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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXEC	CUTIVE S	SECRETARIAT, N	ISC: SUBJECT FIL	Æ	With	drawer
					CAS	9/8/2017
File Folder TECH	HNOLOG	Y TRANSFER (A	PRIL 1983-5/13/19	83)	FOIA	
					F2003	5-004
Box Number 109					SKIN	NER
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211204 MEMO		SEY TO CLARK NA S&T MATTE	RE CIA SUPPORT	1	4/22/1983	B1
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211216 MEMO	POINTS PRC WI	S FOR 11:30 MEE TH SECS SHULT IDGE (DRAFT TA		4	5/13/1983	B1
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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE Withdrawer CAS 9/8/2017 File Folder TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (APRIL 1983-5/13/1983) **FOIA** F2003-004 **SKINNER Box Number** 109 **Doc Date Restrictions** 1D **Document Description** No of Doc **Pages** Type 1 5/13/1983 B1 211222 MEMO P. 1 OF 211216 10/8/2019 M723/1 5/13/1983 B1 211224 MEMO P. 1 OF 211216 M723/1 R 10/8/2019 1 5/13/1983 B1 211225 MEMO P. 1 OF 211216 10/8/2019 M723/1 R

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OF CLASSIED ENCLOSURE(S) RECEIVED 18 APR 83 18

TO CLARK

FROM DUNLOP, B DOCDATE 18 APR 83

KEYWORDS: CCCT

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

SUBJECT: CABINET COUN MTG 20 APR RE DIVERSION OF TECHNOLOGY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK DUE: 19 APR 83 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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COMMENTS

REF# 118635CA

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM

E: <u>5/23/83</u> JECT: <u>Cabinet Co</u>			DUE BY: ce and Trade - Minutes		
	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FY
ALL CABINET MEMBERS		M	Baker		Œ
Vice President			Deaver		
State			Clark		P
Treasury Defense			Darman (For WH Staffing)		
Attorney General			Harper		
Interior Agriculture			Jenkins		
Commerce					
Labor HHS					
HUD		ä			
Transportation					
Energy Education					
Counsellor OMB					
CIA			•	_	_
UN USTR		00000000000000000	CCCT/Gunn		Ľ
	_	_	CCEA/Porter		₽
			CCFA/Boggs		_ 2
CEA CEO		<u>a</u>	CCHR/Carleson		
CEQ OSTP]	CCLP/Uhlmann		
			CCMA/Bledsoe		(2
			CCNRE/Boggs		

KEMARKS:

Attached are minutes of the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade meeting of April 20, 1983. Please note that these minutes are classified SECRET.

ON CITY CARED EXCIT. LES

RETURN TO:

, ATTACHMENTS Craig L. Fuller Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs 456-2823

Becky Norton Dunlop Director, Office of Cabinet Affairs 456-2800

MINUTES CABINET COUNCIL ON COMMERCE AND TRADE Meeting #62, April 20, 1983 Roosevelt Room

Attendees: The Vice President, Messrs. Baldrige, Brock, Smith, Hodel, Harper, Niskanen, Fuller, McNamar, Wallis, Ikle, Keel, Porter, Olmer, Cicconi, Walker, and McMahon

Strengthening Japan's Enforcement of Export Controls

The Council reviewed an information paper on strengthening Japan's enforcement of export controls. The discussion produced agreement that:

- o There is strong evidence that the Soviets and to a lesser extent the Chinese view Japan as a fertile source for acquiring high technology.
- o Although a member of COCOM, the Japanese police and customs officials take a remarkably relaxed attitute toward attempting to stop shipments of goods to the Soviet Union that are inconsistent with the COCOM guidelines.
- o This problem has received limited cabinet level attention and efforts to remedy it have not succeeded at lower levels.
- We need a careful cost-benefit study of the impact of our export controls on U.S. firms.
- o The problem of Soviet access to technological advances through Japan is increasingly important as Japan strengthens its own technology base.
- o There is already at least one subcabinet level group (Senior Interagency Group on the Transfer of Strategic Technology chaired by Under Secretary of State William Schneider) looking at elements of this problem. There may be more.

