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(International Organizations:

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO))

**Case file Number(s):** 275000-319999

**Box Number:** 14

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT:  
SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 8/31/2005

**File Folder** ~~IT067-02~~ 314124  
IT067

**FOIA**

05-139/02

**Box Number**

COOKE

10

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
<del>20274</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>ROBERTS TO RICHARD HAUSER RE DRAFT RESPONSE TO US NATO'S REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE ON POLADS EXCHANGE ON RATIFICATION OF THE 1977 PROTOCOLS</del>	<del>1</del>	<del>5/8/1985</del>	<del>B1</del> R 4/20/06
<del>20275</del>	<del>CABLE</del>	<del>USNATO 2057 RE NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE - 1977 PROTOCOLS TO 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS</del>	<del>3</del>	<del>5/6/1985</del>	<del>B1</del> R 4/20/06

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

275794

IT069

ME007

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

REVISED

8/16/85

MEMORANDUM

W/S

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FR*

SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: with Lord Carrington, NATO Secretary General

DATE: October 7, 1985

TIME: 9:45 am

DURATION: 15 minutes (changed from 10 minutes as previously notified)

LOCATION: Oval Office

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be covered in briefing paper

MEDIA COVERAGE: Coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc:	K. Barun	A. Kingon	W. Martin
	P. Buchanan	J. Kuhn	
	D. Chew	C. McCain	
	T. Dawson	B. Oglesby	
	B. Elliott	E. Rollins	
	M. Friedersdorf	J. Rosebush	
	C. Fuller	R. Scouten	
	W. Henkel	R. Shaddick	
	E. Hickey	B. Shaddix	
	C. Hicks	L. Speakes	
	J. Hirshberg	WHCA Audio/Visual	
	G. Hodges	WHCA Operations	
	J. Hooley	Nell Yates	

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

8/15/85

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

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FIRST LADY  
PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc: K. Barun  
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J. Kuhn  
C. McCain  
B. Oglesby  
E. Rollins  
J. Rosebush  
R. Scouten  
R. Shaddick  
B. Shaddix  
L. Speakes  
WHCA Audio/Visual  
WHCA Operations  
Nell Yates  
W. Martin

Harri

Check out + give to  
Helen - scheduled  
for Oct. 7

Sean

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

5880

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 5, 1985

RECEIVED

1985

SCHEDULE PROPOSALSCHEDULING  
OFFICE

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN  
Director of Presidential Appointments  
and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

REQUEST: Meeting with Lord Carrington, NATO  
Secretary General.

PURPOSE: To consult on East-West relations in the  
period prior to the President's meeting with  
General Secretary Gorbachev.

BACKGROUND: The President traditionally meets with the  
NATO Secretary General when he visits  
Washington. This meeting would symbolize the  
closeness of transatlantic consultations at a  
time of intense Allied interest in the  
upcoming Presidential meeting with Gorbachev.  
It would further reinforce Carrington's  
helpful efforts to manage Allied  
expectations, to ensure Allied steadiness,  
and to deflect Soviet wedge-driving efforts.

PREVIOUS  
PARTICIPATION: The President met with Lord Carrington on  
April 3, 1985 and September 11, 1984.

DATE & TIME: October 7, 1985  
DURATION: 20 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Secretary Shultz, Secretary  
Weinberger, Robert C. McFarlane.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Photo opportunity followed by meeting.

REMARKS REQUIRED: NSC will prepare briefing paper.

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House Photographer.

PROPOSED "PHOTO": The President and Lord Carrington sitting  
in Oval Office.

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane and Secretary Shultz.

OPPOSED BY: None.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~S  
BY: *WFM*

5/16/14

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

276144

IT067

July 8, 1985

NOTE TO NSC/S  
FROM SALLY SHERMAN *SJS*  
RE: Close Out Actions: OBE

<u>Log #</u>	<u>Subject</u>
4488	Ltr to McF. fm. CSIS re. Appt. Re. Conf. 17-20 June
4182	S-960 - Int'l. Security & Development Cooperation Act of 1985 (SR - no comments)
3536	Ltr. to McF. from CSIS re. Contingency Paper and Bonn Summit
2126	Recom Changes to List of Free World Destinations Perle/Fortier, 3/12/85 and 3/15/85
1891	Ltr. to McF. Fm. Schuler re. Oil Products Refined in Libya
1153	RADM Fontaine Ltr. to JMP Re. Tech. Transfer Seminar and Logicon
1154	COCOM High Level Mtg., 6-7 Feb
846	Cable fm. Amb. Keating re. Reagan Revolution in Development Assistance
690	Export Controls and Enforcement in Austrai
240	Ltr. to McF. from U.S. Defense Cte. re. U.S. Illegal Technological Acquisitions by Soviets
6974	State Draft Bill/ NATO Cooperative Projects
6475	Ltr. to McF. from Robt Gray re. Report on Persian Gulf
3901	HR-5417 Authorizing SecDef to Enter into Agreements w/Member Nations of NATO for Cooperative Projects
3799	Weinberger Memo Re. Korea Stop
3286	Mil. Tech Coop Team Visit to China

NOTE: All these actions were in Steve Rosen's safe; please close them out. Thanks.

