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(08/31/1983-November 1983) (5 of 22)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records:

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Subject File

FOIA ID: F1998-069/1, Mayer

Box/OA#: Box 3

[8/31/83 - 11/83] (5/22)

File Folder: Korean Airline Shootdown Vol. II 8/31/83 (1)

Date: 12/21/1999

DOCUMENT NO & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	answers to questions (w/notations), 3p D 10/30/01 NLSF98-069/1 #109	9/9/83	P1, F1
2. cable	091344Z SEP 83, 1p D 9/14/00 NLSF98-069/1 #110	9/9/83	P1, F1, P3, F3
3. report	Situation Report No. 20, 1p R 5/10/06 " #111	9/10/83	P1, F1
4. cable	111111Z SEP 83, 2p D 10/30/01 NLSF98-069/1 #112	9/11/83	P1, F1
5. cable	111323Z SEP 83, 4p D " " #113	9/11/83	P1, F1
6. report	re KAL incident, 1p P 9/14/00 NLSF98-069/1 #114	9/12/83	P1, F1, P3, F3
7. report	Situation Report No. 22, 1p R 5/10/06 " #115	9/11/83	P1, F1
8. report	Situation Report No. 21, 1p R " " #116	9/11/83	P1, F1
9. cable	061901Z SEP 83, 3p Part " " #117	9/6/83	P1, F1 , 86
10. cable	061915Z SEP 83, 1p D 10/30/01 NLSF98-069/1 #118	9/6/83	P1, F1
11. cable	061643Z SEP 83, 4p R 5/10/06 NLSF98-069/1 #119	9/6/83	P1, F1
12. cable	051610Z SEP 83 (w/notations), 1p D 10/30/01 NLSF98-069/1 #120	9/5/83	P1, F1
13. cable	061306Z SEP 83, 1p D " " #121	9/6/83	P1, F1
14. cable	060913Z SEP 83 (w/notations), 3p R 5/10/06 " #122	9/6/83	P1, F1
15. cable	061154Z SEP 83, 2p R " " #123	9/6/83	P1, F1
16. cable	051500Z SEP 83 (w/notations), 2p R " " #124	9/5/83	P1, F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records:

Archivist: kdb/kdb

Subject File

FOIA ID: F1998-069/1, Mayer

Box/OA#: Box 5

[9/31/83 - 11/83]

File Folder: Korean Airline Shootdown Vol. II 8/31/83 (1)

(5/22)

Date: 12/21/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17. wshfr rept	(1p) R 9/14/00 NLSF98-069/1 #125	9/5/83	P1, F1
18. report	#1 re USSR, 4p D " " #126	9/5/83	P1, F1, P3, F3
19. map	(1p) D " " #127	n.d.	P1, F1, P3, F3

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].

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F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

National Security Council The White House

System # _____

Package# _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u><i>[initials]</i></u>	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>	<u>✓</u>	_____
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Executive Secretary	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>I</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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Judge -
There are questions the VP
asked CIA.

[initials]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

WORKING GROUP ON KAL INCIDENT


Situation Report No. 20
Situation as of 1900 EDT, September 10, 1983


Soviet Pilots on KAL Downing

The Soviets put their pilots involved in the KAL shootdown on the Vremya television news program this evening in Moscow. After some footage showing interceptors from a Kamchatka airbase taking off at night, the three pilots were interviewed by a correspondent. The first pilot claimed the (KAL) aircraft was in total darkness. The second, presumably the one who shot down the plane, said that he winked his onboard lights, fired four bursts of tracer shells right across the (KAL plane's) nose, and dipped his wings. He said that he then received a "precise and definite" command. The third pilot claimed he saw the other pilot carrying out these maneuvers and "formed the impression that this was either an espionage aircraft or an aircraft of another type -- even a bomber."

US Search and Rescue Operations

The Koreans have formally requested that the search operation in the crash area be continued, and expanded to include salvage operations if required. They are making a similar request to the Japanese, and have suggested further internationalization of the effort.


Gary D. De Vight, ED/OA/AN
KAL Working Group
Cleared:EUR/SOV:LPascoe


W. A. Garland, S/S-O
Senior Watch Officer

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

12 September 1983

SPOT COMMENTARY: KAL INCIDENT: Tracer Rounds Used in any Case

The news services apparently have been misled by the State Department release on the revised transcripts--specifically the reference, "The transcript does not indicate whether the cannon shots were aimed at the KAL plane or were tracer rounds." This implies that if the rounds were tracer, they were not aimed at the KAL plane, but were instead warning shots. This is not necessarily the case. The SU-15 probably was carrying a standard ammunition load--conventional rounds with tracer rounds interspersed--for his cannon pods. Tracer rounds, therefore, would have been fired whether he was attacking or attempting to warn the airliner.

Prepared by [REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

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By h0J, NARA, Date 11/8/00

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WORKING GROUP ON KAL INCIDENT

Situation Report No. 22

Situation as of 1700 EDT, September 11, 1983

Transcript Revisions Released


The Department today released revisions of three passages in the transcript of Soviet radio transmissions. The remark of one pilot, "I have enough time," was corrected to "They do not see me." A statement that "now I will try a rocket" was changed to show "rockets," and a previously unintelligible section was deciphered to "I am firing cannon bursts." Press accounts note that the revisions may support Soviet claims that warning was given to the airliner before the attack.

ID Card Found

A Canadian citizenship identification card belonging to one of the KAL victims was found ashore on northern Hokkaido Island today. Police searching the Japanese coastline are so far reported to have recovered 198 pieces of KAL debris.

Soviet Air Defense Chief on 747/RS-135 Similarities

Moscow continued its media counter-offensive with a television interview of General Nikolai Moskvityalev, head of the Soviet defense fighter command, who asserted the KAL Boeing 747 was indistinguishable in the dark from an "American spy plane." The general stated: "The RC-135 and the passenger plane Boeing 747 are of one type. They have an identical form and geometrical dimension. They have identical flight speeds. They can be distinguished in the air visually only by day and at a close distance. To do this at night is impossible." Moskvityalev's claim has already drawn fire in Western press accounts; Reuters reports one Western air attaché's rejoinder that "It may be impossible for a Russian pilot to tell the difference, but I don't know of any other pilot in the world who would find it difficult."


Craig Dunkerley, EUR/SOV
KAL Task Force


William A. Garland, E/S-6
Senior Watch Officer

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WORKING GROUP ON KAL INCIDENT

Situation Report No. 21
Situation as of 0500 EDT, September 11, 1983

/S (3)
/S-S (2)
/S-S
/S-1

Soviet Pilots on KAL Downing


The Soviet television interview with the pilots involved in the KAL attack received top billing on late-night news programs. Coverage was factual; the pilots' version of events was not reported as a substantial challenge to the US record of the attack. Film clips of the pilots accompanied the reports.

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
Two Bodies Found

According to press reports, two bodies believed to be from downed KAL plane have been recovered by Japanese. One was the decapitated body of a woman believed to be Caucasian; the other an 8 to 11 year old child. Neither corpse has been identified.

M
CTFO
ILREP
EDITOR



Walter H. Lubkeman
KAL Working Group



Gary Usrey, S/S-O
Senior Watch Officer

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by GJ NARA, DATE 5/10/06

Washington, D.C. 20520

Sep 11

STATEMENT

As part of the policy of the US Government to develop full information on the tragic shootdown of KAL 007 by Soviet forces on August 31, U.S. Government experts have continued to review the poor quality transmission on the tape which was played at the UN Security Council September 6. That review has now been completed. After efforts at electronic enhancement and hundreds of replays of the tape, U.S. Government linguists were able to interpret three passages more clearly as indicated below.

The first segment at 1819:08 which originally was translated "I have enough time," now is translated as "they do not see me." The second segment was a previously unintelligible phrase at 1820:49, which has now been translated as "I am firing cannon bursts." Because of the Soviet pilot's reference at 1828:05 to launching "both" rockets, the linguists also rechecked the reference at 1823:37 which was previously translated as "rocket." They were able to clarify that the plural was used; thus the translations should be "... , now I will try rockets."

The transcript does not indicate whether the cannon shots were aimed at the KAL plane or were tracer rounds. We do note that, according to information made available by the Government of Japan to the United Nations, KAL 007, in its routine radio transmission to Tokyo at 1823* (over two minutes after the cannons were fired) gave no

* 18:23 GMT (3:23 JST)

KE-007: Tokyo Radio Korean Air 007 level 350 (Altitude 35,000 feet).
RJAA: Korean Air 007 Tokyo Roger."

--from the September 7, 1983 statement by the Director-General of the Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

indication it was aware of Soviet aircraft in the vicinity or that cannon had been fired. The evidence indicates that the pilot was totally unaware of the fact that he was off course, that he was intercepted by Soviet fighters, or that any warnings -- visual, radio, gunfire -- were given.

This additional analysis of the tapes reinforces our belief that the totality of the events remains exactly as stated by the US and Japan. The Korean airliner was not aware of the Soviet fighters, nor was it aware that any warning was given. The Soviets consciously made the decision to shoot down the aircraft. The fact is that it was an unarmed, civilian airliner, and it cost the lives of 269 innocent people.

September 11, 1983

THIS IS A TRANSCRIPT OF THE SHOOTDOWN OF KOREAN AIR
FLIGHT 007. TIMES ARE ZULU TIMES. CALLWORDS: KARNAVAL (KAR), DEPUTAT
(DEP), TRIKOTAZH (TRI).

*175658 - A/C ROGER, COURSE 70 (DEGREES).
*180046 (DEP) 121 COURSE 100 IN A CLIMB TO 8000 METERS).
*- (DEP) (121) I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND. WHAT COURSE?...MY COURSE IS
100.
*180057 (DEP) (121) I AM EXECUTING.
*180211 (DEP) 121 COURSE 50.
*180514 (KAR) 163 (ANSWER).
*180553 (DEP) 805 ON COURSE 240.
*180556 (DEP) (805) I SEE IT.
*180600 (DEP) (805) ROGER, UNDERSTOOD. I'M FLYING BEHIND.
*180607 (KAR) (1)63 COURSE 30, 8,000 (METERS).
*180622 (KAR) (163) EXECUTING COURSE 100.
*180630 (DEP) (805) ROGER... DISTANCE TO AIRFIELD?
*180633 (DEP) (805) ROGER.
*180649 (KAR) 163 (ALTITUDE) 4900... I'M EXECUTING...
*- (DEP) 121 I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND.
*180704 (DEP) (121) I AM EXECUTING.
*180750 (DEP) (805) FUEL REMAINDER THREE (METRIC) TONS.
*- (DEP) (805) ROGER. REPEAT THE COURSE.
*- (DEP) (805) TO THE LEFT, PROBABLY? NOT TO THE RIGHT.
*180806 (DEP) (805) CARRY OUT COURSE 260.
*- (DEP) (805) ON COURSE 260... UNDERSTOOD.
*- (KAR) (1)63 COURSE 220, 7500 (METERS).
*- (DEP) (805) ROGER.
*180831 DEP 805 SHOULD I TURN OFF THE WEAPONS SYSTEM?... ROGER.
*180848 (KAR) (163) 163 NEEDS TO DROP HIS WING TANKS.
*180900 (DEP) (805) YES, IT HAS TURNED... THE TARGET IS 80 DEGREES
TO MY LEFT.
*180935 (DEP) (805) EXECUTING (COURSE) 240.
*180944 (DEP) (805) COURSE 240... ROGER.
*181016 (DEP) (805) EXECUTING (COURSE) 220.
*181025 (DEP) (121) EXECUTING.
*181029 (KAR) (163) (COURSE) 245 (DEGREES) FOR 163?... EXECUTING.
*181035 (DEP) (805) COURSE 220.
*181044 (DEP) (805) I DIDN'T UNDERSTAND.
*181051 (DEP) (805) ROGER, (THE TARGET'S STROBE) LIGHT IS BLINKING.
*181057 (KAR) (1)63 COURSE 245, 7500 (METERS).
*181120 (DEP) (805) 8,000 (METERS)... ROGER.
*181128 (DEP) 121 COURSE 280.
*181137 (DEP) (163) 4500 (METERS).

