on work experience (Table 11). *Fewer black youths are obtaining any work experience at all.* Whereas the proportion of white male teenagers and young adults with work experience has changed very little from 1966 to 1977, and the proportion of white female teenagers and young adults with work experiences has increased, the proportion of blacks with work experience has decreased from 67.3 to 47.2 percent for male teenagers, from 90.1 to 76.7 percent for male young adults, from 48.9 to 37.5 percent for female teenagers, and from 67.2 to 63.6 for female young adults.

TABLE 11. Percent of the Population 16 to 24 Years of Age with Work Experience During the Year by Race and Sex, 1966–1977

	White				Black			
	MEN		WOMEN		MEN		WOMEN	
	age 16–19	age 20–24	age 16–19	age 20–24	age 16–19	age 20–24	age 16–19	age 20–24
1966	75.9	93.8	59.8	69.8	67.3	90.1	48.9	67.2
1967	76.0	90.5	61.3	71.2	69.3	88.2	49.8	69.2
1968	77.2	91.5	59.9	73.1	65.2	87.4	51.6	69.2
1969	75.5	90.2	61.3	74.1	67.3	87.2	40.0	69.7
1970	72.7	90.1	60.1	73.9	58.3	80.8	44.6	67.0
1971	70.5	89.6	57.8	72.4	54.7	81.1	39.6	63.2
1972	72.1	91.8	58.8	75.0	50.2	83.5	37.8	63.7
1973	75.1	93.0	64.1	76.2	57.6	85.5	41.8	62.8
1974	75.0	92.7	64.0	77.0	56.0	82.0	41.8	65.1
1975	70.1	90.5	62.0	75.7	47.2	77.9	36.9	61.5
1976	72.4	92.8	63.6	78.5	46.1	79.8	34.1	60.3
1977	73.8	93.2	64.8	79.0	47.2	76.7	37.5	63.6

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, *Monthly Labor Review* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1979).

Thus, the combined indicators of unemployment, labor-force participation, employment-population ratios, and work experience reveal a disturbing picture of black joblessness, especially among younger blacks. If the evidence presented in recent longitudinal research is correct, then joblessness during youth will have a long-term harmful effect on later chances in the labor market.[90]

The changes brought about by the cessation of migration to the central city and the sharp drop in the number of black children under age 13 may increase the likelihood that the economic situation of blacks as a group will improve in the near future. However, the present problems of black joblessness are so overwhelming that it is just as likely that only a major program of economic reform will be sufficient to prevent a significant segment of the urban underclass

from being permanently locked out of the mainstream of the American occupational system.

THE ROLE OF ETHNIC CULTURE

In focusing on different explanations of the social dislocations of the urban underclass, I have yet to say anything about the role of ethnic culture. Even after considering the matter of discrimination, flow of migrants, changes in ethnic demography, structural changes in the economy, and the problem of joblessness which is related to all of these factors, some would still maintain that ethnic differences in culture account in large measure for ethnic variations in certain social problems. But any cultural explanation of group differences in behavior would have to consider, among other things, the often considerable variation within groups on several aspects of behavior. For example, as earlier pointed out, whereas only 7 percent of urban black families with incomes of $25,000 and more in 1978 were headed by women, 85 percent of those with incomes below $4,000 were headed by women. The higher the economic position of black families, the greater the percentage of two-parent households. Moreover, the proportion of black children born out of wedlock is partly a function of the sharp decrease in fertility among married blacks (i.e., husband and wife families), who have on the average a higher economic status in the black community. By treating blacks and other ethnics as monolithic groups, we lose sight of the fact that high-income blacks, Hispanics, and Indians have even *fewer* children than their counterparts in the general population.[91]

