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
July 28, 1987

Dear Andy:

It was thoughtful of you to send me a set of
The Atlantic Council's Policy Papers on
"U.S. Policy Towards the Soviet Union: A
Long-Term Western Perspective, 1987-2000"
and "Defending Peace and Freedom: Toward
Strategic Stability in the Year 2000." A
quick perusal indicates every sign of very
interesting reading and I look forward, with
anticipation, to reading these reports from
cover to cover.

With many thanks, and

Warm regards,



Frank C. Carlucci

General Andrew J. Goodpaster^x
Chairman
The Atlantic Council
of the United States
1616 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

NSC 8705419

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 27, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH 

SUBJECT: Thank You Letter to General Goodpaster


General Goodpaster has sent you a letter enclosing a set of The Atlantic Council's Policy Papers on "U.S. Policy Towards the Soviet Union: A Long-Term Western Perspective, 1986-2000" and "Defending Peace and Freedom: Toward Strategic Stability in the Year 2000."

These reports are the end result of two bipartisan working groups regarding long-term US-Soviet relations, co-chaired by the late Ambassador Stoessel and General Goodpaster -- and the future of strategic stability, co-chaired by Brent Scowcroft and James Woolsey.

The policy recommendations are addressed to key officials in the US executive and legislative branches, and appropriate international organizations. Goodpaster believes that these policy papers outline a realistic course and direction that will provide policy and stability, and also continue to gain bipartisan support.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the draft letter at Tab I thanking General Goodpaster for sending you the reports.

Approve 

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Ltr to Goodpaster
Tab A Incoming

Prepared by:
Mary M. Wengrzynek

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R. JAMES WOOLSEY

FYI

THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL

OF THE UNITED STATES

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5619

PRESIDENT
GEORGE M. SEIGNIOUS II

EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
JOSEPH W. HARNED

SECRETARY
JAMES W. SYMINGTON

19 June 1987

*note the above
made by
TMS*

The Honorable Frank Carlucci
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Frank:

Over the past three years, the Atlantic Council of the United States has convened two bipartisan Working Groups to consider long-term U.S.-Soviet relations and the future of strategic stability.

The Working Group on "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union: A Long-Term Western Perspective, 1987-2000", was co-chaired by the late Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union and myself. The Co-Chairmen of the companion policy paper on "Defending Peace and Freedom: Toward Strategic Stability in the Year 2000" were Brent Scowcroft and R. James Woolsey. The membership of both Working Groups was composed of a bipartisan balance of high-level experts with experience in the subject areas.

These issues are of supreme importance to our NATO allies and Japan, and on numerous occasions we took the opportunity to consult with them about long-term U.S. policy in both areas. Moreover, the leadership of both Working Groups held extensive informal, off-the-record discussions on the same sets of issues with leading Soviet representatives in Moscow and Washington.

The enclosed two policy papers are the result of these efforts. The policy recommendations are addressed to key officials in the U.S. executive and legislative branches, as well as to appropriate international organizations.

We believe that these two policy papers together outline a realistic course and a desirable direction for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the coming years

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-- a course and a direction that will provide policy continuity and stability and that will continue to gain bipartisan support.

As such, I know they will be of great interest to you.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Andy Goodpaster". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

Andrew J. Goodpaster

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8705619

RECEIVED 27 JUL 87 19

TO CARLUCCI

FROM ERMARTH

DOCDATE 27 JUL 87

GOODPASTER, ANDREW

19 JUN 87

KEYWORDS: USSR

ADMINISTRATIVE

SUBJECT: THANK YOU LTR TO GENERAL GOODPASTER FM CARLUCCI

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE: 30 JUL 87 STATUS *A* FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CARLUCCI

COMMENTS

REF#

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POLITICAL SERIES

The Atlantic Council
of the United States

Policy Papers

U.S. Policy Towards the Soviet Union: A Long-Term Western Perspective, 1987-2000

**Report of the Atlantic Council's
Working Group on U.S.-Soviet Policy**

Andrew J. Goodpaster, *and*
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., *Co-Chairmen*
Robert Kennedy, *Rapporteur*

THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES

The Atlantic Council of the United States, now in its 27th year, is a national and bipartisan center for the formulation of policy recommendations on the problems and opportunities shared by the democracies of Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Its purpose is to promote understanding of major international security, political, and economic issues, foster informed public debate, and make recommendations to both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government and to the appropriate international organizations.

The Council is a non-governmental, educational organization, supported by tax-exempt contributions from corporations, foundations, labor unions, and individuals. Directors of the Atlantic Council (listed on the back cover of this Policy Paper) are private individuals with internationally recognized experience in public and private endeavor, including government, finance, business, labor, academia, the law, and the media. They volunteer their time and expertise to help forge links of policy and purpose among the developed democracies and to improve relations with the developing and the communist nations.

The Atlantic Council of the United States
1616 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION: A LONG-TERM WESTERN PERSPECTIVE, 1987-2000

**Report of the Atlantic Council's
Working Group on U.S.-Soviet Policy**

Andrew J. Goodpaster
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Co-Chairmen

Robert Kennedy
Rapporteur

with the assistance of
John M. Weinstein
and
William T. Shinn, Jr.

Washington, D.C.
March 1987

*Additional copies of this policy paper
U.S. Policy Towards the Soviet Union:
A Long-Term Western Perspective, 1987-2000
may be ordered at \$6.00 prepaid from the Atlantic Council.*

The Atlantic Council's brochure, ISSUES AND OPTIONS, 1986-87
is available gratis upon request.

The Atlantic Council of the United States
1616 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006
Telephone: (202) 347-9353

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IN MEMORIAM

Walter John Stoessel, Jr.

January 24, 1920—December 9, 1986

Shortly before this publication went to press, the co-chairman of the project, Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., died suddenly. His passing is a deeply felt loss for all of us who have been associated with him in this endeavor.

Ambassador Stoessel was one of this country's most outstanding diplomats. In a career of singular distinction he served as our Ambassador in Moscow, Bonn, and Warsaw, as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and subsequently as Deputy Secretary of State. One of a rare breed of American statesmen, consistently wise, moderate, and constructive, Ambassador Stoessel made a lasting contribution to the improvement of U.S.-Soviet relations and to the enhancement of U.S. private sector communication with the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Stoessel was also one of the most dedicated supporters of the Atlantic Council. He made an essential contribution to many of the Council's most important programs, including service as co-chairman of the working group on U.S.-Soviet policy, co-chairman of the working group on international terrorism, and member of the working group on strategic stability and arms control. Shortly before his passing, he had agreed to co-chair the Council's new working group on the Western stake in the Soviet economy.

All of us who had the privilege to know and work with Ambassador Stoessel now wish to record our profound regret at the great loss to this country and its endeavors in foreign policy occasioned by his death.

Andrew J. Goodpaster
Co-Chairman

FOREWORD

This policy paper reaffirms the commitment of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on U.S.-Soviet Policy to the development of improved relations with the Soviet Union within a peaceful framework. At the same time it emphasizes continued resolve to resist attempts by the USSR (or any other nation) to extend its influence through military means or intimidation.

The world has changed profoundly in the last few decades. Old colonial empires have crumbled. Advances in communications and transportation have reduced the size of the planet. Technology has advanced at a speed that frequently outpaces our ability to ensure that advances serve our aims rather than compound our problems. We have grown to recognize the fragility of our environment and are beginning to realize the limitations on our resources.

As the world has become more complex, more diverse, and more dynamic, it has also become potentially more dangerous. Advances in military firepower have greatly increased the lethality of the armed forces of even small nations. A further proliferation of nuclear weapons would add an even more ominous dimension to interstate relations. Of most concern, however, has been the massive destructive potential of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States. In today's world, the avoidance of miscalculation which might lead to war, conventional or nuclear, as well as the need to address the many other serious problems we now confront, underscores the need for a new and strengthened framework for U.S.-Soviet relations.

New leadership in the Soviet Union may offer new opportunities in this regard. However, we cannot afford to be overly optimistic. The complexities involved in resolving the conflictual elements in U.S.-Soviet relations should never be underestimated. Serious risks are inescapably involved. Even under the most favorable conditions, future U.S.-Soviet relations seem certain to be characterized by simultaneous conflictual and cooperative dimensions. No escape from this complex pattern of interaction is evident.

Nevertheless, given the dangers we now confront and the fragility of the world in which we live, it is imperative that the United States make every effort to develop a more stable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union and extend every opportunity to the Soviet Union to meet us halfway. We may not succeed—or more likely, may succeed only in part—but we must try.

Although the Soviet system is one which fails to meet many of its own people's aspirations and is a chronic source of international disturbance, the Soviet Union is nevertheless an immense fact of life—a military power of great strength, the world's third largest economic entity, and the source of considerable influence in several regions of the world. It is unlikely to collapse or to disappear through internal revolution. For the United States and the West as a whole, therefore, the challenge is to identify and cultivate areas of actual and potential shared interest—starting with crisis stabilization and the avoidance of war—without jeopardizing our basic interests and value systems. This would be neither Cold War nor convergence, but a positive type of active and sustained engagement.

The future course of U.S.-Soviet relations will depend greatly on Moscow's willingness and ability to convert words to deeds. One task of U.S. policy is to encourage the Soviet Union to do so.

The Working Group believes that the policy recommendations outlined in this paper provide the necessary foundation for such a positive, sustained engage-

ment toward improved U.S.-Soviet relations over the long term. The recommendations are the product of extensive consultations in Washington and in Western Europe with a wide variety of statesmen, parliamentarians, and scholars as well as discussions in Moscow and Washington with senior Soviet representatives.

This policy paper focuses on *long-term* U.S.-Soviet relations and therefore does not dwell on short-term issues and controversies. There is good reason to do this. It is a truism that the political dynamics of contemporary democracies make it difficult if not impossible to pay due attention to long-term policy planning. In addition to this systemic difficulty, which results from the political necessity to take positions and respond to short-term developments and crises, the bipartisanship that long characterized U.S. foreign policy has eroded. These factors have led the Atlantic Council to focus consideration on long-term policy interests and long-term policy formulation, and to do so from a rigorously bipartisan perspective.

The Atlantic Council is well placed to do this. It has developed a unique approach and process to policy formulation that rest on a solid bedrock formed of experience, research, and scholarship. A glance at the composition of this Working Group (see p. 9) reveals precisely those characteristics. The bipartisan Working Group reviewed draft working papers by eminent scholars and practitioners for over two years. These papers will be published by the Atlantic Council in mid-1987 as a book which, I feel sure, will be a significant contribution to the analytic literature. Review of the working papers likewise served as the basis and starting point for the Policy Paper and for the policy recommendations the Working Group is making. These were drafted, reviewed, and refined until they reached a form where in which the vast majority of Working Group members could support them wholeheartedly. Of course, not every participant agrees with every phrase of the Policy Paper, and when a member disagrees significantly his dissent is carried in a footnote or in the Appendix.


It will no doubt be noted that the discussion of arms control measures, which hold a special place of importance in U.S.-Soviet relations, is relatively limited in this Policy Paper. The reason is that long-term strategic stability and arms control are the focus of a parallel Atlantic Council bipartisan Working Group co-chaired by Brent Scowcroft and R. James Woolsey, with Thomas Etzold as Rapporteur. That companion Policy Paper will be published in a few weeks, with the book to follow in a few months.

On behalf of the Atlantic Council and particularly of this Working Group, I want to thank publicly the organizations that have provided the financial support enabling us to undertake and to complete this valuable work: the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, PepsiCo, the William and Mary Greve Foundation, Archer Daniels Midland, the Eisenhower World Affairs Institute, Monsanto International, Northrop Corporation, and the Occidental Petroleum Corporation.

It was my honor to co-chair this Atlantic Council Working Group with Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. Ambassador Stoessel died of leukemia on December 9, 1986. His passing has been a source of great sadness to all of us who knew him and worked with him, and a great loss for the nation.

It is no easy task to summarize with insight the views of so diverse and sometimes divergent a Working Group as those who participated in this effort. The Rapporteur, Dr. Robert Kennedy, merits special congratulation for his keen understanding, careful draftsmanship, and patient diligence in preparing the Policy Paper. Our sincere thanks go also to John Weinstein and William Shinn: the former for providing continuity during Dr. Kennedy's transition to a new

position at the NATO Defense College in Rome, the latter for his insightful and constructive review of consecutive drafts and for his analytical exploration of policy options. A last word of thanks is due to the members of the Working Group, who out of personal interest in U.S. policy often devoted considerable time and attention *pro bono publico*. It is an excellent and welcome example of the American volunteer tradition of sharing thought, experience, and wisdom—a tradition from which the Atlantic Council and the nation have drawn great benefit.



ANDREW J. GOODPASTER

Chairman

Atlantic Council of the United States

MEMBERS OF THE WORKING GROUP

CO-CHAIRMEN:

Andrew J. Goodpaster*, Chairman, Atlantic Council; former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

Walter J. Stoessel**, Former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR and Deputy Secretary of State; Chairman, Presidential Commission on Chemical Warfare.

RAPPORTEUR:

Robert Kennedy, Civilian Deputy Commandant, NATO Defense College; co-rapporteur, Atlantic Council's Working Group on "Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin".

MEMBERS:

Madeleine K. Albright, Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University; former Staff Member, National Security Council.

Willis C. Armstrong, Consultant; former Assistant Secretary of State.

James H. Billington, Director, Woodrow Wilson Center, The Smithsonian Institution.

George S. Blanchard, Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Europe, and Commander, Central Army Group.

Barry M. Blechman, President, Defense Forecasting Inc.; former Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Robert R. Bowie, Professor of Government, Harvard University; former Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.

Robert Byrnes, Distinguished Professor of History, Indiana University.

Kenneth W. Dam, Vice President, IBM Corporation; former Deputy Secretary of State.

Robert H. Donaldson, President, Fairleigh Dickinson University.

Russell E. Dougherty, Attorney; former Commander-in-Chief, SAC, and Chief of Staff, NATO Allied Command Europe.

Herbert J. Ellison, Secretary, George F. Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center; former Professor of Slavic Studies, University of Washington.

Paul S. Ello, Vice President, International Security Programs, BDM Corporation.

Robert F. Ellsworth, President, R. F. Ellsworth & Co.; former Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Ambassador to NATO.

Murray Feshbach†, Former Chief, Soviet Section, Foreign Demographic Analysis Division, U.S. Department of Commerce.

Raymond Garthoff, Fellow, Brookings Institution; former U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria.

Harry Gelman, Rand Corporation.

Lincoln Gordon, Guest Scholar, Brookings Institution; former Assistant Secretary of State.

*Names of Directors of the Atlantic Council are in italics.

**Served until his untimely death in December 1986.

†Served until his appointment as Sovietologist-in-Residence, Office of the Secretary General, NATO.

William Griffith*, Ford Professor of Political Science, MIT; Adjunct Professor of Diplomatic History, Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; Chief Roving Editor of *The Readers Digest*.

John Hardt, Associate Director for Senior Specialists, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

Martin J. Hillenbrand, Dean Rusk Professor of International Relations, and Director, Center for Global Policy Studies, University of Georgia; former Director General, Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, and U.S. Ambassador to Germany.

Donald M. Kendall, Chairman, PepsiCo. Founder, Committee on East-West Accord.

John M. Leddy, Former Assistant Secretary of State and Treasury.

Winston Lord**, President, Council on Foreign Relations.

Stanley J. Marcuss, Partner, Milbank Tweed Hadley & McCloy.

Bernard J. O'Keefe, Chairman, EG & G, Inc.

Michael A. Petrilli, Manager, Information Analysis, Europe Africa, Monsanto International.

Joel Pritchard, Director of Government Relations, Bogle & Gates; former United States Congressman.

Olin C. Robison, President, Middlebury College.

Brent Scowcroft, Vice Chairman, Kissinger Associates; Chairman, President's Commission on Strategic Forces; former Assistant for National Security Affairs to the President.

William T. Shinn, Jr., Faculty Member, Foreign Service Institute; former U.S. Consul General, Leningrad; former Director of Soviet Affairs and Deputy Director of NATO Affairs, Department of State.

Dimitri Simes, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; former Professor of Soviet and East European Studies, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University.

Stanley R. Sloan, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Guest Scholar, Brookings Institution; former Counselor of the Department of State.

Timothy W. Stanley, President, International Economic Studies Institute; former Defense Adviser, U.S. Mission to NATO and ACDA special representative to Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks.

Leonard Sullivan, Jr., Defense policy consultant, System Planning Corporation; former Assistant Secretary of Defense.

William C. Taubman, Bertrand Snell Professor of Political Science, Amherst College.

Malcolm Toon, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Adam Ulam, Director, Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

C. William Verity, Jr., Chairman of the Executive Committee, Armco Steel Corporation; Chairman, U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council.

John M. Weinstein, Special Assistant for Requirements and Capabilities, Strategic and Theater Nuclear Warfare Division, Navy Department

*Served until his appointment as Senior Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany.

**Served until his appointment as U.S. Ambassador to the People's Republic of China (June 1985).

Roy A. Werner, Corporate Director, Research and Analysis, Northrop Corporation.

Nils Wessell*, Former Director, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania.

Joseph J. Wolf, former U.S. Minister to NATO.

EX-OFFICIO MEMBERS:

George M. Seignious II, President, Atlantic Council.

Edna G. Rostow, Editor, *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*.

Steven B. Shantzis, Staff Director, Development, Atlantic Council.

Job L. Dittberner, Staff Director, Projects and Programs, Atlantic Council.

Keith Armes, Staff Director, Management and Operations, Atlantic Council.

PROJECT DIRECTOR:

Joseph W. Harned, Executive Vice President, Atlantic Council.

PROJECT COORDINATOR:

Eliane Lomax, Assistant Staff Director, Projects and Development, Atlantic Council.

*Served until his appointment as Director of the Office of Research, USIA.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION: A LONG-TERM WESTERN PERSPECTIVE, 1987-2000

Introduction

No foreign policy issues have commanded more attention in the post-war period than those arising from our relationship with the Soviet Union. Since the Bolsheviks came to power on a platform which called for class struggle and revolution on a global scale, our relationship has been predisposed to friction. De Tocqueville correctly perceived the basic differences between us and the Russians. Mackinder predicted that geopolitics would put Russia and America on a collision course.

In the wake of World War II, the increasingly omnipresent political and military dispositions of these two powers, their growing nuclear arsenals, and the attendant dramatic increase in destructive potential added to concerns over the future course of Soviet-American relations. Today, the avoidance of miscalculation which might lead to unimaginable catastrophes holds the attention of policy-makers worldwide and underscores the need to search for policies that will reduce the risk of crises and conflict while preserving U.S. interests and those of its allies in promoting freedom, human dignity, and progress.

The need to expand areas of cooperation and to institutionalize mechanisms of conflict avoidance and conflict resolution and thus alter the basic pattern of U.S.-Soviet post-war relations is also driven by powerful world trends. The world has changed profoundly since the late 1940s and early 1950s. While the explosion of the world's first atomic device at Trinity Site on July 16, 1945, ushered in the atomic age with all its uncertainties and potential dangers, it was only the first of a remarkable series of technological changes that have had a major impact on interstate relations. Post-war advances in communications and transportation have compressed both time and distance. Events in one country, for the most part, are now instantly portrayed around the world. The war in Vietnam was presented nightly on television in the United States and elsewhere. Events in El Salvador, or Nicaragua, or Guatemala are instantly open for examination in Europe and in many other countries. Daily carnage in Beirut and in Afghanistan, terrorist bombings in Rome and Vienna, the fall of a government in Manila, human suffering and starvation around the globe are subject to the immediate scrutiny of those world publics whose press freedoms are not constrained. As a result, diplomacy has changed, publics are energized. Even peasants in remote villages have contact with the modern world through the transistor radio. Perceptions and expectations are inevitably altered.

As the world has become smaller, it has also become more complex, diverse, and dynamic. The inevitable post-war breakup of old colonial empires, the dramatic increase in the world's population, the huge economic gap between the industrialized and most of the non-industrial countries, continued concern over the availability of renewable and non-renewable resources, major advances in the firepower and lethality of the armed forces of even the most impoverished nations, the growth of international terrorism, concerns over the future proliferation of nuclear weapons, and heightened awareness of the fragility of the environment and the dependence of all nations on its condition are viewed against a backdrop of an explosion of human potential and rising expectations which are now imposing immense demands on governments around the world.

Such factors make for an interdependence among nations unparalleled in history and signal the need for intense cooperative efforts. They also have given impulse to resurgent nationalism and to a rising tide of religious fundamen-

talism driven, in part, by a lingering resentment of some over the continuing primacy of Western institutions in international politics and the inability of states to overcome their preoccupation with East-West relations in order to address the range of North-South issues. As a result, the international environment of the next several decades is likely to be characterized by a further diffusion of power and the continued devolution of the bipolar structure. The world will be increasingly polycentric, nationalistic, and spontaneous.

The sustained achievement of U.S. security goals will become more difficult in this increasingly fragmented and fluid environment. North-South and intra-alliance relations will take on added significance for the United States and are likely to demand a degree of attention heretofore reserved primarily for super-power relations. In such an environment, the relevance and influence of the great powers will depend increasingly on their willingness and ability to moderate their adversarial relationship and to commit more of their mutual energies to a solution of the many problems which now or will soon confront mankind.

Nevertheless, the difficulty of encouraging the Soviet Union to effective cooperative efforts to reduce tensions and the risk of conflict and to meet the social and economic challenges of the contemporary world should not be underestimated. Profound differences of interest, policies, and standards of conduct separate the United States and the Soviet Union. These differences are unlikely to be resolved in the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the imperative of avoiding nuclear war underscores the need for the United States to press the Soviet Union in the mutual exploration of all avenues in an attempt to limit, and if possible diminish the conflictual pattern that has tended to dominate their post-war relations.

The Soviet Challenge

At the 27th Communist Party Congress in February 1986, General Secretary Gorbachev, after offering standard invectives against capitalism, Western and U.S. imperialism, and discussing the changing correlation of forces, indicated that Soviet leaders are prepared to do everything they can "to improve radically the international situation". He acknowledged that the military balance is "inordinately high" and that man now has for the first time in history the physical capacity for destroying all life on earth. He emphasized the importance of arms control and comprehensive verification measures and called for a considerable reduction in the intensity of military confrontation and a comprehensive system of "international security". He also spoke of such factors as "the dignity of the individual", "the political, social, and personal rights of man", "dialogue", "cooperation", "the development of contacts between peoples and organizations", and "the dissemination of ideas". He rejected terrorism and emphasized the futility and inadmissibility of "pushing revolutions from outside" especially by military means. Despite all of these formulations, however, it is clear that a gulf remains between Soviet words and actions—a gulf that is not new. The rigid and closed nature of Soviet society and its continued militant outward manifestations suggest that if Gorbachev is to translate words to deeds much will need to be done. So far this decade, the record of Soviet actions has been less than encouraging.

The continuing buildup of Soviet strategic and theater nuclear forces and major improvements in conventional forces remain serious causes for concern. The apparent Soviet quest for complete security inevitably leads to instability and insecurity. Such trends, if continued, will ultimately undermine the credibility of Gorbachev's commitment to compete "in a setting of lasting peace".

Another disturbing factor has been Moscow's continued interference in the affairs of the nominally independent states of Eastern Europe. Despite pledges concerning human rights and national independence in Europe made most recently by the Soviet Union when it signed the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975, Moscow clearly remains unwilling to countenance meaningful national independence or individual liberty in Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, the USSR has continued to play a highly unconstructive role in many of the unstable areas in the Third World. In Afghanistan, 120,000 Soviet soldiers continue to wage a brutal war in support of an imposed regime. Elsewhere in Africa, Asia, and Latin America the Soviet Union contributes to unrest, instability, and conflict through the sale of arms, advisers, and military force. For example, in Ethiopia and Angola, Soviet advisers are involved in military planning and support operations along with thousands of Cuban combat troops. In Cambodia, the Soviet Union is backing 140,000 Vietnamese soldiers waging a war of occupation. In Nicaragua, Soviet bloc and Cuban personnel are actively supporting the maintenance of an increasingly repressive regime.

Finally, Moscow continues its apparent violations of a variety of international acts and agreements. Moscow's human rights record, its failure to comply with the provisions of the UN Declaration of Human Rights and with the more recent Helsinki Final Act and, of course, self-serving Soviet interpretations as well as significant outright violations of such arms control commitments as the ABM and SALT Treaties and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and Geneva Protocol, raise serious questions concerning the Soviet commitment to peace and cooperation.

Factors Influencing Soviet Foreign Policy

The closed nature of Soviet society sharply limits the ability of outsiders to discern with any high degree of certainty the factors that influence Soviet objectives, means, and responses to specific international stimuli. Indeed, all that one can say with a high degree of confidence is that a broad range of variables influence specific policy decisions. Nevertheless, many observers point to several major factors which have had and continue to have an important influence on the formulation of foreign policy in the Soviet Union.

First, **geography** has strongly shaped the world view and accompanying political system of the Soviet Union. The absence of natural barriers has been an important element in the political history of the Russian empire. While geography later favored the political expansion of the Russian State, which now spans eleven time zones across the Eurasian continent, at an earlier time, the absence of natural barriers greatly facilitated the invasion of Russian territory. Over the centuries came invasions from all directions by Cumans, Mongols, Crimean Tatars, Poles, Lithuanians, Teutonic knights, French, Germans, and others, including intervention by Western powers during the Russian Civil War. The pillage, the plunder, the enslavement of peoples, the uprooting and successive scattering of developing civilization are reflected in a deep-seated urge to control the vast expanses of its own empire and to dominate events, peoples, and countries on the periphery, and have led to reliance upon a massive military and a highly centralized bureaucracy to do both.

Second, inseparable from its geography, Russian **historical experiences** have helped fashion a psychology which, in some important respects, differs considerably from that of Western Europeans. Fear of invasion has led to an obsession

for security. The quest for security has given rise to a tolerance of, even a preference for, absolutism and the subordination of the individual to the well-being of the State. To protect the existence of the state and to enforce its authority, a supreme instrument of coercion emerges—the secret chancellery of the monarch, or, in Soviet times, the MVD or KGB.

Largely the result of a very different developmental experience, comes a sense of cultural uniqueness and even superiority—repeatedly manifested in the Messianic and proselytizing outlook of the “Third Rome”, in the Slavophiles who rejected the need to adopt Western cultural ideas, and in the expansionism of communist ideology.

Third, **ideology**: Long before Karl Marx expounded his theories for reform, the Russian State under Peter the Great had become the largest landowner, factory owner, employer of labor, trader, and owner of capital in Russia. Long before Lenin offered the notion of the “vanguard of the proletariat”—a highly disciplined, centralized party which would serve as mentor, leader, conscience, and guide—the Russians had become accustomed to the principle of unquestioning submission to the leader of the state. Indeed, the tsar was known as the “little father” and thought to be the very incarnation of truth and justice. Thus, while it can well be argued that ideology is largely irrelevant as a specific guide for the majority of Soviet citizens, including party members, ideology in the Soviet Union today represents an underlying set of values which, in some cases, predate Marxism-Leninism and which help shape the frame of reference within which issues are evaluated and decisions made. Nevertheless, ideology is neither the only nor necessarily the dominant factor affecting the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. As within any bureaucratic structure, a myriad of factors influence decisions, not the least of which are institutional and bureaucratic pressures and perceptions of short and long-term national interests.

Fourth, the **heterogeneity** of the Soviet empire inevitably plays a role in Soviet foreign policy formulation. The Great Russians, the dominant ethnic group, comprise approximately 50 percent of the total population. The existence, however, of over 100 different nationalities with dozens of religious creeds, many of which would not remain by their own volition as members of the empire, adds to the historic Russian sense of insecurity as well as to the constant concern that rebellion or dissidence starting at the periphery could ultimately threaten the very existence of the state. It also produces the suspicion that external forces might, if given a chance, seek to create or exploit rebellion and dissidence. As a result, the Soviet Union has undertaken, at great cost, extensive efforts to insulate from outside influences the many diverse groups which comprise the USSR.

