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Last Updated: 03/30/2023

2427

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

F6006-12

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: EXECUTIVE CLERK'S OFFICE

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Proclamation of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain

The State Department has forwarded for your signature a proclamation of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain.

RECOMMENDATION

<u>OK</u><u>NO</u>

That you sign the proclamation at Tab A

April 15, 1983

Attachment:

Tab A Proclamation


T.D 97-22 dated: 4/18/83 Dignee Prepared by Donald R. Fortier Jo STATE, Rn. 7241 Mas meringer: 4/12/83 NHN #9302427

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*83 NPI 15 P4:40

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BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A PROCLAMATION

CONSIDERING THAT:

The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain, signed on behalf of the United States at Brussels on December 10, 1981, the text of which is hereto annexed;

The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of March 16, 1982, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Protocol;

The President of the United States of America on April 1, 1982, ratified the Protocol in pursuance of the advice and consent of the Senate, and the United States of America deposited its instrument of ratification on April 1, 1982;

Pursuant to the provisions of the Protocol, the Protocol, entered into force for the United States of America on May 29, 1982; NOW, THEREFORE, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, proclaim and make public the Protocol to the end that it be observed and fulfilled with good faith on and after May 29, 1982, by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed this proclamation and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed. DONE at the city of Washington

APR 18, 1923

our Lord one thousand nine hundred eighty-three and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred seventh.

By the President:

Ronald Bogan

Secretary of State

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

12495255 -I-T067

2427

April 15, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

EXECUTIVE CLERK'S OFFICE THROUGH:

WILLIAM P. CLARK FROM:

Proclamation of the Protocol to the North SUBJECT: Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain

The State Department has forwarded for your signature a proclamation of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain.

RECOMMENDATION

OK

NO

That you sign the proclamation at Tab A

SIGNED

Attachment:

Proclamation Tab A

> Prepared by Donald R. Fortier

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

April 12, 1983

2427


MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER

SUBJECT: Proclamation of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum to the President through the Executive Clerk's Office requesting that the President sign the proclamation of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain (Tab A). Tab II transmits the Proclamation to State. Speechwriters have cleared.

RECOMMENDATION



Attachments:

Tab I	Mem	orandum to t	he Presi	dent through	
	the	Executive C	lerk's C	Office	
Tab	A	Proclamati	on for t	he President	's signature
Tab II	Men	orandum from	State		

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National Security Council The White House

Package # <u>2427</u>

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter			
Bud McFarlane		m	
Jacque Hill			
Judge Clark	/		
John Poindexter			and the second
Staff Secretary	-V-		
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I-Information (A-A	ction R-Retain	D-Dispatch	N–No further Action
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cc: VP Mees	e Baker De	eaver Othe	r
	COMMENTS	5	

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520 April 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proclamation of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain

Attached for signature by the President is the proclamation of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain, signed on behalf of the United States at Brussels on December 10, 1981.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on March 16, 1982; the President signed the instrument of ratification on April 1, 1982, and the instrument was deposited on April 1, 1982. The Protocol entered into force on May 29, 1982.

Charles Hill

Charles Hill Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Proclamation

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION

CONSIDERING THAT:

The Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain, signed on behalf of the United States at Brussels on December 10, 1981, the text of which is hereto annexed;

The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of March 16, 1982, two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein, gave its advice and consent to ratification of the Protocol;

The President of the United States of America on April 1, 1982, ratified the Protocol in pursuance of the advice and consent of the Senate, and the United States of America deposited its instrument of ratification on April 1, 1982;

Pursuant to the provisions of the Protocol, the Protocol, entered into force for the United States of America on May 29, 1982; NOW, THEREFORE, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, proclaim and make public the Protocol to the end that it be observed and fulfilled with good faith on and after May 29, 1982, by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed this proclamation and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed. DONE at the city of Washington

> our Lord one thousand nine hundred eighty-three and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred seventh.

By the President:

Secretary of State

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97TH CONGRESS

2d Session

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SENATE

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PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF SPAIN

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TRANSMITTING

A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLAN-TIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF SPAIN, SIGNED IN BRUS-SELS ON DECEMBER 10, 1981, ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

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JANUARY 28, 1982.—Protocol was read the first time and, together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate

> U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1982

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE WHITE HOUSE, January 26, 1982.

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a certified copy of a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Spain, signed in Brussels on December 10, 1981 on behalf of the United States and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. I transmit also for the information of the Senate the report made to me by the Secretary of State regarding this matter.