But in the face of some puzzling facts concerning rates of welfare and crime in the 1960s, the cultural explanation seems to have some validity to some observers. For example, from the Great Depression to 1960, unemployment accounted in large measure for dependency. Indeed, the correlation between the nonwhite male unemployment and the rate of new AFDC cases was very nearly perfect during this period.[92] As the nonwhite male unemployment rate increased, the rate of new AFDC cases increased; as the former decreased, the latter correspondingly decreased. Commenting on this relationship, Moynihan stated: "The correlation was among the strongest known to social science. It could not be established that the men who lost

their jobs were the ones who left their families, but the mathematical relationship of the two statistical series—unemployment rates and new AFDC cases—was astonishingly close."[93] Suddenly, however, the relationship began to weaken at the beginning of the 1960s, had vanished by 1963, and had completely reversed itself during the remainder of that decade, which saw a steady decline in the rate of nonwhite male unemployment and a steady increase in the number of new AFDC cases.[94]

Some observers quickly seized on these figures to suggest that welfare dependency had become a cultural trait because, they argued, even during periods of an economic upswing welfare rates among minorities were increasing. However, upon closer inspection we see that even though nonwhite male unemployment did drop during the 1960s, the percentage of nonwhite males who dropped out of the labor force increased steadily throughout the 1960s (see Table 8), thereby maintaining the association between economic dislocation and welfare dependency. A similar argument concerning crime was advanced in a recent empirical study that demonstrated that labor-force participation rates, not unemployment rates, explain the increase in crime among youth during the last half of the 1960s.[95]

A well-founded sociological assumption is that different ethnic behavior and outcomes are largely reflections of different opportunities for and external obstacles against advancement, ones determined by different historical and material circumstances, including different times of arrival and patterns of settlement in the United States.[96] Moreover, even if we were able to show that different behavior is related to differences in ethnic group values, mobility, and success, this hardly constitutes an adequate explanation. By revealing cultural differences we reach only the first step in a proper sociological investigation. The analysis of their social and historical basis represents the succeeding and, indeed, more fundamental steps.[97]

In short, cultural values do not *determine* behavior or success. Rather, cultural values grow out of specific circumstances and life changes and reflect one's position in the class structure. Thus, if lower-class blacks have low aspirations or do not plan for the future, it is not ultimately the result of a different cultural norm but

because they are responding to restricted opportunities, a bleak future, and feelings of resignation originating in bitter personal experiences. Accordingly, behavior described as social pathological and associated with lower-class ethnics should not be analyzed as a cultural aberration but as a symptom of class inequality. If impoverished conditions produced exceedingly high rates of crime among first-generation Irish, Italians, and Jews, what would have been the outcome of these groups had they been mired in poverty for five to ten generations, as have been so many black families in the United States?[98]

Responses to recurrent situations to which people have to adapt take the form of behavior patterns, norms, and aspirations. As economic and social opportunities change, new behavioral solutions originate, become patternized, and are later upheld and complemented by norms. If new conditions emerge, both the behavior patterns and the norms eventually undergo change. As Herbert Gans has put it: "Some behavioral norms are more persistent than others, but over the long run, all of the norms and aspirations by which people live are nonpersistent: they rise and fall with changes in situations."[99]

CONCLUSION

To hold, as I do, that changes in social and economic situations will bring about changes in behavior patterns and norms raises the issue of what public policy can deal effectively with the social dislocations that have plagued the urban underclass for the past several decades. Any significant reduction of problems of joblessness and related problems of crime, out-of-wedlock births, single-parent homes, and welfare dependency will call for a far more comprehensive program of economic and social reform than Americans have usually regarded as appropriate or desirable. In short, it will require a radicalism that neither Democratic nor Republican parties have been as yet realistic enough to propose.

A shift away from the convenient focus on "racism" would probably result in a greater appreciation and understanding of the complex factors that account for the recent increases in the rates of

social dislocation among the urban underclass. Although current discrimination undoubtedly contributes to their persistent social problems, in the last 20 years these problems have been more profoundly affected by shifts in the American economy from goods-manufacturing to service-producing industries that have produced incredible joblessness in the inner city and that have exacerbated conditions generated by the historic flow of migrants to the large metropolises; and by changes in the urban minority age structure and consequent population changes in the central city.