A fifth factor is **demographics**. Shifting patterns of population growth threaten to challenge the dominance of the Great Russians and their fellow Slavs while imposing upon them difficult economic and political decisions. While the Slavs comprised approximately three quarters of the population in 1959, if current trends continue they will represent only about 60-65 percent of the population by the year 2000.¹ Moreover, the general shifting of the center of population from the West toward Central Asia is likely to have profound effects, not the least of which may well be increasing demands from the Asian republics for the reorientation of investment and redistribution of wealth.

Sixth, the Soviet **economy** is encountering serious difficulties. A period of growth from the late 1940s until the early 1980s helped double the post-war standard of living and transform the Soviet Union into a leading military power of global importance. Since then, there has been a substantial decline in the

rate of growth in the Soviet economy.² Under Brezhnev, western specialists predicted continued retardation with 2 percent per annum growth in Gross National Product (GNP) the maximum trend. Gorbachev's aim to double growth rates in the 1986-2000 period is viewed as ambitious, but increased growth is widely accepted as attainable.³ The problem is not with potential. Rather, it is with the efficiency necessary to exploit the potential. Overly-centralized planning and management, regional shortages of skilled and unskilled labor, low labor productivity due to alcoholism, corruption and sloth, the absence of incentives, unrealistic pricing mechanisms, and persistent agricultural difficulties all point to inadequacies which cannot fail to exert a strong influence on the behavior of the Soviet Union at home and abroad in the decades ahead. Additionally, falling oil prices have denied the USSR hard currency needed for continued access to and acquisition of sorely needed Western technology. Nevertheless, a two trillion dollar GNP, abundant natural resources, and a 145 million person work force make the Soviet economy one of tremendous potential impact on world affairs.

Seventh, while the Soviet collegial **leadership** has managed a smooth transition from Brezhnev to Andropov to Chernenko to Gorbachev, the latter will require time to end the paralysis apparent during the last years of Brezhnev's rule. Clearly it would be a serious mistake to underestimate the magnitude of the problems he must confront, and the impact that political intrigue and bureaucratic and institutional resistance and maneuvering will have on foreign policy formulation.⁴

And finally, despite all these predispositions—the result of historic, cultural, and ideological factors, the Soviet Union (and Russia before it) has often been markedly pragmatic in foreign policy. For example, Russia's participation in the alliance against Napoleon, as well as the Soviet Union's non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany and its subsequent World War II alliance with the Western allies, clearly demonstrate its willingness to subordinate ideological principles and traditional animosities to the pursuit of objectives deemed critical to state survival and well-being. Moreover, even where survival interests are not at stake, Soviet policy has had a remarkably practical side. For example, Soviet policy in Africa toward Morocco versus Algeria and the Polisario guerrillas, and at an earlier time between Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as on the African frontiers issue, suggest that pragmatism and Realpolitik frequently win out over ideological purity. Thus, the genuine Soviet desire to avoid a nuclear holocaust as well as other practical considerations provide a basis for guarded optimism that a substantial area of common ground with the West can be found and that mutually beneficial initiatives can be successfully pursued.

Indeed, the myriad economic problems described above, especially critical at a time when the Soviet Union may be called upon to effect an internal redistribution of wealth while simultaneously undertaking massive industrial and military modernization programs, offer incentives for Soviet leadership to promote trade and economic cooperation with the West. Also, the need to deal with their economic shortcomings may encourage the partial abandonment of ideologically-mandated centralization of the economic forces of that society. Reminiscent of the past efforts to increase private incentives and decentralize the economy in order to overcome the stifling strictures of the state planning bureaucracy, the economic reforms of General Secretary Gorbachev may well embrace pragmatic improvements designed to revitalize the economy. At present, it is too early to make any predictions.

However, while bureaucratic centralization at the highest level is one of Gor-

bahev's principal objectives, he appears to favor decentralization below the ministerial level. Furthermore, the Soviet Union's inability to sustain the economies of its Eastern European allies, many of which are similarly in trouble due to the excesses of centralization, may lead the Soviets to extend their countenance of greater economic decentralization by certain allies—Hungary and East Germany in particular. Whether the imperatives of economic reform will result in more cordial relationships with the West, sustained over time, certainly remains to be seen. Nevertheless, Soviet interest in domestic economic revitalization does offer some possibility for the development of mutually beneficial relations in the economic dimension and an opportunity the West should explore.

Likewise, the need to address such long-term environmental problems as the pollution of the world's atmosphere, oceans, rivers, and streams, as well as the need to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants, reduce terrorism, halt the flow of narcotics, and improve world health and the human condition, offer multiple avenues to mutually beneficial cooperative relations based on pragmatic assessments of national interest.

The preceding underscores two critical theses for U.S.-Soviet relations. The first is that despite Soviet xenophobia and the historical tensions that have characterized U.S.-Soviet relations, there has been and can be at least a limited cooperative interactive dimension, predicated upon constant and emerging shared interests. Furthermore, the domestic and foreign policies of the USSR are not formed in a vacuum. Soviet leaders have adjusted and will continue to adjust policy to accommodate changing domestic and international realities, thereby providing opportunities for the United States to influence Soviet behavior.

U.S.-Soviet Relations: A Framework for Progress

As we look toward the 21st century and ask ourselves how the United States should deal with the Soviet Union, we must recognize the simultaneous existence of conflictual and cooperative dimensions in superpower interactions. Substantial differences of philosophy, interests, and standards of conduct are capable of propelling the superpowers to mutual annihilation. The risk of conflict is made even more palpable by a balance of destructive capabilities which, if unmanaged or managed injudiciously, could place a premium on shooting first and asking questions later. The key to dealing with such a risk is to ensure that the Soviets recognize that superpower relations must be on a *quid pro quo* basis. The West does not seek unilateral advantage by military means and will not concede such an advantage to the USSR. In other words, no unilateral advantages in areas of crucial national interests that could undermine the deterrent balance will be countenanced. In short, the United States must pursue policies that elicit the Soviets' pragmatic bent.

First, the United States must continue to seek an active and productive dialogue with the Soviet Union. Specifically, this dialogue should entail on our part an explicit delineation, without rhetorical excess or hyperbole, of critical U.S. interests such as continued commitment to defense obligations in general and to the Western alliance in particular, and our firm resolve to resist any Soviet attempts to extend its influence by military means. The dialogue must also emphasize our determination

- to reduce the risk of war by enhancing "crisis stabilization";
- to reverse the arms race by reducing armaments through sound and verifiable agreements, and ultimately to ease the burdens of military spending;

- to improve bilateral relations on the bases of reciprocity and mutual interest;
- to manage and resolve regional conflicts based on the principles of non-intervention and the self-determination of peoples;
- to seek improvements in human rights and to convince the Soviets of the advantages to them of joining us in this effort;
- to improve close coordination and joint action with our allies to accomplish the above objectives.

Implicit in the communication of U.S. interests is the recognition that the Soviet Union also has critical interests which will be respected providing they are pursued peacefully and are not in violation of international covenants.

Second, the effectiveness of dialogue will depend upon realism, strength, and flexibility. Realism dictates that a foreign policy based only on declaratory platitudes is hollow and ultimately frustrating and dangerous. The maintenance of peace and freedom depends upon a sustained Soviet perception that this country has the necessary resolve, as manifested in a full range of credible military capabilities that can be exercised in conjunction with diplomatic instruments, to preserve the peace and maintain its freedom and that of its allies and friends.

Nevertheless, it must be made clear to the Soviet leadership that the United States is flexible in its approach to superpower relations and that it recognizes that the complexity of many outstanding problems will require a long-term consistent commitment to their amelioration, if not resolution. A readiness to negotiate with Soviet leaders on the many issues that affect Washington and Moscow is a fundamental requisite of improved relations. This willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union must be an unalterable aspect of U.S. foreign policy.

Moreover, it must be made clear to the Soviet Union that this commitment to strength and dialogue is not a call for renewed U.S. military superiority. Rather, the Working Group believes that parity is an essential element in superpower relations and that effective dialogue in the search for shared political, economic, and security interests can only be achieved if both sides approach that dialogue from positions of adequate strength, confident in their capabilities and in their position within the international order. Furthermore, the Working Group believes that the search for shared interests will be better advanced by consistency and regularity in the negotiating process. Such consistency will do much to stabilize the pattern of superpower relations as well as reduce the probability of misperceptions of U.S. intentions abroad, and the development of unrealistic expectations at home.

Finally, a constructive relationship with the Soviet Union cannot be built independent of our allies and friends. The United States must maintain a continuous dialogue with them in order to understand their interests and to convey our own. The mutuality of U.S. and allied interests is the principal thread of the fabric of East-West relations. However, owing to differences in geography, historical experience, and domestic political realities, certain divergencies do exist between the United States and its allies. Indeed, the rifts between the United States and some significant elements in Western Europe have now begun to approach unhealthy proportions. Through continuous communication, coordination, and compromise, the United States together with its Western allies must seek to narrow their differences and to develop policies that maintain Alliance solidarity, while exploiting a wide range of approaches to strengthen peace and advance social and economic development in the decades ahead.

The Future of U.S.-USSR Relations

There is much to suggest that U.S. foreign policy can and should change only at the margins. Indeed, some argue that the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union is close to immutable and that our task is not to end it, but merely to keep it under control. Nevertheless, given the gruesome potential for conflict in the nuclear age as well as imperatives that mandate that we seek Soviet collaboration in addressing the many social, economic, and ecological problems now confronting the planet, the Working Group believes that the time may be propitious for renewed emphasis on improving U.S.-Soviet relations.

The Soviet Union itself is currently confronted with a series of political, economic, and military dilemmas that include growing restiveness among its East European allies; growing recognition of the inappropriateness of the Soviet model for Third World development; declining hard currency earnings due to the precipitous drop in oil prices; stagnant industrial productivity due mostly to systemic problems of centralized management but aggravated by corruption, an increasingly obsolete physical plant which is in dire need of technological modernization, and an excessive orientation toward the military end of the industrial spectrum; demographic trends that portend calls for a redistribution of wealth within the USSR; failure to resolve regional border and political differences with the People's Republic of China and Japan; revitalized U.S. and NATO military capabilities; and above all the need to avoid nuclear war. At the same time the mantle of leadership is being passed to a new generation of leaders in the Soviet Union. This leadership is seen by some as increasingly rational, technocratic, and reformist. Pragmatic approaches to reform may well come to be viewed by the Soviet hierarchy as increasingly attractive in light of the sustained inability of marginal adjustments, undertaken within the strictures of ideological rigidity, to resolve the monumental problems confronting that country.

This is by no means to say that the conflictual dimension of U.S.-Soviet relations is likely to disappear. Rather, it is the combination of cooperation and conflict on a multitude of issues that will determine the tenor of superpower relations. At one extreme, an effort to deal chauvinistically with the trends noted above could emphasize military force as the preferred foreign policy instrument, resulting in a conflictual relationship reminiscent of the Cold War years and, more recently, the early 1980s. At the other extreme, both nations could recognize their diminished abilities to control unilaterally the outcome of global developments as well as the unacceptable price of unrestrained conflict, thereby paving the way for mutually beneficial relations keyed to areas of mutual advantage. The actual state of U.S.-Soviet relations is, however, more likely to rest somewhere between these extremes. In fact a certain amount of tension in relations may serve the useful purpose of constraining behavior, sharpening perspectives, and encouraging dialogue.

How then should the United States deal with the Soviet Union, which is generally both assertive and insecure in its dealings with the rest of the world? How do we build a constructive relationship with a nuclear power with numerous interests and objectives that differ greatly from our own? How do we encourage dialogue and discourage coercion or aggressive behavior? How do we forge a relationship that will allow our energies to be dedicated increasingly to peaceful endeavors? Clearly, many dimensions are involved—extending from military competition to arms control to trade and cultural contacts.

MILITARY COMPETITION

No other dimension of U.S.-Soviet interaction has been as prominent as has the military. The USSR has been steadily improving the size, quality, and operational capabilities of its armed forces for over two decades. After achieving a rough parity with the United States in the 1970s, the Soviet Union has fielded new generations of strategic weapons which threaten the survivability and thus the deterrent value of a sizeable fraction of the U.S. strategic arsenal and its supporting command, control, and communications (C³) capabilities. With the addition of SS-20 intermediate range missiles, the Backfire bomber, new shorter range missiles, and nuclear self-propelled artillery, the USSR has improved significantly its theater nuclear capabilities. The Soviet Union also has modernized and enhanced its conventional and maritime forces, streamlined its logistics train, and thus greatly improved its ability to project military power. To maintain a balanced and stable military relationship in light of growing Soviet military capabilities, the United States has begun modernizing its strategic missile and bomber forces⁵ as well as its theater nuclear and conventional capabilities.

In the absence of verifiable arms control agreements, realism in U.S.-Soviet relations as well as the search for a more stable security environment make military force modernization essential. As the United States looks to the 1990s and beyond, three objectives must dominate military force planning: U.S. forces must continue to serve as a credible deterrent to Soviet aggression and Soviet blackmail against the United States and its allies; the forces chosen must contribute to crisis stability; and however incredible or unthinkable it may be, should deterrence fail, U.S. forces must be structured so that they add to the possibility of terminating conflict short of Armageddon. To accomplish these tasks the United States must reduce the vulnerabilities of its strategic retaliatory arsenal and its supporting C³; maintain a capacity for limited nuclear options; maintain modern, fully sustainable conventional air, land, and maritime forces; and engage the Soviet Union in the vigorous pursuit of stability through arms control across the spectrum of military capabilities.

In this context, America's strategic arsenal must remain capable of retaliating decisively against the range of assets valued by an adversary after absorbing a Soviet preemptive first strike. This will remain the key to strategic deterrence and stability into the foreseeable future. The current diversity of strategic forces (land, sea, and air) serves several purposes. Diversity provides a hedge against a technical surprise that might render one or even two legs vulnerable to preemptive attack. Force diversity also poses attack timing problems, which make it difficult for the Soviets to coordinate simultaneous strikes on all three legs of the Triad. Thus, while one leg may be technically vulnerable, its elimination from the force mix would heighten the vulnerability of the remaining legs. Diversity also provides a hedge against tactical surprise—bombers can be placed on airborne alert where they are virtually invulnerable to a preemptive attack; nuclear submarines can stay submerged and hidden for months; and the alert status of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) allow a high percentage of them to be launched quickly if attacked. Finally, force diversity dilutes the ability of an attacker to defend itself successfully against retaliatory strikes. What then should be done to reduce vulnerabilities?

First, modernization of the land-based component must continue. This need be undertaken neither at panic speed nor in disregard of long-term arms control objectives. Nor should the United States sacrifice the modernization of those other military capabilities likely to be needed to provide stability and protect

U.S. interests in a world plagued by numerous conventional and unconventional conflicts. However, planning for the eventual replacement of the Minuteman missile force should begin now. As terminal guidance technologies permit missile accuracies to approach zero CEP (accuracy or Circular Error Probable), the likelihood of success of a preemptive attack on the Minuteman force would become very high, if it were attempted. Under such circumstances, mobility offers the most promising prospect for reducing the vulnerability of the U.S. strategic ICBM force.

Mobility was one of the desired features of the MX program as originally conceived. But the size of the MX missile makes real mobility a difficult task. As a result, and in light of the Scowcroft Commission's realistic assessment of Soviet hard-target kill capabilities, a decision to deploy the MX in existing, hardened Minuteman silos was made.

As a future replacement for the Minuteman missile force, the United States should field a small, mobile, single-warhead ICBM. The Working Group recognizes that the concept of a truly mobile missile has yet to be accepted by the public and may pose political difficulties. But such a missile would not only be likely to reduce vulnerability through its very mobility, but also be an attempt to move away from the MIRV (Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle) which has been a principal culprit in the creation of strategic force vulnerabilities. It is inherently more costly, however, to build additional missiles than additional warheads. Thus, whether future replacements for U.S. strategic missiles have single warheads may well depend on whether the Soviets can be convinced of the inherent stability of beginning now to replace all or most of their MIRVed systems with single-warhead systems, whether they are willing to spend the money for what would be a major alteration of their strategic force arsenal, and whether adequate arms control verification procedures can be negotiated to preclude cheating.

Second, the United States should continue to modernize its SLBM (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile) force. The ballistic missile submarine force when at sea is the most survivable leg of the Triad and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. The new *Ohio*-class Trident submarines are significantly quieter than America's older Poseidon SSBNs, making their location by the Soviets highly unlikely. With the planned addition of the longer-range Trident II (D-5) missile, U.S. strategic submarines will be capable of retaliating from greater distances than was previously the case with the Polaris or Poseidon fleet or with the Trident I (C-4) missile. This will permit the U.S. SSBN fleet to use the protection of a vaster expanse of the world's seas to increase its survivability or to improve our ability to cover the Soviet target base. The planned deployment of the D-5 missile, however, has not been without criticism. The principal criticism has been that the planned accuracy of the D-5 missile will permit it to destroy hardened Soviet targets. Such a capability is seen by some as dangerously destabilizing.

Strategic instability, however, is more a function of the overall vulnerability of a country's strategic forces than of the accuracy of a nation's missiles. While the Soviet Union may be concerned over the improved accuracy and resulting hard target kill potential of U.S. SLBMs, U.S. missile firing submarines are virtually invulnerable when at sea. Therefore, there is very little incentive for a destabilizing preemptive strike on these forces by the Soviets. Perhaps, the real concern is less the near-term implications for crisis stabilization and more the potentially destabilizing arms race at sea which might ensue as the USSR searches for ways of locating U.S. SSBNs, as well as the long-term implica-

tions should the seas become less opaque.

Two factors should guide future developments in the U.S. sea-based force if such instabilities are to be avoided: the invulnerability of SSBNs must be preserved and as a hedge against potential failure in this regard, the United States must avoid putting too many eggs in a single basket.

Today, a high percentage of U.S. striking power resides in slightly more than 30 SSBNs. This percentage will increase as *Ohio*-class submarines with 24 missiles replace Poseidon submarines with 16. Thus, while it is probable that for the foreseeable future *Ohio*-class SSBNs will remain invulnerable to preemptive attack while at sea, it is important that we continue to guard against future vulnerabilities and the instabilities they may beget. In this regard, the United States should look to a future nuclear submarine fleet that includes smaller boats that are hopefully less costly, but more numerous. To increase stability, the Soviet Union should be encouraged to do the same. The United States should also engage the Soviet Union in discussions to identify ways to preserve, and perhaps enhance, the invulnerability of SLBM forces.

Third, the United States should modernize its strategic bomber forces. Bombers are the most flexible and stabilizing element of the Triad. They can be used to demonstrate U.S. interest, concern, and determination during severe crisis situations. They can be placed on ground and airborne alert as well as launched on warning and recalled.

Their long flight times preclude their use in first-strike counterforce attacks. Furthermore, since airborne bombers are virtually invulnerable to a preemptive first-strike and since a large percentage of America's megatonnage is carried by bombers, an airborne alert called during a critical confrontation with the USSR might deter direct hostilities between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, bomber forces must penetrate increasingly sophisticated air defenses and are vulnerable to surprise attacks while on their airfields. Fourth, the United States must place great emphasis on insuring the survivability of its strategic C³ nets. Perhaps the most vulnerable components of our strategic retaliatory forces are the communication links that make timely retaliation possible. Soviet doctrine and nuclear warfare exercise scenarios, their emphasis on communications disruption through the use of electronic warfare, and their preoccupation with the survivability of their own command and control links suggest that the Soviet Union would devote a significant portion of attacking forces to the severing of links between the President and U.S. nuclear forces in an effort to delay or disrupt a U.S. strategic retaliatory response.⁶

Finally, President Reagan in his address of March 1983 on military spending, presented his vision of a future in which American defenses could "intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our Allies." Thus was launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Critics of the initiative caution that SDI opens another chapter on the now well-worn path of strategic competition, a chapter which will lead to increased instability at the strategic level at increased cost. They also have argued that the initiative is unnecessary since one of its principal near-term objective - strengthening deterrence through undermining Soviet attack confidence, can be achieved at lower political and economic costs by making U.S. forces more mobile and thus more survivable against strategic preemption. Finally, they maintain that a push for SDI is likely to raise a variety of potentially divisive concerns among our allies.

Proponents argue that since the dynamic relationship between offense and defense has never insured the permanent ascendancy of one over the other, SDI is a prudent hedge against long-known Soviet efforts in this area. They also

contend that new strategic defenses that might evolve from the current research effort may be capable of restoring stability, perceptions of which have been undermined by the Soviet Union's increasing capability, under certain scenarios, to mount a damage-limiting first strike against the United States. Furthermore, it is argued that since the horror of war has by no means completely prevented its occurrence, SDI offers, as a minimum, the prospect of partially protecting the population and of limiting damage to the United States, and perhaps its allies, while providing the time necessary to control escalation or to terminate hostilities should deterrence fail.

The strong support that exists for each of these two conflicting positions underscores the proposition that in the nuclear age both the United States and the Soviet Union are highly dependent on each other for their future security. Thus, the Working Group supports the findings of the Scowcroft Commission and believes that given Soviet efforts in this area, a vigorous research program on anti-ballistic missile technologies is needed, as a minimum to avoid technical surprise. The judgment on whether to proceed beyond research, however, remains dependent on whether the research indicates that the objectives set by the President for SDI can be obtained, as well as on the progress of arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. If strategic defense proves technically feasible, the essential questions are whether deploying strategic defensive systems will increase stability at the strategic level and, if so, to what degree and at what cost. In this regard, it is imperative that the United States seek to engage the Soviet Union in an attempt to determine together whether strategic defense is feasible, and, if feasible, whether it is desirable and what is the potentially optimum mix of defensive and offensive systems.

While modernizing its strategic forces to reduce their vulnerability to preemptive attack, the United States and its Western allies must maintain survivable theater nuclear deterrent forces. Likewise, the West must maintain substantial, well-modernized, and fully sustainable conventional forces—including naval forces, capable of deterring, in conjunction with its nuclear forces, Soviet conventional aggression or intimidation.

ARMS CONTROL

While the increasing costliness of U.S. and Soviet defense expenditures emphasizes the need to reexamine defense expenditures,⁷ the importance of ensuring that future defense postures are consonant with the requirements of strategic and theater stability will remain paramount. In this context, arms control will remain central to the process of improving U.S.-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, as the meeting at Reykjavik once again has emphasized, arms control is one of the most complex undertakings of modern times. The extreme risks of modern warfare coupled with differing perceptions of threat and potential vulnerabilities, differing approaches to deterrence, differing interests and needs of allies, dissimilar strategies, doctrines, force structures, weapons systems characteristics and capabilities, different rates of technological advance, the complexities of verification, differing historical, geographical, and political/bureaucratic factors, and the inability to know with any certainty the potential adversary's actual objectives and intentions enormously complicate efforts to achieve balance and stability through negotiations. Indeed, in light of such complexities, easy solutions to the twin problems of achieving balance and stability are not likely to be forthcoming. Success in arms control will require time and patience.

On the other hand, the arsenals of the superpowers have reached levels at

which genuine security increasingly will depend not just on military hardware, but on arms control. It may be theoretically feasible to plan and build strategic or theater forces, both offensive and defensive, in the absence of arms control. In practice, however, such efforts are likely to result in increasing levels of insecurity at increased costs—the result of the unpredictability of each side's acquisitions and the other side's need for worst-case planning as a prudent hedge. Thus, future strategic and theater programs designed by one side to increase stability are likely to require the cooperation of the other side if stability is to be assured.

While much useful progress on arms accords has been made over the past twenty-five years, the tasks ahead remain increasingly formidable. Rapidly advancing technologies are multiplying the complexities of armaments and countermeasures. In the past, arms control efforts frequently have given the appearance of codifying armaments planned by both sides, while preserving the freedom to exploit potential future advances in weapons capabilities through technological innovation. The problem has been that we are never quite certain where technological advance will lead us and whether that advance will strengthen or weaken stability.

To break such a cycle, the Working Group believes we must begin to take a much longer-term view of arms control. While continuing our efforts to improve deterrence and stability with the forces at hand today, we must look beyond current force structures if we wish to overcome bureaucratic and institutional inertia and thus make the progress demanded by an increasingly dangerous environment. We must continue to ask ourselves the timeworn question: how much is enough. Equally if not more important, we must ask ourselves how little is too little. If we are to get agreement on the paths to take in arms control negotiations, we must know where we wish to go and have charted a course which offers a reasonable chance of getting us there. We must also ask: are we to be captive of technology? Or, can technology be made to serve strategy? Must we insure that arms control negotiations do not interfere with defense programs? Or can the superpowers make both arms control and defense programs serve the ends of strategies fashioned to improve deterrence and stability?

As the Atlantic Council Working Group on strategic stability and arms control chaired by Brent Scowcroft and R. James Woolsey has noted, it is becoming evident that the concept of stability must encompass more than the absence of war, whether or not nuclear weapons are employed.⁸ To this end, increasing the flow of communications, reducing the fear of being rendered militarily inferior or ineffective as a result of technological or military surprise, the avoidance of overreaction to marginal changes in force structures or force dispositions all play an important part in managing relations during periods of tension or crisis as a means of avoiding conflict.

If we are to be successful in addressing such issues, we should engage the Soviet Union in talks designed to outline the strategic environment desired by the end of the second decade of the next century and beyond. Specifically, we should examine with the Soviets concepts of deterrence and crisis stability, delineate those weapon system characteristics considered to be potentially destabilizing in the future, and define in broad terms the preferred future strategic and theater forces. It may be argued by some that technology can not be controlled, it can only be managed. This may be true to a degree. However, even the managing of technology requires a degree of advanced planning not always characteristic of past approaches to force modernization.

While engaging the Soviet Union in such long-term efforts, the United States

should, of course, continue to pursue arms control agreements that bring about real reductions in the level of conventional and nuclear forces and in the destructive power available. It should also continue to seek reductions or the elimination of those weapons systems with characteristics that pose the greatest threat to stability, be it at the theater or strategic, conventional or nuclear levels. In this regard, the following bilateral arms control approaches merit further consideration: (1) a reduction in land-based MIRVed strategic systems and their replacement with single warhead systems; (2) a move away from fixed site land-based systems and the prompt development of mobile systems; (3) an increase in the proportion of strategic warheads at sea; (4) an overall sizeable reduction in time urgent hard-target kill capability; (5) a ban on terminal-homing ICBM and SLBM warheads; (6) a ban on depressed trajectory SLBMs; (7) a reduction of non-strategic nuclear tipped missiles deployed by the superpowers in Europe; and (8) a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. All reductions, however, should be based on the principles of equality or balance of remaining forces and verifiability.

Equally important is the need to create an environment of increased trust and confidence, at least in certain key areas. Thus, the United States should continue to support those confidence building measures that offer the greatest promise of increasing warning time prior to a conflict. With confidence in increased warning time both the United States and the Soviet Union would have more time to consult during a crisis and thus might be less likely to be impelled to conflict.

Of grave concern to the United States is what appears to be Soviet disregard for some provisions of certain arms control agreements. Such apparent disregard not only emphasizes the need for effective verification measures; it also, unless dispelled, endangers the entire arms control process and places obstacles in the path of a general amelioration of the environment of superpower relations. The Working Group recommends that questions as to compliance be handled whenever possible within the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) which can operate away from the glare of publicity.

TRADE

In the past, U.S.-Soviet trade relations have varied considerably. Following the Revolution of 1917, the USSR purchased American capital goods and current technology, paying with scarce foreign currency. American businessmen were active in commercial dealings with the Soviet Union well before we established diplomatic relations in 1933. An American engineer designed the first of the gigantic hydroelectric dams on the Dnieper. American automotive specialists helped the USSR get started on constructing an auto assembly line. American entrepreneurs have always had a special yen to do business with the Soviets, who, all else being equal, have favored the United States over other foreign suppliers.

The world depression of the 1930s, while fostering greater mutual interest in trade, saw a curtailment of U.S.-Soviet trade. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1933, the United States and the Soviet Union signed an annually renewable trade agreement based on the Reciprocal Trade Act of 1934. Most Favored Nation (MFN) status—that is, standard, non-discriminatory trade status—was provisionally accorded the Soviet Union. Although U.S.-Soviet trade was insignificant during the remainder of the 1930's, the United States began shipping a wide range of military and civil goods under lend-lease follow-

ing the German attack on the USSR in 1941. Most of the goods were consumed during the conflict, but the United States maintained its claim for the value of civilian goods on hand in the USSR at the close of the war.

