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FIELD

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON


March 14, 1984

ADMINISTRATION BRIEFING FOR PUERTO RICAN LEADERS

DATE: March 15, 1984

LOCATION: East Room

TIME: 1:30 p.m.

FROM: Faith R. Whittlesey 

I. PURPOSE

To demonstrate this Administration's concern and interest in issues affecting this second largest group within the Hispanic community in this country.

II. BACKGROUND

This event marks the first time that an Administration in power has invited leaders of the Puerto Rican community in the United States to a White House briefing focusing exclusively on issues specifically impacting on this community. (e.g. Education, Employment/Job Training and Housing & Urban Development.) The guests represent a cross section of Puerto Rican leadership residing in large metropolitan areas primarily on the East coast and in the Midwest.

III. PARTICIPANTS

List is attached. (Approximately 200)

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House pool coverage for President's remarks only.

V. REMARKS REQUIRED

Speech (Prepared by Speechwriter's office)

VI. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Social Office

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Attachment: List of participants.

(Myer/BE)  
March 14, 1984  
3:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROPHY BRIEFING FOR PUERTO RICAN LEADERS  
THURSDAY, MARCH 15, 1984

Good afternoon, buenas tardes and a warm welcome. And let me say to each of you, mi casa es su casa. I'm delighted to have this opportunity to spend a few minutes with you -- and opportunity is what I want to talk about.

America has always been a magnet for people seeking freedom and peace, the opportunity to better their lot and to go as far as their God-given talents let them. Pioneers came to our shores with the courage to start all over again because they knew America offered hope for the future. Today, our task is to make sure that even the poorest, most recent pioneers have good reason to dream the same great dreams as those who came before.

A promising future begins with a foothold on the economic ladder. The recovery now surging through this land is providing millions of our people that chance. The economic recovery is helping every American and every ethnic group.

Last month alone, 700,000 Americans found jobs, and we're experiencing the steepest drop in the unemployment rate in over three decades. Since the beginning of the recovery, nearly 5 million people have found jobs. And all the economic indicators suggest more jobs are on the way. But we cannot rest until every American who wants a job can find a job.

We want to build an American opportunity society and that means we cannot go back to the failed policies of big taxing and



spending. The painful consequences of those policies haven't been forgotten. Too many dreams were shattered when double-digit inflation, record interest rates and economic stagnation knocked industries, small businesses, homemakers and breadwinners off their feet. Inflation robbed us all, and the worst hardships were borne by those at the bottom of the economic ladder.

Nor did the explosion in social spending get crime and drugs off the street or give us a better education for our children. The disadvantaged became more dependent on Federal programs as work disincentives discouraged initiative. Urban America was going downhill and solutions seemed farther and farther away. It's no wonder Americans were losing confidence in their Government.

Now that we're regaining confidence, now that America is back on the road to robust growth, I believe it's time to build even wider opportunities.

We must go forward to new goals to keep the nightmare of inflation from ever coming back. We must enact constitutional budget reforms like the line-item veto and the balanced budget amendment. And to make taxes more simple and fair, and to provide greater incentives to our people, we must press for tax simplification -- a sweeping and comprehensive reform of the entire tax code.

I know Secretary of Labor Ray Donovan, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Sam Pierce and others will be speaking with you this afternoon. At the risk of pre-empting them, I'd like to

highlight several programs that offer exciting opportunities for urban America.

In the area of jobs, the Job Training Partnership Act gives communities new flexibility; and, by using private industry councils, it matches local needs with sensible training. The program will train over a million workers a year for productive jobs. The old jobs program, CETA, did just the opposite. It spent \$53 billion to find private sector jobs for only 15 percent of the participants. Well, those days are over, and the future is now a genuine partnership for real jobs with a bright future.

While I'm talking about jobs, let me mention that more and more people recognize that the minimum wage puts unskilled young people at a disadvantage when they're looking for jobs. Our youth employment opportunity wage proposal would give our young people the opportunity to gain their first foothold on the economic ladder. And the proposal would protect current workers from displacement. It will soon be before the Congress and it deserves your strong support.

