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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 5/28/2009

File Folder IT067 023182

FOIA

M08-126/8

Box Number

KERSTEN

11

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
72110	MEMO	CHRIS SHOEMAKER TO RICHARD ALLEN THROUGH ROBERT SCHWEITZER RE LETTER (ANNOTATED)	1	3/31/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

RECEIVED 26 JAN 81 15

TO ALLEN

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 23 JAN 81

006777

PY: 1110

IT 067

FG 006-01

KEYWORDS: NATO

GREAT BRITAIN

X ABRUZZESE, PETER

FG 006-12

AA

X PATRICK, TORY W

SUBJECT: NATO PARLIAMENTARIANS VISIT JAN 28

ACTION: ALLEN APPROVED RECOM

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

COLSON

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 23, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK ALLEN
 FROM: JIM RENTSCHLER
 SUBJECT: NATO Parliamentarians

Peter Abruzzese, HFAC staffer, called me concerning the visit here next week of a ten-member NATO parliamentarian group headed by UK Tory Patrick Wall (said by Abruzzese to be an admirer of yours). The group would like to come in for an off-the-record exchange with somebody on the NSC staff, coupled with a brief "drop-by" from you. They would like to schedule this for the afternoon of Wednesday, January 28.

If your schedule permits, I think it would be useful for you to spend a few minutes with Wall & Co. and provide them with some early orientation anent the new Administration's approach to Alliance relationships. I'd be happy to host the group and natter with them until you could make an appearance.

RECOMMENDATION

That you meet briefly (10-15 minutes) with the Wall group on Wednesday, January 28.

Approve Preferred time and place EoB JRCDisapprove

Thanks
 JRC

RECEIVED 07 APR 81 14

TO ALLEN

X
FROM GARRICK, R

DOCDATE 30 MAR 81

021622

1140

MG

IT067

KEYWORDS: EMERGENCY PREPARED"S NATO

X LUNS, JOSEPH
X GIUFFRIDA
X GUUFFRIDA,
X MCCONNEL, J

FG331

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATION NOT TO INSERT FEMA IN SECRETARY GENERAL SCHEDULE
DURING VISIT TO US

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

SCHWEITZER

NANCE

DEGRAFFENREID

BLAIR

RENTSCHLER

Pipez

COMMENTS

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DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE WH (C)

RECEIVED

81 APR 1 A10:58

JANET COLSON

jc 1407

BUD NANCE

jc 4/1800

DICK ALLEN

*June -
Can we toss?*

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

*jc
6/18/81*

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

MAR 31 1981

NSA-1040

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 30, 1981

TO: Richard V. Allen

FROM: Robert M. Garrick *mg*

The attached is merely for your information; however, being aware of your numerous sources, I can only presume that you have received this information via other informants.

I am tied into this loop because of my assignment as coordinator of disasters between FEMA and the Counsellor's office.

NE 23
1470



FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

Washington D.C. 20472

March 25, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL GIUFFRIDA

FROM: John W. McConnell *John*
Acting Associate Director for Plans and Preparedness

SUBJECT: Foreign Visit

Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Joseph Luns, will visit the United States to meet with President Reagan, Secretary Weinberger and Secretary Haig, 15-16 April 1981. As it appears unlikely that your appointment will be confirmed by April 15, I recommend that we not attempt to insert FEMA into the Secretary General's schedule. Arrangements are being made for you to meet with him during your visit to Brussels this June.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

VIA LDX

C.F.

March 23, 1981

023175
ws 3400-1130
IT067
FEO11
PR007
FEO06-12

MEMORANDUM FOR:

L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: NATO Secretary General Luns' Proposed Meeting
with the President Joseph

This is to confirm that time has been set aside on the President's schedule for an office meeting with NATO Secretary General Luns on April 16 at 11:00 a.m.