For all these reasons, the urban underclass has not significantly benefited from race-specific policy programs such as affirmative action, which have helped in the advancement of trained and educated blacks. Their economic and social plights call for public policies that benefit all the poor, not just the minority poor. These will need to be policies that address the broader problems of generating full employment, of achieving effective welfare reform, and of developing sustained and balanced urban economic growth. Unless such problems are seriously addressed, we should hold little hope for the effectiveness of other policies, including race-specific ones, in significantly reducing social dislocations among the urban underclass.

I am reminded, in this connection, of Bayard Rustin's plea in the early 1960s that blacks ought to recognize the importance of *fundamental* economic reform and the need for a broad-based coalition to achieve it. It is more evident now than at any time in this last half of the twentieth century that blacks and other minorities will need allies to generate a reform program that could improve the conditions of the underclass. And since an effective political coalition will depend in part upon how the issues are defined, it is essential that the political message underscore the need for economic and social reform that benefits all groups in society, not just poor minorities. Politicians and civil rights organizations, as two important examples, ought to shift or expand their definition of racial problems in America and broaden the scope of suggested policy programs to address them. They would, of course, continue to stress the immediate goal of eliminating racial discrimination, but they will also have to recognize that poor minorities are profoundly affected by problems in America that go beyond racial considerations and that the dislocations which

follow have made and, if left alone, will continue to make an underclass an American reality.

NOTES

1. Kenneth B. Clark, *Dark Ghetto: Dilemmas of Social Power* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Lee Rainwater, "Crucible of Identity: The Negro Lower Class Family," *Daedalus* 95 (1966): 176–216; Daniel P. Moynihan, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action* (Washington, D.C.: Office of Policy Planning and Research, U.S. Department of Labor, 1965); and "Employment, Income and the Ordeal of the Negro Family," in *The Negro American*, ed. Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 134–159.
2. Clark, *Dark Ghetto*, p. 27.
3. Rainwater, "Crucible of Identity," p. 10.
4. Clark, *Dark Ghetto*, p. 81.
5. For an excellent discussion of the "Moynihan Report" and the controversy surrounding it, see Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1967).
6. *Ibid.*
7. E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939); Kenneth B. Clark, "Youth in the Ghetto: A Study of the Consequences of Powerlessness and a Blueprint for Change" (1964), Harlem Youth Opportunities (HARYOU) Report; and Bayard Rustin, "From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil Rights Movement," *Commentary* 39 (1965): 25–31.
8. Moynihan, *The Negro Family*, pp. 5–6.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
10. It is interesting to point out that President Lyndon Johnson's widely heralded Howard University commencement speech on human rights, which was partly drafted by Moynihan, drew heavily from the "Moynihan Report" when it was still an in-house document. The speech was uniformly praised by black civil rights leaders.
11. See, for example, Joyce Ladner, ed., *The Death of White Sociology* (New York: Random House, 1973); Robert B. Hill, *The Strength of Black Families* (New York: Emerson Hall, 1972); Nathan Hare, "The Challenge of a Black Scholar," *Black Scholar* 1 (1969): 58–63; Abd-al Hakim Ibn Alkalimat (Gerald McWorter), "The Ideology of Black Social Science," *Black Scholar* 1 (1969): 28–35; and Robert Staples, "The Myth of the Black Matriarchy," *Black Scholar* 2 (1970): 9–16.
12. Orlando Patterson, *Ethnic Chauvinism: The Reactionary Response* (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), p. 155.
13. U.S. Department of Justice, *Uniform Crime Reports for the United States, 1980* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981).

