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083945

4610

IT 067

LE

FO 006-0

FB 006-12

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

REC-103

June 5, 1982

Dear Tom:

Thank you for your note of May 4, forwarding the Roth-Glenn-Nunn Resolution on Pooling NATO's Resources. Dennis Blair on our staff says he has discussed the proposal with you on the phone. I noted that the Resolution passed the Senate recently by an overwhelming margin.

You are aware of the emphasis which we have been giving to NATO conventional defense in the preparations for this Summit. Not only do we need to revive the flagging momentum of the initiatives of the late 1970s, but we need to counterbalance all the attention to NATO's nuclear policy which has virtually dominated discussion over the past two years. Behind the conventional defense emphasis are specific U.S. ideas such as the Roth-Glenn-Nunn Resolution, Senator Nunn's emphasis on taking advantage of new technology to improve conventional defense, and the improvements in our maritime capability which Secretary Lehman and others are working out. We will be discussing all these concepts in the corridors of the Summit meeting and in the many other formal and informal consultations with our NATO partners. As a matter of fact, we have already discussed them at Brussels with some of our NATO counterparts, and have received encouraging, if tentative, responses.

At the upcoming Summit the primary theme is unity and alliance solidarity. We consider it essential at this point not to open fundamental doctrinal questions. We all know that advancing technology will force continuous reevaluation of NATO tactics, and, eventually, strategy, and geopolitical realities will force the Alliance to consider subjects such as out-of-area threats. During these reevaluations we look forward to working with you and others who have ideas and expertise in the NATO field, and to cooperating with knowledgeable members of the Congress.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr.
5333 Westpath Way
Bethesda, Maryland 20816

Center for Strategic and International Studies

NSC # 8203275

KW

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

1 June 1982

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DENNIS C. BLAIR

SUBJECT: Reply to Tom Callaghan

Attached for your signature is a reply to a May 4 letter from your former associate (apparently) Tom Callaghan. It gives a positive reaction to his favorite project, the Roth-Glenn-Nunn resolution, without committing us to specific actions at the Summit.

In fact this resolution, as well as Senator Nunn's recent report, are being discussed in NATO. There have been some positive reactions. However we are not yet ready to give them a big push at this Summit, where the principal messages are unity and solidarity.

The reply for your signature encourages Callaghan without making specific commitments. I prepared a similar response from Judge Clark to a letter from Senator Roth himself.

RECOMMENDATION:

OK

NO

That you sign the reply at Tab I.

Attachment:

Tab I Reply to Tom Callaghan

In house - - but it a choice:

Mr Callahan

In part -

Never represented
view of govt.

F-16 -

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ad use any

sent from Carter to trade

Full expression for conventional force

If admin were to moderate
gathered wide spectrum

- Levin
- Saris

But
would
go long
way

omit per year

letter to Rth - (f. m)
Economic - attempt



The United Irish & American Society of Illinois



Chairman
Pat Hennessy
284-7413

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Joint Vice Chairmen
Pat O'Donnell

Dear Mr. President:

Corresponding Secretary
John Lynch
586-6416

As the tragic situation in Northern Ireland escalates and the possibility of a solution remains static, the Irish and Irish American clubs in the United States are uniting into coalition groups for the purpose of political action. The United Irish and American Society of Illinois is such a coalition. The Society represents thousands of Irish and American Irish in the greater Chicago area.

Recording Secretary
Lavergne Hickey

Treasurer
Frank O'Neill

As Irish and American Irish we can no longer remain silent or passive while our fellow men and women in Ulster suffer personal grief, economic depression, and blatant abuse of their human rights at the hands of a foreign power. The Irish Declaration of Independence of 1916 states, "...We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the unfettered control of Irish destinies..."

Legal Advisory Staff
Louis Kutner
Gabriel Barrett
Richard Lucey
Noreen Daly
Rosemary Larkin
Theodore Grippo

We urge you, as President of the United States to take a firm stand against the British occupation of Northern Ireland. We entreat you to use the great power of your office to explore every means at your disposal to initiate peace talks between the various political factions involved in this continuing controversy.

Freedom loving people of the world cannot remain neutral in regard to Northern Ireland. Ireland has waited for eight hundred years to be united and to be free. The time for a free and united Ireland is NOW.

Very respectfully yours,

Noreen C O'Donnell
6130 S Rockwell
Chgo. Ill 60629

May 4, 1982

MEMORANDUM

To: Robert C. McFarlane *Bud*
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

From: Thomas A. Callaghan Jr. *Tom*

Enclosed is a copy of the bipartisan Roth-Glenn-Nunn Resolution on Pooling NATO's Resources. The Resolution calls on the President to propose at the NATO Summit in Bonn that the Allied Heads of Government agree to:

- . pool their defense efforts and resources to create, at acceptable cost, a credible, collective conventional force for the defense of the North Atlantic area;
- . establish a cooperative defense-industrial base within Europe, and between Europe and North America, eliminating all unnecessary duplication of defense-industrial efforts;
- . share, equitably and efficiently, the financial burdens (which we want) and the economic benefits (which they want) of NATO defense;
- . begin negotiations promptly to establish the strategies, structures, policies, and programs to give full effect to these agreements.

The Resolution then assures the Allies that this policy will have the full support of the American people by requesting the President to work with the Congress, including the submission of implementing agreements to the Congress for approval. This procedure also assures American industry and labor that the negotiated agreements will be made with them, and not done to them.

Many attempts have been made in the past to achieve these cooperative goals. They have all failed because no effort was previously made (1) to involve the President and Congress from the very beginning, and at every stage of the process; (2) to insist that cooperation be not between the U.S. and twelve separate European governments, but with a Europe acting on a united and collective basis; and (3) to assure Europe of an equitable sharing of the economic benefits if they will share the financial burdens of NATO defense. This Resolution also brings the following issue to the fore:

Do the Allied legislators, and the Allied Heads of Government, have the moral right to impose a \$200 billion annual tax burden on their peoples to produce conventional forces that are collectively so weak, that the day could come when we must face the choice between surrender or nuclear war?

Given the anti-nuclear climate here and in Europe, no Allied leader could stand against this issue. The President could get on top of this immediately by signifying his welcome support for the Roth-Glenn-Nunn Resolution -- which may have the same place in history as the Vandenberg Resolution of 34 years ago.

5 May 1982



From the Desk of-
Thomas A. Callaghan Jr.

Dear Bud:

The enclosed formal memo on the Roth-Glenn-Nunn Resolution calling for the pooling of NATO's resources -- merits your immediate attention.

Presidential support for this Resolution (see last para) would garner overwhelming Congressional support. In turn, this would put the President in the strongest possible political position to propose the pooling of resources to NATO Heads of Government at Bonn in June.

You can reach me at 229-8781 if you want to discuss this.

Sincerely,

Tom

Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University

20816.



5333 West Path Way
Bellevue

20816.

[Faint handwritten signature]

[Faint handwritten text]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. Glenn, and Mr. Nunn)

submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

(Insert title of concurrent resolution here)

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

Expressing the sense of the Congress that the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance must pool their resources for their common defense.

Whereas, the United States remains firmly committed to cooperating closely with its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and its other allies in protecting liberty and maintaining world peace;

Whereas, the financial burden of defense of the Free World has reached such proportions that new cooperative approaches among the United States and its NATO allies are required to maintain an adequate collective defense at acceptable costs;

Whereas, although the North Atlantic democracies possess more than half again as many people as the Warsaw Pact countries, and more than twice the gross national product of the Warsaw Pact countries, the loosely organized national defense efforts of the 14 armed nations of the North Atlantic Alliance produce a collection of forces that are qualitatively uneven, quantitatively inferior, and have only a limited ability to rearm, repair, reinforce, support, supply, or even communicate with one another.

