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(International Organizations:

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO))

**Case file Number(s):** 024000-025999

**Box Number:** 13

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT  
(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 5/28/2009

**File Folder** IT067 024571

**FOIA**

M08-126/8

**Box Number**

KERSTEN

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
72120	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE VICE PRESIDENT RE YOUR MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS (SAME TEXT AS 71387)	2	4/15/1981	B1
72123	BRIEFING PAPER	RE VIST OF JOSEPH LUNS (SAME TEXT AS 71388)	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

IT067  
024571

*Collection Name*

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CAS 5/28/2009

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1A

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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(WHORM): SUBJECT FILE

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12

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→ To: NSC/S

81 APR 14 P 6:28

JANET COLSON

*Jc 4/16/80*

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

*Wa 4/18/80*

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

SHOW CC

CY TO MEESE

SHOW CC

CY TO BAKER

SHOW CC

CY TO DEEVER

SHOW CC

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT

April 14, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CP*

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *J.M.*

SUBJECT: Vice President's Meeting with NATO  
Secretary-General Joseph Luns  
(Thursday, April 16 - 10:15 a.m.)

Your memo to the Vice President at Tab I transmits appropriately tailored information to supplement the mindless repeat of Presidential stuff which State "prepared" for his Thursday morning meeting with NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to the Vice President at Tab I.

Approve ✓; As Amended \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Jim Lilley

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
SECRET ATTACHMENT



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED (With Secret Attachment)

April 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: NATO SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS: CALL ON VICE PRESIDENT

Attached per discussion with the Vice President's office is a background paper for use in connection with the Vice President's meeting with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns on April 16 at 10:15 a.m.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "L. Paul Bremer, III".

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

VIA LDX

April 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

L. Paul Bremer III  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Vice President's Meeting with NATO Secretary  
General Luns

The Vice President will meet with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns on April 16 from 10:15 - 10:45 a.m.. He will then accompany Secretary General Luns to the latter's meeting with the President which is scheduled for 11:00 a.m. May we please have recommended talking points and background papers for the Vice President's use by opening of business tomorrow, April 14.



Charles P. Tyson

cc: James Rentschler

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ALLEN LENZ

FROM: Nancy Bearg Dyke <sup>MDD</sup>

SUBJECT: Vice President's Meeting with NATO Secretary  
General Luns

The Vice President will meet with NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns on April 16 from 10:15 - 10:45 a.m. in his White House West Wing office. He will then accompany Secretary General Luns to the latter's meeting with the President which is currently scheduled for 11:00 am. May we please have recommended talking points and background papers for the Vice President's use by opening of business, Tuesday, April 14. Thank you.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTONUNCLASSIFIED WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

March 31, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *for Jerry*

SUBJECT: Request for Meeting with NATO Secretary  
General Luns

Attached is a memorandum from the State Department requesting that you schedule a brief call by Secretary-General Luns in coordination with his meeting with the President on April 16. Dr. Luns plans to leave Washington in the early afternoon of April 16.

I support the request. Secretary-General Luns is a key and durable figure in Europe, and it is worthwhile to get to know him personally.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you schedule a 30-minute meeting with Secretary-General Luns.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Date, Time \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8109586  
NSC 1626~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 26, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: NATO SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS: CALL ON VICE PRESIDENT

The Department of State recommends that the Vice President receive NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns for a brief call during Luns' April 14-16 Washington visit. Dr. Luns has a confirmed appointment with the President at 11:00 a.m., April 16. It may be convenient to schedule a call on the Vice President immediately before or after.

Luns' visit will be a good opportunity to acquaint him with senior Administration officials and outlook. Luns is strongly pro-US and will be helpful in advancing US positions in the Alliance. A meeting with the Vice President will reinforce the public image of strong US support for NATO conveyed by a Presidential meeting.

Please let us know whether the Vice President can meet with Dr. Luns, and indicate the time if the call can be arranged.

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By CAS NARA, Date 5/28/05~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
RDS - . + 3/26/11

cr: 782

MEMORANDUM

1626



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 30, 1981

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS BLAIR 

SUBJECT: Request for the Vice President to Meet with  
NATO Secretary-General Joseph Luns

Attached for your signature is a memorandum to the Vice President forwarding a State Department request for him to meet with Dr. Luns. The memo from you supports that request.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

Approve ✓ ; Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_  
*SWR for 3/3,*

UNCLASSIFIED WITH  
~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

NSC/S

Handcarried to

VP's Office

9 AM, 4/16

B Hands

RECEIVED 27 MAR 81 10

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 26 MAR 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) AS 3/20/09

KEYWORDS: NATO

VISIT

LUNS, JOSEPH

AVP

*3 Talkers*

SUBJECT: APPT REQUEST FOR LUNS W/ VP ON 14 - 16 APR

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO ALLEN TO VP DUE: 30 MAR 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

BLAIR

RENTSCHLER

SCHWEITZER

PIPES

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8109586

LOG 8100782

NSCIFID

( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Allen</i>	<i>X 3/30</i>	<i>for sig to VP</i>	<i>4/01</i>	<i>Tyson ✓</i>
	<i>D 4/2</i>	<i>Dance pd memo to VP, for VA</i>	<i>4/4</i>	<i>CT, DB ✓</i>
	<i>Z 4/13</i>	<i>Recd Dyke memo</i>		
<i>State</i>	<i>D 4/13</i>	<i>Prepare Talkers</i>	<i>4/14</i>	<i>CT, DB, RE ✓</i>
	<i>- 4/14</i>	<i>Recd S/S 8111971</i>		<i>RE, DB, RP, CT ✓</i>
<i>Blair</i>	<i>S 4/14</i>	<i>Prepare memo Allen to VP</i>	<i>4/14</i>	<i>SC ✓</i>
<i>Allen</i>	<i>X 4/14</i>	<i>For Signature</i>	<i>4/15</i>	<i>CT, DB ✓</i>
	<i>C 4/15</i>	<i>Allen pd memo</i>		<i>DB, CT ✓</i>

DISPATCH *ed by White House*

W/ATTCH FILE *W4* (C)

*clm*

26 MAY 1981

025969

ID #

IT067

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 8/105122

Name of Correspondent: Kenneth Rust

MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Submits policy paper regarding NATO.

### ROUTE TO:

### ACTION

### DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
<u>NS</u>	<u>Alle</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>8/105126</u>	<u>CS RYA</u>	<u>TR H</u>	<u>8/106105</u>
		Referral Note:	<u>  /  /</u>			<u>  /  /</u>
		Referral Note:	<u>  /  /</u>			<u>  /  /</u>
		Referral Note:	<u>  /  /</u>			<u>  /  /</u>
		Referral Note:	<u>  /  /</u>			<u>  /  /</u>

#### ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

#### DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

#### FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOb).  
 Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.  
 Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

# RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

## CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: \_\_\_\_\_ Media: L Individual Codes: 1170

Prime Subject Code: IT 067 Secondary Subject Codes: IT 067.02

## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

### SIGNATURE CODES:

**CPn** - Presidential Correspondence  
n - 0 - Unknown  
n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan  
n - 2 - Ronald Reagan  
n - 3 - Ron  
n - 4 - Dutch  
n - 5 - Ron Reagan  
n - 6 - Ronald  
n - 7 - Ronnie

**CLn** - First Lady's Correspondence  
n - 1 - Nancy Reagan  
n - 2 - Nancy  
n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan

**CBn** - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence  
n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan  
n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

### MEDIA CODES:


**B** - Box/package  
**C** - Copy  
**D** - Official document  
**G** - Message  
**H** - Handcarried  
**L** - Letter  
**M** - Mailgram  
**O** - Memo  
**P** - Photo  
**R** - Report  
**S** - Sealed  
**T** - Telegram  
**V** - Telephone  
**X** - Miscellaneous  
**Y** - Study

RECEIVED  
JAN 25 1981

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


June 5, 1981

  
Dear Ambassador Rush:

The President has asked me to thank you for the policy paper on NATO which you sent on May 20. It is a timely contribution to the discussions of the future of the Alliance which are taking place both within and outside the government.

The Working Group which contributed to the study is very impressive. We are happy that several of them have joined this Administration to work in key positions in the national security organization. We are currently taking advantage of their expertise and energy. We will also be reading your policy paper carefully for insights as we grapple with the problems and opportunities of the Alliance.

Sincerely,



Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Kenneth Rush  
Chairman  
The Atlantic Council  
1616 H Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

RECEIVED 26 MAY 81 16

TO PRES

FROM RUSH, KENNETH

DOCDATE 20 MAY 81

KEYWORDS: NATO

SUBJECT: ATLANTIC COUNCIL FWDS POLICY PAPER ON NATO

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN DUE: 29 MAY 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

BLAIR

RENTSCHLER

SCHWEITZER

PIPES

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( C / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

Allen	* 6/3	Gov signature	6/5	RE, SC
	6/5	RVA ref letter		DA, RE, SC, RF

DISPATCH

*WDS 8/25 12:00pm*

W/ATTCH

FILE

WA

(C)

*M/D*

#3002

RECEIVED

81 JUN 3 P 5: 20

JANET COLSON

Jc 4/0900

BUD NANCE

Ja 4/0755

DICK ALLEN

WA 4/2206

IRENE DERUS

igd 5/0820

JANET COLSON

Jc 5/0905

BUD NANCE

Bn

KAY

\_\_\_\_\_

SIGNED

CY TO VP

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO MEESE

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BAKER

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO DEEVER

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

CY TO BRADY

\_\_\_\_\_

SHOW CC

\_\_\_\_\_

MEMORANDUM

3002  
*agf*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR *DB*

SUBJECT: Reply to Kenneth Rush, Chairman, The Atlantic Council

On May 20 Rush sent the President a copy of a recently completed study, "The Credibility of the NATO Deterrent." The study is good stuff, pointing to holes in NATO defenses, and calling for vigorous efforts to fix them.

Attached is a letter of acknowledgment from you to Rush.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve          *✓* Disapprove           
*6/2*

Tab I Letter to Rush  
A - Incoming correspondence from Rush

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KENNETH RUSH

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WATSON WISE  
JOSEPH J. WOLF

# THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

OF THE UNITED STATES

1616 H STREET, N.W. • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

TELEPHONE (202) 347-9353

CABLE: ATCOUN

May 20, 1981

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

025969

Dear Mr. President:

The Atlantic Council of the United States is pleased to submit for your consideration the enclosed policy paper on NATO. It is the result of long and intensive study by a very distinguished group of Americans.

It is hoped that this study of the future of this important alliance in light of current problems will be of use to you and to your staff.

With every good wish for your continued good health and success,

Respectfully,

Kenneth Rush  
Chairman

HONORARY DIRECTORS

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CORTLANDT V. R. SCHUYLER

CHARLES M. SPOFFORD

37

MSC

**SECURITY SERIES**

# **The Atlantic Council of the United States**

## **Policy Papers**

### **The Credibility of The NATO Deterrent:**

**Bringing the NATO Deterrent up to date**

**The Atlantic Council's Working Group  
on the Credibility of the NATO Deterrent**

**Co-Chairmen:  
Kenneth Rush and Brent Scowcroft**

**Rapporteur:  
Joseph J. Wolf**



**THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL  
OF THE UNITED STATES**

The Atlantic Council, established twenty years ago, seeks to promote closer mutually advantageous ties between Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The objective is greater security and more effective harmonization of economic, monetary, energy and resource policies for the benefit of the individual in his personal, business, financial and other relations across national boundaries. These varied and complex relationships have been and will continue to be central to the major economic and political developments which affect our international integrity and domestic well-being.