* - DEP 121 COURSE 280.
 #181151 (DEP) (805) EXECUTING.
 #181203 (KAR) 163 EXECUTING.
 #181210 (DEP) (805) I SEE IT VISUALLY AND ON RADAR.
 #181219 (DEP) (805) ROGER.
 #181221 (KAR) (163) EXECUTING 10 (DEGREES) LEFT.
 #181241 (KAR) 163 I HAVE DROPPED MY TANKS... I DROPPED THEM.
 EXECUTING.
 #181305 (DEP) (805) I SEE IT. I'M LOCKED ON TO THE TARGET.
 #181316 (DEP) (805) ROGER.
 #181326 (DEP) (805) THE TARGET ISN'T RESPONDING TO I.F.F.
 #181335 (DEP) (805) THE TARGET'S COURSE IS 240 DEGREES.
 #181340 (DEP) (805) (THE WEAPONS SYSTEM) IS TURNED ON.
 #181410 (DEP) (805) ROGER. IT'S STILL ON THE SAME COURSE FOR NOW.
 #181416 (DEP) (805) ROGER.
 #181434 (DEP) (805) ROGER. I HAVE (ENOUGH) SPEED. I DON'T NEED TO
 TURN ON MY AFTERBURNER.
 #181441 (DEP) (805) MY FUEL REMAINDER IS 2,700.
 * - (KAR) (163) I'VE DROPPED MY TANKS. ONE AT 4000, ONE AT 3800.
 #181500 (KAR) (163) COURSE 230.
 #181508 (DEP) (805) THE TARGET'S COURSE IS STILL THE SAME. 240.
 #181537 (KAR) (163) EXECUTING.
 #181547 (DEP) (805) I AM IN LOCK-ON.
 #181551 (DEP) (805) COURSE 240.
 #181643 (DEP) (805) THE TARGET'S COURSE IS 240.
 * - (KAR) (163) YES.
 #181705 (KAR) (163) REPEAT THE AZIMUTH.
 #181715 DEP 163 1001 (TAKE CONTROL OF ME) FROM KARNAVAL. AZIMUTH
 43. DISTANCE 60.
 * - (DEP) (163) ROGER.
 #181724 KAR 163 DEPUTAT SEES ME (ON RADAR).
 #181734 KAR 163 DEPUTAT IS INQUIRING: DO YOU SEE THE TARGET OR NOT?
 #181741 (KAR) (163) DO YOU SEE (IT)?
 #181749 --- (805) ARE YOU CALLING 805?
 #181758 --- (805) WHO'S CALLING 805?
 #181803 (DEP) (805) I SEE IT (EMPHATIC)
 #181809 DEP 163 KARNAVAL DOES NOT SEE (UNSPECIFIED).
 #181812 (DEP) (805) REPEAT.
 #181819 (DEP) (805) EXECUTING.
 #181834 (DEP) (805) THE A.N.O. (AIR NAVIGATIONAL LIGHTS) ARE BURNING.
 THE (STROBE) LIGHT IS FLASHING.
 #181856 (DEP) (163) ROGER. I'M AT 7500. COURSE 230.
 #181902 (DEP) (805) I AM CLOSING ON THE TARGET.
 #181908 (DEP) (805) THEY DON'T SEE ME.
 #181912 (DEP) (805) REPEAT.
 #181920 (DEP) (121) EXECUTING.
 #181944 DEP 163 I AM FLYING BEHIND THE TARGET AT A DISTANCE OF 28.
 DO YOU SEE (ME)?
 #181955 DEP 163 (CALL).
 #182008 (DEP) (805) FIDDLESTICKS I'M GOING. THAT IS, MY 2.0.

(INDICATOR) IS LIT (MISSILE WARHEAD ARE ALREADY LOCKED-ON)).
 #182012 (DEP) (805) ANSWERING.
 #182017 (DEP) 805 I ANSWERED.
 #182022 (DEP) (805) (I) NEED TO APPROACH IT (CLOSER).
 #182030 (DEP) (805) I'M TURNING LOCK-ON OFF AND I'M APPROACHING THE TARGET.
 #182041 (DEP) (163) (FOR) 163?
 #182049 (DEP) (805) I HAVE BROKE OFF LOCK-ON. I AM FIRING CANNON BURSTS.
 #- (DEP) (163) (?RIGHT NOW I CAN'T?) SEE IT.
 #- (DEP) (805) EXACTLY. I HAVE EXECUTED (UNSPECIFIED)
 #182117 (DEP) (163) EXECUTING.
 #182124 (DEP) (805) YES. I'M APPROACHING THE TARGET. I'M GOING IN CLOSER.
 #182135 (DEP) (805) THE TARGET'S (STROBE) LIGHT IS BLINKING. I HAVE ALREADY APPROACHED THE TARGET TO A DISTANCE OF ABOUT TWO (2) KILOMETERS.
 #182140 (DEP) (805) THE TARGET IS AT 10,000 (METERS).
 #182151 (DEP) 163 I SEE BOTH. DISTANCE 10. (AND) 15 KILOMETERS.
 #182155 (DEP) 805 WHAT ARE INSTRUCTIONS?
 #182159 (DEP) (163) ROGER.
 #182202 (DEP) (805) THE TARGET IS DECREASING SPEED.
 #182217 (DEP) (805) I AM GOING AROUND IT. I'M ALREADY MOVING IN FRONT OF THE TARGET.
 #182223 (DEP) (805) I HAVE INCREASED SPEED.
 #182229 (DEP) (805) NO. IT IS DECREASING SPEED.
 #182242 (DEP) (805) IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN EARLIER. HOW CAN I CHASE IT. I'M ALREADY ABEAM OF THE TARGET
 #182255 (DEP) (805) NOW I HAVE TO FALL BACK A BIT FROM THE TARGET.
 #182305 (DEP) (805) REPEAT.
 #182310 (DEP) (805) THE TARGET'S ALTITUDE IS 10,000 (METERS)
 #182318 (DEP) (805) FROM ME IT IS LOCATED 70 DEGREES TO THE LEFT.
 #182337 (DEP) (805) I'M DROPPING BACK, NOW I WILL TRY ROCKET
 #182349 (DEP) 163 12 (KILOMETERS) TO THE TARGET, I SEE BOTH. -
 #- (DEP) (121) I'M IN A RIGHT TURN ON A COURSE OF 300.
 #182415 (DEP) 121 EXECUTING.
 #182422 (DEP) (805) ROGER, I AM IN LOCK-ON.
 #182456 (DEP) (121) I AM TURNING TO A COURSE OF 30.
 #- --- (121) ROGER.
 #182511 (DEP) (805) I AM CLOSING ON THE TARGET. AM IN LOCK-ON. DISTANCE TO TARGET IS 8 (KILOMETERS).
 #182516 (DEP) (805) I HAVE ALREADY SWITCHED IT ON.
 #182533 (DEP) 121 ON A COURSE OF 30.
 #182546 (DEP) (805) Z. O. (MISSILE WARHEADS LOCKED ON)).
 #182620 (DEP) (805) I HAVE EXECUTED THE LAUNCH.
 #182622 (DEP) (805) THE TARGET IS DESTROYED.
 #182627 (DEP) (805) I AM BREAKING OFF ATTACK.
 #182633 (DEP) 163 WHAT ARE (MY) INSTRUCTIONS?
 #182638 (KAR) 163 (CALL).
 #182647 (KAR) (163) (THE INDICATOR/S FOR) MY WING TANKS LIT UP, THE FUEL REMAINDER DIFFERS BY 600 LITERS FOR NOW.

*182653 (DEP) (805) FUEL REMAINDER 1600.
 *182701 (DEP) (805) I AM EXECUTING. WHAT IS THE DISTANCE TO THE AIRFIELD?
 *182705 (DEP) (805) ROGER.
 *182708 (DEP) 163 WHAT COURSE?
 *182722 KAR 163 (CALL).
 *182729 KAR 163 (CALL).
 *- (DEP) (163) I AM EXECUTING LEFT TO A COURSE OF 180. (ALTITUDE) 7500.
 *182753 (DEP) (163) COURSE 150. ROGER.
 *182805 (DEP) (805) I LAUNCHED BOTH.
 *182820 (DEP) (163) ROGER. COURSE 150. 7500.
 *182829 (DEP) (163) EXECUTING COURSE 210.
 *182835 (DEP) (163) I EXECUTED.
 *182851 (DEP) (163) ROGER. COURSE 210. 8000 (METERS).
 *182902 (DEP) (163) ROGER. ALONG (THIS) COURSE.
 *182905 (DEP) (163) WHAT IS THE DISTANCE TO THE TARGET?
 *182913 (DEP) (163) NO. I DON'T SEE IT.
 *182921 (DEP) (163) EXECUTING COURSE 360.
 *182950 (DEP) (163) ROGER. TAKING A COURSE OF 360.
 *182957 (DEP) (163) EXECUTING TO COURSE 360.
 *183012 (DEP) 163 COURSE 360.
 *183013 (DEP) (163) ROGER.
 *- (DEP) (163) FUEL REMAINDER 2500.
 *183048 (DEP) (163) ON COURSE 360.
 *183058 (DEP) (163) EXECUTING.
 *183107 (DEP) 121 ON COURSE 30. ALTITUDE 8(000).
 *- (DEP) (121) YES.
 *183114 (DEP) (121) HE (OR IT) IS WORKING.
 *183125 (DEP) (121) EXECUTING.
 *183136 (DEP) (163) ROGER.
 *183205 (DEP) (805) EXECUTING.
 *183207 (DEP) (163) GIVE ME A COURSE.
 *183212 (DEP) (163) EXECUTING (COURSE) 210.
 *183222 (DEP) 163 WHAT IS THE TARGET'S ALTITUDE? (MY) COURSE IS 210.
 *183230 (DEP) (163) ROGER.
 *183241 (DEP) 163 WHAT IS THE DISTANCE TO THE TARGET?... ROGER, ME TOO. WHAT AM I TO DO NOW?
 *183310 (DEP) (163) ROGER.
 *183315 --- 731 ON A COURSE OF 120. (ALTITUDE) 7000.
 *183320 (DEP) (163) 7500.
 *183333 --- (731) EXECUTING COURSE 200 TO THE LEFT.
 *183336 --- (731) ROGER.
 *183351 (DEP) 121 EXECUTING TO THE LEFT. TURNING TO A COURSE OF 71? 50.
 *183356 (DEP) 805 805 ALTITUDE IS 5000 (METERS).
 *183402 (DEP) 163 FUEL REMAINDER TWO (THOUSAND).
 *- DEP 805 REQUEST TO SWITCH TO CHANNEL 7.
 *183408 (DEP) (805) EXECUTING.
 *- (DEP) 121 ALTITUDE 8(000).