Spain's rededication to the values and purposes underlying the North Atlantic Treaty, and her decision to seek full partnership in the effort to maintain Western security, are historic developments and a source of inspiration in these troubled times. Spain's strategic location, and human and material resources, will make a major contribution to the security of the Alliance. Accordingly, I urge that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this protocol.

RONALD REAGAN.

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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, January 15, 1982.

The PRESIDENT, The White House.

THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to its transmission to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification, a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Spain, which was opened for signature at Brussels on December 10, 1981 and which has been signed on behalf of the United States of America and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Spain's influence on the evolution of Western culture and values has been profound. In the aftermath of the disastrous Civil War of 1936–1939, however, Spain was relatively isolated from the mainstream of Western European and North Atlantic developments, particularly in their institutional manifestations. The death of General Franco in 1975 signalled the beginning of the end of this unfortunate era. Since that time, Spain has made extraordinary progress in the restoration of democratic institutions. It is now seeking to resume its rightful place in the councils of the free nations of the West. These developments warrant the continued support and encouragement of the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies.

The enclosed protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Spain constitutes a concrete manifestation of the recognition by the United States and its allies that the time has now come for Spain to assume full partnership in the basic mechanism for the preservation of Western security. Accession of Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty

will be a matter of great significance, not only for Spain, but for the Alliance as a whole. Spanish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will provide the means for integrating into Alliance defense planning the important contribution that Spain can make to the maintenance of peace and security in the European and North Atlantic area. Geographically, Spain is of unique strategic importance, occupying the bulk of the Iberian Peninsula and fronting both the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Participation in the various NATO military programs will assist in the modernization of the Spanish armed forces and also help those forces to exercise a role compatible with democratic institutions.

The United States and Spain have enjoyed a close bilateral military relationship since 1953, when Spain first granted to the United States access to and use of important military facilities in that country. Accession by Spain to the North Atlantic Treaty will permit that cooperation to be broadened to take into account the NATO dimension, and will entail, for the first time, the extension of a security commitment

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to Spain. This new broadened cooperation will be reflected in the bilateral agreement now being negotiated to succeed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of January 24, 1976.

The enclosed protocol is comparable to prior protocols of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty, and does not alter the substantive provisions of that Treaty in any way.

Article I of the protocol provides that upon the entry into force of the protocol, the Secretary General shall, on behalf of all the parties, extend an invitation to Spain to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. Thereafter, Spain shall become a party to that Treaty on the date upon which it deposits its instrument of accession with the United States in accordance with the provisions of Article 10 of the Treaty.

Article 11 of the protocol provides that it shall enter into force when each of the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the United States of its acceptance of the protocol.

Article III of the protocol provides for the equal authenticity of the English and French texts, and for its deposit with the United States, the depositary state for North Atlantic Treaty purposes.

The protocol transmitted herewith, providing for the inclusion of Spain among the States party to the North Atlantic Treaty, will be a direct and material contribution to the security of the Western alliance, and hence to the security of the United States. It is hoped, therefore, that action of the United States with respect to the ratification of the protocol can be completed quickly in order that it be possible for Spain to assume a full partnership in the North Atlantic Treaty structure and institutions.

Respectfully submitted.

WALTER J. STOESSEL, Jr.

PROTOCOL TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ON THE ACCESSION OF SPAIN

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on April 4, 1949,

Being satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of the Kingdom of Spain to that Treaty, Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

Upon the entry into force of this Protocol, the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall, on behalf of all the Parties, communicate to the Government of the Kingdom of Spain an invitation to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with article 10 of the Treaty, the Kingdom of Spain shall become a Party on the date when it deposits its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America.

ARTICLE II

The present Protocol shall enter into force when each of the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty has notified the Government of the United States of America of its acceptance thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall inform all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty of the date of receipt of each such notification and of the date of the entry into force of the present Protocol.

ARTICLE III

The present Protocol, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of all the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. In witness whereof, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol.

Opened for signature at Brussels the 10th day of December 1981.

For the Kingdom of Belgium :

CHARLES F. NOTHOMB.

For Canada:

MARK MACGUIGAN.

For the Kingdom of Denmark:

ANKER SVART.

For France:

C. CHEYSSON.

For the Federal Republic of Germany: HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER.

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For Greece: IOANNIS HARALAMBOPOULOS. For Iceland: HENRIK Sv. BJORNSSON. For Italy: E. Colombo. For the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: FLESCH. For the Kingdom of the Netherlands: M.V.D. STOEL. For the Kingdom of Norway: SVENN STRAY. For Portugal: ANDRE GONCALVES PEREIRA. For the Republic of Turkey: TURKMEN. For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: CARRINGTON. For the United States of America: A. M. HAIG, Jr.

