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William P. Clark  
of Counsel



October 12, 1987

Dear Mr. President:

In case you missed this, I find Henry's  
comment compelling.

Respectfully,



William P. Clark

Enclosure:

enclosure

Article: "Kissinger:  
A New Era for NATO"

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Oct. 12, 1987

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C. 20500

Frank:

I would appreciate your  
passing this note and  
attachment along to the  
President.

Henry A. Kissinger



Bill Clark

# Kissinger: A New Era for NATO

After an INF accord, creative diplomacy will be needed to save the alliance

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

I was born in Europe and became secretary of state of the country that gave me refuge—an inconceivable elevation anywhere else in the world. I have known both sides of the Atlantic intimately, and maintaining close ties between them has always been a priority especially close to my heart. And for a long period it was my good fortune to observe an American policy based on that same commitment. Americans have every reason to take pride in what their leaders have built in 40 years of bipartisan effort on Atlantic relations. America, the daughter of Europe, repaid its heritage by contributing idealism and resources to the old Continent in its darkest hour. And it added to the values of human dignity and freedom that it inherited from Europe an innocence and idealism that have made it a beacon to oppressed peoples everywhere.

To be sure, like many Americans I have often been exasperated by shortsighted European actions and by the tendency among some of our allies to shift the burden of difficult decisions onto the United States. With the passage of time, it has become increasingly evident that the alliance cannot live forever on the capital accumulated in the great decade of creativity that produced the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Marshall plan and the Atlantic alliance. While in office in 1973, I appealed for a rededication of the two sides of the Atlantic. "The next generation of leaders in Europe, Canada and America," I pointed out, "will have neither the personal memory nor the emotional commitment to the Atlantic alliance of its founders . . . On both sides of the Atlantic, we are faced with the anomalous situation in which the public mind identifies foreign-policy success increasingly with relations with adversaries . . ."

That effort at renewal foundered on European fear of American domination and on tactical mistakes on my part. But the situation I foresaw a decade and a half ago is now upon us. A grave crisis of confidence has developed. Concern about America's intentions has always been inherent in the military inequality between the two sides of the Atlantic and their geographic separation. What is new about the current situation is that America is being doubted not by its traditional critics but by its oldest friends.



Pressure tactics: One of the German Pershing 1A missiles slated for removal

The crisis has been triggered by the imminent agreement to eliminate medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles from the arsenals of both superpowers. Its provisions will no doubt be fully debated when it comes up for ratification before the Senate. But the debate will miss a crucial point. Domestic political support for stationing American missiles on the Continent has disappeared in all the European countries. In that sense, the negotiations have already created a new reality. Hence, nonratification is not an option.

It will be the task of American foreign policy to find constructive ways of dealing with that new reality. At the moment, the groups that have most consistently supported close Atlantic cooperation are in disarray. For over a generation, they have accepted as an article of faith that American nuclear weapons were needed to counterbalance Soviet conventional superiority—and that deployment of American missiles on the Continent was an essential component of that strategy. They now find the most conservative U.S. administration

of the postwar era stigmatizing nuclear weapons with arguments all but indistinguishable from the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament.

They experienced the shock of Reykjavik, where the superpowers were on the verge of agreeing to scrap all missiles (including those of our allies). They have seen enormous pressure put on the Federal Republic of Germany to accept the withdrawal not only of the American medium-range missiles on its soil but also of Pershing 1A's, German-controlled missiles located there for a decade and a half. The fact that the last four NATO commanders are themselves deeply uneasy about the agreement compounds the Europeans' anxiety. The internal political debate within the alliance will never be the same again.

The administration justifies the pending agreement by pointing out that the Soviets will give up more warheads than the United States. But the Soviet Union is not in the habit of making unequal agreements. Its quid pro quo is a goal that the Soviets have sought for a generation: sepa-

rating America from its European allies.

This is a particular problem in the Federal Republic of Germany. No other country is in as precarious a geographic, political and psychological position. West Germany is still a relatively new state with an artificial capital and essentially arbitrary frontiers that rose out of the shock and despair of a disastrous war. Across mine fields and barbed wire that divide it from East Germany, it faces at least 20 Soviet divisions in a high state of preparedness. No other country so desperately needs steadiness and sensitivity from its allies. Frequent shocks threaten its fragile self-confidence and hard-won new moorings. An eminent European leader said to me shortly after Reykjavik: "The [medium-range] missiles were a corset that ties Germany to the West. You are now destroying that corset and we will have to pay the price for it."

In addition, if the president persists in his assault on nuclear weapons and establishes denuclearization as a pre-eminent American objective, a crisis with the European nuclear powers, Britain and France, is certain. They do not accept his proposition that their security is enhanced by eliminating all nuclear weapons; nor do they believe it is possible to defend Europe entirely with conventional forces. Under the shock of Reykjavik, they are acquiescing in the withdrawal of American weapons stationed in Germany—but primarily as a means of staving off U.S. pressure to give up their own nuclear forces. If that calculation proves mistaken, they will fiercely resist any assault on their nuclear forces.

The NATO crisis can thus be summed up as follows:

- The apparent change in a military doctrine pursued by the past five administrations places the predominant burden of nuclear defense on weapons based in the United States or at sea. This is occurring at a time when congressional budgetary pressures have put in doubt plans to develop new weapons necessary for a more flexible strategy.

- In the process, many Europeans are convinced, a gap is being created that in time will enable the Soviet Union to threaten Europe while sparing the United States. In technical terms, the defenses of the two sides of the Atlantic will be "decoupled."

- This fear is all the greater because the Soviet conventional superiority has not been reduced. Because of that imbalance, administration invocations of its horror of nuclear war send a shudder through the Europeans, who worry that America may recoil before its nuclear commitments.

All this makes it probable that Europe will seek new directions in the years ahead. Some countries will be tempted to maneuver between East and West and to extend

the administration's denuclearization rhetoric to battlefield weapons. Others will go in the opposite direction and seek to build up their own nuclear forces. In either case, the old pattern of American tutelage will end. While America can no longer prevent these trends, it should try to channel them in a constructive direction. It should endorse the existing European nuclear forces, support their coordination, and encourage a greater European identity in defense and arms-control matters. Where it is feasible, it can strengthen political cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic. Where it is not, it can at least limit the extent to which disagreements are pushed.

## How Did the Crisis Arise?

From the beginning, NATO has faced a fundamental dilemma: it confronts a threat from a single country, while the alliance is composed of many (lately 16) sovereign states, the strongest of which is separated from most of the others by some 4,000 miles. A coalition, no matter how close, can never be—or appear to be—as cohesive as a single state. America has acted as if a legal commitment could make NATO a single unit. But Europeans, with their experience of fragile alliances, have always sought more tangible guarantees. Even in the early days of NATO, when the United States possessed clear nuclear superiority, the allies insisted on a substantial American military presence on the Continent. It made little sense in terms of the prevailing military doctrine of "mas-

sive nuclear retaliation"; but it provided reassurance because it was believed—at least subconsciously—that the United States would have no choice except to defend its own forces.

In the '60s, the Soviet Union began to edge toward parity, and in the '70s the United States and the Soviet Union entered into arms-control negotiations aimed at making nuclear attack militarily unproductive. To some extent, they have succeeded in that end. But a nuclear standoff puts the side that can escape defeat only by the use of nuclear weapons at a clear disadvantage. When nuclear war loses its military rationale, the inevitable question arises whether any nation would risk national suicide for an ally—no matter how close their ties.

The Europeans have never believed that conventional weapons, by themselves, are reliable deterrents; too many European wars have broken out when forces were roughly equal. NATO thus came to rely on American nuclear forces to offset a Soviet conventional threat beyond a certain threshold. But, insecure about relying entirely on a United States arsenal located so far away, our allies sought a claim on American decision making. For defense-minded Europeans, the issue has not been whether the United States had the technical ability to reach Soviet territory from America or from the sea. It was whether America would use that capability in defense of European interests and survival. Atlanticist Europeans reasoned that long-



Harsh memories: Waiting for a U.S. air drop during the 1948 Berlin crisis

range nuclear weapons in Europe would provide the indispensable link between American strategy and European defense.

To be sure, this point of view was never unanimous. A significant portion of European opinion always believed that Europe should rely less on the United States and instead mediate between East and West. The debate became virulent when America sought to deploy medium-range American missiles in Europe in the early '80s. In the end these missiles were introduced only after riots and demonstrations that shook the domestic tranquillity of many countries for months. It is impossible to understand the European reaction to the forthcoming INF agreement without considering what the current leaders went through when the missiles were installed. And the fact that the agreement is supported by some American hard-liners with arguments first advanced by the opponents of missile deployment has added to the psychological havoc.

**Balance of power:** The confusion and anger have been particularly acute in the Federal Republic of Germany. Germany was the last major European state to be unified. Its founding was not the result of a popular movement; it was a decision taken by the princes of the various German states, under the dominant influence of Prussia. Precisely because democracy and nationalism were at odds in Germany for the better part of a century, German populism has always had an abstract romantic quality and lacked a sense of proportion. This turned the strategic problems produced by Germany's geographic location into a permanent source of instability for Europe. Before unification, Germany had for centuries been the battleground on which its neighbors fought to maintain the European balance of power. After unification, Germany sought—understandably, if unwisely—to achieve security against all its neighbors simultaneously. But this effort paradoxically produced Germany's worst nightmare: a coalition of neighboring states. For if Germany was strong enough to defeat all its neighbors simultaneously, it was clearly strong enough to overwhelm them individually. Thus Germany's effort to escape its strategic predicament made the first world war all but inevitable. For centuries Germany has been either too weak or too strong to ensure peace in Europe.