In an increasingly interdependent world where "foreign" policy is ever more closely intertwined with "domestic" policies, there is a clear need for both official and private consideration of means of dealing with problems which transcend national frontiers. The Atlantic Council is a unique non-governmental, bi-partisan, tax-exempt, educational, citizens' organization. It conducts its programs to promote understanding of major international security, political and economic problems, foster informed public debate on these issues, and make substantive policy recommendations to both the Executive and Legislative branches of the US Government, as well as to the appropriate key international organizations.

The Board of Directors of the Atlantic Council is composed of some one hundred prominent leaders and experts in business, finance, labor and education, together with former senior government officials. Their names are listed on the back cover on this *Policy Paper*.

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**The Atlantic Council of the United States**  
1616 H Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20006  
Telephone: (202) 347-9353

---

# **The Credibility of The NATO Deterrent:**

## **Bringing the NATO Deterrent up to date**

**The Atlantic Council's Working Group  
on the Credibility of the NATO Deterrent**

---

**Kenneth Rush and Brent Scowcroft**  
*Co-Chairmen*

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Washington, D.C.  
May 1981

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**THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NATO DETERRENT:  
BRINGING THE NATO DETERRENT UP TO DATE**

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FOREWORD

An increasingly dangerous military imbalance between East and West in Europe — —

The loss of Western nuclear superiority — —

Communist exploitation of mounting instability in countries outside the NATO area — —

And the lack of a cohesive approach on the part of the Western allies — —

All these have combined to raise more serious and profound doubts about the prospects of the Atlantic Allies than ever before.

Against this background, the Atlantic Council, some 18 months ago, decided to undertake this study of the Credibility of the NATO Deterrent.

This is the fourth recent study by Working Groups of the Atlantic Council of the security concerns of the Atlantic Allies. In 1977, our policy paper on "The Growing Dimensions of Security" drew attention to the global nature of the threat and the non-military as well as military challenges to security. In 1978, "Securing the Seas" reflected a two years' study of the Soviet naval challenge and the options open to the Western Alliance. In 1980, the problems of security in the Third World were analyzed in "After Afghanistan: The Long Haul."

The present inquiry examines the significance of threats outside the NATO area for our NATO defenses in light of the steadily growing Soviet military power both in Europe and abroad. It reminds the reader of the modern uses of military power by which major states seek to hide behind activities of surrogate states for intimidation, for the support of insurrection, and for the overthrow of established governments by means short of war. It identifies the growing shortfalls in NATO's defense. It explores the significance for NATO of the loss of Western nuclear superiority. It seeks ways to compensate for new demands outside the NATO area on allied strength. And it seeks to identify the major divisions within the

Alliance which increasingly endanger the continued solidarity and common purpose of this essential coalition.

We were fortunate indeed to have had the benefit of an extremely well qualified Working Group to explore these problems. Their names appear following this Foreword. This Policy Paper is based upon stimulating discussions of most valuable background studies prepared by George Blanchard, Russell Dougherty, William Hyland, Isaac Kidd, Jr., Robert McFarlane, Robert Osgood, Jeffrey Record, George Seignious, John Vogt and Roy Werner. Joseph J. Wolf acted as Rapporteur. A compilation of their studies will be published in book form later in the year. To all of them, our profound thanks for the significant contributions they have made.

During the past year, death deprived us of the long experience and wise counsel of Livingston Hartley and Clinton E. Knox, who had devoted their lives to the cause of peace and freedom. They are deeply missed.

Copies of the final draft of this report were made available to Dr. Joseph M. A. Luns, Secretary General of NATO, to General Bernard W. Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, and to Admiral Harry D. Train II, Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. The views expressed in the report, however, are the sole responsibility of the Working Group and do not necessarily reflect those of any of the NATO authorities.



Special thanks go to the corporations and foundations whose generous help made this study possible. Partial support for the project was received from the Departments of State and Defense. The opinions, conclusions and recommendations expressed do not necessarily reflect those of either Department. They reflect the views of the Working Group, and not necessarily those of the Atlantic Council as a whole. It should also be clear that while the report sets forth the general views of the Working Group, it should not be implied that every member supports every statement therein.

Support for the overall Atlantic Council program, of which this effort is a part, has been made available by a number of U.S. foundations, corporations, labor unions and individuals. We are most grateful for this support, as well as for the extraordinary contributions of time and talent by the Working Group members.

This is a timely report, coming as a new Administration in Washington settles in. It asks the United States to consider well and move toward the views of the European allies, just as it asks the

European allies to consider well and move toward the views of the United States.

It calls for—and this may well be its most important message—the Allies jointly to solve the problems that face us all. There is no room in today's world for dealing with each other at arms length. Only by the closest, most frank and open discussion of our problems can we hope to find the common solutions that history now demands of us.



KENNETH RUSH

BRENT SCOWCROFT

*Co-Chairmen of the Atlantic Council's Working Group  
on The Credibility of the NATO Deterrent*

## The Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Credibility of the NATO Deterrent

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## **THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NATO DETERRENT: BRINGING THE NATO DETERRENT UP TO DATE**

### **The Setting:**

#### **The Atlantic Alliance and Today's Challenges**

The fixed coastal guns of Singapore, pointed seaward, offered no defense to the overland attack from the opposite direction before which Singapore fell in World War II. The NATO nations must take heed of that lesson. They must make sure that their defenses cover all of today's manifold threats and challenges.

For the Atlantic Allies cannot escape these developments. Any illusions that such an escape was possible disappeared with the threat to access to Middle East and Persian Gulf Oil. That threat posed almost as serious a challenge to the security and way of life of the Atlantic Allies as would armed attack across the Oder-Neisse line, yet paradoxically increased rather than reduced the differences among the Allies.

So at the very time that the problems of security confronting the Atlantic Allies in today's world are far more multi-dimensional and troublesome than ever before, the Allies are faced with the prospects of more discouraging disarray than this troubled but resilient alliance has heretofore known.

The problems of security are now global as well as regional. They are now political and economic as well as military. They encompass relations with non-aligned as well as aligned nations. And because of their very difficulty and complexity, they have produced and exacerbated differences between the Allies themselves as to how to meet these challenges which could over time threaten the very existence of the Alliance.

How to deal with these dangers, as well as the threat of armed attack in Europe, is the central problem for today and for tomorrow.

In these circumstances, the way the Atlantic nations, and their allies and associates around the world, should individually and collectively respond, both on the NATO front and on the wider global scene, whether through the Alliance or outside it, will certainly call for some significant adaptations in outlook, policy and effort.

A review of the nature of the challenges and of the means of overcoming them must be undertaken by all concerned nations if the present predicaments are to be overcome. How this would affect the

Atlantic Alliance, which has so long been the centerpiece of security, is a natural place to start.

\* \* \*

A combination of old dangers with new ones now faces the Atlantic Allies with a much more complex, interwoven, multifaceted, sobering and potentially dangerous set of problems than ever before encountered by the Alliance.

*First*, both the power and leadership of the United States relative to the U.S.S.R. and to Western Europe alike has seriously declined over the past decade. To a certain extent, this was inevitable, as productivity expanded in both Western Europe and the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the retrenchment in American military investment and the psychological impact of Vietnam, coincident with the persistent growth of Soviet military power and activity, has not failed to have a pervasive political effect within the Alliance in addition to its more obvious military implications.

*Second*, despite some improvements, the aggregate military strength of NATO has likewise seriously declined, in relation to the steady improvements in the Soviet military establishment.

*Third*, the threat to NATO is no longer focused entirely in Europe. Political instability in the Third World has provided the opportunity for Soviet as well as indigenous threats to Western access to raw materials, especially oil. Additional demands on the Allies in terms not only of military resources, but in terms of political cost as well, result from this inescapable broadening of the NATO horizon.

*Fourth*, détente has succeeded in distracting a considerable segment of Western European opinion from the growth of Soviet strength in Europe. The very real benefits to Western Europe in terms of greater freedom of movement of peoples between East and West, favorable economic ties and the hope of continuing more stable political relations, lead the European Allies to weigh with caution the potential costs of responding to aggressive Soviet conduct at home and abroad.

*Fifth*, There are increasingly divergent perceptions of the threat and, even more importantly, of how to go about responding to it, among the Allies. The United States tends to emphasize the importance of military power; the other Allies, to emphasize political and economic solutions.

\* \* \*

NATO was born of a pattern of aggressive Soviet behavior. The consolidation of Eastern Europe after World War II to form a Soviet

security buffer zone, the activities of Communist parties in Western Europe, Soviet pressure on Greece and Turkey and the Soviet supported invasion of South Korea, led the Atlantic Allies to rearm and organize militarily within the NATO framework to fill the power vacuum which fairly invited Soviet domination of an unarmed Western Europe.

Today, that lesson of the deterrent value of military capability in keeping the peace has to be learned all over again. Not only in the Persian Gulf, but wherever relative power vacuums have existed, an invitation for aggressive adventurism is inherent in the situation. Military power can of course be used for armed conquest. Equally, it can be a decisive factor in the application of political, economic and psychological influences and pressures short of armed force. The Soviets, in discussing their concept of "correlation of forces", expressly recognize that more than military power is involved in a total balance of forces, but accord to military power the role of *primus inter pares*. Countervailing military power, then, is necessary to keep the peace.

But the military power of any one nation alone is far from sufficient to cope with the challenges involved. Collective security measures are the only possible answer; and collective security measures can not be maintained if there is not a fundamental political commonality of purpose between the nations participating in the effort. That common approach is now in danger of eroding because there is a growing lack of agreement on the nature of the problems and on what should be done about them. How to restore a common approach is of at least equal importance with the restoration of the balance of power.

The problem seems to lie in the paradox that the European Allies look to American military power as essential to hold the Soviets in check, while at the same time they believe the United States tends to turn excessively to military solutions of international crises. This places the United States in a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" position; and has frequently led to American impatience with the reluctance of the European Allies to follow its lead when it takes sides more definitely than the latter have considered prudent. Bridging this gap in approach is one of the main tasks for the Atlantic allies.

To find the resources to meet all these growing needs will be no simple task. The major industrialized nations face difficult problems stemming from the energy crisis, the rising cost of oil, social welfare programs that absorb the greater part of national budgets, and the general stagflation that is now prevalent in the world. It is therefore

necessary to look anew at what is needed to keep the peace and the ways those needs can be met.

\* \* \*

Allied cohesion and the political will to contribute, separately and jointly, to the common defense depend upon informed public understanding of the issues involved.

In political and psychological terms, Western civilization has evolved beyond a belief in the use of armed force as an instrument of policy; the Kremlin has not. In these circumstances public support, and especially youthful support, can be obtained only for more fundamental ends than the maintenance of a purely military alliance.

Despite all its troubles, the enduring strength of NATO has been, in the words of the Preamble of the Treaty, the determination of its members "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples."