Allen Wallis suggested and the Council agreed that we should have the SIG on the Transfer of Strategic Technology and any other groups working in this area report on their efforts soon to the CCCT.

State Dept. review completed

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE

SECRET / NO FORN	_
	25X

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/10/12: NLR-753-109-8-1-2

Crest 9/8/17

CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM 2633

DATE: <u>April 18, 1983</u>	NUMBER	: 11863	DUE BY: _		
	il on Cor velt Room		and Trade - Wednesday.	April 20	, 1983
	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
ALL CABINET MEMBERS			Baker	E'	
Vice President State Treasury Defense Attorney General Interior Agriculture Commerce Labor HHS HUD Transportation Energy Education Counsellor OMB CIA UN			Deaver Clark Darman (For WH Staffing) Harper Jenkins		
ÜSTR	_		CCCT/Gunn CCEA/Porter		
CEA CEQ OSTP		00000	CCFA/Boggs CCHR/Carleson CCLP/Uhlmann CCMA/Bledsoe CCNRE/Boggs		00000
EMARKS: The Cabinet Con	incil on	Commer	ce and Trade will most		

Trade will meet Wednesday, April 20, 1983 at 2:00 p.m. in the Roosevelt Room. Agenda and paper attached. Please return acknowledgment of receipt. Due to the nature of Wednesday's meeting, the Cabinet Council attendance will be limited to Principals Only.

AGENDA:

Diversion of Technology CM# 041

paper attached

SECRET ATTACHMENTS

RETURN TO:

☐ Craig L. Fuller Assistant to the President for Cabinet Affairs 456-2823



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CABINET COUNCIL ON COMMERCE AND TRADE

April 20, 1983

2:00 p.m.

Roosevelt Room

AGENDA

1. Diversion of Technology CM # 041

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Collect	tion Name	Withdrawer				
EXEC	ÚTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE	CAS 9/8/2017				
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CLARK TO

DISPATCH

FROM CASEY, W

DOCDATE 22 APR 83

RECEIVED 25 APR 83 15

KEYWORDS: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

SCIENTIFIC

SUBJECT:	RESPONSE TO) CLARK APR	5 MEMO	RE CIA	SUPPORT	r ON CHINA	S & T MA	TTERS	
ACTION:	** PREPARE	MEMO FOR C					S FILE	s	
	FOR ACTION			FOR CON	CURRENC	Ε	FOR I	INFO	
	MANFREDI	WE	iss		DE GRA	FFENREID	RYE		
COMMENTS	** IF APPRO	OPRIATE					KIMMI	TT	
REF#		LOG	3 83020	04		NSCIFID		(C /)
ACTION OF	FICER (S)	ASSIGNED							

- 18 4/20/83

- 1. STAFF SECRETARY
- 2. NSC SECRETARIAT

3. BRIAN MERCHANT SITUATION ROOM

KIMILIA



22 April 1983

•		
MEMORANDUM FOR:	The Honorable William P. Clark The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs	
SUBJECT :	CIA Support on China S&T Matters	25X
REFERENCE :	Your memorandum of 5 April 1983, same subject	
gence support on adjusting our and done this in par Chinaas you ar	ciate the interest you have in our ability to provide intelli- issues involving Chinese science and technology. We have been alytical resources allocated to the China S&T target. We have t to strengthen our capabilities on technology transfer to e well aware, an area of increasing importance to the bilateral hip. I am confident that we are now in a much stronger position pecific area.	25X
depth on basic of in the area of co cessing, and aero	the process of readjustment, we have not provided for enough ngoing research and analysis on Chinese technology, particularly omputers and microelectronics, communications and signal procespace systems. We are taking immediate steps to devote three ions to such basic work in the Office of Scientific and Weapons	25X
	nd to meet the demands for intelligence on China S&T matters and r steps to improve our coverage should they prove necessary. 25X William J. Casey	1
DISCONOCIONAL CONTROLORIA CONTROLORIA CONTROLORIA CONTROLORIA CONTROLORIA CONTROLORIA CONTROLORIA CONTROLORIA C	Dinector of Central Intelligence 25X1	
No Objection	S E C R E T n to Declassification in Part 20 10/10/11 : NLR-753-109-8-3-0	