EF



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

276144 3901  
111D  
27067  
FG013  
LE

94 MAY 14 P 3: 23

May 14, 1984

FG006-11  
PY  
**SPECIAL**

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO:

Legislative Liaison Officer-

- Department of State - *Isaiah (G) Alba - 632-0430*
- Department of Defense - *Warner Warden - 697-1305*
- National Security Council - *Robert Kimmett - 345-4970*
- Department of the Treasury - *Carol Toth - 566-8523*

SUBJECT:

H.R. 5417, authorizing the Secretary of Defense to enter into agreements with other member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organizations for certain cooperative projects. (This bill may be added to the Defense procurement authorization.)

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than FRIDAY, MAY 18, 1984.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Lawler (395-4710) the legislative analyst in this office.

*Ronald K. Peterson*  
RONALD K. PETERSON FOIR  
Assistant Director for  
Legislative Reference

NSC # 8403901

Enclosures  
cc: Al Burman  
John Eisenhower

**SPECIAL**



99TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

# H. R. 5417

To amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of Defense to enter into agreements with other member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for certain cooperative projects.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

APRIL 11, 1984

Mr. STRATTON (for himself and Mrs. HOLT) introduced the following bill; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs

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## A BILL

To amend title 10, United States Code, to authorize the Secretary of Defense to enter into agreements with other member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for certain cooperative projects.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*  
3       That (a) chapter 141 of title 10, United States Code, is  
4       amended by adding at the end thereof the following new sec-  
5       tion:

1 "§ 2401. Acquisition of defense equipment under North At-  
2 lantic Treaty Organization cooperative proj-  
3 ects

4 "(a) The Secretary of Defense may make an agreement  
5 with any other member nation of the North Atlantic Treaty  
6 Organization (or a combination of such nations) for a coopera-  
7 tive project for the research, development, testing, evalua-  
8 tion, production, or support of defense equipment if such co-  
9 operative project would be likely to further the objective of  
10 standardization or interoperability of defense equipment of  
11 the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

12 "(b) The Secretary of Defense may make a contract on  
13 behalf of a cooperative project if each participant in the coop-  
14 erative project agrees (1) to pay such participant's share of  
15 the contract, and (2) to make funds available in such amounts  
16 and at such times as may be required by the contract and to  
17 pay any damages and costs that may accrue from the per-  
18 formance of or cancellation of such contract, in advance of  
19 the time such payments, damages, or costs are due. Except  
20 to the extent waived under subsection (d), chapter 137 of this  
21 title and all other requirements of United States law relating  
22 to procurement shall apply to a contract made by the Secre-  
23 tary of Defense on behalf of the cooperative project.

24 "(c)(1) An agreement for a cooperative project made  
25 under this section may provide that a participating govern-  
26 ment other than the United States (or a NATO body estab-

3

1 lished for the purpose of contracting for the cooperative  
2 project) may make a contract for requirements of the United  
3 States under the project if the Secretary of Defense deter-  
4 mines that—

5       “(A) the contract will be made on a competitive  
6 basis, except to the extent waived pursuant to subsec-  
7 tion (d);

8       “(B) United States sources will not be precluded  
9 from competing under the contract; and

10       “(C) the contract will include a requirement for de-  
11 livery to the United States of technical data and rights  
12 in such data (including patent licenses) adequate to  
13 permit the United States to purchase competitively the  
14 equipment acquired under the cooperative project.

15       “(2) If a participating government other than the United  
16 States (or a NATO body) will make a contract on behalf of  
17 the cooperative project for the requirements of the United  
18 States, the agreement may provide that the contracting gov-  
19 ernment (or the NATO body) shall follow its own procedures  
20 relating to contracting.

21       “(d)(1) Subject to paragraph (2), for a contract described  
22 in subsection (b) that the Secretary of Defense awards to a  
23 contractor outside the United States (or that requires the is-  
24 suance of a subcontract to a subcontractor outside the United  
25 States) in accordance with the requirements of the coopera-

1 tive project, the Secretary of Defense may waive the applica-  
2 tion to such contract or subcontract of any provision of law  
3 specifically prescribing procedures to be followed in the for-  
4 mation of contracts, terms and conditions to be included in  
5 contracts, requirements for or preferences to be given to  
6 goods grown, produced, or manufactured in the United States  
7 or in United States Government-owned facilities or for serv-  
8 ices to be performed in the United States, or regulating the  
9 performance of contracts and the requirement for making  
10 competitive contracts in subsection (c).

11       “(2) A waiver may not be made under paragraph (1)  
12 unless the Secretary determines that—

13               “(A) the waiver is a necessary precondition of an  
14 agreement for a cooperative project, and

15               “(B) the cooperative project is for the research,  
16 development, testing, evaluation, production, or sup-  
17 port of military equipment for which at least two mem-  
18 bers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have  
19 stated a requirement for their military forces.

20       “(3) The authority of the Secretary of Defense under  
21 this subsection may only be delegated to the Deputy Secre-  
22 tary of Defense or the Acquisition Executive designated for  
23 the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

24       “(e) An agreement for a cooperative project made under  
25 this section may provide for the disposal of property that was

1 jointly acquired by the members of the project without regard  
2 to any United States law applicable to the disposal of proper-  
3 ty owned by the United States. Disposal of such property  
4 may include transfer of the interest of the United States in  
5 such property to one of the other participating governments  
6 or the sale of such property.