Charles P. Tyson
Charles P. Tyson *pa*

cc: James Rentschler

NSC #8100782

DLI

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

March 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
 THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON
 FROM: DENNIS BLAIR *DB*
 SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for Secretary General Luns

Attached is a self-explanatory schedule proposal for Secretary General Luns' up-coming visit. *(c)*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the schedule proposal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

OB/E

CONFIDENTIAL

Review on February 19, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
 White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987
 By *CH* NARA, Date *5/20/89*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

DATE:

FROM: Richard V. Allen

VIA: Michael Deaver

MEETING: NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns (U)

DATE: April 10 to 16, 1981 (C)

PURPOSE: To meet with you to discuss U.S. policy towards NATO, the state of the Atlantic Alliance and problems ahead. (C)

FORMAT: -- Oval Office
-- The Vice President, Secretary Haig, Dick Allen
-- 15 minutes (U)

CABINET PARTICIPATION: The Vice President, Secretary Haig (U)

SPEECH MATERIAL: Short briefing paper/talking points prepared by NSC. (U)

PRESS COVERAGE: -- Meeting will be announced.
-- Pool Coverage (U)

STAFF: Dick Allen (U)

RECOMMENDED: State (U)

NOT RECOMMENDED: None. (U)

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None. (U)

BACKGROUND: Secretary General Luns has offered to come to Washington to meet the new Administration. Secretary Haig has offered to meet him, and told him "I know the President will want to see you if at all possible." Secretary General Luns is a good friend of the United States, has met with the President on past visits and a meeting with him is an excellent sign of our support of the Alliance. The meetings with West European leaders have, so far, been on a bilateral basis. A meeting with Secretary General Luns would be the first meeting with a NATO leader not tied to a specific country. (C)

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Time _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review Feb. 19, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 26, 1987

By _____ NARA, Date 5/12/2004

086

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By CS NARA, Date 5/28/09

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DE RUEHC #1087 0590914
O 272223Z FEB 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9889

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 051087

EXDIS
F.O. 11652: GDS 2/19/87
TAGS: NATO, OVIP (LUNS, JOSIPH M.A.H.)
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO LUNS
REF: USNATO 442

1. (CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY HAIG TO SYG LUNS:

BEGIN TEXT: DEAR JOSEPH,

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CALL TODAY AND YOUR LETTER OF JANUARY 27. LET ME SAY HOW MUCH I APPRECIATE YOUR EFFORTS IN ENSURING TIMELY AND PRODUCTIVE ALLIANCE CONSULTATION ON THE URGENT PROBLEMS FACING US. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS WITH YOU PERSONALLY. YOUR INTEREST IN COMING TO WASHINGTON IS INDEED WELCOME, AND WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE APRIL DATES YOU IDENTIFIED. I KNOW THE PRESIDENT WILL WANT TO SEE YOU IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. I WILL ADVISE YOU AS SOON AS WE HAVE A FIRM DATE. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU SOON.

SINCERELY, ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR. END TEXT

HAIG
BT

*****CHSR COMMENT*****

FOE:DEPOL

PSN:020937 PAGE 01 OF 01 TCR:059/13:24Z DTG:272223Z FEB 81

*****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

8105301

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Proposed Visit of NATO Secretary General
Luns

In January Joseph Luns expressed his interest in making an early trip to Washington for meetings with Secretary Haig and other members of the new Administration. Luns offered to come during the March 2-4 or April 10-16 periods. On previous trips to Washington Luns has seen the President; he will wish to do so again. Before replying to Luns, we want to ascertain whether the President will be able to meet with him. A request for an appointment with the President was included in our January 28 memorandum to the President concerning priority visitors.

A Luns visit will provide an excellent opportunity to acquaint him with Administration attitudes toward the Alliance, to review the expanding agenda for Alliance consultations, and to discuss potential areas of difficulty which lie ahead. Luns is good friend of the United States, disposed to be helpful, and a meeting with the President will be an important and visible affirmation of the President's support for the Alliance. Luns will of course pass on to the Allies in Brussels the messages he receives here.