Enterprise zones is another legislative initiative that would mean welcome renewal for urban areas of hardcore unemployment. Enterprise zones encourage growth and opportunity where we need it most -- in areas of high unemployment, in areas hardest hit by urban decay. The legislation provides incentives for business firms and entrepreneurs to invest in blighted areas, create new jobs, and bring new life to distressed areas. This legislation has been on Capitol Hill for 2 years. The Senate has passed it, but the House continues to drag its feet. Forgive me,



but those who refuse to take action on a bill to create jobs and opportunity are the last people who should be giving speeches about their compassion for the unemployed.

And too many of those Members in the House are dragging their feet on another important piece of legislation -- one that would get tough on criminals. For too many years, crime and the fear of crime robbed our cities of their strength and vitality, and inner cities suffered the most. Well, common sense is beginning to pay off. In 1982, the crime rate dropped by 4.3 percent -- the biggest decline in a decade. But we still need to do much more. And I'm determined to do everything possible to get crime off our streets.

We need new laws to stop drug traffickers and tougher laws to fight the criminal elements in our society.

The way to get long-overdue reform begins with passage of our Comprehensive Crime Control Act. This comprehensive anti-crime package will give more protection to our law-abiding citizens, by cracking down on criminals, particularly organized crime and drug traffickers. It would enable authorities to keep people considered dangerous to the community behind bars pending trial. And it would eliminate paroles. The legislation has passed the Senate. The House should stop delaying, put partisan politics aside and do what's right for you, the law-abiding people of this country.

These programs, and they're only a sample, will help those who need help, and they'll promote stronger, more prosperous and stable urban communities.

I sense a spirit of optimism spreading across our land carrying hope and opportunity to more and more urban areas. And I think it's justified. America is moving forward again.

I know much remains to be done; I know many of our fellow countrymen still wonder what will come of their hopes and dreams. Success will not come easy, but it will come. To make it happen, America needs the help of all Americans, including those from La Isla de Encanto [La EEZ-la de An-KHAN-toe] [The Land of Enchantment]. You've enriched our national culture and our heritage. I need your energy, your hard work, and your values. We need people like Antonio Monroig, Rita DiMartino, Reynaldo Maduro and Rafael Capo -- Puerto Rican Americans doing an outstanding job in leadership positions in our Administration. If you follow your hopes and dreams, all of us will benefit.

Muchas gracias and vayan con Dios. [Thank you and God bless you.]



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 14, 1984

BRIEFING PAPER FOR THE PRESIDENT

MEETING WITH SECRETARY DONALD REGAN  
DATE: MARCH 15, 1984  
TIME: 3:15 P.M. (30 MINUTES)  
LOCATION: OVAL OFFICE  
FROM: CRAIG L. FULLER



I. PURPOSE

This meetings is a follow-up to your earlier meeting this week with Don Regan.



II. PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Donald Regan

III. PRESS PLAN

No press. No photographer.

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ON FILE



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 14, 1984

DROP-BY BRIEFING FOR NATIONAL FEDERATION OF PRESS WOMEN

DATE: Thursday, March 15, 1984  
LOCATION: Roosevelt Room  
TIME: 3:55 p.m. (5 minutes)

FROM: Michael McManus *MM/ps*

I. PURPOSE:

To welcome the Board of Directors of the National Federation of Press Women and have a photo taken.

II. BACKGROUND:

This group of 24 women represents a federation with a total membership of 5,000 - which includes publishers, editors, writers, photographers as well as women in advertising, and management. They are in town for an annual conference and we are bringing them in for a briefing on a number of issues of special interest to women. Before you arrive, they will have been briefed by Jack Svahn on such issues as: the economic recovery and its benefits for women, reduction of the marriage penalty and estate taxes, expansion of IRAs, child support enforcement and our Task Force on Legal Equity for Women.

III. The President  
Jack Svahn  
Karna Small  
24 members of the Federation (list attached)

IV. PRESS PLAN:

White House Photographer

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

You will enter the Roosevelt Room and, standing by the door, you will welcome the group to the White House. Then we will have each woman step forward for a brief handshake and photo. You will then depart.

VI. REMARKS:

Talking points attached

National Federation of Press Women, March 14, 1984

Kathleen Brandes  
Managing Editor  
International Marine Publishing Co.

