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**Folder Title:** NSSD 11-82  
US Policy Toward the Soviet Union (3 of 8)  
**Box:** Box 91278

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSSD FILE

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 10/27/2006

**File Folder** NSSD 11-82 (3 OF 8)

**FOIA**

F2000-112/1

**Box Number** 91278

LETTOW

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
29379	MEMO	WILLIAM P CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT, RE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR NSSD <i>R 6/30/2008 NLRRF00-112</i>	1	8/20/1982	B1
29380	NSSD	DRAFT <i>R 6/30/2008 NLRRF00-112</i>	5	ND	B1
29381	NSSD	DRAFT <i>R 6/30/2008 NLRRF00-112</i>	3	ND	B1
29382	MEMO	RICHARD PIPES TO WILLIAM P CLARK, RE TERMS OF REFERENCE (SAME TEXT AS #18330) <i>R 6/9/2011 F2003-009/1</i>	1	6/22/1982	B1
29383	MEMO	PAULA DOBRIANSKY TO CLARK, RE NSSD 11-82 <i>R 6/30/2008 NLRRF00-112</i>	1	8/30/1982	B1
29384	NSDD	DRAFT <i>R 10/17/2007 NLRRF2000-112/1</i>	13	ND	B1
29385	NSDD	DRAFT, RE FALKLANDS <i>R 6/30/2008 NLRRF00-112</i>	5	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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SYSTEM II  
90411

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

CHRON FILE

August 21, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: National Security Study Directive on U.S.  
Policy Toward the Soviet Union

The President has formally approved the attached National Security Study Directive (NSSD 11-82) on U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union. The Department of State will chair the review process to be initiated in an interagency group meeting which should meet no later than Wednesday, August 25, 1982. The attached NSSD provides the guidelines for this review.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

*Robert L. Hartmann*  
William R. Clark for

Attachment: NSSD 11-82

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By M77 NARA, Date 4/5/02

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cy 1 of 9 copies

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 21, 1982

National Security Study  
Directive Number 11-82

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

Introduction

A Review will be conducted of U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union. This National Security Study Directive establishes the Terms of Reference for the Review. (S)

Objectives of the Review

The Review will assess the nature of the Soviet threat to U.S. national security interests in the short and long terms, with emphasis on its non-military aspects, and recommend appropriate U.S. policy responses, by:

- Analyzing the determinants of Soviet foreign policy and domestic policies of concern to the U.S. and other outside powers;
- Assessing Soviet strengths and weaknesses;
- Identifying key elements of likely continuity and change in the Soviet system and Soviet policies; and
- Determining the political, economic, military and ideological means at our disposal for achieving favorable changes in Soviet international behavior, including assessment of the costs and obstacles involved in using them. (S)

The Review will proceed on the premise that Soviet international behavior is determined not only by the external environment but also by political, economic, social and ideological features of the Soviet system itself. It will produce a paper for consideration by the National Security Council, and subsequently, for decision by the President. (S)

Scope of the Review

The Review will deal with the following subjects:

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NLS P. van Tassel, NSC (F88-8862)  
3/11/96  
BY M7D NARA, DATE 4/5/02  
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CHRON FILE

1. The likelihood of changes in the Soviet system: to ascertain what realistic expectation one can have of significant changes in the Soviet system and in Soviet international behavior, and in which areas; whether such changes are likely to make the country more or less threatening, and in which areas. The question of non-evolutionary (violent) collapse of the system from within and its implications for U.S. security will also be considered. (S)

2. Soviet vulnerabilities and strengths: the sources of strains and tensions within the Soviet system and the bases for continuity:

A. Internal

-- Economic (resources and structures by sector, strengths and weaknesses of central planning, other constraints on Soviet economic growth, trends in industrial and agricultural productivity, degree of dependence on foreign trade, the financial outlook, the burden of military expenditures, consumer passivity and dissatisfaction).

-- Political (party, police and society; social malaise and revolutionary consciousness; the self-assertion of the working class; dissident movements among Russians and ethnic minorities; the succession problem).

-- Social (demographic trends; urban and rural society; youth; deviance; the religious factor).

B. External

-- Imperial challenges: increasing burdens of projecting a global presence; allies and proxies; strains in Eastern Europe, including economic relations with CEMA.

-- Communist movements: centrifugal tendencies in the international Communist movement; heresies and deviations.

-- International challenges: the United States, Western Europe, Japan, China, the Third World. (S)

3. The Balance of Internal Forces Making for Continuity or Change: to analyze the Soviet ruling elite in terms of elements favoring the status quo and those favoring change in either a more liberal or a more conservative direction, and to determine what actions by foreign powers assist each of these competing groups. (S)



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3

4. Meeting the Soviet Challenge in the Short and Long Terms: to define the Soviet challenge to our interests over the next three-five years and ten years, and to ascertain the means at the disposal of the United States, its Allies and other mobilizable forces to influence the evolution of Soviet policies and the Soviet regime in directions favorable to our interests:

- Political (key regional crises; the role of U.S. and multi-lateral diplomacy in inhibiting Soviet interventionism; political assistance and support to democratic elements in the USSR and other countries; neutralization of Soviet "active measures"); the role of covert action should also be assessed.
- Economic (altering the mix of available Soviet policy options; technology transfer; energy policy and competition for raw materials; management of East/West trade, including grain sales; sectors of the economy susceptible to influence through Western trade policies; policy on extension of Western credits to the USSR).
- Ideological (the nature and thrust of U.S. informational efforts directed at the Soviet Union; the role of U.S.-Soviet cultural, scientific and other exchanges; scope and intensity of U.S. efforts to counter Soviet disinformation activities; presenting a democratic alternative).
- High-level dialogue (advantages and disadvantages in relation to frequency and scope; the historical record of summitry). (S)

5. Shaping the Soviet environment:

- The military balance (the importance of U.S. and Allied rearmament; the U.S. military strategy most likely to neutralize Soviet strategic and regional objectives; the role of arms control in advancing U.S. national security interests; security assistance to Allies and assistance to anti-Communist forces; regional commitments of U.S. forces). (This section should draw on NSSD-1.)
- Allied cooperation (how best to secure and support the cooperation of our Allies in pursuit of our policies toward the USSR).
- Third World cooperation (actual and potential; bilateral and multilateral; the place of diplomacy). (S)

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**CHRON FILE**

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4

6. Recommended Policies for the U.S. (how U.S., Western and Third-World leverage can be applied against Soviet vulnerabilities to induce Soviet restraint in the short and long term). (S)

Administration

Management of the NSSD -82 Review will be the responsibility of an interagency group that will report its findings in a paper of no more than 25 pages, single-spaced, no later than October 1, 1982. The group will be chaired by the Department of State and will include Assistant Secretary-level representation from the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the International Communication Agency, the Department of Agriculture and the National Security Council staff. (S)

All matters relating to this NSSD will be classified SECRET. Dissemination of this NSSD, the subsequent study material, and the resulting draft NSSD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. (S)

*K. [unclear] [unclear]*

SECRET

of 1 of 9 copies  
**CHRON FILE**

24 AUGUST 1982

NOTE FOR DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Attached NSSD 11-82

The attached document was also sent  
to you via LDX on 23 August. This  
is your official record copy.