14. Norval Morris and Michael Tonry, "Blacks, Crime Rates and Prisons —A Profound Challenge," *Chicago Tribune*, August 18, 1980, p. 2.
15. U.S. Department of Justice, *Uniform Crime Reports.*
16. Morris and Tonry, "Blacks, Crime Rates and Prisons."
17. My discussion of violent crime in Chicago is indebted to Rick Greenberg, "Murder Victims: Most Blacks, Latinos Now Surpassing Whites," *Chicago Reporter: A Monthly Information Service on Racial Issues in Metropolitan Chicago* 10, no. 1 (January 1981): 1 and 4–7.
18. As pointed out in the *Chicago Reporter*, "In its yearly murder analysis, the Chicago Police Department defines the killer of an individual as someone who has been arrested for the crime or is a prime suspect. Because there are a number of unsolved murders each year, calculations of 'who killed whom' are based only on the number of murders in which the police knew or suspected whom the offender was, not on the total number of homicide victims in any racial or ethnic group." Greenberg, "Murder Victims," p. 7.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr., "Chicago Project Dwellers Live Under Siege," *New York Times*, August 6, 1980, p. A14.
22. Chicago Housing Authority, *Statistical Report, 1980* (Chicago Housing Authority Executive Office, 1981).
23. Sheppard, "Chicago Project Dwellers."
24. *Ibid.*, p. A14.
25. Chicago Housing Authority, *Statistical Report, 1980.*
26. Paul Galloway, "Nine Weeks, Ten Murders," *Chicago Sun-Times*, March 22, 1981, pp. 66–67.
27. Chicago Housing Authority, *Statistical Report, 1980.*
28. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Families Maintained by Female Households, 1970–79," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-23, No. 107 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980).
29. Based on calculations from *ibid.*; U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States, 1978," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No. 120 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979); U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Money Income and Poverty Status of Persons in the United States, 1977," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No. 116 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978); U.S. Bureau of the Census, "The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1970," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-23, No. 38 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971); and U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States, 1980," *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No. 127 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981).

30. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Families Maintained by Female Households, 1970–79."
31. *Ibid.*
32. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Money Income and Poverty Status of Families, 1980."
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Ibid.*
35. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Families Maintained by Female Households, 1970–79."
36. Based on calculations from U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Families Maintained by Female Households, 1970–79."
37. Based on calculations from U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Characteristics of the Population of the Poverty Level, 1978," *Current Population Reports,* Series P-60, No. 124 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978) and U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Families Maintained by Female Households, 1970–79."
38. National Center for Health Statistics, "Final Natality Statistics, 1979," *Monthly Vital Statistics Report,* U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981).
39. *Ibid.*
40. Nancy Fisher Schlute, "Illegitimacy Soars, Begets Legacy of Health, Social Hardships," *Chicago Reporter: A Monthly Information Service on Racial Issues in Metropolitan Chicago* 9, no. 6 (June 1980): 1 and 4–6.
41. U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 1977," *Recipient Characteristics Study,* Social Security Administration Office of Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980).
42. Kristin Moore and Steven B. Cardwell, *Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancy and Childbearing* (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 1976).
43. Reported in Ken Auletta, *The Underclass* (New York: Random House, 1982).
44. Moore and Cardwell, *Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancy.*
45. William Julius Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions,* 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), and "The Black Community in the 1980s: Questions of Race, Class and Public Policy," *Annals of the American Academy of Politics and Social Science* 454 (1981): 26–41.
46. Charles C. Killingsworth, Jr., *Jobs and Income for Negroes* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963).
47. Alfred Blumstein, "On the Racial Disproportionality of United States' Prison Population," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 73, no. 3 (1983): 1259–1281.
48. *Ibid.,* p. 1281.
49. Michael Hindelang, "Race and Involvement in Common Law Personal Crimes," *American Sociological Review* 43, 1 (February 1978): 93–109, and *Criminal Victimization in Eight American Cities: A Descriptive Analysis of Common Theft and Assault* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1976).
50. Blumstein, "Racial Disproportionality," p. 1278.
51. Herbert Gutman, *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750–1925* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1976).
52. *Ibid.,* p. xvii.
53. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Social and Economic Characteristics of the Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Population, 1977 and 1970," *Current Population Reports,* Series P-23, No. 75 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).
54. Stanley Lieberson, *A Piece of the Pie: Black and White Immigrants since 1880* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
55. *Ibid.,* p. 369.
56. *Ibid.,* p. 368.
57. *Ibid.,* p. 381.
58. *Ibid.,* p. 377.
59. *Ibid.,* p. 380.
60. Some social scientists have attempted to explain the deterioration of the position of urban blacks as their numbers increased with the argument that there was a shift in the "quality" of the migrants. But as Lieberson points out, "there is evidence to indicate that southern black migrants to the North in recent years have done relatively well when compared with northern-born blacks in terms of welfare, employment rates, earnings after background factors are taken into account and so on." *Ibid.,* p. 374.
61. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Social and Economic Characteristics."
62. Philip M. Hauser, "The Census of 1980," *Scientific American* 245, no. 5 (1981): 61.
63. As Hauser has noted: "Data from the census indicate that blacks who migrate from nonmetropolitan areas are now going to the metropolitan centers of the South and West rather than to those of the urban North as they had in earlier decades." *Ibid.,* p. 61.
64. John Herbers, "Census Finds Blacks Gaining Majorities in Big Cities," *New York Times,* April 16, 1981, p. 1.
65. For a good discussion of socioeconomic differences among Hispanics, see Joseph P. Fitzpatrick and Lourdes Traviesco Parker, "Hispanic-Americans in the Eastern United States," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 454 (1981): 98–124.
66. Ralph Blumenthal, "Gunmen Firing Wildly Kill Three in Chinatown Bar," *New York Times,* December 24, 1982, pp. 1, 13; Richard Bernstein, "Tension and Gangs Mar the Chinatown Image," *New York Times,* December 24, 1982, p. 13; and Robert Lindsey, "Asian Americans See Growing Bias," *New York Times,* September 10, 1983, pp. 1, 9.
67. Lindsey, "Asian Americans."