Dorthy Brush  
Community Relations  
YWCA

Rosemary Carroll  
Public Information Manager  
Plymouth Plantation

Jo Cart  
Editor and Publisher  
Independent & Free Press

Portia Christian

Ret. Librarian and Former PR Director

LeeNora Everett  
Petersburg News Bureau  
Richmond Times-Dispatch

Audrey Fecht  
Press Representative  
ABC TV Network

Kathleen Gurchiek  
Reporter  
Tribune Star

Margaret Dawson Guthaus  
Staff Writer  
Gazette

Marvin Richard Guthaus  
Medical Information Specialist  
The Upjohn Company

Nancy Hawes  
City Editor  
Herald

Lois Jacobs  
Staff Writer - Photographer  
Times-Republican

Debbi Merrill  
Reporter  
Daily Herald-Dispatch

Marjorie Miller  
Conference Consultant

Ellen Nichols  
Freelance Writer

Barbara Pattison Lehning  
Proj. Dir. Parent/Comm. Rel.  
Issaquah School District

Hortense Myers  
Columnist & Political Reporter  
United Press International

Norma Ross  
Community Relations Coord.  
Kansas State University

Edith Schapiro  
Communications Director  
Greater Clifton-Passaic Jewish Federation

Marjorie Solenberger  
Information Officer  
Richard Bland College of William and Mary

Arthur Winter

Ruth Winter  
Author - Pres. NJ Press Women

Louise Wolfe  
Executive Administrator  
National Federation of Press Women

Mary Lou Webb  
Associate Editor-Co-Owner  
Franklin Advocate Newspaper, Wilk-Amite Record



TALKING POINTS FOR DROP-BY AT BRIEFING OF NATIONAL FEDERATION  
OF PRESS WOMEN:

- o Welcome to the White House - I wanted to stop by and tell you how pleased I am that you could come by today and hear from my domestic policy adviser Jack Svahn.
- o I know you have been briefed on a number of issues, but I just wanted to mention how pleased I am to see these continuing signs of a healthy economic recovery because I know that it benefits all Americans - particularly women.
- o The unemployment figures that came out last week were especially heartening - showing that the number of people who HAVE found jobs is up by five million over the past 15 months. And more and more women who want jobs are finding them. The jobless rate for adult women went down 2.2 percentage points during this recovery -- it was 6.9 percent in February.
- o But more than just finding jobs -- it's the KINDS of jobs that women are filling that's so important. Here in the Administration, we have appointed over 1400 women to important, high level government positions and I'm particularly proud of the three women in my Cabinet as well as the outstanding job that Sandra Day O'Connor is doing on the United States Supreme Court.
- o Well now - let me pause because I would like to shake hands and have a photo taken with each one of you.


*D*

# THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MARCH 14, 1984

## MEETING WITH AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

DATE: March 15, 1984  
LOCATION: The Oval Office  
TIME: 4:30 PM  
FROM: Larry Speakes 

### I. PURPOSE

To meet and be photographed with the Washington representatives of Agence France Presse (AFP), the French News Agency, and to answer one or two questions on the record.

### II. BACKGROUND

AFP requested an interview with you in connection with your meeting with President Mitterand, scheduled for next Thursday, March 22. We arranged to staff answers to written questions and offered AFP this brief meeting for one or two impromptu questions. Your verbal answers will be integrated with the written interview.

The principal question asked in the meeting, barring some last minute news break, will probably deal with the recent flurry of attention to Henry Kissinger's TIME Magazine article and Under Secretary Larry Eagleburger's statements which suggest that the U.S. play a lesser role in European defense. Talking points on this subject are attached as is a copy of the Kissinger article.

One of the written AFP questions, in anticipation of your visit to Normandy, is as follows: "Do you remember where you were, what you were doing, and what you felt on June 6, 1944, when you heard of the landing?" We have suggested they ask this as the second question when they see you, so that they may obtain your recollections firsthand.

### III. PARTICIPANTS

Claude Moisy, U.S. Bureau Chief; Gilbert Grellet, Deputy Bureau Chief; Pierre Rousselin, White House Correspondent

### IV. PRESS PLAN

Coverage by participants only. Text of interview will be used by AFP on March 19. They have agreed to our release of the text on March 21.



V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Guests enter the Oval Office, are greeted by the President, sit down for photop and questions.