The dignity and liberty of the individual, his freedom to worship in his own way, to choose his own form of government and to seek a better life for himself and his children are universal human values. They are common to all mankind, including peoples subject to totalitarian rule.

These values represent not only the fundamental basis for allied cohesion but also its essential strength in the battle for men's minds everywhere.

Understanding of the need to safeguard them can go far to strengthen the morale of our armed forces, willingness to serve in them, and political and parliamentary support for them.

In today's turbulent world, greater public realization is necessary that no nation by itself can assure its freedom and the basic values of its own people, but that common effort with other like-minded nations is essential to maintain them.

Yet the younger generations today have no personal memories of *why* it was necessary to fight World War II, of the sacrifices and suffering which resulted from lack of adequate deterrence, or of the dedicated efforts in the early post-war years to build a better international order. The political will to safeguard freedom and the common heritages of the past has a tendency to decline from generation to generation unless it is constantly reinforced.

\* \* \*

The economic, financial and political problems which face the nations of the Alliance are, by their very nature, long term problems.

So also are the problems of defense and of East-West relations; and the problems of defense buildup and economic health are inextricably intertwined.

The predicaments affecting NATO which are analyzed in this study, and, to a considerable extent the proposals that are put forward, should be viewed in that light. Major shifts in strategy, in approach, and in internal relations within an alliance take time to gestate and bear fruit. Their growth cannot be forced. But a beginning must be made. It is none too soon for the Allies to start *thinking together* about these problems, and *together* to seek the answers.

The major predicaments for the Atlantic Allies to consider are these:

1. The Expanding Threat Outside the NATO Area.
2. Today's Threat in Europe: The Non-Military Aspect.
3. Today's Threat in Europe: The Military Aspect.
4. Is NATO Strategy and Force Posture Up To Date?
5. Are NATO's Reinforcement Plans Still Realistic?
6. How Can All These Defense Needs Be Met?
7. Internal and External Problems of the Alliance

Only in *jointly analyzing* these problems can the nations concerned come to *jointly* recognize the course which must be steered and the obstacles that must be either avoided or overcome.

## The Predicaments:

### 1. The Expanding Threat Outside the NATO Area

As the European allies withdrew from "East of Suez", and the United States shrank, during the Seventies, from its sense of global responsibility, the expanding Soviet military establishment has been used to extend the influence of the USSR into critical areas being vacated by the West.

This same period has been one of change, unrest and even turmoil throughout the Third World. The problem of economic development has been compounded by the uncertainties that have afflicted the economic and financial systems of the world, and particularly by the impact of rising oil prices, while struggles for leadership and changes in the structure of societies have added to the kaleidoscopic nature of the situation.

The Soviets have taken advantage of this unsettled climate to build up their own military power and to enhance and employ the power and influence of their militant surrogates and dependents. From North Korea to Vietnam, from Afghanistan to South Yemen to Ethiopia and Libya, and across the Atlantic to Cuba, they are exploiting a chain of like-minded regimes for the reduction of Western influence abroad and the export of unrest and instability in the cause of communist imperialism.

Under the guise of the doctrine calling for Soviet support for "wars of national liberation", the Soviets and their proxies have fostered subversion and insurrection in order to replace unfriendly regimes—particularly those friendly to the West—with those more supportive of their own hegemony. To this end, the Soviet Union has stimulated and supported this coterie of dependents with massive military supply. Concurrently, there have been continued Soviet attempts to undermine regimes friendly to the West, as well as to undermine the influence of the Western nations with the nations of the Third World, such as by massive Soviet propaganda attacks which have from time to time been surprisingly effective. Despite the fact that the Western industrialized nations provide virtually all the economic aid for the developing nations, and the Soviet Union virtually none, Moscow's propaganda has somehow managed to portray the Western allies solely as militarist and imperialist, as the champions of oppressive political systems, and the opponents of change and development.

Moscow finds these alternatives preferable to direct involvement in Third World Countries. The use of Soviet military forces, whether to interfere with Western access directly or to intimidate a supplier

nation from continued friendliness with the West is not the only available means. The less direct, more difficult to deal with and more likely to be encountered line of attack involves the exploitation of radical indigenous political forces to obtain the same results by influencing, intimidating or even overthrowing governments too friendly with the West.

The extent to which Moscow is involved in this second type of threat will of course vary. Not every instance of anti-Western movements is the result of Soviet activity. But in all too many cases there is the pattern of militant groups trained, supplied, supported and sustained by or on behalf of the USSR. They may want to serve their own purposes primarily; yet at the same time in fact they also become surrogates for Soviet action.

There are clear advantages for Moscow in this second course of action. The surrogate acts as a political insulator of Moscow, which can deny responsibility for the acts of its agent. Without becoming overtly an intervening power, the Soviet Union thus has a better chance of escaping opprobrium. The risks for the Soviets, militarily and politically, at home and abroad, are materially reduced, win, lose or draw. It seems probable, therefore, that Moscow will continue to employ this approach as its preferred course of action. At the same time, as Afghanistan reminds us, the use of Soviet armed forces themselves for intimidation, or if necessary, actual interventions remains available as an option if the stakes are high enough and the risks not forbidding.

It is against the background of local and regional political issues, just as much if not more than that of East-West confrontation, that the Western allies will have to learn to mount an effective political defense for themselves and the regimes friendly to them.

Whether the stakes are access to oil in the Persian Gulf, the quarantining of militant communism in Central America, the continued independence of Thailand or the freedom of the Malacca Straits in Southeast Asia, Western interests will require considerably more than military power to generate the sort of indigenous strength that can prevail over the continuing radical pressures that must be expected in the years to come. In the final analysis, the Western nations must increasingly foster common interests between themselves and the developing nations of the Third World. Western support for progress in economic and social growth and justice is a necessary foundation for the sort of local resistance to militant expansionism that is so essential in the circumstances.

It is with regard to the diagnosis of particular Third World crises and the prescription of measures to improve the situation that

differences between the Allies are frequently to be found. The extent to which a situation of unrest and turmoil is fundamentally internal and indigenous in its roots and that to which it is attributable to outside interference is often difficult to decide. The degree of need for military support of regimes in power compared to the degree of need for pressing for social reform is often a place where reasonable men can differ. In these cases, the United States and its Allies have at times been at odds; and the European perception of an American tendency to favor military solutions has gained strength.

\* \* \*

The threat of direct Soviet armed intervention outside the NATO area cannot be put aside, even though it may be less probable than the indirect forms of intervention that have just been discussed.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan underlines the fact that directly, through its own armed forces, as well as indirectly through surrogate nations, the Soviet Union has extended its reach to one of truly global proportions.

In addition to its impressive strategic nuclear power and its transformation of Warsaw Pact forces into a potentially offensive fighting force, it has, over the last decade, spread its power to most of the globe. The large, growing and modern Soviet navy has increased its presence along the sea lanes of the Mediterranean, the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific to a far greater extent than required to protect Soviet maritime traffic to and from Siberia. Europe, the Middle East, most of the Indian Ocean, and the East Asian perimeter are all within range of the Soviet SS-20 and the Backfire bomber. The Soviet ability and readiness to project forces abroad, demonstrated in its military airlift support for Ethiopia and its invasion of Afghanistan, has not been without impact throughout the Third World and the industrialized nations.

No wonder, then, that the situation in the Middle East/Persian Gulf area, after Afghanistan, assumed crisis proportions. Nor is the fact that the Soviets may shortly become net importers of oil a reassuring thought. The Soviets now are in a position to threaten Western access to oil, whether in order to increase their own entree to this source of supply or as a means of bringing pressure to bear on the Western allies. The stakes for the West are truly vital. Middle East oil is indispensable for Japan's economy. It is only slightly less so for the European allies; and it is very important for the United States.

In concrete terms, the issue is continued unimpeded access to oil, but there is a broader significance as well. Freedom of commerce and navigation are vital interests for the mercantile nations of the free

world. Access to other strategically important natural resources (such as titanium, manganese, chromium, and cobalt, to name but a few) as well as oil, and even the very movement of goods and services of all sorts which makes up peacetime commerce may in turn become subject to more pressures than they have been in the past. The precedent in the case of access to oil is hence of major significance.

In the absence of a Western determination to protect access to oil, the situation could well invite further Soviet adventurism. A deterrent military presence in the area, supported by a reinforcement and resupply capability, is thus an inescapable requirement to protect the vital interests of the West. Although the Middle East is admittedly one of the least favorable locations for Western military operations—for example, time and distance factors, climate and terrain—and needed base rights are hard to come by, the ability to deploy and sustain a consequential force in the area is all the more essential if Soviet adventurism is to be made obviously a costly experiment.

The Middle East is by no means the only trouble spot outside the NATO area; though as the longest neglected one, and the one affecting NATO nations most immediately, it has required priority treatment.

In Northeast Asia, Soviet strength, and that of its military dependent, North Korea, have also grown as United States strength has waned. The great bulk of Soviet ground force strength in Asia is deployed along the Chinese border. Soviet naval deployments, now include some 80 combat vessels and a like number of submarines, together with a growing air capability. Backfire bombers and one aircraft carrier now add a further dimension to their capability. The large Soviet equipped forces of North Korea, sixth largest in the world, remain a constant threat across the DMZ, while Japanese-Soviet relations are at best uneasy. Any further significant reduction in American or allied capability in the area could invite instability and confrontation.

In southeast Asia, Soviet support for militant Hanoi, and Soviet access to the naval and airbases of Vietnam, make the ASEAN nations, particularly neighboring Thailand, insecure and ill-at-ease.

The Western hemisphere encompasses considerable poverty and discontent as problems of economic development and social justice confront most governments. Social change, especially where long overdue, is being sought by violent means in many cases. This is a happy hunting ground for Soviet-inspired Cuban activity, in support of local left-wing, radical and militant forces, as exemplified by its activities in the Central American area. The struggle for stability is likely to be long and taxing, and to place further demands on

American political, economic and military resources.

Deterrence, then, has perforce become a world-wide responsibility in response to world-wide threats. While clearly not every outbreak of hostilities in the world should be attributed to Moscow, nor is susceptible of solution by solely military means, a demonstrated capability and determination to respond to Communist assaults upon security, whether direct or indirect, should go far to let Moscow realize the costs of such ventures are going to be high.

\* \* \*

Recognition of the necessity for defense against these problems outside the NATO area raises the issue of which nations should take the lead in responding to the challenge, and the mechanism that should be used to coordinate such activities.

It is necessary to re-emphasize that the challenge outside the NATO area is not only military, but political and economic as well. The defense must equally be at the political and economic levels as well as the military. In coping with the problems of the Third World, assistance in solving problems of economic health and social justice can be at least as, if not more, significant than assistance in developing the ability to resist armed insurrection.

The *sine qua non* for the success of any measures to improve security in the developing world is that they have indigenous roots and indigenous support. It cannot be repeated too often that viable solutions cannot be imposed, let alone maintained, by outside governments alone. The industrialized nations must learn to increase their respective abilities to work with and through people of the Third World and their governments. In the longer run, security in the Middle East is going to depend on the nations of the Middle East themselves, working together for collective security, with Western help and support, rather than primarily on Western military forces.