BT Merchant  
NSC/S  
Situation Room  
White House

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23 AUG 1982

CURRENT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

System II Actions completed on 21 Aug 1982 in Calif by Judge Clark per Jacque Hill

Log #

90625 WPC approved sending memo to Director of OMB. Per JMP, send copy & treat as original.

310  
90441

President has approved & signed NSSD. Original in Calif, Jacque will bring back. Per JMP, send out copies -- date August 21, 1982.

WHSR  
ROUTE SLIP

STAFF	C/O
Clark	
<del>McFarlane</del>	C
Poindexter	
Merchant	
NSC S/S	

Time Stamp

82 AUG 21 P 9: 16

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

*Notify Pipes  
he can move  
out on this*

C : Copy      O : Original

*The original  
went to the  
unit Fri.*

*Bud  
10:00 PM  
done 8/23*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

8/21

*NSC; Flo: GANT:*

Attached NSSD on "U.S. Policy Toward  
the Soviet Union" is DACOMED to  
you to show President's approval.

Original will be returned by first  
means possible.

Jacques

~~SECRET~~THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

29379

~~SECRET~~

August 20, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *wpc*

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for NSSD on "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union"

Issue: Attached at Tab A is the draft of the Terms of Reference for an NSSD on "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union" for your signature.

Discussion: Although relations with the Soviet Union lie at the heart of our foreign policy and military strategy, we do not, at present, have any formal guidelines capable of guiding us in the pursuit of these relations. To overcome this gap, NSC Staff, in cooperation with the Department of State, has drafted the attached Terms of Reference for an NSSD on this critically important subject. The draft goes beyond previous policy formulations bearing on U.S.-Soviet relations in that it requires us to show concern not only for Soviet political and military behavior, but also for the system that makes behavior of this kind possible. This approach calls on us to adjust our policies toward Moscow in such a manner that instead of helping the further consolidation of the totalitarian and imperialist elements in the USSR, we promote the less aggressive, more domestically-oriented forces.

RECOMMENDATION

OK No That you sign the NSSD at Tab A.

## Attachment:

Tab A Terms of Reference for NSSD on "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union"

Prepared by:  
Richard Pipes

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 100-112 #29379

BY AN NARA DATE 6/30/08~~SECRET~~



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 6, 1982

~~SECRET~~  
WITH ~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK  
THE WHITE HOUSESUBJECT: Terms of Reference for NSSD on U.S Policy Toward  
the Soviet Union

In response to your memorandum No. 90411 of July 5, we enclose a draft Terms of Reference incorporating the State comments you requested. The enclosed text has been discussed with the senior NSC staff member on U.S.-Soviet affairs.

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive SecretaryEnclosure:  
As stated.

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By MJD NARA, Date 4/5/02

~~SECRET WITH ~~SECRET~~/~~  
SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Proposed National Security Study

Directive Number

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F00-112 #29380

29380

BY CU NARADATE 6/30/08

## U.S. POLICY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION

### Introduction

A Review will be conducted of U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union. This National Security Study Directive establishes the Terms of Reference for the Review. (S)

### Objectives of the Review

The Review will assess the nature of the Soviet threat to U.S. national security interests in the short and long terms, with emphasis on its non-military aspects, and recommend appropriate U.S. policy responses, by:

- Analyzing the determinants of Soviet foreign policy and domestic policies of concern to the U.S. and other outside powers;
- Assessing Soviet strengths and weaknesses;
- Identifying key elements of likely continuity and change in the Soviet system and Soviet policies; and
- Determining the political, economic, military and ideological means at our disposal for achieving favorable changes in Soviet international behavior, including assessment of the costs and obstacles involved in using them. (S)

The review will proceed on the premise that Soviet international behavior is determined not only by the external environment but also by political, economic, social and ideological ~~aspects~~ of the Soviet system itself. It will *features* produce a paper for consideration by the National Security

Council, and subsequently, for decision by the President. (S)

Scope of the Review

The Review will deal with the following subjects:

1. The likelihood of significant changes in the Soviet system:

to ascertain what realistic expectation one can have of significant changes in the Soviet system and in Soviet international behavior, and in which areas; whether such changes are likely to make the country more or less threatening, and in which areas. The question of non-evolutionary (violent) collapse of the system from within and its implications for U.S. security will also be considered.

2. Soviet vulnerabilities and strengths: the sources of strains and tensions within the Soviet system, and the bases for continuity:

A. Internal

-- Economic (resources and structures by sector, strengths and weaknesses of central planning, other constraints on Soviet economic growth, trends in industrial and agricultural productivity, degree of dependence on foreign trade, the financial outlook, the burden of military expenditures, consumer passivity and dissatisfaction).

-- Political (party, police and society; <sup>malaise and</sup> revolutionary consciousness; <sup>self-awareness</sup> the <sup>rise</sup> of the working class; dissident movements among Russians and <sup>ethnic</sup> minorities; ~~impact and prospects~~; the succession problem).

-- Social (demographic trends; urban and rural society; youth; deviance; the religious factor).



B. External

- Imperial challenges: increasing burdens of projecting a global presence; allies and proxies; strains in Eastern Europe, including economic relations with CEMA.
- Communist movements: centrifugal tendencies in the international Communist movement; heresies and deviations.
- International challenges: the U.S., Western Europe, Japan, China, the Third World.

3. The Balance of Internal Forces Making for Continuity or

Change: to analyze the Soviet ruling elite in terms of elements favoring the status quo <sup>and those favoring</sup> ~~or~~ change in either a more liberal or a more conservative direction, and to determine what actions by foreign powers assist each of these competing groups.

4. Meeting the Soviet Challenge in the Short and Long Terms:

to define the Soviet challenge to our interests over the next 3-5 years and 10 years, and to ascertain the means at the disposal of the U.S., its Allies and other mobilizable forces to influence the evolution of Soviet policies and the Soviet regime in directions favorable to our interests:

- Political (key regional crises; the role of U.S. and multilateral diplomacy in <sup>inhibiting</sup> ~~limiting~~ Soviet interventionism; political assistance and support <sup>to</sup> ~~for~~ democratic elements in the USSR and other countries; neutralization of Soviet "active measures"); the role of covert action should also be assessed.

- Economic (<sup>altering</sup> ~~changing~~ the mix of available Soviet policy options; technology transfer; energy policy and

competition for raw materials; management of East/West trade, including grain sales; sectors <sup>of the economy</sup> susceptible to influence through ~~US~~ Western trade policies; policy on extension of Western credits to the USSR).