Whereas, the need for a credible conventional deterrent in Western Europe has long been recognized in theory but has never been fully addressed in practice, largely because of the existence for many years of American nuclear superiority in Europe;

Whereas, United States nuclear superiority in Europe has now disappeared, leaving European, Canadian and American forces in Western Europe vulnerable to the threat of attack by the overwhelmingly superior conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact countries;

Whereas, a more equitable sharing by member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of both the burdens and the technological and economic benefits of the common defense would do much to reinvigorate the member countries of NATO with a restored sense of unity and common purpose;

Whereas, the West's wasteful and duplicative defense-industrial system and inadequate collective conventional deterrent do not provide the Soviet Union with incentives to agree to meaningful and mutual arms reductions; and

Whereas, a decision to pool the West's enormous technological, industrial, and economic resources will not only lead to lower defense costs, but will provide a powerful inducement for the Soviet Union to enter into a meaningful arms reduction agreement so that both East and West can devote their energies and resources to peaceful, cooperative pursuits:
Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

That it is the sense of the Congress that --

(1) the President should propose at the summit meeting of the heads of governments of the member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter in this concurrent resolution referred to as "NATO"), scheduled to take place in June 1982 on Bonn, West Germany, that the NATO allies of the United States join the United States in agreeing to--

- (A) pool their defense efforts and resources to create, at acceptable costs, a credible, collective conventional force for the defense of the North Atlantic area;
 - (B) establish a cooperative defense-industrial effort within Europe and between Europe and North America that would ultimately reduce the defense costs of the United States and other NATO countries, by providing a larger production base while eliminating unnecessary duplication of defense-industrial efforts;
 - (C) share, equitably and efficiently, the financial burdens, as well as the economic benefits, including jobs, technology, and trade, of NATO defense; and
 - (D) begin negotiations promptly to establish the strategies, structures, policies, and programs to give full effect to the agreements described in clauses (A) through (C); and
- (2) to assure the NATO allies of the United States that the policy described in paragraph (1) has the full support of the American people, the President should work with the Congress in negotiating the implementing strategies, structures, policies and programs, and should present such agreements with the European members of the Alliance acting on a united and collective basis, and with Canada, to the Congress for approval.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this concurrent resolution to the President.

RECEIVED 08 MAY 82 12

TO MCFARLANE FROM CALLAGHAN, THOMAS A DOCDATE 04 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: NATO SUMMIT NUNN, SAM
DEFENSE POLICY CONGRESSIONAL ROTH, WILLIAM V
GLENN, JOHN H

SUBJECT: ROTH#GLENN#NUNN RESOLUTION ON POOLING NATO RESOURCES

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 11 MAY 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
RENTSCHLER MYER SHOEMAKER PIPES
KRAEMER RUSSELL LINHARD
NORTH
GOLD
MCGAFFIGAN

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID W /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO
Kimmet S 6/01 for concurrence
Clark V 6/02 for signature 6/5
C/6/5 MCFarlane Sgd ltr DB

DISPATCH W/ATCH FILE W/ (e) MCF

4661

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1110

IT 087

FG006-11

FG006-12

FG011

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 2, 1982

TR

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON
Office of Management and Budget
Executive Office of the President

SUBJECT: NSC Advisory on H.Con.Res. 347

This is to advise you that the NSC staff has reviewed and concurs with the State Department's proposed response (Tab A) to Chairman Zablocki concerning H.Con.Res. 347 on the subject of pooling NATO resources.

Michael O. Wheeler
Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment:

Tab A Proposed response to Zablocki

NSC# 8204661



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on H.Con.Res. 347. The Department shares the objective that NATO member countries must effectively pool their resources for the common defense. Efforts to improve conventional defense, especially in the area of armaments cooperation, can be invaluable both in improving the capabilities of Allied forces and reducing the cost of weapons procurement.

The Resolution supported U.S. efforts to ensure that at the Bonn Summit there would be a strong statement on improving defense. We were pleased when NATO leaders stated in documents released at the Summit that they will;

-- "In accordance with current NATO defense plans, and within the context of NATO strategy and its triad of forces, continue to strengthen NATO's defense posture with special regard to conventional forces."

-- "Continue to improve NATO planning procedures and explore other ways of achieving greater effectiveness in the application of national resources to defense, especially in the conventional field. In that regard, we will continue to give due attention to fair burdensharing and to possibilities for developing areas of practical cooperation from which we can all benefit."

-- "Explore ways to take full advantage both technically and economically of emerging technologies, especially to improve conventional defense."

The Alliance has made progress in the area of arms cooperation, and we will work toward greater achievements in this area. We have signed agreements with most of our NATO partners, which are designed to reduce obstacles to defense trade and improve cost effectiveness. We have also reached agreement within NATO for the coproduction of

The Honorable
Clement J. Zablocki,
Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.

several weapons systems. This will avoid the duplication of weapons systems and enhance the early exchange of technology. Finally, we have negotiated agreements for family-of-weapons projects, such as advanced air-to-air missiles and anti-tank guided weapons, which provide a transatlantic division of labor in the development of these systems. It is important to note that work to facilitate arms cooperation is a daily occurrence at NATO. We and our NATO partners work together in Brussels to develop common military doctrine. This doctrine serves as the essential basis for Alliance arms cooperation efforts. This continuing effort usually goes unnoticed because of lack of fanfare.

We do, however, have limitations which hinder us in meeting our arms cooperation objectives. Indeed, there are significant U.S. legal impediments to improving NATO arms cooperation. For example, the 1982 Defense Appropriations Bill contains restrictive provisions pertaining to specialty metals and administrative use vehicles which have caused our NATO Allies to express doubt as to our true commitment to an arms cooperation program. Also, I understand that the House will soon be considering an amendment to the FY 83 DOD Appropriations Act which would prevent DOD from making a foreign manufacturer the sole source for procurement of military weapons or equipment. If such an amendment were approved, our ability to meet our mutual objective of improved Alliance arms cooperation would be jeopardized.

Once again, we welcome your interest and support in this key area. We look forward to working with you in the future in efforts to improve that cooperation.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely,

Powell A. Moore
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 2, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER *Jm*

SUBJECT: Advisory to Peterson on H.Con.Res. 347

Your memo to Ronald K. Peterson (Tab I) provides an NSC advisory (affirmative) on a proposed State response to Chairman Zablocki (Tab A) concerning H.Con.Res. 347 which deals with pooling of NATO resources.

RECOMMENDATION:

OK

NO

That you sign the memo to Peterson at Tab I.