It was the West's good fortune that in the period following World War II the new West German state was led by a truly great man, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer understood that Germany could find its emotional bearings and overcome the legacy of distrust only by resisting the temptations of geography and attaching itself firmly to the Western Alliance. He acted courageously and painfully, while the Soviet Union was turning the eastern

third of the country into a communist outpost—and while a passionate domestic opposition was accusing him of giving up the option of unification in favor of the Western Alliance and the American connection.

Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), was the chief

## What is new about this crisis is that America is being doubted by its oldest friends

spokesman for that point of view. His party had heroically resisted the Nazis and included some of the most admirable men in German politics. But precisely because the SPD represented one of the few elements of historic continuity, it advocated a policy that amounted to dressing up traditional nationalism in neutralist garb—that is, trading Western ties for unification.

The opponents of NATO only gradually came to terms with German integration into the West. Adenauer's legacy proved so strong that in the '70s two distinguished Social Democratic chancellors, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, were able to make major contributions to Western policy (in part because a staunchly pro-Western core of German public opinion forged during the bitter debates of the '50s provided a hedge against adventurism).

Still, Schumacher's legacy proved almost as lasting as Adenauer's. His disciples never completely overcame their doubts, and when Chancellor Schmidt proposed the deployment of American medium-range missiles on German soil, the upheaval in his party helped bring him down. Since then, the SPD has pursued an agenda much closer to the spirit of its first leader than of its last chancellor—one that stresses national issues, antinuclear policies and German autonomy. And since the third German party—the Free Democrats—can survive only by maneuvering between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, any weakening of the Christian Democrats is bound to jeopardize the steady course of German policy.

I have known the Christian Democratic leaders who have responsibility for foreign policy and defense for decades. After a life-

time of unquestioning support for American policies, they find themselves adrift in an unfamiliar world in which American briefers parrot the slogans of their antinuclear adversaries. They resent the pressures that caused them to give up their own 450-mile-range missiles, the Pershing 1A's. (To be sure, Washington denied applying any pressure. However, its claim that it was on the verge of a historic agreement implicitly put the onus on Germany if the talks failed.) After the INF agreement goes into force, the nuclear missiles left in Germany will be unable to hit targets outside East or West Germany. No government in Bonn is likely to sustain support for a strategy under which only Germans are threatened by nuclear retaliation from German soil.

As they grow more and more disillusioned with America, heretofore pro-Atlantic Germans may seek an emotional outlet by promoting the so-called "German question." To be sure, the Soviet Union and its East European allies have no conceivable interest in actual unification. But they do not need to agree to unification to influence German policy. The notion that the fate of Germany under communist rule should be eased is gaining momentum. By manipulating that slogan, the communists could discourage the Federal Republic from making further pro-Western moves without paying the price of actual unification.

Most European leaders share this assessment of the German situation. And the leaders of Britain and France are bound to wonder whether if the START talks progress their own nuclear forces will eventually be subjected to the same pressures as the Pershing 1A's in Germany. The disarray in the alliance will then be complete.

## What Should Be Done?

No one should pretend that there is a simple remedy to a crisis that has been building for a decade or more. Nor will the old standby of multiplying reassurances work. A NATO summit—now being discussed in Washington—would act as a brief tranquilizer, at best. Before the NATO heads of government meet, the United States must make up its mind about what it wishes to say and how it can elicit a reliable long-term consensus.

A few principles can be stated here:

■ *It is imperative for the United States to establish a relationship between its rhetoric and its strategy, and between its defense and arms-control policies.* President Reagan cannot keep repeating the goal of denuclearizing the world without further eroding the American nuclear commitment to Europe. Moreover, somebody must face the fact that slogans of denuclearization are impossible to fulfill—and hence irresponsible. So many nuclear weapons have been produced and the territory of both super-

powers is so vast that it would be impossible to ensure that all these weapons have been eliminated. No arms agreement could do away with the knowledge of how to make these weapons. Any negotiation would have to take into account open as well as clandestine programs in new nuclear countries. In short, it cannot be in the interest of the democracies to keep avowing objectives more sentimental than realistic—and to stigmatize the weapons on which the defense of the West must for the foreseeable future be based.

■ *The popular sport of Europe-bashing must end.* This is not the time to settle old scores, however real. America's traditional friends need reassuring, not lecturing. In particular, a time of nuclear withdrawal is not the occasion to push for so-called "burden-sharing" by threatening to remove conventional forces. What is most lacking, after all, is an agreement on precisely what burden is supposed to be shared.

■ *It is urgent that allied strategic doctrine be reviewed.* The relationship between conventional and nuclear forces is in the process of being lost. I have argued for 30 years that the threshold at which nuclear weapons have to be used should be raised much higher. But a few realities must be faced: the United States will not restore the draft. And no Western nation will substantially increase its defense budget (indeed, the trend is in the opposite direction). The practical problem, therefore, is to define a realistic threshold for conventional forces—and for once to meet it.

At the moment, the potential for distrust between the two sides of the Atlantic is paralyzingly deep. An increasing number of Europeans, especially in Germany, want to remove battlefield nuclear weapons from their soil. The practical implication of that would be to shift the risks of nuclear deterrence from the most threatened country entirely to the most distant ally. By the same token, the administration's suggestion that battlefield weapons can substitute for medium-range missiles creates the reverse impression in many European minds—namely, that America seeks to confine nuclear devastation to European territory. The alliance can no longer avoid a precise definition of who, in times of crisis, has what nuclear responsibilities and in what time frame.

■ *The American nuclear forces assigned to the NATO commander should be more precisely defined.* Now that any major nuclear response to Soviet aggression against NATO will have to come from the seas or from America, some of the weapons earmarked for that purpose should be placed more immediately and visibly under NATO control. The American strategic weapons "assigned" to NATO now belong to the alliance in name only. A defined number of warheads fall into that category,

but no specific submarines—and the submarines on which the warheads are stationed are constantly being rotated. But as former NATO commander Bernard Rogers has pointed out, there will be no way for the Soviets to distinguish NATO-assigned forces from the overall U.S. strategic force.

## The Soviets will not be stupidly impatient. The democracies need to save themselves

A flexible nuclear response is therefore becoming almost impossible. Some concrete measures that give the NATO commander a greater and continuing role in overseeing the weapons earmarked for European defense are essential, as well as some method of clarifying which part of the U.S. strategic forces serves the purpose of flexible response.

■ *Defense policy must be related to arms-control policy.* It is quite predictable that the Soviet Union will apply the Reykjavik model to conventional forces—and sooner rather than later. A numerical scheme seemingly advantageous to the United States will be put forward—say, to start with, the withdrawal of two Soviet divisions for one American division. But no such scheme can alter the geographic reality of Soviet proximity to Europe. And the inevitable corollary would be a freeze on NATO's remaining conventional forces. Unless carefully designed, such schemes could enhance the Soviet conventional advantage by forcing smaller NATO forces to be stretched thin against an aggressor with the option of concentrating its forces. Until there is an alliance agreement on a desirable conventional threshold, no criteria exist for assessing conventional reductions.

Similarly, it is certain that pressure for denuclearized zones within the alliance will mount. In my view, the denuclearization of central Europe would open the floodgates of neutralism, encouraging no-first-use doctrines that imply that the alliance prefers to be defeated by conventional forces than to use nuclear weapons. This is undoubtedly why Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has rejected any further nuclear reductions in Europe until

allied and Soviet-bloc conventional and chemical weapons are brought into balance. She has seen the alliance drifting perilously close to self-imposed military impotence in which START negotiations remove the rationale for retaliation with strategic weapons, INF negotiations prevent retaliation from European territory and conventional talks threaten to freeze an unfavorable conventional equation.

■ *The United States should encourage a greater European sense of identity in defense matters.* In the wake of Reykjavik and the tentative INF agreement, the Europeans are sure to seek greater self-reliance. The only open question is whether those efforts take the form of neutralism or of common European defense. The current governments in Britain and France will almost certainly accelerate their nuclear buildups, giving that priority over conventional reinforcement; the defense-minded element in the rest of Europe will strive to foster a specifically European conception of security. The United States should encourage these trends, for the alternative is neutralism.

**European identity:** Allowing Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own defense will in the long run strengthen Atlantic ties and help Germany overcome its sense of isolation. Washington for a generation has supported the Common Market, which inherently involves competition with America. It should therefore abandon its historic reserve and welcome a European identity in defense, which in the end is bound to spur Atlantic cooperation. There is no foreseeable East-West conflict in which Europe will not be better off without American support. This is why, if the British and French can agree on coordinating their nuclear forces, the United States should encourage it as an important first step toward a greater European role in nuclear defense.

To symbolize its confidence in the new arrangement, America could allow the NATO military commander to be a European. Meanwhile, the secretary-general, the political representative of NATO, might be American—a reversal of traditional roles that would demonstrate that the alliance is adapting to new political conditions.

A few weeks ago, a European in a senior position of responsibility told me that though he agreed with my analysis, he had concluded that opposition to what was inevitable would reduce his effectiveness. "Remember," he said, "that even Churchill would have gone down in flames had Hitler not been stupidly impatient."