*183420 (DEP) (163) EXECUTING.
 *183428 (DEP) 163 ON A COURSE OF 210, 7500.
 *183437 (DEP) (163) WHAT ARE MY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS?
 *183443 DEP 163 (CALL).
 *- (DEP) (163) WHAT ARE MY FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS? MY FUEL
 REMAINDER IS 2000.
 *183515 (DEP) (163) EXECUTING COURSE OF 60 TO THE RIGHT.
 *183520 --- (731) ROGER. ON A COURSE OF 260. REPEAT THE ALTITUDE.
 *183523 --- (731) ROGER. 7(000).
 *183527 (DEP) 121 ON A COURSE OF 240. ALTITUDE 8(000).
 *- TRI 121 (CALL).
 *- TRI 121 (CALL).
 *- (121) (TPM) (ANSWERING).
 *183554 (DEP) (121) TRIKOTAZH ANSWERED ME.
 *- TRI 121 DO YOU SEE THE TARGET?
 *- (121) (TRI) NO I DON'T SEE (IT).
 *183602 (DEP) (121) HE DOESN'T SEE THE TARGET.
 *183630 (DEP) 121 FUEL REMAINDER 2,200.
 *- (DEP) (121) ROGER.
 *183703 DEP 163 COURSE 60 (DEGREES), 7500.
 *183715 (DEP) (163) I'M TALKING TO YOU.
 *183721 (DEP) (163) ROGER. COURSE 60.
 *183745 --- (731) EXECUTING 9.
 *- (DEP) 163 I CAN (STAY) UNTIL 2(000)/FUEL REMAINDER). IS IT
 ALL RIGHT?
 *183821 (DEP) (163) AND TRIKOTAZH, IS IT NECESSARY (TO TELL) THEM?
 *183837 (DEP) (163) I DON'T SEE ANYTHING IN THIS AREA. I JUST LOOKED.
 *183916 (DEP) (121) EXECUTING.
 *183935 (DEP) (163) (I HAVE) AROUND 2,000, AND I DROPPED MY
 (WING)TANKS.
 *183941 (DEP) (163) AROUND 2,000.
 *183946 (DEP) (163) ROGER.
 *183949 --- 731 FUEL REMAINDER 2,000.
 *184004 (DEP) 163 THERE ARE CLOUDS BELOW ME IN THIS AREA. AND THERE
 ARE NO CLOUDS IN THIS AREA WHERE I'M GOING.
 *184011 (DEP) (163) I'M NOT ABLE TO DETERMINE THE CLOUD BASE. THE
 CLOUDS ARE BELOW ME, AND I'M AT ABOUT 2,000.
 *184041 (DEP) (163) EXECUTING TO THE RIGHT, 10 (DEGREES).
 *184133 (DEP) (163) WHO WAS THAT FOR?
 *184139 (DEP) (163) TO THE LEFT COURSE 60? I HAVE COURSE 60 NOW.
 *184144 (DEP) (163) EXECUTING.
 *184153 --- (731) EXECUTING.
 *184258 (DEP) (163) EXECUTING TURN TO THE RIGHT.
 *- DEP 163 ON (CHANNEL) ONE (WITH CALLWORD) VODOLEJ?
 *184314 (DEP) (163) ON (CHANNEL) ONE (WITH CALLWORD) VODOLEJ?
 *- (DEP) (163) YES.
 *184322 (DEP) (163) ROGER. (CALLWORD) URYUK.
 *184543 DEP 163 I AM IN A RIGHTHAND TURN.
 *184552 (DEP) (163) ROGER. COURSE 60.
 *184605 (DEP) (163) (COURSE) 340? (I'M ON) 360 NOW.

0184609 (DEP) (163) ROGER.

-CWS КАРНАВАЛ (КАР) ПЕПУТАТ (ПЕТ) ТРИКОТАЖ (ТРИ)*
*175658 - А/С ВАС ПОНЯЯ. КУРС 70.
*180046 (ПЕТ) 121 С КУРСОМ 100 В НАБОРЕ ПО В/И.
*- (ПЕТ) (121) НЕ ПОНЯЯ. КАКОЯ КУРС?... АГ, С КУРСОМ 100 ИДУ.
*180057 (ПЕТ) (121) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.
*180211 (ПЕТ) 121 КУРС 50.
*180314 (КАР) 163 ОТВЕЧАЮ.
*180353 (ПЕТ) ВОЗ/МЯ НА КУРСЕ 240.
*180356 (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) НАБЛЮДАЮ.
*180600 (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) ПОНЯЯ ВАС. ПОНЯЯ. Я ИДУ СЗАДИ.
*180607 (КАР) (1)63 КУРС 30. ВООО.
*180622 (КАР) (163) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ КУРС 100.
*180630 (ПЕТ) ВОЗ/МЯ ВАС ПОНЯЯ.
*- (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) УКАЗАНИЕ ПО ТОЧКИ?
*180633 (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) ВАС ПОНЯЯ.
*180645 (КАР) 163 4900.
*- (КАР) (163) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.
*- (ПЕТ) 121 НЕ ПОНЯЯ..
*180704 (ПЕТ) (121) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.
*180750 (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) ОСТАТОК ТРИ ТОННЫ.
*- (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) ПОНЯЯ. А КУРС ПОВТОРИТЕ.
*- (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) ВЛЕВО НАВЕРНО? ИЛИ ПРАВО.
*180806 (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ 260.
*- (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) НА КУРСЕ 260.
*180816 (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) ПОНЯТНО.
*- (КАР) (1)63 С КУРСОМ 220. 7 С ПОХОВИНОЯ.
*- (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) ПОНЯЯ.
*180831 ПЕТ ВОЗ СНЕВСИСТЕМУ ВЫКЛЮЧАТЬ?
*180836 (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) ПОНЯТНО.
*180848 (КАР) (163) 163/ЕМУ НУЖНО СБРАСЫВАТЬ ПОТВЕСКИ.
*180900 (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) ДА, ОНА РАЗВЕРНУЛАСЬ.
*- (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) АГ. ЦЕЛЬ У МЕНЯ СНЕГА ПОУ ВО УЖЕ.
*180935 (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ 240.
*180944 (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) КУРС 240.
*180950 (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) А ПОНЯЯ ВАС.
*181016 (ПЕТ) (ВОЗ) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ 220.
*181025 (ПЕТ) (121) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.
*181029 (КАР) (163) 163/ЕМУ 245?... ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.

*181035 (ТЕУ) (805) А КУРС 220.
 *181044 (ТЕУ) (805) НЕПОНЯТНО.
 *181051 (ТЕУ) (805) А ТОНЯЯ. ОНА С МИГАЛКОЙ ИДЕТ, С МИГАЛКОЙ.
 *181057 (КАР) (1)63/ИЯ КУРС 245, 7 С ПОЛОВИНОЙ.
 *181120 (ТЕУ) (805) А 8000.
 *181125 (ТЕУ) (805) А ВАС ТОНЯЯ.
 *181128 (ТЕУ) 121 КУРС 280.
 *181137 (ТЕУ) (163) 4500.
 * - ТЕУ 121 КУРС 280.
 *181151 (ТЕУ) (805) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.
 *181203 (КАР) 163/ИЯ ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.
 *181210 (ТЕУ) (805) ВИЗУАЛЬНО НАБЛИЖАЮ. И ТО, (CORRECTS) НА
 КРАНЕ ВИДУ.
 *181215 (ТЕУ) (805) ВАС ТОНЯЯ.
 *181221 (КАР) (163) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ ВЛЕВО 10.
 *181241 (КАР) 163/ИЯ БАКИ СЕРОСИЯ.
 *181251 (КАР) (163) СЕРОСИЯ.
 *181302 (КАР) (163) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.
 *181305 (ТЕУ) (805) НАБЛИЖАЮ. В ЗАХВАТЕ ЦЕЛЬ.
 *181316 (ТЕУ) (805) А ТОНЯЯ ВАС.
 *181326 (ТЕУ) (805) А ЦЕЛЬ НА ЗАПРОС НЕ ОТВЕЧАЕТ.
 *181335 (ТЕУ) (805) А КУРС ЦЕЛИ, ТАК, 240 ГРАДУСОВ.
 *181340 (ТЕУ) (805) ВКЛЮЧЕНА.
 *181410 (ТЕУ) (805) ВАС ТОНЯЯ. ПОКА ИДЕТ С ПРЕЖНИМ КУРСОМ.
 *181416 (ТЕУ) (805) ПОНЯТНО.
 *181434 (ТЕУ) (805) ТОНЯЯ. У МЕНЯ СКОРОСТЬ, НЕ НАДО БУДЕТ ВОРСАЯ
 ВКЛЮЧАТЬ.
 *181441 (ТЕУ) (805) ОСТАТОК У МЕНЯ 2700.
 * - (КАР) (163) БАКИ СЕРОСИЯ, (ВХ ОКИН, НА) 4000, 3800.
 *181500 (КАР) (163) А С КУРСОМ 230 ИДУ.
 *181508 (ТЕУ) (805) КУРС ЦЕЛИ ПОКА ПРЕЖНИЙ, 240.
 *181537 (КАР) (163) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.
 *181547 (ТЕУ) (805) В ЗАХВАТЕ ИДУ.
 *181551 (ТЕУ) (805) 240 (КУРС).
 *181643 (ТЕУ) (805) КУРС ЦЕЛИ 240.
 * - (КАР) (163) ТА.
 *181705 (КАР) (163) ПОВТОРИТЕ АЗИМУТ.
 *181715 ТЕУ 163/ИЯ 1001 С КАРНАВАЛА. АЗИМУТ 45, УДАЛЕНИЕ 60.
 * - (ТЕУ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЯ.
 *181724 КАР (163) ТЕКУТАТ МЕНЯ НАБЛИЖАЕТ, 163/ЕГО.
 *181734 КАР 163/ИЯ ТЕКУТАТ ЗАПРАШИВАЕТ: ЦЕЛЬ НАБЛИЖАЕТЕ ИЛИ НЕТ?
 *181741 (КАР) (163) НАБЛИЖАЕТЕ?
 *181749 - (805) ВОС/ОГО СПРАШИВАЕТ(Е)?
 *181758 - (805) КТО ЗАПРАШИВАЕТ ВОС/ОГО?
 *181803 - (805) НАБЛИЖАЮ. (EMPHATIC)
 *181809 ТЕУ 163/ИЯ КАРНАВАЛ НЕ НАБЛИЖАЕТ.
 *181812 (ТЕУ) (805) ПОВТОРИТЕ.
 *181819 (ТЕУ) (805) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.
 *181834 (ТЕУ) (805) А. Н. О. ГОРИТ. МИГАЛКА ГОРИТ.
 *181856 (ТЕУ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЯ. У МЕНЯ 7 С ПОЛОВИНОЙ, С КУРСОМ 230.