Please coordinate with Committee

Attachments:

- Tab I Wheeler memo to Peterson
- Tab A Proposed response to Zablocki



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

4661

June 30, 1982

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-
Department of Defense
National Security Council ✓

SUBJECT: State proposed report on H.Con.Res. 347
regarding NATO resources.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than TUESDAY, JULY 27, 1982.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler (395-4710), the legislative analyst in this office,

Ronald K. Peterson

RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc: Jeff Scott
Bob Howard

RECEIVED 01 JUL 82 12

TO WHEELER FROM PETERSON, R

DOCDATE 30 JUN 82

KEYWORDS: NATO RESOURCES

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

SUBJECT: STATE PROPOSED RPT ON HCR-347 RE NATO RESOURCES

ACTION: MEMO WHEELER TO PETERSON DUE: 26 JUL 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
RENTSCHLER	MYER	PIPES
	KIMMITT	KRAEMER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (H /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Wheeler</i>	<i>S 7/2</i>	<i>For Sig</i>	<i>7/3</i>	<i>RC ✓</i>
<i>C</i>	<i>7/6</i>	<i>Wheeler sgd memo</i>		<i>RE, RK, MW ✓</i>

DISPATCH *7/6 clm* W/ATTCH FILE *WH* (C) *clm*

ID # 095773

IT 067

WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

O - OUTGOING

H - INTERNAL

I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 02/08/25

Name of Correspondent: U.S. Mission to NATO

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Unopened (NATO Confidential)

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
NSC		ORIGINATOR	02/08/25		C	02/08/25
		Referral Note:				
		Referral Note:				
		Referral Note:				
		Referral Note:				

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

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Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

RECORDS MANAGEMENT ONLY

CLASSIFICATION SECTION

No. of Additional Correspondents: _____ Media: S Individual Codes: 1.170 _____

Prime Subject Code: IT 067 Secondary Subject Codes: _____

PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

SIGNATURE CODES:

- CPn - Presidential Correspondence
 - n - 0 - Unknown
 - n - 1 - Ronald Wilson Reagan
 - n - 2 - Ronald Reagan
 - n - 3 - Ron
 - n - 4 - Dutch
 - n - 5 - Ron Reagan
 - n - 6 - Ronald
 - n - 7 - Ronnie
- CLn - First Lady's Correspondence
 - n - 0 - Unknown
 - n - 1 - Nancy Reagan
 - n - 2 - Nancy
 - n - 3 - Mrs. Ronald Reagan
- CBn - Presidential & First Lady's Correspondence
 - n - 1 - Ronald Reagan - Nancy Reagan
 - n - 2 - Ron - Nancy

MEDIA CODES:

- B - Box/package
- C - Copy
- D - Official document
- G - Message
- H - Handcarried
- L - Letter
- M - Mailgram
- O - Memo
- P - Photo
- R - Report
- S - Sealed
- T - Telegram
- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

U.S. Mission to NATO
270 New York 09687
OFFICIAL BUSINESS

WHITE HOUSE MAIL
RECEPTION AND SECURITY
OFFICE


MAR 25 4 10 03

*NSC
copy*

SG/82/367

NATO CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.



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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 17, 1982

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FG006-11

FO003-02

FG006-12

1 LD

MEMORANDUM FOR RONALD K. PETERSON

FROM: MICHAEL O. WHEELER MW

SUBJECT: Proposed Defense Department Report on H.R. 347

The NSC staff has no objection to the proposed DOD Report on H.R. 347. We support efforts to achieve improved defense cooperation among NATO members.

NSC# 8205658

HW

MEMORANDUM

5658

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

August 16, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL O. WHEELER

THROUGH: RICHARD T. BOVERIE *B*

FROM: ALLAN A. MYER *OSM*

SUBJECT: Proposed DOD Report on H.R. 347

OMB has requested our views on the Defense Department's proposed report on H.R. 347, "To express the sense of the Congress that the member countries of NATO must more effectively pool their resources for their common defense".

DOD and the Administration have long supported efforts to achieve improved defense cooperation among NATO members. As DOD accurately points out, in recent years there have been a number of restrictive legislative provisions which impair cooperative defense efforts. H.R. 347 should be supported.

Jim Jim Rentschler and Bob Kimmitt concur. *PKS for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign memo at Tab I to Ronald Peterson.

Approve ✓

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Ronald Peterson
- Tab II Incoming Correspondence



5658
CR 4661

August 6, 1982

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-
Department of State
National Security Council



SUBJECT: Defense proposed report on H. Con. Res. 347,
"To express the sense of the Congress that the
member countries of the NATO must more effectively
pool their resources for their common defense.

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to
the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.
A response to this request for your views is needed no later than
FRIDAY, AUGUST 27, 1982.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler (395-4710),
the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc: John Eisenhower
Bob Howard



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

August 4, 1982

Honorable David A. Stockman
Director, Office of Management
and Budget
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Mr. Stockman:

The views of the Department of Defense have been requested on H. Con. Res. 347, 97th Congress, "To express the sense of the Congress that the member countries of the NATO must more effectively pool their resources for their common defense."

Advice is requested as to whether there is objection to the presentation of the attached report to the Committee.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to read "Werner Windus".

Werner Windus
Director
Legislative Reference Service

Enclosure



GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Honorable Clement J. Zablocki
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Reference is made to your request for the views of the Department of Defense on H. Con. Res. 347, 97th Congress, "To express the sense of the Congress that the member countries of the NATO must more effectively pool their resources for their common defense."

The Department of Defense fully supports the goal of increasing both the efficiency and effectiveness of Alliance defense efforts through greater defense cooperation among the NATO nations. The Department of Defense believes that NATO conventional defenses must be improved and that some of the resources necessary to achieve needed improvements could come through increased cooperative efforts within the Alliance.

As a part of its continuing effort to improve NATO defenses, the Department of Defense strove to ensure that the recent NATO Summit in Bonn issued a meaningful statement on defense along with its other declarations. The Summit statement on defense not only stressed the need for strengthening NATO's defense posture, particularly conventional forces, but also called for achieving greater effectiveness in the application of national resources to defense. H. Con. Res. 347 was helpful in producing a climate of understanding that made possible the successful advocacy of this kind of language in the Summit documents.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, our efforts to achieve improved Alliance defense through rationalization of defense production and armaments cooperation often encounter serious obstacles. Recent legislation has made our task much more difficult and has raised questions in the minds of our Allies regarding the true direction of U.S. policy toward the Alliance.

As an example, we are striving to strengthen deterrence through improving our capacity rapidly to reinforce NATO Europe in a time of crisis or war. A cornerstone of these improvements is the prepositioning in Europe of the equipment of three additional divisions. This prepositioning will add significantly to the credibility of NATO's deterrence by making it possible for these divisions to reach Europe very quickly. Such speed could in some situations serve to avert hostilities, thus saving untold lives and treasures. Despite this, however, the 1982 Defense Appropriations Act contains restrictions which prevent us from progressing toward our prepositioning goals and there are even more severe restrictions being proposed for 1983.

Additionally, there are significant U.S. legal impediments to improving NATO arms cooperation. The 1982 Defense Appropriations Act also contains restrictive provisions pertaining to specialty metals and administrative use vehicles which have caused our NATO allies to express doubt as to our true commitment to an arms cooperation program. Also, I understand that some members have been considering an amendment to the FY 83 Defense Appropriations Act which would prevent the Department of Defense from making a foreign manufacturer the sole source for procurement of military weapons or equipment. If such an amendment were approved, our ability to meet our mutual objective of improved Alliance arms cooperation would be jeopardized.

We believe H. Con. Res. 347 implies both the need and the responsibility for the House of Representatives to take all possible steps to remove present and avoid future restrictions which would serve to hinder and defeat the kind of Alliance cooperation which the Resolution calls for. We would greatly welcome such an effort and would cooperate with it in every way possible.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this report for the consideration of the Congress.

Sincerely,

RECEIVED 09 AUG 82 13

TO WHEELER

FROM PETERSON, R

DOCDATE 06 AUG 82

WINDUS, W

04 AUG 82

KEYWORDS: NATO

DEFENSE POLICY

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PROPOSED REPORT ON HR-347 RE NATO COMMON DEFENSE

ACTION: MEMO WHEELER TO PETERSON

DUE: 27 AUG 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~RENTSCHLER~~

MYER

BOVERIE

PIPES

MYER

KRAEMER

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8204661

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(N /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Wheeler</i>	<i>S 8/17</i>	<i>for signature</i>	<i>8/19</i>	
	<i>C 8/17</i>	<i>Wheeler's memo to Peterson</i>		<i>Am, Law, TIC</i>

DISPATCH *H.W. 8/18*

W/ATTCH FILE *(W4) (G)*

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Paw
PLU
article -

NATO Officials Agree to Study Trade Issues

By Richard M. Weintraub
Washington Post Staff Writer

Ministers to Bypass Pipeline Dispute To Tackle East-West Economics

VAL DAVID, Quebec, Oct. 3— Foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization agreed today to temporarily bypass their divisions over the Soviet natural gas pipeline and launched wide-ranging studies into the economic components of the East-West relationship.