My wise European friend had a point. The Soviets will not be stupidly impatient. The democracies will have to save themselves. By dealing with the new realities creatively, they can yet revitalize their alliance.

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Communique issued by the Session of the Political  
Consultative Com. of the Warsaw Pact

NSC # 8704230

ON THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW  
TREATY

UNDER PRESENT-DAY CONDITIONS, IT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO PERCEIVE CORRECTLY THE OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS OF STATES AND MILITARY-POLITICAL ALLIANCES ENSHRINED IN THEIR MILITARY DOCTRINES.

IN THIS LIGHT AND GIVEN THE NEED TO BANISH WAR ONCE AND FOR ALL FROM CIVILIZATION, TO END THE ARMS RACE, TO RULE OUT THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE, TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY, AND TO BRING ABOUT GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY HAVE RESOLVED TO SET OUT THE PRINCIPLES OF THEIR MILITARY DOCTRINE, WHICH PROVIDES THE BASIS FOR THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WARSAW TREATY ORGANIZATION AND REFLECTS THE COMMON DEFENCE-ORIENTED MILITARY-POLITICAL OBJECTIVES OF ITS MEMBER STATES AND OF THEIR NATIONAL MILITARY DOCTRINES.

1

THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE WARSAW TREATY AND THAT OF EACH STATE PARTY IS SUBORDINATED TO THE TASK OF PREVENTING WAR, WHETHER NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL. BY VIRTUE OF THE VERY ESSENCE OF THEIR SOCIAL SYSTEM THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE NEVER LINKED THEIR FUTURE WITH THE MILITARY SOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, OR WILL THEY EVER DO SO. THEY WISH TO SEE ALL INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES RESOLVED BY PEACEFUL, POLITICAL MEANS. IN THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE AGE THE WORLD HAS BECOME TOO FRAGILE A PLACE FOR WAR AND POLITICS OF VIOLENCE. IN VIEW OF THE COLOSSAL DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL THAT HAS BEEN ACCUMULATED, MANKIND IS FACED WITH THE PROBLEM OF SURVIVAL. A WORLD WAR, NOTABLY A NUCLEAR ONE, WOULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES NOT ONLY FOR THE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN SUCH A CONFLICT BUT FOR ALL LIFE ON EARTH.

THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY IS STRICTLY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE.



IT IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT THAT UNDER PRESENT-DAY CONDITIONS RECOURSE TO MILITARY MEANS TO RESOLVE ANY DISPUTE IS INADMISSIBLE. THE ESSENTIAL PRECEPTS OF THIS DOCTRINE ARE AS FOLLOWS:

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY WILL NEVER UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES INITIATE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ANY STATE OR ALLIANCE OF STATES UNLESS THEY ARE THEMSELVES THE TARGET OF AN ARMED ATTACK.

THEY WILL NEVER BE THE FIRST TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEY HAVE NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON ANY OTHER STATE, EITHER IN EUROPE OR OUTSIDE EUROPE.

THEY DO NOT VIEW ANY STATE OR ANY PEOPLE AS THEIR ENEMY. RATHER, THEY ARE PREPARED TO CONDUCT THEIR RELATIONS WITH ALL THE WORLD'S COUNTRIES, WITHOUT ANY EXCEPTION, ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL REGARD FOR SECURITY INTERESTS AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY DECLARE THAT THEIR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ARE FIRMLY BASED ON RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF INDEPENDENCE AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, THE NON-USE OR NON-THREAT OF FORCE, THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, EQUALITY AND THE OTHER PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES EMBODIED IN THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND IN OTHER UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

WHILE COMMITTED TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DISARMAMENT MEASURES, THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY ARE AT THE SAME TIME COMPELLED TO MAINTAIN THEIR ARMED FORCES IN SUCH A STRUCTURE AND AT SUCH A LEVEL THAT THEY ARE ABLE TO REPEL ANY OUTSIDE ATTACK ON ANY ONE OF THE STATES PARTIES.

THE ARMED FORCES OF THE ALLIED STATES ARE KEPT IN A STATE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS THAT IS SUFFICIENT TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE NOT COUGHT UNAWARES. SHOULD THEY, HOWEVER, BE SUBJECTED TO ATTACK, THEY WILL INFLICT A CRUSHING BLOW ON THE AGGRESSOR.

IT IS NOT THE PURPOSE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY TO MAINTAIN ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BEYOND THE SCALE REQUIRED TO MEET THESE OBJECTIVES. SO THEY WILL STRICTLY KEEP TO THE LIMITS SUFFICIENT FOR DEFENCE AND FOR REPELLING ANY POSSIBLE AGGRESSION.

2

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY CONSIDER IT THEIR PARAMOUNT DUTY TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE SECURITY FOR THEIR PEOPLES. THE ALLIED SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DO NOT SEEK TO HAVE A HIGHER DEGREE OF SECURITY THAN OTHER COUNTRIES, BUT WILL NOT SETTLE FOR A LESSER DEGREE. THE STATE OF MILITARY-STRATEGIC PARITY WHICH CURRENTLY EXISTS REMAINS A DECISIVE FACTOR FOR PREVENTING WAR. EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN, HOWEVER, THAT PARITY AT EVER INCREASING LEVELS DOES NOT LEAD TO GREATER SECURITY. FOR THIS REASON THEY WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE EFFORTS IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THE MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM AT PROGRESSIVELY LOWER LEVELS. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES,

THE CESSATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND MEASURES GEARED TOWARDS REAL DISARMAMENT ARE ASSUMING TRULY HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE. IN THIS DAY AND AGE, STATES HAVE NO OPTION BUT TO SEEK AGREEMENTS THAT WOULD RADICALLY SCALE DOWN MILITARY CONFRONTATION.

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY ARE UNSWERVINGLY COMMITTED TO THESE TENETS. IN FULL CONFORMITY WITH THE DEFENSIVE NATURE OF THEIR MILITARY DOCTRINE, THEY ARE VIGOROUSLY PURSUING THE FOLLOWING FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES:

FIRST, GENERAL AND COMPLETE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR TESTING WITHOUT DELAY AS A HIGH PRIORITY MEASURE TO HALT THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION AND REFINING OF NUCLEAR ARMS, THE GRADUAL REDUCTION AND FINAL ELIMINATION OF THE WEAPONS AND THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE,

SECOND, PROHIBITION AND ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL AND OTHER CATEGORIES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION,

THIRD, REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE TO A LEVEL WHERE NEITHER SIDE, MAINTAINING ITS DEFENCE CAPACITY, WOULD HAVE THE MEANS TO STAGE A SURPRISE ATTACK AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE OR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN GENERAL,

FOURTH, STRICT VERIFICATION OF ALL DISARMAMENT MEASURES THROUGH A COMBINATION OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL BODIES, THE EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATIONS, AND ON-SITE INSPECTIONS,

FIFTH, ESTABLISHMENT OF NUCLEAR-WEAPONS-FREE AND CHEMICAL-WEAPON-FREE ZONES IN VARIOUS AREAS OF EUROPE AND IN OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD AS WELL AS OF ZONES OF THINNED-OUT ARMS CONCENTRATION AND INCREASED MUTUAL TRUST, INTRODUCTION OF MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS IN EUROPE AND AGREEMENTS ON SUCH MEASURES IN OTHER REGIONS OF THE WORLD, INCLUDING SEAS AND OCEANS. FURTHERMORE, MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY AND THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE TO FORGO THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND TO MAINTAIN PEACEFUL RELATIONS, THE ELIMINATION OF THE MILITARY BASES ESTABLISHED ON THE TERRITORY OF OTHER COUNTRIES, THE RETURNING OF THEIR ARMED FORCES TO THEIR NATIONAL TERRITORIES, THE MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE MOST DANGEROUS CATEGORIES OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM THE ZONE OF DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO MILITARY ALLIANCES, AND MEASURES TO LOWER THE CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THIS ZONE TO AN AGREED MINIMUM LEVEL,

SIXTH, AS THEY REGARD THE DIVISION OF EUROPE INTO OPPOSING MILITARY BLOCS AS UNNATURAL, THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY FAVOUR THE SIMULTANEOUS DISSOLUTION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE WARSAW TREATY AND, AS A

FIRST STEP, THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR MILITARY ORGANIZATION, AND FINALLY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY PROPOSE TO THE MEMBER STATES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE TO ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS IN ORDER TO COMPARE THE MILITARY DOCTRINES OF THE TWO ALLIANCES, ANALYSE THEIR NATURE AND JOINTLY DISCUSS THE PATTERNS OF THEIR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT SO AS TO REDUCE THE MUTUAL SUSPICION AND DISTRUST THAT HAS ACCUMULATED OVER THE YEARS, TO ENSURE A BETTER PERCEPTION OF EACH OTHER'S INTENTIONS AND TO GUARANTEE THAT THE MILITARY CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINES OF THE TWO MILITARY BLOCS AND THEIR MEMBERS ARE BASED ON DEFENSIVE PRINCIPLES.