*181902 (ТЕТ) БОС/НА СБЛИЖАЮСЬ С ЦЕЛЮ.
 *181908 (ТЕТ) (БОС) ОНИ МЕНЯ НЕ ВИДЕЮТ.
 *181912 (ТЕТ) (БОС) ПОВТОРИ.
 *181920 (ТЕТ) (121) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.
 *181944 ТЕТ 163/НА ИЗУ СЗЛКИ ЦЕЛИ НА УДАЛЕНИИ 25. НАБЛЮДАЕТЕ?
 *181955 ТЕТ 163 (CALL)
 *182008 (ТЕТ) (БОС) БЛКИ ПЛ(КИ), Я ИЗУ, ЗНАЧИТ, У МЕНЯ З.Г. ГОРИТ
 УЖЕ. (UPSET)
 *182012 (ТЕТ) (БОС) ОТВЕЧАЮ.
 *182017 (ТЕТ) БОС/НА ОТВЕТИЛ.
 *182022 (ТЕТ) (БОС) НАДО ПОДХОДИТЬ К НЕМУ.
 *182030 (ТЕТ) (БОС) ВЫКЛЮЧАЮ ЗАХВАТ, ПОДХОЖУ Я К НЕМУ.
 *182041 (ТЕТ) (163) 163/ЕМУ?
 *182049 (ТЕТ) (БОС) СБРОСИЛ ЗАХВАТ. ЕЩЕ ОЧЕРЕДИ НА КУБЕК.
 * - (ТЕТ) (163) (ВХ СЕЯЧАС НЕ МОГУ) НАБЛИЗИТЬ ЕГО.
 * - (ТЕТ) (БОС) ТАК ТОЧНО. ВЫПОЛНИЛ.
 *182117 (ТЕТ) (163) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.
 *182124 (ТЕТ) (БОС) ЭА, ПОДХОЖУ К НЕА. ПОДХОЖУ БЛИЖЕ.
 *182135 (ТЕТ) (БОС) А ЦЕЛЬ С МИГАЛКОЙ. Я УЖЕ ПОДОВЕЛ К НЕА, НА
 УДАЛЕНИИ ГДЕ-ТО ТВА КИЛОМЕТРА.
 *182140 (ТЕТ) (БОС) ЦЕЛЬ ИДЕТ НА 10000.
 *182151 (ТЕТ) 163 НАБЛИЖАЮ ОБОИХ, ПЛАННОСТЬ 10 - 15 КИЛОМЕТРОВ.
 *182155 (ТЕТ) БОС/НА МОИ ДЕЙСТВИЯ?
 *182159 (ТЕТ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЛ.
 *182202 (ТЕТ) (БОС) А ЦЕЛЬ УМЕНЬШАЕТ СКОРОСТЬ.
 *182217 (ТЕТ) (БОС) А Я ОБХОЖУ. ВЫХОЖУ ВПЕРЕДИ ЦЕЛИ УЖЕ.
 *182223 (ТЕТ) (БОС) УВЕЛИЧИЛ СКОРОСТЬ.
 *182229 (ТЕТ) (БОС) НЕТ. УМЕНЬШАЕТ СКОРОСТЬ (ЦЕЛЬ).
 *182242 (ТЕТ) (БОС) НУ НАДО БЫЛО РАНЬШЕ. КУДА ЖЕ ПОГОН? Я ТЕПЕРЬ
 УЖЕ, АГ, НА ТРАНСВЕРСЕ ЦЕЛИ. (UPSET, ANGRY)
 *182255 (ТЕТ) (БОС) НЕМНОГО ТЕПЕРЬ НАДО ОТСТАВАТЬ ОТ ЦЕЛИ.
 *182305 (ТЕТ) (БОС) ПОВТОРИ.
 *182310 (ТЕТ) (БОС) ВЫСОТА ЦЕЛИ 10000.
 *182318 (ТЕТ) (БОС) МЕСТО, СЕЯЧАС ОНА ОТ МЕНЯ, АГ, ПОХ 70 ГРАДУСОВ
 СЛЕВА.
 *182337 (ТЕТ) (БОС) Я УЖЕ ОТСТАЮ. СЕЯЧАС Я РАКЕТЫ ПОПРОБУЮ.
 *182349 (ТЕТ) 163 ПО ЦЕЛИ 12, ОБОИХ ВИЖУ.
 * - (ТЕТ) (121) А В ТРАВОМ ВПРАВЕ НА КУРСЕ 300.
 *182415 (ТЕТ) (121) ВЫПОЛНЯЮ.
 *182422 (ТЕТ) (БОС) ВАС ТОНЯЛ. В ЗАХВАТЕ ИЗУ.
 *182436 (ТЕТ) (121) А ПО КУРСА 30 РАЗВОРАЧИВАЮСЬ.
 * - - (121)? ТОНЯЛ.
 *182511 (ТЕТ) (БОС) А СБЛИЖАЮСЬ К ЦЕЛИ. В ЗАХВАТЕ. УДАЛЕНИЕ ПО ЦЕЛИ
 В.
 *182516 (ТЕТ) (БОС) ВКЛЮЧИЛ УЖЕ.
 *182517 - (ТРИ) (10)
 *182533 (ТЕТ) 121 НА КУРСЕ 30.
 *182546 (ТЕТ) (БОС) З.Г.
 *182620 (ТЕТ) (БОС) ПУСК ПРОИЗВЕЛ.
 *182622 (ТЕТ) (БОС) А ЦЕЛЬ УНИЧТОЖЕНА.

*183356 (ТЕУ) 805/МЯ А ВИСОТА 5000.
 *183402 (ТЕУ) 163/МЯ ОСТАТОК 88Е.
 * - ТЕУ (805) РАЗРЕШИТЕ НА 7/ОЯ КАНАЛ 805/ОМУ.
 *183408 (ТЕУ) (805) ВЫХОЖИЯ.
 * - (ТЕУ) (121) ВИСОТА 8(000), 12(1) (18).
 *183420 (ТЕУ) (805) ВЫХОЖИЯ.
 *183428 (ТЕУ) 163/МЯ С КУРСОМ 210, 7 С ПОЛОВИНОЯ.
 *183437 (ТЕУ) (163) МОИ ТЕРЯСТВИЯ ТАЛЫВЕ. ЧТО?
 *183443 ТЕУ 163 (CALL)
 * - (ТЕУ) (163) МОИ ТЕРЯСТВИЯ ТАЛЫВЕ. У МЕНЯ ЖЕ ОСТАТОК.
 *183456 (ТЕУ) (163) 2000 (ОСТАТОК).
 *183518 (ТЕУ) (163) ВЫХОЖИЯ ВПРАВО КУРС 60.
 *183520 - (731) А ТОНЯЖ, С КУРСОМ 260. А ВИСОТУ ПОВТОРИТЕ.
 *183523 - (731) ТОНЯЖ, 7(000).
 *183527 (ТЕУ) 121 НА КУРСЕ 240. ВИСОТА 8(000).
 * - ТРИ 121 НА СВЯЗЬ.
 * - ТРИ 121 НА СВЯЗЬ.
 * - (121) (ТРИ) НА СВЯЗИ.
 *183554 (ТЕУ) (121) ОТВЕЧАЕТ МНЕ ТРИКОТАЖ.
 * - ТРИ 121 ЧЕЗЬ НАБЛИЖАЕТЕ. НЕТ?
 * - (121) (ТРИ) НЕТ. НЕ НАБЛИЖАМ.
 *183602 (ТЕУ) (121) А НЕ НАБЛИЖАЕТ ОН ЧЕТИ.
 *183630 (ТЕУ) 121 ОСТАТОК 2200.
 * - (ТЕУ) (121) ТОНЯЖ ВАС.
 *183703 ТЕУ 163 С КУРСОМ 60, 7 С ПОЛОВИНОЯ:
 *183718 (ТЕУ) (163) ВАМ... ВАМ ГОВОРИ.
 *183721 (ТЕУ) (163) ТОНЯЖ. КУРС 60.
 *183745 - (731) А ВЫХОЖИЯ 9.
 * - (ТЕУ) (163) 163/ЕМУ. КО ТВУХ ГОТОВ. НЕЛЬСЯ?
 *183821 (ТЕУ) (163) А ТРИКОТАЖ, ИМ НУЖНО?
 *183837 (ТЕУ) (163) НЕ НАБЛИЖАМ НИЧЕГО В ЭТОМ РАЙОНЕ. ТОЛЬКО
 СМОТРЕЖ.
 *183916 (ТЕУ) (121) ВЫХОЖИЯ.
 *183935 (ТЕУ) (163) 2000 ГДЕ-ТО. ВОТ У МЕНЯ. И ЧТОБ Я СБРОСИЛ БАКИ
 (ВХ ЕТИН-)(СТОП).
 *183941 (ТЕУ) (163) 2000 ГДЕ-ТО ОРИЕНТИРОВОЧНО.
 *183946 (ТЕУ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЖ.
 *183949 - 731/МЯ ОСТАТОК 2000.
 *184004 (ТЕУ) 163/МЯ В ЭТОМ РАЙОНЕ ПОДО МНОЯ. ОБЛАКА. А ВОТ В ЭТОМ
 РАЙОНЕ БЕЗОБЛАЧНО (ГДЕ) Я ИДУ.
 *184011 (ТЕУ) (163) НИЖНЯЯ КРАЯ НЕ МОГУ ОПРЕДЕЛИТЬ. НЕ. АГ. НИЖЕ
 ОБЛАЧНОСТЬ. ГДЕ-ТО ВИСОТА 2000 ИДУ.
 *184041 (ТЕУ) (163) ВЫХОЖИЯ ВПРАВО 10.
 *184133 (ТЕУ) (163) КОМУ?
 *184139 (ТЕУ) (163) ВЛЕВО КУРС 60? У МЕНЯ КУРС 60 СЕЯЧАС.
 *184144 (ТЕУ) (163) ВЫХОЖИЯ.
 *184153 - (731) ВЫХОЖИЯ.
 *184258 (ТЕУ) (163) ВЫХОЖИЯ ВПРАВО ВПРАЖ.
 * - ТЕУ 163 НА 1/ОМ ВОХОЖЕЯ?
 *184314 (ТЕУ) (163) (НА) 1/ОМ ВОХОЖЕЯ?