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	NATO							
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	SPAIN							
	PREPARE MEMO FOR					FTIPS		
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(NSC/Bakshian edit) March 29, 1983 -4:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: MEETING WITH NATO AMBASSADORS ARMS REDUCTION WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 1983

Last week, when I addressed the American people on this Administration's defense program, I expressed our determination to reduce our reliance on the terrible power of nuclear weapons to accure the peace.

Today, I want to say a few words about this critical aspect of our security policy -- our efforts to drastically reduce the arsenals which burden the lives of our own citizens, of our friends and Allies, and, yes, of our adversaries as well.

As you know, over the last year-and-a-half, this Administration has undertaken a comprehensive and far-reaching arms control program designed to achieve deep reductions of nuclear arms, to rid the world of chemical weapons, and to cut the size of conventional forces in Europe. I will be saying more about these initiatives in my speech tomorrow.

But this morning, let me focus on one of these negotiations. I have just met with the Ambassadors of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. We invited them here because the citizens of their countries share with Americans a profound hope for success in the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

The forces being discussed in the I.N.F. negotiations directly affect the security of our Allies. As I told you last week, the Soviet Union has deployed hundreds of powerful, new SS-20 missiles, armed with multiple warheads and capable of

Page 2

striking the cities and defense installations of our Allies in Europe, and of our friends and Allies in Asia as well. The Soviets have built up these forces even though there has been no comparable threat from NATO. They have deployed them without let-up -- there now are more than 350 SS-20 missiles, with more than 1,000 nuclear warheads. NATO will begin deploying a specific deterrent to this threat late this year, unless, as we hcps, an arms control agreement makes this deployment unnecessary.

The United States, with the full support of our Allies, has been negotiating in Geneva for more than a year to persuade the Soviet Union that it is a far better course for both of us to agree to eliminate totally this entire category of weapons. Such an agreement would be fair and far-reaching. It would enhance the security of the Soviet Union as well as the security of NATO. And it would fulfill the aspiration of people throughout Europe and Asia for an end to the threat posed by these missiles.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has steadfastly resisted this proposal and has failed to come up with any serious alternative. The Soviets insist on preserving their present monopoly of these weapons. Under their latest proposal, the Soviets would retain almost 500 warheads on their SS-20 missiles in Europe <u>alone</u>, and hundreds more in the Far East, while the U.S. would have zero missiles. In fact, this Soviet proposal would leave them with more SS-20 missiles than they had when the talks began in 1981. In addition, the Soviets have launched a massive propaganda campaign seeking to divide America from our Allies, and our Allies from each other.

From the opening of these negotiations nearly 18 months ago, I have repeatedly urged the Soviets to respond to our zero-zero proposal with a proposal of their own. I have also repeated our willingness to consider any serious Soviet proposal.

Their failure to make a serious proposal is a source of deep disappointment to all of us who have wished that these weapons might be eliminated -- or at least significantly reduced. But I do not intend to let the shadow the Soviets have cast over the Geneva negotiations further darken our search for peace.

When it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But, if the Soviets insist that there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many.

If the Soviets will not now agree to the total elimination of these weapons, then let them at least join us in an interim agreement that would substantially reduce these forces to equal levels on both sides.

To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles provided the Soviet Union reduced the number of its warheads on longer-range I.N.F. missiles to an equal level on a global basis. Page 4

Ambassador Nitze has explained that the United States views this proposal as a serious initial step toward the total elimination of this class of weapons, and he has conveyed my hope that the Soviet Union will join us in this view. Our proposal for the entire elimination of these systems remains on the table.

We have suggested that the negotiations resume several weeks earlier than originally planned. The Soviets have agreed to our proposal and talks will resume on May 17th.

It is my hope that this initiative will lead to an early agreement. We remain ready to explore any serious Soviet suggestions that meet the fundamental concerns which we have expressed.

I invited the NATO Ambassadors here today not only to review these developments but to express my appreciation for the firm support which the Allies have given to our negotiating effort in Geneva. And I can assure them of my personal commitment to the closest possible consultations with them on I.N.F.

This consultation process has already proven one of the most intensive and productive in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance. It has made the initiative announced today not just an American proposal, but an Alliance initiative in the best sense of that term.