OTHER POSSIBLE SUBJECTS FOR THE CONSULTATIONS ARE THE IMBALANCES AND ASYMMETRICAL LEVELS THAT HAVE EMERGED IN CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES, AS WELL AS THE SEARCH FOR WAYS TO ELIMINATE THEM THROUGH A REDUCTION BY THE SIDE WHICH HAS AN ADVANTAGE OVER THE OTHER, ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THESE REDUCTIONS LEAD TO EVER LOWER LEVELS. THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY PROPOSE THAT SUCH CONSULTATIONS BE HELD AT ACKNOWLEDGED EXPERT LEVEL, INCLUDING MILITARY SPECIALISTS REPRESENTING THE COUNTRIES OF BOTH SIDES. THEY ARE PREPARED TO START SUCH NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE THE END OF 1987. THE CONSULTATIONS MAY BE HELD IN WARSAW OR BRUSSELS OR IN THE TWO CITIES ALTERNATELY.

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JUN 1 1967

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED BY THE SESSION OF THE POLITICAL  
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE  
WARSAW TREATY

87 JUN 2 P 4: 33

A SESSION OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY ON FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL ASSISTANCE WAS HELD IN BERLIN ON 28 AND 29 MAY 1987. IT WAS ATTENDED BY.

ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA: TODOR ZHIVKOV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE BULGARIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA, HEAD OF THE DELEGATION, GEORGI ATANASOV, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, DOBRI DZHUROV, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, MILKO BALEV, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARY OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, PETYR MLADENOV, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

ON BEHALF OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: JANOS KADAR, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST WORKER'S PARTY, HEAD OF THE DELEGATION, GYOERGY LAZAR, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, MATYAS SZUERGES, SECRETARY OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, PETER VARKONYI, MEMBER OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FERENC KARPATI, MEMBER OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.

ON BEHALF OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC: ERICH HONECKER, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY OF GERMANY, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, HEAD OF THE DELEGATION, WILLI STOPH, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, HERMANN AXEN, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARY OF THE PARTY'S

CENTRAL COMMITTEE, EGON KRENZ, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARY OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE, HEINZ KESSLER, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, GUENTER MITTAG, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARY OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE, OSKAR FISCHER, MEMBER OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

ON BEHALF OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: WOJCIECH JARUZELSKI, FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF STATE OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, HEAD OF THE DELEGATION, ZBIGNIEW MESSNER, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, JOZEF CZYREK, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO AND SECRETARY OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MARIAN ORZECOWSKI, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FLORIAN SIWICKI, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.

ON BEHALF OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA: NICOLAE CEAUSESCU, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIST PARTY, PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA, HEAD OF THE DELEGATION, CONSTANTIN DASCALESCU, MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, PRIME MINISTER, ION STOIAN, ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND SECRETARY OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, VASILE MILEA, ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, IOAN TOTU, ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GHEORGHE CARANFIL, AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA TO THE GDR.



ON BEHALF OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:  
MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, HEAD OF THE  
DELEGATION, ANDREJ GROMYKO, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE  
PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CHAIRMAN OF THE PRESIDUM OF  
THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,  
NIKOLAI RYZHKOV, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL  
COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, EDUARD  
SHEVARDNADZE, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL  
COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SERGEJ SOKOLOV,  
ALTERNATE MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL  
COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF DEFENCE, VADIM MEDVEDIEV, SECRETARY  
OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

ON BEHALF OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC: GUSTAV HUSAK,  
GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST  
PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, PRESIDENT OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST  
REPUBLIC, HEAD OF THE DELEGATION, LUBOMIR STROUGAL, MEMBER OF  
THE PRESIDUM OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, CHAIRMAN OF THE  
GOVERNMENT, VASIL BILAK, MEMBER OF THE PRESIDUM AND SECRETARY  
OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MILOS JAKES, MEMBER OF THE  
PRESIDIUM AND SECRETARY OF THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE,  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, MILAN VACLAVIK, MEMBER OF THE  
PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.

ALSO TAKING PART IN THE SESSION WERE THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  
OF THE UNITED ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW  
TREATY, MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION VIKTOR KULIKOV, AND THE  
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE POLITICAL CONSULATIVE COMMITTEE,  
HERBERT KROLIKOWSKI, FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.

1.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SESSION REVIEWED THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AT LARGE. THEY BELIEVE THAT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS, CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE INCREASING INTERDEPENDENCE OF STATES, ADVANCES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AND THE EXISTENCE OF WEAPONS OF UNPRECEDENTED DESTRUCTIVE POWER CALL FOR A NEW WAY OF THINKING, A NEW APPROACH TO THE ISSUES OF WAR AND PEACE, DISARMAMENT AND OTHER COMPLEX GLOBAL AND REGIONAL PROBLEMS, AND FOR THE ABANDONMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF 'NUCLEAR DETERRENCE' WHICH SUPPOSES THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE THE GUARANTEE FOR THE SECURITY OF STATES. IN A NUCLEAR WAR, THERE CAN BE NO WINNERS. FOR THIS REASON, THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY REAFFIRMED THEIR BELIEF THAT THE OVERRIDING TASK IS TO PREVENT WAR, TO BANISH IT PERMANENTLY FROM CIVILIZATION, TO PRESERVE PEACE ON EARTH, TO PUT AN END TO THE ARMS RACE AND TO MOVE TOWARDS CONCRETE MEASURES OF DISARMAMENT, PRIMARILY IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD, WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING COMPLETE AND GENERAL DISARMAMENT. THIS REQUIRES A POOLING OF EFFORTS OF ALL STATES AND ALL PEACE-LOVING FORCES, GREATER TRUST IN RELATIONS AMONG STATES, ESPECIALLY AMONG THOSE BELONGING TO DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS, AND BETWEEN THEIR MILITARY-POLITICAL ALLIANCES, AND A CORRECT PERCEPTION OF EACH OTHER'S CONCERNS, OBJECTIVES AND INTENTIONS AS REGARDS THE MILITARY SPHERE.

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY REITERATE THAT THEIR MILITARY DOCTRINE IS DEFENSIVE IN NATURE AND BASED ON THE NEED TO KEEP THE BALANCE OF MILITARY FORCES AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL AS WELL AS THE DESIRABILITY OF REDUCING THE MILITARY POTENTIALS TO SUFFICIENT LEVELS AS REQUIRED FOR DEFENCE. THEY ADOPTED A DOCUMENT ON THIS MATTER, WHICH WILL BE PUBLISHED.

2.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SESSION CONSIDER THAT IT IS NOW POSSIBLE TO ADOPT THE FOLLOWING PRACTICAL STEPS IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN ORDER TO STOP HUMANITY FROM DRIFTING TOWARDS A NUCLEAR DISASTER:

- IMMEDIATE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT ON ELIMINATING ALL AMERICAN AND SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE ON THE BASIS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL UNDERSTANDING REACHED AT REYKJAVIK. FOLLOWING UPON ITS SIGNING THE SOVIET MISSILES EMPLACED IN THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN RESPONSE TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE WILL BE WITHDRAWN WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THESE COUNTRIES.

- SIMULTANEOUS ELIMINATION OF THE SOVIET AND US SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE AND NEGOTIATIONS ON SUCH MISSILES STATIONED IN THE EASTERN PARTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND ON THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES.

- SETTLEMENT OF THE ISSUE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING TACTICAL MISSILES, IN EUROPE THROUGH MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AS PROPOSED BY THE WARSAW TREATY STATES AT THEIR MEETING IN BUDAPEST.

- AGREEMENT ON RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS COUPLED WITH A STRENGTHENING OF THE ABM TREATY REGIME.

THE ALLIED SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ADVOCATE A 50 PER CENT REDUCTION IN THE OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS OF THE USSR AND THE USA WITHIN A PERIOD OF FIVE YEARS AND NEGOTIATIONS ON SUBSEQUENT REDUCTIONS.

- COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING AS A HIGH PRIORITY MEASURE DESIGNED TO PUT AN END TO THE DEVELOPMENT, MANUFACTURE AND REFINEMENT OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND TO BRING ABOUT THEIR REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION THE WARSAW TREATY STATES PROPOSE THAT EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS BE STARTED WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY TO WORK OUT PERTINENT ACCORDS.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SESSION FIRMLY SUPPORT THE IDEA THAT OUTER SPACE BE KEPT FREE OF WEAPONS, THAT THE ABM TREATY BE STRICTLY OBSERVED AND THAT AGREEMENTS BE CONCLUDED BANNING ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS AND SPACE-TO-EARTH WEAPONS AND PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE, THAT ALL ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE BE CONDUCTED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES, ON A RATIONAL BASIS AND FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL MANKIND.

THE LEADERS OF THE ALLIED SOCIALIST STATES ADVOCATE THE ELABORATION OF KEY PROVISIONS FOR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA ON OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS, THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ABM TREATY REGIME AND THE CONDUCTING OF NUCLEAR TESTS. ALONG WITH THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY OF MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES, THEY COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL AND PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE PREPARATION OF LEGALLY BINDING SOVIET-AMERICAN ACCORDS.

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT FOR ALL EUROPEAN STATES, NOTABLY THE MEMBERS OF THE TWO ALLIANCES, TO CONTRIBUTE ACTIVELY TOWARDS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT AND THE SUCCESS OF PERTINENT NEGOTIATIONS. THEY ARE DOING EVERYTHING IN THEIR POWER SO AS TO ACHIEVE CONCRETE ACCORDS, BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL, WITH THE AIM OF REMOVING NUCLEAR AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY THE END OF THIS CENTURY.