NSC/S PROFILE UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8303265

TO

CLARK

FROM TYSON

DOCDATE 12 MAY 83

RECEIVED 13 MAY 83 12

KE YWORDS: PRC

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS

EXPORT CONTROLS

SUBJECT: TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER POLICY RE CHINA

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE: 14 MAY 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS DISPATCHED TO AGENCIES VIS LDX.

(L/) NSCIFID REF# LOG

ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED

W/ATTCH FILE.

RCM HAS SEEN THE WHITE HOUSE 5/13 WASHINGTON (Bud) In trying to broken a decision on the PRC Tech Transfer issue I had the staff works ups draft decision meno which They discussed informally with State, Defense and Commerce over the past few days. Last night I sent the attacked draft out for comment to State, Defense and Commerce. Baldidge has asked to talk to Judge on this issue before hac lewes on monday. It is scheduled for 11:30 today. Doe asked Clay if Shultz wants to come to that

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON meeting, Caps will be in new yorks but he has a copy of this graper. Judge has tulked to him on the phone about it this morning. Ithink State will agree with proper as written, Defense will not want to Change country category. Commerce will want a more positive signal of our intent to merene technology Judge has taked to Casey about use . John

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL

Executive Secretary
The Department of State

SUBJECT

Draft Memorandum for the President re Technology Transfer Policy for the PRC

Note: Judge Clark has not reviewed this memorandum in final.

Please deliver copy to Paul Wolfowitz.

John Rounderter Charles Mino

John M. Poindexter Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN JAMES CORMACK

Office of the Secretary of Defense

DR. FRED IKLE

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT:

Draft Memorandum for the President re Technology Transfer Policy for the PRC

Note: Judge Clark has not reviewed this memorandum in final.

Charles Pipe

John M. Poindexter Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

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THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET

WASHINGTON

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT:

Technology Transfer Policy for the People's

Republic of China

Issue

How to improve and clarify our technology transfer policy for China.

Facts

On June 4, 1981, you issued a "Presidential Directive on Export Control Policy" stating that it was in our strategic interest to preserve China as an effective counterweight to growing Soviet military power and to strengthen our strategic cooperation with China. Toward that end, you stated it was important that our export control policy support a secure, friendly, and modernizing China, and you directed that technology be approved at "significantly higher technical levels". Because there was some confusion and disagreement in the interpretation and implementation of that Directive, I issued a clarifying memorandum on May 6, 1982. Unfortunately, this policy has still not been effectively implemented, and confusion persists over the interpretation of these guidelines. There are now political reasons for clarifying and improving our technology transfer policy toward China, and for the purposes of Secretary Baldrige's trip it is desirable to make some decisions on this issue now.


For four months the Department of Commerce and an NSSD Working Group on China have been re-evaluating our technology transfer policy toward China. Both groups have produced studies, and Secretary Baldrige convened two recent meetings (April 25 and May 2) of the Export Administration Review Board (EARB) to examine the recommendations of these two studies.