to do

Canaan Valley

Gatorade

Baseball

Wrestling

Car racing

NY

to do:

April -

Canaan Valley

May

Gatorade

June

July

In New York City, 'Workfare' Gets Mixed Results

Continued From Page A1

Reagan, the National Governors' Association and Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, who is chairman of a Senate subcommittee drafting new welfare legislation, have all endorsed the idea of turning the system of income maintenance into a job-training and placement program.

75,000 Mothers Are Eligible

New York City's effort centers on about 75,000 mothers who have children 6 years old and older and who are enrolled in the nation's largest welfare program, Aid to Families With Dependent Children. The women represent about 30 percent of all mothers on public assistance in the city.

The state, which oversees the social service programs operated by New York's cities and counties, had long required that some welfare recipients work with state job counselors to be placed in full-time jobs and had encouraged voluntary job training and education.

But until 1985 there were no requirements for women with young children who either lacked skills or who could not find child care.

Now, the mothers are required to get a job, enter a job-training or remedial education program or work part time for a government agency. The government pays for the courses.

"The ultimate goal is to instill in people the notion that work is better than welfare and that they have the responsibility to do everything they can to try to push themselves toward self-sufficiency," said Herb Rosenzweig, an executive deputy administrator of the Human Resources Administration, which runs the city's social-service programs.

Mr. Rosenzweig said the new effort has not cost the city any additional money and that employees at the agency were simply shifted to run the program.

Since the effort began, about 12,500 mothers have enrolled in job training or educational programs and 5,000 more have been assigned to work four hours a day, primarily in municipal agencies, according to city officials. Another 5,000 mothers are earning money by working part time for private companies, and about 4,000 are working with state job counselors to find full-time work.

Except for those who are working on their own with private companies, the women do not receive additional money for taking courses or working with government agencies.

Several Problems With Program

City officials say they have no figures on the number of mothers who terview are given three weeks to enroll in a training or education program. The mothers, many of whom have not been in the workforce for years, often have to find such programs themselves, without much help from city counselors; if they do not, they must accept work assignments in government agencies.

¶Because thousands of people must be dealt with, individual interviews tend to be brief, perfunctory and largely uninformative, according to the advocates.

¶There often is no space in government financed day-care centers, and private child care usually costs far more than the allowances granted by the city, according to members of nonprofit agencies that work with the poor.

¶At least 25 percent of those told to report for work assignments fail to appear.

City officials and lawyers who represent welfare recipients say that up to a third of those called for work assignments end up being "sanctioned" — the administrative process by which the city seeks to remove clients from the welfare roles, at least temporarily.