Attachment: Talking Points

SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH  
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE

- The important thing is that both Kissinger and Eagleburger reaffirmed the centrality of the transatlantic defense relationship to Western security and world peace.
- Mr. Eagleburger's speech, in particular, was intended as a stimulus for the discussion and resolution of long-term challenges facing the Alliance -- totally in keeping with the intimacy and candor of the transatlantic dialogue.
- Views such as theirs -- and those coming from the European side of the Alliance -- represent constructive contributions to the healthy consideration of issues within the community of Alliance security concerns.
- Allies on both sides of the Atlantic must acknowledge, examine, and discuss their common problems if they are to devise joint solutions.
- The NATO Alliance is healthy. Its structure is sound. Its strategy is valid and viable.
- All Allies should make greater efforts to strengthen NATO defenses. I am pleased to note the progress that is being made.
- The United States will continue to make an undiminished contribution to the strength of the Alliance.
- Our commitment to Europe remains firm.



## Special Section

## A Plan to Reshape NATO

By HENRY KISSINGER

*After 35 years of preserving peace in Western Europe, the Atlantic Alliance confronts new military, political and social realities. In this article, a former Secretary of State proposes dramatic—and in his view, vital—steps to help the alliance meet the challenges ahead. Among them: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander should be a European, not an American, as is now the case; Europe should have a decisive voice in certain nuclear arms-control talks and greater responsibility for its ground defense. If Europe refuses to accept that responsibility, the U.S. should withdraw up to half of its ground forces from Europe.*

**L**ebanon and the Soviet succession have preoccupied us in recent weeks, but the Atlantic Alliance must remain the pivot of American policy. On its unity depends the security of free peoples. From its cohesion will flow whatever hopes

the Soviet succession offers for a new dialogue. Unfortunately, just as storms recur in nature, crises recur in the Atlantic Alliance. Nearly every Administration for a generation has been involved in them. However, the present controversies in NATO are both unprecedented and unsettling.

In West Germany, Scandinavia, the Low Countries and even in Britain (though to a lesser extent), "peace" movements have been pulling governments in the general direction of their policies, even though those governments disagree with their premises. In addition, the main opposition parties in West Germany and Great Britain—which, in the nature of democratic politics, can be expected to get into office eventually—are advocating policies that amount to unilateral nuclear disarmament for their countries. Because these groups hold sway over key segments of public opinion, too many European leaders—even conservative ones—have yielded to the temptation to demonstrate their peaceful intentions the easy way, by pretending to be reining in a bellicose and insensitive U.S. through their ministrations. As a result, among those who shape public attitudes—and thereby set what become the limits of the politically possible—there is less intellectual or philosophical agreement than in any previous period.

This creates an exceedingly dangerous situation. An alliance cannot live by arms alone. To endure it requires some basic agreement on political aims that justify and give direction to the common defense. If military arrangements provide its only bond, it will sooner or later stagnate. It will surely prove unable to take advantage of diplomatic opportunities for an easing of tensions. That is the central issue before the Atlantic Alliance today. It requires a remedy that is fundamental, even radical—in the literal sense of going to the root.

Four problems in particular are gnawing at the alliance:

1) *Lack of an agreed, credible strategy.* The gap between NATO's formal strategy and what the public will support has widened dangerously. The so-called flexible response devised in the 1960s remains NATO's official doctrine. It contemplates a defense of Europe that begins with conventional weapons and then goes up the ladder of nuclear escalation—until it reaches whatever level is necessary to halt Soviet aggression. In today's circumstances this doctrine has a fatal weakness: neither existing nor projected NATO conventional ground forces are adequate to

repel a major Soviet conventional attack. Therefore, the doctrine would require a nuclear response at an early stage. Yet strategic nuclear parity deprives the threat of strategic nuclear war of much of its credibility; mutual suicide cannot be made to appear

as a rational option. And no alternative nuclear strategy has been developed. Partly for this reason, public opinion, essentially unopposed by most NATO governments, is moving powerfully against any reliance on nuclear weapons—even tactical ones.

The alliance is thereby trapped in a precarious combination of (a) inadequate conventional forces, leading to (b) reliance on nuclear weapons in (c) a strategic environment that makes the threat of their use, and therefore their deterrent value, less and less credible, and (d) a public climate of growing nuclear pacifism that undermines what credibility remains. Lack of a coherent defense policy leaves the alliance, possessing a huge stockpile of enormously destructive weapons, disarming itself psychologically.