To these efforts, on this broad front, all of the industrialized nations can contribute to a more significant extent than in the past. At the same time, the greatest cost, in terms of resources and responsibility, has to do with regard to the military side of the equation. Here, the task has fallen primarily upon the United States, not only in the Far East and the Western Hemisphere, but now also in the Persian Gulf. At the same time, the concurrent presence of French and United Kingdom warships in the region and the supporting measures taken by Australia are most significant. Without this demonstration of common cause, the United States would all the more easily be identified in the minds of many as the sole concerned industrialized nation, materially weakening the Western position.

To organize to meet this complex global challenge requires flexible procedures that will involve all concerned nations, whether within or outside formal alliances. Consultation must insure that the views of all nations affected by the question at issue are thoroughly considered, and that there will be no surprises between friends and allies. Certain nations, more willing and able to take active part in the necessary measures, will likely emerge as the leaders of one effort or another. But rather than to establish any formal directorate, with all the problems of exclusivity that would create, or to constitute some new body so broadly based as to be ineffective, it would seem best to use and expand existing multilateral and bilateral consultative procedures as needs be, and set about getting the job done.

## 2. Today's Threat in Europe: The Non-Military Aspect.

The Soviet-West German peace treaty and related international agreements, in effect recognizing Eastern Europe as a Soviet buffer area, went far to meet the over-riding concern of the Soviet Union for its own security. Second only to that goal has been the Soviet objective of becoming the dominant power in Europe, to which it has since been free to turn.

The Soviet Union does not seek a war with the NATO nations. Both Soviet doctrine and Soviet opportunistic pragmatism call rather for a policy of political attack. Its policy is to obtain military superiority, first of all for defense, and then in order to exploit that superiority for political purpose. Frontal armed conquest of a strong opponent could be far more costly, and inevitably involve more risks to the Soviet regime, already troubled with economic ills and the seeds of political dissent, than measures short of war. The prime mission of the Soviet armed forces, Soviet writers say, is to protect the system should a declining capitalist world be impelled to use force, and not to put the system at risk by moving against a strong adversary. Nor is Soviet policy likely to want to see Western Europe levelled in warfare. It would undoubtedly prefer to turn it into a docile, productive and supportive buffer area. The most likely threat, then, is going to be in the political arena. The Soviets will try to combine fear of their military superiority with hope on the part of Western European nations for benefits from selective détente in order to support a major effort in order, over time, to split the Old World from the New.

The division of Europe from the United States as a requisite first step towards political domination of Europe may begin to seem to the Soviets to be attainable. Most likely, they will seek to decouple American nuclear power from Europe, to pare down American influence with its allies, to get the U.S. to accept Soviet inspired regional arms control arrangements in the name of Allied solidarity, and to play on the inevitable divergencies of European and American policy, especially in the Third World.

The Soviets have concurrently employed two principal strategies. One has been to foster the relaxation of tensions, not only with Western Europe, but originally with the United States as well. The other has been to sharply change the military balance through the major buildup of its own forces, and by seeking to weaken the NATO military position through arms control talks and by exhorting and threatening the European allies over the risks connected with nuclear modernization.

While following a policy of aggressive political and even military intervention in the Third World, in Western Europe the Soviet policy of "selective détente" has been marked by improved economic and political relations. Communist trade with European NATO countries is now about two-thirds of the current level of trade between the United States and its European partners. The hard currency supporting the Soviet share comes from Western credits. With Soviet exports to Western Europe focusing on the key areas of energy and raw materials, the politically important sectors of Western European banking and industry, as well as labor, are affected more than the bare figures indicate.

Western Europe is moreover important to the Soviets as much as an exporter of much needed technology as of finished goods. As far as the Federal Republic of Germany is concerned, not only economic gains but the improvement of contacts between the hostage peoples of East Germany and those of the Federal Republic has been a natural and pre-eminent motive in its support of détente. Finally, the replacement of bluster and threat with more proper Soviet conduct toward Western Europe, notwithstanding its pattern of conduct elsewhere, has influenced the political climate in the capitals of Europe and has gained support from a broad spectrum of society, including both left and right, that not unnaturally prefers détente to a return to the cold war with its apparently greater dangers and lesser benefits.

There are to be sure, some constraints on Soviet conduct in Europe as well. The Soviet economy is far from able to satisfy the desires of its peoples, and actions that would jeopardize the support it receives from East-West trade would be costly to it. But far more

importantly, the chronically uncertain political situation in the countries of Eastern Europe must be a restraining factor in any estimate of the situation developed in Moscow. As the continuing unrest in Poland bears witness, the citizens of Eastern Europe are something less than sycophants of Moscow. What has been a security shield for the Soviets will not necessarily prove to be either a dependable source of military strength or a dependable line of communications in the event of Soviet attack.

All of these factors argue against the probability of an armed attack against Western Europe. Far more likely is the use of Soviet military strength to back up pressure, whether tacit or overt, directed toward influencing and dominating Western European policies to support Moscow's ends.

If the challenge of the future is likely to be in the political area rather than on the battlefield, does it follow that it is no longer necessary to maintain a balance of military power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact?

The answer is self-evident. If the balance of power were allowed to become so askew that resistance to military pressure, let alone armed attack, would be impossible, the extension of Soviet hegemony would be all too easy. The Western "values of democracy and respect for human rights and individual freedom" would be, in all too short a time, seriously menaced, or indeed, snuffed out.

In addition, while the risk of armed attack is small, there are still some genuine risks of hostilities that must be taken into account, including

—The danger that the Soviets would be more likely to risk military adventures in the Middle East or elsewhere which could spread to Europe should they come to feel that the balance of power in Europe was strongly in their favor.

—The ever present possibility that, as in the past in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, or, more recently, in Poland, the Soviets would use armed force under the Brezhnev Doctrine to preserve their hegemony in Eastern Europe—or in connection with Berlin—with ensuing events leading, intentionally or unintentionally, to armed confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

—The possibility that the Kremlin might feel forced to evoke the Russian people's love for "Mother Russia" in a military adventure should the inherent human hope for freedom spread from Poland and other Eastern European countries to influence the Soviet Union itself.

—The possibility that hostilities along the Mediterranean littoral—whether instigated by Libyan militancy, Arab-Israeli confrontation,

or otherwise, could subsequently lead to an East-West confrontation.

—The danger that a continually growing imbalance of military strength could, over time, and accompanied by a resulting political weakness in the West, lead the Soviets to risk a surprise attack in anticipation of early collapse and surrender by the West.

However, it cannot be gainsaid that these very factors have led to a most troublesome reaction which is increasingly being reflected in vocal segments of European opinion. Demonstrated primarily by opposition to nuclear arming of the West (and begging the question of the much greater nuclear arming of the East) and by the erroneous concept that there is little that smaller countries can do to affect the balance of power, it has developed into a neo-defeatist school of thought that is reminiscent of the "Better Red than dead" slogan of some years back. While still a minority, any movement that draws strength from such diverse sectors as church and youth groups, and Labor and Socialist elements in a number of Western European nations presents real cause for concern.

Building up Western defenses is therefore only half the story. The other half is going to be in the field of political and diplomatic action to seek to cope with the political maneuvers of the Soviet Union which are short of open threat or force. This is in many ways a more difficult task than that of building a credible defense posture. It means dealing with the minds of men—allies, friendly powers, and opponents alike—and doing so within the tradition of freedom of thought that is the hallmark of Western civilization. It means developing a consensus on what should be done with regard not only to the global threat, but even more importantly, with regard to the continuing ever-present political aspects of the threat to NATO.

It means demonstrating continuing willingness to enter into negotiation for meaningful arms control agreements which will restore or preserve stability and the overall balance of power. For the European allies, commitment to the pursuit of arms control measures is an indispensable concomitant to measures of defense. The United States must be responsive to this political requirement, as, for example, with regard to the "dual track" policy on the Theater Nuclear Force decision of December 1979, which linked arms control negotiations with the decision to proceed with the Long Range Tactical Nuclear Force. The current French proposal for a first phase Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), focussed on Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), exemplifies the opportunities that can be taken to preserve and enhance security.

It means relying more on measures short of the use of armed force, reliance on the good offices of other nations, the employment

of political, economic and financial leverage, and the development of strong pressures from the entire international community. It will encompass employing bilateral diplomatic channels, multi-lateral organizations and private channels alike. It will mean increasing the public consciousness of the average citizen of the West of the risks and dangers of the coming period—a task made doubly difficult as the generation that has experienced the threat of Soviet power yields to a successor generation that has not known these dangers at first hand. It means doing all this in a way that strengthens the political support for the Alliance both internally within each nation and externally between them all. And above all, it will mean devoting conscious effort on the part of all the nations of the Alliance to maintain their unity despite the centrifugal pressures and temptations that must be planned for and resisted. Without that unity, there will be, as Senator Arthur Vandenberg warned, "surrender on the installment plan."

It means involving non-NATO countries in cooperative efforts to deal with security problems in those regions. It will involve reversing the recent trends toward lower informational activities such as Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America while Soviet broadcasts multiply dramatically. It will require better and more timely intelligence better disseminated on the part of the free nations.

An uneasy peace is likely to be what the Western nations will have to acclimatize themselves to for a long time to come. Sustaining vigilance and common cause over an extended period which may never provide the stimulus that comes from the imminent fear of war will not be easy, but it is likely to be what is required.

### 3. Today's Threat in Europe: The Military Aspect

It is in the European Theater that the Soviets have consistently deployed their best-equipped, most ready ground and air forces with 30 combat ready divisions and 1700 aircraft deployed in Eastern Europe. Backed up by the less effective but numerous second echelon forces in the neighboring USSR, their presence inescapably requires a high level of countervailing forces in Western Europe.

The Soviet Union has pursued a program of steady quantitative as well as qualitative improvement over the past decade. New generations of tanks, guns, armored fighting vehicles and aircraft, along with an impressive chemical warfare capability, have transformed the Soviet military establishment into a first class fighting force with improved combat power and sustaining logistical support. Its strength

and composition far exceeds what might be needed either for defense or to preserve internal security in the Eastern European countries. It has now clearly attained an offensive posture as well, increasing the need for readiness among NATO forces.

While the NATO nations have continued to modernize the equipment of their forces, they have failed to keep pace with the gains of the Warsaw Pact. The NATO Long Term Defense Plan (LTDP) of 1977, intended to remedy some of these deficiencies, has not been implemented with the sense of urgency and of additional priority needs that it should command. It is at best a shifting of priority of defense spending, being implemented by deferring other high priority needs.

NATO readiness has always needed to be at a high standard to overcome certain inherent disadvantages to which the Alliance has been subject, some inescapably, others at high cost. NATO, as a purely defensive alliance, gives the USSR the initiative that comes with attack. The Soviets also have the advantage of internal lines of communication, uncertain though they may be, while the Alliance depends on sea transport for much of its sustenance.

Then, too, there is the fact that the peacetime deployments of too many of NATO's troops are not garrisoned at their optimum battle stations because of the high economic and political costs of relocation. And there is the political requirement of "forward defense," that is, that the land of one ally cannot be sacrificed to protect the others, which excludes the possibility of trading space for time. Though relocating cantonment areas and dropping the forward defense strategy might be desirable from the military point of view, the cost of the disruptive political strains that would accompany such actions would outweigh the military advantages that would accrue.