Discussion

At the May 2 EARB meeting, the participants (except CIA, which abstained) agreed that the following steps be taken to improve our technology transfer policy toward China:

Land William

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- -- Increase the level of technology transfer to China.
- -- Retain the present system of national security controls.
- -- Make the administrative improvements recommended in the study done under the China NSSD working group chaired by OSTP. This includes negotiating a special "no retransfer" agreement with China similar to agreements we have concluded with Sweden and Austria.
- -- Rigorously define those areas within the four special mission areas (nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, electronic and anti-submarine warfare, and intelligence gathering) most critical to our national security and target our controls more precisely on them.
- -- Establish an Interagency Working Group to do the necessary definitional work and set benchmark levels for specific technology transfer. The group would draw up a selective ("red line") list of the most sensitive technologies which would be subject to a presumption of denial. It would establish a second level ("green line") below which licensing policy would be the same as for all other friendly, non-allied nations. For technologies between these levels, there would be case-by-case review, with a presumption of approval unless the export would substantially and directly enhance China's capabilities in one of the four special mission areas and pose a credible major risk to our national security.

There were, however, several issues on which agreement could not be reached at the EARB meeting and which have not been resolved in subsequent interagency discussions. In order to resolve these disagreements, I recommend the following:

Recommendations

- Category Change: Move China from Category P to Category V in the Country Group Categories of the Export Administration Regulations.
 - This will be a clear signal to the Chinese that we intend to treat them as a friend rather than as an enemy. At the same time, the retention of national security controls will provide the Department of Defense with the authority it needs to continue to protect US national security interests. This is essentially a political decision, to be made because the symbolic aspect of what we decide is important in our relationship with the Chinese. Nevertheless, we should

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not announce this change until we have consulted with our COCOM partners.

Approve	Disapp	rove	

- 2. Establishment of Working Group of Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP).
 - A working group of the ACEP, consisting of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and the National Security Council, will be established to do the following:
 - a. The group will be instructed to develop a new definition of a "credible major risk to national security" to be used in conjunction with the guidance to be established setting the new technology transfer levels for China. The group is to report this definition to the EARB within 30 days. If a consensus is not agreed upon in this time period, then within seven days after that deadline, the EARB will submit an options paper to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
 - Within 60 days of the issuance of the above definition, the working group should define more precisely the areas of concern within the four special mission areas and set new benchmark levels for technology transfer for the key commodity control list items significantly above what they are now. The group will submit this report to the EARB for approval. An interim report will be provided to the EARB at the end of 30 days, describing the progress made and problems encountered in devising the new guidelines. Within seven days of the submission of the final report to the EARB, the EARB will submit its report to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. An options paper will be included for any items on which consensus has not been reached.

Approve		Disapprove	
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WASHFAX RECEIPT -J 41 1: PID: 37 THE WHITE HOUSE - "LII" OF STATE 3 MAY 12 PM 10 48 MESSAGE NO. 966 CLASSIFICATION SEC FROM CHARLES TYSON NSC (NAME) (EXTEMSION) (ROOM HUNG MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DEAST MEGAL ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PALKY for the ME TO (AGENCY) DELIVER TO: STATE . CHARLES HILL REMARKS:

83 MAY 12 PID: 37

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WASHFAX RECEIPT

THE WHITE HOUSE



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HESSAGE NO. 967 CLASSIFICATION PROMCHARLES TYSON, (ROOM NUMBER) MESSAGE DESCRIPTION DENFT MEMO ON TECHNOLOGY Policy for THE TO (AGENCY) DELIVER TO: DEPT/ROOM NO. EXTENSION OSD 000 CORMACK FRED IKLE REMARKS :

NSC/S	PROFILE
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ID 8303271

RECEIVED 13 MAY 83 13 JNCLASS SECTION

CLARK

DOCDATE 13 MAY 83

KEYWORDS: PRC

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS SHULTZ, G

EXPORT CONTROLS

BALDRIGE, M

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS FOR CLARK MTG W/ SHULTZ & BALDRIGE RE TECHNOLOGY

TRANSFERS TO PRC

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8303265 NSCIFID

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

DISPATCH



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 13, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

WPC HAS SEEN

FROM:

CHARLES P. TYSON

GUS WEISS

SUBJECT:

Talking Points for 11:30 a.m. Meeting Today on PRC with Secretary Shultz and Secretary

Baldrige

This is in response to the views of Commerce at Tab A.