Luns recently reaffirmed his interest in meeting with Secretary Haig. We would like to provide a positive response, agreeing to a Luns visit sometime during the April 13 - 16 period. Please let us know if the President will be able to meet with Luns at that time.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
GDS 2/19/87

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By NARA, Date 5/22/07

CE 14/0

AF 23 11:17

WASHFAX RECEIPT
THE WHITE HOUSE

C

182 NSC/S

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(B)

APR 23 11 22

MESSAGE NO. 114 CLASSIFICATION _____ NO. PAGES 7
 FROM Charles Tyson (Name) _____ (Extension) _____ (Room Number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION

TO (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Dept/Room No.	Extensica
<u>State</u>	<u>Secretariat</u>		
	<u>S/S</u>		
	<u>S/S-S</u>		
	<u>SWO-info.</u>		

REMARKS: _____

Urgent

RECEIVED 27 FEB 81 17

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 27 FEB 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

Des 5/20/09

KEYWORDS: NATO

AP

LUNS, JOSEPH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED VISIT OF NATO SECRETARY LUNS & APPT REQUEST W/ PRES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: 03 FEB 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

BLAIR

RENTSCHLER ✓

SCHWEITZER ✓

PIPES ✓

TYSON ✓

COMMENTS

REF# 8105301

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(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
	<i>C 3/23</i>	<i>CTsgd memo to Bremer</i>		<i>CT, DB, RE</i>

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ed via LDX by Tyson's office

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FILE

W# (C)

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81 APR 9 P. 6: 20

(check date) →

JANET COLSON

gr

For Staffing
4/10/91

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

782
add on

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

DATE: 12/9/81

TO: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: GREGORY *JB* NEWELL
SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY.

PLEASE IMPLEMENT THE FOLLOWING AND SUBMIT BRIEFING PAPER AND REMARKS TO RICHARD DARMAN BY 3:00 P.M. OF THE PRECEDING DAY.

MEETING: with NATO Secretary-General Luns

DATE: April 16

TIME: 11:00 am

DURATION: 30 mins

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED:

MEDIA COVERAGE: Coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

- | | |
|---------------|-------------------------------|
| cc: J. Brady | M. Friedersdorf |
| M. Brandon | C. Fuller |
| J. Canzeri | D. Gergen |
| R. Darman | C. Gerrard |
| M. Deaver | K. Khachigian |
| E. Dole | P. McCoy |
| H. Donaldson | L. Speakes |
| M. Evans | S. Studdert |
| D. Fischer | R. Williamson |
| J. Fitzgerald | WHCA Audio/Visual, Operations |

RECEIVED 27 FEB 81 17

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 27 FEB 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CAJ 5/20/09

KEYWORDS: NATO

AP

LUNS, JOSEPH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED VISIT OF NATO SECRETARY LUNS & APPT REQUEST W/ PRES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 03 FEB 81 STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

BLAIR

RENTSCHLER

SCHWEITZER

PIPES

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8105301

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(M / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

24/12/10 Red Powell Memo CT, RP, DB

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 6, 1981

C.F.

023182

3500

ws ITC67

NDOR


20167

F6006-12

Dear Mr. Gouriet:

Thank you for your letter of March 16 and the enclosed paper on micro-nuclears in NATO. We and our Allies are in the process of considering the various options for improving our conventional and strategic defensive capabilities in Europe, and the concepts contained in your paper will be most helpful in that effort. We can and must proceed with a vigorous and imaginative multilateral effort to redress the force imbalances in Europe which have developed over the past several years. This remains one of the highest priorities of this Administration.

Sincerely,



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Mr. John^{*} Gouriet
*Campaign against Soviet Oppression
34 Parkview Court
Fulham High Street
London SW 6, U.K.

NSC #8101607

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Campaign
against  **Soviet**
Oppression

MAR 23 1981

1607

Staff

34 Parkview Court, Fulham High Street, London SW6 Tel. 01-731 4387

March 16, 1981

write letter, pl


Dear Richard Allen,

THE CASE FOR MICRO-NUCLEARS IN NATO

I have pleasure in enclosing a paper which I have just written for consideration by President Reagan and Mrs Thatcher. She had an introductory note on this concept when she visited Washington recently.

I hope both the President and General Haig will find an opportunity read this paper. I am convinced, as a former tank soldier, that this represents perhaps the only effective way in which the West can redress the enormous imbalance in conventional forces ranged against NATO, and thus once again provide a credible deterrent. I hope you can show them it.