7       “(f) An agreement for a cooperative project made under  
8 this section may provide for the reciprocal waiver of customs  
9 and duties that might otherwise be applicable to equipment or  
10 goods imported in pursuance of such agreement.

11       “(g) A cooperative agreement made under this section  
12 shall provide that the cost of any service performed by the  
13 Department of Defense on behalf of the cooperative project  
14 shall be shared equitably by all participants. The cost of serv-  
15 ices performed for other participants in the project by the  
16 United States on behalf of the project may be offset by the  
17 cost of services performed by other participants on behalf of  
18 the cooperative project.

19       “(h) The Secretary of Defense may not make an agree-  
20 ment for a cooperative project under this section unless—

21               “(1) each participating government in the project  
22 has agreed not to transfer title to or possession of any  
23 defense article or technical data relating to the cooper-  
24 ative project to any person not an officer, employee, or

1 agent of that government without the prior consent of  
2 the Secretary of Defense; and

3 "(2) each participating government has agreed  
4 that it will maintain security of defense articles and  
5 services and technical data relating to the cooperative  
6 project and will provide substantially the same degree  
7 of security protection as that afforded to such defense  
8 articles and services and technical data by the United  
9 States.

10 "(i) With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, a  
11 cooperative agreement made by a military department or  
12 other component of the Department of Defense before the  
13 effective date of this section that otherwise meets the require-  
14 ments of this section may be treated as having been made  
15 under this section."

16 (b) The table of sections at the beginning of such chap-  
17 ter is amended by adding at the end thereof the following  
18 new item:

"2401. Acquisition of defense equipment under North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
cooperative projects."



NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8403901

RECEIVED 15 MAY 84 09

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PETERSON, R

DOCDATE 14 MAY 84

~~SUSPENSE~~

KEYWORDS NATO

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

NATO DEFENSE

SUBJECT HR-5417 AUTHORIZING SECDEF TO ENTER INTO AGREEMENTS W/ MEMBERS NATIONS OF NATO FOR COOPERATIVE PROJECTS

ACTION: MEMO KIMMITT TO PETERSON

DUE: 17 MAY 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

MATLOCK

LEHMAN, C

THOMPSON

LINHARD

SOMMER

SABLE

COBB

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( CM )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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W/ATTCH FILE WA (C)

RECEIVED 15 MAY 84 09

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PETERSON, R

DOCDATE 14 MAY 84

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SABLE

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COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( CM *ps* )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*1 7/9 OBE per Fortier*

DISPATCH *ps/7/9* W/ATTCH FILE *WIT* (C)





## U.S. National Archives & Records Administration

### Current Status Details for CTRH RECID: 279121 MAIN SUBCODE: IT

Current Status	None
User Name	dbarrie
Status Date	2014-04-03
Case Number	
Notes	Transferred to IT067 (NATO)



### Review Status History

<u>No.</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>User</u>	<u>Case Number</u>	<u>Notes</u>
1	None	2014-04-03	dbarrie		Transferred to IT067 (NATO)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 17, 1984

JV

8303  
279121  
1130  
IT  
ND  
FG 006-12  
ND 007  
FG 013  
ND 018


LD

Dear Jim:

In response to your note of October 29, Lieutenant Colonel Donald Mahley is the NSC Staff member with primary responsibility, among other areas, for NATO defense issues. Brigadier General James Delk of the Reserve Forces Policy Board did visit Colonel Mahley in October, although this was at General Delk's request. They discussed the prospect and desirability of a future Reserve Forces Policy Board meeting obtaining an NSC Staff briefing on Reserve issues. During discussion, Colonel Mahley offered a review of some of his own thinking, as well as that of several other individuals around Washington, that the constraints on active forces and the growing nature of the Warsaw Pact threat have implications for Reserve Forces structure, training, and equipment.

I think both this meeting and the discussion that occurred were proper. It is our practice to encourage informal contacts with agency counterparts, and Colonel Mahley would be willing to share his opinions with you if you so desire. Please let me know if we may schedule such a meeting.

Sincerely,

  
Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

Honorable James H. Webb, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Reserve Affairs  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

NSC 840 8303

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 15, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM:

DONALD MAHLEY *Ron Lehman for*

SIGNED

SUBJECT:

Restructuring of Reserve Forces Policy Board

Attached at Tab I is a proposed reply to ASD Webb.

For your information, Mr. Webb has some factual inaccuracy in his letter, beyond the points raised in the draft reply. The primary purpose for which BG Delk sought an appointment (which he did at the recommendation of the Reserve Forces Policy Board executive secretary, a Col F.J. McKeown who is an old friend of mine from NWC teaching days) was to inquire about getting a Reserve Forces Policy Board briefing by the NSC Staff in March.

In the course of that discussion, I offered the point that if efforts to improve NATO's conventional defense proceed in the way I anticipate, there might well be implications for reserve component missions, organization, and equipment levels. I allowed that such implications, if a part of any national approach to NATO, would indeed be of interest to a Reserve Policy Board.

*Rm*  
Ron Lehman concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the reply to ASD Webb at Tab I.