- 1. Move PRC from Category P to V: Commerce position is too liberal in that national security controls must be retained; these are not part of free world controls.
- 2. Baldrige cannot inform PRC of any export category change without US consultation with COCOM partners: Correct.
- 3. USG does not need another group to set export benchmarks: NSC staff disagrees; an effective and specific working group (well managed) is precisely what has been lacking.
- 4. Directive needed to Defense and Commerce to apply benchmark level: This point is not exactly clear to us, but as best we understand its intent, we agree.
- 5. Establish benchmark higher than two times: Disagree because this is yet another arbitrary guideline for which the analysis has not been done.
- 6. Set an uns pecified percent of free world technology for PRC export: Disagree, as again being artibtary.



DECLASSIFIED

NLITE M125 # 211214

BY W NARA DATE TO 19 19

Problems with May 12 Draft Memo to the President

- O Cannot agree to move China from category P to V unless we actually intend to treat China the same as other countries in V such as UK, France, West Germany and Yugoslavia.
- o Baldrige cannot tell PRC of U.S. intention to move China from P to V until U.S. consults with COCOM partners. Therefore, we cannot announce category change on Baldrige trip.
- o We don't need another working group to set a new benchmark. [The benchmark in Judge Clark's May 1982 memo is "the indicator of the technical level of products and know-how that imply the presumption of acceptable national security risk."] Therefore a new definition of "risk to national security" is no more than a judgment that a benchmark higher than two-times is needed. Obviously, any benchmark cannot be rigidly applied to all product categories, but it can provide an approximate base point for licensing people to determine whether a particular export poses a major risk to national security.
- o We do need a directive to Commerce and Defense -- not to set a new benchmark level, because that is a political judgment, not a technical one -- to apply the benchmark to the specific product categories within 90 days.
- o I recommend that the President establish a benchmark higher than two-times which is consistent with his original June 1981 policy. That policy stated that we should allow the approval of technology to China at "significantly higher levels than previously, albeit somewhat below those approved for other friendly non-allied countries."
- o In my judgment, a level of percent of free world meets the President's policy.

Talking Points A

- o The President has asked me to reaffirm U.S. policy allowing the approval of technology to China at "significantly higher levels than previously." We have every intention of implementing this policy.
- o Consistent with the President's policy, we expect increased approval of technology transfer to China in the near future. We acknowledge that there have been internal difficulties in applying this policy.

But we have taken internal steps that if carried out could result in significant new approvals. Within 90 days you will see the results of this action.

However, you the Chinese must recognize that this level will remain below the level approved for our allied trading partners.

Talking Points B

- o The President has asked me to reaffirm U.S. policy allowing the approval of technology to China at "significantly higher levels than previously." We have every intention of implementing this policy.
- o However, we believe we have already raised the level of technology being licensed to China. We cannot at this time commit to any greater levels than are now being approved.

Talking Points C

- o The President has asked me to reaffirm U.S. policy allowing the approval of technology to China at "significantly higher levels than previously." We have every intention of implementing this policy.
- Accordingly, the President has instructed me to tell you that we intend to approve exports to China which are percent of the state-of-the-art technology readily available in the free world. This will replace the lower standard of two-times. This will result in significant new approvals in the near future.