2) *Intermediate-range weapons and arms control.* The arrival of the new U.S. intermediate-range weapons in Europe late last year was properly hailed as a major success. For if public demonstrations and Soviet pressure had succeeded in blocking that deployment, the Soviet Union would in effect have achieved a veto over NATO's military dispositions. But unless the alliance clarifies the purpose of these missiles, the accomplishment is likely to be transitory, since the basic European attitude toward the missiles is that of a host toward a now unwanted guest whose invitation to dinner it would be too awkward to withdraw. Some prominent Europeans purport to see in the missiles' presence a hidden American design to confine a nuclear war to Europe. Others treat them as one of those peculiar American aberrations that periodically upset the alliance's equilibrium. Too few recognize, and even fewer are willing to admit, that in fact the missiles link the strategic nuclear defense of Europe and the U.S. Weapons capable of reaching Soviet territory stake the American homeland to the defense of Europe; they do not enable America to remain immune.

European ambivalence makes it excruciatingly difficult to define "progress" toward arms control, while the nearly desperate eagerness with which progress is pursued makes its attainment less likely. The Soviets have refused even to discuss any proposal balancing U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe against the Soviet arsenal at a lower level. They insist on total withdrawal of American missiles while retaining a large number of their own. The goal of leaving Europe vulnerable to Soviet nuclear blackmail is obvious. Yet significant segments of European opinion persist in blaming the U.S. for the deadlock. In Europe





and in the U.S., this attitude must in time erode the public support needed not only for missile deployment but also for coherent arms control.

3) *East-West relations.* Behind the sharp differences over defense strategy and arms control lies a parallel dispute over the alliance's posture toward the Soviet Union. Too many Europeans accept the caricature of a U.S. run by trigger-happy cowboys whose belligerence has provoked Soviet intransigence. Many Americans, on the other hand,

consider such European notions naive and believe that together with the pacifist and neutralist demonstrations, they reflect a trend toward appeasement that encourages Soviet intransigence.

4) *Relations with the Third World.* Most European leaders believe that they have a special opportunity to establish preferential relationships with Third World countries. In the flash points of the Middle East, Africa and Central America, they see U.S. approaches as hopelessly tainted by an obsession with Soviet ambitions; some hope to win favor in the Third World by an ostentatious dissociation from the U.S. More than a few Americans view such behavior as a free ride paid for by U.S. sacrifices or as a positive incitement to Third World radicalism.

These differences could be healthy if they led to compatible and constructive policies for the 1980s and '90s. So far this has not happened. Mutual recriminations have created opportunities for Soviet political warfare even during this period of stagnation in the Kremlin leadership. The Politburo is obviously convinced that the West has become so paralyzed concerning nuclear weapons that there is no urgency about nuclear arms control; the Soviets can simply wait for a while to harvest the fruits of Western anxieties. By contrast, there may be concern in Moscow that NATO will move to close the gap in conventional forces; hence the willingness to resume the talks, moribund for ten years, about limiting conventional arms. Does this reflect a genuine interest in arms control, or is it a means to thwart the desperately needed Western conventional buildup by creating the same conditions by which public opinion was mobilized on the missile question? And what is one to make of the almost deferential pleas by all major NATO countries for the resumption of a dialogue that the Soviets have interrupted? Or of the upgrading of all major European delegations except the French to the Andropov funeral, compared with the Brezhnev rites 15 months ago—especially as Andropov's rule was marked by the flagrant attempt to influence the German election, the walkout from arms-control talks and the shooting down of the Korean airliner, not to speak of Andropov's 15-year stewardship of the KGB?

Will the Soviets see Western pleas for dialogue as a demonstration of good will, or will they learn from the compulsion to demonstrate good intentions after months of harassment that intransigence pays because the West has weak nerves? Will we fail to relax tensions because the Soviets conclude that atmospherics can substitute for dealing with the real causes dividing the world? Europe is not moderating the U.S., and the U.S. is not stiffening Europe's spine, as the folklore on each side would have it. More likely, each is in danger of paralyzing and demoralizing the other. Western disunity is perhaps the principal obstacle to progress in East-West negotiations.

This state of affairs has deeper causes than particular policies on either side. The present NATO structure is simply not working, either in defining the threat or in finding methods to meet it.