Approve   *K*   Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*as revised.*

## Attachments

Tab I Letter to ASD Webb  
Tab II Incoming Correspondence from ASD Webb



National Security Council  
The White House

1439 *lml*

System # I  
Package # 8303

1.1-15 #2-28

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter			
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<u>4</u>		
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<u>Rosie</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>Redo</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

31 NOV 15 6:13

STATION

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**National Security Council  
The White House**

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

84 NOV 8 P 3

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	3	_____	Staff
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Ackon Mahley  
Cmt R. Lehman

Prepare letter (Dear Jim) Kimmitt ->  
Webb dne 11/13.

04 NOV 7 P 7: 56

1. [illegible]  
 2. [illegible]  
 3. [illegible]  
 4. [illegible]  
 5. [illegible]  
 6. [illegible]  
 7. [illegible]  
 8. [illegible]  
 9. [illegible]  
 10. [illegible]

[illegible]

THE MINE HOTEL  
[illegible]





ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

8303

October 29, 1984

RESERVE AFFAIRS

Mr. Robert Kimmitt  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
and Executive Secretary  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bob:

It was brought to my attention today that a member of your staff, Major Don Mahley, made contact with BG James Delk of the Reserve Forces Policy Board regarding the possibility of restructuring the use of our reserve forces in a NATO scenario. I am informed that Major Mahley sought and obtained a private meeting with General Delk, apparently in order to make a recommendation to the National Security Council in this matter.

As you must know, the Reserve Forces Policy Board is a statutorily independent board that reports to the Secretary of Defense through my office. I have no objections to members of your staff educating themselves in whatever manner they deem necessary in order to fulfill their responsibilities. However, I would suggest that the assistance of my office might be more directly appropriate to policy formulation in such matters, particularly on so delicate a subject.

Best Wishes,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Jim", is written above the typed name.

James H. Webb, Jr.

RECEIVED 08 NOV 84 20

TO KIMMITT

FROM WEBB, J

DOCDATE 29 OCT 84

KEYWORDS: NATO DEFENSE

SUBJECT: RESTRUCTURING OF RESERVE FORCES POLICY BOARD

ACTION: MEMO KIMMITT TO WEBB

DUE: 13 NOV 84 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MAHLEY

LEHMAN, R

COMMENTS STAFFED PER KIMMITT

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( CT )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

<i>Kimmit</i>	<i>X</i>	<i>11/15</i>	<i>For Signature</i>		
	<i>C</i>	<i>11/17</i>	<i>RIS - H Sgt</i>		<i>MA'LE'</i>

DISPATCH

*EA 119*

W/ATTCH

FILE

*WH EA (C)*

299914

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NDW/8

PX



SOME THOUGHTS  
ON  
THE NATO ALLIANCE  
AND  
THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE

G. A. KEYWORD

INTRODUCTION

History will record that the last half of the 20th Century saw weapons become available that, for the first time since the Old Testament, could destroy entire civilizations overnight. Worse, their devastation was completely out of proportion to any previous measure of military balance.

But in the beginning they were few in number, delivery was difficult and imprecise, and they had little military value as preemptive weapons. Western policy thereby evolved about the rational avoidance of their use by assuring these weapons would survive any first strike -- and total destruction of any attacker would immediately follow. History will also record that 20th Century Man gradually became more concerned about these weapon's survival than his own.

Technical advances in only fifteen years, especially in the ICBM, led to real concerns for the prospect of an escalatory arms race and continued stable balance between East and West. Starting in 1960, an almost frantic decade of arms control agreements culminated in the SALT I Treaty. By its own wording this was only a stop-gap measure establishing a framework. Real arms control was to take hold rapidly thereafter.<sup>1</sup> Seven years were spent trying to produce SALT II. It failed -- ostensibly because of intolerable Soviet actions such as Afghanistan. But there were deeper problems.

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<sup>1</sup> On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement, included within the documented text of the SALT ABM Treaty Section 3, Unilateral Statements:

"The U.S. delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated

On the one hand, there was an awakening that technology -- and a massive Soviet strategic investment in ballistic missiles -- produced a situation vastly different from that of SALT I days. That the strategic balance had shifted was recognized. The only discussion was over exactly when: 1978, 1979, or 1980? There was graver concern, however, that the underpinnings of stable deterrence had begun to shift as well.

They had begun to shift militarily as the 1970s closed when ICBM's lost their survivability. The flexibility, payload, and accuracy of Soviet missiles had increased to the point that the West could find no survivable basing mode. The even broader implications were that the even more fragile National Command Authority, command and control networks, and bomber escape routes were also at risk. Worse, an explosion in data-processing coupled with this offensive power might have the ability to better localize (not necessarily locate) and thus threaten to destroy the presently secure SSBN force.

The Scowcroft Commission foreshadowed these concerns when they pointed out we depend more and more upon the threat of having to launch our forces under attack<sup>2</sup> if they are to have

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<sup>1</sup> (Cont'd) "...that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. If an agreement providing for more complete limitations were not achieved within five years [emphasis added], U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms."

<sup>2</sup> Commission Rpt Page 8: "...In such a case the Soviets should have no confidence that we would refrain from launching our ICBM's during that interval after we had been hit [by SLBM attack on our bombers]. It is important to appreciate that this would not be a 'launch-on-warning,' or even a 'launch-under-attack,' but rather a launch after attack -- after massive nuclear detonations had already occurred..."