During the "Cold War", the United States first imposed export controls on trade with the USSR and then terminated the bilateral agreement when Congress ended Soviet MFN status. Since then U.S.-Soviet trade has had its ups and downs. In recent years, the result of poor harvests and inadequate storage facilities and transportation nets, Soviet demand for grain has become a major factor in U.S.-USSR trade relations. Nevertheless, discussions that focus on U.S.-Soviet trade arrangements have aroused strong emotions in the United States. In 1972 a "triangular" trade and finance arrangement was negotiated in which the lend-lease debt would be settled, the Executive Branch would seek MFN status from Congress for the USSR, and Export Import Bank credits would be extended. In 1974-1975 the Jackson-Vanik and, especially, Stevenson Amendments to trade legislation scuttled the arrangement by linking it to the Jewish emigration question. The amendments had a debatable impact on Soviet policy toward Jewish emigration. Moscow seemed determined to demonstrate that its policy could not be shaped by such overt outside influence and, hence, deliberately reduced the level of emigration.

Today there is no trade agreement between the United States and the USSR. Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe that, in light of Soviet economic conditions, an expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade would be welcomed by the Soviets as well as by U.S. businessmen.⁹ Two major security/political concerns, however, confront American decision-makers. Both grow out of an apprehension over the continued Soviet military buildup. First, the United States is reluctant to provide the Soviet Union with technology which has significant military potential or utility. U.S. attempts to curtail the flow of technology, especially technology with potential military applicability, have frequently been at odds with the interpretation of European allies as well as U.S. businessmen as to just what constitutes goods of potential military utility. It was to resolve differences of this kind that the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) was founded in 1950. Separate and more informal arrangements were later made with Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan. Under COCOM, military arms are not sold to the USSR or its allies. COCOM has also been successful in curtailing sales of technologies closely identified with the production of military hardware.

There is, however, a limit to what can be achieved through such a cooperative arrangement. Where products have a direct civilian application and only tangentially affect military systems, so-called "dual-use" technologies, agreement on limiting sales has been more difficult. In the recent past, to enforce its attempt to limit the transfer of technology (such as in the Soviet pipeline case), the United States has forbidden the sale of goods produced in other countries by subsidiaries or licensees of American companies. The United States has also initiated procedures to prevent the transshipment to our adversaries of goods sold to our allies. Because Western European governments frequently characterize such actions as an assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction, the result on occasion has been a deterioration in U.S. relations with its allies with the risk of countervailing action in the affected countries. While working through COCOM may be difficult at times, the Working Group believes that the COCOM process continues to offer the best prospect for reaching enforceable agreements on constraining the flow of military technology from the West to the Soviet Union. Recent improvements in the efficiency, timeliness, and technical analytical work of COCOM determinations support this judgement.

The United States, however, should resist temptations to use COCOM for other foreign policy purposes. COCOM is an inappropriate tool for such purposes. Moreover, while dialogue is essential to the COCOM process, the United States should avoid heavyhanded efforts to coerce allies to agree to its positions and, whenever possible, should avoid unilateral action. Such actions are likely to be costly to the system of Alliance cooperation and may well contribute to a breakdown in the very unity upon which an effective long-term U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union must be built.

A second concern which policy-makers confront is the fear that increasing trade between the United States and USSR will assist the Soviet Union in overcoming its economic difficulties. Soviet leaders would then be in a position to devote increased efforts to a further expansion of their military capability. Mindful of the fact that U.S.-Soviet trade represents a minimal fraction of the Soviet GNP and that much of what the United States sells to the Soviet Union is available from other sources, it seems clear that such concerns should not be weighted too heavily. Moreover, even if U.S.-Soviet trade were larger and potential Soviet economic gains from expansion of trade with the United States were greater, it is not at all clear that Soviet economic weakness would be in our best interest. In the past, Soviet economic weakness has coincided with periods of xenophobia and domestic repression.

Thus, trade per se need not be avoided. Working in conjunction with our allies, what is desirable is to avoid subsidizing West-Soviet trade. Such trade as is conducted should be undertaken on a normal commercial basis. Recently, Gorbachev has reaffirmed his willingness to seek those changes within the Soviet system and to the Soviet Constitution that would be necessary to permit joint ownership ventures and direct U.S. private investment in the Soviet economy. He has also suggested twenty-two projects for consideration for joint venture/investment. It is, of course, not realistic to expect American businessmen to subsume U.S. national interests in their decision-making. Nevertheless, Gorbachev's offer must be assessed in terms of the national interest. There is little doubt that such an offer is likely to entail potential risks, for example, in the area of direct and indirect technology transfer. However, the Working Group believes this offer should be carefully explored as part of a general attempt to normalize U.S.-Soviet economic relations.

Perhaps the area of greatest controversy is the question of economic sanctions. The political impulse to "do something" when confronted with Soviet actions that are repulsive is powerful and even perhaps required in democratic countries. Economic sanctions often appear to be the only practicable and immediate choice to express disapproval in the age of nuclear weaponry. The problem, however, is that economic sanctions are most unlikely to be successful in getting the targeted country to alter its decisions except under highly specialized circumstances that are not generally applicable to the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Furthermore, although offering some initial psychological satisfaction, sanctions entail an economic cost to the country that imposes them. Nevertheless, in an environment where policy instruments are severely constrained, the use of economic sanctions may be warranted on certain occasions. Each situation must be judged on its own merits taking into account such factors as the nature of the outrage, the degree of Western consensus, and whether alternative suppliers will also support the sanctions. In sum, sanctions must be undertaken in clear recognition of domestic costs and the very low probability that the sanctions will have any appreciable effect on altering decisions already taken by Soviet leadership. For this reason, sanctions that are undertaken must not be

open-ended or indefinite and should be proportional to the offense committed. A time-frame should be identified to allow the levying state to return to a more normal relationship without loss of face.

PROFESSIONAL CONTACTS, CULTURAL INTERACTIONS AND INFORMATION FLOW

As President Reagan has said, "enduring peace requires openness, honest communications, and opportunities for our peoples to get to know one another directly."¹⁰ Greater professional, cultural, and educational interchange and an improvement in the quantity and quality of communications between our two societies can play a role, albeit limited, in improving relations.

An increase of government-to-government contacts at all levels might serve to reduce the causes of mutual distrust. It might also open avenues for pre-crisis resolution of issues likely to be explosive. Moreover, the establishment of dialogue at various levels among U.S. and Soviet military personnel (e.g. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Chiefs, and field commanders) might serve to lessen tendencies toward worst-case planning, as well as reduce the frictions which could result in escalatory political and military situations. The precedent for such dialogue already exists. At the level of field commanders, a dialogue began with General Eisenhower and has continued sporadically in the European theater ever since.

Furthermore, greater cultural and intellectual interchange between our societies may serve to discourage the sense of uniqueness and ethnocentrism characteristic of both superpowers which frequently has impeded more pragmatic and objective relations. Specifically, Americans might become disabused of the notions that the Soviets want to and can be like us, that the correctness of U.S. views is self-evident, and that U.S.-Soviet disagreements are due solely to the latter's unreasonable obstructionism. On the other hand, it is possible that greater Soviet exposure to Americans could provide a basis for more informed and balanced views of the United States and help to counteract the distortions imposed by Soviet official news control. On the positive side, a firmer basis for cooperation and mutual trust can be built on increased contact across the spectrum of interests. In the area of science and technology, cooperative endeavors could be undertaken in such fields as catalytic chemistry, nuclear fusion energy, biotechnology, agriculture, and food packaging. As proposed by the President, we could launch new joint space ventures and establish joint medical research programs, all based on the criteria of mutual benefit. We could increase exchanges of citizens from educational, fraternal, and cultural groups. We could increase scholarship programs; improve language studies, conduct courses in history, culture, and other subjects; establish libraries and cultural centers; and increase athletic competition. Perhaps through such programs we can begin to see what is best in each other's societies and thus reduce the tendency to focus on the worst.

Especially important, but perhaps more difficult, is the need to improve the general flow of information between the United States and the Soviet Union and between West and East. Restrictions on travel and communications of all kinds as well as the deliberate use of disinformation can only undermine attempts to improve relations. The Soviet Union has clearly registered its concern to every available Westerner over the rhetoric that has accompanied statements concerning U.S.-Soviet affairs in recent years. However, no mention has been made of the anti-American diatribes that have consistently characterized

almost every aspect of Soviet reporting on the United States. Future Soviet-American relations cannot be built satisfactorily on such a one-sided foundation. Rhetorical excess, vitriolic reporting, and deliberate disinformation can only serve as promoters of distrust, reinforcing notions held in each capital that the other's ultimate goal is the elimination of its principal adversary.

EASTERN EUROPE

Eastern Europe is a region of continuing importance to the United States and the West. It is the focus of an immense military standoff and a restive and uneasy component of the Soviet external empire. Indeed, the key to long-term stability in Europe may well be in Eastern Europe.

The post-war policy of the United States toward Eastern Europe has been shaped by three basic factors: (1) the region's critical position in the context of West European security and the global superpower confrontation; (2) the influence of organized ethnic groups, representing immigrants and their descendants from Eastern Europe; and (3) the idealistic pursuit of the universal desiderata of national self-determination and respect for human rights. Economic interests in trade and investment have had a marginal impact on overall U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe. Within this context, the general thrust of U.S. policy has been to seek an ultimate relaxation of the Soviet imperial system, including the long-term aspiration of eliminating the division of Europe.

At the outset, however, the Working Group recognized that the maintenance of close political, economic, and military relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe remains one of Moscow's foremost objectives. Nevertheless, in response to pressures from within their own societies, some East European regimes, in search of legitimacy, have displayed a long-term trend toward increasing "domesticism"—the pursuit of separate national interests in lieu of "community" interests where national and "community" interests diverge. Soviet responses to such evolutionary developments in Eastern Europe have been plagued by the difficulty of securing both "cohesion" and "viability". Maintaining cohesion is not simply a matter of physical security for the Soviet State, as important as Moscow considers this to be. For political and ideological reasons as well, the cohesiveness of the "socialist community" is an important element in the Soviet goals of legitimizing Communist rule in the USSR and affirming the appeal of "Marxism-Leninism" beyond Soviet borders. On the other hand, the Soviets recognize that the search for stability within Eastern Europe, the concomitant need to avoid undermining the national legitimacy of Communist regimes there, and the desire for economically viable allies which contribute to, not drain, the Soviet economy have resulted in a need for a degree of tolerance of national views, concerns, and approaches.

Thus, while the Soviet Union is obviously concerned about trends in a number of East European countries, Soviet leaders are sophisticated enough to know that it is not the United States that provides the primary impetus for change.

It was inevitable that, given historical patterns of relations in Europe, distinctive national characteristics and yearnings for a greater measure of autonomy would emerge even under Communist regimes.

Within this context, it has appeared to the Working Group that possible pathways toward an ultimate relaxation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe essentially are confined to a spectrum from (a) accommodation to Soviet control through (b) transformation of Soviet control to (c) dissolution of Soviet con-

trol. Of these, accommodation has been consistently rejected as offensive to American and Western public opinion, unacceptably close to appeasement, and unworkable because internal forces for change in Eastern Europe rule out static forms of stability. Dissolution by force has been viewed as impossible without risking a possible Third World War and has not received serious consideration. Dissolution through Western encouragement of ferment and revolution within Eastern Europe is a high risk venture which could easily result in the imposition of even greater Soviet control. Especially important, such a policy would almost certainly create fissures within the Atlantic Alliance. It would run counter to the policies of a number of Western European states who, since the sixties, have sought increased stability in and improved relations with Eastern Europe and who would have to face the consequences of instability at their front door. Moreover, such an approach, in the absence of a dissolution of the Soviet state, would clearly be counterproductive to the long-term improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. However, continued transformation—a gradual change in the Soviet imperial relationship with Eastern Europe—holds some promise as a potentially effective and realistic operational goal.¹¹ The situation in Eastern Europe is fluid, not frozen. Eastern Europe has room for maneuver between the extremes of total accommodation to Soviet hegemony and confrontation. There has been and can be evolutionary change.

While the most powerful forces influencing change are and will remain internal to Eastern Europe, the evolutionary process can be aided by contact and dialogue with the West at the governmental level and with the people. Concerning the latter, an important part of Western influence in Eastern Europe comes from examples of political freedom and economic success provided through Western radio and TV broadcasting, cultural exchanges, travel, business contacts, and non-state relations. Such contacts should be continued and their expansion encouraged. Concerning dialogue with East European regimes, East European governments are likely to remain interested in pragmatic relations with the West. They seek trade, credits, and investment. They are searching for new means to enter Western markets, both to repay debts and to reinvest their imports of Western goods.

The East European dilemma is that the USSR needs high quality machinery, consumer goods, and an increased output of "hard goods" from East Europe. To meet Soviet needs, Eastern Europe must modernize its industries and expand its economic exchanges with the West. Furthermore, economic growth and a consequent improvement in living standards is essential to political stability. While Moscow wants modernization and political stability, it is not enthusiastic about reforms that will potentially reduce party control and systemic orthodoxy.

The critical question as future years unfold will be how far and at what rate the Soviet Union is prepared to let the Eastern Europeans go. While there can be no definitive answer to this key question, U.S. and especially Western European policy can play a role, albeit limited, in that decision. Soviet leaders will remain involved in an active debate on how far to tolerate, even encourage, experimentation with economic systems and cultivation of relations with the West. The task of U.S. and Western policies is to encourage Soviet tolerance while expanding dialogue and contact in Eastern Europe. Given the predispositions of the Soviets, the former will clearly be more difficult than the latter. By encouraging the Soviets to recognize that there is an inherent element of instability in the antagonism of the peoples of Eastern Europe to their regimes as a result of Soviet control; by emphasizing the need to normalize relations

among the states of Europe and ultimately the desirability of establishing closer ties between East and West Europe without threatening Soviet perceptions of their own basic security interests; by underscoring the cooperative rather than the conflictual side of East-West relations in Europe; by emphasizing the non-zero-sum nature of U.S. and Soviet relations with the East European states; and by seeking ways to reassure the Soviet Union of its essential security needs through negotiated agreements, the West may help to encourage Soviet leaders to accept and indeed facilitate a gradual transformation in Eastern Europe.

There can be no purely U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Some of our West European allies and friends, notably Germany and Italy, as well as Austria, have more extensive ties and closer contacts with Eastern Europe than do we. U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe also must take into account the enormous variations that exist among the nations of Eastern Europe. Frictions are inevitable in Eastern Europe. The absence of normalization in Poland, the dubious economic conditions in Romania and Czechoslovakia, the uncertainty of leadership successions in most of Eastern Europe and lower levels of Soviet support all point to future crises in the region. While there is no lack of formal machinery which might be employed to coordinate Western policies toward Eastern Europe, there remains a need to encourage a refinement in the Western consultative and policy coordinating processes in hopes of achieving a flexible harmonization of policies.

In all of this, however, the United States must make it clear that in dealings with the Soviet Union the West is not prepared to sacrifice its East European interests nor the interests of the East Europeans themselves in favor of a "condominium" arrangement which would abandon Eastern Europe to the permanent and exclusive sphere of Soviet influence. It also must continue to underscore its belief that long-term stability in Europe—as elsewhere—can only be assured in an environment of national self-determination, respect for human rights, and the opening up of societies.

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

American policy since the Nixon Administration, openly or tacitly, has seen improved relations with China as an influence for restraint by the Soviet Union. It is, of course, a mistake to understand U.S.-PRC relations only in the context of the triangular relationship with the Soviet Union. Indeed, the improvement in Chinese-American relations during the past fifteen years has been a development of historical importance in its own right.

More recently, the initial euphoria over improving U.S.-PRC relations has given way to the daily toil of managing a relationship which involves not only short, medium and long-term Chinese and U.S. strategic interests, but also a complex web of political, economic, and security relations with allies and friends throughout Asia and elsewhere. With a view to the future, the United States should continue to explore and develop every opportunity for cooperation with the PRC as China manages its emergence as a more dynamic international power.

In recent years, profound changes have taken place in China which suggest reasons for optimism. Some observers note that political reforms have led to what appears to be a degree of intraparty democracy. Moreover, they contend that the decision-making process has been made less personalized and more consultative. Mass political terror has ended. A degree of personal freedom, though not political freedom, has been allowed. Formal and informal channels have been made available to different groups, however, which allow them to

express their interests and pressure policy-makers indirectly¹². Economic reforms have gone even farther. The central planning system has been modified somewhat to permit greater local flexibility and initiatives. Realistic pricing methods are being debated as a means of encouraging market mechanisms. There has been a decollectivization of the agricultural commune system. Private sector development has been encouraged. Through an "open door" policy China's ties to industrial market economies and international economic institutions are developing rapidly. Nevertheless, despite reform successes in the agricultural sector, inflation, balance of payments difficulties, challenges to traditional Chinese values, and a variety of other factors have led to a strong counter-attack on the "open-door" policy by conservatives. Where the current course of political and economic reforms will ultimately take the PRC is, of course, unknown. Leadership succession still remains uncertain as does the question of whether reforms will achieve a sufficient degree of institutionalization and legitimacy to resist future counter action by "conservatives".

In foreign affairs, since 1982 when the PRC formalized its "independent foreign policy", Sino-Soviet relations have gradually improved. Both Beijing and Moscow continue to repeat their willingness to normalize relations further. Gorbachev reaffirmed his satisfaction about that improvement at the 27th Party Congress. Border tensions have been reduced. Both governments are less critical of each other's foreign policy, and trade, though still relatively modest, doubled between 1982 and 1984. A long-term trade agreement has been signed. Cultural ties have been expanded.¹³

Despite these improvements, however, the strategic relations between Beijing and Moscow have not changed fundamentally. China's preconditions for normalization of relations have not been met. There has been no breakthrough in border negotiations or outstanding Chinese territorial claims. Especially, there has been no reduction in Soviet support for Hanoi's occupation of Kampuchea, nor has there been a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Rather, Moscow has enlarged its Pacific fleet, strengthened its air power and deployed large numbers of SS-20 missiles in the Far East, and increased its aid to Hanoi and its military presence in Vietnam. Thus, for Beijing, the Soviet Union remains the primary threat to its security.

Consequently, the United States and China share certain geopolitical objectives which suggest cooperative efforts in various forms. Both view Moscow as the principal threat. Both are concerned about Moscow's increasing military power in the Far East. Both are pursuing similar objectives in Afghanistan and Indochina. Both seek to curb Soviet expansionism. Despite this confluence of interest, however, there are good reasons why Washington's approach on security issues should be kept low key. Ultimately, attempts to inflame animosities between China and the Soviet Union are likely to be counterproductive to U.S. relations with both. Rather, the United States should continue the present trend of U.S.-PRC relations by expanding economic and cultural ties, encouraging China to play a constructive role in enhancing stability in Asia, and offering continuing, quiet assistance and support for Chinese efforts to reduce Soviet military and political pressure. Such an approach by the United States, taken in conjunction with European and Asian allies, could strengthen relations with the PRC while hopefully encouraging the Soviet Union to more moderate action in Asia.

THE THIRD WORLD

Perhaps no other area of Soviet-American interaction will be more difficult to deal with than the Third World. The temptation to seek local advantage at

the expense of advances in great power cooperation may continue to plague the new generation of Soviet leaders as it has preceding ones. The lessons of their failures in Indonesia and Egypt will continue to pale in light of lingering ideological dogma which draws Soviet leadership toward support for "national liberation" movements. However, at the recent Party Congress, while Gorbachev reaffirmed the solidarity of the Soviet Union with the forces of national and social liberation, the endorsement was notably less strident and enthusiastic than in the past. Nevertheless, in the Third World opportunities for potential U.S.-Soviet cooperation seem likely to remain limited. On the other hand, as an Atlantic Council Working Group suggested in an earlier report, the animation and agitation, the turbulence and terror, the rising expectations and rising resentments in developing countries will continue to have an impact on U.S.-Soviet relations and on our Atlantic and Pacific alliances.¹⁴

The so-called "Third World" is a politically, economically, militarily, culturally, and geographically diverse grouping of nations that includes the majority of peoples, lands, and ocean islands and sits astride most of the world's maritime choke points. As a result, no single set of variables can describe the current conditions in Third World countries or the cures for the many problems which these countries confront. What is clear, however, is that most countries in the Third World are undergoing dynamic change. With the break-up of old colonial empires and the increasing diffusion of political, economic, and military power, the Soviet Union has chosen to exploit this unsettled atmosphere. It has been busy building an infrastructure of people from Third World countries who are being educated and indoctrinated in the Soviet Union and returned to their homelands. Should the political situation arise, the Soviets hope such an infrastructure of trained cadres will propel them to greater influence in the countries affected.

Here as in other areas, we can reduce the risk of dangerous miscalculation by encouraging, where possible, Soviet pragmatism and restraint. Despite the expenditure of massive resources, it must be clear even in the Kremlin that the USSR has relatively little to show for its three decades of effort in the Third World. In this regard, it could be argued that Soviet policy in the Middle East has shown, perhaps, a glimmer of pragmatism. In that area, the Kremlin has played a relatively passive role during recent years. Moscow, of course, would like a larger voice in the Middle East and the Soviets have given a considerable amount of arms aid to Syria and Iraq. However, few who know the region would describe those countries as totally subservient to Soviet policy. Nor have close American ties with Israel permitted the USSR to play as politically expansive a role in Arab countries as might have been expected. Perhaps Moscow has been as much confounded as Washington by the turbulence and unpredictability of events in that troubled part of the world.¹⁵

In Central America and the Caribbean the Soviet Union's role has been mixed. Until the successes of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, Moscow refused to endorse Fidel Castro's notion of open revolution, preferring instead what it believed to be the more pragmatic approach of working with local communist party organizations to improve their position from within existing political structures. While Moscow recently has been more active in encouraging and arming guerrilla forces throughout the region, the Soviets generally have done so through third parties—as revealed in the papers captured in Grenada. Nevertheless, Moscow would like to encourage what it perceives to be continuing antagonism toward the United States by certain groups within the region. Moscow, also is likely to continue its active, vigorous support for the Sandinista regime in

Nicaragua. The Kremlin, however, is unlikely to delude itself—especially in the wake of Grenada—that the United States will remain indifferent to developments judged to be critical to its security. Unfortunately, it may be difficult to find significant common areas of interest for active great power cooperation anywhere in Latin America other than the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the possibility of direct confrontation.

The Soviet Union also can be expected to continue to exploit opportunities as they arise in Africa. It has shown itself willing to deliver arms at marketable prices and has invested in the region with its own forces and advisers and those of surrogate Cuba. Perhaps it was only natural for ambitious leaders emerging in the poor, post-colonial countries of Africa, many of which were inadequately prepared for independence, to find in some form of Marxism adapted to African conditions a congenial ideology to justify the essentially dictatorial practices they imposed. Western educated elites exposed to left-wing doctrines in Western Europe or the Soviet Union frequently returned to Africa with strong antipathies toward international capitalism and the multinational corporations and banks which were its institutional embodiment. It was relatively easy for these elites, many of whom harbored resentment toward their former colonial masters, to lean towards the Soviet Union during the post-colonial period, and Moscow was quick to exploit the ensuing instabilities.¹⁶ Since then, the Soviet Union has remained active in Africa, from the northern tier with its open support for Libya's Gadhafi, through its substantial intervention on the Horn, to southern Africa where the USSR has attempted to exploit the woes of blacks and whites alike in an effort to gain propaganda advantage as a "supporter" of Black Africa. While on the whole Moscow's activities in Africa have failed to achieve their objectives, new Soviet leaders probably will continue to respond to opportunities for exploitation. In this region, as well as in Asia, ties between America's European allies and elites in their former colonies may mitigate Soviet influence. Thus, the United States can and should rely on closely coordinated policies with its European allies to counter Soviet influence in this part of the world. American policy should continue to emphasize non-intervention in the internal affairs of African nations and the removal of foreign forces. Economic and social progress in the region can only be achieved if Africans are allowed to deal with their internal difficulties free from the interference of outside military forces. Such forces represent a new colonialism and inhibit further progress by the nations of the region.

In Asia and the Pacific region, Korea, Thailand, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran are among the potential areas of clash between Washington and Moscow. Nor should the Philippines be dismissed as a potential area of Soviet intrigue. During the past decade, the Asia-Pacific region has experienced an exceptionally broad range of important changes. Economically, it is the world region with the highest growth rate. Intra-regional economic activities have expanded rapidly. The region also continues to become ever more competitive in the international market and its share of world trade continues to increase. Indeed, the region has surpassed Europe in the list of principal U.S. trading partners.

From a political and security perspective, the region presents a more complicated picture. The U.S.-Soviet military power balance in the region has shifted to one which is increasingly less favorable to the United States and, in the absence of countering capabilities, will in all probability continue to do so. As noted earlier, the Soviet military buildup in Asia over the past decade has been significant, as has its improvement of transportation, communications and supply

facilities. Indeed, it is no longer an exaggeration to say that the USSR now has in place the capability for fighting a two-front war.¹⁷ Moscow, clearly, is now in a strong strategic position in the region and might be tempted to exploit that position.

In Northeast Asia, Moscow appears to be interested in playing a greater role on the Korean peninsula just when South Korea is experiencing domestic difficulties and North Korea faces an important political transition. Furthermore, while the Kremlin so far has been unwilling to make concessions on the critical "northern territories" issue which is of greatest interest to Japan, its diplomatic posture toward that country has warmed considerably. In Southeast Asia, Hanoi with apparent Soviet support has continued its aggressive behavior in Kampuchea and seems unlikely to be willing to withdraw its forces in the near future. In exchange, the Soviet Pacific fleet enjoys excellent port facilities at Cam Ranh Bay and has deployed long-range bombers to Da Nang. In Southwest Asia, the Soviet pursuit of hegemony in Afghanistan has ravaged the country and resulted in renewed pressures on Pakistan.

In sum, the environment in Asia, as well as other parts of the Third World, is fraught with potential for crises. As a result, the Third World will remain the most likely area of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. This suggests, at a minimum, the need for dialogue between the United States on one hand and the United States and its allies on the other to clarify interests and search for mechanisms to manage relations with the Soviet Union in the Third World. Efforts should be undertaken to encourage the Soviet Union to play a constructive role in resolving the many political and economic problems that plague Third World countries. One area of mounting concern has been the ever increasing flow of arms to Third World countries. Many of these countries can neither afford the burden of larger military forces nor the instabilities that frequently attend increases in armaments. The United States and the Soviet Union should explore means for controlling and reducing arms sales to the Third World. It is clear as well that while seeking the cooperation of the Soviet Union, the United States in conjunction with its Atlantic and Pacific allies must recognize the increasing importance of the North-South dimension of inter-state relations and continue to pursue vigorously a relationship of constructive interaction between the Third World and Western nations. This relationship should be founded on development assistance, trade, and investment and the peaceful settlement of disputes. In many ways this latter line of policy is more fundamental and constructive. Both for its own direct results and to lessen the opportunities for Soviet exploitation, the rewards for enlightened Western efforts will be greater than from the continued pursuit of the more sterile East-West confrontation.

At the same time that the Western states work to improve the confidence and viability of Third World states, they should encourage the democratization of geopolitically "friendly" but internally authoritarian Third World regimes. They also should attempt to understand and deal more effectively with governments of a radical, dictatorial, expansionist, socialist, or communist hue that are interspersed throughout the Third World. As an earlier Atlantic Council Working Group concluded, "The West cannot afford to preclude opportunities for patient, quiet relations which may help to prepare the way for the acceptance of more moderate policies as time goes by and conditions change".¹⁸

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

International terrorism may be defined as premeditated violence—including murder, assassination, kidnapping, hostage-taking, and intimidation—conducted

against governmental, civilian, or private sector targets by individuals, subnational groups or state agents not constrained by the rules of law.¹⁹ When terrorists are deliberately aided and abetted by the government of a sovereign state, it could be considered an act of belligerence.

For some years, there has been evidence pointing to Soviet support for terrorist activity. While the Soviet Union cannot control all of the activities of the many groups it supports, improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations should include a firm commitment to reduce and ultimately withdraw support for terrorist activity.