"The ministers agreed on the basic considerations of what is necessary for the West's security in the economic field," Canadian Foreign Minister Allan MacEachen said in announcing the decision.

The Reagan administration, which banned sales of equipment to the Soviets for the pipeline in retaliation for the martial law in Poland, has imposed sanctions against companies in Britain, France, West Germany and Italy after parts made under U.S. license were shipped. The sanctions led to a bitter dispute over an issue the United States had hoped would be a point of Western unity in opposition to Poland's crackdown against the independent trade union Solidarity.

The administration contends that economic pressure on the Soviet Union will lead Moscow to influence events in Warsaw.

Since the sanctions were imposed, the United States has said it would welcome alternatives, and the agreements reached here today appear to be the first serious effort to find those alternatives, a point made by senior administration sources in welcoming the initiatives.

French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, a bitter foe of the sanctions, spoke positively of the agreements.

"The decision to discuss the overall policy and economic relations is something new," he said. "The United States is consulting its allies before making major economic decisions."

MacEachen was host to the unusual meeting of the 16 NATO officials at a rustic lodge nestled in the Laurentian Mountains about 55 miles north of Montreal. West Germany, which changed governments Friday, was represented by a top-level career diplomat and the other nations sent foreign ministers.

MacEachen emphasized that the steps announced today in no way imply "economic war or trade war" against the Soviet Union and its allies but are designed to probe areas in which the Western alliance might be strategically vulnerable to the Warsaw Pact because of economic relationships.

The studies, which one minister involved in the talks emphasized were "operational," will probe energy, credits, agricultural commodities, high-technology goods with military applications as well as those for

more general use and general trade levels.

The studies will be undertaken in a variety of forums, including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, where Japan also is involved; the International Energy Agency; COCOM, the committee that deals with sales of military-related technology, and special sessions of finance ministers as well as the regular economic summit meetings of the heads of the major industrial states.

MacEachen said no timetable was set but that there is "a sense of urgency" about the project.

The 16 officials met alone, except for interpreters, for a total of eight hours in four meetings this weekend. The idea of holding informal talks without aides first originated with Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo and was meant to follow the example of similar meetings that have been held for several years within the European Community.

After a hesitant opening session, according to one participant from a key European country, the group began to deal with major issues.

"There was an identity of views" fairly quickly on security policies, on the military aspects of force levels

and the necessity to pursue arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, the minister said.

The real point of discussion was on the gas pipeline and energy. But the basic question, he said, was whether security policy should be only military or should it be something more, such as economic policy.

"These discussions brought to the fore that a global policy also should include the economic issues," the official said.

MacEachen stressed that the decision to develop a broader policy on trade with the Soviet Bloc did not imply a change by either side in the short run on the sanctions. It was unclear whether the results of the studies launched today will satisfy the Reagan administration's stated goal of developing wide-ranging and effective economic measures for dealing with the Soviet Union that could replace the pipeline sanctions.

In recent weeks the Reagan administration and the four European countries have become increasingly unyielding in their positions on the pipeline, with powerful domestic political considerations added to the foreign policy mix.

Tensions on the issue were so great that some European policymakers had begun to express fears of long-term damage to the alliance.

MacEachen attempted to put those fears to rest, saying, "Anyone who thinks the alliance is in bad shape is dead wrong. Anyone who thinks Americans and Europeans can't get along is dead wrong."

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Bonn, Germany

October 21, 1982

Dear Jim

The enclosed copy of a speech of mine delivered on October 20 before a German military audience may be of interest to you. I enclose it together with my regards and best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur F. Burns
Ambassador

The Honorable
James Baker
Washington

Speech given by Burns on the NATO Alliance
before a German Military audience

REFLECTIONS ON THE NATO ALLIANCE

BY

ARTHUR F. BURNS

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

PRESENTED AT
ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE
COMMANDERS OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL ARMED FORCES
HAGEN, WEST GERMANY
OCTOBER 20, 1982

REFLECTIONS ON THE NATO ALLIANCE

I AM VERY PLEASED BY YOUR INVITATION TO ADDRESS THIS DISTINGUISHED AUDIENCE. AND I SHALL BE ESPECIALLY GRATEFUL IF YOU ACCEPT MY PRESENCE HERE AS TESTIMONY OF THE HIGH RESPECT IN WHICH MY COUNTRY HOLDS THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC'S MILITARY SERVICES.

DURING THE PAST YEAR, STRIDENT VOICES HAVE BEEN ACCORDED EXCESSIVE ATTENTION BOTH IN YOUR COUNTRY AND IN MINE. LET ME THEREFORE REGISTER AT THE START MY GOVERNMENT'S APPRECIATION OF GERMANY'S CONTRIBUTION TO OUR COMMON DEFENSE.

AS THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR I HAVE HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN ABOUT THE EXCELLENCE OF YOUR FIGHTING FORCES, ABOUT THE HIGH STATE OF READINESS OF YOUR MILITARY RESERVES, AND ABOUT THE VAST AMOUNTS OF PROPERTY THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC PUTS AT THE DISPOSAL OF ALLIED TROOPS. I AM AWARE ALSO OF OTHER SACRIFICES THAT GERMANY IS MAKING TO ASSIST AMERICAN SOLDIERS AND AIRMEN, PARTICULARLY YOUR RECENT DECISION TO COMMIT SOME 90,000 RESERVISTS IN SUPPORT OF AMERICAN COMBAT FORCES IN THE EVENT OF WAR. AND I NEED HARDLY ADD THAT MY GOVERNMENT FULLY APPRECIATES THAT IF WAR BROKE OUT IN EUROPE, THE PREPONDERANT PART OF NATO'S LAND, NAVAL, AND AIR FORCES WOULD, INITIALLY AT LEAST, BE EUROPEAN.

BUT I REGRET TO ADD THAT MANY, PERHAPS MOST, AMERICANS ARE UNAWARE OF THE IMPRESSIVE SCALE OF EUROPEAN--ESPECIALLY GERMAN--COMMITMENTS TO NATO, JUST AS TOO MANY EUROPEANS HAVE LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF AMERICAN EFFORTS ON THEIR BEHALF OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA. LARGELY AS A RESULT OF SUCH MUTUAL IGNORANCE, WE HAVE EXPERIENCED TENDENTIOUS DEBATES OVER DEFENSE BURDEN-SHARING, MILITARY STRATEGY, ARMS CONTROL, OSTPOLITIK, DETENTE, AND A HOST OF OTHER POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES.

A PARTICULARLY TROUBLESOME ASPECT OF TRANSATLANTIC MISUNDERSTANDINGS IS THE FAILURE OF NUMEROUS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS OF THE GENERAL PUBLIC, TO GIVE SUFFICIENT WEIGHT TO THE DIFFERENCES OF PERSPECTIVE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO ALLIES BRING TO WORLD PROBLEMS.

I AM NOT THINKING NOW OF EPHEMERAL SOURCES OF FRICTION THAT PERIODICALLY ARISE, SEIZE THE HEADLINES FOR WEEKS OR MONTHS, AND THEN VANISH TO PRACTICALLY EVERYONE'S RELIEF. WHILE TROUBLESOME AT THE TIME, SUCH PASSING DISAGREEMENTS OFTEN TEACH OUR COUNTRIES SOMETHING USEFUL ABOUT ONE ANOTHER, JUST AS AN HONEST AIRING OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MARRIAGE PARTNERS OFTEN STRENGTHENS FAMILY TIES.