City officials contend that the vast majority of those who are sanctioned had failed to appear for work assignments. The lawyers say the city often tries to remove people who challenge their employment assessments or work assignments.

Vital Resources Are Still Lacking

A large portion of people who are sanctioned by the city are restored to the welfare roles when they appeal their cases, said Marc Cohan, director of the government benefits unit of the South Brooklyn Legal Services.

The critics also say that the program is marked by confusion. They say that neither the welfare mothers nor the city and state workers who interview them are given adequate information to help them locate appropriate job training or basic education classes. As an example, they cite the fact that the city only recently finished compiling a manual listing details on 350 public training and educational programs.

"They are attempting to do a massive thing without the resources to do it," said Eve Brooks, director of Statewide Youth Advocacy, a nonprofit research and policy group based in Rochester that has drafted a study on New York City's program.

"Unless there is a major investment in a quality job-training system and child care and other supporting services — and unless in reality there are jobs available — the hope raised by this program is pretty illusory," Ms. Brooks said.

But Mr. Rosenzweig, who is in charge of all of the city's income-maintenance programs, said it was not realistic to expect that large numbers of mothers on public assistance —

The New York Times

Catherine Zall, deputy commissioner of Human Resources Administration in charge of employment services, said the priority now was to refine the "workfare" program in several key ways.

partment of General Services.

"I like this program," she said as she filled out forms at the department's main office in the Municipal Building. "It gives me an opportunity to be here, picking up skills, and I can still be home in time to see my children at 3 o'clock. I like the feeling of working. You get a better sense of respect, of self-worth."

Not far away, about 20 women were working at computers, completing the last few weeks of an 11-week course in word-processing. The program, created in 1983, is filled almost exclusively with welfare mothers, most of whom already had good typing skills. Sixty percent of the program's graduates obtain full-time jobs, which pay an average of $14,000 to $15,000 a year, according to city officials.

But the successes are still the exceptions, according to those who are monitoring the employment opportunity program. Some critics question how many of the work assignments in government agencies involve truly productive work that could lead to full-time jobs.

Recipients Fault Job Training

One afternoon last week, three welfare mothers with teen-age children

"And the next hardest thing is finding someplace to hide," said another. "There's nothing to do."

The women said they had received no training and did not see how their work assignments would lead to full-time jobs. They also said they must leave home so early in the morning that they cannot make sure their children get to school each day.

"To me, this system is set up to keep you down, not to help you get on your feet," one mother said.

Those who are monitoring the city's new program say that its growing pains illustrate the difficulties in altering a decades-old strategy toward welfare.

"I'm philosophically in favor of the theories behind it, but there are serious questions on whether they have the capacity to serve the tremendous number of people who need to be served under this program," said Fred Sebesta, a social worker who conducted the study by Statewide Youth Services.

City Councilwoman Ruth W. Messinger, a Manhattan Democrat and a former social worker, said, "The danger of launching a full-scale program without any of the necessary supports is that women will be convinced that they cannot become economically independent and will suffer serious economic sanctions in the process."

Many of the top officials who oversee the new city program assumed their positions in recent months, and they acknowledge that the effort could be improved. But they also say many expectations may have been unrealistic.

"Given the size of the population we have here — and given my own experiences in seeing some of the barriers that people face here — I'm positive that we can do more," said Mr. Grinker.

Catherine Zall, who became the deputy commissioner in charge of the agency's employment services six months ago, said the priority now is to refine the effort in several key ways. Ms. Zall prepared the manual of training and educational programs so both welfare recipients and city workers know where to find appropriate courses.

She is also about to begin an experiment in one of the seven centers scattered throughout the city where welfare mothers come for their first interview. At a center in downtown Brooklyn, counselors will carefully lay out the options to the recipients and will lead them through the process, helping them to make phone calls and to set up interviews with job-training centers or basic education classes.

The city also intends to begin evaluating job-training programs, so it can refer welfare mothers to the most successful ones. Officials will also try to devise ways to move people from work assignments in government agencies into more advanced job training courses, according to Ms. Zall.