Some will contend that any possible agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union will flag on the issue of definition. This ought not, however, preclude the possibility of reaching an agreement with Moscow on certain issues where we have common interests. Indeed the history of aircraft hijackings, the seizure of Soviet diplomats in the Middle East in mid-1985, and Gorbachev's address at the 27th Party Congress suggest that some common ground may exist. Thus, the agenda for expanded U.S. talks with the Soviet Union should include efforts to find common grounds for Soviet-American cooperation in stemming the growing tide of terrorist activities.

To improve chances for success, talks on the control and elimination of international terrorism should be in a forum separate from existing arms control negotiations, avoiding linkage to more controversial issues. The talks could first focus on establishing principles for joint action to prevent the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups. Ultimately, they should address the full range of potential terrorist activities, including such issues as the misuse of diplomatic missions for terrorist activities, hostage taking, abductions, and bombings.

The Working Group suggests that a most useful approach might initially concentrate on what constitutes a terrorist act. A sharp differentiation could be drawn between the violent action against innocents and the political sympathies of the perpetrators. To the victims of terrorism the consequences are the same regardless of the "purity" of the terrorists' objectives in some abstract sense. Thus, the hijacking of an aircraft from East to West which places innocents at risk would be as criminal as a hijacking from West to East or anywhere else. Likewise, the taking of an American, Soviet, or any other diplomat as hostage would be condemned by both superpowers equally.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Perhaps the greatest strengths of the Western world derive from its fundamental respect for human rights. Indeed, the guarding of individual human rights and freedoms is one of the principal duties of Western governments.

This commitment is driven not only by the belief that it is a moral imperative, but also by the demonstrated experience that societies which protect the rights and freedoms of the individual are best able to advance in face of the complexities of the modern world. Ultimately it is the cultivation of the human resource upon which the future depends.

The issue is how to advance the cause of human rights in a world where they are so often subject to extraordinary abuse. Here idealism must be tempered with realism if real progress toward our ideals is ever to be achieved. The pace of improvements within the Soviet Union on the individual rights of its citizens cannot be the *sine qua non* for an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. However, the Working Group believes that the Soviet Union should be encouraged to fulfill its obligations as set forth in the UN Declaration of Human Rights

and the Helsinki Final Act, for failure to fulfill its obligations is likely to pose obstacles to the long-term improvement of relations between our countries. The rhetoric of a moral crusade is not likely to be helpful and should be avoided. More promising is consistent and quiet diplomacy designed to encourage the Soviet Union and others to moderate their policies. In any case, it must be increasingly apparent to all that failure to stimulate human creativity and incentives will inevitably result in a permanent competitive disadvantage in an increasingly dynamic world.

The United States should also appeal to the Soviet Union to use its influence with its allies, quietly urging them to compliance with human rights accords. As one example, the USSR might be encouraged to use its influence to halt the Bulgarian government campaign of enforced assimilation of the ethnic Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Such actions by Bulgaria are in contravention of a number of international agreements as well as the Bulgarian Constitution.

Conclusions and Policy Recommendations

Future U.S.-Soviet relations seem certain to be characterized by the simultaneous existence of conflictual and cooperative dimensions. There is no foreseeable escape from this complexity. By the year 2000, the two nations will still be the world's only superpowers. Their ideologies and political and economic systems will remain radically different and in competition. Neither side will "collapse" nor fail to maintain strong and effective defenses. Rival alliances will remain intact. Differences in history and outlook will continue to make each side mistrustful of the other.

Furthermore, the drama of U.S.-Soviet relations will be played out against a backdrop of rapid technological change, continued instability in the Third World which could entail superpower confrontation, and an increasing recognition of the fragility of the environment upon which we all depend. Technological advance will offer opportunities for dramatic improvements in the human condition, while also adding a dimension of uncertainty not only in the superpower balance but also in the balances elsewhere around the world as dramatic increases take place in the lethality and firepower of modern weaponry. Within this context, there is a paramount need to reduce the chance of confrontation, miscalculation, and the risks of nuclear war. Thus, while recognizing that some of Moscow's predispositions have deep historical and ideological sources, agreements to minimize such risks may be possible in light of the Soviet Union's oft evidenced caution and pragmatism. Furthermore, in spite of the soured relations of the past decade, opportunities exist for cooperation in other aspects of relations in the political, military, and economic realms which may help to serve as building blocks for a more general improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Such opportunities should be vigorously identified, explored, and negotiated.

The Working Group believes that the policy recommendations outlined below, if implemented, will provide a firm foundation for improved U.S.-Soviet relations. Equally important, the Working Group believes that if the recommendations are followed, the United States would go a long way to closing the gulf between it and its Allies that now exists. The recommendations have been the product of an interaction with the Atlantic Council Working Group on strategic stability, co-chaired by Brent Scowcroft and R. James Woolsey, which conducted its work in parallel with this effort. The recommendations also take in-

to account extensive discussions in Washington and in Western Europe among a wide variety of statesmen and scholars as well as in Moscow with Soviet representatives. Of course, the future of U.S.-Soviet relations will depend greatly on Moscow's willingness and ability to convert words to deeds. The task of U.S. policy is to encourage the Soviet Union to do so. Accordingly the following policy recommendations are made:

General Policy Recommendations

The United States must continue to seek an active and productive dialogue with the Soviet Union. This dialogue should be carried on with consistency and regularity and include explicit delineations on our part of critical U.S. and allied interests and our firm commitment to resist any Soviet attempt to extend its influence by military means. The dialogue must also emphasize America's determination (1) to reduce the risk of war by enhancing "crisis stabilization"; (2) to reduce and stabilize armaments levels through sound and verifiable agreements, and ultimately to ease the burdens of military spending; (3) to improve bilateral relations on the basis of reciprocity and mutual interest; (4) to manage and resolve regional conflicts based on the principles of non-intervention and the self-determination of peoples; and (5) to seek improvements in human rights and encourage the Soviet Union to recognize the advantages of joining us in this effort. A willingness to engage in a dialogue with the Soviet Union must be an unalterable aspect of U.S. foreign policy.

Specific Policy Recommendations

Military/Security

1. The military/security dimension of U.S.-Soviet relations will remain the foremost consideration by policy makers well into the next decade. Superpower military parity will remain an essential factor for stability. Successful dialogue demands that both sides approach negotiations from positions of adequate strength, confident in their capabilities and in their position in the international order. Thus, while avoiding the impression that it seeks an arms race with the USSR, is pursuing military superiority, or is uninterested in reaching equitable arms reduction agreements, the United States must maintain the credibility of its nuclear and conventional deterrent forces through appropriate force modernizations and improvements in command, control and communications (C³).
2. To avoid instability, the result of surprise advances in the field of military technology, and to strengthen the deterrence of nuclear conflict by defensive means, if such proves feasible and desirable, the United States should continue to pursue in concert with its allies a research program on anti-ballistic missile defense technologies.
3. It is of paramount importance to strengthen stability at the strategic and theater nuclear levels, and also at the conventional level where there is perhaps an even greater potential for a clash between U.S. and Soviet forces. Efforts to this end must not be held hostage to events in peripheral areas.
4. Arms control is central to the process of improving U.S.-Soviet relations. The United States should continue its efforts to seek genuine and verifiable arms limitations and vigorously explore the possibility of limiting the military use of space to those uses which reinforce stability. More specifically, the United States should seek reductions in or the elimination of those weapons systems with characteristics that pose the greatest threat to

stability—theater or strategic; conventional or nuclear. In this regard the following bilateral arms control approaches merit further consideration:

- a reduction in MIRVed land based strategic systems and their replacement by single warhead systems;
 - a move away from fixed site land-based systems and the prompt development of mobile systems;
 - an increase in the proportion of warheads at sea;
 - an overall sizeable reduction in vulnerable time urgent hard-target kill capability;
 - a ban on terminal-homing ICBM and SLBM warheads;
 - a ban on depressed trajectory SLBMs;
 - a capping and subsequent reduction of non-strategic nuclear tipped missiles deployed by the super-powers in Europe; and
 - a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.
5. Moreover, the Working Group believes that the United States and the Soviet Union must begin to take a longer-term view of arms control if stability is to be truly enhanced in the future. To this end the United States should engage the USSR in talks designed to outline the strategic environment desired in the early decades of the next century. Specifically we should jointly:
- examine concepts of deterrence and crisis stability;
 - delineate those weapon systems characteristics considered potentially destabilizing in the future
 - define in broad terms the preferred balance of strategic and theater forces of the future.
6. The United States and the Soviet Union also should explore means of reducing arms sales in the Third World
7. The United States should attempt to engage the Soviet Union in talks designed to limit terrorist activities around the world. Such talks should be separate from existing arms control negotiations and focus first on establishing principles for joint action to prevent the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups. Ultimately, talks should focus on the full range of potential terrorist activities. While the USSR cannot control all of the activities of the many groups it supports, improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations should include a firm commitment to reduce and ultimately withdraw support for terrorist activity.

Political

8. Consistent with the call for broad ranging dialogue with the Soviet Union based on realism, strength and flexibility, the Working Group believes that the search for shared interests will be best served by consistency and regularity in the negotiating process. Thus the Working Group recommends that U.S. and Soviet leaders meet regularly in summit session, perhaps biennially*. Foreign Ministers and other relevant cabinet-level officials should meet their counterparts one or more times every year.
9. With the long-term goal of eliminating the division of Europe in mind, the United States should continue to seek a gradual transformation of the Soviet

*Malcolm Toon comments: "I have reservations about summitry as a way of doing serious diplomatic business. If we must have summit meetings—and they are probably inevitable given the nature of political process in both countries—they should be well prepared by experts, preceded by close and comprehensive consultations with principal allies, based on a specific agenda, and geared to agreed political objectives. Reykjavik met none of these desiderata and thus was a near disaster. Summitry of the Reykjavik type should be avoided like the plague."

imperial relationship in Eastern Europe through a policy of contact and dialogue with East European peoples and governments. This process should include the maintenance and expansion of:

- contacts and dialogue with East European regimes across the spectrum of activities;
 - trade and investment;
 - Western radio and TV broadcasting;
 - professional and cultural exchanges, travel, business contacts, and other non-state relations.
10. The United States must also recognize that it cannot by itself play a decisive role in accelerating the process of change in Eastern Europe. It should work closely with its allies and encourage a refinement in the Western consultative, coordinating, and crisis management machinery with the aim of a flexible harmonization of policies.
11. In Asia, the United States should expand economic and cultural ties with the PRC and encourage China to play a constructive role in enhancing stability, while offering continued quiet support for Chinese efforts to reduce Soviet military and political pressure. The U.S. should not, however, attempt to inflame animosities between the USSR and the PRC.
12. In the Third World, differing and competitive interests suggest that the potential for great power friction and confrontation will remain. As a minimum, the United States should engage the Soviet Union to clarify interests, establish limits of behavior and search for mechanisms for crisis management. Real social and economic progress in the Third World will require a stability built upon the pursuit of a new dynamic and constructive interaction between the Third World and Western nations. This relationship should be founded on development assistance, trade, and investment and should be coordinated to the extent possible with the political and economic policies of our allies.
13. The United States should encourage Soviet leadership to recognize that the nature of improvements in human rights does not constitute a win/lose situation between West and East but that improvements will indeed create circumstances from which all parties will benefit.
14. Perhaps the greatest strengths of the Western world derive from a fundamental faith in human nature. The United States, however, should not make the improvement of the individual rights of Soviet citizens the *sine qua non* for an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. The United States, without excessive hyperbole and in close consultation with its allies, should encourage the Soviet Union to fulfill its obligations under international covenants including the Helsinki accords to which it has freely agreed.

Economic

15. The United States should take a broad and comprehensive view of trade with the Soviet Union. Recognizing that the USSR is a permanent fixture of the world landscape for the foreseeable future, and that it has very considerable human and natural resources of its own, the United States should normalize trade with the Soviet Union and thus permit the sale of a variety of civilian use goods to the USSR on a commercial basis. Working in conjunction with our allies, the U.S. government, however, should avoid subsidizing U.S.-Soviet trade.
16. The USSR, provided it is prepared to respond on a *quid pro quo* basis, should be granted Most Favored Nation (MFN) status through mechanisms

similar to the 1972-73 trade agreement. This will inevitably involve a difficult political process in the United States, but the Working Group believes that linking MFN to Soviet emigration policy serves neither the ends of increased emigration nor improved U.S.-Soviet relations. MFN status should be primarily, but not solely, an economic determination.*

17. For security reasons, the United States must continue to prohibit the export to the USSR of military goods and technologies essentially designed for military purposes.
18. The United States should also continue to work with its allies through COCOM to limit Soviet access to high technology likely to significantly enhance the military capability of the USSR—even if there are non-military uses which predominate in the West. The United States however, should not attempt to use COCOM for other foreign policy purposes.
19. Trade, security, and criminal regulations should be strictly enforced and the cooperative efforts of other countries should be carefully sought.

Cultural/Social/Technical

20. The free flow of ideas and peoples should be encouraged as a means of enhancing the awareness of mutual concerns, adding to the understanding by each of the nature and national culture of the other, and—as a guiding aim—developing common interests and points of view. Hence the United States should seek an increase in government to government contacts at all levels, including:
 - a dialogue among U.S. and Soviet military personnel at various levels (e.g. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Chiefs, and field commands)
 - an increase in exchanges of citizens from educational, fraternal, and cultural groups;
 - greater numbers of scholarship programs, improved language studies, and a greater number of courses in each other's history and culture; and
 - a reduction in restrictions on travel and communication.
21. The United States also should seek, where security interests are not jeopardized, to expand U.S.-Soviet scientific and technical cooperation. In the wake of the Chernobyl disaster, a range of cooperative initiatives should be undertaken in the fields of disaster control, environmental protection, and medical assistance.
22. The United States should improve the quality of its information programming both in sophistication and in awareness that Soviet disinformation is becoming more effective at a time when a younger generation of allies and friends in the West may be more susceptible. The United States should also seek an end to deliberate disinformation.
23. Whatever the problems that may be anticipated during the remainder of this century, the United States should place its confidence in the basic strength of the democratic institutions and open societies that it and its allies possess. U.S. policy must go beyond attributing all evils to Soviet interventionism or merely accepting continuing confrontation in order to gain and maintain the support of friends and allies around the world. The United States should offer a vision of the future based on human freedom, dignity and creativity.

*Brent Scowcroft comments that MFN status has not and should not be based primarily on economic factors.

ENDNOTES

Working papers cited below will be collected and published later this year by the University Press of America.

1. Murray Feshbach, "Between the Lines of the 1979 Census", *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1982, pp. 27-27. See also John M. Weinstein, "All Features Grate and Stall: Soviet Strategic Vulnerability and the Future of Deterrence" in Robert Kennedy and John M. Weinstein, eds. *The Defense of the West: Strategic and European Security Issues Reappraised*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984, pp. 50-52.
2. See Robert F. Byrnes, "The USSR in the 1980s and Beyond", Atlantic Council Working Paper.
3. See John P. Hardt, "Soviet Economic Constraints on Defense to Year 2000," Appendix to Atlantic Council Occasional Paper by Timothy W. Stanley on "Western and Eastern Economic Constraints on Defense: The Mutual Security Implications," 1986.
4. Seweryn Bialer, "St. Mikhail and the Dragon".
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8. See Brent Scowcroft, R. James Woolsey, and Thomas Etzold, "Defending Peace and Freedom; Toward Strategic Stability in the Year 2000." Atlantic Council Policy Paper, March 1987.
9. See John P. Hardt, "United States-Soviet Economic and Technological Interaction", Atlantic Council Working Paper.
10. President Reagan "A Mission for Peace." Address to the nation, Washington D.C., Nov. 14, 1985, reproduced in Current Policy 765, U.S. Department of State.
11. Lincoln Gordon, Atlantic Council Working Paper.
12. See Guo-cang Huan, "Sino-Soviet Relations to the Year 2000: Implications for U.S. Interests", Atlantic Council of the United States, Occasional Paper, 1986.
13. Ibid.
14. "After Afghanistan—The Long Haul", Atlantic Council Policy Paper, Washington, D.C., March 1980, p. 9.
15. See Martin J. Hillenbrand, "U.S.-Soviet Political Interaction", Atlantic Council Working Paper.
16. Ibid.
17. See Guo-cang Huan, "Sino-Soviet Relations", op. cit.
18. "After Afghanistan—The Long Haul," p. 49.
19. For a fuller treatment of the subject see "Combatting International Terrorism: U.S.-European Cooperation and Political Will," Atlantic Council Policy Paper, November 1986.

APPENDIX

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS AND DISSENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE WORKING GROUP

DISSENT, by Barry Blechman

I can endorse enthusiastically the overall content and tone of the policy paper, and also the vast majority of its recommendations. I differ sharply with its analysis and findings concerning the modernization of U.S. strategic forces, however, in two respects:

1. *Modernizing Land-Based Offensive Forces:*

A prospective problem of ICBM vulnerability was recognized within the U.S. government in the early 1960s, and discussed publicly by then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird as early as 1969. The fact that four presidents and six secretaries of defense have been unable to solve this problem over a period of nearly twenty years is no coincidence, nor does it reflect incompetence on the part of the executive branch, mendacity on the part of Congress, fatal flaws in arms control, or the evil intentions of the Soviet Union. Rather, the persistence of this problem reflects certain inalterable technological trends, as well as geographic, sociological, and political constraints on American strategic choices. Instead of continuing to ignore these real, and apparently impervious, constraints, as would be the case if the study group's recommendations were implemented, it is long past time for the country to turn to alternative means of achieving the purposes of its strategic offensive forces.

There are certain unique characteristics of ICBMs that cannot be abandoned. These characteristics pertain primarily to the ICBM force capabilities to execute discrete and precise strikes, flexibly and reliably. The United States should retain a substantial number of ICBMs in its force posture for these purposes; a portion of the existing Minuteman IIIs and the 50 already authorized MXs can fill this need well into the next decade, probably through the century. At some point they will have to be replaced, and a mobile ICBM with one or two warheads is probably the best way to go about it.

This proposed force of land-based missiles would be intended to provide certain limited options to the United States in the event of extraordinary situations—involving either the Soviet Union or third nations. It would not, however, be intended to play a role in deterring a large-scale attack on this country or our allies, nor to survive such an attack. That should be made clear, publicly and explicitly. For the survivable retaliatory capabilities necessary to deter such attacks, the United States can depend solely on its strategic submarines and bombers, and the planned size of those forces should be increased explicitly to compensate for the declared subtraction of ICBM capabilities. Additions to the SLBM force probably should involve the placement of Trident II missiles on a less expensive type of submarine than the *Ohio*-class so as to increase the number of potential aimpoints, but detailed studies are required to determine the most efficient means of ensuring the required number of survivable warheads to compensate for reductions in survivable land-based missile warheads.

By moving toward this modified Triad over the remainder of this century, the United States would both retain the special capabilities of ICBMs for those

roles in which, realistically, they might be required—and yet also finally be rid of the weakness in our retaliatory capabilities which has bedeviled four administrations.

2. *Exploring Strategic Defenses:**

I agree with the study group that “a vigorous research program on anti-ballistic missile technologies is needed”. The final draft of the policy paper does not, however, mention the need to carry out that research in such a way that our enthusiasm for the long-term promise of strategic defense does not force the nation to incur too great a price in the near term. Specifically:

a) Our research should be carried out within the confines of the ABM Treaty. Termination of that treaty’s restrictions within the near to mid term can benefit only the Soviet Union, which is in a far better position to deploy strategic missile defenses based on existing ground-based technologies, than the United States is to deploy either space-based or ground-based defenses. To protect the treaty, it is necessary in negotiations with the Soviet Union to clarify current ambiguities or disagreements about the types of research and radar deployments which are permitted by the treaty at present, as a matter of the greatest urgency.

b) Our determination to pursue research on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) technologies should not be permitted to forestall U.S./USSR agreement on deep reductions in strategic offensive forces. Restrictions on offensive forces would be a helpful adjunct to any defensive system. Moreover, those BMD technologies with the greatest promise would not be ready for full-scale development until the next century. A commitment to sustain the ABM Treaty, clarified as described above, for a substantial period of time, would not preclude a deliberate and efficient research program into BMD technologies, and could be a very helpful means of securing deep cuts in offensive forces.

c) Finally, in view of the tight constraints on defense spending likely to be maintained over the next five years, it is imperative that ABM research not be permitted to crowd out research on other important defense needs. Moreover, research cannot be driven by political agendas, at least not efficiently. If the nation is neither to waste a great deal of money nor deprive itself of the scientific talent and other resources necessary to solve other pressing problems in defense and civilian technologies, BMD research should be pursued on a far more deliberate schedule than is currently envisioned by the administration.

DISSENT, by Helmut Sonnenfeldt

I believe that certain portions of this paper tend to overestimate the extent to which the desire “to avoid a nuclear holocaust” (p.17) constitutes a basis for mutually beneficial initiatives and agreements between the United States and the USSR. In the past, at any rate, this undoubted desire, on both sides, does not appear to have greatly advanced significant arms control agreements. While it presumably contributed to caution at moments of crisis, it has not produced substantial cooperative arrangements to reduce the incidence and severity of crises. Containment of crises seems to have been largely the result of risk assessments and unilateral decisions on both sides.

Perhaps this will change, but it needs to be demonstrated.

Against this background, I believe the paper may give excessive weight to

*Robert Bowie wishes to associate himself with this section of Barry Blechman’s dissent.

the role arms control, as hitherto achievable, can play in reducing risks of confrontation and conflict. Most of the crises that involved U.S.-Soviet confrontations and risks of direct conflict have occurred in conditions when the strategic forces of the two sides were smaller in number and less sophisticated than they are today or will be in future.

At the same time, the paper, in my view, gives inadequate emphasis to dangers stemming from conflict situations around the world in which the interests of the two superpowers are or may become engaged. Many of these situations are affected by recently—as distinct from historically—asserted Soviet ambitions for influence and presence and, in particular, by the injection of Soviet and Soviet-supplied military forces. As noted, agreed resolutions of such clashes are difficult to achieve. Continued efforts and dialogue toward this end are necessary. But for many years to come, the danger of U.S.-Soviet conflict is likely to stem at least as much from clashes of interest and ambition as it is from shifts, in one direction or other, in the military programs of the two sides. I believe the paper should have given greater weight to this aspect of the U.S.-Soviet relationship and made arms control a less central focus.

DISSENT, by Leonard Sullivan, Jr.

I find the policy paper’s emphasis on the details of strategic force modernization to be excessive and unbalanced. The West’s emphasis on maintaining substantial, well-modernized, and fully sustainable conventional forces—including naval forces—must also be increased.

There is room for argument about which Western nations should provide what share of the West’s conventional force capabilities; whether the distribution of active and reserve forces might be shifted to somewhat lower peacetime costs; and whether we might depend more on the West’s enormous industrial mobilization potential. But in any event, the West must remain collectively willing to deter the use of massive Soviet conventional land, air, and naval forces either for aggression, or, as may be far more likely, for purposes of intimidation.

Unlike the nuclear balance, however, the conventional balance will continue to be achieved only through full consideration of allied contributions—on both sides. Furthermore, the deterrence of Western intimidation depends on factors of confidence well beyond the perceived military balance. Hence the overall correlation of Western strengths is fundamental to U.S.-Soviet relations.

While the chances of Soviet-backed military attacks into Western Europe or South Korea may be relatively—if not vanishingly—slight, the chances of accidental encounters between superpower conventional forces during pursuit of lesser but conflicting objectives in the Third World cannot be overlooked. The need to assure the prompt and rational defusing of such unintentional confrontations is as important at the lower end of the conflict spectrum as it is at the nuclear level.

Finally the West cannot afford to grant a unilateral edge to the Soviet Union in military capabilities to use—or survive—chemical or biological warfare. In fact, some of these weapons are probably potentially at least as devastating to the future of the civilized world as nuclear weapons.

In all of these areas, the ability to achieve an assured “balance” in military capabilities is virtually impossible due to the extraordinary range of uncertainties in any such estimates. Such uncertainties can only be alleviated by reducing the total size of the forces, their state of readiness, and the willingness of their national leaders to lash out with them. These considerations all belong within the domain of arms control.

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Combatting International Terrorism: U.S.-Allied Cooperation and Political Will, Andrew J. Goodpaster, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Brent Scowcroft, and R. James Woolsey, Co-Chairmen; Stanley S. Bedlington, Rapporteur. 72 pp. \$6.00. November 1986.

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**Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group
on Strategic Stability and Arms Control**

Brent Scowcroft *and*
R. James Woolsey, *Co-Chairmen*
Thomas H. Etzold, *Rapporteur*

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*Washington, DC
May 1987*

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FOREWORD

This paper addresses the challenges before us in preserving peace and defending our freedoms for the remainder of this century as, and to the extent that, these depend on the quality of strategic stability in the Soviet-American relationship. It is a companion to the Atlantic Council study on the broad dimensions of Soviet-American relations, chaired by Andrew J. Goodpaster and the late Walter J. Stoessel, Jr. Our work has benefited greatly from insights developed in their Working Group on "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union: A Long-Term Western Perspective 1987-2000."

While the Soviet-American and East-West strategic relationship has consistently demanded attention since 1945, there may be no period that has held the wide range of opportunities—for good or ill—of the years that lie before us. In both its course and outcome, the October 1986 meeting of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik demonstrated how far and how fast the military relationships of the superpowers might be altered—and with them the entire structure of Western security. Still more recent proposals and counter-propositions concerning Intermediate Nuclear Forces have added to the need for Western analysis of the possible security implications emanating from force reductions or other reconfigurations of the military, political, and technical elements of defense and deterrence.

This paper is intended to provide one essential component of such an analysis, namely, an assessment of the chief elements of strategic stability in terms consistent with both the necessities and the opportunities of this century's closing years.


As in all publications of the Atlantic Council, the present paper reflects the narrowing of differences, at times amounting to a consensus, that emerged from extended discussions and correspondence among well-informed Americans. In this particular effort, our work also profited from consultations with European colleagues in visits to the North Atlantic Assembly. Discussions with the Soviet Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada have also been held.

The inclusion of individuals possessing varied expertise and convictions in a Working Group such as this on the one hand reduced the prospect for unanimity while on the other it increased the likelihood that differing views would be appropriately aired and weighed. The conclusions and recommendations here presented reflect the results of such a process, and correspondingly no individual member of this Working Group on "Defending Peace and Freedom: Strategic Stability to the Year 2000" can be assumed to agree with every word of the Policy Paper.


As co-chairmen of the Working Group, we thank its members, and particularly Joseph J. Wolf, who provided indispensable early drafts of the Policy Paper for the Group's consideration. We appreciate as well the efforts and contributions of many other individuals at the Atlantic Council and beyond it, whose support, views, and suggestions improved the present effort. Members of the Working Group participated as individuals, not as representatives of agencies or organizations. The views expressed here are correspondingly their own. (Members of the Working Group are identified at the end of this foreword.)

Like other Atlantic Council projects, the present assessment of long-term strategic stability has depended on financial support from a variety of sources. We acknowledge with sincere thanks the contributions of the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust, the William and Mary Greve Foundation, and the Northrop Corpora-

tion. In addition, the project was supported in part by the U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The ideas, conclusions and recommendations, however, are solely those of the Atlantic Council's Working Group. They do not necessarily correspond to those of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or of any other department or agency of the U. S. Government.



BRENT SCOWCROFT



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between now and the end of the century, our sense of strategic stability will depend greatly on the degree to which we can expect to manage long-term Soviet-American relations without war. This question first and foremost involves the central military relationship—comprehensive, not just nuclear. But it has important political, economic, and psychological dimensions as well.

Our working group has come to view strategic stability as a condition in which the Soviet Union does not perceive that it can benefit by initiating war or by taking major risks of military confrontation; it is also important that U. S. behavior be seen as calm, firm, and stable by the Soviets. The United States must be able to deal from strength and must ensure that the Soviet Union does not succeed in seeking dominance and unilateral advantage. But it must do so without appearing to expect the Soviet Union to deal from a position of inferiority, and while recognizing that certain types of pressure could cause the Soviets to react in ways threatening to peace, freedom, and Western security. This requires a realization that neither side is likely to be able to obtain dominance or a condition of one-sided advantage. It is thus necessary to search out the changes in military forces that could promote strategic stability, either by arms control, force structure changes, or some combination of both. Such efforts must be complemented by nurturing democratic values and unity among democratic states, and by steady efforts to resolve regional conflicts successfully and in ways that keep the prospect of East-West military confrontation remote. Although the United States can take many steps that will have constructive effects on these problems, ultimate success in enhancing strategic stability also requires cooperation with—and from—the Soviet Union.