IN THE CASE OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIES, I WOULD PUT IN THE CATEGORY OF "PASSING DISAGREEMENTS" THE DEBATE OVER REARMING OF GERMANY IN THE 1950'S; THE DEBATE OVER THE MULTILATERAL FORCE IN THE 1960'S; THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE "YEAR OF EUROPE" IN THE 1970'S; AND I HOPE THAT BEFORE LONG WE CAN ADD, AS AN EXAMPLE FROM THE 1980'S, THE ONGOING CONTROVERSY OVER THE SIBERIAN PIPELINE.

EXAMPLES SUCH AS THE FOREGOING ARE MORE EASILY MANAGEABLE THAN THE DIFFERENCES OF PERSPECTIVE TO WHICH I HAVE JUST REFERRED. INSTEAD OF SQUANDERING PRECIOUS POLITICAL CAPITAL ON WHAT ARE FAIRLY BOUND TO BE TRANSITORY IRRITATIONS, WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES. FOR OUR PREPONDERANT PURPOSE MUST ALWAYS BE TO WORK TOWARDS CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOMMODATION OF OUR BASIC NATIONAL INTERESTS.

THERE ARE AT LEAST TWO SUCH FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES. FIRST, THE UNITED STATES BRINGS A GLOBAL VIEW TO WORLD AFFAIRS, IN CONTRAST TO THE WIDELY HELD REGIONAL VIEW OF OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS. SECOND, EAST-WEST RELATIONS ARE VIEWED QUITE DIFFERENTLY ON EACH SIDE OF THE ATLANTIC.

AS A RESULT OF THESE DIFFERENCES OF PERSPECTIVE, WE NOW AND THEN FIND OURSELVES AT ODDS ON IMPORTANT ISSUES OF POLICY, SUCH AS THE NATURE AND GRAVITY OF THE SOVIET THREAT; THE PROPER RESPONSE TO SOVIET AGGRESSION, AS IN AFGHANISTAN OR POLAND; THE PRINCIPLES THAT SHOULD GOVERN TRADE WITH THE EAST; THE BEST MEANS OF PROVIDING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SUPPORT TO COUNTRIES OF THE THIRD WORLD; AND THE PROPER ALLIANCE RESPONSE TO THREATS TO ITS SECURITY THAT ARISE OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA, AS IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

IT MAY HELP OUR RESPECTIVE NATIONS TO DEAL WITH THE MAJOR DIFFERENCES OF PERSPECTIVE OF WHICH I HAVE SPOKEN IF WE CAN REACH BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR ORIGINS. LET US THEREFORE STOP TO EXAMINE THESE DIFFERENCES.

THERE IS, FIRST, THE QUESTION OF A GLOBAL VERSUS A REGIONAL VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. WE AMERICANS HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING THE TENDENCY OF EUROPEANS TO BE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED WITH EVENTS IN THEIR OWN BACKYARD. NEVERTHELESS, WE ARE OFTEN TROUBLED BY WHAT WE PERCEIVE TO BE A EUROPEAN RELUCTANCE TO CONFRONT THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE OF EVENTS THAT TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE EUROPE ITSELF. IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, AMERICANS HAVE FREQUENTLY BEEN URGED NOT TO "ROCK THE

BOAT" WHEN WE HAVE CALLED ATTENTION TO THE DANGEROUS ADVENTURES UNDERTAKEN BY THE SOVIET UNION OR ITS SURROGATES IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD--AS IN AFGHANISTAN, SOUTHEAST ASIA, POLAND, PARTS OF AFRICA, AND CENTRAL AMERICA.

IN FACT, OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES REPEATEDLY INFORM US THAT THEY CANNOT PLAY AN ACTIVE MILITARY ROLE OUTSIDE OF EUROPE, AND THAT WORLDWIDE CRISIS MANAGEMENT MUST THEREFORE REMAIN THE PROVINCE OF THE UNITED STATES. BUT WHEN WE THEN PROCEED, IN KEEPING WITH THAT AWESOME RESPONSIBILITY, TO COUNTER SOVIET AGGRESSION, WE ARE APT TO BE CRITICIZED FOR WHAT WE DO, OR FOR HOW WE DO IT, OR BOTH.

CONSIDER, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CASE OF AFGHANISTAN. THE AMERICAN DECISION TO BOYCOTT THE 1980 SUMMER OLYMPICS IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN WAS WIDELY CRITICIZED BY EUROPEANS AS POINTLESS SYMBOLISM--ALTHOUGH IT MUST BE ADDED IN ALL FAIRNESS THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WAS ONE OF THE FEW COUNTRIES TO JOIN US IN THAT BOYCOTT.

SUBSEQUENTLY, THE UNITED STATES TOOK STEPS, IN RESPONSE TO THE GENERALLY UNSTABLE SITUATION IN SOUTHWEST ASIA, TO PROTECT VITAL AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN ACCESS TO OIL SUPPLIES. WE INCREASED OUR NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN

OCEAN, AND ESTABLISHED A RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE WHOSE MISSION IS TO RESPOND PROMPTLY TO SUCH THREATS AS MIGHT ARISE IN THAT REGION. BUT WHILE THE UNITED STATES WAS AT FIRST CRITICIZED FOR RESPONDING SYMBOLICALLY IN AFGHANISTAN, WHEN IN FACT A DIRECT MILITARY RESPONSE ON OUR PART WAS THEN IMPOSSIBLE, WE LATER FOUND OURSELVES CRITICIZED FOR TAKING MILITARY PRECAUTIONS TO DETER FURTHER AGGRESSION. OUR MILITARY INITIATIVES WERE CHARACTERIZED BY SOME AS BEING PROVOCATIVE TOWARD MOSCOW, AND THEY WERE CRITICIZED BY OTHERS ON THE GROUND THAT WE WERE WILLING TO USE AMERICAN FORCES COMMITTED TO NATO OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA--THUS INCREASING THE THREAT TO EUROPE ITSELF.

WHEN AMERICANS ARE CRITICIZED FOR INVOLVING THEMSELVES IN BEHALF OF FUNDAMENTAL WESTERN INTERESTS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE, AS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, AND THEN FIND EUROPEANS MOVING SELECTIVELY OUT OF THEIR CONTINENTAL SHELL, AS IN THE CASE OF EL SALVADOR, IT SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISING THAT MANY AMERICANS ARE LEFT WONDERING WHAT PRECISELY EUROPEANS EXPECT OF THEM.

THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THIS AMERICAN-EUROPEAN DISSONANCE CAN BE FOUND, I BELIEVE, IN OUR RESPECTIVE NATIONAL HISTORIES. THE UNITED STATES ENTERED THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AS A GROWING BUT NONETHELESS A REGIONAL

POWER, WITH GEORGE WASHINGTON'S WARNING AGAINST "ENTANGLING ALLIANCES" STILL THE GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

UNTIL THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR II, AMERICANS CONSIDERED BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY AS THE WORLD'S LEADING MILITARY POWERS. MOST OF MY COUNTRYMEN WOULD HAVE LOOKED ASKANCE AT THE PROSPECT OF THE UNITED STATES SUCCEEDING THE EUROPEAN POWERS IN THAT ROLE, OR TYING ITSELF TO EUROPE'S FATE THROUGH AN "ENTANGLING ALLIANCE." THE HASTE WITH WHICH WE DEMOBILIZED OUR MILITARY FORCES AFTER WORLD WAR I, AND AGAIN AFTER WORLD WAR II, IS REVEALING IN THIS CONNECTION. BETWEEN 1945 AND 1948, THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS IN UNIFORM SHRANK FROM ALMOST 12 MILLION TO A MERE 1,300,000.