"I think that work and the opportunity to work is the basic right to a

placed in full-time jobs and had encouraged voluntary job training and education.

But until 1985 there were no requirements for women with young children who either lacked skills or who could not find child care.

Now, the mothers are required to get a job, enter a job-training or remedial education program or work part time for a government agency. The government pays for the courses.

"The ultimate goal is to instill in people the notion that work is better than welfare and that they have the responsibility to do everything they can to try to push themselves toward self-sufficiency," said Herb Rosenzweig, an executive deputy administrator of the Human Resources Administration, which runs the city's social-service programs.

Mr. Rosenzweig said the new effort has not cost the city any additional money and that employees at the agency were simply shifted to run the program.

Since the effort began, about 12,500 mothers have enrolled in job training or educational programs and 5,000 more have been assigned to work four hours a day, primarily in municipal agencies, according to city officials. Another 5,000 mothers are earning money by working part time for private companies, and about 4,000 are working with state job counselors to find full-time work.

Except for those who are working on their own with private companies, the women do not receive additional money for taking courses or working with government agencies.

Several Problems With Program

City officials say they have no figures on the number of mothers who have found full-time jobs as a result of the new effort. They are setting up studies that will eventually tell them exactly what happens to the mothers brought into the program.

Both advocates for welfare recipients and city and state officials say the effort, which is called the employment opportunity program, has a number of problems. Among them are these:

¶Fewer than 10 percent of those who have been assigned to work in city agencies have eventually found full-time jobs, according to estimates by municipal officials.

¶There is a backlog of about 25,000 mothers awaiting assignments to city agencies; officials hope to cut the backlog in half by the end of the year.

¶Mothers called in for their initial interview often find that the city seeks to remove clients from the welfare roles, at least temporarily.

City officials contend that the vast majority of those who are sanctioned had failed to appear for work assignments. The lawyers say the city often tries to remove people who challenge their employment assessments or work assignments.

Vital Resources Are Still Lacking

A large portion of people who are sanctioned by the city are restored to the welfare roles when they appeal their cases, said Marc Cohan, director of the government benefits unit of the South Brooklyn Legal Services.

The critics also say that the program is marked by confusion. They say that neither the welfare mothers nor the city and state workers who interview them are given adequate information to help them locate appropriate job training or basic education classes. As an example, they cite the fact that the city only recently finished compiling a manual listing details on 350 public training and educational programs.

"They are attempting to do a massive thing without the resources to do it," said Eve Brooks, director of Statewide Youth Advocacy, a nonprofit research and policy group based in Rochester that has drafted a study on New York City's program.

"Unless there is a major investment in a quality job-training system and child care and other supporting services — and unless in reality there are jobs available — the hope raised by this program is pretty illusory," Ms. Brooks said.

But Mr. Rosenzweig, who is in charge of all of the city's income-maintenance programs, said it was not realistic to expect that large numbers of mothers on public assistance — fewer than one-third of whom read at the seventh-grade level — could find jobs quickly.

"I personally see this as a very long-term issue," Mr. Rosenzweig said. "It is not a program that can be assessed with new jobs and moving people off welfare. This is not a group that will quickly move into the job market."

In addition, Mr. Grinker said, the outlook is complicated by the fact that many more companies in the suburbs have entry-level job openings than those in the city.

The program has had its success stories, of course.

Pauline Lewis, a 29-year-old Bronx woman with four children, has been doing four hours of clerical work a day for about two months at the city's Department of General Services.

The New York Times

Catherine Zall, deputy commissioner of Human Resources Administration in charge of employment services, said the priority now was to refine the "workfare" program in several key ways.

"I like this program," she said as she filled out forms at the department's main office in the Municipal Building. "It gives me an opportunity to be here, picking up skills, and I can still be home in time to see my children at 3 o'clock. I like the feeling of working. You get a better sense of respect, of self-worth."

Not far away, about 20 women were working at computers, completing the last few weeks of an 11-week course in word-processing. The program, created in 1983, is filled almost exclusively with welfare mothers, most of whom already had good typing skills. Sixty percent of the program's graduates obtain full-time jobs, which pay an average of $14,000 to $15,000 a year, according to city officials.