In our view, the furtherance of strategic stability requires efforts to link three broad sets of issues: (a) deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons for any purpose; (b) extended deterrence of actions against our allies, and (c) the management of regional conflicts and crises in ways that achieve our objectives while minimizing the risks of superpower confrontation. These considerations mean that in attempting to enhance strategic stability to the year 2000, we must: (1) preserve effective deterrence against the use of nuclear weapons; (2) improve Western forces sufficiently to revitalize the concept of extended deterrence and the strategy of flexible response, and (3) seek, both unilaterally and together with the Soviets, more effective ways to dampen regional conflicts and deal with crises when they arise.

Between now and the end of the century, a number of trends and issues will affect the manner in which we must shape policies intended to further strategic stability. Force relationships are changing in ways that challenge both our thinking and our abilities to direct developments constructively. Long-observed distinctions between nuclear and conventional weapons are blurring. There is also the possibility of fundamental change in nuclear offense/defense possibilities. Further, serious interest in deep reductions in nuclear forces has raised anew the critical link between nuclear and conventional forces in defense of the West. Moreover, the apparent momentum of Soviet programs in chemical and biological weapons, the possibility of continued nuclear proliferation, and the near certainty of numerous regional conflicts and crises in coming years, along with leadership changes and economic pressures, further complicate efforts to build a more stable Soviet-American strategic relationship.

We conclude that, for many years to come, strategic stability in a military

sense will depend on a mixture of nuclear and conventional forces; that arms control will remain central to Soviet-American relations; and that because long-term Soviet-American relations will remain inherently conflictual, we must defend our values and institutions through unilateral steps when necessary, though cooperatively when possible. In this context, success in strengthening strategic stability through the end of the century will require a careful admixture of force modernization, arms control measures, and efforts to reduce both the incidence and the risks of regional conflicts and other crises.

Our recommendations (pages 44-46) for enhancing strategic stability through the end of the century therefore center on four elements:

- We must develop and deploy more survivable, reliable retaliatory nuclear forces for the United States, to enhance deterrence and reduce the dangers of a preemptive strike.
- We must improve Western conventional defenses in relation to possible threats, to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons.
- We must construct a more continuing and forward-looking arms control process, to sustain such efforts in the face of short-term difficulties.
- We must devise and employ better crisis management and avoidance methods, to enable the superpowers to lower the military level of competition and confrontation in such circumstances.

As regards nuclear weapons, we must devise and develop a strategic posture that, while effective in deterring conflict, also provides no incentive for an attempt to conduct a disarming first strike against our retaliatory forces. This requires: (a) a balanced reduction in the ratio of warheads to vulnerable launchers; (b) either the countering or the removal of Soviet advantage in prompt, hard-target kill vehicles; (c) phased and verifiable reductions in ballistic missile warheads to a point below that at which a successful disarming first strike could be executed; (d) a vigorous program of permitted research and testing of advanced defenses to examine their utility, guard against technological surprise, encourage sustained progress and balance in reductions, and provide an insurance policy against circumvention of agreements. In the latter regard, we believe it important to make clear that our future defenses, as they prove both feasible and desirable, will be proportional to the offensive threat we face. A lower level of offense would permit a lower level of defense.

In the absence of agreements limiting and balancing conventional forces, Western defenses also require improvement in order to keep the prospect of nuclear war remote and to revitalize the extended deterrence on which the mutual security of the world's democratic states has rested since World War II. In practice, this means that the United States and its alliance partners should seek measured, not sudden and massive, reductions in nuclear weapons. The hope remains that improved political relationships with the Soviet Union may permit a bolder approach at some point. An alliance that depends on nuclear weapons for its security should couple major reductions in them to corresponding and appropriate steps in regard to conventional forces. Western conventional defenses can and should be improved both in traditional ways, such as enlarging stocks of ammunition and spare parts, and in exotic ways exploiting the possibilities of new technologies.

While taking steps to reconfigure nuclear forces and improve conventional defenses, we must also develop a more consistent, continuous, and institutionalized arms control process. There should be a stronger emphasis on *designing* the future Soviet-American military relationship, not only on dismantling what we have at present while repudiating what was done in the past. This re-

quires a clearer focus on urgent short-term problems—chiefly the disparity in nuclear systems capable of attacking hard and/or point targets. Even more, however, it necessitates development of a broader agenda in which efforts to reduce possibilities of military surprise in Europe, as well as those of war by inadvertence or miscalculation, receive added emphasis. Whether or not cast as arms control efforts, this broader agenda must also encompass efforts to reduce, limit, or as appropriate avoid regional conflicts and other sources of crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons will more likely result from than lead toward greater strategic stability. It is therefore increasingly important to diminish the extent to which we rely on nuclear weapons in order to compensate for inferiority in conventional military power, or for inadequacy in crisis management and conflict avoidance abilities. Such efforts can create the conditions in which fewer nuclear weapons genuinely contribute to greater security for Western nations, institutions, and values.

DEFENDING PEACE AND FREEDOM: TOWARD STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE YEAR 2000

I. The Meaning of Strategic Stability

From now to the end of the century, as in the 40 years since the conclusion of World War II, the risks and opportunities in relations with the Soviet Union will continue as the central focus of American strategic concerns. The risks arise from the reality that in important respects the interests, values and goals of the superpowers conflict and will continue to do so. The opportunities spring from the recognition of both sides that they share a vital interest in avoiding war, and from the increasing sense that they may be able to cooperate in improving the prospects for peace and well-being.

The Soviet-American relationship encompasses a broad range of issues, but the strategic stability of that relationship is first and foremost a question of central military balance—comprehensive, and not just in nuclear forces. Yet, even as a primarily military issue, strategic stability has important political, economic, and psychological dimensions. The main focus of concern in past years has been the nuclear weapons both sides possess in such abundance. But it is increasingly apparent to Soviet and American leaders that the hazards may be rather more complex in character, such as regional crises causing alliance disarray or posing escalation risks, or the possibility of unacceptable changes in Soviet and American patterns of influence throughout the world. Theoretically speaking, each side would probably prefer a condition in which it was in a clearly dominant position. Realistically, however, and largely because of the nuclear armament and technical potential on each side, such advantage is not attainable. If there is to be a strategically stable situation over time, then in the interest of peace and freedom the United States must be able to ensure that Soviet efforts to achieve dominance and unilateral advantage do not succeed. While defending peace and freedom, it must recognize that certain types of pressure on the Soviet Union could elicit Soviet reactions highly dangerous to peace, democratic values, and Western security. Hence the need to explore the question of how to manage the Soviet-American military relationship, both direct and indirect, in ways that keep the prospect of war unattractive and remote.

We have come to view strategic stability as a condition in which the USSR does not perceive that it can benefit by initiating war or by taking major risks of military confrontation, and in which U. S. behavior is seen as calm, firm, and stable by the Soviets. This condition is not a static one because it encompasses the entire scope of functional capabilities of each side, including the interaction of force structure asymmetries, as well as opposing perceptions and evaluations. Thus the steps to reduce the risk of war include: a steadfast search for the conditions in the military balance that lead to strategic stability, either by arms control or force structure changes, or some combination of them both; promotion of democratic values and the unity of democratic states, and the transmission of both commitments to a successor generation; and steady efforts to resolve regional conflicts in ways that keep the prospect of East-West military confrontation remote. The United States can take many constructive steps unilaterally in dealing with these concerns so as to preserve strategic stability, but ultimate success also requires some measure of cooperation with—and from—the Soviet Union.

In our view, the furtherance of strategic stability requires efforts to link three broad sets of issues: (a) deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons for any purpose; (b) extended deterrence of coercive actions against our allies, and (c) the management of regional conflicts and crises successfully, but in ways that minimize the risks of superpower confrontation. This is no small task, for each includes extremely difficult and longstanding problems. To join them in a strategic concept will require a sustained and skillful effort. Strategic stability must encompass not only measures that reduce the risk of war but also measures that reduce Soviet incentives to conduct political aggression against the West. A major aim of Soviet policy is to divide the Western alliance and to reduce U. S. influence without resort to war. If we are to have stability there will have to be continuing efforts in the West to discourage such Soviet policies. Such efforts may at times increase the risk of war temporarily, but should reduce it in the longer run.

Yet there are reasons for hopefulness, if not quite optimism. In some important respects, deterrence has worked well. As we approach the end of the 20th century, strategic relationships between the superpowers and between East and West exhibit considerable stability. There is no reason to believe that a great war is imminent; deterrence of nuclear weapons use and of major conflict based on nuclear retaliatory capability seems robust. Moreover, it has gradually become clear that the Soviet-American strategic relationship is relatively stable for a very broad range of force postures. In part, this reflects the high numbers of nuclear weapons on both sides. In part, it flows from the fundamental political interest that both sides share in avoiding nuclear war even while pursuing competitive and conflicting interests around the globe. Yet continued strategic stability is not guaranteed. We have every reason to continue efforts to keep the prospect of war remote, and to reduce risks of accident, inadvertence, and miscalculation inherent in the very existence of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons, quite simply, have established reasons for improving our diplomacy, and not only our strategic forces.

Improving our diplomacy to meet better the conditions of the nuclear age requires a great deal more than the civilities and subtleties often thought of in such a context. Much of the debate over stability confines itself to the objective of ruling out the possibility of "first strikes" by either side. Such suggestions arise from a preoccupation with the problem of attacks on vulnerable strategic forces, to the neglect of broader considerations of strategic stability. They erroneously assume that nuclear weapons will be used only if disarming attacks are possible against the opponent's strategic forces, and draw conclusions on the desired military posture and on possible "action-reaction" cycles from this inadequate view of the problem.

Strategic stability requires a continuing effort to assure both allies and third parties against nuclear attack or intimidation by maintaining effective deterrence. Bilateral mutual nuclear deterrence is not enough to prevent the international system from deteriorating. There remains a need to protect non-nuclear countries from nuclear coercion. Moreover, in a many-nation world, including at least six countries that have exploded nuclear weapons, and some 150 that have not, unconditional deterrence is not a sensible goal. If each country possessing nuclear weapons could unconditionally—that is, under all circumstances—deter any other, this would create an extremely unstable situation. A condition of perfectly stable unconditional mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union would mean, for example, that the United States could not effectively respond to, and therefore could not deter a full-scale Soviet con-

ventional attack on an allied country. Commitments for protection against nuclear coercion or attack, coupled with demonstrated restraint and responsibility in the ownership of nuclear technology and devices, are a necessary element of stability on the international scene.

The preservation and strengthening of extended deterrence is increasingly vital to a condition of strategic stability in Soviet-American relations. One central problem of postwar Western security strategy has been the need to counter Soviet invasion of, or deter Soviet attack against, an ally of the United States dependent on the American nuclear guarantee.¹ Deterrence of surprise attack against strategic nuclear forces is only one element of this problem. Reliable deterrence requires the availability of U. S. responses adequate to deny Soviet attack objectives. Threats to respond with unrestricted and indiscriminate destruction would be suicidal and therefore incredible to both Allied and Soviet leaders. Stability requires that the West be able both to deny Soviet attack objectives and to maintain Soviet incentives to refrain from all-out use of nuclear weapons.

The foregoing observations also point to the exact importance of Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) in Western defense. The ability to respond proportionally *and in kind* has long been considered, in the West more so than in the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact, a plausible way to prevent escalation to a strategic nuclear exchange. In some respects militarily arguable as a proposition, it has become politically paradoxical as well. For in the Western democracies, government leaders and their military subordinates must strive mightily to avoid the onus of escalation even in prospect while resting security on a willingness to use nuclear weapons first if necessary. In addition, the deployment of modest numbers of theater weapons on the territory of European allies has for many people made more credible the American guarantee of Europe's security. INF forces are meant to show and if necessary to prove that the alliance can and will resort to nuclear weapons in its defense.

Sole reliance on conventional forces by the West, even if resource constraints permitted, would fail to deal with Soviet selective use of nuclear weapons against an ally or even against the United States. Total reliance on the nuclear firebreak in peacetime is an invitation to the USSR to breach it for decisive advantage in war. Stability requires therefore that all elements in the West's military posture, including its strategic nuclear forces, support policies of proportionate and effective response to attack while giving a reasonable probability of preserving vital Western interests. This, in turn, implies a critical role for a command and control system that could maintain politically directed control of military operations during a war in which nuclear weapons were used.

NATO willingness to use nuclear weapons first if necessary in response to Soviet military attack remains essential for coupling the United States to Western Europe's security. But when alliance conventional forces are inferior and U. S. nuclear capabilities are not clearly adequate to deter a Soviet first strike, such a policy cannot have the intended credibility and effect either on the Soviet Union or within the publics and governments of the Western alliance. It thus becomes meaningless.

Improved efforts to deal with crises, whatever their origins, and with the regional conflicts that so often give rise to them, form another major component of a stable long-term Soviet-American relationship. After all, nuclear weapons have not deterred all conflict since 1945. Now that the Soviet Union has achieved at least nuclear parity, and as the Soviets continue to improve their conventional capabilities, nuclear weapons may in the future deter an even smaller range of conflict than in the past. Nuclear parity may have the unwell-

come effect of increasing, not diminishing, the risk of war, at least as long as Western conventional weaknesses remain uncorrected. A world in which there is nuclear parity but in which the Soviet Union possesses conventional military superiority is potentially a more hazardous world than we have inhabited since World War II. Should a major East-West war occur, its genesis may very well be in a regional or local war involving fundamental interests of the superpowers.

Despite some 40 years of postwar experience, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States has developed fully adequate ways of dealing even internally with sudden developments seeming to pose exceptionally high risks and opportunities in conjunction with major interests. How to cooperate in crisis, at least where enlarging shared interests might permit, has been explored even less extensively. The militarization of much of the Third World, the emergence of extremist religious sentiment, and the growing capabilities of terrorists give special urgency to efforts in this dimension of the long-term Soviet-American strategic relationship in the closing years of this century.

Our tasks in attempting to enhance strategic stability to the year 2000, then, are three. First, we must preserve effective deterrence of major conflict, and correspondingly reassure our allies and others through a combination of arms control and modernization measures designed to make the role of nuclear weapons safer and more constructive in coming years. Second, we must improve Western conventional forces sufficiently to revitalize the long-term and long-distance security commitments we have undertaken in order to preserve peace and freedom to and beyond the year 2000. Finally, we must seek, both unilaterally and together with the Soviets, more effective procedures and approaches to dampen regional conflicts and deal with crises when they arise.

II. Trends and Issues

Between now and the end of the century, a number of trends and issues will affect the ways in which we must shape policies intended to further strategic stability. Some arise out of present inadequacies in both nuclear and non-nuclear forces in the West. Others reflect the effects of trends in East-West force relationships. Still others spring from political, economic, and negotiating contexts.

CHANGING FORCE RELATIONSHIPS

In one issue raised by new technologies, long-held distinctions between nuclear and conventional weapons, and between short- and long-range weapons, may be blurring. Nuclear and conventional explosives continue to depend on different physical materials, principles, and processes. But highly accurate conventional weapons with special warheads soon will be able to perform some missions formerly reserved to strategic nuclear forces. Similarly, in both nuclear and conventional weapons categories, new technologies are making it possible to extend or deepen the battle area, as in the Follow-on Forces Attack concept now embraced by the Western alliance. Smaller and lighter warheads together with improved propulsion technologies are making short-range nuclear weapons somewhat less short in range, and so less distinct from other classes of weapons. Air-delivered munitions likewise can be employed effectively at greater distances than earlier.

The capacity of conventional munitions to perform formerly strategic missions may have some good effects. By providing militarily credible alternatives to nuclear weapons, this ability could raise the nuclear threshold. It could revalidate the linkages between strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conven-

tional weapons in ways that strengthen deterrence by affirming the ability of the alliance to escalate in accord with its flexible response strategy; and it might permit earlier and deeper nuclear arms reductions than otherwise.

Yet such developments may just as easily lead to unwanted consequences. Use of dual-capable weapon systems could provoke a nuclear response in some circumstances. It could also become safer, and therefore easier, to undertake conventional military operations having significant military consequences. Reductions in nuclear weapons should they come, might be less meaningful if upgraded conventional weapons were to replace them in the order of battle. In terms of immediate military effect, it would make little difference, for example, whether a power grid were disrupted by nuclear or conventional weapons; the distinction would still be important, of course, in terms of the prospects for collateral damage, follow-on attack, and escalation.

As for shorter and longer range weapons, to people living in Germany and France it is immaterial whether the nuclear weapons used against them are delivered by SS-20s or by SS-21s, -12/22s*, or -23s. It is increasingly clear that earlier distinctions between strategic and nonstrategic weapons are less valid, militarily and politically, than they once may have been.

Most troubling in the latter 1980s, however, is the prospect of fundamental change in the offense/defense relationship as concerns nuclear weapons. We have finally reached the point at which we and the Soviets must reconcile the consequences of having taken different paths in developing nuclear weapons, as well as in attempts to mitigate their possible effects through traditional passive defenses and novel active defenses such as multiple facilities and airborne or otherwise mobile command posts. The United States has done much less to protect its forces, cities, command and control links, and leadership from attack than has the Soviet Union, thus creating a fundamental and important asymmetry in target sets. At the same time, the United States has also done far less than have the Soviets to develop and field weapons capable of destroying hardened targets. In effect, for many years the Soviet Union has enjoyed a double advantage in these areas. In the near and middle term, several considerations make it vital that we restore balance between Soviet and Western systems capable of destroying retaliatory forces. As long as nuclear weapons exist—and they are likely to do so for decades to come—a genuine and certain American retaliatory capacity is vital to continued deterrence of major conflict and of the use of nuclear weapons. Assured retaliatory capability is indispensable to reducing the threat of a nuclear preemptive first strike by the Soviets, and is thus a central contribution to deterrence, stability, and predictability under varying conditions of peace, crisis, or regional conventional conflict. We would prefer to negotiate reductions in Soviet counterforce advantages, but if necessary we should compensate for them via an American buildup of offsetting or equivalent capabilities. An effort to combine the two approaches should probably be the ultimate result.

In practice, possibilities for strategic countermeasures, both on initial defense and initial offense, involve somewhat more than the much discussed Strategic Defense Initiative. Improved accuracy, re-entry systems, propulsion technology, and countermeasures can make strategic forces more effective, while increasing ground mobility (or speed of launch, especially of bombers), better concealment, deception, and hardening can render them more survivable. A basic problem is that these developments are occurring at different rates, and in vary-

*The SS-12 missiles now deployed are expected to be replaced by an improved system, designated by NATO as SS-22.

ing degrees, on either side. Mobility for strategic forces and cold-launch techniques are a growing reality, at least on the Soviet side. Fast-burn technology is nearly available. Spinning boosters and more exotic effects such as energy-absorbing coatings, maneuverable re-entry vehicles, and novel trajectories are in effect already invented, if not in all cases yet deployed. New hardening techniques have also re-emphasized to some degree the significance of passive defenses. It is therefore particularly important to distinguish between the SDI and other prospects for defense as a major component of military posture in coming years.

WESTERN CONVENTIONAL MILITARY INADEQUACY

One of the most important force relationships to consider in regard to strengthening strategic stability in coming years is traditional, not new. Since its earliest years, the Western alliance has relied heavily on nuclear deterrence both to assure the strategic coupling of the United States to its European allies and to compensate for consistent failure of the alliance to field conventional forces considered adequate to defend against a Soviet attack.

As is always the case with peacetime military organizations in democratic countries, Western conventional military shortcomings reflect the results of years of compromise among political and economic considerations, not only military ones. It has been politically difficult for most of the Western states to contemplate increasing their forces, in part because the political repercussions could have forced governments from office. There has been a significant anti-military component of public opinion in Western countries over the past four decades, perhaps not surprising in the aftermath of this century's two great wars, which acquired new momentum from the American involvement in Vietnam. Soviet cultivation of this component has been sometimes clever, sometimes clumsy.

Economic considerations have played the major part in perpetuating the inadequacy of Western conventional military forces. Almost from the time of their invention, nuclear weapons have appeared to be more cost-effective than conventional forces. The "more bang for the buck" slogan of the 1950s reflected the real and continuing circumstance that vast amounts of firepower could be purchased and delivered for a small fraction of the cost involved in fielding conventionally-armed infantry, armor, artillery, air, and naval forces. Even today strategic nuclear forces amount to only about 17 percent of the American defense budget, and make up a somewhat smaller proportion of the total alliance military investment each year.

Within the alliance, both officially and privately, there have been so many efforts to catalog conventional military deficiencies that little need be said here. Suffice it to say that many long-standing problems remain just as they have been, with equally long-standing but unexecuted recommendations for improvement. Western military planners still think in terms of how many days they might be able to last before going down in defeat under a Soviet conventional attack. Experts talk of winning engagements, but not wars.

For all their familiarity, Western conventional military limitations have a two-fold importance in the context of strategic stability. In an age in which the Soviet Union has long since acquired nuclear parity with the United States, many allies have found it difficult to sustain the earlier degree of confidence in the American security guarantee, based largely on the threat to employ nuclear weapons to stave off conventional military defeat in Europe. At times the degree of conventional military weakness as compared with possible attacking forces from the East has seemed so great that the possibility of a massive conventional attack succeeding within a few days could not be ruled out. Even assuming that

the United States intended to follow through on its security pledge, some doubt that the alliance would be able to act politically in time to be effective militarily.

Both sets of considerations flowing from Western conventional military weakness have significantly eroded confidence in the effectiveness of continued extended deterrence should the trend toward increasing conventional imbalance go unchecked.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The East's extraordinary and continuing acquisition of additional chemical (and possibly biological) weapons, together with the proliferation of such weapons, poses another issue relevant to strategic stability in coming years. The Soviet Union has a chemical weapons stockpile many times that of the West and persists in adding to it. The United States stopped producing chemical weapons in 1969. With the Soviets, the United States in 1972 foreswore the use, production, storage, and transfer of biological or toxin weapons. Since that time, despite formal treaty pledges, Soviet scientists have conducted the world's largest research and development effort in so-called "novel agents"—new and complex biological and toxin substances suitable for use as weapons. There is some evidence of testing of such agents in combat in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Moreover, the Soviets have trained and equipped thousands of special troops to serve in offensive chemical warfare units and have planned and practiced for large-scale use of chemical weapons against the West.

Additionally, in the last 20 years a number of other states have acquired chemical weapons. Sixteen nations now have them; many others seek and soon will have both weapons and production capacity. Among their number are some of the states least likely to show restraint in peace or war: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Vietnam.

The significance of this development goes beyond the natural repugnance and apprehension occasioned by the thought of chemical and/or biological weapons being employed against our military forces or populations. Even a modest chemical warfare threat requires military forces to operate while wearing bulky protective clothing and using procedures that cut their effectiveness by 50 percent to 60 percent under good conditions. Massive use of chemical weapons, especially in early moments of war against unprepared defenders, could much reduce the value of the alliance's entire investment in improved conventional defenses, and could also reduce its ability to resort to nuclear weapons. New aircraft, improved tanks, and more exotic weapons could not be operated as effectively as intended and needed. Thus the use of chemical weapons against Western forces could make early resort to nuclear weapons even more necessary.

The cheapest and quickest response to this problem of imbalance in chemical weapons would be an effective arms control ban. But the soundest counter at present is restoration of a modest but modern chemical weapons deterrent/retaliatory ability. Over time, but not too much time, this must be coupled with significantly improved alliance preparations for defense against chemical and biological weapons attack. The latter, unfortunately, is extremely expensive but, in view of its significance for protecting the value of improved conventional defenses, worth the cost. As for proliferation of chemical and toxin weapons, both sides can and should do much more to make acquisition of key weapons-oriented chemicals, specialized equipment, and knowledge of advanced formulas and techniques slower, more expensive and more difficult.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The possibility of further nuclear proliferation also has implications for our ability to strengthen strategic stability in coming years. There has been much satisfaction and, at times, self-congratulation over achievements to date in discouraging proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet, in spite of such successes as the 1985 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, at which 127 parties affirmed the regime and its goals, we cannot confidently expect the number of nuclear weapon states to remain constant indefinitely. Many experts consider it not only possible but likely that by the end of the century there will be as many as 10 nuclear weapon states. In view of the intensity of longstanding regional tensions in the Middle East, South America, southern Africa, and South Asia, every instance of nuclear proliferation could become an occasion of some strategic significance.

Perhaps the most immediate apprehensions reflect concern over the possibility that terrorists might acquire one or more nuclear devices—a risk that might well increase in proportion to the number of states having them, since few states can protect them as well as Soviets and Americans do. The technological sophistication needed to build a nuclear weapon makes that route highly unlikely for terrorist groups. But theft of a weapon remains a risk. Moreover, theft of certain nuclear materials, and their possible dispersion using conventional explosives, could obviate the need for terrorists to have a nuclear device in order to mount a credible nuclear threat. Terrorist use of chemical or biological weapons is also a highly troubling possibility.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND CRISES

Within the framework of rough nuclear parity and a relatively stable situation in Europe, regional conflicts and crises pose some of the greatest barriers to enhancing strategic stability in the latter 20th century. One reason is that in such conflicts the Soviet Union and the United States often invest militarily, not only politically. It is something of an irony that "struggle between opposed social systems" should come nearest to having a military character in some of the world's more remote regions, though this irony can readily be understood in terms of the more immediate risks that direct conflict in central areas would entail. Because the local stakes in themselves can be high for one or both superpowers—access to oil, or strategic minerals, or hemispheric security—such conflicts have a degree of escalation potential that cannot be ignored. Further, many such conflicts have substantial effects outside the immediate zones of armed engagement; regional political and power relationships as well as economies often hang in the balance, and with them the structure of bases and influence through which great powers attempt to protect their far-flung interests. It is little wonder that President Ronald Reagan, in speaking to the United Nations in September 1985, warned that without a settlement of regional conflicts, a more stable superpower relationship was unlikely. He proceeded to invite the Soviets to engage in regular and purposeful talks on a range of regional conflicts and crises, which the Soviets agreed to do. To date, there have been two sets of annual discussions on critical areas. The United States has raised questions concerning Soviet actions and involvement in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Ethiopia. The Soviets have countered with complaints about American policy and activities in Central America, Angola, and the Middle East.

In addition, there has developed a certain tension between arms control issues and regional conflicts as the primary problem to be resolved in high-level Soviet-

American meetings. The Soviets have accused the United States of trying to "replace discussion of the main issue of disarmament with that of regional conflicts." The United States has responded that the Soviets seem determined to have single-issue summits, mainly because they want to make propaganda rather than progress in superpower relations.

Early meetings and other efforts addressing Soviet and American views on easing regional conflicts confirm how profound the differences are between the two sides. The meetings of regional specialists, mentioned above, have been described unenthusiastically—the first year's as "sterile," and the meetings shortly before the Iceland sessions of Reagan and Gorbachev as "more professional" and "nonpolemical". Only in regard to the Persian Gulf war does there seem to be any convergence of interest; there both the United States and the Soviet Union would probably prefer to see Iran and Iraq in some rough power balance, rather than one or the other dominant. American officials believe for the most part that the Soviets intend to consolidate the power of the factions they favor in regional conflicts under the guise of peace talks and "national reconciliation" efforts. Joint Soviet-American efforts in regard to the Iran-Iraq war have so far not gone beyond support of resolutions in the United Nations Security Council urging Iran and Iraq to negotiate an end to their conflict.

CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP

Between now and the end of the century, a new generation of leaders will consolidate power in the Soviet Union, assume power in Western Europe, and seek office in the United States. As James Reston has observed, "At the end of his first year in office, Mr. Gorbachev is the only head of a major government in the world today—with the possible exception of Prime Minister Nakasone in Japan—who is young enough, at 55, and secure enough in office to influence world affairs after this decade. All the rest, in the United States, China, Britain, France, West Germany, and Italy are facing retirement." These changes at the top hold uncertain but potentially great significance for our efforts to improve strategic stability.