WITH THIS BACKGROUND IN MIND, IT SHOULD BE EVIDENT THAT THE RATHER WIDESPREAD CURRENT EUROPEAN CRITICISM OF THE UNITED STATES AS AN AGGRESSIVE SUPERPOWER TENDS TO DAMAGE ALLIANCE HARMONY IN TWO RESPECTS. FIRST, SUCH CRITICISM TROUBLES MANY AMERICANS, WHO FIND IT PUZZLING WHY EUROPEANS DEROGATE THE SUPERPOWER STATUS OF THE NATION THAT TWICE CAME TO RESTORE FREEDOM IN EUROPE. SECOND, THIS ANTI-SUPERPOWER STANCE SERVES TO FUEL THE DISENCHANTMENT OF MANY AMERICANS WITH A BURDENSOME WORLD ROLE THAT OFTEN APPEARS TO BE ONLY GRUDGINGLY SUPPORTED BY OUR ALLIES.

I AM INCLINED TO CONCLUDE THAT THE REASONS BEHIND THE GLOBAL VERSUS REGIONAL DEBATE WILL BE BETTER UNDERSTOOD IF WE KEEP IN MIND THAT DURING THE VERY PERIOD WHEN AMERICANS WERE ADJUSTING WITHOUT ENTHUSIASM TO A WORLD ROLE WHILE LONGING FOR SIMPLER TIMES, WESTERN EUROPEANS WERE COPING WITH THE LOSS OF A WORLD ROLE WHILE REMEMBERING IT WITH NOSTALGIA. IT WOULD BE HARD TO IMAGINE A RICHER FIELD FOR OCCASIONAL MISUNDERSTANDING AND HURT FEELINGS EVEN AMONG NATIONS THAT ARE JOINED FIRMLY IN AN ALLIANCE.

THE DRASTICALLY ALTERED WORLDWIDE POWER RELATIONSHIP OF WHICH I HAVE JUST SPOKEN HAS HAD A DIRECT IMPACT ON OUR SECOND AREA OF MAJOR MISUNDERSTANDING: THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP.

ONLY IN THE PERIOD SINCE WORLD WAR II HAS THE UNITED STATES PAID MUCH HEED TO RUSSIA AS A MILITARY THREAT. EVEN DURING THE "RED SCARE" DAYS OF THE 1920'S, IT WAS THE PERCEIVED POLITICAL--AND NOT THE MILITARY--THREAT POSED BY SOVIET RUSSIA THAT GAVE AMERICAN LEADERS PAUSE.

THE VAST POLITICAL, MILITARY, AND ECONOMIC POWER THAT WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS REPRESENTED IN AMERICAN EYES, TOGETHER WITH THE FACT THAT WE AND THE RUSSIANS WERE SEPARATED BY HALF THE GLOBE, MADE THE VERY

IDEA OF A RUSSIAN MILITARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES SEEM FAR-FETCHED. WE THEN ASSUMED THAT WESTERN EUROPE WOULD BE READY TO CHECK POSSIBLE RUSSIAN EXPANSIONISM IN MUCH THE SAME WAY THAT WESTERN EUROPEANS NOWADAYS TEND TO LOOK TO THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF THAT FUNCTION.

INDEED, UNTIL THE MID-1940'S, THE PRINCIPAL OVERSEAS DANGER TO AMERICA WAS PERCEIVED TO COME FROM WESTERN EUROPE ITSELF, NOT FROM EASTERN EUROPE. UP UNTIL OUR CIVIL WAR, THE BRITISH WERE REGARDED AS THE MAJOR THREAT; SUBSEQUENTLY, THIS ROLE WAS ASSIGNED BY AMERICANS TO THE GERMANS, NOT TO THE RUSSIANS.

IT IS AN INESCAPABLE FACT THAT UNTIL MISCALCULATION AND DELUSION LED EUROPE INTO WORLD WAR II, THE NATIONS OF WESTERN EUROPE WERE CAPABLE OF COUNTERBALANCING THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION. AT THE END OF THAT WAR, HOWEVER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION FOUND THEMSELVES STANDING FACE TO FACE IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHILE MOST OF THE OTHER NATIONS ON THE CONTINENT WERE POWERLESS. A SECOND ELEMENT--NUCLEAR WEAPONRY--THEN EMERGED WITH DECISIVE IMPACT ON THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP.

I NEED NOT DWELL BEFORE THIS AUDIENCE ON THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SHAPING THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS THE MILITARY ASPECT OF POSTWAR EUROPE. BEFORE 1940, MOST AMERICANS--AND, I SUSPECT, MOST EUROPEANS AS WELL--WOULD HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE EXPRESSION "EAST-WEST RELATIONS" REFERRED TO RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WESTERN NATIONS AND, SAY, CHINA AND JAPAN. THE IDEA OF A FAULT LINE RUNNING THROUGH THE HEART OF EUROPE WOULD HAVE SEEMED ABSURD.

BUT ONCE THE WAR ENDED, THE TERM "EAST-WEST RELATIONS" QUICKLY ACQUIRED A NEW MEANING. WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONRY ON THE HORIZON AND THE PREPONDERANCE OF POWER IN THE HANDS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE NEWLY BORN EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION TOOK ON A WORLDWIDE DIMENSION--WHICH IT RETAINS TO THIS DAY. AND IT IS PRECISELY HERE THAT WE FIND THE LINK BETWEEN THE EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE GLOBAL VERSUS REGIONAL DEBATE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ON THE OTHER.

MORE THAN ANY OF OUR ALLIES, AMERICANS TEND TO SEE AND TO FEAR SOVIET POWER BEING PROJECTED ON A WORLDWIDE SCALE. SOVIET TROOPS AND THEIR SURROGATES NOWADAYS CONDUCT A MILITANT FOREIGN POLICY AROUND THE WORLD. NOT ONLY THAT, THE SOVIET FLEET PATROLS THE SEAS OFF AMERICA'S EASTERN, WESTERN AND CARIBBEAN COASTS, AND SOVIET AIRCRAFT TEST OUR AIR DEFENSES.

WHETHER ONE LIKES IT OR NOT--AND WE AMERICANS DO NOT PARTICULARLY LIKE IT--ONLY THE UNITED STATES CAN RESPOND ON A COMPARABLE SCALE. WE REMAIN THE COUNTERBALANCE.

THIS, THEN, IS WHERE THE TWO BASIC DIFFERENCES IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS--NAMELY, EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND GLOBAL VERSUS REGIONAL STRATEGY--COME TOGETHER. FOR AMERICANS, EAST-WEST RELATIONS CANNOT BE REGIONAL; THEY ARE NECESSARILY GLOBAL. WE ARE BOUND TO EUROPE BY STRONG CULTURAL AND POLITICAL TIES. WE DO NOT LIKE TO CONTEMPLATE TURNING OURSELVES INTO A FORTRESS AMERICA. AND WE FEAR THAT IF THE UNITED STATES WERE TO WITHDRAW INTO A REGIONAL SHELL, CONFINING ITSELF TO THE AMERICAN CONTINENT, WESTERN EUROPE WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO ACCOMMODATE ITS OWN WORLD VIEW TO THAT OF THE NEIGHBORING SUPERPOWER--THE SOVIET UNION.

I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT NEXT ON A RELATED DIFFERENCE OF PERSPECTIVE THAT IS PRESENTLY TROUBLING THE NATIONS OF THE ALLIANCE - THAT IS, OUR DIFFERING VIEWS OF DETENTE.