Existing arrangements are unbalanced. When one country dominates the alliance on all major issues—when that one country chooses weapons and decides deployments, conducts the arms-control negotiations, sets the tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the framework for relations with the Third World—little incentive remains

**“A European officer should take the traditionally American place as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, probably with a U.S. deputy.”**

for a serious joint effort to redefine the requirements of security or to coordinate foreign policies. Such joint efforts entail sacrifices and carry political costs. Leaders are not likely to make the sacrifice or pay the cost unless they feel responsible for the results.

An imbalance such as the one now existing cannot be corrected by “consultation,” however meticulous. In the long run, consultation works only when those being consulted have a capacity for independent action. Then each side

takes the other seriously; then each side knows that the other's consent has to be won. Otherwise consultation becomes “briefing.” Agreement reflects not conviction but acquiescence for want of an alternative.

The present imbalance is not new. It has existed ever since World War II. But military dependence on another nation has a cumulative impact. When dependence no longer results from wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under conditions of relative prosperity, it can breed guilt, self-hatred and a compulsion to display independence of the U.S. wherever doing so is safe, especially with regard to some Third World issues and certain aspects of East-West relations.

The problem has become even more acute because the generation of leaders that built NATO has virtually disappeared. Those who governed Europe during the early postwar years were still psychologically of the era when Europe bestrode the world. Global thinking came naturally. European leaders assumed responsibility for their own security policies and gave it up only reluctantly because of special circumstances. But nearly 40 years have passed since the end of World War II. The new leaders were reared in an era when the U.S. was pre-eminent; they find it politically convenient to delegate Europe's military defense to us. Too many seek to position themselves somewhere between the superpowers—the first step toward psychological neutralism. Thus Europe's schizophrenia: a fear that the U.S. might not be prepared to risk its own population on a nuclear defense of Europe, coupled with the anxiety that America might drag Europe into an unwanted conflict by clumsy handling of Third World issues or East-West relations.

The rush to condemn our actions in Grenada by so many of our European allies is a case in point. What could have been in the minds of their leaders? Even making allowance—especially in the case of Britain—for totally inadequate consultation, they could hardly have wanted us to fail. That would surely have affected our willingness to run risks in defense of other areas, ultimately including even Europe. Rather, they must have assumed that their actions were irrelevant and costless: that we would not be deterred, that we would exact no penalty and that therefore it was safe to use the incident to score points with “progressives” at home and with Third World radicals abroad.

**T**he change in the nature of European leadership has been paralleled in the U.S. Our new elites do not reject NATO any more than do their European counterparts. But for them, too, the alliance is more a practical than an emotional necessity, more a military arrangement than a set of common political purposes.

On both sides of the Atlantic, we find ourselves threatened by the dominance of domestic politics over global political strategy. In Europe this leads in too many countries to a faintly disguised neutralism. In the U.S. it accelerates our already strong tendency toward unilateralism and isolationism.

U.S. leaders have too often adjusted foreign policies to political pressures, bureaucratic infighting or changing intellectual fashions. The history of the American attitude toward intermediate-range missiles in Europe is an example. These were proposed to the Europeans in 1957-58, in-

**“Europe should take over those arms-control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil.”**



stalled in Britain, Italy and Turkey by 1960 and withdrawn in 1963. They reappeared later in 1963 as part of a NATO multilateral force, and were abandoned once again by 1965. They were put before NATO for the third time in 1978 and accepted once again in 1979. Not surprisingly, Europeans organizing to stop the current deployment are encouraged by the knowledge that previous American decisions have not proved immutable.

Similarly, our allies have had to adjust from passionate U.S. advocacy of SALT II to its rejection, and then to the fact that we have chosen to observe a treaty we refuse to ratify; from a strategic doctrine of massive retaliation to one of flexible response; from a policy of détente to one of confrontation and back to conciliation, not to speak of the gyrations in our Middle East policy—all in addition to the reassessments that occur whenever a new Administration comes into office. Each change of course leaves victims among European leaders who have staked their domestic positions on policies that the U.S. later abandons. Each lurch encourages a kind of neutralism, as Europeans seek to avoid being made hostage to sudden swings in American policy.

A continuation of existing trends is bound to lead to the demoralization of the Western alliance. An explicit act of statesmanship is needed to give new meaning to Western unity and a new vitality to NATO. In my view such an effort must have three components: (a) a more significant role for Europe within NATO, (b) a reform of the NATO organization and (c) a reassessment of current NATO deployment.