As generations change, new European and American leaders may place less value on the postwar transatlantic connection. Openings to the East and nationally advantageous attitudes towards Third World issues may seem to be valid alternatives to a concerted alliance approach. In one evidence of such tendencies, Johannes Gross, a German publisher, recently noted that he and other Europeans "are unable to escape the tormenting thought that NATO strategy does not take sufficiently into account our wish to survive." As early as 1982, opinion polls showed that a plurality of Germans under age 30 preferred a neutral option, and in 1983 major German parties campaigned on the slogan "In the German interest."

Correspondingly, the next generation of American leaders may lack a special affinity for, and commitment to, Europe. Now and for some years, Americans have perceived inequity in alliance burden sharing and seen important interests in regions outside the NATO area.

Recent statements by the leadership of the British Labour Party constitute an especially pointed example of how serious some potential election turnovers could prove for American and Western efforts to improve strategic stability while remaining at peace, enjoying accustomed freedoms, and feeling secure. The party's leader, Neil Kinnock, and other senior members of the Labour party, have repeatedly pledged to: rid Britain of nuclear weapons—American as well as Britain's own; work within the alliance for a promise of no-first-use of nuclear

weapons, which would reverse NATO's long-standing determination to escalate rather than accept defeat in conventional warfare; and support an overall nuclear weapons freeze. While there is a long tradition in the Western alliance of different approaches to official NATO doctrine and strategy, including the refusal of the Scandinavian members of NATO to allow foreign or nuclear forces to be based in their countries except in war, it would be fundamentally a different matter if one of the four most powerful and central states to the alliance departs radically from a policy and posture long considered to be the very heart of effective deterrence. While the most recent Labour Party statements suggest that there has been some reconsideration of earlier radical positions, the issue seems certain to remain volatile and troubling.

Between now and the end of the century, there is a greater potential for alliance disunity than at any time since its founding. In many respects, the stakes have risen; all parties now have more to lose than in earlier decades. They are richer, more comfortable, and have developed strong ties to Eastern Europe. Recovered economies, while important, comprise only a part of what is at risk. Our confidence in deterrence, and in the validity of the combined nuclear and conventional defenses of the alliance; our shared future in terms of new defenses and coming technologies; and our ability to accept less than ideal outcomes in some parts of the world in order to prevent conflict in or over Europe—all these come into question when Western solidarity diminishes.

In Europe, new leaders will come to office over the next several years, in the course of regular and periodic elections. In the Soviet Union, new leadership is already in place, and beginning to make significant impressions both abroad and at home. Mikhail Gorbachev has already proven himself effective at consolidating power at home and a formidable competitor in public diplomacy abroad—especially as concerns arms control and related issues. Some in the West have come to believe that there is a Soviet desire for substantive and equitable arms reductions, and the easing of political tensions that might accompany such developments. Although there are also many good reasons to consider the possibility that the new Soviet leader and his team seek strategic and political advantage, not stability, it is necessary politically to keep open the possibility that new Soviet leaders might seek an improvement in Soviet-American relations, including their military aspects. It would be a cruel irony, however, if through disunity or impetuous enthusiasm the West proved incapable of concerting effective policies for exploring this question while opening opportunities on which Soviet negotiators and spokesmen could capitalize.

ECONOMIC PRESSURES

To the extent that improved conventional defenses would enhance strategic stability in coming years, present economic constraints could have important long-term effects. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation adopted late in 1985 gave special prominence to the economic implications of large deficits and low growth, but in some important respects obscured the underlying phenomenon. Some time between 1983 and 1985, there has occurred a sea change in the long-term economic expectations of Western leaders, who now seem quite pessimistic. Interestingly, this has coincided with modest improvement in economic performance in the United States. More broadly in the industrial democracies, however, unemployment has remained highly resistant to amelioration. Stagnation has been more common than renewed growth. Trade and monetary policies have proven politically difficult, almost impossible, to align. Declining oil prices, long desired, have cushioned an overdue adjustment in the value of the dollar.

But it is far from clear that the lower level of oil prices will confer any lasting benefits on the West, especially if conservation efforts are undermined. Indeed, it is not clear how low or high oil prices will be in coming years.

Since World War II, there has been a correlation between the economic assumptions of U. S. policy makers and their confidence in approaching both immediate and extended security obligations. When we have believed that resources were expandable, we have exerted confident leadership abroad; when expecting resources to contract, we have cut commitments and hesitated even in the face of provocation or injury. In such experience, we have learned that our objectives, our security, our alliance cohesion, and general international conditions depend in an extraordinary measure on the strength and performance of the American economy.

The implications of fiscal austerity for strategic stability are several and far-reaching. Programs to modernize strategic forces are under way in the United States, Great Britain and France; in each country, completion of current programs is many years away, in some cases more than a decade. The largest costs for strategic modernization remain ahead. Similarly, the alliance, while committed to improved conventional defenses, emerging technologies, and such concepts as Follow-on Forces Attack, has scarcely begun to pay the price. Defenses against strategic forces, tactical ballistic missiles, and against the Soviets' own advanced conventional weapons remain in early research stages, far from the point at which their actual cost can even be reliably estimated, much less paid. There is a real possibility that, before many years have passed, Western nations will find themselves with militarily ineffective amounts of some expensive new weapons, and unable to buy others for which they have spent billions in research and development.

It is important to note that the Soviet Union, and not only much of the West, faces serious economic difficulties in coming years. In the West it is usually a matter of fiscal and budget management. In the East, constraints are felt more directly in the allocation of people, factory space, and materials. The Soviet growth rate has slowed considerably, and is now almost flat. Agricultural production has failed by far to keep up with demand, although average Soviet citizens live better now than in years past, at least in many material ways. Soviet manufactured goods are relatively poor in quality. The Soviet Union's scientific and technology base, while large and in certain key areas quite good, is losing ground in important areas of advanced technology, such as computing, new materials, and more. After 70 years of Socialist development, the Soviet economy has remained too weak to afford a convertible currency or to permit the government to play a major role in international financial institutions. In his January 15, 1986 address to the party Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev gave first priority to improving the domestic economy, and within that goal to a crash program aimed at broadening and strengthening the nation's advanced technology base. Soviet leaders and officials have said repeatedly that they seek arms control not only for reasons of theory and politics, but for basic economic reasons: they need resources for economic development. A number of Western authorities agree that economic development has become the Soviet Union's highest priority and that some Soviet leaders may truly seek a transfer of resources from military to non-military applications. Skeptics point out that a stronger technology base can as easily be used to augment Soviet military power as to revitalize the economy and argue that a Soviet Union with a still more vigorous economy would likely be a more dangerous competitor in military as well as other spheres.

Even so, it now appears that the West can no longer afford to deter war by doing business as usual. The gap between requirements and resources is likely to widen over coming years. Replacing weapons type for type while concurrently modernizing strategic and conventional forces for sea, air and ground warfare, will not be possible for long. Present American defense procurement plans, for example, call not only for MX missiles, B-1B bombers, and more Trident submarines, but for Stealth bombers (\$60 billion); new attack submarines (\$100 billion); new army helicopters (\$30 billion); and strategic defenses (\$30 billion for the research phase alone). With or without Gramm-Rudman-Hollings provisions, long-term economic expectations demand great caution in starting large new programs. To avoid simply forfeiting strategic parity, and with it stability, Western nations will have to improve their efficiency in defense programs—admittedly difficult to do, but essential. The West cannot afford to compete with itself in defense any more than to negotiate with itself in arms control. Notably, when initially declining to take part in NATO acquisition of AWACS aircraft, for example, one French official remarked that "France sells aircraft; it does not buy aircraft." In the interest of the collective defense, every member of the alliance—including the United States—will have to adopt a new perspective on such matters, something on which all can improve.

In some respects, the considerations cited here—trends in force relationships, political change in East and West, and the issues of economic limits, nuclear proliferation, and chemical and biological weapons—are the familiar stuff of Western security concerns over the past forty years. But as these factors converge in the latter 1980s and early 1990s, there is reason to be concerned about the Western ability to maintain competition while seeking more cooperation with the Soviet Union over the long term. Many in the West have come to doubt the need for and real effectiveness of nuclear weapons in deterrence and to dread their possible effectiveness in use. This is the classic dilemma of Western security: the fear of unaffordable risks or costs on one hand, and of unacceptable results on the other. Yet any perception that deterrence is weakening in Europe correspondingly reduces the solidarity of the alliance and its ability to plan and act in concert. Hence the necessity, increasingly urgent, to devise a group of policies which the United States and the Western community can support, and on which East and West can negotiate.

III. Findings and Recommendations

The following policy recommendations intended to enhance strategic stability in long-term Soviet-American relations rest on several related findings.

First, for many years to come strategic stability in a military sense will depend on a mixture of nuclear and conventional forces. The often-expressed hope that nuclear weapons could be eliminated by the year 2000 is an illusion; it may even be an imprudent approach. The year 1996, as set forth in Reykjavik, is even more questionable as a target date for eradication of nuclear weapons.

Second, arms control will remain a central element in Soviet-American political relations, as well as in relations among the Western allies. It is therefore increasingly important to foster more continuity in the process and to develop an agenda sufficiently broad and forward-looking to be constructive. The right kind of arms control can enhance stability.

Third, the long-term Soviet-American relationship will nevertheless remain inherently competitive in many respects. There is much on which we and the

Soviets will be unable to agree, and some things over which we may contend. Therefore, it will remain highly important to devise Western policies and take Western steps deemed necessary to safeguard Western security and interests. It will be equally important to make clear our willingness and firm intention to do all that is necessary in our defense.

To strengthen strategic stability through the end of the century will require a careful admixture of force modernization and arms control measures. While seeking agreements to limit and balance the forces of the two sides, we must modernize our forces in spite of hopes that this might be unnecessary or fears that it might prove unwise. In fact, weapons become unreliable and ultimately unserviceable over time, and simply must be replaced. But there are better reasons for fielding new forces. The most important requirement arises from the dynamism of Soviet military programs, both nuclear and conventional. This compels the West to improve its forces as well, in order to preserve deterrence and stability while defending peace and freedom.

In modernizing our forces, it should be possible to reconfigure them in ways more reassuring, and perhaps more negotiable, than before. Further, new forces offer possibilities for exploring more cost-effective uses of modern conventional weapons, and for adjusting the relative weight of conventional and nuclear forces in the overall defense of the West.

Our findings and recommendations for strengthening deterrence through a calculated blend of nuclear and conventional force improvements and arms control efforts reflect concern for several themes, principles, and criteria. We believe, first, that our actions should serve *our* needs and purposes, not simply react to *Soviet* decisions and behavior. Consequently, we explicitly reject mirror-imaging of Soviet or Eastern forces in shaping Western nuclear and conventional forces. In addition, we believe strategic stability is ill-served by routinely assuming the worst case when assessing the other side's programs and intentions; we must remain clear-eyed about the Soviets, but being so does not mean that we should neglect their weaknesses, whatever their intentions may be. They have no need to fear aggression from us, whatever their psychological or political need to see themselves as surrounded and embattled. On a related point, we consider it fundamentally important to convince the Soviets that they will not succeed in putting us in a condition of military inferiority. Given their willingness to demand sacrifices from their people, any ambition in the West to force them into such a position is unlikely to succeed. Rough military parity thus seems to be here to stay.

Further, the steps we take in modernization and arms control should be designed to build confidence and reduce uncertainty in regard to programs, plans, and intentions, and so to dampen the intensity of action-reaction cycles. Moreover, we believe that our forces, policies, and actions should be shaped in ways that extend the decision time available to leaders and governments in moments of crisis or tension. We recognize that many of the appropriate steps to be taken in both modernization and arms control areas have long been identified and discussed—without, however, being acted upon. Our suggestions, therefore, contain much that is familiar, along with some that is new, in the hope of encouraging action on ideas whose time has come.*

*Albert Carnesale notes that the task before the United States is not that of achieving strategic stability; we already have it. Given the current strategic postures of the United States and the Soviet Union, it is virtually inconceivable that either side could successfully conduct a disarming first strike. Nor does there seem to be much danger of the situation changing in the foreseeable future. Our nation's task is the more modest one of maintaining the current state of strategic stability. While each and every one of the recommendations in this paper could contribute to that goal, none is essential.

NUCLEAR FORCES

The relationship between nuclear forces and strategic stability from now to the year 2000 may be less clear, technically, than at any other time in the nuclear age. One thing is completely unambiguous: for many years to come, nuclear weapons are likely to play an important role in deterrence and defense for both East and West. As long as this is so, nuclear forces must be configured in ways that give the greatest possible opportunity for national leaders to act with restraint in times of tension. This purpose is best served by assuring that strategic nuclear forces are secure. Moreover, from decreased vulnerability of such forces comes the confidence that deterrence can be maintained with fewer, not more, nuclear weapons.

We conclude that stability would be enhanced by retaining ICBMs in Western strategic forces through the end of the century, but only if they can be made more survivable. For more than a decade, American officials and others have debated what to do about land-based missiles in an era of rapidly increasing missile accuracy. Despite the technical trends, however, there are good reasons to keep U. S. ICBMs in service, and improve them, so long as the Soviets retain their heavy MIRVed systems. We would prefer to see both sides verifiably eliminate prompt, hard-target kill capable ICBMs. Until then, without more effective land-based ICBMs, the West will for many years be unable to offset in kind the prompt, hard-target kill capacities of Soviet strategic rocket forces, although at some point the D5 SLBM may help with parts of this problem. This Soviet capability constitutes one of the most dangerous elements in current strategic relationships, because it encourages fears of preemptive attack and threatens our ability to do what is prudent in crisis and necessary in war. The MX missile, now being deployed in small numbers and based in silos, puts Soviet targets at risk that cannot be put at risk as well by other systems, at least for a number of years.

U. S. ICBMs in general serve another important purpose. The diversity of our strategic forces in large measure determines our resistance to attack. The ability of some portion of the strategic forces to survive a first strike—and still to retaliate—remains the bedrock of deterrence. We believe this role—a hedge against the failure of the other components of the triad—will be a central contribution ICBMs can make in coming years if they can be made more survivable. This role could conceivably be performed with smaller numbers of ICBMs than are now deployed, if they were less vulnerable than the present ICBM force.

Stability would be strengthened, in our view, if future land-based systems were made more survivable with one or more of a variety of means, to strengthen our confidence in the deterrent effects of an invulnerable force. For more than 20 years, the nation has considered questions of whether and how to modernize ICBMs; this concern for vulnerability has been a central issue, in part because there is no longer any cheap way to make forces safe from attack. We have had to rethink the role and nature of our ICBM force in the light of our objectives as well as the new technological opportunities and threats, including those of: ballistic missile defense; increasing effectiveness of ballistic missiles, including those launched from submarines against identified, hardened targets; and increasing opportunities for quick and adequate communications with submarines carrying ballistic missiles.

In 1983, the President and the Congress agreed on a three-element solution to this problem. The program was to include (1) the deployment of 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silos; (2) deployment of a number of small, single-warhead missiles such as the Midgetman, and (3) an arms control agreement

that, among other things, would use warheads of approximately equivalent yields as the standard of measurement, rather than launchers, thus limiting the threat so as to improve force survivability and to keep costs at a reasonable level. Both within the administration and the Congress, this package has encountered serious obstacles. In mid-1985, for example, some in the Administration expressed concern about mobile missiles' cost and difficulty of verification. The Administration then proposed to the Soviets a total ban on mobile ICBMs; some officials expressed preference for a MIRVed mobile missile. The Congress refused to fund more than 50 MX missiles and first seemed to deny, then restored, the funding needed to keep the development program for the small mobile missile on schedule.

The logic of this reluctance to commit to small mobile ICBMs, however, runs contrary to our conviction that it is essential to render strategic forces more survivable. We should welcome, not fear, a Soviet move away from the SS-18, a heavy missile deployed in fixed silos, even if it is accompanied by the deployment of smaller, initially less accurate, mobile ICBMs—especially the SS-25 now being deployed. While mobile missiles do add to the problems of verification, in a more stable environment with better ICBM survivability, and with small, mobile ICBMs on both sides, the sensitivity of the U. S. ICBM force to variations in the number of Soviet ICBM warheads would be markedly less than is now the case. In view of congressional refusal to fund the full 100 MX missiles, and the inability, at Reykjavik, of Soviet and American leaders to direct the drafting of an arms agreement that was, among other things, based on counting warheads of roughly equivalent size rather than, or together with, launchers, we consider it particularly important to proceed now with the development and deployment of a small, mobile ICBM.

While overdue, the Administration's December 1986 decision to proceed with full-scale engineering development of a small mobile ICBM was a welcome and highly significant strategic step. A decisive move toward mobility, and hence survivability, for the U. S. ICBM force has long been essential, for technical as well as political reasons. Technically, it permits the land-based portion of the triad really to be a hedge against unfavorable trends—should these materialize—in regard to sea-based or air-breathing components of the force. Politically, by demonstrating to the Soviets our ability to make our forces more secure without their help, we have increased their incentives to bargain seriously about reductions.

A larger, heavier, and therefore less mobile missile, while perhaps more cost-effective in delivering warheads, could deprive us of needed flexibility, which at minimum includes the ability to use the national road network and to transport weapons by air to areas of the country where forests and other features could lend cover in times of need. Higher costs per deployed warhead can prove less expensive per survivable warhead if we proceed correctly.

We also recommend, over time, a reduction in the warhead-to-launcher ratio in Soviet and American strategic forces in order to make individual targets less attractive. If there were fewer warheads on each launcher, it would be less useful to think about first-strike attacks. This is because fewer re-entry vehicles per aim point would make targets less valuable, and dispersal of warheads among more numerous aim points would make it both more difficult and more expensive to destroy them.

We believe that efforts to make nuclear forces more secure and survivable should include intensified efforts to improve command and control of nuclear forces, in part for the additional purpose of improving our ability to make timely

assessments and to take discriminate actions in crisis or under attack. Discussions on such steps on either side should be conducted for the purpose of establishing a common and reassuring perspective on the dual responsibility to assure the availability of retaliatory forces while preventing their unauthorized or accidental use.

The Soviet Union and the United States could and should enlarge their cooperative commitment to responsible management of nuclear weapons and nuclear power. More could be done to prevent unauthorized access to facilities, materials, knowledge, and weapons. The two sides could also do more to prevent unauthorized use of weapons through wider employment of sophisticated arming links, improved tactical as well as strategic command and control, and advanced fusing techniques. By working on such things cooperatively as well as individually, both sides could enhance confidence in the earnestness and effectiveness of the other in such important matters. Finally, the Soviet-American collaboration on nuclear nonproliferation must be continued, and as possible, intensified.

We conclude that strategic stability will more likely be strengthened by *measured*, rather than precipitate, reductions in the strategic nuclear forces. The value that land-based strategic forces still provide, the time it will take to replace those now in service and to investigate possibilities for enhancing both force survival and possible damage limitation through defenses, and potential changes in the size and characteristics of British, French and Chinese nuclear forces all underscore a need for caution in how nuclear weapons are reduced—and how fast.

Moreover, and perhaps disappointingly, even a 50 percent cut in strategic forces would neither assure the survivability of land-based missiles nor ensure American and allied populations against virtual extermination. Such cuts, if taken too quickly or in the wrong ways, could not only fail to have positive effects but could have negative consequences. By freeing resources, they could increase the possibility that sea-based forces would become less secure; and they could encourage a transfer of resources and reliance from long-range to shorter range nuclear systems without fundamentally reducing important Western vulnerabilities.

Concern for stability may at some point dictate the mutual retirement of more destabilizing forces, such as heavy ICBMs. While these and other reductions in the strategic forces of both sides could be of considerable size and importance as early steps in an arms control program, these reductions are unlikely to be as deep or as rapid as some have suggested and others have hoped. Freedom from the fear of nuclear war is inherently desirable, but only on terms that minimize the chances of war between East and West even in the absence of nuclear weapons. For some years to come, and without reduced alliance vulnerability to conventional attack, it will simply be impossible to have full confidence in the deterrent effectiveness of drastically smaller strategic nuclear forces.

ADVANCED DEFENSES

Since the appearance on the national agenda in March 1983 of strategic defenses, both their importance and the level of contention about them have steadily increased. The prospect of moving from deterrence based primarily on offensive systems to primary reliance on defensive technologies—or on some combination of the two—raises questions of cost, feasibility, politics, and ultimate effects on strategic stability. At present, it seems likely that many years will be required to resolve such questions in a measure sufficient to develop

a national consensus on strategy and forces, to say nothing of a security perspective that the allies and the Soviets might come to share.

Critics of strategic defenses denounce their pursuit for any purpose other than to bargain with the Soviets, preferably at an early opportunity. Some SDI opponents believe that strategic defenses cannot be made feasible, because the Soviets will be able to expand and improve offensive forces faster than defensive weapons can be effectively developed and deployed. Other critics contend that even if strategic defenses became available they would cost more to deploy than to counter; prove unaffordable amid continued budgetary constraints; and draw funds away from more needed and more achievable military programs for purposes such as improved conventional defenses in NATO.

SDI opponents further suggest that—as far as U. S. actions are concerned—pursuit of strategic defenses is becoming the primary threat to continued effectiveness of existing arms control agreements, especially the ABM Treaty, now that SALT II has been officially (though marginally) breached. From their perspective, and to the extent that earlier agreements provide a basis for new arrangements in arms control, strategic defenses also appear to pose the primary obstacle to negotiation of lower and potentially more stable force relationships. Critics of strategic defenses also express concern over potential effects on third countries. Some fear that SDI could decouple American from European security by providing preferential defense of only the U. S. portion of the NATO area, or that it could render ineffective the independent nuclear deterrent of the Western allies by leading to more extensive Soviet defenses. Other SDI opponents suggest the possibility that strategic defenses could cause a shift in emphasis from strategic to tactical nuclear weapons and that in turn this could encourage nuclear proliferation.

The most serious charge leveled at strategic defense efforts, however, is that their development and deployment could weaken deterrence. In this view, as American strategic forces were supplemented by strategic defenses, Soviet leaders would have to fear an American strategic strike when American defenses could render insufficiently effective any possible Soviet retaliation. This logic would, so it is argued, force Soviet leaders to improve their capacity for, and perhaps to execute, a preemptive first strike.

In sum, those who oppose pursuit and deployment of strategic defenses conclude that the SDI forms the major barrier to much improved Soviet-American relations; undercuts American leadership in the alliance and among others interested in arms control progress; weakens domestic consensus on the broad outlines of national security policy; and undermines deterrence.

Proponents of strategic defenses argue that these can prove feasible, affordable, and sensible—both politically and strategically. Advocates of such defenses argue that improvements in computing, sensors, propellants, and materials technology permit deployment of such defenses in the 1990s. Late in 1986, a number of officials, scientists, and military officers urged this view on President Reagan, and asked him to decide for the early 1990s deployment of partial defenses using kinetic weapons based in space. Experimental work on more exotic weapon and system technologies, according to SDI's supporters, is also producing early promising results. SDI proponents contend that costs for strategic defenses will be of an order of magnitude similar to that of any major new weapon system. While expensive, therefore, strategic defenses would be affordable—perhaps \$100 billion for the early 1990s' partial defense system, or approximately the cost of the attack submarine program recently approved. Moreover, cost effectiveness at the margin has been made an explicit criterion for any deploy-

ment of advanced defenses. Hence SDI advocates dismiss the view that cheap Soviet offenses will necessarily overwhelm expensive American defenses.

Advocates of strategic defenses maintain further that such systems, even when only partially effective and deployed mostly to defend military targets, would materially strengthen deterrence. The uncertainties introduced by partial defenses, they contend, would reduce the confidence of Soviet planners in their ability to execute a successful preemptive strike. In combination with other steps to improve the survivability of a credible American strategic force, therefore, they believe that defenses could revitalize deterrence based not on a despairing concept of mutually assured destruction but on confidence that essential forces and functions could assuredly survive even determined attack. In turn, they contend that stronger deterrence based on such a concept would strengthen, not weaken, both the perception and the reality of transatlantic security by offsetting Soviet advantages in INF. With renewed confidence in its secure retaliatory capabilities, the West would, in this view, repose greater confidence in American security guarantees. Further, SDI advocates suggest, European nuclear forces could retain an important deterrent role in their own right, the more so with early, extensive European participation in strategic defense programs.

We recommend continued and vigorous research and testing in advanced technologies that might be used for strategic defenses, but at a pace consistent with our recognition that the ultimate promise and effect of these technologies has not yet been sufficiently demonstrated to justify an early decision to shift the basis of deterrence from offensive to defensive systems. The chief goal of such work, as with strategic force modernization programs, should be to ensure that the survival of our retaliatory forces depends on our preparations rather than on Soviet forbearance. In this perspective, some types of defensive systems may become a partial alternative to a massive buildup of offensive weapons in order to restore and reinforce our posture of deterrence.*

Such work should be linked to efforts to develop effective non-nuclear defenses against shorter-range missiles, such as SS-21s, SS-12/22s, and SS-23s, in ways that confirm to our allies our commitment to defend the entire alliance area, and not to accord preferential defenses to North America.

One reason for following this course is simply that as a practical matter it will prove increasingly difficult technically to distinguish between so-called strategic defenses and those intended to protect against forms of attack other than by ICBM or SLBM, especially in terminal defense systems. The improving effectiveness of non-nuclear weapons in itself requires serious attention to problems of defending forces and installations. Requirements for better defenses are generic, not particular to the problem of preventing damage from nuclear weapons delivered exclusively on a ballistic trajectory—much less those delivered exclusively on long-range ballistic trajectories by MIRVed systems launched from specific areas. The importance of passive and active defenses against nuclear as well as non-nuclear attack will surely grow whether or not in terms of a Strategic Defense Initiative.

Moreover, it would be imprudent not to investigate the technical potential of advanced defenses, whether or not space-based, because for nearly twenty years the Soviets have invested heavily in defense programs which many experts consider analogous to more recent U. S. efforts. At a minimum, we must insure ourselves against technological surprise in this important area, while work-

*Richard Gardner does not agree that the development of space-based strategic defenses could increase strategic stability.

ing to reduce present imbalances caused in part by the greater degree of protection the Soviets have developed for critical targets.

In this regard, it is important to note that the ABM Treaty has not fully achieved all of its stated objectives, in part for reasons related to the issue of compliance, and because new technology introduces ambiguities in applying treaty provisions. The Soviets' nuclear offensive buildup, their vast programs of air and civil defense, and their active programs of ballistic missile development and modernization make clear that the ABM Treaty and SALT II have not established a condition of stability, however much they may have been intended to do so. While negotiators explore the possibilities of fixing or replacing the ABM Treaty in terms more consistent with technical, political, and strategic realities, work on advanced defenses should proceed at least for a time within the traditional, and currently observed, interpretation of that Treaty, and with continued commitment to consult with the Soviets in advance of phasing in those new defenses for which such an obligation exists. Rather than committing itself to observe the ABM Treaty restrictively for a fixed interval such as 10 years, the United States should condition its continued restraint on steady Soviet reductions in the level of offensive threat and serious Soviet participation in efforts to review and, as necessary, revise the ABM Treaty in accord with new technological realities affecting both the possible and the desirable balance between offensive and defensive systems. Termination of the ABM Treaty at this point could favor the Soviet Union more than the United States, as the former is prepared to deploy nationwide defenses based on traditional technologies while effective space-based defenses may lie some years into the future.*

Moreover, any effective program aimed at introducing defenses should be based on a recognition of the useful roles that can be played by defenses of various degrees of effectiveness and not focused exclusively on the remote and probably unrealistic objective of essentially leak-proof defenses. More moderate and feasible levels of defense, to the extent they prove effective, may offer the potential of reducing the vulnerability of strategic forces, deterring selective attacks against other critical military targets, reducing collateral damage from nuclear attacks if they occur and protecting against small unauthorized attacks or attacks by lesser nuclear powers. This potential requires that we press forward with an active R&D program to explore a possible evolutionary deployment of advanced defenses as technological progress makes useful levels of effectiveness feasible.**

*Richard Gardner believes that we should adhere to the traditional interpretation of the treaty and that we should try to negotiate with the Soviet Union an agreed definition of permitted and non-permitted testing and development of exotic systems, as part of a START agreement that reduces offensive forces in a manner that enhances stable deterrence. Robert Bowie further disagrees with the paper's reservations about agreeing to comply with the ABM Treaty for 10 years as part of a package involving major cuts in offensive weapons, including Soviet heavy ICBMs. He considers such reservations misguided, arguing that the Soviets will hardly agree to such cuts if the SDI issue remains open. Further, he notes, most experts agree that at least 10 years of research (reasonably defined) will be needed to explore the technologies before an informed judgment about SDI potential, or any development and deployment, could be possible.