IN THE FACE OF EUROPEAN UNEASE ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ABANDONMENT OF DETENTE AS A PART OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, IT IS USEFUL TO RECALL THAT A DECADE AGO MANY EUROPEANS WERE EQUALLY CONCERNED THAT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION WERE BECOMING ALTOGETHER TOO CLOSE.

AS CHRISTOPH BERTRAM, THE DISTINGUISHED FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES IN LONDON, RECENTLY OBSERVED, "EUROPEANS ARE WORRIED IF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE PROGRESSING SMOOTHLY LEST THIS IMPLY A 'DEAL OVER OUR HEADS;'...YET THEY ARE EVEN MORE WORRIED IF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE IN DIFFICULTIES AND UNDERSTANDABLY SO: THE EFFECTS ARE FELT MOST DIRECTLY IN EUROPE." THE EUROPEAN IMPULSE, MR. BERTRAM ADDS, "IS OFTEN NOT TO RALLY TO THE WESTERN AGAINST THE EASTERN SUPERPOWER BUT TO RESENT BOTH AS SPOILERS OF EUROPEAN DETENTE."

NO ONE CAN DENY THAT WEST GERMANY HAS A GREATER INTEREST IN PRESERVING DETENTE THAN DOES THE UNITED STATES. IF ONE WERE TO ASK A TYPICAL CITIZEN OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO LIST THE BENEFITS OF OSTPOLITIK AND DETENTE, HE COULD POINT TO NORMALIZATION IN AND AROUND BERLIN, TO IMPROVED PERSONAL CONTACTS BETWEEN CITIZENS OF THE TWO GERMANY'S, TO THE RETURN OF A QUARTER MILLION ETHNIC GERMANS FROM EASTERN EUROPE IN THE LAST HALF DOZEN YEARS, TO STRONGER ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN EUROPE--IN SHORT, TO A WHOLE RANGE OF DEVELOPMENTS THAT CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE FLOWERING OF DETENTE IN THE 1970'S.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IF ONE WERE TO ASK A TYPICAL AMERICAN CITIZEN TO IDENTIFY SOME WAY IN WHICH DETENTE HAS AFFECTED HIS LIFE, HE WOULD BE HARD PUT TO RESPOND. FROM A PURELY DOMESTIC STANDPOINT, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR AMERICANS TO COME UP WITH A TELLING ARGUMENT FOR DETENTE. NOT ONLY THAT, BUT WHEN AMERICANS TURN TO THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE, THEY INEVITABLY VOICE DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THEIR EXPECTATIONS FROM THE POLICY OF DETENTE HAVE NOT BEEN FULFILLED--THAT REPRESSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS VASSAL STATES HAS NOT DIMINISHED, WHILE THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP AND ITS POLITICAL ADVENTURISM AROUND THE GLOBE HAVE ACTUALLY INCREASED.

GENTLEMEN, LET US NOT SHY AWAY FROM ADMITTING THAT THERE IS A MAJOR DIFFERENCE IN PERCEPTION HERE. MY GOVERNMENT HAS BECOME DOUBTFUL ABOUT THE ADVANTAGES OF DETENTE. YOUR GOVERNMENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, PERCEIVES CONTINUING BENEFITS.

THE TWO STANDPOINTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY CONTRADICTORY, BUT IN ORDER TO LIVE WITH THEM OUR TWO COUNTRIES NEED TO AVOID EXAGGERATING EXTREME POSITIONS. AS PRESIDENT REAGAN DECLARED IN BERLIN LAST JUNE: "A UNITED, RESOLUTE WESTERN ALLIANCE STANDS READY TO DEFEND ITSELF IF NECESSARY. BUT WE ARE ALSO READY TO WORK WITH THE SOVIET BLOC IN PEACEFUL COOPERATION IF THE LEADERS OF THE EAST ARE WILLING TO RESPOND IN KIND."

PERSISTENT DIFFERENCES OF PERSPECTIVE AMONG ALLIES, SUCH AS THOSE I HAVE DISCUSSED, MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO CLOUD THE PARAMOUNT FACT THAT NATO HAS ASSURED THE PEACE, THE SECURITY, THE FREEDOM, AND THE PROSPERITY OF ITS MEMBERS FOR OVER THIRTY YEARS. WE SHOULD NOT FEAR TO CONFRONT OUR DIFFERENCES. ON THE CONTRARY, WE MUST UNDERSTAND AND DEAL WITH THEM IF THE ALLIANCE IS TO SURVIVE AND REMAIN ROBUST.

WE MIGHT BEGIN BY RECOGNIZING THAT DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES DO NOT MEAN DIVERGENT MORAL OR POLITICAL OR PHILOSOPHIC VALUES. NATO WAS FOUNDED IN 1949 AS A DEFENSIVE MILITARY ALLIANCE, COMMITTING THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND THE WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES TO STEM SOVIET AGGRESSION IN EUROPE. NATO COULD NOT, HOWEVER, HAVE REMAINED VIABLE OVER ITS LONG HISTORY IF ITS PURPOSE HAD BEEN ONLY MILITARY.

NO, GENTLEMEN. THE REASON FOR THE SURVIVAL AND VITALITY OF THE ALLIANCE DERIVES FROM A FACT WHICH OVERRIDES EVERY OTHER--NAMELY, THAT IT IS BASED ON AND REPRESENTS THE BASIC MORAL AND POLITICAL VALUES THAT WESTERN EUROPE SHARES WITH THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. IN THE ABSENCE OF THOSE COMMONLY SHARED VALUES, WE COULD FIND IN AN HOUR OF THREATENING DISASTER THAT THE POLITICAL WILL TO RESIST NAKED AGGRESSION WAS ABSENT. THEN NATO WOULD INDEED BE THE HOLLOW SHELL THAT SOME INADEQUATELY INFORMED CRITICS ALREADY DESCRIBE IT AS BEING.

THE TIME IS CERTAINLY RIPE FOR SOME ADJUSTMENT IN NATIONAL ATTITUDES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. LET US, FIRST OF ALL, KEEP IN MIND THAT THE INHERENT TASK OF INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY IS TO ACCOMMODATE DIVERGENT PERCEPTIONS OR INTERESTS, AND THAT THIS ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVE IS BEST PURSUED WITHOUT THE FANFARE OF PUBLICITY. THIS YEAR'S UNSEEMLY POST-VERSAILLES SPECTACLE OF VARIOUS NATIONAL SPOKESMEN MAKING STATEMENTS ON WHO "WON" AND WHO "LOST" AT THE SUMMIT MEETINGS MUST NOT BE REPEATED.

SECOND, BETTER CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES AMONG THE NATIONS OF NATO ARE NEEDED IN THE INTEREST OF HARMONY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. WHILE MEETINGS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY AND DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS OF NATO COUNTRIES OCCUR RATHER FREQUENTLY, THEY HAVE NOT BEEN THOROUGH ENOUGH OR TIMELY ENOUGH--PERHAPS NOT EVEN FREQUENT ENOUGH--TO AVOID OCCASIONAL SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDINGS. AS A NEWCOMER TO THE DIPLOMATIC PROFESSION, I CONTINUE TO BE ASTOUNDED BY THE ECCENTRIC VIEWS THAT SOME OF THE HIGHEST OFFICIALS IN NATO NATIONS AT TIMES NOURISH ABOUT THE INTERESTS OR OBJECTIVES OF THEIR SISTER GOVERNMENTS.