With all good wishes,
Yours sincerely,


JOHN GOURIET

PS. I am delighted to hear that serious consideration is atlast being given to tangible support for the Afghan resistance. It can't come too soon!

Mr. Richard Allen,
Potomac International Corporation,
905 16 Street NW,
Washington DC 20006.

UK Committee:
Vladimir Bukovsky
John Gourlet
Dr Stephen Haseler
Nigel Linacre
(Chairman, East European
Solidarity Youth)
Rastko Marcetic
(Chairman European
Liaison Group)
Secretary: George Miller

'Peace only comes from strength'

A CHANGE OF STRATEGY AND TACTICS - THE CASE FOR MICRO-NUCLEAR

DEFENCE IN NATO

Throughout history weapons, strategy and tactics have changed, evolved either in response to innovations introduced by the other side, in defence against an aggressor, or to gain the advantage over an opponent. Einstein's Third Law has constantly been invoked and extended.

Thus it was that knights in armour became obsolete in the face of pikemen who effectively spiked their horses' bellies. Cavalry were armed with lances to winkle out foot soldiers lurking in ditches. Infantry were forced to disperse from their dense Napoleonic columns by bursting artillery shells, and the horse finally gave way to the tank and the machinegun in the latter part of World War I. By the onset of World War II, mechanised flying columns and formations of tanks, infantry and guns were able to race through Poland and Western Europe in an unstoppable 'blitzkrieg', very different from the almost static grind of trench warfare only twenty-five years earlier, when every meter of ground gained had been measured in thousands of lives lost.

However in the forty years that have elapsed since Rommel's panzer columns cut through the linear defences of the Maginot Line and pushed the British back into the sea at Dunkirk, the world's military tacticians and strategists have been obsessed with variations of the same tune. Maybe this is because the Allies were able then to come back from the very brink of defeat at the hands of Hitler. And assisted by the prodigious efforts of British and American industry in support of those who fought and held the Axis, whether in the air over Britain, in the Western Desert, or in Asian jungles, an earlier totalitarian scourge was countered and finally defeated by employing similar but often superior equipment and tactics.

We learnt that in a fluid battle, the only way to defeat composite all-arms battle groups was to identify and absorb the main thrust of the enemy attack, falling back before it so as to guide the enemy into a pre-determined 'killing zone'. Rigid defensive lines were too brittle, too easily pierced and had become obsolete to the concept of 'mobile defence' in which a battalion battle group could expect to be given responsibility for an area perhaps no more than 800 meters wide but some 50 kilometers deep, as part of the brigade or divisional tactical plan.

Ranged against us in every 'telephone' battle, TEWT (tactical exercise without troops), radio communications exercise or full scale manoeuvre is the Soviet Union and its satellite dependents of Eastern Europe, usually dubbed 'Redland' for exercise purposes. It is assumed that in reality 'Redland' would adopt similar tactics to those employed by Rommel, and it is openly acknowledged at the highest Western levels that should the Soviets decide to stage a 'blitzkrieg' against Western Europe they could expect to reach the Channel ports within a week. NATO as at present equipped could not delay a conventional Soviet advance for long enough to deploy limited existing reinforcements of men and materiel, except in the unlikely event of several weeks warning, let alone commence a Beaverbrook programme.

For there are three important differences between the situation obtaining from 1939 to 1945 and today. At no time did the Axis powers enjoy the same numerical superiority that the Soviets have now attained over the West. Only in the final stage of the war in the Far East was nuclear power employed, to achieve a 'coup de grace' against an enemy already largely defeated. The intervening years have witnessed a nuclear arms race which started with a considerable US advantage, rapidly reached parity due in no small part to technological exchange and the much abused maxim 'international trade knows no boundaries', and today find the Soviets comfortably ahead in almost every sphere of military development, because they have chosen to spend some 18% of their GNP each year on

further expansion of their nuclear and conventional arsenals.