*182627 (ТЕУ) (805) ВЫХОДУ ИЗ АТАКИ.
 *182633 (ТЕУ) (163) 163/ЕМУ ПЕАСТВИЯ?
 *182638 КАР 163 (CALL)
 *182647 (КАР) (163) У МЕНЯ КРЫШЕВНЕ БАКИ ЗАГОРЕЛИСЬ. ПОКА ОСТАТОК
 АГ. ОТЛИЧАЕТСЯ НА 600 ЛИТРОВ.
 *182653 (ТЕУ) (805) ОСТАТОК 1600.
 *182701 (ТЕУ) (805) ВЫПОЛНЯМ. АГ. УВЕЩЕНИЕ КО. ВО ТОЧКИ?
 *182705 (ТЕУ) (805) ВАС ТОНЯЯ.
 *182708 (ТЕУ) (163) 163/ЕМУ КУРС?
 *182722 КАР 163 (CALL).
 *182729 КАР 163 (CALL)
 * - (ТЕУ) (163) ВЫПОЛНЯМ ВЛЕВО КУРС 180. 7 С ПОЛОВИНОЯ У МЕНЯ.
 *182753 (ТЕУ) (163) А КУРС 150. ТОНЯЯ.
 *182805 (ТЕУ) (805) ОБЕ ПУСТИЯ.
 *182820 (ТЕУ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЯ. КУРС 150. 7 С ПОЛОВИНОЯ.
 *182829 (ТЕУ) (163) ВЫПОЛНЯМ КУРС 210.
 *182835 (ТЕУ) (163) ВЫПОЛНИМ.
 *182851 (ТЕУ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЯ. КУРС 3- (CORRECTS) 210. 8000.
 *182902 (ТЕУ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЯ. ВО КУРСУ.
 *182905 (ТЕУ) (163) ТЯЛЬНОСТЬ КО ЦЕЛИ?
 *182913 (ТЕУ) (163) НЕТ. НЕ НАБЛИЖАЮ.
 *182921 (ТЕУ) (163) КУРС 360 ВЫПОЛНЯМ.
 *182950 (ТЕУ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЯ. КУРС 360 БЕРУ.
 *182957 (ТЕУ) (163) ВЫПОЛНЯМ НА КУРС 360.
 *183012 (ТЕУ) 163 КУРС 360 (ВЫПОЛНИМ).
 *183013 (ТЕУ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЯ.
 * - (ТЕУ) (163) ОСТАТОК 2500.
 *183048 (ТЕУ) (163) С КУРСОМ 360.
 *183058 (ТЕУ) (163) ВЫПОЛНЯМ.
 *183107 (ТЕУ) 121 НА КУРСЕ 30. ВИСОТА В(000).
 * - (ТЕУ) (121) ЯА.
 *183114 (ТЕУ) (121) ОН РАБОТАЕТ.
 *183125 (ТЕУ) (121) ВЫПОЛНЯМ.
 *183156 (ТЕУ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЯ.
 *183205 (ТЕУ) (805) ВЫПОЛНЯМ.
 *183207 (ТЕУ) (163) (1)63/ЕМУ КУРС ПЯТЕ.
 *183212 (ТЕУ) (163) ВЫПОЛНЯМ 210.
 *183222 (ТЕУ) (163) ВИСОТА ЦЕЛИ 163/ЕМУ (ПЯТЕ). КУРС 210.
 *183230 (ТЕУ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЯ.
 *183241 (ТЕУ) (163) УВЕЩЕНИЕ КО ЦЕЛИ 163/ЕМУ.
 *183247 (ТЕУ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЯ.
 *183249 (ТЕУ) (163) Я ТОЖЕ.
 *183305 (ТЕУ) (163) 163/ЕМУ ПЕАСТВИЯ?
 *183310 (ТЕУ) (163) ВАС ТОНЯЯ.
 *183315 - 731/МЯ С КУРСОМ 120. 7000.
 *183320 (ТЕУ) (163) 7 С ПОЛОВИНОЯ.
 *183333 - (731) ВЫПОЛНЯМ ВЛЕВО КУРС 200.
 *183336 - (731) ТОНЯЯ.
 *183351 (ТЕУ) (121) (ВЫПОЛН)ЯМ ВЛЕВО. 121. НА КУРС (ВХ1)50
 РАЗВОРАЧИВАЮСЬ. ВИСОТА В(000).

*- (ХЕТ) (163) ХА.

*184322 (ХЕТ) (163) УРНК, ПОННІ.

*184343 ХЕТ 163 В ПРАВОМ ВИРАЖЕ НАХОМУСЬ.

*184352 (ХЕТ) (163) КУРС 60, ПОННІ.

*184605 (ХЕТ) (163) 3407 ВОТ СЕЧАС 3607

*184609 (ХЕТ) (163) ВАС ПОННІ.



Security Council

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GENERAL

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7 September 1983

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1983 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF JAPAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement issued on
7 September 1983 by the Director-General of the Public Information and Cultural
Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in response to the
statement made by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at
the 2471st meeting of the Security Council on 6 September 1983.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have the contents of this letter and
the attached statement circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) MIZUO KURODA
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of
Japan to the United Nations

Annex

Statement by the Director-General of the Public Information and
Cultural Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan,
dated 7 September 1983

At the official meeting of the United Nations Security Council on 6 September 1983, the Soviet representative, Ambassador Oleg A. Troyanovsky, accused Japan asking why, if Japanese air traffic control authorities were aware that the Korean Air Lines jetliner was flying in Soviet air space, Japan did not stop the aircraft or give any warning to it.

The same criticism of Japan has also figured in reports by Soviet media. In response to these Soviet charges the Government of Japan makes the following rebuttal:

1. Japanese air traffic control authorities usually rely upon air traffic surveillance radar and communications from the pilot of a civilian aircraft to determine whether each aircraft is flying according to its flight plan. However, Japanese surveillance radar visibility is limited to the air space over and around Japan and, for an aircraft flying at over 20,000 feet altitude, even the Yokotsudake radar station at Hakodate, Hokkaido, which is located closest to NAKKA position (42° 23' North, 147° 28' East), some 270 kilometers East-South-East of Kushiro, can cover only as far as 42° 16' North, 145° 13' East, some 150 kilometers South-South-East of Kushiro. It was thus impossible for any Japanese air traffic surveillance radar station to ascertain that the Korean Air Lines jetliner was flying off course.

The only way to ascertain the actual location of an aircraft which cannot be seen by air traffic surveillance is to rely upon communication from the pilot, and standard practice is to assume that the said communication is correct. The record of radio transmission between the pilot of Korean Air Lines flight 007 and the Japanese air traffic control authorities (Tokyo International Air Control at Narita) after that aircraft entered Japanese air control jurisdiction over the broad expanses of the North Pacific is as follows.

2. List of communication (as released by Civil Aviation Bureau, Ministry of Transport)

A. 17:09 GMT (2:09 JST)

KK-007 (call sign): Korean Air 007. Over NIPPON (49° 41' North, 159° 19' East) 17:07. Level 330 (flight level 33,000 feet). Estimating NAKKA 18:26. 132.0 (132,000 pounds fuel remaining). Minus 49 (outside temperature minus 49°C). 320 diagonal 45 (Northwest winds at 45 knots). Requesting selcal check.

RJAA (Tokyo International Air Control): (Send selcal)

KE-007: Check. Korean Air 007. Selcal okay.

B. 18:18 GMT (3:15 JST)

KE-007: Korean Air 007 Requesting 350 (flight level 35,000 feet).

RJAA: Roger. Standby. Call you back.

C. 18:20 GMT (3:20 JST)

RJAA: Korean Air 007 clearance. Tokyo ATC clears Korean Air 007. Climb and maintain flight level 350 (35,000 feet).

KE-007: Roger. Korean Air 007 climb maintain flight level 350 (35,000 feet), leaving 330 (33,000 feet) this time.

RJAA: Tokyo Roger.

D. 18:23 GMT (3:23 JST)

KE-007: Tokyo Radio Korean Air 007 level 350 (Altitude 35,000 feet).

RJAA: Korean Air 007 Tokyo Roger.

E. 18:27 GMT (3:27 JST)

KE-007: KE007 HANNAH (Signal was noisy and weak).

3. As may be seen, communication between Korean Air Lines flight 007 and Tokyo International Air Control at Narita was normal until the start of unintelligible transmission from Korean Air Lines flight 007 at 3:27 Japan Standard Time. Narita fully expected to receive the pilot's report that he had passed NAKKA some 270 kilometers East-South-East of Kushiro at 3:26, and it was not until 3:27 that there was any suspicion that there might be trouble (e.g., radio failure) with Korean Air Lines flight 007 near NAKKA.
4. For approximately 17 minutes from 3:12 to 3:29, the Air Self-Defense Forces radar station at Wakkanai sighted and recorded an aircraft flying southwest over Sakhalin approximately 100 miles north of Wakkanai, but there was no way that the Air Self-Defense Forces could have known at that time that this aircraft was Korean Air Lines flight 007. The Air Self-Defense Forces were not following Korean Air Lines flight 007 by radar all the while that it was in communication with Narita Air Traffic Control but rather suddenly picked that aircraft up on their radar at 3:12 when it entered the air space over Sakhalin, and even then it was sighted as an unidentified aircraft.

5. It was only the after-the-fact integration and analysis of radar and communication records of 3 and 4 above which revealed the possibility that Korean Air Lines flight 007 had strayed from its route and flown into Sakhalin air space.
6. Information provided under 1-5 above points to the following conclusions:
 - A. Since it was not until 3:27 that Narita Air Traffic Control became aware of any irregularity regarding Korean Air Lines flight 007, even if Narita had immediately contacted the Air Self-Defense Forces and had been able to deduce that the unidentified aircraft which had flown into the air space over Sakhalin was indeed Korean Air Lines flight 007, this was already after the said aircraft had been shot down by the Soviet Union at 3:26 21'.
 - B. Japan was in no position to warn Korean Air Lines flight 007 since we had no way of knowing that the aircraft had strayed from its route between the time it left Anchorage and the time it was shot down near Moneron (Kaiba) Island off the coast of Sakhalin.
7. As may be seen from the above explanation, it can only be concluded that the Soviet charges are completely groundless and that this Soviet attitude represents an attempt to shift to Japan part of the blame which the Soviet Union must rightly bear for this incident.

The Government of Japan hereby strongly demands that the Soviet Union promptly retract these charges and respond in good faith to this incident.