3.

THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE SESSION FAVOUR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE ELIMINATION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THEY REITERATE THEIR PREPAREDNESS TO COMPLETE THE PREPARATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND PROVIDING FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE STOCKPILES OF SUCH WEAPONS AND THE INDUSTRIAL BASES FOR THEIR PRODUCTION BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. THEY RECALL IN THIS REGARD THEIR MOSCOW DECLARATION OF 25 MARCH 1987.

4.

THEY DISCUSSED WAYS OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAMME ADOPTED BY THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY IN JUNE 1986 WITH A VIEW TO ACHIEVING A 25 PER CENT REDUCTION IN ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE DURING THE EARLY 1990'S.

THE REDUCTIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE SIMULTANEOUSLY AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE TACTICAL NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SESSION SUGGEST THAT WHILE THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED ARE BEING PUT INTO EFFECT, IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO WORK OUT NEW MEASURES ENABLING EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS IN ARMED FORCES, ARMAMENTS AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES TO GET UNDER WAY BY THE YEAR 2000.

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY HOLD THE VIEW THAT THE REDUCTION IN MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE SHOULD BE A CONTINUOUS PROCESS WITH THE MILITARY BALANCE BEING SECURED AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL AT EACH STAGE. AWARE OF THE ASYMMETRIC STRUCTURES OF THE ARMED FORCES MAINTAINED BY THE TWO SIDES IN EUROPE, WHICH ARE ROOTED IN HISTORICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL AND OTHER FACTORS, THEY STATE THEIR PREPAREDNESS TO HAVE THE IMBALANCE THAT HAS ARISEN IN CERTAIN ELEMENTS REDRESSED IN THE COURSE OF THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSING THAT THE SIDE WHICH HAS AN ADVANTAGE OVER THE OTHER SIDE MAKE THE APPROPRIATE CUTBACKS. THE PROCESS OF CUTTING BACK ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS SHOULD BY ACCOMPANIED BY APPROPRIATE REDUCTIONS IN THE MILITARY EXPENDITURES OF THE STATES CONCERNED.

THE STATES REPRESENTED AT THE SESSION PROPOSE TO ALL STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE THAT A MEETING OF THEIR FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD BE HELD TO ADOPT A DECISION ON INITIATING EXTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON DRASTIC REDUCTIONS IN ARMED FORCES, CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AND TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE COUPLED WITH APPROPRIATE CUTBACKS IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES. THESE TALKS SHOULD ALSO

COVER A NUMBER OF HIGH PRIORITY MEASURES DESIGNED TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND AVERT THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK, TO ENSURE THE MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE MOST DANGEROUS OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FROM THE ZONE OF DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN THE TWO MILITARY ALLIANCES AND TO REDUCE THE CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THIS ZONE TO AN AGREED MINIMUM LEVEL.

THE BEST FORUM TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WOULD BE THE SECOND STAGE OF THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. BUT OTHER OPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH DISARMAMENT ISSUES, ESPECIALLY WITHIN THE CSCE PROCESS, INCLUDING THE CONVENING OF A SPECIAL FORUM, ARE ALSO POSSIBLE.

THE ALLIED SOCIALIST STATES ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS HELD IN VIENNA BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATO AND WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES AND DESIGNED TO ASSIST IN FORMULATING A MANDATE FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS.

REAFFIRMING THEIR GOOD WILL AND STRIVING TO CREATE THE BEST POSSIBLE CONDITIONS FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS, THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY DECLARE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO EXERCISE MAXIMUM RESTRAINT REGARDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR MILITARY POTENTIALS AND, ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY, NOT TO BUILD UP ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS AS WELL AS TO PROCLAIM A MORATORIUM ON ARMS SPENDING FOR A PERIOD OF ONE OR TWO YEARS. THEY CALL ON THE NATO COUNTRIES TO DO LIKEWISE.

5.

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO STEPS AIMED AT LESSENING MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND ENHANCING SECURITY IN INDIVIDUAL REGIONS OF EUROPE, TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ZONES FREE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE BALKANS, IN THE CENTRE AND IN THE NORTH OF THE CONTINENT. THEY REAFFIRM THEIR RESOLVE TO ENSURE THAT THE PROPOSALS MADE TO THIS EFFECT BY THE GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ROMANIA AND BULGARIA ARE IMPLEMENTED.

AS REGARDS THE PROPOSALS MADE BY THE GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE CORRIDOR ALONG THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN THE WARSAW TREATY AND NATO COUNTRIES THAT WOULD BE 300 KILOMETRES WIDE (150 KILOMETRES ON EITHER SIDE), THESE PROVIDE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL, ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS, OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, I.E. NUCLEAR MUNITIONS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR MINES, SHORTER-RANGE AND TACTICAL MISSILES, NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, NUCLEAR-ARMED TACTICAL STRIKE AIRCRAFT AND NUCLEAR-CAPABLE SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS.

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY ARE ALSO IN FAVOUR OF CONTINUING AND INTENSIFYING THE MULTILATERAL DIALOGUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE AND CHEMICAL-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE BALKANS.

THE STATES REPRESENTED AT THE SESSION FULLY SUPPORT THE PLAN SUBMITTED BY POLAND FOR ARMS REDUCTION AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ITS IMPLEMENTATION WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN STRENGTHENING PEACE AND STABILITY ON THE CONTINENT.

6.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DISARMAMENT MEASURES WOULD BE GUARANTEED BY AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF VERIFICATION CONFORMING WITH

THE INTENT OF THE DISARMAMENT MEASURES AND INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. SINCE, IN THE PROCESS OF MOVING TOWARDS REAL DISARMAMENT, VERIFICATION BECOMES A PRINCIPAL MEANS OF GUARANTEEING SECURITY, THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY ADVOCATE THE CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF STRINGENT MEASURES TO VERIFY THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AT ALL STAGES.

IT MUST BE GUARANTEED THAT MEASURES TO VERIFY THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR MISSILES ARE TAKEN AT ALL THE SITES WHERE THESE MISSILES ARE DISMANTLED AND DESTROYED, AS WELL AS ON TESTSITES, AT MILITARY BASES, INCLUDING THOSE IN THIRD COUNTRIES, IN TRAINING CENTRES, STORAGE FACILITIES AND AT MANUFACTURING PLANTS, STATE-OWNED AND PRIVATE.

IN THE FIELD OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS, MEASURES TO VERIFY THE ACTUAL REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY MEASURES TO MONITOR THE MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES THAT REMAIN AFTER THE PROCESS IS COMPLETED.

7.

THE STATES REPRESENTED AT THE SESSION REVIEWED THE COURSE TAKEN BY THE VIENNA MEETING OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, WHICH HAS ENTERED THE CRUCIAL STAGE OF DRAFTING GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENTS. THEY STATED THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING. SUBSTANTIAL AND WELL-BALANCED DECISIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN AT THE MEETING TO FACILITATE REAL PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT, IN CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES IN THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN FIELDS ON THE FIRM AND RELIABLE BASIS OF ALL THE PRINCIPLES ENSHRINED IN THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. REJECTING THE DIVISION OF EUROPE INTO TWO OPPOSING MILITARY BLOCS, THEY ARE IN FAVOUR OF THE SIMULTANEOUS DISSOLUTION OF



THESE ALLIANCES. GOODNEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS AND COOPERATION IN THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOME.

THE STATES REPRESENTED AT THE SESSION ARE CONVINCED THAT THE PROPOSED MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS FROM THE CSCE COUNTRIES COULD NOT ONLY FACILITATE THE START OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS IN EUROPE BUT COULD ALSO BE CONDUCTIVE TO THE SOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES RELATING TO EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SESSION WERE AGREED THAT LASTING PEACE AND GOODNEIGHBOURLY COOPERATION IN EUROPE ARE CONDITIONAL ON RESPECT FOR THE TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL REALITIES EXISTING ON THIS CONTINENT. THE ACTIVITIES OF REVANCHIST FORCES, NOTABLY IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, AND ANY ENCOURAGEMENT OF REVANCHISM, WHEREVER IT MAY OCCUR, RUN COUNTER TO THE INTERESTS OF DETENTE AND SECURITY AND ARE CONTRARY TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT. ANY SUCH ACTIVITIES WILL CONTINUE TO BE REJECTED MOST VIGOROUSLY.

THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CLIMATE OF TRUST, MUTUAL RESPECT AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG NATIONS REQUIRE THAT AN END BE PUT TO POLITICS OF ENMITY AMONG THEM AND TO ALL ATTEMPTS AT FOMENTING ANTICOMMUNISM, PROPAGATING RACISM, RESORTING TO DISCRIMINATION IN ANY SHAPE OR FORM AND SPREADING CHAUVINISTIC AND NATIONALISTIC VIEWS.

8.

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY ARE PREPARED TO LOOK FOR WAYS OF EXPANDING MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS ECONOMIC, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION WITH ALL COUNTRIES. THEY ARE IN FAVOUR OF REMOVING THE OBSTACLES TO TRADE AND ECONOMIC EXCHANGES AND OF INTENSIFYING ECONOMIC RELATIONS AMONG THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE CSCE, WHICH WOULD BE CONDUCTIVE TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF DETENTE, SECURITY AND PEACE IN EUROPE.

THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY ARE IN FAVOUR OF EXTENSIVE COOPERATION IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD. THEY ARE OF THE CONVICTION THAT EVERYTHING MUST BE DONE TO ENSURE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO LIVE AND WORK IN PEACE AND FREEDOM AND THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF POLITICAL, CIVIL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THEIR ENTIRETY AND INTERDEPENDENCE, WITH DUE RESPECT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES.

9.

THE STATES REPRESENTED AT THE SESSION REITERATE THEIR COMMITMENT TO A COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY WHICH WOULD EMBRACE THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL AS WELL AS THE ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN SPHERES. IT WOULD ALSO INCLUDE COOPERATION ON ECOLOGICAL MATTERS. SUCH A SYSTEM OF SECURITY WOULD LEAD TO THE EMERGENCE OF A WORLD FREE FROM NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WHICH THE USE OR THREAT OF FORCE WOULD BE RULED OUT AND RELATIONS AMONG NATIONS BE SHAPED IN THE SPIRIT OF MUTUAL RESPECT, FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION.

THE INITIATIVE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS DESIGNED TO OVERCOME ANY CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH AND TO ASSERT CIVILIZED STANDARDS AND AN ATMOSPHERE OF OPENNESS, TRANSPARENCY AND TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SESSION WELCOMED THE BROAD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BEGUN AT THE UNITED NATIONS ON THESE ISSUES. THEY WISH TO SEE THE RESULT-ORIENTED DIALOGUE CONTINUED AND WIDENED IN EVERY DIRECTION AND AT ALL LEVELS IN ORDER TO MOVE TOWARDS CONCRETE MEASURES CREATING MATERIAL, POLITICAL, LEGAL, MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL GUARANTEES OF PEACE AND TOWARDS PRACTICAL ACTION TO BUILD SECURITY FOR ALL. THEY EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS 42ND SESSION WILL MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THIS END. THE UNITED NATIONS COULD BECOME THE EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE OF THE COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

THE STATES REPRESENTED AT THE SESSION STRESSED THE NEED FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE BY ALL STATES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY, THE NON-USE OR NON-THREAT OF FORCE, THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES, NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, EQUALITY, AND THE OTHER PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND OTHER UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

10.

THE LEADERS OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY EXCHANGED VIEWS ON SEATS OF TENSIONS AND CONFLICTS IN THE WORLD. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR RESOLVE TO MAKE AN ACTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO FINDING JUST POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO THESE ISSUES THROUGH NEGOTIATION.

AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE HELD UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND WITH ALL THE INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION AS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE PARTICIPATING ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE ATTAINMENT OF LASTING PEACE IN THE REGION. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PREPARATORY COMMITTEE INVOLVING THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS WELL AS ALL INTERESTED PARTIES COULD BE A PRACTICAL STEP TOWARDS CONVENING SUCH A CONFERENCE.

IT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF WORLD PEACE IF THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT WAS ENDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND THE PROBLEMS AT ISSUE WERE RESOLVED BY WAY OF NEGOTIATION WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF BOTH STATES ON THE BASIS OF THE UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SESSION WELCOMED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC AND EXPRESSED THEIR CONVICTION THAT THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEMS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA BY WAY OF NEGOTIATION ON THE BASIS OF RESPECT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY OF EVERY COUNTRY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS OF GOODNEIGHBOURLINESS AND COOPERATION IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD WOULD BE CONDUCIVE TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. THEY VOICED SUPPORT FOR THE POLICY OF ACHIEVING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND OF BRINGING ABOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE SITUATION AROUND AFGHANISTAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON THE BASIS OF THE CESSATION OF ANY INTERFERENCE IN THE COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND RESPECT FOR ITS INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY. THEY EXPRESSED THEIR INTEREST IN THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOVIET-AFGHAN UNDERSTANDING ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

THE STATES REPRESENTED AT THE SESSION REAFFIRMED THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THEIR STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM, COLONIALISM AND THE RACIST POLICIES OF APARTHEID, WITH THE NAMIBIAN PEOPLE FIGHTING FOR LIBERATION AND GENUINE INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF SWAPO. THEY STRONGLY CONDEMN THE AGGRESSIVE ACTS PERPETRATED BY THE RSA AGAINST THE PEOPLES OF ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE AND THE OTHER INDEPENDENT NEIGHBOURING STATES.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SESSION VOICED THEIR FULL SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS BEING MADE TO ACHIEVE A JUST POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THEY CALLED FOR AN END OF ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST NICARAGUA AND FOR THE RECOGNITION OF EVERY PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR PATH OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FREELY AND WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE.

THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SESSION DEALT WITH SOME ASPECTS OF THE WORLD ECONOMIC SITUATION, INCLUDING ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE ELIMINATION OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT. THEY ADOPTED A RELEVANT DOCUMENT, WHICH WILL BE PUBLISHED.

11.

THE SESSION CONDUCTED AN EXTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION AMONG THE ALLIED SOCIALIST STATES. IT COMMENDED THE FOREIGN MINISTERS COMMITTEE AND THE DEFENCE MINISTERS COMMITTEE FOR THE WORK PERFORMED AFTER THE BUDAPEST SESSION OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE AND DEFINED THEIR FUTURE TASKS.

WHILE DISCUSSING QUESTIONS RELATING TO COOPERATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE WARSAW TREATY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE SESSION AGREED TO RENDER THEIR FOREIGN POLICY COOPERATION MORE DYNAMIC, ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL RELATIONS AMONG THE ALLIED STATES. THEY CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT FOR EVERY ALLIED STATE TO INCREASE ITS ACTIVITY AND INITIATIVE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS IN THE INTERESTS OF A HARMONIZED FOREIGN POLICY LINE.

IN THIS CONNECTION, IT WAS AGREED TO ESTABLISH A MULTILATERAL GROUP OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY TO PROVIDE CONTINUOUS MUTUAL INFORMATION.

IT WAS ALSO DECIDED TO FORM A SPECIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY ON DISARMAMENT MATTERS THAT WILL BE COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MINISTRIES OF DEFENCE AND WILL EXCHANGE VIEWS AND INFORMATION ON MATTERS OF ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT, ESPECIALLY IN THE NUCLEAR SPHERE, INCLUDING THE CONSIDERATION

OF INITIATIVES OF THE ALLIED STATES AND THE DRAFTING OF JOINT PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMISSION IS DESIGNED TO ENABLE ALL STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY TO TAKE AN EVEN MORE ACTIVE PART IN JOINT EFFORTS IN THE FIELD OF ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT.

THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE HEARD A REPORT OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE UNITED ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES PARTIES OF THE WARSAW TREATY ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SUPREME COMMAND AND ADOPTED A RELEVANT DECISION.

THE SESSION WAS MARKED BY AN ATMOSPHERE OF FRIENDSHIP AND COMRADELY COOPERATION. IT WAS EVIDENCE OF IDENTICAL VIEWS ON ALL MATTERS DISCUSSED.

THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC IN ITS CAPACITY AS HOST OF THE SESSION WILL ARRANGE FOR THE DOCUMENTS ADOPTED AT THE SESSION TO BE MADE AVAILABLE TO OTHER STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

THE NEXT REGULAR SESSION OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY WILL BE HELD IN WARSAW. THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, HENRYK JAROSZEK, DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WAS APPOINTED SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE PERIOD AHEAD.

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# Kissinger: A New Era for NATO

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After an INF accord, creative diplomacy will be needed to save the alliance

BY HENRY A. KISSINGER

I was born in Europe and became secretary of state of the country that gave me refuge—an inconceivable elevation anywhere else in the world. I have known both sides of the Atlantic intimately, and maintaining close ties between them has always been a priority especially close to my heart. And for a long period it was my good fortune to observe an American policy based on that same commitment. Americans have every reason to take pride in what their leaders have built in 40 years of bipartisan effort on Atlantic relations. America, the daughter of Europe, repaid its heritage by contributing idealism and resources to the old Continent in its darkest hour. And it added to the values of human dignity and freedom that it inherited from Europe an innocence and idealism that have made it a beacon to oppressed peoples everywhere.

To be sure, like many Americans I have often been exasperated by shortsighted European actions and by the tendency among some of our allies to shift the burden of difficult decisions onto the United States. With the passage of time, it has become increasingly evident that the alliance cannot live forever on the capital accumulated in the great decade of creativity that produced the Greek-Turkish aid program, the Marshall plan and the Atlantic alliance. While in office in 1973, I appealed for a rededication of the two sides of the Atlantic. "The next generation of leaders in Europe, Canada and America," I pointed out, "will have neither the personal memory nor the emotional commitment to the Atlantic alliance of its founders . . . On both sides of the Atlantic, we are faced with the anomalous situation in which the public mind identifies foreign-policy success increasingly with relations with adversaries . . ."

That effort at renewal foundered on European fear of American domination and on tactical mistakes on my part. But the situation I foresaw a decade and a half ago is now upon us. A grave crisis of confidence has developed. Concern about America's intentions has always been inherent in the military inequality between the two sides of the Atlantic and their geographic separation. What is new about the current situation is that America is being doubted not by its traditional critics but by its oldest friends.