THIRD, WE NEED TO DEAL MORE RESOLUTELY THAN WE YET HAVE WITH ELEMENTS OF INCOHERENCE IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE WEST. ON THE ONE HAND, NATO COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN DEVOTING, YEAR AFTER YEAR, VAST RESOURCES TO OUR COMMON DEFENSE AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT. SIMULTANEOUSLY, HOWEVER, PARTLY THROUGH PRIVATE BANKS AND PARTLY THROUGH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, WE IN THE WEST HAVE LOANED DURING THE PAST DECADE VAST SUMS OF MONEY TO THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SATELLITES. AT TIMES, THIS HAS EVEN BEEN DONE AT SUBSIDIZED INTEREST RATES. IN VIEW OF THE PRIORITY THAT THE SOVIET UNION ASSIGNS TO ITS MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES THAT WE HAVE SO LIBERALLY PUT AT ITS DISPOSAL HAVE INDIRECTLY HELPED TO STRENGTHEN ITS ALREADY FORMIDABLE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. TO MAKE MATTERS WORSE, THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN ABLE TO BENEFIT UNDULY THROUGH ITS IMPORT OF TECHNOLOGY AND MILITARY-RELATED PRODUCTS FROM WESTERN NATIONS. THESE FACTS HAVE BEEN STRONGLY EMPHASIZED BY THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, AND THEY ARE BETTER UNDERSTOOD BY OUR ALLIES TODAY THAN THEY WERE A YEAR AGO. FORTUNATELY, DESPITE RECENT DIFFERENCES ABOUT THE SIBERIAN PIPELINE, THERE ARE SOME ENCOURAGING SIGNS THAT A MORE COHERENT WESTERN POLICY TOWARD THE EAST MAY BEFORE LONG DEVELOP, AND THAT NATO ITSELF MAY BECOME MORE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE RESOLUTION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE.

FOURTH, FOR SOME YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN SEEKING EXPANSION OF NATO'S INTEREST BEYOND THE AREA SPECIFIED IN THE FORMAL TREATY. THIS EFFORT USUALLY MET WITH CONSIDERABLE RESISTANCE IN EUROPE, AT LEAST PARTLY BECAUSE OTHER NATO NATIONS FOUND IT UNDESIRABLE TO BE DRAWN INTO ACTIVITIES THAT COULD DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THEIR MORE CENTRAL CONCERNS. OF LATE, AT LEAST SOME OF OUR ALLIES HAVE COME TO REALIZE THAT DEVELOPMENTS OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA MAY INDEED HAVE SUFFICIENT SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE TO JUSTIFY THEIR ASSISTING THE UNITED STATES. ACTION, HOWEVER, HAS LAGGED BEHIND RHETORIC; AND THIS THEREFORE REMAINS A SUBJECT THAT DESERVES THE MOST EARNEST ATTENTION OF NATO NATIONS.

FIFTH, THE WORLD-WIDE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES OF THE PAST TWO OR THREE YEARS HAVE INEVITABLY EXACERBATED TENSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THE SPECTER OF PROTECTIONISM IS AGAIN RAISING ITS UGLY HEAD BOTH IN WESTERN EUROPE AND IN NORTH AMERICA. IT IS CLEARLY IN THE PERMANENT INTEREST OF EVERY MEMBER NATION OF THE ALLIANCE NOT ONLY TO WARD OFF PROTECTIONIST DEVICES WITHIN ITS OWN DOMAIN, BUT ALSO TO COOPERATE MORE CLOSELY WITH ITS ALLIES IN ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AREAS. A STRONG AND HEALTHY INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY IS ABSOLUTELY FUNDAMENTAL TO THE CONTINUED POLITICAL AND MILITARY VITALITY OF NATO.

SIXTH, WHILE THE COMBINED STRENGTH OF OUR NATIONS IS ENORMOUS, WE DO NOT MAKE THE BEST USE OF OUR ASSETS TO MEET ALLIANCE GOALS. IN A RARE SHOW OF VIRTUAL UNANIMITY, THE UNITED STATES SENATE PASSED EARLIER THIS YEAR A RESOLUTION URGING THE CREATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM FOR MORE EFFECTIVE POOLING OF NATO'S VAST FINANCIAL, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES. IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY FOR ALL OUR NATIONS, THE OBSTACLES TO SUCH A GOAL ARE GREAT; BUT WE MUST DO BETTER IN THE FUTURE IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE TO DEFEND OURSELVES ADEQUATELY.

TIME WILL NOT PERMIT ME TO GO MUCH FURTHER IN THESE REFLECTIONS ON THE NATO ALLIANCE. BUT I CANNOT LEAVE THIS AUDIENCE WITHOUT REPEATING A THEME THAT I HAVE STRESSED SINCE ASSUMING AMBASSADORIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN BONN--NAMELY, THAT WE MUST DO BETTER WITHIN OUR NATO COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY IN YOUR COUNTRY AND MINE, IN TEACHING YOUNG PEOPLE THAT OUR SHARED MORAL AND POLITICAL VALUES HAVE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR THEIR OWN AND THEIR COUNTRY'S FUTURE.

IT APPEARS TO ME THAT SOME YOUNG CITIZENS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC AT TIMES TAKE AN ALMOST PERVERSE DELIGHT IN EXAGGERATING DIFFERENCES AMONG OUR NATIONS. THEIR BELITTLING OR TOTALLY DISMISSING THE

VALUES THAT BIND US TOGETHER IN NATO FILLS ME WITH SADNESS. THOSE VALUES ARE NOT ABSTRACT CONCEPTS. INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW ARE PRICELESS REALITIES THAT HAVE BEEN HANDED DOWN TO US BY OUR ANCESTORS AT ENORMOUS SACRIFICE OF BLOOD AND TREASURE. UNFORTUNATELY, MANY YOUNG PEOPLE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA NOW TAKE THESE VALUES FOR GRANTED, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THEY HAVE NEVER BEEN WITHOUT THEM, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN CHALLENGED SUFFICIENTLY TO HELP PRESERVE THEM--INDEED, TO FIGHT FOR THEM IF NECESSARY.

IT IS OUR COMMON RESPONSIBILITY AS PARENTS, AS TEACHERS, AS POLITICANS, AND AS CITIZENS TO MAKE SURE THAT THE DEMOCRATIC VALUES THAT BIND US IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP ARE APPRECIATED BY THOSE WHO FOLLOW IN OUR FOOTSTEPS AND WHO WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME LEADERS OF OUR RESPECTIVE SOCIETIES. THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IT MEANS TO LIVE IN A DEMOCRACY--NOT ONLY ITS BENEFITS BUT ALSO ITS RESPONSIBILITIES--IS ESSENTIAL IF CITIZENS ARE TO BELIEVE IN AND PRESERVE THE VALUES REPRESENTED BY DEMOCRACY. THESE VALUES ARE THE ESSENTIAL MORTAR OF OUR NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. THAT IS WHY MUCH OF MY ENERGY AS AMBASSADOR IS DEVOTED TO BETTERING THE OPPORTUNITIES OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN YOUR COUNTRY AND MINE TO BE EXPOSED TO EACH OTHER'S LIVES AND CULTURES.

MY HOPE IS THAT IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD, AMERICANS AND EUROPEANS--ESPECIALLY THE CITIZENS OF YOUR COUNTRY AND MINE--WILL AVOID RHETORIC THAT INFLAMES PASSIONS, THAT GOOD WILL AND REASON WILL PREVAIL IN ACCOMMODATING BOTH OUR PERSPECTIVES AND OUR INTERESTS, AND THAT WE WILL ALWAYS REMEMBER THAT AS LONG AS THE NATIONS OF THE WEST STAND TOGETHER OUR WESTERN CIVILIZATION WILL REMAIN SECURE.