-- Ideological (the nature and thrust of U.S. informational efforts directed at the Soviet Union; the role of U.S.-Soviet cultural, scientific and other exchanges; scope and intensity of U.S. efforts to counter Soviet disinformation activities; presenting a democratic alternative).

-- High-level dialogue (advantages and disadvantages in relation to frequency and scope; the historical record on summitry). (S)

5. Shaping the Soviet environment:

-- The military balance (the importance of U.S. and Allied rearmament; the U.S. military strategy most likely to neutralize Soviet strategic and regional objectives; the role of arms control in advancing U.S. national security interests; security assistance to Allies and assistance to anti-Communist forces; regional commitments of U.S. forces). (This section should draw on NSSD-1.)

-- Allied cooperation (how best to secure and support the cooperation of our Allies in pursuit of our policies toward the USSR).

-- Third World cooperation (actual and potential; bilateral and multilateral; the place of diplomacy).

6. Recommended Policies for the U.S. (how U.S., Western and Third-World leverage can be applied against Soviet vulnerabilities to induce Soviet restraint in the short and long terms). ~~(S)~~

Administration

Management of the NSSD -82 Review will be the responsibility of an interagency group that will report its findings in a paper of no more than 25 pages single-spaced no later than ~~September 15~~, 1982. The group will be chaired by the Department of State and will include Assistant Secretary-level representation from the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the International Communication Agency, the Department of Agriculture and the National Security Council staff. ~~(S)~~

Oct 15/

All matters relating to this NSSD will be classified SECRET or SECRET/SENSITIVE. Dissemination of this NSSD, the subsequent study material, and the resulting draft NSSD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. ~~(C)~~

SECRET

SYSTEM II  
90411

16

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CHRON FILE

July 5, 1982

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER MEIGS HAIG, JR.  
Secretary of State


SUBJECT: Terms of Reference for NSSD on U.S. Soviet Policy

I am transmitting herewith for comments by the Department of State a new set of Terms of Reference for an NSSD on "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union." ~~(S)~~

*Will. P. Clark*

William P. Clark

Attachment



~~SECRET~~

Review July 05, 1988.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

17  
29381

Proposed National Security Study  
Directive Number

## U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

### Introduction

A Review will be conducted of long-term U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union. This National Security Study Directive establishes the Terms of Reference for the Review. (S)

### Objectives of the Review

The Review will seek to define the nature of the Soviet threat to U.S. national security interests and to identify the means which the U.S. can employ to neutralize that threat. It will proceed on the premise that Soviet international behavior is a response not only to external threats and opportunities but also to the internal imperatives of the Soviet political, economic, social and ideological system. The Review will:

- Define the nature of the Soviet threat and especially its non-military components.
- Identify the changes in the Soviet system and in Soviet domestic and international policies that would best serve to promote U.S. national interests.
- Determine the political, economic, military and ideological means at the disposal of the United States and its Allies most likely to promote favorable changes in the Soviet system and Soviet international behavior. (S)

The Review will produce a paper for consideration by the National Security Council, and subsequently, for decision by the President. (S)

### Scope of the Review

The Review will deal with the following subjects:

1. The likelihood of significant changes in the Soviet system: to ascertain what realistic expectation one can have of significant changes in the Soviet system and in Soviet international behavior; whether such changes are likely to make the country more or less threatening. The question of non-evolutionary (violent) collapse of the system from within and its implications for U.S. security will also be considered. (S)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 100-112 #29381

BY CN NARADATE 6/30/08

~~SECRET~~

2. Soviet vulnerabilities: the sources of strains and tensions within the Soviet system:

A. Internal

- Economic (decline in industrial and agricultural productivity; problems of financial liquidity; the burden of military expenditures; consumer dissatisfaction).
- Political (dissident movements among Russians and minorities; the atrophying of the party apparatus; the succession problem).
- Social (unfavorable demographic trends; the alienation of youth; discontent among various social strata). (S)

B. External

- Soviet relations with client states: allies and proxies; strains in Eastern Europe.
- Communist movements: centrifugal tendencies in the international Communist movement; heresies and deviations.
- International challenges: the U.S., Western Europe, Japan and China.
- Imperial challenges: increasing burdens of projecting a global presence. (S)

3. Internal forces making for change: to identify elements in the Soviet ruling elite which desire to change the system both in a more liberal and in a more conservative direction, and to determine what actions by foreign powers assist each of these competing groups. (S)

4. Western ability to influence Soviet policies: to ascertain the means at the disposal of the United States and its Allies to influence the evolution of the Soviet regime and Soviet policies in a direction favorable to their interests:

- Political (Western solidarity as leverage; the role of U.S. and multilateral diplomacy in limiting Soviet interventionism in world trouble spots; political assistance and support for democratic elements in other countries; neutralization of Soviet "active measures").
- Economic (technology transfer; energy policy and competition for raw materials; management of East/West trade, including grain sales; policy on extension of Western credits to the USSR).



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(9)

- Ideological (the nature and thrust of U.S. informational efforts directed at the Soviet Union; the role of U.S.-Soviet cultural, scientific, and other exchanges; scope and intensity of U.S. efforts to oppose Soviet disinformation activities).
- High-level dialogue (advantages and disadvantages in relation to frequency and scope; the historical record on summitry). (S)
- 5. Shaping the Soviet environment:
  - The military balance (the importance of U.S. and Allied rearmament; the U.S. military strategy most likely to neutralize Soviet strategic objectives; the role of arms control in advancing U.S. national security interests; assistance to anti-Communist forces; regional commitments of U.S. forces).
  - Allied cooperation (how best to secure the support and cooperation of our Allies in pursuit of our policies toward the USSR).
  - Priorities in the U.S. strategic approach (an examination of how U.S. and Western leverage can be applied against Soviet vulnerabilities to induce Soviet restraint). (S)

#### Administration

Management of the NSSD -82 Review will be the responsibility of an interagency group that will report its findings no later than August 15, 1982. The group will be chaired by the Department of State, with the Deputy Chairmanship being assumed by a representative of the Department of Defense. It will also include Assistant Secretary-level representation from the National Security Council staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the International Communication Agency, and the Department of Agriculture. (S)

All matters relating to this NSSD will be classified SECRET or SECRET/SENSITIVE. Dissemination of this NSSD, the subsequent study material, and the resulting draft NSDD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. (C)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

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MEMORANDUM

29382

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 22, 1982

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

8000

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

NLRR F03-009 #29382

FROM:

RICHARD PIPES

BY KML NARA DATE 7/15/11

SUBJECT:

Terms of Reference for NSSD on U.S. Soviet Policy

You may recall that three months ago we submitted to State the Draft Terms of Reference for an NSSD on "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union." State returned this Draft without comment, proposing instead to proceed with a review of the bulky "East-West Policy Study", approved by a SIG in the summer of 1981. This review, which was carried out on a working group level, yielded no result: the East-West paper was simply too unwieldy and covered too much of the same ground as NSDD No. 1 to be of use. Having realized that this was the case, State came up with a new set of Terms of Reference. I had problems with this paper because I felt it did not tackle the problem boldly enough. State promised a revision but nearly two weeks have passed by and none has arrived. John Poindexter, therefore, suggested that I proceed once again with a draft of my own. The product of this effort is attached at Tab I. It is a synthesis of my previous draft and that which State had submitted earlier this month. (S)

The basic difference between State and myself is philosophical. State believes that we should be content with an attempt to influence Soviet behavior by proffering rewards to the USSR when it is peaceful and punishments when it is not. Following what I sense to be the President's belief, I, by contrast, argue that behavior is the consequence of the system, and that our policies (such as the recent sanctions and credit restraints) aim at modifying the system as a prerequisite of changed behavior (e.g., compelling the USSR to alter its economic structure). The most controversial item in the attached Terms of Reference is the following sentence: "[The Review] will proceed on the premise that Soviet international behavior is a response not only to external threats and opportunities but also to the internal imperatives of the Soviet political, economic, social and ideological system." State may be expected to fight this proposition tooth and nail, although it seems to me to express the quintessence of the President's approach. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

I recommend that you forward the document at Tab I to State for their comments so that we can proceed with an interagency review as soon as possible. (S)

Approve           

Disapprove           

Attachments:

Tab I

Terms of Reference (with transmitting memorandum)

~~SECRET~~

Review June 22, 1988.

90688

21

CHRON FILE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Paula

I've talked to Rick Burt. He will ask that you prepare an overview/ introduction to the paper which encompasses the objectives of the study at today's IG.

The recommended policies of course, will flow from the study.

Burt

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CHRON FILE

~~SECRET~~

August 30, 1982

29583

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*

SUBJECT: NSSD 11-82: U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union

On Friday, August 27, I attended a State-chaired interagency meeting convened to task drafting responsibilities of NSSD 11-82, a U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. At the meeting, State distributed an outline which differs in part from the Terms of Reference signed by the President. Specifically, their outline omits an introduction, a section detailing the objectives of the directive and recommended policies for the U.S. These sections are crucial in providing the appropriate background, overview and focus that the directive needs. During the meeting, State also recommended that only CIA and State should draft the directive, thus excluding NSC and all other agencies. Hence, I proposed that NSC should draft the introduction and the section on the objectives of the review and should work jointly with State on recommended U.S. policies. My suggestions were met with resistance by State. I, therefore, propose that you authorize Richard Pipes to secure State's approval of NSC's drafting role and direct him to write the omitted sections.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Richard Pipes to secure State approval of NSC drafting role and to write the omitted sections.

Approve ✓ Disapprove           

cc: William L. Stearman

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 100-112 # 29383

BY GA NARADATE 6/30/88

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 10 SEP 82 11

TO WHEELER

FROM BREMER

DOCDATE 09 SEP 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

NSSD

SUBJECT: DRAFT NSSD 11-82 STUDY RESPONSE

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ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES IFS O

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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## COMMENTS

REF# 8227068

LOG 8290411

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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September 9, 1982

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Interagency Group No. 30

TO	:OVP	- Mr. Donald P. Gregg
	NSC	- Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
	ACDA	- Mr. Joseph Presel
	USDA	- Mr. Raymond Lett
	CIA	- Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
	Commerce	- Mrs. Helen Robbins
	Defense	- COL John Stanford
	JCS	- MAJ Dennis Stanley
	Treasury	- Mr. David Pickford
	UNA	- Amb. Harvey Feldman
	USIA	- Ms. Teresa Collins

SUBJECT: Draft NSSD 11-82

In response to tasking assigned by Interagency Group No. 30 on August 27, the attached State draft, with Defense inputs, addresses topics 4 & 5 of NSSD 11-82. In accordance with instructions contained in NSSD 11-82, addressees should handle this material on a strict need-to-know basis.

There will a meeting of the IG chaired by Assistant Secretary Designate Richard Burt at 3:00 p.m., September 14 in Room 6226, Department of State. The meeting will consider the draft submissions by State/Defense and CIA and consider next steps in the policy review process.

*L. Paul Bremer, Jr.*  
L. Paul Bremer, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. State Draft

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1987  
FOIA 101 NARA, Date 10/27/06

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Clearances: EUR/SOV: TWSimons Jr. *by len*  
EUR: MPalmer  
EUR: RBlackwill  
PM: JAzrael *by len*  
S/P: PKaplan *by len*

~~SECRET~~BY CU NARA DATE 10/17/07II. Meeting the Soviet Challenge

The Soviet propensity for challenging the West and running risks to undermine U.S. interests requires a sustained Western response if Soviet ambitions are to be frustrated. It is also clear that the necessary firm and measured long-term Western response to the Soviet challenge requires that the United States exercise fully its capacity for leadership. This demands a comprehensive, long-term U.S. effort to induce Soviet restraint by shaping the environment in which Soviet policy decisions are made.

A. Shaping the Soviet Environment(1) The Military Balance

Foremost in shaping the military environment Moscow faces is the US-Soviet military balance. The U.S. must modernize its military forces so that several goals are achieved:

--Soviet leaders must perceive that the U.S. is determined never to accept a second-place or deteriorating strategic posture. Doubts about the military capabilities of U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent forces, or about the U.S. will to use them if necessary, must never exist;

--Soviet calculations of possible nuclear war outcomes, under any contingency, must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for the Soviet leaders to initiate a nuclear attack;

--Leaders and the publics in all states must be able to observe that this indicator of U.S. strength remains at a position of parity or better. They will then understand that U.S. capacity for pursuing the broader US-Soviet competition shall not be encumbered by direct Soviet coercion of the U.S.;

--The future of U.S. military strength must also appear to friend and foe as strong: technological advances must be exploited, research and development vigorously pursued, and sensible follow-on programs undertaken so that the viability of U.S. deterrent policy is not placed in question.

In Europe, the Soviet leadership must be faced with a rein-vigorated NATO focused on three primary tasks: strengthening of conventional forces, modernization of intermediate-range nuclear forces, and improved mobility and sustainability for U.S. units assigned rapid deployment and other reinforcing missions to the NATO area and Southwest Asia. Worldwide, U.S. general-purpose forces must be ready to move quickly from peacetime to wartime roles, and must be flexible to affect Soviet calculations in a wide range of contingencies.

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The US-Soviet military balance is also a critical determinant shaping Third World perceptions of the relative positions and influence of the two major powers. Moscow must know with certainty that, in addition to the obvious priority of North American defense, Eurasian and other areas of vital interest to the U.S. will be defended against Soviet attacks or threats. But it must know also that areas less critical to U.S. interests cannot be attacked or threatened without serious risk of U.S. military support and of potential confrontation in that or some other area.