But the successes are still the exceptions, according to those who are monitoring the employment opportunity program. Some critics question how many of the work assignments in government agencies involve truly productive work that could lead to full-time jobs.

Recipients Fault Job Training

One afternoon last week, three welfare mothers with teen-age children discussed their assignments at a city welfare office on 161st Street in the South Bronx. The women said they were each assigned, more than a year ago, to work in a custodial crew, making sure that soap dispensers are filled and that toilet paper is provided in bathrooms on eight floors of the building.

They must report to work at 7 A.M., the women said, and they generally are allowed to leave by mid-afternoon. Their work seldom takes as much as an hour to finish, according to the women, who asked not to be identified. Full-time custodial crews clean the building at night, they said, leaving them with almost nothing to do.

"The hardest thing we do is get here," said one mother.

former social worker, said, "The danger of launching a full-scale program without any of the necessary supports is that women will be convinced that they cannot become economically independent and will suffer serious economic sanctions in the process."

Many of the top officials who oversee the new city program assumed their positions in recent months, and they acknowledge that the effort could be improved. But they also say many expectations may have been unrealistic.

"Given the size of the population we have here — and given my own experiences in seeing some of the barriers that people face here — I'm positive that we can do more," said Mr. Grinker.

Catherine Zall, who became the deputy commissioner in charge of the agency's employment services six months ago, said the priority now is to refine the effort in several key ways. Ms. Zall prepared the manual of training and educational programs so both welfare recipients and city workers know where to find appropriate courses.

She is also about to begin an experiment in one of the seven centers scattered throughout the city where welfare mothers come for their first interview. At a center in downtown Brooklyn, counselors will carefully lay out the options to the recipients and will lead them through the process, helping them to make phone calls and to set up interviews with job-training centers or basic education classes.

The city also intends to begin evaluating job-training programs, so it can refer welfare mothers to the most successful ones. Officials will also try to devise ways to move people from work assignments in government agencies into more advanced job training courses, according to Ms. Zall.

"I think that work and the opportunity to work is the basic right to a dignified life in this society," Mr. Grinker said. "We have to find ways to maximize those opportunities for people who have been dependent on welfare."

LOTTERY NUMBERS

March 22, 1987

New York Numbers — 282

New York Win 4 — 7978

March 21, 1987

New York Lotto 48 — 6, 9, 11, 15, 38, 46; supplementary, 2

New York Win-10 — 7, 8, 25, 30, 33, 34, 35, 38, 40, 43, 47, 50, 54, 55, 60, 61, 64, 70, 79, 80

After Suicides, a Town Seeks Answers and Solace

Continued From Page B1

but friends rallied around him and said they were sure they "talked him out of that suicide stuff."

No one said Mr. Olton was a ringleader, only that his problems were the deepest and most obvious. But everyone said the clique the four friends belonged to was extremely close.

Close-Knit Group

because of memories of Joe," said Nanette, a former girlfriend of Mr. Olton who did not want her last name used. "When I heard they were hanging out, I knew it wasn't going to be good for Tom or for her."

Mr. Olton was in the rehabilitation program the day of the fall and was not allowed to leave for the funeral. Friends said he was distraught by that.

Nightmares about the fall haunted Mr. Rizzo. He was there the late summer day his friends headed to the Palli-

out of school, but according to Tina, she was studying for her graduate equivalency diploma and planning on going to college. Friends and clergymen said that Cheryl and Lisa did not get along with their stepfather but that the relationship seemed to have steadied.

Return to the Vortex: Drinking Again

That winter, the two Thomases

police station and drove him to his parents' house. Mr. Olton spent the night at Mr. Jennings's apartment.

Saturday morning, Mr. Jennings called Mr. Rosado in Monroe, told him what had happened and said he needed help talking to Mr. Olton. The circle of friends tightened to offer support. By Sunday, although Mr. Olton had a fight with his mother and was staying at the Rizzo house to cool off, things seemed to have calmed down.

"We didn't know he had tried sui-