Pressure tactics: One of the German Pershing 1A missiles slated for removal SYGMA

The crisis has been triggered by the imminent agreement to eliminate medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles from the arsenals of both superpowers. Its provisions will no doubt be fully debated when it comes up for ratification before the Senate. But the debate will miss a crucial point. Domestic political support for stationing American missiles on the Continent has disappeared in all the European countries. In that sense, the negotiations have already created a new reality. Hence, nonratification is not an option.

It will be the task of American foreign policy to find constructive ways of dealing with that new reality. At the moment, the groups that have most consistently supported close Atlantic cooperation are in disarray. For over a generation, they have accepted as an article of faith that American nuclear weapons were needed to counterbalance Soviet conventional superiority—and that deployment of American missiles on the Continent was an essential component of that strategy. They now find the most conservative U.S. administration

of the postwar era stigmatizing nuclear weapons with arguments all but indistinguishable from the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament.

They experienced the shock of Reykjavik, where the superpowers were on the verge of agreeing to scrap all missiles (including those of our allies). They have seen enormous pressure put on the Federal Republic of Germany to accept the withdrawal not only of the American medium-range missiles on its soil but also of Pershing 1A's, German-controlled missiles located there for a decade and a half. The fact that the last four NATO commanders are themselves deeply uneasy about the agreement compounds the Europeans' anxiety. The internal political debate within the alliance will never be the same again.

The administration justifies the pending agreement by pointing out that the Soviets will give up more warheads than the United States. But the Soviet Union is not in the habit of making unequal agreements. Its quid pro quo is a goal that the Soviets have sought for a generation: sepa-

rating America from its European allies.

This is a particular problem in the Federal Republic of Germany. No other country is in as precarious a geographic, political and psychological position. West Germany is still a relatively new state with an artificial capital and essentially arbitrary frontiers that rose out of the shock and despair of a disastrous war. Across mine fields and barbed wire that divide it from East Germany, it faces at least 20 Soviet divisions in a high state of preparedness. No other country so desperately needs steadiness and sensitivity from its allies. Frequent shocks threaten its fragile self-confidence and hard-won new moorings. An eminent European leader said to me shortly after Reykjavik: "The [medium-range] missiles were a corset that ties Germany to the West. You are now destroying that corset and we will have to pay the price for it."

In addition, if the president persists in his assault on nuclear weapons and establishes denuclearization as a pre-eminent American objective, a crisis with the European nuclear powers, Britain and France, is certain. They do not accept his proposition that their security is enhanced by eliminating all nuclear weapons; nor do they believe it is possible to defend Europe entirely with conventional forces. Under the shock of Reykjavik, they are acquiescing in the withdrawal of American weapons stationed in Germany—but primarily as a means of staving off U.S. pressure to give up their own nuclear forces. If that calculation proves mistaken, they will fiercely resist any assault on their nuclear forces.

The NATO crisis can thus be summed up as follows:

- The apparent change in a military doctrine pursued by the past five administrations places the predominant burden of nuclear defense on weapons based in the United States or at sea. This is occurring at a time when congressional budgetary pressures have put in doubt plans to develop new weapons necessary for a more flexible strategy.

- In the process, many Europeans are convinced, a gap is being created that in time will enable the Soviet Union to threaten Europe while sparing the United States. In technical terms, the defenses of the two sides of the Atlantic will be "decoupled."

- This fear is all the greater because the Soviet conventional superiority has not been reduced. Because of that imbalance, administration invocations of its horror of nuclear war send a shudder through the Europeans, who worry that America may recoil before its nuclear commitments.

All this makes it probable that Europe will seek new directions in the years ahead. Some countries will be tempted to maneuver between East and West and to extend

the administration's denuclearization rhetoric to battlefield weapons. Others will go in the opposite direction and seek to build up their own nuclear forces. In either case, the old pattern of American tutelage will end. While America can no longer prevent these trends, it should try to channel them in a constructive direction. It should endorse the existing European nuclear forces, support their coordination, and encourage a greater European identity in defense and arms-control matters. Where it is feasible, it can strengthen political cooperation between the two sides of the Atlantic. Where it is not, it can at least limit the extent to which disagreements are pushed.

## How Did the Crisis Arise?

From the beginning, NATO has faced a fundamental dilemma: it confronts a threat from a single country, while the alliance is composed of many (lately 16) sovereign states, the strongest of which is separated from most of the others by some 4,000 miles. A coalition, no matter how close, can never be—or appear to be—as cohesive as a single state. America has acted as if a legal commitment could make NATO a single unit. But Europeans, with their experience of fragile alliances, have always sought more tangible guarantees. Even in the early days of NATO, when the United States possessed clear nuclear superiority, the allies insisted on a substantial American military presence on the Continent. It made little sense in terms of the prevailing military doctrine of "mas-

sive nuclear retaliation"; but it provided reassurance because it was believed—at least subconsciously—that the United States would have no choice except to defend its own forces.

In the '60s, the Soviet Union began to edge toward parity, and in the '70s the United States and the Soviet Union entered into arms-control negotiations aimed at making nuclear attack militarily unproductive. To some extent, they have succeeded in that end. But a nuclear standoff puts the side that can escape defeat only by the use of nuclear weapons at a clear disadvantage. When nuclear war loses its military rationale, the inevitable question arises whether any nation would risk national suicide for an ally—no matter how close their ties.

The Europeans have never believed that conventional weapons, by themselves, are reliable deterrents; too many European wars have broken out when forces were roughly equal. NATO thus came to rely on American nuclear forces to offset a Soviet conventional threat beyond a certain threshold. But, insecure about relying entirely on a United States arsenal located so far away, our allies sought a claim on American decision making. For defense-minded Europeans, the issue has not been whether the United States had the technical ability to reach Soviet territory from America or from the sea. It was whether America would use that capability in defense of European interests and survival. Atlanticist Europeans reasoned that long-



Harsh memories: Waiting for a U.S. air drop during the 1948 Berlin crisis

range nuclear weapons in Europe would provide the indispensable link between American strategy and European defense.

To be sure, this point of view was never unanimous. A significant portion of European opinion always believed that Europe should rely less on the United States and instead mediate between East and West. The debate became virulent when America sought to deploy medium-range American missiles in Europe in the early '80s. In the end these missiles were introduced only after riots and demonstrations that shook the domestic tranquillity of many countries for months. It is impossible to understand the European reaction to the forthcoming INF agreement without considering what the current leaders went through when the missiles were installed. And the fact that the agreement is supported by some American hard-liners with arguments first advanced by the opponents of missile deployment has added to the psychological havoc.

**Balance of power:** The confusion and anger have been particularly acute in the Federal Republic of Germany. Germany was the last major European state to be unified. Its founding was not the result of a popular movement; it was a decision taken by the princes of the various German states, under the dominant influence of Prussia. Precisely because democracy and nationalism were at odds in Germany for the better part of a century, German populism has always had an abstract romantic quality and lacked a sense of proportion. This turned the strategic problems produced by Germany's geographic location into a permanent source of instability for Europe. Before unification, Germany had for centuries been the battleground on which its neighbors fought to maintain the European balance of power. After unification, Germany sought—understandably, if unwisely—to achieve security against all its neighbors simultaneously. But this effort paradoxically produced Germany's worst nightmare: a coalition of neighboring states. For if Germany was strong enough to defeat all its neighbors simultaneously, it was clearly strong enough to overwhelm them individually. Thus Germany's effort to escape its strategic predicament made the first world war all but inevitable. For centuries Germany has been either too weak or too strong to ensure peace in Europe.

It was the West's good fortune that in the period following World War II the new West German state was led by a truly great man, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. Adenauer understood that Germany could find its emotional bearings and overcome the legacy of distrust only by resisting the temptations of geography and attaching itself firmly to the Western Alliance. He acted courageously and painfully, while the Soviet Union was turning the eastern

third of the country into a communist outpost—and while a passionate domestic opposition was accusing him of giving up the option of unification in favor of the Western Alliance and the American connection.

Kurt Schumacher, the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), was the chief

## What is new about this crisis is that America is being doubted by its oldest friends

spokesman for that point of view. His party had heroically resisted the Nazis and included some of the most admirable men in German politics. But precisely because the SPD represented one of the few elements of historic continuity, it advocated a policy that amounted to dressing up traditional nationalism in neutralist garb—that is, trading Western ties for unification.

The opponents of NATO only gradually came to terms with German integration into the West. Adenauer's legacy proved so strong that in the '70s two distinguished Social Democratic chancellors, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, were able to make major contributions to Western policy (in part because a staunchly pro-Western core of German public opinion forged during the bitter debates of the '50s provided a hedge against adventurism).

Still, Schumacher's legacy proved almost as lasting as Adenauer's. His disciples never completely overcame their doubts, and when Chancellor Schmidt proposed the deployment of American medium-range missiles on German soil, the upheaval in his party helped bring him down. Since then, the SPD has pursued an agenda much closer to the spirit of its first leader than of its last chancellor—one that stresses national issues, antinuclear policies and German autonomy. And since the third German party—the Free Democrats—can survive only by maneuvering between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, any weakening of the Christian Democrats is bound to jeopardize the steady course of German policy.