**Robert Bowie disagrees with an evolutionary approach to SDI deployment, noting that Secretary of State Shultz has said we should not deploy initial strategic defenses until we know what the ultimate defense system will consist of. If the purpose of SDI is to protect ICBM silos and similar military targets, the question should be whether this is better than alternative means to less vulnerability, such as mobility, sea-basing, or arms control.

INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES

In the latter 1980s, the political and military questions surrounding INF have acquired special prominence. The forces themselves and the Soviet-American negotiations on their elimination or reconfiguration have acquired a political significance both greater than, and in some respects inconsistent with, their military value. Next steps in regard to such forces have consequently become an issue between the United States and its allies; among and between conservatives and liberals in Western publics; and between East and West in the context of arms control negotiations.

Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in the middle 1970s in effect created a new class of weapons, in which the Soviets rapidly developed a quantitative and—unusual in Western experience—qualitative advantage. Efforts in the Western alliance to provide the doctrinally appropriate and politically necessary deterrent resulted in a decision to base American-built intermediate range nuclear forces in Western Europe, the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles. This decision and its subsequent fulfillment was intended to guarantee the “coupling” of the United States to the defense of Europe in the face of a changing, more complex nuclear threat and in the absence of effective remedies to long-standing Western inferiority in conventional forces in Central Europe.

In this context, Soviet-American negotiations over the reduction, dismantling, or relocation of INF—or some combination of all those possible steps—have broad political, not only narrow technical or military, implications and potential consequences. It is therefore somewhat ironic that in 1982, again in 1986 at Reykjavik, and once more in the early months of 1987, Soviet and American negotiators have come closer to agreement on regulating INF than on any other major arms control question.

Politically, INF continue to represent America's enduring commitment to defend Western Europe even at considerable risk to the United States itself. The American security pledge to Asian as well as European states, however, makes it especially important to avoid either the fact or the appearance of striking deals on INF in Europe that increase the threats posed to America's allies and friends in East Asia, as for example a relocation of SS-20 mobile forces could suggest.

Militarily, INF remain a secondary, not primary, concern in terms of future strategic stability. While having short times of flight, for example, INF cannot pose the threat of a disarming first strike to the central strategic forces on either side. Their presence does not much increase the overall nuclear threat faced by the Western European democracies and Japan. Their reduction or elimination would not much alter basic military relationships in the absence of correlative adjustments in conventional force ratios and reduction of the Soviet advantage in short-range nuclear and conventional ballistic missile systems—the SS-21s, -12/22s, and -23s, for which the West has no analog.

Although we support any step towards effective arms control that is consistent with our security, we remain concerned that an agreement on INF not prejudice the prospects for useful agreements on central strategic systems: ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range air-launched cruise missiles. In part, this is a matter of recognizing and remembering the inherent verification difficulties posed by such weapon systems. It is also the more difficult because the way in which the United States has promoted SDI has tended to highlight the problem of defending Europe against ballistic missile attacks.

In part because INF *are* secondary to the central strategic weapons balance, it may prove easier to negotiate their reduction and realignment than would

be the case with other classes of weapons. But an INF agreement as the first of several could have unwanted effects. Most importantly, if such an agreement left the United States with zero INF in Europe in the face of Soviet tactical ballistic missiles, chemical, and conventional force advantages that exist today, the coupling of the U. S. deterrent to NATO could be damaged. While the military dimensions of this matter are important, the issue's long-term impact on European confidence in the American security guarantee is even more critical.

If INF are significantly reduced or even eliminated from Europe, therefore, we consider it essential to: continue with the modernization and hardening of NATO quick-reaction aircraft; investigate vigorously a more rapid modernization of tactical missiles such as the Lance than is now being considered; and accelerate work on defenses against tactical ballistic missiles. Each of these steps would help to offset continuing Soviet advantages in shorter range systems capable of delivering conventional, chemical, and/or nuclear ordnance.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Between now and the end of the century, relatively better conventional forces would complement the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, and so contribute significantly to strategic stability. Militarily, the deficiencies of present conventional defenses would require the use of nuclear weapons early in war. Politically, the failure to improve conventional defenses erodes the alliance's ability to devise sound and coordinated responses to crises and contingencies. The Soviet Union's offensive military posture in Europe remains the root cause of instability in this vital region; but Western forces themselves are structured in ways much less stable, especially in crisis, than we would like. Many Western nuclear weapons deployed in Europe as essential links in deterrence through the threat of escalation are positioned too far forward and may take too long to release and employ; therefore, they may invite preemptive attack. Conventional forces in Central Europe remain insufficiently mobile, too weak in fire power, and too limited in weapons reach to give confidence that they can absorb an initial blow and contain the momentum of forces coming behind. The present state of Western conventional forces also means that Alliance governments generally cannot deal with Third World contingencies without drawing on forces meant for, and located in, the NATO area.

We therefore conclude that strategic stability would be enhanced by improving alliance conventional defenses especially relative to those of the East in ways that reduce both the need for early resort to nuclear weapons and the necessity for destabilizing drawdowns of NATO forces when contingencies arise elsewhere. Such steps would raise the crisis stability of the forces by extending decision time for leaders faced with a potential need to escalate. By slowing and possibly diminishing the prospects for escalation, moreover, such steps could also permit something other than worst-case thinking.

The resort to nuclear weapons would be easier to defer under attack if Western governments would augment their non-nuclear defenses. Similarly, necessary counter-attack options could be preserved in more stable ways through more extensive use of advanced conventional munitions for missions formerly reserved to nuclear forces. Modern and effective defenses against chemical weapons would also help, as would a modern chemical weapons retaliatory capacity for deterrent purposes. Conventional defenses also—and perhaps first—need improvement in ordinary, not only exotic, ways, such as in larger ammunition and spare parts stocks and in readiness measures.

We believe it essential that the alliance maintain the ability to use the seas even in the face of opposition. This is vital for the purpose of preserving the essential integrity of the Western partnership, while assuring global military reach in crisis or contingency. Without strong assurance that vital reinforcements and resources will be accessible in crisis and war, no concept of deterrence and defense of the West can stand.

We also encourage alliance policies fostering an effective European defense industrial base and better alliance cooperation, so as to avoid wasting money through internal competition and duplication of effort. Long-term economic prospects underscore the need for improvements in alliance-wide ratios between resources invested and results obtained. We must seek greater benefits from economies of scale, from specialization, and from technology sharing. We support closer collaboration on research and development among nations, coordination of procurement efforts, and other more efficient uses of our financial, industrial, and technological resources. Greater industry-government cooperation is desirable in such areas as exchange of research and development data, test data, technology transfer, and Third World arms sales. Agreements among NATO nations for certain countries to act as lead nations for specific types of weapons systems or material, or to specialize in their development and production for the entire alliance, would be cost effective and could lead to greater inter-operability and standardization. These, in turn, would greatly increase the defense and deterrence capabilities of Western conventional forces.

Nevertheless, we recognize that advanced technology cannot cure all ills in Western conventional forces. The pursuit and then attempted absorption of advanced technology in American forces alone provides many cautionary experiences. Efforts to develop better forces primarily through advanced technology could cause great problems for the allies and the alliance if not done just right. Purely technological solutions to basic problems in force relationships, moreover, would not be likely to endure; the other side, if it is in any way willing to invest comparable effort and resources, has so far always been able either to catch up or to give every prospect of doing so. Since World War II, the rate at which technological advantages erode has remained very high. We conclude, therefore, that in seeking a more stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union in the future, the choice between (a) obtaining government concessions in return for refraining from fielding new systems, and (b) deploying new systems as available, should always at least be weighed. But it should be weighed in the context of our longstanding and continuing reliance on a technological lead to offset Soviet numerical advantages.

ARMS CONTROL AND STABILITY

Between now and the end of the century, arms control can make a substantial contribution to enhanced strategic stability—but only to the extent that the practices and attitudes of the sides are realigned and their efforts refocused. For a generation, more has been expected of arms control than has been achieved. It has not always been clear whether arms control was to be a means to security and stability or, rather, an end itself. Past efforts have, to be sure, constrained certain technologies and placed limits on aggregate force numbers. But these efforts have not produced the desired condition of strategic stability between the superpowers. Instead, at present we have developed high levels of weaponry without similarly high levels of stability.

We must continue to seek agreements to control arms and reduce international tensions, for in the long run that is the best hope for stable peace, and

both our allies and our own people expect no less than such an effort from our political leaders. However, all of our experience to date with arms control suggests that reaching agreements will be very time consuming, that they will deal with marginal or dispensable military capabilities, and that they will be extremely difficult to enforce. These problems are inherent in the arms control process because the relationship between East and West is essentially adversarial and because Soviet objectives in arms control frequently do not coincide with our own. While we might hope for better and more far-reaching results in the future, we must remain cautious in our expectations, however great our aspirations.

Apart from arms control's potential effects on East West political and military relationships, in the early 1980s it has evolved into a major factor in Western domestic and interallied politics. It has become increasingly difficult to deal with arms control and its potential on substantive grounds. Western democratic governments, under pressure of electoral processes, have become more and more tactically oriented. This orientation has encouraged a tendency to focus primarily on negotiations and not on steps that individual states—or states collectively—might take to constrain weapons developments having strategically destabilizing effects. In addition, foreshortening political perspectives on arms control have permitted overemphasis on reductions as the chief, and sometimes seemingly only, goal of arms control. Dealing in numbers, it is now evident, is too narrow an approach.

Among the most important and most common of these political effects is a growing tendency in Western publics to expect too much, both from arms control in broad terms and from specific arms control proposals or approaches. No matter how well nurtured and vigorous, arms control processes cannot bear the whole weight of the Soviet-American or East-West relationship. Unrealistic and unrealizable expectations are a substantial hazard to genuine arms control efforts. Moreover, the now popular idea of seeking deep reductions in nuclear weapons, while meritorious in some respects (assuming the right *sort* of reductions), will not in itself solve the fundamental strategic problems confronting us: concerns about the attractiveness, under certain conditions, of a disarming first strike; inferior conventional forces; and inadequate crisis management capabilities. Nor will they reduce costs of military forces on the scale some imagine. Smaller nuclear forces may well require better conventional forces, as we believe, and these conventional forces in turn could cost considerably more than the nuclear forces retired. In addition, small forces of any sort are generally very inefficient; often they are not worth deploying, operating, or fixing when broken.

In considering the possible contributions arms control efforts might make to the preservation of strategic stability in coming years, it is therefore especially important to keep our expectations within bounds by understanding what arms control can and cannot do. Arms control cannot end the threat of nuclear war; nuclear weapons can be discarded but not "disinvented." Nor, as just indicated, will defense budgets fall sharply even as a result of extensive nuclear arms reductions. Nuclear arms control alone, moreover, cannot greatly reduce wartime casualties and damage, because so few weapons can do so much against soft targets such as cities.

Arms control can, however, help with at least some other problems. It may be able to help reduce or control first-strike weapons such as the SS-18, and it can help reduce tendencies toward worst-case planning. Arms control may establish a basis for forgoing expenditures on classes of weapons not yet developed or deployed; such was at least a partial effect of the ABM Treaty of 1972.

Arms control can also have value as a political process, both in expanding mutual understanding in important areas, such as military doctrine, and in reassuring citizens and governments of serious commitment to reducing risks of war and other tensions. On both sides, practices and attitudes have posed impediments to reaching meaningful and lasting arms control agreements consistent with security and stability. If there is to be progress in arms control, both the Soviet Union and the United States will have to do much to overcome the obstacles, substantive and psychological, arising from the first generation of experience with arms control.

At present, the most highly visible, and in some respects the most important, obstacle to reaching significant new arms control agreements is the apparent failure of the Soviet Union to comply in practice with certain commitments it has already accepted. Officials of the United States have concluded that the Soviet Union has breached both the ABM treaty and the SALT accords in important respects. Without repeating here all the complaints advanced, we agree that several such actions have potential military significance, such as the construction of large radars at Krasnoyarsk and elsewhere in a configuration suggesting ABM potential; encrypting telemetry; and developing and deploying more new ICBMs than are permitted under the SALT II treaty. The United States has responded by posing, but not putting into practice, a treaty interpretation that would remove important restrictions on space-based testing and development.

The linked arms control issues of verification and compliance stand unresolved, some believe because the Soviet Union has declined to deal seriously with the questions about Soviet programs and treaty obligations raised in recent years in the Standing Consultative Commission in Geneva, although others think the United States has prepared to exploit rather than remove the issues. At this point, however, the very least we can conclude is that the Soviet Union has exploited to the fullest the loopholes, ambiguities, and marginal assessment requirements of past arms control treaties.

The theory of compliance is well understood. Compliance requires a means to verify what in fact is taking place in terms of agreements in force; a procedure for consultation and explanation of questionable or unclear activity; and a determination as to whether what is observed is either inconsistent with or prohibited by any agreement in force. Breaches of commitments having substantial military significance require prompt response to redress the situation.

But in practice, compliance is less straightforward. Decisions on what to do about lesser violations of commitments can be extremely difficult. Violations that lack immediate or major military impact can have—and in recent years often have had—great effect on the willingness and ability of American people and leaders to pursue new arms control agreements or continue observing old ones. Failure to react to the appearance of noncompliance can only encourage continued exploration of the limits both of the agreements as drafted and of America's tolerance for that exploration. Yet, whether with major or lesser violations, appropriate and effective countermeasures proportionate to the offenses themselves may not always be available. This in turn can lead to increasingly technical approaches to major political issues. Apparent Soviet inclination to explore every possible ambiguity and loophole in texts drafted years ago under different military and technical circumstances has led American officials to search with intensity for indications of possible noncompliance, whatever their military significance.

Failure to resolve compliance and verification problems materially prejudices

the political climate. It casts shadows on previous agreements; gives reason to hold back from new ones; and raises suspicions that a side may be preparing to "break out" of present regimes in ways that might confer military advantage. There will be neither strategic stability nor arms control in coming years without a greater commitment to answering serious questions when raised and an ability to distinguish between issues and irritations.

The legacy of the first generation of arms control, then, in large part consists of a tension between, on the one hand, the enthusiasm of those who believe it can be highly effectual and who look for it to be the principal method of achieving a lasting peace; and, on the other, the skepticism of those who see arms control efforts as a trap for democratic societies, a trap that invariably prevents them from pursuing necessary programs for defense and security. In some respects such a tension can be healthy, and it seems important to realize that neither attitude has a monopoly on truth. We need rather a degree of realism about the achievements and the potential of arms control as well as its limits and shortcomings.

What then should we seek and, therefore, do to develop arms control efforts in ways that will bring results commensurate with their political importance in the Soviet-American relationship and their psychological significance for Western publics and governments?

We must lay a basis for an arms control process, one that endures even when there are serious disagreements and even when results are long in coming. Beyond doubt, continued negotiation without result has a lulling effect. But without any negotiation, or with lengthy interruptions such as those occasioned by the Soviet departure from Geneva negotiations in 1983, there can be no result at all. Further, and in some important respects, the continuity of process is a result in itself. If we are to alter, over time, the ratio of competitive and cooperative aspects of Soviet-American relationships, an early and seemingly crucial step, in our opinion, would be to sustain the greatest continuity possible in discussions of the military aspects of the Soviet-American relationship.

Several measures would contribute toward developing arms control as a process, an element of continuity, in Soviet-American long-term relations.

We must conserve, if not entirely preserve, some elements of the foundations laid in earlier arms control efforts. It is, in our view, easier to go from a little to something more than to go from nothing at all to something extensive—at least in this particular field. A world without arms control raises uncertainties that can only be unhelpful as Soviet and American negotiators, to say nothing of allied and Third World governments, seek more reassuring political and military relationships. Moreover, whether in conserving valuable aspects of earlier arms control work or in devising the terms of new efforts, we believe it to be important to frame agreements—or their extensions—in terms that limit their vulnerability to electoral cycles, particularly because of Soviet efforts to exploit American election-year political pressure. In practice, this means that the term of agreements might usefully bridge at least two American presidential elections and be renewed or end in odd-numbered years. If there is to be a time-limited amendment of the ABM Treaty, it should be with this point in mind.

One other element essential to conserving aspects of past arms control as a basis for long-term process would be a more mature understanding of the problems posed by loopholes. Over the course of an agreement, permitted types of weapons, with sound military justifications, are likely to be developed in ways that seem to exploit or create loopholes in earlier agreements. The Soviet SA-12 surface-to-air missile is a case in point. While we might wish theoretically to have loophole-free agreements, generally loopholes are there for a purpose. It

would, however, be useful to recognize explicitly in future treaties that, as technologies change, actions that are formally legal can threaten the workability of the treaty and will require renewed negotiations.

We must broaden the focus of arms control efforts in ways that permit Soviet and American governments to work on coming problems even while they face serious difficulties on present concerns. It will always be necessary to deal with immediate problems as well as those more distant in the context of arms control. Historically, the greatest successes in arms control, few as these may be, have mostly resulted from mutual rejection of systems not yet fielded. Conversely, the most difficult negotiations in terms of constraining force developments on either side have addressed forces already fielded or through advanced development.

A few words are necessary both in regard to the near-term issues and longer-term problems of focusing arms control. In the near term, arms control efforts must focus first and foremost on those systems most likely to have destabilizing effects on the military relationship, whether these are offensive or defensive. For the next few years, it is going to be more important to achieve the perceived equivalence that strengthens deterrence and calms apprehensions than to achieve major cuts in force levels. In practical terms, we favor placing heavy emphasis on achieving equivalence in survivability and hard-target kill strategic forces, in order to sustain unmistakably a satisfactory and reassuring condition of deterrence against their use.

Correspondingly, however, we recognize that ideas about the prospects for strategic defenses may either help or hurt that endeavor, depending on how such defensive potential is handled. In one sense, there should be no real debate on the desirability of strategic defenses. In theory, if one could start all strategic deployment from scratch, it is difficult to see how either side could be disadvantaged by relying primarily on defensive rather than offensive weapons for security. But in the real world we also see that strategic defense programs could be destabilizing if mishandled. The most worrisome possibility might arise in the course of a transition from present to future offense-defense configurations; if one side possessed a combination of strong defenses and substantial counterforce capabilities, and was so motivated, the attractiveness of a preemptive first strike could increase dangerously. Moreover, such defenses might be extremely costly, and might thus squeeze out other urgent strategic force improvements. Some defense programs could in certain respects breach, or at least call into question, aspects of the ABM Treaty, which in other contexts seems at least for the time being an important element of continuity in constructing an effective arms control process.

We therefore believe that both discussions and developments in strategic defense programs should be linked more effectively with shared interests in improved command and control and mobile missiles, which are conducive to more survivable strategic forces, and with possible unilateral steps to improve the survivability of critical installations and forces.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

In the longer term, if there is to be an arms control process strong enough to bear up in spite of inevitable Soviet-American disagreements on immediate issues, whether or not in the arms arena, there must be a broader agenda. Some elements of such an agenda are visible now, and some are even active. But none is now important enough to sustain vigorous arms control discussions between Soviets and Americans when there is a deadlock in talks concerning strategic

forces, intermediate nuclear forces, or strategic defenses. This is a weakness which we must work to correct.

The risks of nuclear war arise not from the weapons systems themselves but from the fundamental clash of Soviet and Western values and interest. Therefore, arms control solely of strategic forces is insufficient. The two sides must focus as well on reducing possibilities of military surprise in Europe and on minimizing the risk of war through inadvertence or miscalculation.

Confidence-building and crisis management measures can help. Over the past generation, these have enjoyed only modest emphasis. If, as in arms control, such activities can be contemplated for their long-term potential rather than for their short-term political payoff, their as yet unrealized possibilities could make a difference for the better. Negotiated confidence-building and crisis management measures could reduce the likelihood that miscalculation or misunderstanding might lead to confrontation or, worse, to war.

Such measures might also prove to be a useful hedge against near- and mid-term inability to negotiate satisfactory numerical and qualitative force relationships. It may prove to be the work of a generation, not just a negotiation, to reconfigure Soviet and American forces in more stable ways.

More time to reflect before reacting and a greater sense of shared interests could also help insulate central strategic relationships from regional issues. East and West now have primarily competitive, not cooperative, interests in the Third World, and these differences seem likely to remain irreconcilable for many years. Increasingly, East and West have the raw military capacity to challenge one another in the world's major regions, although such challenge will remain difficult to mount effectively far from one's own shore. Good judgment—caution—will surely stand as the most essential barrier to ill-considered superpower clashes over regional issues. The ability to communicate without compromising, at least initially, seems certain to be more important as long-standing force relationships and doctrines alter between now and the end of the century.

Modest steps to enlarge the role of confidence building and crisis management could have significant effects. Of course, long-running negotiations in Stockholm and Vienna, the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks deserve continued support, even though for the most part they do not address issues of strategic force posture. In addition, we also support establishment of a Risk Reduction Center (or Centers), after further definition of possible structure, charter, and operations—and with a clear focus on a peacetime rather than crisis role, at least initially.

Risk reduction centers, for example, could develop common ground as well as procedures for responding to third-party threats and incidents, such as those posed by terrorists or others who come to possess nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological weapons, whatever their political, ethnic, or religious nature.

The national and alliance institutions already charged with crisis responsibilities could and should be strengthened. There is no particular virtue in keeping government so lean at the top that such important responsibilities can be discharged only through improvisation. We should also give a high priority to improved intelligence monitoring of Eastern military activities and programs.

In the foregoing context, the security policies and postures of the superpowers could usefully be made more predictable over time, and thereby more negotiable. As mentioned, we recognize that perfect symmetry-of forces, or mirror-imaging, is not necessary and should not be sought. But we must improve our abilities to assess underlying force relationships and to adjust them for the purpose of

sustaining strategic stability through times of tension and times of change. Uneven rates of modernization present one large barrier to doing so. Yet the long lead times inherent in producing modern weapons seem to offer opportunities for improving present conditions, and the interest of each side in avoiding technological surprise by the other gives added incentive for changing current practices.

It would also be helpful in this regard to resolve present outstanding questions of data on forces as a prelude to regular information exchange on force structure, exercises, and posture. The two sides could also share some plans and program information in a timely way, so that their implications could be discussed and evaluated well before decision for full-scale development, acquisition, and deployment of new systems. This would take a very different Soviet Union than the one we have known since World War II. But it is time for us to put the new Soviet leadership to the test they have in fact proposed: building a better relationship on deeds, not words, including steps of substance in arms control. Further, we encourage more extensive military-to-military contacts, apart from those in the course of current negotiations. We also consider it important to begin discussion of potential verification problems with a view to allaying concerns about "break-out" in coming years.

There is further reason to seek a broader agenda or focus on stabilizing measures. To a greater extent than most Soviet and American leaders of recent years have expected, strategic stability by the end of the century may be much more a multilateral question than it is now. The ability of the Soviet Union and the United States to manage their military relationships, keep the military dimensions of their competition subdued where possible, and deal with problems such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and more will all depend increasingly on the cooperation of still other nations.

We believe, in sum, that it is both necessary and possible to regulate our security relationship with the Soviet Union with higher confidence and fewer recriminations than has so far been the case. We do not share the view that, as some have said, the West "has essentially run out of ideas on arms control." But whatever the ideas, we must be clear on how, appropriately, to assess their merit. In 1982, at the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament, President Reagan reminded his colleagues that "we should not confuse the signing of agreements with the solving of problems." The number and frequency of agreements reached is no measure either of their quality or of their consequence. Likewise the speed and scale of reductions is an inappropriate standard by which to judge arms control efforts; it embodies the classic error of measuring force sizes rather than force relationships, the latter being much more important for security and stability. In this respect, it will be essential to alter both public perceptions and popular expectations of arms control in favor of a substantively sounder appreciation for process and goals instead of undue desire for "cosmetic achievements."

For all the foregoing reasons, we must develop a more consistent, continuous, and institutionalized arms control process, as suggested here, with much stronger emphasis on designing a more stable future Soviet-American relationship.

In our view, useful arms negotiations with the Soviet Union require that we demonstrate to Soviet leaders our resolve to achieve our security objectives with or without agreements and our determination to enforce our rights under such agreements as are reached. Only if convinced of this will the Soviets give up their attempts to achieve unilateral advantage by playing on Western appetites for arms agreements. If Soviet leaders are themselves assured of continuing

Western unity and resolve, their desire to avoid armed conflict with the West gives hope for stability in a sense useful to the West and for arms control as a significant part thereof.

IV. Post-Reykjavik Perspectives

At their October 1986 meeting in Reykjavik, discussion between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev altered the arms control agenda in important aspects, very likely for many years to come. Upon reflection, and after an initial exchange of recriminatory statements, both Soviet and American leaders agreed that there had been a qualitative shift in the debate. Although they differed on emphases, and even more on exact details of various proposals and counterproposals, they shared a sense of accomplishment in having turned from a focus on controlled expansion of strategic forces to thoughts about deep reductions in them. "For the first time," noted Secretary of State George Shultz, "we have begun to deal seriously with the implications of a much less nuclear, if not non-nuclear, world... a safer form of deterrence."

As set out by the two sides, the "Reykjavik revolution" (as it came to be described in some circles) had four components:

- agreement on 50 percent reductions in strategic forces;
- a Soviet-proposed 10-year moratorium on SDI deployment and a ban on out-of-laboratory SDI research;
- agreement to remove INF from Europe;
- proposals from the U. S. to eliminate all ballistic missiles over 10 years, and counterproposals from the Soviet Union to do away with *all* strategic nuclear forces, and perhaps all nuclear weapons.

Following the Reykjavik meeting, Western officials expressed concern about remaining imbalances in shorter-range nuclear forces, and proposed to reduce the range, but not dispose of, the Pershing IIs already deployed in Europe. The Soviets countered with a proposal to eliminate the shorter-range nuclear missiles altogether. Moreover, the Soviets floated for consideration a new definition of what might constitute the "laboratory" to which research should be confined: "research work on the ground—in institutes, at proving grounds, at plants." It remained to see whether this definition would be formally presented and whether, if so, it could be satisfactorily described in the detail essential to an agreement.

The possibility of rapid and radical changes in levels and characteristics of nuclear forces dominated the Reykjavik sessions. Yet, whether by chance or by design, the Reykjavik meeting left many onlookers under the impression that strategic defenses had become the core of current strategic problems, and that prevention of their development was the key to a safer world. Especially in the view of earlier critics of the SDI, the summit had been a historic opportunity, tragically untaken, to trade the SDI concept for the Soviet heavy ICBM force. From their perspective, such a step could have revitalized and extended a cooperative Soviet-American approach to stability through arms control. Many commentators also lamented what they saw as failure to bring home the other prizes—deep cuts in strategic nuclear forces and removal of INF from Europe—which had seemed within reach if only the President had relented on SDI.

To still other observers, the meeting seemed a near approach to strategic disaster for the West, an attempt to move too fast tactically in the absence of a strategic design. In such a view, it endangered deterrence to agree on the magnitude and rate of reductions in strategic forces before defining the goals these

should serve and determining how and when these might be taken. Similarly, removing INF from Europe as deep reductions were, so it was suggested, about to occur, and in the absence of improved conventional defenses could only risk alliance cohesion in security policy. The inability of either side to define critical terms, such as the meaning of research "confined to a laboratory," likewise in this perspective made the achievement of a precise understanding on SDI programs impossible, and the negotiation of an inexact one imprudent.

The degree of controversy surrounding Reykjavik in its aftermath indicates how much remains to be done in joining issues of Western security, strategy, arms control, and new technology into a vision of a more secure world. The complexity of the issues at hand makes it increasingly important to improve our approach to negotiations as well as analysis. We have sometimes, for example, linked negotiations on strategic forces to extraneous issues; but in coming years, our hopes for a safer world may not be as well served by binding ourselves to the relationships between issues that were developed in earlier years. Our credibility is also at stake; for if we cannot continue to convince Soviet leaders of our determination never to accept severe disadvantage in the nuclear balance, or for that matter in the overall balance, the feasibility and value of future arms agreements will remain at best conjectural. For there to be a stable nuclear relationship, both sides must feel secure from preemptive first strike; under present technological and economic conditions, stability is either mutual or it is nonexistent.