The most serious deficiencies are in those readiness measures needed to let NATO's deployed forces fight successfully against large scale attack at the conventional level, particularly in the Central Region. Despite some steps to improve the situation, the deficiencies still include:

- lack of defense against and response to chemical warfare, both still inadequate in the Allied forces in comparison to the threat;
- deficiencies in operational reserves;
- inadequate numbers of tanks and anti-tank weapons to counter the Soviet armored superiority;
- shortage of ammunition of all sorts, currently inadequate for sustained combat conditions of more than a few days, and in many cases poorly located and protected;

- shortage of other War Reserve Materiel stored in the theater to replace materiel consumed or destroyed in combat;
- inadequate air-defense measures, particularly surface to air missiles, compared with excellent Soviet capability in this area, presaging serious NATO losses early in any air battle;
- lack of survivable war headquarters and interface of Allied and national communication networks;
- insufficient allied war headquarters manned in peacetime;
- lack of sufficient exercises in which national forces are placed under international command;
- shortages in infrastructure of all kinds, national and international;
- lack of naval forces needed to insure the arrival of reinforcements in Europe;
- deficiencies in trained manpower in ready and reserve units;
- lagging electronic warfare measures to counter the impressive Soviet capability in this field; and
- inadequate training of personnel and maintenance of equipment.

Moreover, ministerial level government officials do not sufficiently appreciate how national legal and procedural obstacles could hinder NATO from quickly adopting an alert posture in time of crisis. It must be remembered that, except for air defense forces, most NATO forces remain under national command in peacetime, even including, for example, the intelligence and warning activities of the reconnaissance forces in the Central Region. Each of these democratic nations must move within its legal procedures to authorize essential preparatory measures that should be taken in a period of strategic warning—a slow enough process even if well prepared for in advance, which is not now the case. Governments are themselves not yet prepared to overcome concerns that moving to a state of preparedness in response to a crisis situation would increase tensions, a theme long exploited by Soviet propaganda.

These problem areas alone could limit the duration of the conventional phase of hostilities to a matter of only days, or at best, a few weeks.

Because of the greater Soviet military pressure in NATO's Central Region, the special problems of the Northern and Southern regions are all too often overlooked. But these regions stand astride the exit routes from the Baltic, White and Black Seas, affecting access to the Atlantic, Mediterranean and the Middle East, together with the Persian Gulf. Turkey is the land bridge to the Middle East and Eurasia, standing between the USSR and the Middle East. The security of these areas affects the security of all NATO as well, and

is equally important in Soviet strategy. The Soviets maintain continuous political pressure on both regions, by such measures as the movement of elements of their armed forces, pressing the Svalbard issue, and, most recently, attacking prestocking in Norway and reviving the proposal for a nuclear free Scandinavia, and through economic and political overtures to Turkey. They remain quite ready to exploit internal difficulties in any flank country which might be used to weaken its ties to NATO.

The problems of these two regions are compounded by the longer distances which separate them from the rest of the Alliance. There are political problems in the Northern Region limiting peacetime foreign military presence, while in the Southern Region the heritage of the recent Greece-Turkey strife requires extensive rebuilding of the indigenous economic and military power base. Particularly as the additional military requirements for the Middle East are being considered, it is essential that the ability of the Alliance to support the countries of the flanks remain significantly high.

In time of crisis, smaller or more troubled nations need the assured support of their allies. The presence of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the NATO roles of United States military units at installations in the Southern Region have signalled that an attack in that area will not involve local forces alone. In the North, the preparatory pre-stocking for allied reinforcements should convey the same message; and combined training exercises can further demonstrate allied unity. The participation of various nations has been deemed politically important, as evidencing broadly-based identity of interest on the part of the Allies in the defense use of resources. Air defense and communications still need improvement. The overall very powerful political-military pressure in the Nordic area operates to make defense all the more difficult. In the south, the return of Greece to the NATO integrated military fold is most welcome news, but Turkey's extreme internal problems and the unfortunate hiatus in US arms supply have created continuing political and military problems of no small dimensions.

One of the better ways to speedily "show many flags," and so to demonstrate Allied resolve in a time of crisis, is the use of combined forces, such as elements from the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), and the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force, which can promptly be injected into an endangered locality. The ability to deploy such multilateral forces in response to pressures to position them on both flanks simultaneously could be important. They would underline the risks for the Soviets that attack on the flanks would involve real risks of widening of the theaters of war.

The ability to resupply NATO's first line troops takes on added importance in light of these problems of readiness. This immediately brings to mind issues of the availability of manpower, equipment and transport. European reservists are mainly dedicated to fill existing units and to be individual replacements rather than to constitute replacement units, mainly because of the lack of the additional unit equipment needed for the latter role. American reserves are notoriously short of personnel, particularly for the Individual Ready Reserve. Both are deficient in training. The status of equipment for re-supply is less than reassuring. Stockpiles of finished equipment are not available; nor, in many cases, are there adequate stockpiles of raw materials to permit production. Industrial mobilization is not organized or planned for in any adequate way, on either side of the Atlantic, to provide a "surge" capability in time of crisis or warfare.

The transportation system must cover not only military but civilian needs as well. Heavy equipment and bulk supplies will have to be moved by sea, and perhaps under combat conditions. Many European allies rely on United States replenishment of American-made inventory items. It has been computed that NATO will need some 12 to 24 dispositions of 70 merchant ships each at sea at any one time. The weakness of the American merchant marine has to some considerable extent been countered by the agreement of the European allies to make some 600 merchant ships available in time of emergency; but problems in assuring needed civil airlift support have not yet been resolved.

The task of receiving material in the theater and moving it up to the combat troops, a national responsibility, still is inadequately prepared for and loosely organized, despite reason to hope for progress in current negotiations for increased host nation support. The security of ports is threatened by the long range Soviet bomber and fighter bomber aircraft as well as missiles. The opportunities for mining of ports and for sabotage of supply are self-apparent. The capabilities of landing "over the beach" or by lighters are now being explored, but civilian ships' crews need to be made familiar with these measures. The nettlesome problem of refugees will further complicate the movement of men and equipment.

The ability to reinforce NATO's front line strength is one of the most significant aspects of NATO's ability to mount a credible deterrent. The ready, forward-deployed forces in Europe do not provide any forces for a strategic reserve for the Central Region, which is sorely needed to give credibility to the NATO defense. It is now doubly important in light of the improved readiness and offensive posture of the Soviet forces. To strengthen the defense and to

provide a strategic reserve, the United States is in the process of pre-positioning heavy equipment for four divisions in Europe, with equipment for two additional divisions planned to follow. This will permit personnel to be deployed by air, cutting deployment time to about 10-15 days after receipt of strategic warning and national decisions in response thereto. The ability thus to strengthen NATO defenses, in such a time of emergency,—indeed, to provide a reserve pending the arrival of US reinforcements—could be of the greatest political as well as military importance. It would demonstrate both the strength and the resolve of the Allies, notwithstanding the massive Soviet propaganda barrage about “tightening of tensions” which must be expected at such a time.

To what extent NATO can and should continue to rely on these plans for reinforcement from the United States, particularly in light of the additional responsibilities the United States is now assuming in response to the global threat, is the subject of more detailed consideration in a subsequent section of this policy paper.

But even under the more favorable assumptions of present plans, NATO cannot have high confidence of maintaining a forward defense without early resort to nuclear weapons. The heavily increased risks for NATO, stemming from the loss of that nuclear superiority on which it has long relied, and what it implies for the credibility of the deterrent, are dealt with in the next section.

#### **4. Is NATO Nuclear Strategy and Force Posture Up To Date?**

The central strategic nuclear capability of the United States remains an indispensable factor in the balance of power. Better-than-expected performance and earlier-than-expected deployment of the fourth generation of Soviet ICBMs, concurrently with the delay of U.S. strategic modernization programs, has nevertheless given the USSR general parity, if not in fact impending superiority. That trend is now in the process of being changed. Concern over the continuing survivability of the United States land-based missiles in light of growing Soviet missile strength and of the continuing capability of the other legs of the Triad is now leading to measures to redress such deficiencies. Inferiority at the strategic nuclear level would drastically affect the confidence and political fiber of all the Allies. Although the superiority in strategic nuclear weapons the West enjoyed in the past may no longer be attainable, inferiority simply cannot be accepted, as the American people have recently made clear. Maintain-

ing general strategic parity is hence a matter of such imperative priority, that, in the ensuing discussion it is assumed that it will be maintained by such short term and long term measures as may be necessary.

At the theater nuclear level, the deployment against Europe of the Soviet SS-20 mobile IRBM represented a substantial improvement in the Soviet nuclear arsenal, giving the Soviets a prompt counterforce capability against all of Western Europe, a capability not matched by NATO. Together with the Backfire bomber and the new generation of long range fighter bomber aircraft, this survivable long range threat to Europe has tipped the theater balance heavily in favor of the Warsaw Pact.

The relatively small Long Range Theater Nuclear Force (LRTNF) is at once a first step toward restoring the theater nuclear balance and a first step toward meaningful arms limitation negotiations on theater nuclear weapons. The LRTNF may serve as reassurance to those European Allies who were concerned at the possible decoupling of the strategic deterrent. It is, however, of more than political significance, in that it can provide an ability to interdict the reinforcement of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe, and will bring Soviet territory within range of weapons based in NATO. But while the LRTNF should make Soviet planners less confident of the success of large scale attack, the fact remains that resort to nuclear weapons by the Allies would be counter-productive should the Soviets respond with their full theater nuclear power.

The loss of the clear strategic and tactical nuclear superiority which marked the earlier years of NATO's history is obviously a matter for serious consideration. The extent to which it requires change or adaptation of NATO strategy and force posture is considered below.

NATO strategy has long been based on a combination of conventional and nuclear weapons. What the proper mix between these two elements should be has been a matter of equally long debate within the Alliance.

Some have favored a relatively low level of conventional defense. The arguments in favor of that position include defense budget limitations, concern that the ability to fight a sustained campaign on the conventional level would decouple the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, worry lest Europe again be devastated by a great conventional war as it was in the 1940's, and rightly or wrongly, a feeling that the Soviets are not going to attack the West even if there is only a low level of Allied resistance. These arguments are found mainly, but not solely, on the European side of the Atlantic.

Others have urged a higher level of conventional defense. They have believed that a conventional defense which could only hold for a matter of a short time would be no better than a trip-wire leading to nuclear war at an unnecessarily early stage. They have also been concerned that too thin a conventional defense would weaken the credibility of NATO's deterrent and defensive capability, as it would weaken the Soviet impression of the readiness of the NATO countries to move from deterrence to actual war if attacked on a large scale.

The end result of this debate has been a compromise in doctrine, and a conventional force and equipment level that has so far failed to meet even the levels that doctrine requires. NATO's conventional forces are supposed to be able to sustain a forward defense sufficient to inflict serious losses on the aggressor and convince him of the risks of continuing his aggression. As we have seen, NATO's forces can in fact sustain such an effort for all too short a period of time. But then NATO has been able in the past to rely on the use of tactical nuclear weapons to deter and defend to the extent that the conventional capability has been insufficient. Western nuclear superiority in the past supported the assumption that escalation to nuclear warfare would place control of the situation in NATO's hands.