The third difference is that the 'enemy', potential though he may still be in shooting terms, is real enough in his ideological obsession to impose communo-socialism on the whole world. He continues regardless of communism's ineluctable failure in his own empire, garnered over the last sixty years from fourteen independent nations on his borders, now nearly fifteen with Afghanistan, plus many others influenced by and suffering from the effects of communism worldwide - whether they are as large as China or as small as El Salvador. To the communist ideologue, war, even thermo-nuclear war, is the pursuit of politics by other means, and he is convinced that he will not only survive but win such a war.

It is therefore less a question of 'if' but 'when' and 'where' the Soviets will seek to extend their influence. Events since 1945 have shown that they will exploit every opportunity, even to 'stealing apples from the United States' back garden' - the Caribbean. If they can achieve their ultimate objective of world domination without a nuclear shot being fired, they will do so. However to achieve a 'checkmate' situation the Soviets require first to seal off Arab oil supplies and South African minerals, both vital to the West. By imposing sufficient threat to NATO so as to concentrate the minds and the military resources of the West on defending Western Europe, they can take advantage of vulnerable oil and mineral supplies.

Nevertheless in building vast conventional 'blitzkrieg' forces, the Soviets have committed themselves to an identifiable and limited type of action. These forces are still formidable, and a further 3000 tanks rolled off the production lines in 1980 to join the 40,000 plus, already evenly deployed, allegedly to counter either a Chinese or NATO 'aggression'. They are able to concentrate ten tanks to every one of the West's in any sector of NATO and still maintain parity everywhere else, thus attaining almost certain conventional supremacy on any chosen axis. Ofcourse, if their aim is to over-run Europe, they will require mobile forces, unless they are prepared to occupy a nuclear wasteland - contaminated by residual radiation and persistent chemical and biological agents, all of which they possess in large quantities.

Conversely NATO does not require great numbers of conventional battle groups, tanks, guns and men to defend Western Europe from a tank dominated 'blitzkrieg' provided the West is prepared to deploy micro-nuclear weapons. Neither would the Soviets if their intentions were really defensive, for NATO does not pose a realistic threat at present, and would pose still less of a threat to Russia if its limited aggressive tank capability was withdrawn behind a micro-nuclear defensive belt. It is therefore my contention that the Soviet tank armies could be rendered ineffective at comparatively low cost by micro-nuclears and handheld missiles - the pikemen of this generation.

Both sides have developed an awesome array of strategic inter-continental missiles, many with multi-warheads to evade SALT restrictions, as well as theatre tactical weapons. The United States at present has some 6000 of the latter deployed in Western Europe, having withdrawn about 1000, it is understood, last year. Each of these so-called 'tactical' weapons carries atleast one 4KT to 50KT warhead. These compare with the 20KT 'nominal yield' of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, which each laid waste the entire city and killed upwards of 100,000 people within a radius of 2.5 miles. The mobile Soviet SS20s carry up to 1 megaton warheads which would totally destroy areas within a radius of 8 miles, and are designed for theater use.

The West has falsely assumed that the philosophy of MAD - 'mutually assured destruction' will ensure that a nuclear holocaust will never happen because it would cause unacceptable damage and casualties to both sides. However the Soviets, who have never accepted MAD, have blown the strategic nuclear umbrella inside out. They have not only built more warheads than the United States, while keeping to the letter, but certainly not the spirit of SALT I, but they have designed weapons that will destroy

the hardened silos containing the US deterrent. They have also developed an extensive anti-missile capability.

The net result is that the United States would have to launch a pre-emptive first nuclear strike, unlikely in any circumstances other than an equally improbable direct conventional attack on the US itself, or an ultimatum, in order to get their ICBMs airborne. They would know however that the majority of their missiles would be destroyed before reaching their targets, whereas the Soviet first strike ICBMs would still be intact in their hardened silos or on mobile launchers. The Soviets have thus been able to create a nuclear advantage out of all proportion to the numbers of strategic weapons involved. It is systems that count in the nuclear game, not pieces on the board. They have also made significant advances in the fields of laser beam and fast particle technology to destroy satellites, and in the development of low yield 'enhanced radiation'/'reduced blast' weapons - the 'neutron bomb' on the battlefield.