Over the past months, we and our Allies have consulted intensively on the I.N.F. negotiations. I have been in frequent and close contact with other heads of governments. Vice President Bush had very productive discussions with Allied leaders on I.N.F. during his trip to Europe. Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger have exchanged views with their counterparts from Allied governments. And the NATO Special Consultative Group has met regularly to review the negotiations and consider criteria which should form the basis for the Alliance position in I.N.F. The very thoughtful views expressed by the Allies in these consultations have been a significant help in shaping this new initiative.

This process is a model for how an alliance of free and democratic nations can and must work together on critical issues. It is the source of our unity, and gives us a strength that the other side cannot hope to match. And it gives me great confidence in the eventual success of our efforts in Geneva to create a safer world for all the Earth's people.

Thank you.

(NSC/BAKSHIAN)

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MARCH 30, 1983 10:00 A.M.


CI BAKOHIAN)

STATEMENT FOLLOWING MEETING WITH NATO AMBASSADORS ON ARMS REDUCTION

LAST WEEK, WHEN I ADDRESSED THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ON THIS ADMINISTRATION'S DEFENSE PROGRAM, I EXPRESSED OUR DETERMINATION TO REDUCE OUR RELIANCE ON THE TERRIBLE POWER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ASSURE THE PEACE.

TODAY, I WANT TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT THIS CRITICAL ASPECT OF OUR SECURITY POLICY — OUR EFFORTS TO DRASTICALLY REDUCE THE ARSENALS WHICH BURDEN THE LIVES OF OUR OWN CITIZENS, OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES, AND, YES, OF OUR ADVERSARIES AS WELL.

ALTER BUSINESS STREET



AS YOU KNOW, OVER THE LAST YEAR-AND-A-HALF, THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS UNDERTAKEN A COMPREHENSIVE AND FAR-REACHING ARMS CONTROL PROGRAM DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE DEEP REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR ARMS,/TO RID THE WORLD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS,/AND TO CUT THE SIZE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, I WILL BE SAYING MORE ABOUT THESE INITIATIVES IN MY SPEECH TOMORROW.

- 2 -

BUT THIS MORNING, LET ME FOCUS ON ONE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. I HAVE JUST MET WITH THE AMBASSADORS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. WE INVITED THEM HERE BECAUSE THE CITIZENS OF THEIR COUNTRIES SHARE WITH AMERICANS A PROFOUND HOPE FOR SUCCESS IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES.

THE FORCES BEING DISCUSSED IN THE I.N.F. NEGOTIATIONS DIRECTLY AFFECT THE SECURITY OF OUR ALLIES, AS I TOLD YOU LAST WEEK, THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEPLOYED HUNDREDS OF POWERFUL, NEW SS-20 MISSILES, ARMED WITH MULTIPLE WARHEADS AND CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE CITIES AND DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS OF OUR ALLIES IN EUROPE, AND OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IN ASIA AS THE SOVIETS HAVE BUILT UP THESE WELL. FORCES EVEN THOUGH THERE HAS BEEN NO COMPARABLE THREAT FROM NATO, / THEY HAVE DEPLOYED THEM WITHOUT IFT-UP - THERE NOW ARE MORE THAN 350 SS-20 MISSILFS, WITH MORE THAN 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS. / NATO WILL BEGIN DEPLOYING A SPECIFIC DETERRENT TO THIS THREAT LATE THIS YEAR, UNLESS, AS WE HOPE, AN AGREEMENT TO ELIMINATE SUCH WEAPONS WOULD MAKE THIS DEPLOYMENT UNNECESSARY.

- 3 -

THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE FULL SUPPORT OF OUR ALLIES, HAS BEEN NEGOTIATING IN GENEVA FOR MORE THAN A YEAR TO PERSUADE THE SOVIET UNION THAT IT IS A FAR BETTER COURSE FOR BOTH OF US TO AGREE TO ELIMINATE TOTALLY THIS ENTIRE CATEGORY OF WEAPONS. /SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE FAIR AND FAR-REACHING, / IT WOULD ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET UNION AS WELL AS THE SECURITY OF NATO. | AND IT WOULD FULFILL THE ASPIRATION OF PEOPLE THROUGHOUT EUROPE AND ASIA FOR AN END TO THE THREAT POSED BY THESE MISSILES. SO FAR, THE SOVIET UNION HAS RESISTED THIS PROPOSAL AND HAS FAILED TO COME UP WITH ANY SERIOUS ALTERNATIVE. THEY INSIST ON PRESERVING THEIR PRESENT

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MONOPOLY OF THESE WEAPONS.