What has occurred to change the picture is the loss of that fairly clear NATO superiority in both strategic and tactical (or theater) nuclear weapons, which had given the Atlantic Alliance escalatory control. Such clear NATO superiority is not likely to be seen again. The central strategic nuclear balance is likely at best to be one of general parity over any extended period of time. Meanwhile the Soviets have now gained superiority in the theater nuclear realm with its new generation of weapons, particularly the mobile, survivable SS-20. In such circumstances, resort to tactical nuclear weapons by the Allies would be likely to make them worse off, as not only the national infrastructure and populations of Western Europe, but also NATO's military forces themselves would be vulnerable to Soviet nuclear counter attack. To the extent that control of the situation through escalation to tactical or theater nuclear war exists, it can be said to now rest with the Warsaw Pact rather than the West.

This new situation calls for a thorough, new stock-taking. Its implications for the NATO deterrent concept are obviously significant. The first question is whether nuclear weapons are now of no significance other than to create a nuclear stand-off, leaving the conventional balance of forces to be the sole arbiter in the event of armed conflict. If that were to be the case, NATO might just as well choose to accede to the Soviet proposal for a "no nuclear first-use" treaty.

Deterrence depends on confronting an adversary with sufficient strength to make him doubt that armed attack could be profitable. Obviously, the more doubt of success, the better; the essential task is to deny him a reasonable prospect of success. In this context, nuclear weapons, as long as they continue to exist, may well continue to contribute to the deterrent by making the situation too ambiguous for any would-be aggressor. The shift in escalatory control surely means that the Soviet Union is no longer faced with as high a degree of probability as before that the West would employ nuclear weapons if it were at the point of losing a war. The question then is whether there is now absolutely no chance that the West would resort to first use, or whether the Soviets would have to entertain some doubt whether nuclear weapons might yet be used.

As long as nuclear weapons exist, and general strategic parity prevails, the risk of Allied first use of nuclear weapons in response to armed attack by the Warsaw Pact, particularly in times of confusion and anxiety or as a measure of last resort, simply cannot be excluded from the thinking of the Soviet planners. The loss of escalatory control appreciably reduces the readiness with which NATO would be prepared to initiate use of tactical or theater nuclear weapons; at the same time, it does not go so far as to necessarily reduce that chance to zero. If large scale Soviet conventional attack were met with a stubborn and sustained conventional defense but nevertheless was at the point of prevailing, the Soviets could not but be uncertain that such a resolute enemy would not turn to nuclear weapons as a measure of last resort. In such circumstances, with the conquest of a viable Western Europe no longer possible, and with the survival of the Soviet regime and homeland at risk, the Soviet planners simple would not have the ability to guarantee a reasonable chance of success.

It remains to consider what the effect would be on Soviet appraisals should NATO's conventional capacity to resist an attack remain markedly more limited, for example, a matter of days or at best a few weeks, as is now the case. The Soviets might well draw quite different conclusions from such a demonstration of lack of purpose on the part of the Alliance. They might base their estimates of the situation on European fears that the Americans were decoupling nuclear weapons because of fear of Soviet nuclear power, as well as on American reluctance to take the risks of strategic nuclear war on behalf of European allies which would not undertake a genuine conventional defense of their own lands. In the absence of NATO preparations for a more serious conventional level defense than in the past, they might then well be led to conclude that, if push came to

shove, NATO would not really fight at all, with either conventional or nuclear weapons.

In other words, the conventional balance has assumed far greater deterrent significance now than it did before when NATO had clear escalatory control. A more genuine conventional capability is essential to make NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense responsive to today's needs. It must be bolstered significantly if the Soviets are still to think the Alliance is serious. It must equally be bolstered to assure continuing confidence within the alliance that commitments and obligations are being shared equally, and that the job of deterrence and defense is being successfully performed.

Some observers believe that a new strategic doctrine is called for, one which pointedly rejects early reliance on nuclear weapons and clearly demonstrates the willingness of the European Allies to defend their homelands no matter the cost. But this would inevitably lead to a debate on nuclear strategic doctrine which could be divisive, creating domestic political problems for some Allies and sharpening divisions within the Alliance. In any event, it would not be necessary so long as a consensus developed simply reflecting a new sense of urgency about building up the conventional element of NATO's forces—a recognition that NATO's conventional strength, deficient even before the loss of nuclear superiority, is now on the way to being dangerously deficient.

### **5. Are NATO's Reinforcement Plans Still Realistic?**

At the December 1980 Ministerial Meeting of NATO, there was agreement "to prepare against the eventuality of a diversion of NATO-allocated forces the United States and other countries might be compelled to make in order to safeguard the vital interests of weaker nations outside the North Atlantic Treaty area." The Ministers then "recognized that the developing situation would entail a suitable division of labor within NATO." This agreement in principle remains to be fleshed out.

It is instructive to review how a major part of the reinforcement of the Alliance's defense effort falls on the United States. At the risk of over-simplification, it can be said that there seems to have been a basic assumption that all-out war would certainly involve the NATO theater, and that that theater would have overriding priority over any other. In light thereof, all American units not otherwise committed, both active and reserve, have long been allocated to the reinforcement

of NATO. Those premises now no longer fully apply, and hence it is necessary to consider how NATO's reinforcement needs can be met under the new circumstances of conflicting requirements.

Now it appears possible that some of these active duty American forces might have to be transferred to the Middle East should hostilities occur there at the same time as a NATO crisis. In addition, U.S. military air and sea lift as well as covering naval and air forces could be heavily involved in that theater just when needed to reinforce Europe. The all too few specialized service support units needed to receive, handle and maintain equipment once arrived in theater might all be already involved in the Middle East. There could also be some derogation of projected NATO deployments, such as intelligence collection aircraft and even combat units, as the needs in other theaters developed. The heavy shortages now existing in reserve units and in Individual Ready Reserve personnel if not overcome, could further jeopardize the reinforcement of the European theater. And should there be hostilities, the safe and prompt arrival of reinforcements in Europe, whether from the United States or the Middle East, would become increasingly uncertain.

The importance of being able to add to NATO's ready forces promptly on receipt of early warning has already been noted. Common prudence requires preparation now against the contingency that some of these reinforcements, most probably those units whose equipment had not been prepositioned in Europe, would not be available within the early time frame required.

It is not feasible to look to the United States in these circumstances, given the additional burden it is already assuming in the Middle East on behalf of the Alliance. Moreover, it must be assumed that available active U.S. ground forces would be already committed, whether to NATO or elsewhere, and the readying of reserve units from the U.S. would involve too great an element of time to be a useful measure.

One alternative would be to plan for the withdrawal of two or three divisions of U.S. ready forces from NATO Europe for deployment in Southwest Asia when and if needed. In terms of time and distance, Europe is much nearer to the oil fields of the Middle East than is the United States. At the same time, the political and practical problems of overflight arrangements, coupled with the political and military problems of such a force withdrawal from NATO should the crisis threaten the European front as well as access to the Middle East, make this alternative offer less than an adequately certain and effective basis for planning for either the NATO or the Middle East theaters.

On the other hand, a further alternative strongly commends itself because it would improve, rather than lower, NATO defenses. The European Allies have large numbers of reserves, but in many cases they are mainly intended to be individual replacements, and lack only training and the organizational equipment that would let them be quickly available for employment. To the extent that these reserves could be manned and equipped by the European Allies, the Alliance would be able to rely on a more assured, more immediate and less costly means for rapid mobilization and reinforcement by M+10. Though some increased costs for training of the reserve personnel would be involved, the greater personnel expense of continuing peacetime active duty pay would not need to be incurred. In this time of need, this obvious resource should be fully exploited to meet the need for the "suitable division of labor" the North Atlantic Council had in mind.

In addition, at least two other steps are needed to compensate for the effect of Middle East emergencies on NATO's ability. The shortage of airlift in the event of concurrent crises in two theaters would affect the ability of the United States to provide air transport for the divisions which would remain allocated to NATO for M+10 deployment. In light thereof, plans for Alliance-wide civil air transport support should be reviewed and updated to insure prompt and timely arrival of reinforcements upon receipt of early warning. A most essential additional measure would be the expansion of host nation support services to ensure the reception and forward movement within the theater of reinforcement and resupply shipments, a subject now under negotiation. The combat support and combat service support functions which are performed by the all too few U.S. specialized units should be transferred to European civilian and reserve personnel, lest the U.S. units be already involved in another theater. Contingency planning for other compensatory measures may well become desirable as the situation develops.

Once the Alliance deals with the immediate problem of compensating for the impact of Middle East requirements, it can turn to exploring means for meeting the growing need for improved conventional capability. The advantages that would accrue from developing the potential of reserves already in Europe are so significant as to suggest that this method of procedure also be increasingly relied on by the Alliance in the longer term future. Organizing the trained reserves in Europe into additional combat units which would be speedily mobilized and deployed in time of crisis could provide the most efficient and effective solution to that need.

## 6. How Can All These Defense Needs Be Met?

From almost every point of view, the resources of the non-Communist world far outweigh those of the Communist world: population, gross national product, productivity, technological capability, demography and that indispensable stimulus, freedom of thought.

Indeed, NATO Europe alone has two-thirds the population and more gross national product than the whole Warsaw Pact. If the economic strength of Japan is added to that of NATO, the superior strength of the industrialized nations of the West becomes even more apparent.

With regard to certain strategic natural resources, however, the allied nations are at some marked disadvantage. Indeed, it is surprising that the significance of those materials for a "surge" capability in military production has received so little attention. Minerals and metals such as titanium, manganese, chromium, cobalt, and aluminum must be imported by all the Western industrialized nations, while the Warsaw Pact countries can depend on their own resources for these commodities to a very great extent. Energy resources—particularly oil—are of critical importance to the Western nations. The lack of adequate stockpiling of such items has long been the subject of study within the Alliance, but, with few exceptions, of inadequate action. But with these exceptions, it is clear that the Allies have the resources in money and men to cope with any challenge of which the Warsaw Pact is capable.

The simple fact is that, while social programs have burgeoned, proportionately larger resources simply have not been made available for defense by the West, while the Warsaw Pact has given defense expenditures an overriding priority at the expense of social programs. At the same time, important military manpower problems have emerged which have been detrimental to the West. Terms of service have been reduced dangerously, and, in the case of the United States, problems of recruitment and retention of skilled and unskilled personnel have affected both the quality and quantity of what should be a proficient and fully manned force.

The fact that NATO has lost ground to the Warsaw Pact over the past decade is thus not due any more to the greater Soviet effort than it is to the inadequate Western effort. The sense of urgency with respect to defense measures has been lacking. Public support for defense clearly was flagging throughout the Seventies. Among the NATO nations, U.S. defense expenditures for NATO decreased in real terms over the decade. The expenditures of some of the European Allies increased. But the net result has been a broadening of the

number of deficient partners and a slowing down of the total defense effort. And even with the drop in the United States defense expenditures, the United States spent twice as much on a per capita basis as the European allies.

At the same time, the economies of many of the continental allies blossomed. France, Germany, the Benelux nations, and Norway all approached or bettered the same level of GNP per capita as the United States. Yet the ratio of defense costs of these nations to those of the United States remained about 5 to 3, or at best, 5-3½. The United States is currently on the verge of undertaking major new defense programs in an effort to rectify the present imbalance. This will concurrently require painful reductions in other sectors of the budget. It is part of a larger effort to strengthen the economy as well as the security of the nation. At the time of this writing, it is too early to say with certainty how much defense spending will actually be increased, but indications are clear that, with a Reagan program averaging \$35 billion increase per year for five years, there will be significant and sustained increase.