[Ed. Note: I must assume no attacker would allow free interval between SLBM and ICBM arrival. I therefore have to consider ourselves having to plan for launch under attack.]

any hope of survival. This increasing tendency to shorter decision times and spasm warfare has clearly indicated a tendency toward decreasing stability as well.

Simultaneously, the ethical underpinnings of present deterrence have come under fire. Scowcroft notes: "Deterrence is not, and cannot be, bluff. In order for deterrence to be effective we must not merely have weapons, we must be perceived to be able, and prepared, if necessary to use them effectively against the key elements of Soviet power." But it is this issue -- bluff vs planned use -- that the Bishops develop as the central ethic against present policy. That they argue themselves into a paradox, i.e., weapons and deterrence are acceptable as long as you don't think seriously about using them, is at the heart of our problem.

*Note* | There is expanding popular confusion as to just what comprises our justifiable self-interest -- evidenced by the broadly based Freeze movement. The unmistakable trend is that of decreasing popular support for future nuclear systems, both within nations and between nations. Western leaders cannot forever fend off such pressures. The trend is clear. Western strategic options are becoming alarmingly narrow. And at the same time, even Henry Kissinger points out that conventional arms control measures alone are insufficient, and are at a justifiable "...impasse in thought..." Continuing upon the present course, with deterrence maintained solely by an ever-increasing offensive threat, presents little hope and even fewer options. On the other hand, reestablishing historical check-and-balance effects of offense vs defense might offer new avenues to catalyze the process to effective arms control. That is:

- o To reduce the risk of war
- o To reduce the arms of war
- o To reduce the consequences of war

Two years after President Reagan assumed office, the Chairman of his Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended a new "strategic vision" to provide new options for the future. While obligatory modernization of U.S. strategic offensive forces had already begun in 1981, they were seen likely to be inadequate as we ended the next decade.

| On March 23, 1983, the President proposed we explore the feasibility of a new strategy. Such a strategy would use greater reliance upon defense rather than offense to move toward a goal of someday making nuclear weapons effectively impotent and obsolete. He proposed we initially explore the technologies to defend against the principal source of today's instability, the ballistic missile.

Such a strategy, even in early stages, could restore stability -- first by making preemption infeasible, and ultimately by greatly reducing our reliance upon the weapons themselves.

In that same speech -- often overlooked -- the President noted this would entail increasing our conventional leverage. We have to address the complete problem, not simply the veneer. I believe these goals can be met readily -- and sustained -- by the superior technical industrial bases of the allied free nations.

Such a change from long-accepted doctrine presented a ripe target for the Western press and Soviet propaganda. But it has survived the criticism. Two years later it receives increasing support from the public, the media, defense strategists, scientists, and even key political figures in the ranks of opposing parties.

It is the larger implications of SDI that motivated the Soviets to return to Geneva; and redirected the initial knee-jerk reactions to "Star Wars". The U.S. media is now giving more serious discussion to the feasibility of both the technologies and policies in a view toward a future that seeks to defend -- not simply avenge -- a free society. Moreover, it is the first enforceable catalyst to arms control in almost thirty years; and the only means by which I can foresee securing the implications of any truly drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals.

From the perspective of the West, concerns expressed about the SDI fall into four broad categories:

Technical Feasibility:

Many of the defense and scientific community have renewed the debate preceding the 1972 ABM treaty. Missile defense was then only feasible during the last seconds of missile flight, and then only with nuclear weapons. Interception while the missile was still in boost-phase was not even a serious option. From this perspective, otherwise highly distinguished spokesmen have commented that the objective of "rendering nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" is simply impossible. A number of scientific groups and leaders have commented likewise. But during just the last few years, remarkable advances in the technology of directed-energy such as lasers and particle beams; as well as sensors, optics -- and most emphatically -- data processing and satellite survivability; have permitted a wholly new and realistic approach to the concept of ballistic missile defense, one that emphasizes boost-phase intercept.

For example, it is feasible to build large, short-pulse lasers emitting very high frequency (visible) light -- and place them on the ground. New deformable, phased-array mirrors can not only compensate for the atmosphere, but permit what otherwise would be impossibly large optics and aim them precisely and rapidly. Only the simple, cheap, proliferable, and highly survivable components of any defense might then have to be in space. Demonstrations of as much as 100 megajoules of energy compressed into pulses of less than 100 microseconds -- many times per second -- would clearly be seen by Soviet planners as signaling the end of the ICBM's strategic reign.

Critics would note that the USSR might shift to cruise missiles and bombers. But such shifts would themselves move the Soviets toward a more balanced, stable, posture. The President's Strategic Defense Initiative did not see the ICBM as its only priority, just the first and most difficult. SDI technologies will rapidly evolve toward these other systems as well.

Although many scientists remain skeptical, those who have examined the state-of-the-art have concluded boost-phase intercept is entirely feasible today. This makes defense of whole areas -- not merely limited military targets as in the pre-1972 debate -- entirely plausible. Boost-phase kill negates two generations of heavy-lift and highly MiRV'd Soviet ICBMs. It reverses the arguments of the 1972 Treaty, a technologically different era. It makes the ICBM a totally unproductive military system for preemption. It makes it negotiable.