UNDER THEIR LATEST PROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS WOULD RETAIN ALMOST 500 WARHEADS ON THEIR SS-20 MISSILES IN EUROPE <u>ALONE</u>, AND HUNDREDS MORE IN THE FAR EAST, WHILE WE WOULD HAVE ZERO. THEIR PROPOSAL WOULD ACTUALLY LEAVE THEM WITH MORE SS-20 MISSILES THAN THEY HAD WHEN THE TALKS BEGAN IN 1981. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS HAVE LAUNCHED A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AIMED APPARENTLY AT DIVIDING AMERICA FROM OUR ALLIES, AND OUR ALLIES FROM EACH OTHER.

- 5 -

FROM THE OPENING OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS NEARLY 18 MONTHS AGO, I HAVE REPEATEDLY URGED THE SOVIETS TO RESPOND TO OUR ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL WITH A PROPOSAL OF THEIR OWN. I HAVE ALSO REPEATED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ANY SERIOUS ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL. THEIR FAILURE TO MAKE SUCH A PROPOSAL IS A SOURCE OF DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT TO ALL OF US WHO HAVE WISHED THAT THESE WEAPONS MIGHT BE ELIMINATED — OR AT LEAST SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. BUT I DO NOT INTEND TO LET THIS SHADOW, THAT HAS BEEN CAST OVER THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, FURTHER DARKEN OUR SEARCH FOR PEACE.

WHEN IT COMES TO INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE NONE THAN TO HAVE SOME. BUT, IF THERE MUST BE SOME, IT IS BETTER TO HAVE FEW THAN TO HAVE MANY.

IF THE SOVIETS WILL NOT NOW AGREE TO THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THESE WEAPONS, I HOPE THEY WILL AT LEAST JOIN US IN AN INTERIM AGREEMENT THAT WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE THESE FORCES TO EQUAL LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES. TO THIS END, AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE HAS INFORMED HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE ITS PLANNED DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES/PROVIDED THE SOVIET UNION REDUCED THE NUMBER OF ITS WARHEADS ON LONGER-RANGE I.N.F. MISSILES TO AN EQUAL LEVEL ON A GLOBAL BASIS.

- 7 -

AMBASSADOR NITZE HAS EXPLAINED THAT THE UNITED STATES VIEWS THIS PROPOSAL AS A SERIOUS INITIAL STEP TOWARD THE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF THIS CLASS OF WEAPONS,/AND HE HAS CONVEYED MY HOPE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL JOIN US IN THIS VIEW, OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE ENTIRE ELIMINATION OF THESE SYSTEMS REMAINS ON THE TABLE,

- 6 -

WE HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS RESUME SEVERAL WEEKS EARLIER THAN ORIGINALLY PLANNED. THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO THAT, AND TALKS WILL RESUME ON MAY 17TH.

- 8 -

I HOPE THIS INITIATIVE WILL LEAD TO AN EARLY AGREEMENT. WE REMAIN READY TO EXPLORE ANY SERIOUS SOVIET SUGGESTIONS THAT MEET THE FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS WHICH WE HAVE EXPRESSED.

I INVITED THE NATO AMBASSADORS HERE TODAY NOT ONLY TO REVIEW THESE DEVELOPMENTS BUT TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR THE FIRM SUPPORT WHICH THE ALLIES HAVE GIVEN TO OUR NEGOTIATING EFFORT IN GENEVA. AND I CAN ASSURE THEM OF MY PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE CONSULTATIONS WITH THEM ON I.N.F. THIS CONSULTATION PROCESS HAS ALREADY PROVEN ONE OF THE MOST INTENSIVE AND PRODUCTIVE IN THE HISTORY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. IT HAS MADE THE INITIATIVE ANNOUNCED TODAY AN ALLIANCE INITIATIVE IN THE BEST SENSE OF THAT TERM.

OVER THE PAST MONTHS, WE AND OUR ALLIES HAVE CONSULTED INTENSIVELY ON THE I.N.F. NEGOTIATIONS. I HAVE BEEN IN FREQUENT AND CLOSE CONTACT WITH OTHER HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS. VICE PRESIDENT BUSH HAD VERY PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIED LEADERS ON I.N.F. DURING HIS TRIP TO EUROPE. SECRETARIES SHULTZ AND WEINBERGER HAVE EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH THEIR COUNTERPARTS FROM ALLIED GOVERNMENTS. AND THE NATO SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP HAS MET REGULARLY TO REVIEW THE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONSIDER CRITERIA WHICH SHOULD FORM THE BASIS FOR THE ALLIANCE POSITION IN I.N.F. THE VERY THOUGHTFUL VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE ALLIES IN THESE CONSULTATIONS HAVE BEEN A SIGNIFICANT HELP IN SHAPING THIS NEW INITIATIVE.