The result of these increases could bring the spending of the United States for defense close to the ratio of 2½ to 1 in relation to European allies whose GNP per capita is at least equal to that of the United States. Should European defense expenditures fail to respond to this sort of American leadership, the popular reaction in the United States can be easily imagined.

In terms of total resources, there is no question but that the United States and its European allies can increase their defense budgets substantially. The rate at which this can be done without adversely affecting the economy, let alone raising difficult political problems prejudicial to the common defense, is the practical question facing every government in the Alliance.

Leaders in the NATO countries naturally want to ensure that increasing defense expenditures will not result in political defeat at the hands of opponents who have opposed NATO over the years. Equally, they wish, in time of inflation, stagnant growth, exorbitant energy costs and economic and financial uncertainty, to preserve the health of their economies, so essential for political stability.

In fairness, it must be pointed out that the picture is by no means all one-sided. One can take comfort from the return of Greece to NATO's fold; from Turkey's renewed pledge of constancy, from France's increase of 18 percent in funds for defense, and from Italy's attitude on Theater Nuclear Weapons. Over the past decade, German expenditures for defense have increased more regularly than American. The European allies provide by far the greater share—over

three-quarters—of the ground and air forces for the defense of Europe. They provide proportionately more than the United States in terms of aid to less favored nations, an expense in the shared interest of security in the Third World. Germany has been a leader in economic aid to Pakistan, Poland, and above all, Turkey.

Most of the allies rely on conscription, rather than the more expensive all-volunteer forces employed by the United States. Indeed, some European leaders have said that Americans cannot be considered serious about their armed forces until they go to conscription. And, most importantly, the average European citizen, himself subject to compulsory military service, views the American system as a shirking of equal responsibility and hardship on the part of the United States.

Even so, there is a strong sector of American opinion that holds that greater burden sharing on the part of the Allies should be a pre-requisite to further NATO defense contributions by the United States. Some even go so far as to argue that increases in American defense budgets should be matched dollar for dollar by countries whose GPN per capita matches our own.

Some believe that the United States should withdraw two or more of the US divisions now stationed in Europe, leaving it to the European nations to replace them. The Atlantic Council's Working Group is emphatically opposed to reducing the American forces in NATO. In addition to being military folly at a time when NATO forces should be strengthened rather than weakened, it would send the wrong political signal to friend and foe alike. It would undermine European confidence in America, and generate strong pressures for European accommodation with the U.S.S.R. Weakening America's role could beget further weakness in Europe; conversely, staunchness on the part of the United States should beget a greater degree of staunchness throughout the Alliance.

Nevertheless, it must be bluntly cautioned that while the proposal for such a withdrawal from Europe is not the prevalent view at this time, American public opinion could very well turn in that direction if there was either a general belief that there was no longer a fair division of labor within the Alliance, or that the Allies were seriously at cross purposes in their foreign and defense policies.

The question of resources cannot be left without discussing the problem of burden sharing by nations outside NATO. With the per capita GNP of Japan approaching that of the nations of Western Europe and the United States, the share of Japan's contribution to world-wide peace and stability is inappropriately small. Even under the concept of "comprehensive security", whereby contributions to

local and regional stability through non-military measures would be included, it remains totally inadequate. Benefitting as Japan does from American security efforts in the Middle East and in North East Asia, as well as from the British and French naval presence off the Persian Gulf, it should not only bear an increased share of its self-defense, but contribute far more heavily and directly to the expenses being incurred to its benefit. Other allies in the Pacific, such as Australia and New Zealand, can also further contribute to the common effort.

The industrialized nations of the free world are profligate with the defense resources that are available to them. The NATO Allies, however, have all the disadvantages of a system wherein each nation is responsible for the supply of its own forces. The inevitable waste of duplication, with lack of interoperability of all too many kinds of equipment, has ensued, and, incredible though it may seem, has defied solution for over two decades. The cause has been a combination of selfish motives, including protection of national industry and labor, the "NIH" syndrome—whereby funds are refused for equipment "not invented here"—and just plain national pride. In all too many cases, American units and bases in Europe cannot support or repair the equipment of other allies which might need their help; and the same is true in reverse. Mutual support of troops deployed on each other's flanks becomes questionable in these circumstances. Economically, the result is deplorable; it could be tragic operationally.

But on both sides of the Atlantic there has been a lack of true dedication to a genuine two-way street for defense procurement. Past experiences have been unsatisfactory, particularly due to the attitude of the United States; and future plans unfortunately are based on that track record rather than on trying to achieve greater efficiency in the employment of allied resources. Unless greater efficiency in the employment of resources is achieved, the Alliance will continue to get less for each defense dollar than it should. Measures of rationalization, standardization and interoperability (RSI) such as licensing and coproduction have been useful. But even in their totality, and if given full support, they could not provide the sort of savings and effectiveness that could come from more intelligent use of the research, development and procurement measures of the respective nations to meet the military requirements of the Allied headquarters. Until national parliaments are willing to put protectionism aside in favor of the common good, however, maximum effective use of resources cannot be attained. The increasingly imperative need to bolster NATO's conventional posture should help to break through

old prejudices which can but ill be afforded today. In the meantime, RSI measures should be backed even more strongly than in the past, with the United States for once taking the lead in action as well as words.

## 7. Recapitulation: External and Internal Problems of the Alliance

It has already been pointed out that the most probable danger to the Alliance and the highest priority Soviet policy goal concerning the Alliance is the splitting of Europe and the United States. The Soviets can be expected to exploit fully such differences as exist, playing on them to exacerbate their impact. And such differences, stemming from divergent interests and perceptions, not only exist, but to a considerable extent, are inherent in the trans-Atlantic relationship. Moreover, we have seen how facing up to the need to update NATO defenses is bound to create additional internal problems for the Allies.

To recapitulate, the major issues that are likely to continue to trouble the Alliance as to the very nature of the threat and what to do about it are:

1. The change in the balance of power, which has heightened Western Europe's sense of physical vulnerability, and intensified allied anxieties about the reliability and effectiveness of U.S. protection and leadership.

2. The development of a degree of détente in Europe which is regarded by many Europeans as both an inevitable step toward peaceful life on the European continent and a crucial counterpart to collective defense. It has given the Europeans a tangible stake in maintaining the *status quo* and in decoupling their relations with the Russians from tensions and crises outside the NATO area. The U.S., on the other hand, is inclined to view détente as indivisible, and to deplore a differential East-West posture that protects allied fruits of conciliation at the expense of conceding the Soviets a free hand outside the NATO area.

3. The projection of Soviet influence as well as indigenous threats to Western access to vital resources in the Third World—through arms aid, Cuban and East German surrogates, and Soviet forces—has greatly increased. Ideally, this magnification of a common security threat to the U.S. and its allies should have galvanized them to take immediate concerted counter-measures. In reality, it has

accentuated differences of interest and perspectives. It has put the U.S. in the position of assuming the burden and risks of containment outside the NATO area on behalf of allies that fear such action may jeopardize détente. This has led some of the allies to look for ways to insulate themselves from regional conflicts.

4. The submerged but profound differences over the need to improve the conventional posture of the forces of the Alliance could lead to a major element of misunderstanding and distrust.

5. Burden sharing, particularly in light of the new tasks which the United States is undertaking in the Third World, especially for the Middle East, will be considerably in the public eye in days to come. As the American defense burdens increase, and as Europe's GNP per capita continues to approach that of the U.S., there will be strong pressures for greater contributions from the European allies.

And there are other problem areas as well. For example, European opinion attaches greater importance to the continuation of the arms limitation process and appears far more optimistic than does American opinion. It is a political imperative in Europe to be able to demonstrate that all reasonable efforts along that line are being exhausted in order to justify heavy defense expenditures; while American opinion is far less insistent on that point. And economic and financial relations among the industrialized nations are central to all other aspects of cooperation.

Overarching these differences is the general tendency of European opinion to leave the military and political responsibility for security outside the NATO area to the United States, while at the same time remaining free to criticize Washington for undue emphasis on the military nature of the threat and on the military side of solutions. This clash can be alleviated to the extent that the European allies become more involved and more responsible in these extra-NATO matters and the United States increasingly shares responsibility and direction of these enterprises with its friends. However, to the extent that common cause is not made on these matters, then it will be doubly important that the Europeans react more constructively to America's exercise of the responsibilities Europeans do not wish to share. By the same token, Americans will need to demonstrate a greater readiness to couple non-military solutions with those of a military nature.

If these problem areas are not openly recognized, and persistent efforts made either to eliminate or at least limit them on the one hand, or to carry on as an alliance despite them on the other, then they could breed misunderstanding and distrust. It is this potential for increasing disarray that is so disturbing.

The Allies can not afford to overlook either the dangers of exacerbated differences or the risks of inadequate defense measures, whether military or non-military. They cannot afford to give absolute priority to the need for agreement in their ranks, else they would be certain to attain only least common denominator agreements. Not one can afford to press for defense measures which would risk continued support for NATO. They must nevertheless find the means to improve their defense posture, and share that burden equitably.

While it would be self-delusion to pretend that all differences in point of view can be resolved easily or speedily, experience indicates that patient consultation among allies can, over time, find common ground. Thorough consultation and collaboration have borne fruit for the Allies in the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks, where the Allies have displayed remarkable unity on issues involving both defense policy and arms limitations policy. Similar unity among the Western nations at the Madrid Conference monitoring the Helsinki Agreements on the Soviet threats to Poland was the result of common appreciation of the importance of the issue.

If the Allies could develop a procedure that would result in consultation being initiated even as early as the time when divergencies were merely anticipated, early consultation could greatly reduce the possibility of the Allies working at cross purposes. Reaching full agreement within the Alliance on all such issues would be an unrealistic goal. There are issues on which no complete consensus exists or is likely to emerge. On the other hand, identifying the political risks of disagreement, when disagreement is inevitable, and working to minimize those risks, is well within the realm of the possible. The Allies should agree to bridge the gap between differing views wherever possible; make every effort to avoid surprises for allies whose views may differ; and try to limit the scope and impact of remaining disagreements.

The question of allied cooperation must be seen and understood not only by governments, but by parliaments, by the media and by informed public opinion as part of a long term, ongoing process. In this respect the role of the North Atlantic Assembly (and particularly of the U.S. participation therein) should be strengthened. After all, we are talking of a reinvigorated defense effort reaching well through this decade; and the opportunities for disagreements over any such time frame are naturally high. The problem is not in disagreement; it is in whether or not diversity of view in an alliance can be channelled to work for the common good.

The genius of the civilization of the Atlantic nations has been the ability to strike a reasonable balance between individual liberty and

responsibility to others. That concept, if applied to allied as well as domestic affairs, can afford the answer.

## CONCLUSIONS

Six important messages result from the foregoing review of the significance for the Atlantic Allies of the current manifold threats to their security.