#### Arms Race in Space:

The earliest outcry -- and the continuing theme of Soviet propaganda -- stresses "arms race in space." This virginal-sanctity-of-space is the entré into their moral argument against muddying up an otherwise pristine environment. This ignores five simple facts: It is in space that military intelligence has long been gathered. It is in space that the military battle-management and C<sup>3</sup> systems reside. It is in space that only the Soviets have tested national command exercises within the Soyuz missions. It is in space that only the Soviets have yet tested anti-satellite weapons. And it is from space that tens of thousands of nuclear warheads will descend upon the earth. Space -- far from being sanctified -- has in fact been a "free-fire" zone for more than 15 years.

In contrast, both the Joint Chiefs' call for strategic vision and the President's SDI proposal seek alternatives to the existing offensive spiral. Defense threatens weapons, not people. It can be accused of stimulating an arms race only if it succumbs to ill-advised actions inviting Soviet attempts

to simply proliferate "more of the same." Here then remains a central misunderstanding born of the 1972 debates.

Terminal defenses of this earlier era -- interceptors standing alone or as first moves in any defensive shift -- degrade catastrophically to simple proliferation. No new Soviet approaches are needed. No radical shifts in Soviet investment or strategic priority are necessary. No technological lead is gained by the West. No real protection is afforded by stopping five out of six warheads against an adversary who has the throw-weight to put as many as necessary on the target. And not even the hope of protection is offered to those who will pay for this defense -- the people.

In contrast, boost-phase defense technologies, degrade gracefully. Attempts to proliferate result in only a slowly diminishing defense effectiveness. Boost phase defense systems don't kill a half dozen warheads, they destroy hundreds of boosters -- thousands of warheads -- each. Boost-phase systems don't cover tens of square miles, they cover tens of millions. Boost-phase systems can't be decoyed with simple lightweight penetration aids, they attack multi-megawatt rocket exhausts. There is tremendous leverage on the defender's side. Attempting to overcome it through simple arms proliferation is implausible. Instead of spurring an arms race in space an effective defense can serve as the missing catalyst for ending the present offensive arms spiral.

Concerns have also been introduced, both in the U.S. and abroad, that the SDI would create a first-strike capability for the West. In fact, that capability did once exist and its use was never contemplated. But the need for a mutually negotiated stable transition was recognized both in President Reagan's original speech on SDI nearly two years ago and, more recently, in his proposal to discuss at Geneva the "Strategic Concept".

While the Soviet Union has chosen to build a strategic force -- primarily ICBMs -- that is emphatically preemptive in nature, the West has tended to deemphasize the various aspects of civil defense. The Soviets have invested hundreds of billions in passive and active defense measures, and discipline, for both their key socioeconomic assets and political/military leadership. They have a national air defense system that is effective against both aircraft and cruise missiles. Further, the Soviet Union has had a massive effort underway for fifteen years, using some of their finest technical talent, to develop just such advanced defenses as the SDI. Comparing capabilities, the West can hardly stand accused of preparing for a first-strike.



Decoupling the U.S. from its Allies:

There is concern that SDI would produce "fortress America." In contrast, the President has clearly stated that our goal is to defend not just the United States but our allies as well. "Our security and theirs is one."

It is again boost-phase technology that makes this possible. It can defend Europe, the U.S. or other nations. For example, the SS-20 is as vulnerable to its intercept as the SS-17, 18 or 19. Boost-phase intercept can occur even before an ICBM's precise target is known. What's more it destroys the missile threat close to its origin. Defense need not wait until the last second -- surrendering both time and tactics to the attacker.

As discussed previously, other delivery systems, such as shorter-range tactical weapons, cruise missiles or aircraft are also targets for defensive technologies. The SDI is only the first step toward a major change in strategy. That first step addresses ballistic missiles because they have been the dominant contributor to the erosion of stability. It is the ICBM, with its ability to destroy civilizations in minutes, that has most clearly displayed the central flaws of a doctrine allowed to evolve without deep thought for the clear long-term implications -- under which we now face grave decisions.

As deterrent strategy moves away from the present dominance of offensive measures to an increasing dependence upon defense, the transition must be managed to ensure that stability is continually enhanced. The course of change can be managed best by the Alliance. Instead of decoupling the U.S. from its Allies, development of defensive technologies will require even closer cooperation.

Unaffordable:

Immediately after the initial SDI speech, wild cost estimates approaching trillions of dollars were proffered. Recalling the often heated debates that preceded the 1972 ABM treaty, these groundless estimates ignored the tremendous advances in technology that make the SDI feasible today and, instead, stem from extrapolating terminal defenses to whole continents. While somewhat abated, concerns remain that the SDI will divert funds from conventional force modernization.

Two facts are worth noting here: 1) Research and development is performed to produce new means and to make those means affordable; 2) The U.S. will spend between 1.5 and 2 trillion dollars on defense between 1985 and 1989.

The SDI is a first step toward a new strategy, one that will include both missile defense and use of emerging technologies to strengthen conventional forces. Each of these pursuits has a common goal--reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons. But each new element in an unfolding strategy requires an assessment of the cost and the effectiveness.