(2) Cooperation with Our Allies:

One of the central propositions of U.S. foreign policy throughout the post-war period has been that an effective response to the Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial democracies. At the same time, there will continue to be inevitable tensions between our unwillingness to give the allies a veto over our Soviet policy, and our need for allied support in making our policy work. More effective procedures for consultation with our allies can contribute to the building of consensus and cushion the impact of intra-alliance disagreements. However, we must recognize that, on occasion, we may be forced to act to protect our vital interests without allied support and even in the face of allied opposition.

Our allies have been slow to support in concrete ways our overall approach to East-West relations. In part because of the intensive program of consultation we have undertaken, allied governments have expressed rhetorical support for our assessment of the Soviet military challenge, our rearmament program, and our negotiating positions in START and INF. Less progress has been made in obtaining allied action in the vital areas of upgrading conventional defense and in planning for joint military action to protect vital Western interests in the developing world, particularly the Persian Gulf. With INF deployments scheduled to begin in 1983, West European governments will come under increasing domestic pressure to press us for progress in START and INF. In the likely absence of an acceptable INF agreement with Moscow, we may need during 1983 to subordinate some other policy initiatives with our allies to the overriding objective of obtaining allied action to move forward on INF deployments.

Although it will be more difficult to achieve a durable consensus with our allies on East-West economic issues, we must seek to do so. The current intra-alliance dispute over exports for the pipeline underscores European (and Japanese) unwillingness to support a strategy which they see as aimed at undermining the detente of the 1970s. Nonetheless, we must continue to persevere in this painful process of reeducating our European partners. At the same time, our ability to convey a sense that the U.S. is open

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to the possibility of improved relations with the USSR if Moscow moderates its behavior will be important to obtaining allied support.

### (3) Third World Cooperation

As in the 1970s, the cutting edge of the Soviet challenge to vital U.S. interests in this decade is likely to be in the Third World. Thus, we must continue our efforts to rebuild the credibility of our commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on our interests and those of our allies and friends and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures. We must where possible erode the advances of Soviet influence in the developing world made during the 1970s.

Given the continued improvement of Moscow's force projection capabilities and the Soviet emphasis on arms aid to pro-Soviet Third World clients, any effective U.S. response must involve a military dimension. U.S. security assistance and foreign military sales play an important role in shaping the security environment around the periphery of the USSR and beyond Eurasia. But security assistance will not be enough unless we make clear to the Soviets and to our friends that the U.S. is prepared to use its own military forces where necessary to protect vital U.S. interests and support endangered friends and allies. Above all, we must be able to demonstrate the capability and the will for timely action to bring U.S. resources to bear in response to fast-moving events in Third World trouble spots.

An effective U.S. policy in the Third World must also involve diplomatic initiatives (e.g., the President's Mid-East proposal, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the Namibia initiative) to promote the resolution of regional crises vulnerable to Soviet exploitation. The U.S. should counter, and if possible weaken or displace, Soviet aid relationships, particularly those involving states that host a Soviet military presence or act as Soviet proxies. This of course requires corresponding changes in the recipient state's international policies. The U.S. must also develop an appropriate mixture of economic assistance programs and private sector initiatives to demonstrate the relevance of the free economies to the economic problems of the developing world, while exposing the bankruptcy of the Soviet economic and political model. In this connection, we must develop the means to extend U.S. support to individuals and movements in the developing world that share our commitment to political democracy and individual freedom. We have forsaken much of the competition by not having the kinds of long-term political cadre and organization building programs which the Soviets conduct.

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Possibly the greatest obstacle we face in carrying out this approach in the developing world is the problem of obtaining adequate budgetary resources. As in the case of our rearmament program, pressures for budgetary restraint are certain to generate calls for reduction of the resources devoted to meeting the Soviet challenge in the developing world. These pressures must be resisted if we are to be able to meet our commitments and secure our vital interests.

(4) The Soviet Empire (Eastern Europe, Cuba, Third World Alliances)

As noted above, there are a number of important vulnerabilities and weaknesses within the Soviet empire which the U.S. should seek to exacerbate and exploit. This will involve differentiated policies, e.g. Angola is different from Poland, Cuba is different from Vietnam. We will need a different mix of tools for each. The prospects for change may be greater on the extremities of Soviet power (Soviet alliances in the developing world) than closer to the center of the Soviet empire (Eastern Europe) -- though the latter obviously offers potential as well.

Eastern Europe: Although the Polish crackdown cut short a process of peaceful change, the continuing instability in that country is certain to have far-reaching repercussions throughout Eastern Europe. In addition, the deteriorating economic position of East European countries and the possible long-term drying up of Western resources flowing to the region will force them to face some difficult choices: greater dependence on the Soviets and relative stagnation; or reforms to generate a renewal of Western resources.

The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow's hold on the region. We can advance this objective by carefully discriminating in favor of countries that show relative independence from the USSR in their foreign policy, or show a greater degree of internal liberalization. This policy of differentiation in Eastern Europe is the subject of NSSD 5-82.

Afghanistan: Possibly the most important single vulnerability in the Soviet Empire is Afghanistan, where Moscow's imperial reach has bogged Soviet forces down in a stalemated struggle to suppress the Afghan resistance. A withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan followed by a real exercise of self-determination by the Afghan people would encourage other democratic and nationalist forces within the Soviet Empire and increase the likelihood that other Third World countries would resist Soviet pressures. Thus, our objective should be to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets' political and other costs remain high while the occupation continues.

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Cuba: The challenge to U.S. interests represented by Moscow's alliance with Cuba requires an effective U.S. response. The Soviet-Cuban challenge has three critical dimensions (as well as numerous other problems):

-- Soviet deliveries of advanced weapons to Havana: The flow of advanced Soviet weapons to Cuba has accelerated so as to represent a growing threat to the security of other Latin American countries and, in the case of potentially nuclear-capable systems, the U.S. itself. We must be prepared to take strong counter-measures to offset the political/military impact of these deliveries.

-- Soviet-supported Cuban destabilizing activities in Central America: The U.S. response must involve bilateral economic and military assistance to friendly governments in the region, as well as multilateral initiatives to deal with the political, economic, and social sources of instability. We should retain the option of direct action against Cuba, while making clear our willingness seriously to address Cuba's concerns if Havana is willing to reduce its dependence on and cooperation with the Soviet Union. We should also take steps to prevent or neutralize the impact of transfers of advanced Soviet weapons to Nicaragua.

-- Soviet-Cuban interventionism in Southern Africa: We should counter and reduce Soviet and Cuban influence by strengthening our own relations with friendly African states, and by energetic leadership of the diplomatic effort to bring about a Cuban withdrawal from Angola in the context of a Namibia settlement and appropriate external guarantees of Angola's security.