END

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAIR, ELAB, US, KS, ICAO
SUBJ: SHOOTING DOWN OF KAL PLANE: IFALPA CALLS FOR 60-DAY
BAN ON FLIGHTS TO MOSCOW, OTHER MEASURES
REF: (A) STATE 251902 (B) LONDON 18736

1. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: THE GOVERNING BOARD OF THE WORLD PILOTS' ASSOCIATION (IFALPA) LATE TODAY RECOMMENDED TO ITS NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS A 60-DAY BAN ON CIVIL AIRLINE FLIGHTS TO MOSCOW TO PROTEST SOVIET DOWNING OF THE KOREAN AIR LINER. IT ALSO CALLED ON RELATED ASSOCIATIONS (MEANING AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS AND GROUND HANDLERS) TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTION. IT ALSO DEMANDED SOVIET GUARANTEES THAT SIMILAR ATTACKS NEVER AGAIN HAPPEN. THE FOREGOING DECISIONS HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO THE MEDIA.



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2. ~~(U)~~ IN AN EMERGENCY MEETING TODAY NEAR LONDON, THE GOVERNING BOARD OF THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIRLINE PILOT ASSOCIATIONS (IFALPA) TOOK THE FOLLOWING ACTION TO PROTEST THE SOVIET SHOOTING DOWN OF THE KOREAN AIR LINER SEPTEMBER 1:
(A) DECLARED THE USSR AN OFFENDING STATE IN TERMS OF IFALPA'S STANDARDS;
(B) CALLED ON ITS MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS TO BAN ALL FLIGHTS TO MOSCOW FOR 60 DAYS AND DECIDED TO REVIEW THE BAN AFTER 30 DAYS WITH A VIEW TO EXTENDING ITS DURATION AND EXPANDING ITS SCOPE TO ALL USSR AIR SPACE;
(C) CALLED ON RELATED INTERNATIONAL UNIONS AND PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS TO TAKE SIMILAR ACTIONS (PARTICULARLY THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS AND GROUND HANDLERS);
(D) DEMANDED SOVIET GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES THAT SIMILAR

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ATTACKS ON AIRLINERS WILL NEVER AGAIN OCCUR - IF NO SUCH GUARANTEES ARE GIVEN IFALPA WILL CONSIDER FURTHER ACTION. THE ABOVE IS THE GIST OF A STATEMENT GIVEN TO THE PRESS ABOUT 1800 LOCAL TIME. THE DECISIONS ARE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THAT IFALPA CANNOT FORCE MEMBER NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS TO COMPLY WITH THOSE DECISIONS ASKING THEM TO TAKE SPECIFIC ACTIONS, SUCH AS REFUSING TO FLY TO MOSCOW.

3. (C) THIS REPORT CAME FROM [REDACTED] U.S. AIR LINE PILOT ASSOCIATION (USALPA), WHO SAID HE AND HIS CANADIAN AND BRITISH COUNTERPARTS INTERVENED IN TODAY'S MEETING TO BRING ABOUT THE ABOVE RESULT. UNTIL THEIR INTERVENTION, [REDACTED] REPORTED, THE BOARD, WHICH IS FORMALLY KNOWN AS THE PRINCIPAL OFFICERS GROUP, WAS HEADING FOR A DECISION TO SUSPEND FLIGHTS TO MOSCOW FOR A FEW DAYS ONLY.

4. (C) [REDACTED] SAID THAT IFALPA HAS 65 NATIONAL MEMBER ASSOCIATIONS, INCLUDING THE USSR AND SOVIET BLOC GROUPS. HE SAID THE AIRLINES OF 17 NATIONAL MEMBER ASSOCIATIONS CURRENTLY FLY TO MOSCOW AND ESTIMATED THAT UP TO 14 OF THEM WOULD COMPLY WITH THE BOARD'S CALL FOR A BAN ON MOSCOW FLIGHTS. THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE ARGUED AGAINST ANY ACTION, HE SAID, AND HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THE FRENCH WILL DO. HE IS CERTAIN THAT THE GERMAN PILOTS WILL COMPLY AND WAS ADAMANT THAT BRITISH PILOTS WILL OBSERVE THE BAN. HE THOUGHT COMPLIANCE WOULD BEGIN WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. [REDACTED] SAID HIS ASSESSMENT OF PROBABLE COMPLIANCE IS BASED IN PART ON A WEEKEND SAMPLING OF MEMBERS' SENTIMENT WHICH

SHOWED SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT FOR A MOSCOW BAN.
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TAGS: PREL, EAIR, ELAB, US, KS, ICAO
SUBJ: SHOOTING DOWN OF KAL PLANE: IFALPA CALLS FOR 60-DAY

5. (C) FINALLY, [REDACTED] REPORTED THAT IT IS LIKELY THAT
RELATED ASSOCIATIONS, SUCH AS AIRPORT GROUND HANDLERS AND
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS, WILL BEGIN TO BOYCOTT AEROFLOT
FLIGHTS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. **BL**

6. (C) COMMENT: WE ARE NOT FAMILIAR ENOUGH WITH IFALPA
POLITICS TO ASSESS THE LIKELY DEGREE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
MOSCOW BAN. [REDACTED] SAID THAT TODAY'S MEETING WAS
HEADING FOR A SYMBOLIC SUSPENSION OF MOSCOW SERVICE UNTIL
HE AND HIS CANADIAN AND UK COUNTERPARTS INTERVENED. WHILE
THOSE THREE NATIONAL ASSOCIATIONS HAVE 70 PER CENT OF
IFALPA'S MEMBERSHIP, SIGNIFICANT COMPLIANCE WOULD SEEM TO
DEPEND ON THE COOPERATION OF SEVERAL SMALLER NATIONAL
ASSOCIATIONS. [REDACTED] NOTED THAT THE DEGREE OF COMPLIANCE
WILL DEPEND IN PART ON PRESSURE FROM NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS.
HE RETURNS TO WASHINGTON TOMORROW TO REPORT MORE FULLY TO
HIS ASSOCIATION. **BL**
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 11288

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, UR, US
SUBJECT: MFA PROTESTS GLEN COVE INCIDENT

1. (CONFIDENTIAL) - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: MFA HAS REGISTERED A "RESOLUTE PROTEST" OVER THE GLEN COVE BREAK-IN AND CHARGED THAT AMERICAN AUTHORITIES HAD ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE "PROVOCATION." THE NON-PAPER BLAMES THE U.S. FOR CREATING A HOSTILE ANTI-SOVIET ATMOSPHERE WHICH ENCOURAGES "TERRORIST ACTS" AGAINST SOVIET INSTITUTIONS IN THE U.S., AND STATES THAT USG REFUSAL TO FULFILL ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IS FRAUGHT WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE U.S. SIDE. APOLCOUNS REJECTED SOVIET VERSION OF EVENTS AND OBJECTED TO PROTEST'S HINT OF RISK TO AMERICANS IN USSR. HE ASSURED MFA REP THAT THE U.S. HAS PROVIDED AND WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE NECESSARY PROTECTION FOR SOVIET PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY IN THE U.S. END SUMMARY.

3. NEAR COB ON SEPTEMBER 6, MFA USA DEPARTMENT DEPUTY CHIEF MIKOL' CHAK SUMMONED APOLCOUNS PARRIS TO MFA HERE HE READ, AND THEN HANDED OVER, THE TEXT OF A ON-PAPER PROTESTING THE RECENT BREAK-IN AT THE GLEN COVE FACILITY. INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION FOLLOWS; ORIGINAL WILL BE POUCHED TO EUR/SOV:

4. BEGIN TEXT:

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR STATES THE FOLLOWING TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

ON SEPTEMBER 4, A CROWD OF UNRESTRAINED HOOLIGANS FORCED THEIR WAY INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE RESIDENCE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR TO THE UN AND COMMITTED AN UNBRIDLED ANTI-SOVIET BRAWL THERE. THIS OUTRAGE LASTED FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT THE POLICE TOOK NO MEASURES TO AVERT THE CARRYING OUT OF THIS HOSTILE ONSLAUGHT. ONLY AFTER DEMANDS BY OFFICIALS OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WERE PARTICIPANTS IN THE ATTACK REMOVED FROM THE TERRITORY OF THE RESIDENCE.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHAT TOOK PLACE MANIFESTLY TESTIFY TO THE FACT THAT AMERICAN AUTHORITIES WERE AWARE IN ADVANCE OF THE PREPARED PROVOCATION. IT IS SUFFICIENT TO SAY THAT WHAT TRANSPIRED ON THE

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TERRITORY OF THE RESIDENCE WAS SHAMELESSLY OBSERVED AND PHOTOGRAPHED BY NUMEROUS AMERICAN TELEVISION CORRESPONDENTS. NONE OF THE ATTACKING CRIMINALS WAS ARRESTED.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS OUTRAGEOUS ACT OF VIOLENCE IS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF THE ILL-INTENTIONED SLANDEROUS CAMPAIGN UNFOLDING IN THE USA IN PURSUIT OF THE GOAL OF BLACKENING THE SOVIET UNION, AND SOWING FEELINGS OF ANIMOSITY AND HATRED TOWARD THE SOVIET PEOPLE. HOSTILE ANTI-SOVIET INSINUATIONS WHICH ARE NOW MADE DAILY BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP, IN FACT, DIRECTLY ENCOURAGE TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST SOVIET INSTITUTIONS LOCATED IN THE USA. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS ALREADY REPEATEDLY INDICATED THE INTOLERABLE CHARACTER OF THE ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES, NOT ONLY COMPLICATING THE CONDITIONS OF RESIDENCE OF THE SOVIET MISSION IN THE USA AND HINDERING THEIR NORMAL ACTIVITIES BUT ALSO THREATENING THE PERSONAL SAFETY OF THE STAFF AND MEMBERS OF THEIR FAMILIES.

THE UNPRECEDENTED INCURSION WITH THE CONNIVANCE OF AMERICAN AUTHORITIES INTO THE TERRITORY OF THE RESIDENCE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR TO THE UN WHICH ENJOYS DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY IS A FLAGRANT ACT OF ARBITRARINESS ("PROIZVOL") INTOLERABLE IN A CIVILIZED SOCIETY. IN THIS MANNER WAS AGAIN GRAPHICALLY DEMONSTRATED THE REAL BASIS OF THE WIDELY

BROADCAST STATEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA CONCERNING ITS ADHERENCE TO THE COMMONLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS AND TO THE OBSERVATION OF ITS RESPONSIBILITY TAKEN ON ITSELF TO ASSURE THE SECURITY OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN THE USA.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR RESOLUTELY PROTESTS THE CRIMINAL, BANDIT ATTACK ON THE RESIDENCE OF THE HEAD OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE USSR TO THE UN AND DEMANDS THE IMPLEMENTATION
BT

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, UR, US
SUBJECT: MFA PROTESTS GLEN COVE INCIDENT
OF EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO BAR SIMILAR ACTIONS IN THE
FUTURE. IT SHOULD BE CLEAR, THAT AN EVASION BY THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE USA OF THE FULFILLMENT OF ITS
RESPONSIBILITIES ON THIS SCORE, WILL BE FRAUGHT WITH
SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE AMERICAN SIDE ITSELF.