It is often assumed that any reduction in our reliance upon nuclear weapons will result in an increasing dependence upon even more costly conventional systems. In fact, a number of technologies are emerging from the intense high-technology trade competition that promise extremely high military leverage -- at reduced cost. An example is the clear prospect of carrying out many of the missions traditionally attributed to manned aircraft by pilotless vehicles. These use modern sensor and data processing technology along with new materials and manufacturing techniques to produce highly effective systems at low cost. Developing these technologies jointly can spur economic growth throughout the Alliance by stimulating the development of technologies with commercial benefits.

Coupling the rapid acceleration in commercial technologies to conventional military requirements can restore the "force multiplier" that languished as tactical nuclear weapons became more and more prevalent. The nuclear threshold can be elevated, and affordably, and with it the prospect of escalation to global nuclear war will diminish. While some would argue that the differences between nuclear war and conventional war are diminishing, in fact, modern conventional weapons are becoming far better able to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. And it is this central theme of Western civilization that has become obscured over the last decades by the brute-force nature of nuclear weapons.

#### CONCLUSION

It's time for the members of the Alliance to rethink our collective course. Our present strategy of deterrence only through the threat of massive retaliation offers little hope and fewer and fewer options to prevent a continuing erosion of stability in the nuclear balance. A change is necessary--and it is feasible. In fact, it is inevitable.

The SDI is a first step toward a new strategy that will combine defensive measures with the present offense to offer hope for a future where nuclear weapons play a diminished role. When the 1972 ABM treaty was signed, there were no realistic alternatives to the status of mutual vulnerability that resulted. Today, remarkable advances in technology do offer alternatives and the SDI proposes to explore them.

Any change in defense strategy must be managed with care and vision, and this is particularly so in the nuclear age. The Alliance is the best means to manage the course of change that the SDI embarks us on.



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## Current Status Details for CTRH RECID: 303577 MAIN SUBCODE: IT067

Current Status	None
User Name	dbarrie
Status Date	2014-07-18
Case Number	S697
Notes	Transferred to IT093

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## Review Status History

<u>No.</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>User</u>	<u>Case Number</u>	<u>Notes</u>
1	None	2014-07-18	dbarrie	S697	Transferred to IT093



# U.S. National Archives & Records Administration

## Current Status Details for CTRH RECID: 314124CU MAIN SUBCODE: IT067-02

Current Status	None
User Name	dbarrie
Status Date	2014-05-16
Case Number	
Notes	Transfer to IT067

## Review Status History

<u>No.</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>User</u>	<u>Case Number</u>	<u>Notes</u>
1	None	2014-05-16	dbarrie		Transfer to IT067

IT067-02

# WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET



*g*

- O - OUTGOING
  - H - INTERNAL
  - I - INCOMING
- Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 1/1

Name of Correspondent: Mike Matheson

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) \_\_\_\_\_ (B) \_\_\_\_\_ (C) \_\_\_\_\_

Subject: Draft response for guidance to USNATO's request for guidance for a May 14 POLADS exchange on ratification of the 1977 Protocols.

ROUTE TO:	ACTION	DISPOSITION
Office/Agency (Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD
<u>CUHOLL</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>85105107</u>
		Type of Response Code
		Completion Date YY/MM/DD
	Referral Note:	
<u>CUAT18</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>85105107</u>
		<u>C 85105108</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>5-8-85 JGR MEMO TO R. HAUSER</u>
<u>CUAT04</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>85105108</u>
		<u>C 85105108</u>
	Referral Note:	<u>5-8-85 RAN MEMO TO MATHESON</u>
		<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:	
		<u>1 1</u>
	Referral Note:	

**ACTION CODES:**

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure
- i - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

**DISPOSITION CODES:**

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

**FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:**

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.  
 Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).  
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## PRESIDENTIAL REPLY

Code	Date	Comment	Form
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C		Time:	P-
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DSP		Time:	Media:
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- V - Telephone
- X - Miscellaneous
- Y - Study

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 8, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE MATHESON  
DEPUTY LEGAL ADVISER  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FROM: RICHARD A. HAUSER *Original signed by RAH*  
DEPUTY COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Draft Response to U.S. NATO's Request  
for Guidance for a May 14 POLADs Exchange  
on Ratification of the 1977 Protocols

Counsel's Office has reviewed the above-referenced proposed guidance cable, and finds no objection to it from a legal perspective.

RAH:JGR:aea 5/8/85


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Chron



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 8, 1985



MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD A. HAUSER

FROM:

JOHN G. ROBERTS *JGR*

SUBJECT:

Draft Response to U.S. NATO's Request  
for Guidance for a May 14 POLADs Exchange  
on Ratification of the 1977 Protocols

State Deputy Legal Adviser Mike Matheson has asked for our views on a proposed guidance cable to be sent to the U.S. NATO Mission. At the last Law of War Working Group meeting, on April 22, the participants were advised that a meeting of the NATO Political Committee would be held on May 14, and that one of the items on the agenda would be the status of ratification of the 1977 Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention. The 1977 Protocols update and revise the famous 1949 Geneva Convention on the acceptable conduct of war and treatment of prisoners of war. The 1977 conference was unable to reach agreement on limitations on the use of specific types of weapons, so another conference was held in 1979-1980 that gave rise to the Conventional Weapons Convention, with three additional Protocols.