Soviet Third World Alliances: Our policy should seek to weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links between the Soviet Union and its Third World allies and clients. In implementing this policy, we will need to take into account the unique circumstances which influence the degree of cohesion between the Soviet Union and each of its Third World allies. In some cases, these ties are so strong as to make the Third World state a virtual proxy or surrogate of the Soviet Union. We should be prepared to work with our allies and Third World friends to neutralize the activities of these Soviet proxies. In other cases, ties between the Soviet Union and a Third World client may be tenuous or subject to strains which a nuanced U.S. policy can exploit to move the Third World state away from the Soviet orbit. Our policy should be flexible enough to take advantage of these opportunities.

Finally, we should seek where possible and prudent to encourage democratic movements and forces to bring about political change inside these countries.

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(5) China

The continuing Sino-Soviet rift -- motivated by racial enmity, ideological competition and security concerns -- provides the U.S. with some leverage over Soviet international behavior. However, our ability to capitalize on these potential strategic advantages depends upon the durability of the Sino-American rapprochement. Given the Soviets' strategic interest in undermining Sino-American relations, and particularly in preventing U.S. arms assistance to China, we can expect that Moscow will seek to disrupt our relations with Beijing. We will have to remain alert to such Soviet maneuvers and be prepared to counter them with initiatives of our own. Equally, we will need to manage carefully our relations with Beijing to avoid giving Moscow any exploitable opportunities.

B. Bilateral Relationships

It will be important to develop policies which give us maximum leverage over Soviet internal policies. Even though we recognize the limits of our capabilities to influence Soviet domestic trends and developments, the U.S., especially when working together with our allies, does have some capability to influence Soviet resource allocation through a variety of policy initiatives, such as our own defense spending and East-West trade policies. Through our radio broadcasting and other informational programs directed toward the Soviet Union, we may be able to accelerate the already advanced erosion of the regime's credibility with its own people, thus weakening the ideological basis for Soviet external expansionism. We also can offer private and other forms of assistance to forces seeking to promote democratic change. We can publicly and through quiet diplomacy seek to advance the cause of individual human rights in the Soviet Union.

Despite the post-Afghanistan, post-Poland attenuation of US-Soviet bilateral ties, there remain sectors of the bilateral relationship that are important to Moscow and thus to any effort to induce moderation of Soviet conduct.

(1) Arms Control

Arms control negotiations, pursued soberly and without illusions, are an important part of our overall national security policy. We should be willing to enter into arms control negotiations when they serve our national security objectives. At the same time, we must make clear to the allies as well as to the USSR that our ability to reach satisfactory results will inevitably be influenced by the international situation and the overall state of US-Soviet relations. However, we should be under no illusions that ongoing arms control negotiations will give us leverage sufficient to produce Soviet restraint on other international issues.

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U.S. arms control proposals should be consistent with necessary force modernization plans and should seek to achieve balanced, significant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. The START, INF, and MBFR proposals we have tabled meet these criteria and would, if accepted by the Soviets, help ensure the survivability of our nuclear deterrent and thus enhance U.S. national security. The fact that START and INF negotiations have begun has for the present somewhat reduced public pressure on us and on Allied Governments for early arms control agreements with Moscow. In the absence of progress in START and INF, however, we should expect that pressure to grow again.

## (2) Economic Policy

U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must be seen in a strategic context. At a minimum, we must ensure that US-Soviet economic relationships do not facilitate the buildup of Soviet military power. We must also bear in mind that U.S. controls on the critical elements of trade can also influence Soviet prospects for hard-currency earnings, and raise the cost of maintaining their present rate of defense spending. We need to develop policies which use the leverage inherent in U.S. and Western economic strength to modify Soviet behavior over time. Thus, our economic policies should provide negative and, where appropriate, positive incentives for more responsible Soviet behavior, while avoiding any subsidies of Soviet economic development. Although unilateral steps may be necessary for certain strategic or political imperatives, agreement with the Allies on the fundamental ground rules of trade will be essential if we are to take advantage of Soviet economic weaknesses.

There are, however, real limits to Western leverage on the Soviet economy. The Soviet system is still basically autarchic, and the USSR can substantially protect itself against foreign economic pressure. The difficulty of organizing effective multilateral restrictions on trade with the USSR is illustrated by our experience with the grain trade. Given the enormous Soviet difficulties in agriculture and the growing Soviet dependence on grain imports, suspension of grain trade by all Western and Third World suppliers would be a potentially important source of leverage over Soviet behavior.

However, it proved impossible to organize effective, sustained multilateral restrictions on international grain trade with the Soviet Union during the period of the post-Afghanistan grain embargo. This permitted the Soviets to shift their grain purchases from the U.S. to other suppliers, thus minimizing the impact of the grain embargo. Other major grain suppliers remain unwilling to contemplate restrictions on grain exports to the USSR, thus unilateral restrictions by the U.S. would impose costs

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on U.S. farmers without giving us additional leverage over Soviet behavior. Under these circumstances, U.S. grain sales should be permitted to proceed, while still subject to overall foreign policy control.

While recognizing the problems and difficulties inherent in developing a unified Western approach to economic relations with Moscow, we should nonetheless seek a consensus including the following basic elements:

1. Credits. The key objective is agreement on common restrictions on official credits and guarantees to the USSR and establishment of a mechanism to monitor official credits and guarantees.
2. Technology Transfer. The policy should include a unified and strengthened position on military-related high technology and equipment containing that technology.
3. Energy. The objectives here are twofold: a) to reach consensus on the need to minimize Western dependence on Soviet energy supplies; and b) to enhance Western leverage in this key sector by agreement on the equipment and technology to be made available to the USSR.
4. Foreign Policy Controls. There must be allied consensus that foreign policy, i.e. non-strategic, controls on trade with the Soviets may be imposed, primarily in crises, in support of clear objectives and with criteria for removal of the controls.
5. Differentiation. The traditional approach of treating each of the East European countries as distinct entities on the basis of their own policies will be maintained. This offers the best opportunity to encourage pluralism and independence in East European countries.

### (3) Official Dialogue

We can expect the Soviets to continue to press us for a return to a US-Soviet agenda centered on arms control. We must continue to resist this tactic and insist that Moscow address the full range of our concerns about their international behavior if our relations are to improve. US-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues can serve our interests if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow for responsible behavior and to drive home that we will act to ensure that the costs of irresponsibility are high. We can also use such contacts to make clear that the way to pragmatic solutions of regional problems is open if Moscow is willing seriously to address our concerns. At the same time, such contacts must be

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handled with care to avoid offering the Soviet Union a role in regional questions which it would not otherwise secure.

A continuing dialogue with the Soviets at the level of Foreign Minister is essential, both to facilitate necessary diplomatic communication with the Soviet leadership and to maintain allied understanding and support for our approach to East-West relations. Secretary Haig met with Gromyko on three occasions between September 1981 and June 1982, and this pattern of frequent Ministerial-level contacts should be maintained in the future.