THIS PROCESS IS A MODEL FOR HOW AN ALLIANCE OF FREE AND DEMOCRATIC NATIONS CAN AND MUST WORK TOGETHER ON CRITICAL ISSUES. IT IS THE SOURCE OF OUR UNITY, AND GIVES US A STRENGTH THAT NO ONE CAN HOPE TO MATCH. AND IT GIVES ME GREAT CONFIDENCE IN THE EVENTUAL SUCCESS OF OUR EFFORTS IN GENEVA TO CREATE A SAFER WORLD FOR ALL THE EARTH'S PEOPLE.

THANK YOU.

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(NSC/Bakshian edit) March 29, 1983 4:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: MEETING WITH NATO AMBASSADORS ARMS REDUCTION WEDNESDAY, MARCH 30, 1983

Last week, when I addressed the American people on this Administration's defense program, I expressed our determination to reduce our reliance on the terrible power of nuclear weapons to assure the peace.

Today, I want to say a few words about this critical aspect of our security policy -- our efforts to drastically reduce the arsenals which burden the lives of our own citizens, of our friends and Allies, and, yes, of our adversaries as well.

As you know, over the last year-and-a-half, this Administration has undertaken a comprehensive and far-reaching arms control program designed to achieve deep reductions of nuclear arms, to rid the world of chemical weapons, and to cut the size of conventional forces in Europe. I will be saying more about these initiatives in my speech tomorrow.

But this morning, let me focus on one of these negotiations. I have just met with the Ambassadors of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. We invited them here because the citizens of their countries share with Americans a profound hope for success in the Geneva negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

The forces being discussed in the I.N.F. negotiations directly affect the security of our Allies. As I told you last week, the Soviet Union has deployed hundreds of powerful, new SS-20 missiles, armed with multiple warheads and capable of

Page 2

striking the cities and defense installations of our Allies in Europe, and of our friends and Allies in Asia as well. The Soviets have built up these forces even though there has been no comparable threat from NATO. They have deployed them without let-up -- there now are more than 350 SS-20 missiles, with more than 1,000 nuclear warheads. NATO will begin deploying a specific deterrent to this threat late this year, unless, as we hope, an arms control agreement makes this deployment unnecessary.

The United States, with the full support of our Allies, has been hegotiating in Geneva for more than a year to persuade the Soviet Union that it is a far better course for both of us to agree to eliminate totally this entire category of weapons. Such an agreement would be fair and far-reaching. It would enhance the security of the Soviet Union as well as the security of NATO. And it would fulfill the aspiration of people throughout Europe and Asia for an end to the threat posed by these missiles.

Unfortunation, the Soviet Union has steadfastly resisted " this proposal and has failed to come up with any serious alternative. The Soviets insist on preserving their present monopoly of these weapons. Under their latest proposal, the Soviets would retain almost 500 warheads on their SS-20 missiles in Europe <u>alone</u>, and hundreds more in the Far East, while the WS. would have zero missiles. In fact, this Soviet proposal would leave them with more SS-20 missiles than they had when the talks began in 1981. In addition, the Soviets have launched a

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Allies, and our Allies from each other.

From the opening of these negotiations nearly 18 months ago, I have repeatedly urged the Soviets to respond to our zero-zero proposal with a proposal of their own. I have also repeated our willingness to consider any serious Soviet proposal.

Their failure to make asserious proposal is a source of deep disappointment to all of us who have wished that these weapons might be eliminated -- or at least significantly reduced. But I do not intend to let the shadow the Soviets have cast over the Geneva negotiations further darken our search for peace.

When it comes to intermediate nuclear missiles in Europe, it would be better to have none than to have some. But, if there soveres inclusions there must be some, it is better to have few than to have many.

If the Soviets will not now agree to the total elimination of these weapons, then late them at least join us in an interim agreement that would substantially reduce these forces to equallevels on both sides.

To this end, Ambassador Paul Nitze has informed his Soviet counterpart that we are prepared to negotiate an interim agreement in which the United States would substantially reduce its planned deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles provided the Soviet Union reduced the number of its warheads on longer-range I.N.F. missiles to an equal level on a global basis. Page 4

Ambassador Nitze has explained that the United States views this proposal as a serious initial step toward the total elimination of this class of weapons, and he has conveyed my hope that the Soviet Union will join us in this view. Our proposal for the entire elimination of these systems remains on the table.

We have suggested that the negotiations resume several weeks earlier than originally planned. The Soviets have agreed to corr proposed and talks will resume on May 17th.