**First, the security of the Allies can be endangered by events outside the NATO area just as much as by the threat in Europe, and by political warfare, whether at home or abroad, just as much by the military threat. The defensive measures of the Allies, whether within or without the Alliance, must be equally ecumenical.**

Soviet military strength cannot be permitted to dominate any friendly region, whether in Europe, Asia, Latin America or the Middle East. The armed forces of the free world should be able to deter and check Soviet attempts to subjugate free peoples by force or fear, whether the threat be direct or indirect.

The Allies should equally be able to help cope with the use of militant surrogates of the Soviets to subvert or overthrow governments friendly to the West without getting bogged down in another Vietnam.

They must increasingly be prepared to successfully employ means short of armed force, such as political and economic counter measures, to respond to threats short of actual hostilities.

In the Third World, they must work through and strengthen the independent governments politically and economically so as to help them resist external and internal dangers and seek to increase common interests with them.

Though the lead role may fall to the United States in defending the common interests of Allies abroad, the resistance to Soviet expansionism must increasingly reflect a broad base of international participation and support.

**Second, the United States must, by its actions and attitudes, re-assume the global responsibilities of leadership among the free world nations that cannot otherwise be fulfilled. The response of the European allies thereto is equally indispensable for the continued confidence and strength of the Alliance.**

The retrenchment of American power and leadership in recent years has strongly affected Allied confidence in and reliance on the United States. Reassurance will depend on insuring continuing general strategic nuclear parity and restoring a world-wide American military posture otherwise consonant with the requirements. It

will equally depend on American ability and willingness to relate more closely to European thought and European ability and willingness to reciprocate.

The resolve of the United States will be judged by friend and foe alike by the nature and scope of its defense program, and above all, by the example in terms of willingness to sacrifice it will set for the Alliance.

There is no reason why the European allies, particularly those which are now as well off as the United States, should not hold themselves to the same high standard of increased defense effort.

The public support necessary for a common defense effort still depends on Alliance-wide devotion to the concepts of self-help and mutual aid. If that exists, all other differences can be dealt with satisfyingly. Without it, the Alliance will falter.

**Third, deficiencies in conventional strength in a time when the West no longer has nuclear superiority must not be allowed to dangerously affect the credibility of the NATO deterrent strategy.**

Unless there is a significant improvement in the readiness, interoperability, and sustainability of NATO's conventional forces, there is increasing risk that Soviet planners could come to doubt the purpose as well as the ability of the Alliance to defend itself, whether at the conventional or nuclear level.

The improvement of the posture of NATO's general purpose forces is thus more urgently essential to bring the NATO deterrent up to date than ever before. In the absence thereof, loss of mutual trust and confidence within the Alliance, as well as greater risks in East-West relations, will all too likely follow.

**Fourth, the reservoir of military reservists in Europe should be tapped; first, to provide a reserve for Allied Forces Central Europe and thus compensate for United States forces presently allocated to NATO which may be required to protect the interests of allied nations outside the NATO area, and, subsequently, to further strengthen the conventional capability of the Alliance.**

Affording greater assurance of timely arrival at reserve battle stations on the European front and at markedly lower cost to the Alliance, common sense indicates that initial planning should cover the equivalent of the two to three divisions of American forces which might be required elsewhere.

In the longer term, additional combat units drawn from this pool could further enhance the conventional capability of the Alliance on a most economical basis.

**Fifth, the Allies must be increasingly conscious of the risks of disagreements among themselves and together find ways to keep such differences to manageable proportions, recognizing that without political harmony there can be no common defense.**

The augmentation of consultation on individual and collective measures to respond to challenges to their security should reduce the dangers of surprise amongst friends and the depth of disagreements among them. Nevertheless, divergent views of the European allies on the one hand and the United States on the other will continue to arise. The Allies must increasingly be alert to anticipate such problems, and to develop means to minimize their impact.

Not one of them can afford the luxury of going it alone.

**Sixth, allied cohesion, and the political will to contribute separately and jointly to the common defense depends upon public understanding of the issues involved.**

The enduring strength of the Atlantic Alliance lies, in the words of the Preamble of the Treaty, in the determination of its members "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilizations of their peoples."

In recent years that determination has shown serious signs of erosion, particularly on the part of the younger generations which have no personal memories of the causes, suffering, common effort and results of World War II.

Keeping that determination strong from generation to generation calls for stimulating the appreciation throughout the peoples of the Alliance of the basic values of Western Civilization and how they can be preserved.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The nations of the Atlantic Alliance must jointly expand their concept of defense and their activities, whether within or outside of NATO.

1) They should improve their procedures and their practices for **identifying challenges from any quarter** to the security of any of them, and for **consulting effectively on measures to be taken individually or in concert** in response to such challenges.

2) Such procedures and practices should increasingly embrace **the development of political and economic as well as military measures in response to challenges short of the use of armed force.**

3) They should develop the means to **work more closely with the nations outside of NATO** whose security is threatened by external forces, and should consult more closely with them and with each other on such challenges.

4) They should give priority to the task of identifying and **controlling the dangers of divergent perceptions and approaches within their ranks** equal to that of dealing with external threats.

5) They should increase efforts to **develop greater awareness**, particularly among the young, and among those in the armed services, **of the common need to strengthen and defend the basic values of Western Civilization.**

They should equally improve their means of defense, and jointly consider the following proposals:

6) **Expand military capability** so that challenges outside the NATO area can be met without affecting the credibility of the NATO deterrent.

7) **Compensate for the contingent need** to use perhaps two to three American divisions now earmarked for NATO in other areas by **drawing on the reservoir of readily available European reservists and civilian resources to form equivalent replacement units.**

8) **Provide the means** to establish the **readiness of NATO's conventional forces** by providing the equipment, manpower and training, now in seriously short supply, as specifically noted in this study.

9) Increasingly accord to the role of **conventional forces the priority** required of them as the result of the **passing of the period of Western nuclear superiority.**

10) Proceed to deploy **modern long range theater nuclear weapons** while continuing to seek **satisfactory arms limitation agreements.**

11) Be willing to join our allies in **pressing for arms control agreements which will enhance stability**, particularly confidence-building measures.

12) **In the longer term, increase the conventional force level** by organizing trained European manpower into additional reserve units.

13) Continue support for and the **ability to reinforce the countries of the northern and southern flanks:** particularly the political, economic and military assistance needed by Turkey to play its full role in the Alliance.

14) Seek to continually **adjust the burdens of global defense** so that nations which benefit from efforts in the common cause share more equally in the burdens thereof.

15) Make a major effort to **break through the resistance** to developing a **more economic use of the defense production resources** of the Alliance as a whole.

**Specific recommendations for the United States**, some of which could well apply to other allies, are:

16) The United States must demonstrate its readiness to **resume** a role of responsible and consistent **leadership** in world affairs.

17) It should increasingly demonstrate its readiness to **appreciate and consider** the particular concerns and **viewpoints of its allies**, expecting only that the Allies equally **appreciate and consider** the concerns and **viewpoint of the United States.**

18) The United States should stimulate a **new conviction** among Allied and friendly nations that, with full collaboration, it will be possible both to preserve liberty and keep the peace.

19) American **leadership by example** is needed to stimulate Allied confidence and accomplishment in restoring the balance of power.

20) **The Congress and the Executive Branch** must collaborate to provide the basis for a **long-term and consistent non-partisan foreign policy and defense program** for the years ahead.

21) The United States should recognize that progress toward **self-sufficiency in energy, toward financial stability and economic**

**growth** are indispensable if the United States is to meet its international obligations and its defense needs.

22) Not only must the **central strategic forces** be strengthened, and the **long range theater nuclear force** be supported, but American general purpose forces must be provided with the equipment, the manpower, the operating and maintenance budgets, the war reserve material, the logistic and air and sea lift support and protection, and the industrial mobilization base that will **materially increase their ability to sustain a conventional defense**. These revised goals should be clearly set out, and the long range programs to realize them projected, to insure the steady progress toward these ends.

23) The United States should take the lead in seeking to improve the **rationalization, standardization** and, above all, **interoperability** of defense equipment of the allies, seeking to develop in practice a reciprocally beneficial system that would enhance collective allied strength and at the same time abandoning the more nationalistic approach it has in fact too long pursued.

24) The United States should give high priority to **improving its military manpower posture**, and be prepared to turn to **some form of compulsory service** if adequate results are not forthcoming from other means in the near future.

25) The United States should provide increased and more consistent support to bilateral and multilateral **economic assistance programs** for the developing countries, and maintain its leadership in seeking to **open the markets** of the world on a reciprocal basis.

26) The United States should support a wider effort in the field of **foreign information broadcasts and publications** so that the people and the governments of the developing countries are more fully informed about world matters.

## Special Comment

Leonard Sullivan, Jr.

I agree with the central themes of this report, but believe it seriously underestimates the severity of NATO's inadequacies. It ignores the clear and evident need for major restructuring of the strategies, roles, and missions of both NATO and the larger Western Alliance.

The Working Group has begged the basic issue of whether or not, within the context of the unfavorable worldwide shifts in the "correlation of forces", NATO presents a credible deterrent to Soviet bloc exploitation. Like NATO itself, this group fails to differentiate between what might deter the West, and what will deter the Soviets. I find it highly unlikely that the Soviets are *militarily deterred* by a European NATO that:

- a) has no mechanism for the tactical or strategic linkage of military security threats in different parts of the world;
- b) depends critically on costly U.S. transoceanic reinforcements, also earmarked for other contingencies, rather than developing its own more effective latent mobilization potential;
- c) counts on nuclear escalation to avoid running out of conventional munitions;
- d) is composed of disparate multinational forces which do not use common equipment, cannot operate together, and could not resupply each other;
- e) fails to prepare the battlefield, and does not intend to defend itself in depth;
- f) will not inconvenience itself sufficiently to share equally in the burdens of its own defense; and
- g) assumes that the U.S. will absorb the predominant burden of nuclear destruction to avoid damaging Europe.

The Soviets are, at virtually no risk, expanding their political and economic inroads into Western Europe and encouraging the degeneration of the will and solidarity of the NATO members. How are they deterred from the pursuit of their objectives? Why on earth should they exercise military force unless or until Europe resists their advances?

If, on the other hand, Western Europe does eventually find the will to resist the bear's hug, then they will certainly first have to eliminate the strategic military absurdities noted above. There is no shortage of innovative alternatives available.

Equally as important as these military realities, the West must

recognize that its ultimate long-term political and economic strength lies in the depth and diversity of its civil sector, not its military structure. Unless and until the West comes to grips with the fundamental issues of preserving its *collective* economic strength and learning to *use it* as an instrument of its overall security objectives, the chances of arresting the deleterious shifts in the total correlation of forces are slim indeed.

Finally, this paper tacitly implies that the "vital security interests" are essentially independent of the level of allied acceptance of responsibility. But what delusion should *any* member of NATO or the entire Western Alliance be entitled to exploit the full benefits of our political and economic interdependence while inadequately contributing to our collective security? The large and real inequities in security burden sharing are already a disgrace and appear destined to become worse. It is past time for the U.S. to recognize and assert that it cannot and will no longer do more than its share. If greater participation is not forthcoming from either our North American, our Atlantic, or our Pacific allies, then the U.S. must for its own good unilaterally readjust its own security objectives and strategies to bring its expectations into line with its capabilities over the long haul. We have no supernatural mandate to sacrifice our own future on the altar of allied indifference.

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\*Resigned from the Board after assuming office in the Reagan Administration.