We can expect that the question of a possible US-Soviet summit will continue to be raised by the Soviets, our allies, and important segments of domestic opinion. Every American President since Franklin Roosevelt has met with his Soviet counterpart. In some cases, U.S. Presidents have attended summits for the purpose of establishing personal contact with their counterparts (e.g. Kennedy in Vienna) or in the vague expectation that an improvement in US-Soviet relations would flow from the summit (e.g. Johnson at Glasboro). In other cases, allied pressures for East-West dialogue at the Head of State level have played a major role in the Presidential decision to meet at the summit (e.g. Eisenhower at Geneva and Paris).

The approach to summitry which prevailed throughout the 1970s held that American Presidents should not meet with their Soviet counterparts until there were concrete US-Soviet agreements ready to serve as the centerpiece of the summit. However, these summits did not always produce durable improvements in US-Soviet relations, and sometimes complicated management of US-Soviet relations by generating expectations that could not be realized.

In any summit between President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart we would want to ensure that concrete, positive results were achievable. We would also need to ensure that any summit were timed to achieve the maximum possible positive impact in terms of U.S. interests.

#### (4) Assertion of Values

The U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union must have an ideological content which asserts the superiority of Western values of freedom, individual dignity, and political democracy over the repressive and authoritarian character of Soviet society. We need to create a sense that history is moving in the direction of forces which support free elections, free enterprise, a free press, and free trade unions. We need specific programs to support this offensive. Among the instruments which we should employ are:

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--Increased U.S. informational efforts directed at the Soviet Union, particularly VOA and RFE/RL;

--A systematic and energetic U.S. effort to counter Soviet disinformation and "active measures" campaigns directed at U.S. interests;

--A positive and assertive effort to support democratic elements in both communist and non-communist countries, taking into account the special requirements and vulnerabilities of democratic forces seeking to survive in a hostile environment.

The role of US-Soviet cultural, scientific, and other cooperative exchanges should be seen in light of our intention to maintain a strong ideological component in our relations with Moscow. We should not further dismantle the framework of cooperative exchanges which remains from the 1970s unless new incidents of Soviet irresponsibility require us further to attenuate the US-Soviet bilateral relationship. We should look at ways exchanges can be used to further our ideological offensive.

### III. Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing our Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behavior

The interrelated tasks of rebuilding American capacity for world leadership and constraining and, over time, reducing Soviet international influence cannot be accomplished quickly.

We face a critical transition period over the next five years, and our success in managing US-Soviet relations during this period may well determine whether we are able to attain our long-term objectives. Despite the long-term vulnerabilities of the Soviet system, we can expect that Soviet military power will continue to grow throughout the 1980s. Moreover, the Soviet Union will have every incentive to prevent us from reversing the trends of the last decade which have shifted the world power balance in Moscow's favor. Thus, the coming 5-10 years will be a period of considerable uncertainty in which the Soviets will test our resolve.

These uncertainties, moreover, will be exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process of political succession to Brezhnev. As noted above, we cannot predict with confidence what policies the various succession contenders will espouse. Consequently, we should not seek to adjust our policies to the Soviet internal conflict, but rather try to create incentives (positive and negative) for any new leadership to adopt policies less detrimental to U.S. interests. Our posture should be one of a willingness to deal, on the basis of the policy approach we have taken since the beginning of the

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Administration, with whichever leadership group emerges. We would underscore that we remain ready for improved US-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant changes in policies of concern to us; the burden for any further deterioration in relations would fall squarely on Moscow.

We should be under no illusion about the extent of our capabilities to restrain the Soviet Union while American strength is being rebuilt. Throughout the coming decade, our rearmament program will be subject to the uncertainties of the budget process and the U.S. domestic debate on national security. In addition, our reassertion of leadership with our allies, while necessary for the long-term revitalization of our alliances, is certain to create periodic intra-alliance disputes that may provide the Soviets with opportunities for wedge driving. Our effort to reconstruct the credibility of U.S. commitments in the Third World will also depend upon our ability to sustain over time commitments of resources, despite budgetary stringencies. As noted above, these constraints on our capacity to shape the Soviet international environment will be accompanied by real limits on our capacity to use the US-Soviet bilateral relationship as leverage to restrain Soviet behavior.

The existing and projected gap between our finite resources and the level of capabilities needed to constrain Soviet international behavior makes it essential that we: 1) establish firm priorities for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will have the greatest restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and 2) mobilize the resources of our European and Asian allies and our Third World friends who are willing to join with us in containing the expansion of Soviet power.

#### (1) U.S. Priorities

Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be a strong military, capable of acting across the entire spectrum of potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to deter attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., our allies, or other important countries, and to defeat such an attack should deterrence fail. Achieving this strategic aim largely rests, as in the past, on a strong U.S. capability for unilateral military action. Strategic nuclear forces remain an important element of that capability, but the importance of other forces -- nuclear and conventional -- has risen in the current era of strategic nuclear parity.

Although unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuilding Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat, the protection of Western interests will require increased U.S. cooperation with allied and other states and greater utilization of

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their resources. U.S. military strategy must be better integrated with national strategies of allies and friends, and U.S. defense programs must consider allied arrangements in the planning stage.

U.S. military strategy for successfully contending with peacetime, crisis, and wartime contingencies involving the USSR on a global basis is detailed in NSSD 1-82. This military strategy must be combined with a political strategy focused on the following objectives:

-- Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong leadership in developing policies to deal with the multifaceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will also require that the U.S. take allied concerns into account. In this connection, and in addition to pushing the allies to spend more on defense, we must attach a high priority to a serious effort to negotiate arms control agreements consistent with our military strategy, our force modernization plans, and our overall approach to arms control. We must also develop, together with our allies, a unified Western approach to East-West economic relations consistent with the U.S. policy outlined in this study.

-- Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its position in Afghanistan. This will require that we continue efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, we should keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that Soviet costs on the ground remain high.

-- Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer term increase in diversity and independence throughout Eastern Europe. This will require that we continue to impose costs on the Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also require that we maintain a U.S. policy of differentiation among East European countries.

-- Building and sustaining a major ideological political offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed to bring about change inside the Soviet Union itself. This must be a long-term program, given the nature of the Soviet system.

-- Maintenance of our strategic relationship with China, thus minimizing opportunities for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

-- Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship.

This will require that we use a variety of instruments, including diplomatic efforts such as the Contact Group Namibia/Angola initiative. U.S. security and economic assistance in Latin America will also be essential. However, we must retain the option of direct use of U.S. military forces to protect vital U.S. security interests against threats which may arise from the Soviet-Cuban connection.

(2) Cooperation with our Allies

As noted throughout this paper, we must cooperate with our allies to restrain Soviet expansionism. Only the U.S. can directly counterbalance Soviet power, but our allies can often more effectively intervene in regions of historic interest to maintain peace, limit opportunities for Soviet opportunism, and oppose Soviet surrogate activity.