It is my hope that this initiative will lead to an early agreement. We remain ready to explore any serious Soviet suggestions that meet the fundamental concerns which we have expressed.

I invited the NATO Ambassadors here today not only to review these developments but to express my appreciation for the firm support which the Allies have given to our negotiating effort in Geneva. And I can assure them of my personal commitment to the closest possible consultations with them on I.N.F.

This consultation process has already proven one of the most intensive and productive in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance. It has made the initiative announced today net-just on American proposaly but an Alliance initiative in the best sense of that term.

Over the past months, we and our Allies have consulted intensively on the I.N.F. negotiations. I have been in frequent and close contact with other heads of governments. Vice President Bush had very productive discussions with Allied leaders on I.N.F. during his trip to Europe. Secretaries Shultz

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Page 5

and Weinberger have exchanged views with their counterparts from Allied governments. And the NATO Special Consultative Group has met regularly to review the negotiations and consider criteria which should form the basis for the Alliance position in I.N.F. The very thoughtful views expressed by the Allies in these consultations have been a significant help in shaping this new initiative.

This process is a model for how an alliance of free and democratic nations can and must work together on critical issues. It is the source of our unity, and gives us a strength that the other side cannot hope to match. And it gives me great confidence in the eventual success of our efforts in Geneva to create a safer world for all the Earth's people.

Thank you.



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Current Status	None					
User Name	dbarrie					
Status Date	2014-05-16					
Case Number						
Notes	Transfer to IT067					

Review Status History

<u>No.</u>	<u>Status</u>	Date	<u>User</u>	Case Number Notes
1	None	2014-05-16	dbarrie	Transfer to IT067

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1983

Dear Joe:

Thank you for your letter of April 29th relaying to me the comments you had already provided to HO DARCOM concerning your views on our willingness to cooperate with NATO. I have shared these views with some of my colleagues at OMB and state, without making reference, specifically to you. Thus, I think that your views are given exposure here in Washington.

Indeed, Lucy and I very much enjoyed having you and your family visit with us a couple of weeks ago and look forward to a weekend with the Browns next fall.

In the meanwhile, best wishes.

Sincerely,

Edwin L. Harper Assistant to the President for Policy Development

Mr. Joseph E. Brown COL, Infantry Commander/Director LCWSL Department of the Army US Army Armament Research and Development Command Dover, NJ 07801

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR BILL SCHNEIDER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

FROM: EDWIN L. HARPER ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT

SUBJECT: NATO Cooperative R&D Programs

Given your interest, I thought you might be interested in these views with respect to four areas in which we may wish to move forward in NATO.

- First, to correct the congressional language that prohibits the purchase from allies of weapons involving specialty metals since that negates the possibility of two-way trade.
- o To develop a clear policy on the extent to which we will cooperate in the area of Fire and Forget munitions.
- o To explore ways to maintain the interoperability of our artillery and armored fighting vehicles as we consider improvements to these weapon systems in the future.
- o Finally, we must resolve the POMCUS situation and payment of our share of the Host Nation support costs since we are committed to a reinforcement to ten divisions within ten days and POMBUC sets five and six would be necessary to achieve that capability.

It is suggested that given the current concerns the Germans have over the deployment of Pershing II, it would be in our national interest at this time to attempt to reverse the perception in Germany that we are not interested in cooperative programs. Obviously if we are to have NATO we must have Germany.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY US ARMY ARMAMENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COMMAND DOVER, NEW JERSEY 07801

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF:

DRDAR-LC

APR 2 9 1983

Honorable Mr. Edwin L. Harper Assistant to the President for Policy Development The White House Washington, D.C. 20500

-Response & In From " letter" - Al Kheel. 1-4 - Schuerder meno

Dear Ed:

Thank you very much for arranging a most interesting day for our family in The White House. It is truly inspirational to see the historic rooms that have been and are being used to carry out the meetings and visits that are so influential in shaping America's future. Your personal insight into the activities of The White House was most informative and inspirational for the girls in particular who will long remember what they saw there.

On a personal note, it was a real pleasure to have the opportunity of being with your family again to renew our friendship and to spend time together. We will look forward to a chance to host you all here in New Jersey and go to a West Point football game, which I think you would find interesting.