It is important to keep distinct the 1977 Protocols and the Protocols to the Conventional Weapons Convention. The upcoming NATO meeting concerns only the 1977 Protocols. The United States has not yet decided whether to seek ratification of the 1977 Protocols, pending review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That review is not yet complete, but all indications are that the Chiefs will recommend against ratification. The proposed guidance cable accordingly points out the major areas of concern, so the NATO Allies are aware that we may well decide not to ratify. The main objection is found in paragraph four: the Protocols would treat many terrorist organizations as if they were countries engaged in war, legitimizing their activities and offering them protections and courtesies that should not be extended to common criminals.

I have no objections. The cable embodies the reality that the military concerns of the Department of Defense are prevailing in these discussions over the diplomatic objectives of the Department of State.

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS F05-139/2 #20274

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 4/20/06

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C.

May 6, 1985

*JGR*

TO: NSC - Mr. Kimmett  
OSD/ISP - Mr. Feith  
OSD/GC - Mr. McNeill  
JCS/J-5 - Commo. Sackett  
ACDA/GC - Mr. Graham  
White House Counsel - Mr. Hauser ✓

FROM: State/L - Mike Matheson <sup>NDM</sup>

Attached is a draft response to USNATO's request for guidance for a May 14 POLADs exchange on ratification of the 1977 Protocols. Please give me your clearance/comments by COB Thursday May 9.

Thanks very much.

Attachment:  
Draft response.

Dept. of State

ACK	MRN	DTG
CLASSIFICATION		
SPECIAL CHARGES		
DRAWING OFFICER: MATHESON:EDK		
05/06/85, EXT. 23245, WANG 2040		
APPROVING OFFICE	NAME	

1 OFFICE	NAME	2 OFFICE	NAME
3		4	
5 CLEARANCES		6 CLEARANCES	
7		8	

DECISIONS OF THE SECRETARY

ROUTINE USMISSION NATLO

INFO PRIORITY

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CAUTIONS

E.O. 12356:

TAGS:

SUBJECT: NATO POLITICAL COMMITTEE - 1977 PROTOCOLS TO 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS

REF: USNATO 2057

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. USNATO 2057 REQUESTED GUIDANCE FOR MAY 14 EXCHANGE ON THE STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS, INCLUDING THE ISSUES WE SEE AS IMPORTANT. GUIDANCE FOLLOWS.
3. THE USG HAS TAKEN NO DECISION REGARDING RATIFICATION OF THE 1977 PROTOCOLS. WE ARE PRESENTLY AWAITING THE RESULTS OF A LENGTHY STUDY BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROTOCOLS. WE WILL SHARE THE RESULTS OF THAT STUDY WITH NATO ALLIES AS SOON AS THEY ARE AVAILABLE. IN THE MEANTIME, THE FOLLOWING IS A BRIEF

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F05-139/2#20275

BY LOI NARA, DATE 4/20/06

AND PRELIMINARY LISTING OF THE ISSUES WE CURRENTLY SEE AS MOST IMPORTANT. THIS LIST IS OF COURSE NOT FINAL OR EXHAUSTIVE.

4. THE USG CONTINUES TO HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT ARTICLE 1{4}, WHICH PURPORTS TO EXTEND THE RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ARMED GROUPS ON THE BASIS OF INAPPROPRIATE POLITICAL CRITERIA, AND WHICH, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 44, COULD GIVE POW STATUS TO MEMBERS OF SUCH GROUPS UNDER INAPPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. THE USG CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED THAT ARTICLE 28{2} MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS PRECLUDING MEDICAL AIRCRAFT FROM CARRYING ENCRYPTION EQUIPMENT FOR SECURE COMMUNICATIONS TO SUPPORT MEDICAL OPERATIONS.

6. THE USG CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED THAT THE PROHIBITION IN ARTICLE 39{2} ON THE USE OF ENEMY UNIFORMS WOULD IMPOSE UNDUE LIMITATIONS ON ALLIED OPERATIONS.

7. THE USG CONTINUES TO HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS THAT THE PROHIBITIONS ON REPRISALS IN PART IV WOULD UNDULY CONSTRAIN ALLIED MILITARY OPTIONS IN THE EVENT OF SERIOUS BREACHES BY ENEMY FORCES.

8. THE USG CONTINUES TO BE CONCERNED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF PART IV ON INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS AND COLLATERAL INJURY TO CIVILIANS MAY BE INTERPRETED IN A MANNER THAT WOULD UNDULY CONSTRAIN THE NECESSARY

FLEXIBILITY AND DISCRETION OF FIELD COMMANDERS.

9. THE USG CONTINUES TO REGARD IT AS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT NATO ALLIES SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT THE RULES RELATING TO THE USE OF WEAPONS INTRODUCED BY PROTOCOL I APPLY ONLY TO CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, AND IN PARTICULAR DO NOT HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

10. THE USG CONTINUES TO SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF OTHER NATO ALLIES TO CLARIFY THE INTERPRETATION AND SCOPE OF VARIOUS PROVISIONS OF THE PROTOCOLS, INCLUDING ARTICLES 41, 44 AND 56-58 OF PROTOCOL I.

11. THE USG LOOKS FORWARD TO HEARING THE VIEWS OF OTHER NATO ALLIES ON THESE AND OTHER POINTS. 44