While rejecting a unilateralist approach, we cannot permit our approach to US-Soviet relations to reflect only the lowest common denominator of allied consensus. The challenge we face from the Soviet Union requires U.S. leadership which will inevitably lead to periodic disagreements in an alliance of free nations, such as NATO. This is an enduring dilemma which has confronted American Administrations throughout the postwar period. It cannot be finally resolved, but it must be managed effectively if we are to maintain the unity of purpose among free nations on which U.S. security depends.

IV. Articulating Our Approach: Sustaining Public and Congressional Support

The policy outlined above is a strategy for the long haul. We should have no illusions that it will yield a rapid breakthrough in our relations with the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic near-term victories in our effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pressure is likely to mount for change in our policy. We can expect appeals from important segments of domestic opinion for a more "normal" US-Soviet relationship. This is inevitable given the historic American intolerance of ambiguity and complexity in foreign affairs. Moscow may believe that if pressure from allies and publics does not drive this Administration back to Soviet-style peaceful coexistence and detente, the USSR can hunker down and concentrate on neutralizing the Reagan foreign policy until a new, more pliable U.S. Administration emerges.

We must therefore demonstrate that the American people will support the policy we have outlined. This will require that we avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term progress in US-Soviet relations. At the same time, we must demonstrate credibly that our policy is not a blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for US-Soviet relations.





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, D.C. 20520

CHRON FILE

September 10, 1982

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(With ~~SECRET~~ Attachment)

Interagency Group No. 24

TO : OVP - Mr. Donald P. Gregg  
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler ✓  
ACDA - Mr. Joseph Presel  
AID - Mr. Gerald Pagano  
CIA - Mr. Thomas B. Cormack  
Commerce - Mrs. Helen Robbins  
Defense - COL John Stanford  
JCS - MAJ Dennis Stanley  
OMB - Mr. Alton Keel  
Treasury - Mr. David Pickford  
UNA - Amb. Harvey Feldman  
USIA - Ms. Teresa Collins  
USTR - Mr. Dennis Whitfield

SUBJECT: Draft NSDD on U.S. Policy Toward South America

Attached is the draft NSDD corresponding to the NSDD 10-82 policy study and executive summary circulated under our memorandum 8225479 dated August 25.

Addressees are asked to review the draft NSDD in connection with the previously circulated documents. Clearance of the three documents is requested at a senior policy-making level. Concurrence or comments should be conveyed to Mr. Tain Tompkins at 632-5804 by COB Thursday, September 16. It is hoped that a final version of the documents can be ready for submission to the White House the week of September 20.

Your prompt attention is appreciated.

R. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
Draft NSDD

UNCLASSIFIED  
(With ~~SECRET~~ Attachment)

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Draft NSDD in response to NSSD 10-82

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE AMERICAS  
IN THE WAKE OF THE FALKLANDS CRISIS

1. U.S. interests in Latin America and the Caribbean include a region free of Soviet-dominated or other hostile governments; the development of stable and democratic political systems and institutions which promote respect for basic human rights; cooperative bilateral relations to deal with security and other issues flowing from geographic proximity; protection of major U.S. trade and investment; access to raw materials; prevention of nuclear proliferation and maintenance of stable balance of power among the states in the region; and receptivity to U.S. leadership.

2. The Falklands crisis strained, to varying degrees, our relations with Latin American countries, and highlighted the potential for instability in South America. Our policy must address the following specific problems:

- Instability and irredentism in Argentina, which imply new opportunities for the USSR to gain access to a strategic position in the Southern Cone;
- Disillusionment with U.S. leadership in Venezuela

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CN WARA DATE 6/30/08

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and elsewhere, which provides tempting opportunities for Cuba to reenter inter-American diplomacy;

- The increased importance of Brazil as a potential stabilizing factor in South America at a time when economic pressures are eroding our ties and influence in that country.

3. The highest United States priority in Latin America continues to be the prevention of further inroads by the Soviet Union or its client states in our immediate environs -- Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico.

4. To restore and assert U.S. influence in South America, the United States will, subject to Congressional and statutory limitation:

- Maintain its diplomatic position on the fundamental Falklands issues as it was before the crisis, specifically: U.S. neutrality on the question of sovereignty over the islands and support for negotiations or other peaceful efforts to resolve this dispute;
- Lift the military pipeline embargo on Argentina soon, after discussion with the UK;

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- Depending on discussions with Chile and on Argentine behavior, certify Argentina and Chile jointly, to preserve regional political and military balance, before the end of 1982.
  
- Rebuild a close relationship with Brazil, to include Cabinet-level consultations, renewed cooperation in military training and trade, and a dialogue on nuclear issues. To develop this process, the U.S. will seek appropriate Brazilian nonproliferation-related concessions (e.g. restraint in exports to sensitive regions) which could allow Presidential waiver of Symington/Glenn. We should also seek progress in discussions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco and safeguards which could resolve the fuel supply issue and permit resumed nuclear cooperation. The United States will also explore arms co-production agreements. We should also review our global sugar policy in the light of its foreign and domestic impact.
  
- Use flexibility within NSDD 5 guidelines to respond promptly to arms transfer requests. The U.S. will seek to prevent regional arms races, as

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well as to preserve sub-regional arms balances and to upgrade bilateral ties. Measures should be sought to lessen Peru's dependence on Soviet arms supplies.

- Use our influence through traditional diplomatic channels to promote human rights so as to facilitate public support for expanded, closer relationships with the governments concerned;
- Seek to play a supportive role, to the extent our resources permit, in such economically weak states as Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay.
- Pursue a more active bilateral diplomacy throughout the continent, while seeking to turn back efforts to alter the Inter-American System. The United States will make no attempt to buy back our friends or to give the appearance of guilt. Nor will the U.S. court the most resentful (Venezuela and Peru). Rather we will use a series of ad hoc bilateral cabinet-level meetings with a

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substantial but not exclusive economic focus  
to show that dialogue with the U.S. is possible.  
The U.S. will lead with Brazil, then Mexico and  
Venezuela when the time is appropriate.

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KEYWORDS: USSR

NSSD

SUBJECT: IG MTG ON 17 SEPT RE DRAFT NSSD 11-82 STUDY

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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## COMMENTS

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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September 13, 1982

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
Interagency Group No. 30

TO:

OVP	- Mr. Donald P. Gregg
NSC	- Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
ACDA	- Mr. Joseph Presel
USDA	- Mr. Raymond Lett
CIA	- Mr. Thomas B. Cormack
Commerce	- Mrs. Helen Robbins
Defense	- COL John Stanford
JCS	- MAJ Dennis Stanley
Treasury	- Mr. David Pickford
UNA	- Amb. Harvey Feldman
USIA	- Ms. Teresa Collins

SUBJECT: Draft NSSD 11-82

It has become necessary to reschedule the next meeting of the Interagency Group No. 30 which will consider the draft NSSD 11-82. The meeting has been rescheduled for September 17 at 3:00 p.m. in Room 6226, Department of State.

  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED  
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997  
By mon NARA, Date 4/5/02

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DECL: OADR