In our view, a vision for a more secure world must include a *regime* for nuclear weapons, for these weapons will be central political and strategic factors for decades to come. Decisions about nuclear forces and nuclear arms control are interrelated; both should aim to enhance Western security by ensuring that Western nuclear weapons can perform their essential deterrent functions as long as, and to the extent that, these are necessary. Strategic nuclear forces exist both to deter nuclear or conventional attack on us and our allies and to ensure that we can retaliate in extreme circumstances. Because we cannot foresee these circumstances exactly, there remains a residual and unavoidable imprecision in our ability to discern the exact difference between what is necessary and what might be desirable as older forces leave service and newer ones become available.

As for the forces themselves, it is increasingly clear that both sides *can* have nuclear offensive forces which are sufficiently diverse and resistant to first strike that each feels confident in its ability to retaliate, but not in its ability to mount a successful first strike. Such a condition may exist with high numbers of weapons, although numbers by themselves are insufficient to ensure it. Such a condition could exist at lower weapons levels, but is likely to prove somewhat harder to achieve in coming years. An important common denominator of such a posture at varying weapons levels, however, is the need for mobility. Mobile ICBMs are one key to stable nuclear relationships in which neither side can have a convincing first-strike capability.

In part because strategic defenses will work, if ever, only after many years, we believe that for the indefinite future defensive weapons should be considered within the present framework of deterrence through retaliation. The strategic problem, some therefore suggest, will remain essentially what it has been for 25 years: to define a relationship between offensive and defensive arms that leads to a condition of strategic stability.

In such a perspective, moreover, we believe that INF do not properly constitute a separate military category. The strategic nature of forces and weapon systems is determined not by their range, accuracy, or destructive power but

by the political objectives they can be made to serve. ICBMs threaten locations in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, not only the superpower homelands. Short- and intermediate-range weapons vitally threaten most members of the Western alliance. Under these conditions, without sound agreements on inter-continental offensive weapons—and a growing understanding on the potential role of defenses—an initial, separate agreement on INF would be of limited strategic significance and could have unwanted political effects. In this context, it is noteworthy that a primary objective of British Prime Minister Thatcher, in meeting with President Reagan shortly after the Reykjavik summit, was in fact to obtain his agreement not to press for the abolition of all long-range ballistic missiles, and to proceed more slowly on the question of INF forces in Europe.

As it appears increasingly likely that future strategic forces will be fewer than, and different from those now existing, we endorse improved Western conventional defenses and the contribution that investigation of advanced strategic defenses seems likely to make in this area. A healthy balance between nuclear and non-nuclear defensive capabilities will always be essential to Western security in their own right, and there are long-standing, good reasons to strengthen Western conventional defenses. But trends in strategic forces and defenses raise additional concerns and opportunities in this context. While a defensive component in the nuclear area might help gradually to reduce Western dependence on assured retaliation, and to make deterrence more secure, such a component also raises questions of “transition” that go beyond the nuclear balance. Clearly, as we and our allies have come to realize, strategic defenses and lower levels of nuclear weapons would require major improvements in the conventional balance of forces if deterrence were to remain broadly effective. Moreover, a major portion of the technological breakthroughs necessary to make SDI effective is likely to contribute to alliance conventional defense much earlier, and must therefore be treated as an element of the overall transition from a retaliatory to a defensive strategic posture.

V. Summary Findings and Recommendations

In working toward enhanced strategic stability, we should aim by the year 2000 to achieve certain broad objectives in keeping with the concept of stability set out in this discussion.

We must devise and develop a strategic nuclear posture that is effective in deterring any other party's use of nuclear weapons, provides no incentives for an attempt to conduct a disarming first strike against our retaliatory forces, and also provides a convincing measure of extended deterrence.

In our view, practical application of this policy perspective entails several steps. In nuclear forces, we should:

- retain the triad, to diversify forces sufficiently to make effective initial attack very difficult;
- deploy the 50 authorized MX missiles, and procure the additional 50 contained in the original program, in the absence of Soviet willingness to retire similar heavy missiles on their side, while seeking to make them survivable enough to threaten prompt retaliation against critical hard targets of sufficient importance to assure that Soviet advantages in prompt, hard-target-kill systems

will not be exploited;*

- take effective steps to make land-based forces more survivable, through increased mobility or other means if necessary;
- accelerate efforts to develop and deploy small mobile missiles;
- seek, over time, a balanced reduction in the ratio of warheads to launchers;
- continue efforts to improve command and control of nuclear forces;
- conduct a vigorous program of research and testing of possibilities for strategic defenses, while keeping development efforts consistent with the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty as long as the Soviets demonstrate willingness to reduce the level of offensive threat and review the relationship of offensive to defensive systems.**
- be cautious about deep, and especially rapid, arms reductions. Pursuit of reductions alone is inadequate as an approach to arms control; some types of reductions could be destabilizing; others, properly conceived, could make significant political and military contributions in the context of a well developed strategic purpose and design.*** A moderate pace in reductions appears essential because it will take time to develop such a design; assess the military, technical, and political effect of reductions at every stage in executing the design; and extend public understanding and support of it so that each step has the intended reassuring effect, if warranted.

We must improve Western conventional defenses and, more important, the balance between those of East and West, and revitalize the extended deterrence so essential to the security and well-being of our mutual security partners around the world, to keep the prospect of nuclear war remote.

We recommend:

- basic improvements—long advocated and still needed—in ammunition stocks, readiness measures, and interoperability of equipment and systems;
- acquisition of modern chemical retaliatory forces, and especially of defensive equipment against chemical or biological weapons;
- more effective, and more cost-effective, use of emerging technologies especially for augmenting the mobility, firepower, and weapons reach of alliance conventional forces;

*Robert Bowie and Richard Gardner argue that the proposal to deploy an additional 50 MX missiles seems unwise. While this goal is hedged here by conditioning it on Soviet refusal to retire some or all heavy missiles, and on making the MX missiles more survivable, it has not proven feasible in many years of trying. The mobile Midgetman seems a much better response to the problem, one that contributes more to stability. Franklin Kramer supports adding quickly employable hard-target kill capability to the U. S. arsenal, but agrees that MX vulnerability makes that system destabilizing, rather than stabilizing. He would rather spend the money required for 50 additional MX missiles on conventional force improvements, which in his view have a far higher priority.

**Franklin Kramer, while thinking it desirable to adhere to the traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty if the Soviets “demonstrate willingness to reduce the level of offensive threat and review the relationship of offensive to defensive systems,” believes that there may be other circumstances in which adherence would also be desirable, as well as other conditions in which it might not.

***Robert Bowie notes that of course major reductions of the wrong sort *could* be damaging, but that we face a different choice. Substantial cuts are likely to offer the best basis for moving away from vulnerable, hard-target kill weapons such as the Soviet SS-18 and the U.S. MX. The aim should be to restructure the forces on both sides toward greater stability, as the report suggests. Franklin Kramer adds that we are at a sufficiently high level of nuclear weapons, with the more likely prospect being that totals will increase rather than decrease, so that we need to strive toward reductions rather than being cautious about them. While destabilizing reductions are to be avoided, a world in which significant reductions had been accomplished would likely be one that was significantly more stable.

- maintenance of the abilities to assure timely reinforcement of allies, as well as access to critical resources in crisis or war, while maintaining conventional military and political options beyond the NATO area;
- improved non-nuclear defenses against some advanced attack capabilities such as tactical ballistic missiles;
- expanded capability to use advanced conventional weapons against targets formerly reserved for attack by nuclear forces;
- strengthening of the European defense industrial base, coupled with other measures to increase efficiency in alliance use of resources for defense.†

We must develop a more consistent, continuous, and institutionalized arms control process, with much stronger emphasis on shaping the future Soviet-American military relationship towards greater stability. We conclude that, in order for arms control to contribute more to strategic stability between now and the end of the century, some redirection of effort will be required. We believe that future efforts should:

- give priority to dealing with destabilizing nuclear systems, not to achieving reductions for their own sake;
- seek to reduce possibilities of military surprise, especially in Europe, while keeping in mind the technical possibilities for Soviet countermeasures to defeat or deceive Western indication and warning systems;
- develop to the extent possible shared Soviet and American interests in, and approaches toward, minimizing the risks of war as a result of inadvertence or miscalculation;
- attempt to build a climate of confidence by resolving force data questions and compliance concerns, sharing plans and program information in time to discuss them before taking irreversible steps, encouraging military-to-military contacts, and discussing future verification possibilities and problems.

We must improve our abilities to deal with crises, resolve regional conflicts, and lower the military aspects of Soviet and American involvement in both— while building up our ability to abstain from unproductive engagement in such situations. This requires us to:

- strengthen national and alliance organizations and institutions already charged with crisis responsibilities;
- apply improvements in risk reduction mechanisms to this purpose as well.

VI. Conclusion

Our formula for a more stable strategic relationship, and through it, a safer world, consists then of these few elements:

- More survivable, reliable nuclear forces for the United States.
- Improved Western conventional defenses.
- A continuing—and more forward-looking—arms control process.
- Better methods of crisis prevention and crisis management.

Reductions in nuclear weapons remain desirable—and in psychological terms probably always will as far as the interested public is concerned—but only as and when they make less likely both the continuation of Soviet aggression against

†Franklin Kramer argues that additional European defense capacity is likely to decrease, rather than increase, efficiency in the use of alliance resources.

the states of Western Europe, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, and the military confrontation of the United States and the Soviet Union. Talks on strategic arms could usefully return to the realm of the realizable. Fifty percent cuts in strategic warheads, and related reductions in delivery systems, would be a substantial accomplishment. Such cuts would not, however, reverse current trends making land-based missiles more vulnerable; moreover, they could make more resources available for use against the seabased deterrent on which we now depend; and they would leave more than enough warheads to destroy very large proportions of Western populations even after attacking priority military targets.

We must therefore strive to ensure that the cuts negotiated reduce or eliminate rather than perpetuate present destabilizing aspects of strategic force relationships. We must make sure that major adjustments in strategic forces occur in some well thought-out relation to progress in balancing conventional forces, especially in Europe. And we must insist that any new agreement, whether concerning conventional or nuclear forces, incorporate provisions making possible effective verification of compliance, which in most cases would require provision for on-site inspections, very likely on a challenge basis.

Finally, we conclude that deep reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons will more likely result from, rather than lead toward, greater strategic stability. It is therefore increasingly important to diminish the extent to which we rely on nuclear weapons in order to compensate for inferiority in conventional military power. If we can achieve progress in this regard, nuclear weapons—even at greatly reduced levels—can provide an enduring reason for the Soviet Union and the United States to deal with each other circumspectly and, perhaps, in an increasingly cooperative way.

APPENDIX 1

ADDITIONAL COMMENT AND DISSENT BY MEMBERS OF THE WORKING GROUP

DISSENT, by Albert Wohlstetter and Fred S. Hoffman

By collecting, but not assessing, the conflicting views of participants in the Working Group, the paper has succeeded in reflecting rather than clarifying the public debate on national security policy. As a result, we find ourselves agreeing strongly with some of the paper's conclusions, disagreeing equally strongly with others, and very troubled by the paper's evasions and inconsistencies concerning some of the most fundamental security problems we face.

We agree on the need for further efforts to improve command and control of nuclear forces, provide better-protected land-based forces by increasing mobility and other means, improve NATO's conventional capabilities, and work out better ways of preventing or managing crises. These agreements follow from our even more basic agreement with the paper's analysis of stability in a many-nation world. That analysis recognizes that a stable unconditional mutual deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union would mean that the United States could not respond to and therefore could not deter a Soviet nuclear or non-nuclear attack on an ally. It contrasts sharply with the view of stability that has dominated and misled much recent discussion of nuclear strategy—that the United States needs, and should have, only a capability for a suicidal destruction of Soviet civil society. Even if the Soviets had the same view and only the same capability, as is assumed in the theory of mutual assured destruction, we could not then deter the Soviets from attacking an ally. A binary theory of stability based on mutual assured destruction makes impossible any coherent justification for our alliance relationships.

Unfortunately, the paper's analysis and conclusions fail to draw the implications of the broader multilateral view of stability completely or consistently; it accepts the currently fashionable and highly misleading assumption that the so-called "arms control process," aimed at reaching formal agreements with the Soviet Union, is essential to achieving the objectives of arms control. And it adopts a position on the ABM Treaty that would make it impossible either to assess potential benefits of defenses or to realize these benefits in a reasonable period. At the same time it invites the Soviets to continue exploiting the inherent ambiguities in treaties that seek to restrict technological advance. We must, therefore, dissociate ourselves from many of the paper's statements.

We disagree in particular with those that seem to be relics of a binary view of stability based on mutual assured destruction doctrine. The paper's unclarity in this regard results in internal inconsistencies in its assessment of the current stability of the strategic relationship. A common-sense view of stability in a many-nation world calls for a more coherent consideration of how to deter not only non-nuclear attacks but Soviet selective nuclear attacks directed at an ally as well.

To make it credible that we will respond to some plausible Soviet attacks we need to use a dual criterion in evaluating our weapons and military plans; they need both to have a significant military effect and to reduce as much as feasible the indiscriminate collateral destruction of innocents. That criterion confers particular significance on the technologies that will permit one or a few conventional weapons to destroy a target previously vulnerable only to massive

non-nuclear attacks, or to a nuclear weapon. We think it wrong then for the paper to suggest that it makes little difference, except "in terms of the prospects for collateral damage . . . and escalation," whether a target is attacked by nuclear or conventional weapons. The exception is not minor. It can make a major difference as to the credibility of our response and as to our ability to control the level of destruction if we do respond. That is a principal reason for developing advanced conventional weapons.

We need to improve not only NATO's ability to respond to conventional attack in kind but its ability to answer selective Soviet nuclear attacks aimed at accomplishing some concrete military objective. We need to do this not only because it is politically essential to show our resolve to respond to Soviet attacks with nuclear weapons if necessary. It is also crucial to think of the military contexts in which we might have to use these weapons, perhaps in response to Soviet use of nuclear weapons directed solely against an ally. Non-nuclear weapons cannot reliably deter a Soviet selective use of nuclear weapons. The paper asserts the continuing need for "NATO willingness to use nuclear weapons first if necessary in response to Soviet military attack," but ignores the dependence of such willingness on the U. S. ability to use nuclear weapons discriminately. U. S. resolve to respond is likely to be credible in Soviet eyes only if they believe that, in responding, we would be acting in our own long-term interest to obtain some concrete military objective and that we could do this without responding so indiscriminately as to ensure that destruction would get out of control. However, the paper never discusses the requirement for such selective response and continuing control.

Consequently, the paper implicitly retains the "deterrence only" strategy of mutual assured destruction—a strategy of existential bluff. Such a strategy cannot deter reliably in a world where our bluffs may be called by autonomous events, as well as by deliberate actions taken by the Soviets, perhaps to extricate themselves from what they may see as even greater risks. The Soviets have made it clear in their programs and their internal discussions that they have rejected a strategy of mutual assured destruction for themselves—their Western-oriented public relations efforts to the contrary notwithstanding. For us to continue to rely on suicidal threats is not only to undermine deterrence; it also undermines Western public support for our strategy and will ultimately divide rather than unify NATO.

We cannot agree with the paper's recommendations concerning the ICBM force. If by "small mobile missile" the paper means the one-warhead Midgetman, the proposed compromise would combine the vulnerable MX with the costly mobile Midgetman whose rationale currently depends upon Soviet cooperation in limiting the number of their reentry vehicles. This is hardly a basis for a satisfactory long-term posture for our nuclear offensive forces. Such a proposal violates the paper's earlier recommendation that our actions should serve "our needs and purposes, not simply react to Soviet decisions and behavior," with which we concur strongly. Our needs are not met by a posture that retains incentives for "use it or lose it" responses or for forces that are evaluated primarily in terms of their ability to inflict "assured destruction." We believe that active defense will be an essential element in reducing the vulnerability of U. S. land-based ICBMs in the 1990s and beyond. But not only of our ICBMs. It will be an essential component in preserving such key elements of our defense as the National Command Authority and the systems that are needed for keeping control of our nuclear forces during combat. Active defense will not replace all other measures of defense, but will have a useful synergy with other measures

such as those like mobility that preserve location uncertainty.

Another failure to resolve contending views in a key area of policy occurs in the paper's treatment of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the ABM Treaty. After repeating the standard (and often confused) arguments for and against the SDI, the paper recommends that we "press forward with an active R&D program aimed at an evolutionary deployment of advanced defenses as technological progress makes useful levels of effectiveness feasible." We agree with this and with much of its discussion of the strategic utility of moderate levels of defense. However, its recommendation that the research and testing program concern itself chiefly with ensuring the survival of our retaliatory forces would needlessly prejudice its potential to serve a wide range of useful functions. We would also give greater emphasis to the potential of ballistic missile defenses in protecting our forces in Europe or other theaters of military operations *against either nuclear or non-nuclear attack*. We disagree strongly with the paper's conclusion that we should observe the "traditional" rather than the broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty while negotiations proceed, which would preclude the research and testing necessary to achieve timely realization of the potential of advanced defenses.

The paper repeatedly affirms the currently fashionable assumption that the "arms control process," the quest for formal agreements between the U. S. and the Soviet Union, is essential to achieving our security objective. If, by arms control, we mean recognition that the U. S. and the Soviet Union have some fundamental interests in common as well as fundamental conflicts, the ends of arms control are also achievable and need to be pursued by our unilateral decisions. Those decisions can and must recognize that we and the Soviets have common interests in avoiding war, especially unrestricted nuclear war, and that we and they act to allocate limited defense resources to achieve our respective national objectives, not simply to maximize force ratios or the ability to destroy each other. Unless we abandon the assumption that failure to reach formal agreements necessarily means an unlimited arms race and intensifies the risk and destructiveness of war, we will get bad agreements as well as bad unilateral policies.

While formal agreements might theoretically reinforce our unilateral efforts, their record in doing so is hardly comforting, as the paper recognizes. On the contrary, the "arms control process" has offered enticing opportunities and Premier Gorbachev seems to differ mainly in being better at it. But even in the absence of these asymmetries, formal agreements, especially those of indefinite duration, make harder the process of adjusting to changes in technology and the strategic environment.

We agree with the paper's observation that Soviet leaders will conduct useful arms negotiations only if we convince them of our resolve to achieve our security objectives with or without agreements and that we will enforce our rights under them. However, this is incompatible with the paper's recommendations that work on advanced defenses should be constrained by the "traditional" rather than a looser interpretation of the ABM Treaty. In our view, those who support the restrictive interpretation are, as Judge Sofaer, the State Department's Legal Adviser, has written, "determined unilaterally to impose upon the U. S. obligations we have no legal basis for requiring the Soviet Union to abide by, and which the Russians refused to accept." The paper offers no arguments in support of its recommendation that we interpret the Treaty restrictively and many arguments that suggest the opposite. The restrictive interpretation would ensure that no U. S. ballistic missile R&D program would yield the informa-

tion necessary for a reliable decision on whether to deploy. And it would leave the USSR free to continue exploiting loopholes and ambiguities and probing the limits of our tolerance of noncompliance.

Indeed, the paper's recommendations are silent on actions to deal with non-compliance. On the contrary, the discussion invites inaction by relating the need for prompt action to "breaches having substantial military significance." But what kind of breach of a restriction on R&D can be shown to have "substantial military significance," given the multiple purposes of many such activities and uncertainties about their impact, not to mention the difficulties in documenting Soviet activities in this area? Lamely, the paper concludes that strategic stability and arms control depend on "a greater commitment to answering serious questions" regarding compliance.

The paper's confusion in the area is emphasized by its recognition that "... the ABM Treaty has not fully achieved all of its stated objectives, in part for reasons related to the issue of compliance, and because new technology introduces ambiguities in applying Treaty provisions." In our view, the Treaty has failed. Its failure to limit the Soviet nuclear offensive buildup, their vast programs of air and civil defense or their active program of BMD development and modernization makes clear that the SALT regime failed even in its stated goal of gaining mutual Soviet and U. S. acceptance of mutual assured destruction doctrine. More important, the Treaty's objective is incompatible with stability in the sense we have discussed earlier.

More generally, the paper urges greater caution in the pursuit of reductions in existing weapons systems and emphasis on restricting future systems and the R&D activities necessary to attain them. This position runs counter to the long term security interests of the U. S. and stability. The inherent ambiguities in agreements designed to control the "qualitative arms race" offer fertile ground for Soviet exploitation of the asymmetries that make possible Soviet evasion of such agreements while they restrain the West from pursuing any competitive advantages from its greater technical agility. The paper's approach, moreover, avoids constraining the Soviet Union in the area where it has demonstrated its own relative advantage, its ability to provide sustained funding for massive investments in arms, free of the political vicissitudes that (reinforced by Soviet blandishments) lead to fluctuations and inefficiency in comparable Western efforts.

COMMENT, by Joseph J. Wolf

We need to define further a negotiable policy that would enhance the stability and security of both sides.

With regard to nuclear weapons, we should give priority to phased and verifiable reduction in ballistic missiles to a point below which a successful disarming first strike could not be executed by either side, without resort to defensive systems (including SDI) not authorized by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

Within that context, all weapons systems, offensive and defensive, whether in the hands of troops or in research or development, should be negotiable. The capability for preemptive attack should be reduced by limitation, not by augmentation of forces. The current Soviet advantage in hard-target kill capabilities thus would be handled in the context of enhancing security for both sides. The statement in the Policy Paper that "They have no need to fear aggression from us" needs to be buttressed with more tangible measures; the inclusion of the destabilizing systems of both sides would make the policy proposals more negotiable.

Nor should such a proposal prejudice the concept of extended deterrence, for the remaining retaliatory forces should be quite sufficient should they be required in that ultimate resort to nuclear weapons by NATO against the sort of intentional all-out massive attack, nuclear or conventional, that would require such response.

Of course, should these themes be rejected by the Soviets, there would be no recourse but to turn to further rearmament.

Second, the policy with regard to conventional weaponry should couple the advocacy of strengthening and modernizing the conventional element of the deterrent (which is essential whether or not conventional arms control measures are attainable) with the search for measures which would permit reductions of forces in being in the European theater without impairing security.

Finally, although recent extravagant proposals for sweeping reductions in nuclear weapons do require the words of caution about sudden and massive cuts in nuclear weapons one finds in the Policy Paper, the importance of moving on to considerable phased reductions is, in my view, not adequately reflected in the discussion of the need for a more consistent, continuous and institutionalized arms control process. Though even 50 percent reductions would not come close to eliminating the risk of war, they would get rid of a good part of the self-evident surpluses of nuclear weapons on both sides, and permit future negotiation to focus on the body of weapons yet remaining. Phased significant reductions could have important effects on East-West relations, as each step toward greater stability would invite further progress. Such step by step progress should also strengthen the self-confidence and hence the cohesion of the democratic nations of the West. This would be of particular importance in light of the fact that for some time to come, the most plausible and probable Soviet threat to the West lies not in armed attack, but in political measures intended to lead to Soviet influence and domination without the use of force; and a program for continuing progress in arms control is imperative as a political answer to domestic malaise and discontent of the sort that would be likely in the absence of such a Western policy.

DISSENT, by Raymond L. Garthoff

The Policy Paper is a balanced, middle-of-the-road assessment and prescription for strengthening stability through strengthening deterrence. It makes many sensible observations and recommendations. With minor changes, it could have been written any time in the past decade, and we would undoubtedly have been better off by far if American policy had been carried out on the basis it prescribes.

My dissent stems from the fact that the framework for the study was focused on the year 2000, not 1965 or 1975 or 1985. I believe that it fails to recognize the pitfalls of resting on familiar deterrence doctrine, and the potentialities offered by significant change underway in the thinking of the new Soviet leadership. I would not state that a sharp improvement in American and Alliance security is assured by new thinking in Moscow, nor that we should entrust our security to hope that it can be. A strong geopolitical competitive element will remain in relations between the West and the Soviet Union. A bedrock of underlying mutual deterrence no doubt will have to remain long after the year 2000. Still, unless we start soon to make a major effort to determine the extent to which the Soviet Union is prepared to work seriously toward shared security, we will never know the potential for enhancing our common security. That ef-

fort should be made, in arms control and in development of political relations, naturally with prudent safeguards in our position as we pursue the possibility.

My more specific dissents are partly based on other grounds, but in large part stem from the basic propositions stated above.

Arms Reductions. While correctly arguing that reductions alone may not enhance security, the paper is much too cautious and negative on strategic arms reductions, beginning with the Geneva/Reykjavik 50 percent.

SDI. The paper presents pros and cons on the SDI, but is premised on seeking a "desirable balance between offensive and defensive systems" for deterrence. I believe that is wrong, that it fails to appreciate the need and the possibility of avoiding an inevitable destabilizing upswing in offense/defense arms competition which SDI will generate, and which can be avoided by sharp, verified constraints on Soviet and American strategic defense and offensive arms. It would be easier and better to strengthen the ABM Treaty regime than to relax it. The paper also does not even mention the effects of opening up a new area of competition in weapons in space. The position on SDI also reflects a mistaken view that there is a strong need to "restore and reinforce our posture of deterrence" to which either (or both) SDI and a "massive buildup in offensive arms" is needed. Our deterrent is strong.

ICBMs. The paper states, in my view incorrectly, that "the West will for many years be unable to offset in kind the prompt, hard-target kill capacities of Soviet strategic rocket forces." It therefore supports 100 MX, in addition to D-5 and Midgetman. It would be far better, and is probably negotiable, to eliminate all SS-18, SS-24, MX and D-5 missiles (along with more measured reductions in other offensive arms, and constraints on counterposed defenses).

INF. I believe the paper is in error in history and in strategic terms in arguing that an "ability to respond proportionally and in kind has long been considered" necessary or "plausible" to deter escalation, and that replacement of the obsolescent SS-4 and SS-5 by the much more capable and less vulnerable SS-20 "in effect created a new class of weapons". In any case, it does not follow that to eliminate that entire class in Europe would be undesirable and could damage the coupling of the deterrent. If it could damage reassurance of our Allies, we should address that problem, not compound it.

Compliance. Compliance is a major issue because the nature of the problem, and its existence with respect to certain U. S. as well as Soviet activities, is not sufficiently recognized. But carefully examined, it could be dealt with. Neither the USSR nor the United States has a "pattern" or policy of noncompliance. The issue is not in any respect "the most important obstacle to reaching significant new arms control agreements". What is most required is a real effort to resolve issues, and to ensure strict compliance, rather than to nourish and exploit the issue for confrontational political warfare.

Conventional Forces. The paper points to shortcomings in the Western conventional (and chemical) posture and recommends a number of prudent steps. It is, however, focused entirely on ensuring a balance for deterrence; that should be a minimum, not the maximum, goal. There is no discussion of possible conventional arms reductions and limitations—a difficult but important subject which will need to be addressed well before 2000.

Crisis Management. Some useful findings and recommendations on crisis management are made, but the tendency is to emphasize "organization," "institutions," and "mechanisms". The real problem is political, including reciprocal political accommodations, and should lead to more emphasis on crisis avoidance.

Arms Control. Arms control is not an end in itself, it is a possible instrument to serve primarily security, and other (political, economic), interests. The paper does not address such key possibilities as a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a ban on anti-satellite weapons, as well as being so deeply committed to traditionally perceived requirements for deterrence and skepticism as to Soviet interests in arms control as to foreclose real possibilities of sharply constraining strategic defensive systems, sharply reducing offensive systems, eliminating chemical weapons, and possibly significantly restructuring and reducing conventional forces.

The paper is a solid, conservative platform; regrettably, it does not raise our horizons to the potentialities for the year 2000.

APPENDIX 2

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

ABM: Anti-Ballistic Missile
AWACS: Airborne Warning and Control System
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF: Intermediate Nuclear Forces
MIRV: Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
R&D: Research and Development
SALT: Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SDI: Strategic Defense Initiative
SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

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