I have known the Christian Democratic leaders who have responsibility for foreign policy and defense for decades. After a life-

time of unquestioning support for American policies, they find themselves adrift in an unfamiliar world in which American briefers parrot the slogans of their antinuclear adversaries. They resent the pressures that caused them to give up their own 450-mile-range missiles, the Pershing 1A's. (To be sure, Washington denied applying any pressure. However, its claim that it was on the verge of a historic agreement implicitly put the onus on Germany if the talks failed.) After the INF agreement goes into force, the nuclear missiles left in Germany will be unable to hit targets outside East or West Germany. No government in Bonn is likely to sustain support for a strategy under which only Germans are threatened by nuclear retaliation from German soil.

As they grow more and more disillusioned with America, heretofore pro-Atlantic Germans may seek an emotional outlet by promoting the so-called "German question." To be sure, the Soviet Union and its East European allies have no conceivable interest in actual unification. But they do not need to agree to unification to influence German policy. The notion that the fate of Germany under communist rule should be eased is gaining momentum. By manipulating that slogan, the communists could discourage the Federal Republic from making further pro-Western moves without paying the price of actual unification.

Most European leaders share this assessment of the German situation. And the leaders of Britain and France are bound to wonder whether if the START talks progress their own nuclear forces will eventually be subjected to the same pressures as the Pershing 1A's in Germany. The disarray in the alliance will then be complete.

## What Should Be Done?

No one should pretend that there is a simple remedy to a crisis that has been building for a decade or more. Nor will the old standby of multiplying reassurances work. A NATO summit—now being discussed in Washington—would act as a brief tranquilizer, at best. Before the NATO heads of government meet, the United States must make up its mind about what it wishes to say and how it can elicit a reliable long-term consensus.

A few principles can be stated here:

- *It is imperative for the United States to establish a relationship between its rhetoric and its strategy, and between its defense and arms-control policies.* President Reagan cannot keep repeating the goal of denuclearizing the world without further eroding the American nuclear commitment to Europe. Moreover, somebody must face the fact that slogans of denuclearization are impossible to fulfill—and hence irresponsible. So many nuclear weapons have been produced and the territory of both super-

powers is so vast that it would be impossible to ensure that all these weapons have been eliminated. No arms agreement could do away with the knowledge of how to make these weapons. Any negotiation would have to take into account open as well as clandestine programs in new nuclear countries. In short, it cannot be in the interest of the democracies to keep avowing objectives more sentimental than realistic—and to stigmatize the weapons on which the defense of the West must for the foreseeable future be based.

■ *The popular sport of Europe-bashing must end.* This is not the time to settle old scores, however real. America's traditional friends need reassuring, not lecturing. In particular, a time of nuclear withdrawal is not the occasion to push for so-called "burden-sharing" by threatening to remove conventional forces. What is most lacking, after all, is an agreement on precisely what burden is supposed to be shared.

■ *It is urgent that allied strategic doctrine be reviewed.* The relationship between conventional and nuclear forces is in the process of being lost. I have argued for 30 years that the threshold at which nuclear weapons have to be used should be raised much higher. But a few realities must be faced: the United States will not restore the draft. And no Western nation will substantially increase its defense budget (indeed, the trend is in the opposite direction). The practical problem, therefore, is to define a realistic threshold for conventional forces—and for once to meet it.

At the moment, the potential for distrust between the two sides of the Atlantic is paralyzingly deep. An increasing number of Europeans, especially in Germany, want to remove battlefield nuclear weapons from their soil. The practical implication of that would be to shift the risks of nuclear deterrence from the most threatened country entirely to the most distant ally. By the same token, the administration's suggestion that battlefield weapons can substitute for medium-range missiles creates the reverse impression in many European minds—namely, that America seeks to confine nuclear devastation to European territory. The alliance can no longer avoid a precise definition of who, in times of crisis, has what nuclear responsibilities and in what time frame.

■ *The American nuclear forces assigned to the NATO commander should be more precisely defined.* Now that any major nuclear response to Soviet aggression against NATO will have to come from the seas or from America, some of the weapons earmarked for that purpose should be placed more immediately and visibly under NATO control. The American strategic weapons "assigned" to NATO now belong to the alliance in name only. A defined number of warheads fall into that category,

but no specific submarines—and the submarines on which the warheads are stationed are constantly being rotated. But as former NATO commander Bernard Rogers has pointed out, there will be no way for the Soviets to distinguish NATO-assigned forces from the overall U.S. strategic force.

## The Soviets will not be stupidly impatient. The democracies need to save themselves

A flexible nuclear response is therefore becoming almost impossible. Some concrete measures that give the NATO commander a greater and continuing role in overseeing the weapons earmarked for European defense are essential, as well as some method of clarifying which part of the U.S. strategic forces serves the purpose of flexible response.

■ *Defense policy must be related to arms-control policy.* It is quite predictable that the Soviet Union will apply the Reykjavik model to conventional forces—and sooner rather than later. A numerical scheme seemingly advantageous to the United States will be put forward—say, to start with, the withdrawal of two Soviet divisions for one American division. But no such scheme can alter the geographic reality of Soviet proximity to Europe. And the inevitable corollary would be a freeze on NATO's remaining conventional forces. Unless carefully designed, such schemes could enhance the Soviet conventional advantage by forcing smaller NATO forces to be stretched thin against an aggressor with the option of concentrating its forces. Until there is an alliance agreement on a desirable conventional threshold, no criteria exist for assessing conventional reductions.

Similarly, it is certain that pressure for denuclearized zones within the alliance will mount. In my view, the denuclearization of central Europe would open the floodgates of neutralism, encouraging no-first-use doctrines that imply that the alliance prefers to be defeated by conventional forces than to use nuclear weapons. This is undoubtedly why Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has rejected any further nuclear reductions in Europe until

allied and Soviet-bloc conventional and chemical weapons are brought into balance. She has seen the alliance drifting perilously close to self-imposed military impotence in which START negotiations remove the rationale for retaliation with strategic weapons. INF negotiations prevent retaliation from European territory and conventional talks threaten to freeze an unfavorable conventional equation.

■ *The United States should encourage a greater European sense of identity in defense matters.* In the wake of Reykjavik and the tentative INF agreement, the Europeans are sure to seek greater self-reliance. The only open question is whether those efforts take the form of neutralism or of common European defense. The current governments in Britain and France will almost certainly accelerate their nuclear buildups, giving that priority over conventional reinforcement; the defense-minded element in the rest of Europe will strive to foster a specifically European conception of security. The United States should encourage these trends, for the alternative is neutralism.

**European identity:** Allowing Europe to assume greater responsibility for its own defense will in the long run strengthen Atlantic ties and help Germany overcome its sense of isolation. Washington for a generation has supported the Common Market, which inherently involves competition with America. It should therefore abandon its historic reserve and welcome a European identity in defense, which in the end is bound to spur Atlantic cooperation. There is no foreseeable East-West conflict in which Europe will not be better off without American support. This is why, if the British and French can agree on coordinating their nuclear forces, the United States should encourage it as an important first step toward a greater European role in nuclear defense.

To symbolize its confidence in the new arrangement, America could allow the NATO military commander to be a European. Meanwhile, the secretary-general, the political representative of NATO, might be American—a reversal of traditional roles that would demonstrate that the alliance is adapting to new political conditions.

A few weeks ago, a European in a senior position of responsibility told me that though he agreed with my analysis, he had concluded that opposition to what was inevitable would reduce his effectiveness. "Remember," he said, "that even Churchill would have gone down in flames had Hitler not been stupidly impatient."

My wise European friend had a point. The Soviets will not be stupidly impatient. The democracies will have to save themselves. By dealing with the new realities creatively, they can yet revitalize their alliance.

C. F.

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Personal Message for Ambassador Price from Colin L. Powell F0002  
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Charlie:

The President has asked me to respond to your telegram of December 11 concerning Lady Olga Maitland.

We all share your admiration for Lady Olga and her associates, and we appreciate the very valuable pro-NATO and pro-Administration public diplomacy effort which they have made over the past several years. We had indeed hoped to arrange for Lady Olga and a few of her European and American colleagues to meet with the President either just before or just after the recent Summit, but it simply could not be worked out from a scheduling standpoint.

One of my staff members, Steve Steiner, has stayed in regular contact with Lady Olga through the years and has provided her with up-to-date Administration materials on INF, SDI and other issues in which she is interested. He also kept her posted on the state of play as we tried to work out a Presidential meeting. I have asked Steve to continue to stay in close touch with her.

With best wishes for the Holiday Season.

Handwritten initials and date: 12/14

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**National Security Council  
The White House**

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Situation Room	<u>1</u>	<u>YD/23 Dec 87</u>	<u>D</u>
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>R</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc:    VP                    Baker                    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                    Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Date/Time)

9496

~~NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL~~

*Pls put in  
System + dispatch  
thru Sec Rm.*

December 23, 1987

Florence:

Here is a proposed response to  
Ambassador Price concerning Lady Olga  
Maitland, as you requested. Let me  
know if you want any changes.

Have a really Merry Christmas and  
Happy New Year!

*Steve*

*[Handwritten initials]*

CONFIDENTIAL

NSC/S PROFILE

ID 8709496

RECEIVED 24 DEC 87 07

TO PRICE, C

FROM POWELL

DOCDATE 23 DEC 87

01/20/14

KEYWORDS: GREAT BRITAIN  
INF

NATO

MAITLAND, OLGA

SUBJECT: POWELL MSG TO AMB PRICE RE LADY MAITLAND

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( AK AK )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
				CHON ✓ SES ✓

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE WH (C) ✓  
AK