THE MINISTRY INSISTS ON A FULL INVESTIGATION OF
WHAT TOOK PLACE WITH SEVERE PUNISHMENT OF THE GUILTY
AND COMPENSATION FOR THE MATERIAL DAMAGES WHICH
WERE SUSTAINED.

END TEXT.

5. APOLCOUNS FIRMLY REJECTED THE SOVIET VERSION OF
THE INCIDENT, ESPECIALLY ITS IMPLICATION THAT THE
USG HAD IN SOME WAY ENCOURAGED OR HAD ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE
IT WOULD OCCUR. HE CHALLENGED SOVIET ASSERTION THAT
POLICE TOOK NO ACTION TO PREVENT THE INTRUSION,
POINTING OUT THAT PROMPT MEASURES HAD BEEN TAKEN
TO REMOVE VIOLATORS FROM THE GROUNDS. MOST DISTURBING
IN THE MFA NON-PAPER, APOLCOUNS CONTINUED, WAS ITS
HINT, BY REFERRING TO POSSIBLE "CONSEQUENCES," THAT
AMERICANS IN THE SOVIET UNION MIGHT NOW BE PUT AT
RISK AS THE RESULT OF THE GLEN COVE INCIDENT. WHILE
NOT UNDERTAKING TO DEFEND WHAT HAD HAPPENED AT GLEN
COVE, APOLCOUNS NOTED THAT THE INCIDENT HAD TO BE
INTERPRETED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE KAL INCIDENT.

6. MIKOL' CHAK RESPONDED THAT A SELF-RESPECTING GOVERN-
MENT MUST PUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES ABOVE THE LEVEL OF
EMOTIONS. THE USG, HE WENT ON, NOT ONLY CONSISTENTLY
ABROGATED ITS DUTY TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR THE SOVIET
COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES--DESPITE NUMEROUS PRO-
TESTS FROM THE MFA--BUT ACTUALLY CREATED THE HOSTILE
ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH SUCH ATTACKS THRIVE. THE USSR
EXPECTED, MIKOL' CHAK CONCLUDED, THE USG TO TAKE CONCRETE
MEASURES TO MEET ITS RESPONSIBILITIES.

7. APOLCOUNS ADVISED MIKOL' CHAK THAT ANY HOSTILE
ATMOSPHERE IN THE UNITED STATES HAD BEEN CREATED
SOLELY BY SOVIET ACTIONS. IN UNDERTAKING TO CONVEY
THE PROTEST TO WASHINGTON, HE ASSURED MIKOL' CHAK
THAT THE USG WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY
MEASURES TO INSURE THE SAFETY OF SOVIET PERSONNEL

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AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

8. COMMENT: THE MFA DEMARCHE FOLLOWS CLOSE ON THE HEELS OF A TASS DISPATCH CARRIED IN THE SEPTEMBER 6 EDITION OF PRAVDA. UNLIKE THE SOVIET PROTEST, THE TASS PIECE CONTAINS NO HINT OF ACTION AGAINST U.S. PERSONNEL, NOR HAVE WE OBSERVED SUCH HINTS IN OTHER ASPECTS OF MOSCOW'S PUBLIC HANDLING OF THE KAL CRISIS. END COMMENT.
ZIMMERMANN
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MADRID FOR CSCE DELEGATION
E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: EAIR, PREL, KS, UR, GE
SUBJ: SHOOTING DOWN OF SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER: FRG
GOVERNMENT REACTION TO U. S. SANCTIONS

1. THE FOLLOWING IS AN EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF A
STATEMENT MADE BY PETER BOENISCH, PRESS SPEAKER FOR
THE GERMAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AT 1500 HOURS SEPTEMBER
6, REGARDING U. S. SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION
FOLLOWING THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE SOUTH KOREAN AIR-
LINER.
-

2. BEGIN TEXT:
-

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONSIDERS THE AMERICAN SANCTIONS
AND REACTIONS TO THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE AIRLINER TO
BE MODERATE AND RESPONSIBLE. WE, TOO, DEMAND OF THE
SOVIET UNION A FRANK ELUCIDATION OF THE INCIDENT AND THE
PUNISHMENT OF THE GUILTY. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF
GERMANY IS CONCERNED, AS ARE OUR ALLIES, WITH GUARANTEEING
THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC AND THE UNIMPAIRED AND
PEACEFUL MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT AND
TRADE CONNECTIONS. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CONTINUES
ITS CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE U. S. A. AND ALL OTHER
AFFECTED STATES. ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ON THIS SUB-
JECT AT THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL WILL TAKE PLACE
IN MADRID ON SEPTEMBER 7, 1983 ON THE OCCASION OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE. WE ARE STRIVING FOR A
COMMON APPROACH WITH OUR EUROPEAN PARTNERS. THE FEDERAL
CABINET HAS ADOPTED THIS PROCEDURE WITHOUT DISSENT.
END TEXT.

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E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ELAB, UK, US, UR, KS, PREL, EAIR
SUBJECT: SHOOTING DOWN OF KAL PLANE -- BRITISH TRADES
-- UNION CONGRESS STATEMENT
REF: A) LONDON 18845, B) LONDON 18736

1. ON 5 SEPTEMBER THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE TRADES
UNION CONGRESS ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT,
ENTITLED "DESTRUCTION OF KOREAN AIRLINER, SEPT. 5."
THE COUNCIL VOTE WAS 34 IN FAVOR, EIGHT AGAINST
ISSUING THE STATEMENT.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF TUC STATEMENT:
-- THE GENERAL COUNCIL CONDEMN THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES
FOR THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE KOREAN AIRLINE FLIGHT
007. THERE CAN BE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS CALLOUS
ACT WHICH SHOWED A SHOCKING DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE.
THEY WISH TO EXPRESS THEIR SYMPATHY WITH THE
FAMILIES AND FRIENDS OF THE 269 PEOPLE WHO WERE
KILLED, INNOCENT VICTIMS OF AN HORRIFIC ACT.
-- THE GENERAL COUNCIL CALL FOR A FULL, IMPARTIAL
INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT AND FOR ALL RELEVANT
INFORMATION, INCLUDING THE REASON WHY THE FLIGHT WAS
SO FAR OFF COURSE, TO BE MADE AVAILABLE. THEY
BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES OWE THE WORLD,
PARTICULARLY IN THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE OF TENSION
AND SUSPICION, A SPEEDY EXPLANATION AND APOLOGY,
AND THAT ALL THE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITIES CON-
CERNED SHOULD SHOW RESTRAINT AND SHOULD COOPERATE
FULLY AND FRANKLY IN ORDER THAT A SIMILAR ACT
SHOULD NEVER BE PERPETRATED AGAIN.
-- THE GENERAL COUNCIL CALL ON ALL GOVERNMENTS
TO COLLABORATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM,
AND IN COOPERATION WITH THE APPROPRIATE INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS, IN DRAWING UP
FIRM AND CLEAR MEASURES AND PROCEDURES TO INSURE

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THAT CIVIL AIRCRAFT ARE NOT STRUCK AGAIN IN THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES. END TEXT. STREATOR
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: - PREL, EAIR, KS, MY, UR
SUBJECT: REACTION TO KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT -
- MALAYSIA POSTPONES VISIT OF SOVIET MFA
- OFFICIAL
REF: (A) KUALA LUMPUR 6920, (B) KUALA LUMPUR 7231

1. (C) SUMMARY: MALYSIAN MFA HAS POSTPONED INDEFINITELY THE VISIT OF A SOVIET MFA OFFICIAL IN REACTION TO THE KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT. PUBLIC REACTION HAS INCLUDED DEMONSTRATIONS AND STATEMENTS OF CONDEMNATION BY VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS. PRIME MINISTER MAHATHIR AND HIS VISITING TURKISH COUNTERPART HAVE CHARACTERIZED THE SOVIET ACTION AS "TOTALLY INEXCUSABLE." END SUMMARY

2. (C) MALYSIAN MFA OFFICIAL SEPT 6 ADVISED EMBOFF THAT MFA HAS DECIDED TO POSTPONE INDEFINITELY THE VISIT OF SOVIET MFA DIRECTOR FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS, ANATOLIY S. ZAYTSEV, WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED FOR SEPT 12 (REF A). POSTPONEMENT IS IN RESPONSE TO PUBLIC OUTCRY OVER THE AIRLINE INCIDENT, SAID MFA OFFICIAL, WHO ADVISED THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR WOULD BE CALLED IN AND INFORMED OF MFA DECISION TODAY SEPT 6. HE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT SINGAPORE AND THAILAND WERE TAKING SIMILAR ACTION TO DEFER ZAYTSEV'S PROPOSED VISIT.

3. (U) ON SEPT 5 SOVIET EMBASSY WAS THE SCENE OF A PROTEST DEMONSTRATION BY ABOUT 100 MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (DAP) CARRYING BANNERS CONDEMNING THE "BARBARIC ACT AND BRUTAL MURDER." DEMONSTRATION, WHICH DID NOT HAVE THE REQUIRED POLICE PERMIT, WAS DISPERSED BY POLICE WITHOUT INCIDENT. ALSO ON SEPT 5 CUEPACS PRESIDENT AHMAD NOR SUBMITTED PROTEST NOTE TO SOVIET EMBASSY ON BEHALF OF HIS ORGANIZATION, WHICH IS A FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE UNIONS. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, CUEPACS PROTEST NOTE WAS REJECTED BY SOVIET EMBOFF, WHO REPORTEDLY SAID THAT THE KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT WAS MANUFACTURED BY THE US WITH THE COLLABORATION OF THE JAPANESE AND SOUTH KOREANS.

4. (U) A SMALL INDOOR DEMONSTRATION WAS HELD BY

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SEVERAL DOZEN MEMBERS OF THE LOCAL KOREAN COMMUNITY, WHO REPORTEDLY PLAN TO APPLY FOR POLICE PERMIT TO HOLD PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY LATER THIS WEEK.

5. ~~(U)~~ STRONGLY WORDED STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE SOVIET ACTION HAVE BEEN ISSUED BY VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS, INCLUDING THE YOUTH WING OF MALAYSIA'S GOVERNING UMNO PARTY. PENANG YOUTH WING OF UMNO'S COALITION PARTNER MCA (MALAYSIAN CHINESE ASSOCIATION) PASSED A RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A WORLDWIDE BOYCOTT OF SOVIET GOODS AND THE USE OF SOVIET PLANES AND SHIPS. LIM KIT SIANG, LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION DAP, HAS ALSO CALLED ON GOM AND OTHER ASEAN GOVERNMENTS TO BAN AEROFLOT (WHICH HAS REGULAR PASSENGER SERVICE TO KUALA LUMPUR) AND SOVIET SHIPS.