In short the West is particularly vulnerable at the present time to ultimatum and submission to overwhelming superiority, and will remain so until approximately 1986. By then we can hope to have restored the existing imbalance to a point where once again we have a credible deterrent, provided at least present expenditure plans are adhered to. However it is my contention that we could obtain better value for money within current budgets by developing the concept of a micro-nuclear belt across NATO.

If we stick to our present strategy of mobile conventional warfare to contain and canalise enemy thrusts, we shall have to greatly increase the number of tanks and anti-tank weapons and trained crews in our battle groups. Also resurrected are plans to produce the B1 bomber, the 'neutron bomb' and greater numbers of cruise missiles in addition to Trident, the very expensive seaborne successor to Polaris. To achieve even a worthwhile proportion of these requirements in the probable time-frame indicated will cost a great deal more than the 3% net increase in defence expenditure in real terms agreed by the British government. In any event we need that deterrent today, not just in the mid- to late 1980s, when it could be too late.

The gravamen of my submission is therefore first that it may well not be possible to restore a credible deterrent in the time available, with the equipment required to support present tactical and strategic doctrine, should the Soviets decide to take advantage of 'their window of opportunity.' This is at present wide open, and will remain so until the West accumulates the weapons and the will to close it. Second the West is in a poor position to pay even for essential improvements in present and foreseeable economic circumstances. Indeed the Soviets having virtually bankrupted themselves on arms development, and but for Western credits, food etc, would now be bankrupt, may be hoping that the West will follow suit in a vain attempt to catch up. We would then be even more vulnerable to overthrow - perhaps from internal fomentation.

Nevertheless the situation inside the Soviet 'Empire' is increasingly volatile and unpredictable, as events in Poland have shown. A deepening crisis at home could persuade the Soviets to try for their final objective while they think they can win with relative impunity. The pressure both at home and abroad where the Reagan/Thatcher stance is evidence of a new tougher attitude in the West, is mounting. And if they don't move soon, i.e. within four or five years at the most, their own system may have crumbled beyond the point of further expansion or even survival.

Soviet hostility to the 'neutron bomb' is an indication of its effectiveness, particularly against tanks, and is therefore a recommendation for its urgent deployment. However I do not believe that the 'neutron bomb' or enhanced radiation weapon is sufficient on its own. Its radius of lethality (approximately 1400 metres for a 0.1 KT warhead airbursting at 3000 feet) is too great for use in the proximity of our own forward troops. Second, although radiation sickness disables within minutes those within 400-600 metres of the explosion, it does not kill

immediately, nor does it destroy tanks, which can be manned with fresh crews. There is therefore the probability of Soviet attacks being pressed home with even greater determination if the crews realise that they have nothing to lose.

Therefore in addition to the 'neutron' ER weapon I submit that urgent fresh consideration should now be given to the deployment of micro-nuclear weapons of 0.1 KT down to 0.05 KT with enhanced blast and heat properties. These have a lethal radius of up to 800 metres against tanks from an airburst. They can be fired from existing weapons such as mortars or pack howitzers with ranges from 2000 to 11,000 metres. By comparison a 155 mm conventional medium artillery shell carries about 25 pounds of high explosive. There are normally 16 guns in an artillery regiment. It would require 9000 conventional 155mm shells bursting simultaneously to achieve the effect of one 0.1 KT EBH shell, and 560 regiments to fire them!

In my view the tactical concept should be radically revised so that a belt of these weapons, perhaps 25 kilometres deep, is established inside the NATO frontier, making maximum use of terrain to concentrate and channel an enemy advance into killing zones. This tactical micro-nuclear belt should consist of an interlocking grid, comprising short and medium range systems, some permanently deployed, others at short notice to go to predetermined locations with prepared bunkers, and all to have designated overlapping target areas and special communications networks.

Behind this belt in depth should be the existing tank units deployed to destroy any armour that had succeeded in breaking through. Meanwhile in the forward observation and nuclear firing positions short range anti-tank weapons and light reconnaissance units should be deployed to slow up and canalise the enemy thrusts.