Talking Points D

- The President has asked me to reaffirm U.S. policy allowing the approval of technology to China at "significantly higher levels than previously." We have every intention of implementing this policy.
- O Accordingly, the President has instructed me to tell you that we intend to place China in licensing category V. In this category are most of our Western trading partners.
- o Although we will not be approving exports to China at the same level as to our Western allies, such as the UK or West Germany, this change in category will demonstrate our commitment to significantly raising the level of technology approved.
- o Before we can implement this policy we will need the approval of our COCOM partners.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET

WASHINGTON

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
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- -- Make the administrative improvements recommended in the study done under the China NSSD working group chaired by OSTP. This includes negotiating a special "no retransfer" agreement with China similar to agreements we have concluded with Sweden and Austria.
- -- Rigorously define those areas within the four special mission areas (nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, electronic and anti-submarine warfare, and intelligence gathering) most critical to our national security and target our controls more precisely on them.
- -- Establish an Interagency Working Group to do the necessary definitional work and set benchmark levels for specific technology transfer. The group would draw up a selective ("red line") list of the most sensitive technologies which would be subject to a presumption of denial. It would establish a second level ("green line") below which licensing policy would be the same as for all other friendly, non-allied nations. For technologies between these levels, there would be case-by-case review, with a presumption of approval unless the export would substantially and directly enhance China's capabilities in one of the four special mission areas and pose a credible major risk to our national security.

There were, however, several issues on which agreement could not be reached at the EARB meeting and which have not been resolved in subsequent interagency discussions. In order to resolve these disagreements, I recommend the following:

Recommendations

- 1. Category Change: Move China from Category P to Category V in the Country Group Categories of the Export Administration Regulations.
 - This will be a clear signal to the Chinese that we intend to treat them as a friend rather than as an enemy. At the same time, the retention of national security controls will provide the Department of Defense with the authority it needs to continue to protect US national security interests. This is essentially a political decision, to be made because the symbolic aspect of what we decide is important in our relationship with the Chinese. Nevertheless, we should

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not announce this change until we have consulted with our COCOM partners.

Approve	 Disapprove	

- 2. Establishment of Working Group of Advisory Committee on Export Policy (ACEP).
 - A working group of the ACEP, consisting of representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, and the National Security Council, will be established to do the following:
 - a. The group will be instructed to develop a new definition of a "credible major risk to national security" to be used in conjunction with the guidance to be established setting the new technology transfer levels for China. The group is to report this definition to the EARB within 30 days. If a consensus is not agreed upon in this time period, then within seven days after that deadline, the EARB will submit an options paper to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
 - Within 60 days of the issuance of the above definition, the working group should define more precisely the areas of concern within the four special mission areas and set new benchmark levels for technology transfer for the key commodity control list items significantly above what they are now. The group will submit this report to the EARB for approval. An interim report will be provided to the EARB at the end of 30 days, describing the progress made and problems encountered in devising the new guidelines. Within seven days of the submission of the final report to the EARB, the EARB will submit its report to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. An options paper will be included for any items on which consensus has not been reached.

Approve	Disapprove	
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May 13

Secretariat --

CPT ran with orig which had a couple of typos -- which I corrected & reran. It is attached herewith to replace the one which had typos Also, I never saw the attachment -- hence it is not attached. You'll probably get it with the comeback. What a mess!!

Mary

+ combask

3271

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 13, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM:

CHARLES P. TYSON

GUS WEISS

SUBJECT:

Talking Points for 11:30 a.m. Meeting Today on PRC with Secretary Shultz and Secretary

Baldrige

This is in response to the views of Commerce at Tab A.

- 1. Move PRC from Category P to V: Commerce position is too liberal in that national security controls must be retained; these are not part of free world controls.
- Baldrige cannot inform PRC of any export category change without US consultation with COCOM partners: Correct.
- 3. USG does not need another group to set export benchmarks: NSC staff disagrees; an effective and specific working group (well managed) is precisely what has been lacking.
- Directive needed to Defense and Commerce to apply benchmark level: This point is not exactly clear to us, but as best we understand its intent, we agree.
- 5. Establish benchmark higher than two times: Disagree because this is yet another arbitrary quideline for which the analysis has not been done.
- 6. Set an unspecified percent of free world technology for PRC export: Disagree, as again being arbitrary.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

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