As we discussed, I have some concerns that our domestic policies are impacting on our foreign policy as it relates to the nature of the cooperative research and development programs within the NATO alliance. While I think we all recognize the need to protect sensitive manufacturing technology, it is equally important that we not give the impression to our NATO allies that we don't trust them or that we are falling off of our commitment to cooperate with them. We must insure that they will be able to defend their countries as a part of the NATO alliance with modern weapons which are the most efficient available and which would allow the raising of the nuclear threshold. I see the opportunity for what we call indirect fire "Smart" or "Fire and Forget" munitions to play this kind of a role in that they are basically defensive weapons systems which allow for the defeat of enemy armor and thus provide an alternative way of blunting a Russian massed armor attack. These systems are as yet several years off, but the interest in Germany, as it is in the United States, is very high and we are in the process of trying to work out ways of cooperating with Allies that would not compromise our need to maintain the production know how in the United States.

I have written my comments to HQ DARCOM concerning my views on the necessity for combating the perception that we are not willing to cooperate. Basically I see that we need to move forward in four areas. First, to correct the congressional language that prohibits the purchase from Allies of weapons involving specialty metals since that negates any possibility of a two way street. Second, to develop a clear policy on the extent to which we will cooperate in the area of Fire and Forget munitions. Third, to explore ways to maintain the interoperability of our artillery and armored fighting vehicles as we consider improvements to these weapon systems in the future. Finally, we must resolve the POMCUS situation and payment of our share of the Host Nation support costs since we are committed to a reinforcement to ten divisions within ten days and POMCUS sets five and six would be necessary to achieve that capability. Given the current concerns the Germans have over the deployment of Pershing II, it would be in our national interest at this time to attempt to reverse the perception in Germany that we are not interested in cooperative programs. If we are to have NATO we must have Germany.

Thanks again for all you did to arrange for a most interesting visit and for the very warm hospitality in your home. We all wish you continued success in your most important endeavors.

Sincerely,

VOSEPH E. BROWN COL, Infantry Commander/Director, LCWSL BS

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REMARKS:

Please return this tracking sheet with your response

Edwin L. Harper Assistant to the President for Policy Development (x6515)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR AL KEEL

FROM: EDWIN L. HARPER

SUBJECT: NATO Cooperative R&D Programs

I thought you might be interested in these views given your special responsibilities in this area.

- o First, to correct the congressional language that prohibits the purchase from allies of weapons involving specialty metals since that negates the possibility of two-way trade.
- o To develop a clear policy on the extent to which we will cooperate in the area of Fire and Forget munitions.
- o To explore ways to maintain the interoperability of our artillery and armored fighting vehicles as we consider improvements to these weapon systems in the future.
- o Finally, we must resolve the POMCUS situation and payment of our share of the Host Nation support costs since we are committed to a reinforcement to ten divisions within ten days and POMBUC sets five and six would be necessary to achieve that capability.

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DATE: 12 AUG 83

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REFERRAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: KIMMITT

SOURCE: GREGG, D

DATE: 12 AUG 83

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL

NATO

INF AVP

SUBJ: REQUEST BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR VP 2 NOV MTG W/ PERMANENT REP OF NATO

REQUIRED ACTION: PREPARE BACKGROUND PAPERS / TALKING

POINTS / LIST OF NPG MEMBERS

DUEDATE: 17 AUG 83

COMMENTS:

ROBERT M. FOR KIMM

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NSC #830 5648

MEMORANDUM



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT WASHINGTON

August 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT EXECUTIVE SECRETARY NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FROM: Don Gregg

SUBJECT: Vice President's Meeting with the Permanent Representatives of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)

The Vice President will meet with the Permanent Representatives of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) on Wednesday, November 2, at 4:00 p.m. in the Roosevelt Room. We would very much appreciate your providing background papers, talking points, and a list of the members of the NPG for the Vice President's use as soon as convenient.

Thank you.

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 6, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Vice Presidential Meeting with the Permanent Representatives of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group

The NATO Permanent Representatives have accepted an invitation to visit SACLANT headquarters in Norfolk, Va., at the conclusion of the NPG Ministerial meeting in Canada on October 27-28. The NATO decision to deploy LRINF will dominate the NPG meeting, which will also deal with the question of possible reduction in the nuclear stockpile in Europe.

We should take the advantage of the presence of the Permanent Representatives in the Washington area to reinforce the public image of our commitment to the Alliance and our common security and arms control interests in the last crucial months before INF deployments. A meeting in Washington would provide a framework for positive U.S. media exposure following the anticipated major demonstrations in Europe but prior to the debate on INF in the German Bundestag.

Accordingly, we recommend that the Vice President agree to meet with the Representatives on November 2, immediately after their visit to SACLANT. If such a meeting were agreed, we would set up a broad program for the Permreps including meetings at State, Defense and the Hill.

Formm Met

🔊 Charles Hill (Executive Secretary

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