The micro-nuclear concept is not new. Yields down to 0.01 KT and various compositions were perfected in the early 1960s. The 'Davy Crockett' for example, jeep borne and fired from a mortar with a crew of three or four, was withdrawn on political grounds because it was thought dangerous to deploy such weapons and the responsibility of firing them at such junior level. Atomic demolition mines (ADMs) have been included in NATO defence plans since the 1960s. However they are difficult to deploy, they create residual radiation with yields up to 10 KT and are unpopular with politicians and local population alike.

No doubt this argument will be advanced again, if only because the West at present is equipped, as are the Soviets, with tactical nuclear weapons of such high yield as to potentially create vast areas of total destruction accompanied by a considerable residual radiation hazard. Of course, and rightly, decisions to fire such weapons should only be taken at the highest level. The Soviets believe such decisions would never be taken, even at a tactical level due to the widescale destruction to life and property. Whereas the micro-nuclear weapon is a purely defensive weapon of limited lethal radius, unlike the tank, which can be used in attack, or weapons of larger yield and longer range. A positive and much easier decision could be taken to invoke the micro-nuclear belt in the event of any Soviet incursion. Such an attack could be delivered by low profile assault groups (as envisaged by Lieut. Colonel Cyril Joly in his recent book 'Silent Night') infiltrating and striking with no obvious build-up and therefore minimal warning. Conversely the Soviets could attempt a mass tank and motor rifle division 'blitzkrieg,' whose concentration almost certainly will alert Western intelligence. Alternatively, and perhaps their most likely option, the Soviets could use their enormous conventional superiority to force us into capitulation without a shot. With a micro-nuclear defensive belt the West could call their bluff. Indeed the Soviets would be disinclined to try, if they were convinced we would use it.

The micro-nuclear weapon concept could not be described as having an offensive or mass destruction capability. It would however provide a

virtually impenetrable barrier and therefore a very effective, comparatively low cost, rapidly assembled deterrent along the frontier, provided it is deployed as a deep interlocking belt and not as an adjunct to the concept of 'mobile defence.' The final advantage is that such a system would release resources and manpower to strengthen other vulnerable vital strategic areas outside Western Europe.

I therefore urge an immediate study to determine the feasibility and cost of establishing a micro-nuclear belt in NATO.



JOHN GOURIËT
Former British tank cmd.
and operations officer
Chieftain tank regiment in
NATO, and Ministry of Defence
operational planning staff

London, March 9, 1981

~~SECRET~~

RECEIVED 28 MAR 81 13

TO ALLEN

FROM GOURIET, JOHN

DOCDATE 16 MAR 81

UNCLASSIFIED ~~STATUS~~ OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CHS 5/28/09

KEYWORDS: STRATEGIC FORCES NATO
NUCLEAR MATTERS

SUBJECT: MICRO-NUCLEARS IN NATO

ACTION: PREPARE REPLY FOR ALLEN SIG DUE: 31 MAR 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION		FOR COMMENT		FOR INFO
SCHWEITZER		BLAIR ✓	RENTSCHLER ✓	PIPES ✓
		NAU ✓		

COMMENTS

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April 13, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR

L. Paul Bremer III
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Vice President's Meeting with Ambassador
W. Tapley Bennett

The Vice President will meet with our Ambassador to NATO, W. Tapley Bennett, on Wednesday, April 15, for 45 minutes. May we please have recommended talking points and background papers for the Vice President's use by close of business today.



Charles P. Tyson

cc: James Rentschler

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FROM DYKE, N

DOCDATE 10 APR 81

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13 APR 81

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KEYWORDS: NATO

AVP

BENNETT, F TAPLEY

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TALKERS FOR VP MTG W/ US AMB TO NATO ON APR 15

ACTION: PREPARE TALKERS

DUE: 13 APR 81 STATUS D FILES

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Kan -

Did the talking
joints ever come
via QVA to VP?

Glenn advise.

JK

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN LENZ

FROM: Nancy Bearg Dyke *MBD*

SUBJECT: Vice President's Meeting with Ambassador W.
Tapley Bennett

The Vice President will meet with our Ambassador to NATO, W. Tapley Bennett, on Wednesday, April 15, from 5:00 - 5:45 p.m. in his White House West Wing office. May we please have any recommended talking points and background papers for the Vice President's use by close of business, Monday, April 13. Thank you.