6. ~~(U)~~ ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS OF PRIME MINISTER MAHATHIR'S SEPT 5 MEETING WITH TURKISH PRIME MINISTER ULUSU, BOTH LEADERS SHARE THE VIEW THAT SOVIET ACTION WAS "TOTALLY INEXCUSABLE." IN HIS SPEECH AT A DINNER FOR THE TURKISH PRIME MINISTER, MAHATHIR WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT "MALAYSIA ABHORS SUCH IRRESPONSIBLE ACT WHICH IS IN COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR HUMAN LIVES AND A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION, COMMITTED BY A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE GUILTY PARTY OWES THE WORLD AN APOLOGY AND AN EXPLANATION FOR HAVING CAUSED THE TRAGIC LOSS OF HUNDREDS OF LIVES."

7. ~~(U)~~ MEDIA HAS ALSO GIVEN HEAVY HUMAN INTEREST COVERAGE TO MALAYSIAN STUDENT WHO WAS A PASSENGER ABOARD THE KOREAN AIRLINER.

8. ~~(C)~~ COMMENT: JUST AS WITH HANDLING OF VISIT OF SOVIET OFFICIAL, WE WOULD EXPECT THAT ANY FURTHER ACTION BY THE GOM IN REACTION TO THE AIRLINE INCIDENT PALMER
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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, EAIR, KS, MY, UR
SUBJECT: REACTION TO KOREAN AIRLINER INCIDENT -
ASEAN GOVERNMENTS.
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DEPT. PASS CINCPAC HONOLULU HI, CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR,
COMUS JAPAN AND COMSEVENTHFLT

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINS, PREL, EAIR, MARR, UR, US, JP, KS

SUBJECT: KAL 007: DEMARCHE ON SEARCH AND RESCUE IN
-- SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS

REFS: (A) MOSCOW 11239; (B) MOSCOW 11240,

-- (C) ZIMMERMANN-MANN TELCON

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. EMBOFF PASSED NEW COORDINATES FOR SEARCH AND RESCUE
OPERATIONS WITHIN SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS TO MFA USA
DEPARTMENT SECTOR CHIEF KAPRALOV AT 0950 LOCAL SEPTEMBER 6.
KAPRALOV DOUBLE-CHECKED COORDINATES WITH EMBOFF, BUT
MADE NO COMMENT ON THE STATUS OF OUR REQUEST FOR ACCESS

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PAGE 02 OF 02 MOSCOW 1265

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TO SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS.

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FROM USMISSION ICAO
E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: ICAO, UN, PREL
SUBJECT: ICAO SPECIAL COUNCIL SESSION ON KAL FLIGHT 007
REF: FIGGINS/WILLIAMS (IO/UNP) TELECON OF 9/4/83

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) CALLED SPECIAL SESSION OF COUNCIL AT REQUEST OF GOVT OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA (ROK) WHICH ASKED THAT A COUNCIL MEETING BE HELD ON SEPT 15 (REASONS FOR THIS DATE ARE BEST KNOWN TO ROK). A CONCERTED EFFORT ON TUESDAY, SEPT 6 BY US AND LIKE-MINDED DELEGATIONS MIGHT MOVE MEETING UP TO EARLIER DATE. RELATIVE ADVANTAGES OF EARLIER MEETING OR LEAVING MEETING ON 15TH HINGE ON CONSIDERATIONS OF ENHANCING ICAO ROLE OF TECHNICAL EXPERTISE. FOLLOWING ARE MISSION'S THOUGHTS PENDING DEVELOPMENTS IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL. END SUMMARY.

2. AFTER ICAO COUNCIL PRESIDENT, ASSAD KOTAITE, RECEIVED REQUEST ON SEPT 1 FROM ROK TO HOLD SPECIAL SESSION TO ICAO COUNCIL ON SEP 15, HE SECURED REQUIRED MAJORITY SUPPORT FOR A SPECIAL SESSION (17 MEMBERS) ON SEPT 2.

3. ADVANTAGES OF HOLDING MEETING ON SEPT 15 INCLUDE: FIRST, IT IS ONE DAY PRIOR TO PRE-ASSEMBLY COUNCIL SESSION WHICH CONVENES SEPT 16. HENCE, VIRTUALLY ALL 33 PERMANENT DELEGATIONS WILL BE IN MONTREAL TO ATTEND. FURTHERMORE, THE COUNCIL WILL MEET IN A SPECIAL SESSION THUS RECORDING CLEARLY THAT GOVERNMENTS MEMBERS OF ICAO BELIEVED THAT THE ISSUE OF AN UNARMED CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT BEING SHOT DOWN BY A MILITARY AIRCRAFT (UNDER WHATEVER CIRCUMSTANCES) DEMANDED A SPECIAL RESPONSE, NOT TREATMENT AS QUOTE OTHER BUSINESS UNQUOTE AT A REGULAR COUNCIL SESSION. (FYI: WHEN COUNCIL PRESIDENT KOTAITE REQUESTED USSR DELEGATION TO ACQUIESCE IN MEETING, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE URGED ISSUE BE PLACED INSTEAD ON SEPT. 16 AGENDA OF REGULAR 109TH, PRE-ASSEMBLY COUNCIL MEETING. SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE ALSO OPINED TO PRESIDENT KOTAITE THAT ONUS SHOULD BE PLACED ON GOVERNMENT OF KOREA FOR INCURSION INTO SOVIET AIRSPACE. END FYI.)

4. SECOND ADVANTAGE OF SEPT 15 DATE IS THAT COUNCIL WILL HAVE STRICTLY LIMITED TIME OF APPROXIMATELY 6 HOURS BEFORE FOLLOWING DAY'S ORDINARY SESSION, TIME ENOUGH TO CONSIDER TECHNICAL REMEDIES SUCH AS MODALITIES OF FACT-FINDING MISSION AND ESTABLISHMENT OF WORKING GROUP TO MODIFY AND AMPLIFY PRESENT ICAO STANDARDS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES. (AS DEPT. IS AWARE ICAO DID AMPLIFY PROCEDURES FOR INTERCEPTION FOLLOWING 1978 SOVIET FIRING ON KAL 707 NEAR MURMANSK). HOLDING SPECIAL SESSION OF COUNCIL ANY EARLIER THAN SEPT 15 INCREASES RISK OF EXPANDED CONDEMNATORY POLEMICS AND CONTEN-

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TIOUS VERBAL ATTACKS AND COUNTERATTACKS WHICH ARE MORE APPROPRIATELY
AIED IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY; IN SHORT,
AN EARLIER MEETING INCREASES RISKS OF POLITICIZATION.

5. ADVANTAGES OF HOLDING ICAO COUNCIL MEETING EARLIER
THAN SEPT 15 INCLUDE ADDING MORE
TIMELY PRESSURE ON USSR GOVT TO PROVIDE FULLER
EXPLANATION FOR ACTIONS OF ITS MILITARY AIRCRAFT. VARIOUS
DELEGATIONS, INCLUDING US, COULD RATIONALIZE CALL FOR
MOVE FROM THURSDAY, SEPT 15, TO EARLIER DATE ON GROUNDS OF
DISSATISFACTION WITH USSR EVASIVENESS IN UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

6. MISSION BELIEVES USG WISHES TO CREATE ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH
ICAO COUNCIL ACTS AS A FORUM FOR TECHNICAL, NONPOLITICIZED,
SOLUTIONS TO FUTURE CONTINGENCIES MORE THAN AS A FORUM TO
ASSIGN BLAME FOR PAST TRAGEDIES. NEVERTHELESS, MISSION WAS
NOT PLEASED WITH COUNCIL PRESIDENT KOTAITE'S PRESS STATEMENT
OF SEPT. 1 WHICH BLANDLY EXPRESSED NEED FOR FUTHER
FACTS WITHOUT EVEN INTIMATEING THAT A HUMAN TRAGEDY HAD
OCCURRED FOR WHICH THERE CAN BE NO JUSTIFICATION.
MISSION SEEKS INSTRUCTIONS TO TELL PRESIDENT KOTAIT
OF OUR DISSATISFACTION PRIVATELY AT MISSION
DISCRETION.

7. FINALLY, MISSION SUGGESTS THAT U.S. DELEGATION TO ICAO
ASSEMBLY STIMULATE AN ASSEMBLY MOVE TO CHANGE
RULES OF PROCEDURE WHICH PRESENTLY REQUIRE ONE WEEK'S NOTICE
IN ORDER TO ALLOW ICAO COUNCIL TO MEET IN
EMERGENCY SESSION ON LESS THAN ONE WEEK'S NOTICE (ANALOGOUS

TO EMERGENCY SESSIONS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL).
THIS CHANGE OF RULES SEEMS FEASIBLE
SINCE, UNLIKE OTHER SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, ALL MEMBERS OF
ICAO COUNCIL ARE REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN PERMANENT MISSION IN
MONTREAL AS A CONDITION OF COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP. THIS CHANGE
OF RULES SEEMS DESIREABLE IN ORDER TO PLACE ANY FUTURE
INCIDENTS QUICKLY INTO A TECHNICAL FORUM WHERE INFORMATION
IS MORE LIKELY TO BE MORE FULLY SHARED BY ALL PARTIES BEFORE
HIGHLY-PUBLICIZED POSITIONS TAKEN FOR PUBLIC-RELATIONS AND
FACE-SAVING REASONS HARDEN INTO POLITICAL ORTHODOXY.

8. MISSION WOULD WELCOME COMMENT FROM AMEMBASSY SEOUL OR
OTHER ADDRESSEES ON ROK GOVT CHOICE OF SEPT. 15. MISSION
LIKewise SEEKS ADVICE AND INSTRUCTIONS ON WHETHER TO SEEK
EARLIER CONVENING OF SPECIAL SESSION OF COUNCIL THAN SEPT.
15 AS PRESENTLY SCHEDULED. MISSION APPRECIATES FULL REPORTING
FROM DEPT. AND USUN.

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ADDENDUM TO TASS STATEMENTS AND REPORTS

DATE	GIST
5 Sept Moscow TV	Additional text asserts that Soviet forces fulfilled their duty and that the human sorrow is not the USSR's fault. Those who provoked the incident reckoned either that they would gain intelligence or that a shootdown would build a wave of anti-Soviet hysteria. Described such a tactic as <u>Hitlerite</u> .
5 Sept 1500z Moscow TV	Accuses US of using any pretext--as in the present provocation involving the South Korean airliner--to whip up tension and drag INF missiles into Europe.
Release for 6 Sept. Red Star article	Accuses CIA of planning in detail the airliner incident as a dirty and dangerous provocation for political gain to raise the pitch of military hysteria, the arms race, and preparations for war.
Earlier Items	
3 Sept 1755Z TASS Report	This long report provided no information on the incident but used western press sources to place the blame on the US, accusing Washington of feverishly covering up traces of the provocation staged against the Soviet Union using the Korean airliner.

Comment: Numerous other items have said nothing about the shootdown but have used western press sources to support accusations that the US is at fault for using the flight of the Korean airliner for intelligence purposes or for planning the provocation.