## A NEW ROLE FOR EUROPE

During the entire post-World War II period it has been an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a strong, united Europe was an essential component of the Atlantic partnership. We have applied that principle with dedication and imagination, insofar as it depended on American actions, in all areas except security. With respect to defense, the U.S. has been indifferent at best—at least since the failure of the European Defense Community—to any sort of Europeanization. Many in this country seemed to fear that a militarily unified Europe might give less emphasis to transatlantic relations or might botch its defense effort and thus weaken the common security. The opposite is almost certainly the case.

In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination. What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its external barriers are higher than its internal ones. In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation with the U.S. A Europe analyzing its security needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find association with the U.S. essential. Greater unity in defense would also help to overcome the logistical nightmare caused by the attempt of every European nation to stretch already inadequate defense efforts across the whole panoply of weapons. For example, there are at least five kinds of battle tanks within NATO, different types of artillery and different standards for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In a major conflict it would be nearly impossible to keep this hodgepodge of forces supplied.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires Europe to develop greater identity and coherence in the field of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burden sharing," paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind something more structural—a more rational balance of responsibilities. The present allocation of responsibilities fails to bring the allies to reflect naturally about either security or political objectives. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise. But since drift will surely lead to unraveling—if more imperceptibly—statesmanship impels a new approach.

## STRUCTURAL REFORM

Structural reform cannot substitute for a sense of purpose and clear doctrine. But if pursued with care and sensitivity, it can help catalyze the development of shared political purposes. These common objectives require that European judgments on security, East-West diplomacy and other matters emerge from Europe's own analysis. Mere acquiescence in American decisions, briefings and pressures provides a façade of unity; shared purposes require a deeper sense of participation. Specifically:

1) By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for conventional ground defense. This is well within the capability of a group of countries with nearly one and one-half times the population and twice the G.N.P. of the Soviet Union. The Soviets moreover, have to divide their forces on at least two fronts.

2) This requires that planning for Europe's defense become a more explicitly European task. Heretofore, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has been American. In the new arrangement a European officer should take that traditionally American place, probably with a U.S. deputy. Such a change is also likely to give a new perspective to allied strategic planning. The U.S. has generally achieved its military successes by the weight of the equipment that our vast industrial potential has made available. This has tended to tempt our military leaders to equate strategy with logistics. European nations have rarely

enjoyed such a material margin; rather they have had to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics—precisely what NATO needs in an age of nuclear parity and renewed emphasis on conventional defense.

3) Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary-General, who is responsible for running the alliance's political machinery, has been European. In the new structure, with its greater emphasis on political coordination, it would make more sense for this official to be American—whenever the new Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, decides to retire. Meantime, no Western leader is better qualified for guiding NATO's transition than the wise and thoughtful Carrington.

4) Europe should take over those arms control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil. The INF negotiations with the Soviets (for intermediate range missiles) and the MBFR negotiations (on conventional forces) have heretofore been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a European chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though predominantly European, delegation.

**T**he structure that I am proposing would enable Europeans to confront—on their own initiative and in their own context—issues that have been evaded for at least two decades: the precise definition of an adequate conventional defense; the nature of the so-called nuclear threshold—the point where there is no choice except conventional defeat or nuclear escalation; the relationship between strategy and arms control. Since nuclear weapons would presumably be used only if conventional defense failed, Europe would be responsible for setting the nuclear threshold by its own efforts; it could relieve nuclear anxieties by the simple expedient of augmenting its conventional defenses.

By the same token, European leadership in the MBFR and INF negotiations would place final responsibility for both conventional force levels and intermediate-range missile deployment in Europe with the leaders whose countries will have to bear the brunt—good or ill—of the outcome of these negotiations. This is especially important with respect to the American intermediate-range missiles in Europe. That deployment makes sense only if the all genuinely believe that the prospect of a nuclear blow from Europe





on Soviet territory will help deter a Soviet conventional attack or nuclear blackmail. If our principal allies do not share this conviction, the psychological basis for the deployment will evaporate.

European chairmanship of the INF talks would oblige Europe's leaders to face the issue head-on; their domestic critics would no longer be able to argue (as they do now) that U.S. intransigence is the principal obstacle to arms control.

As for the U.S., it would of course participate in these deliberations—in a less dominant position—through its continued membership in the integrated command, its responsibility for nuclear defense, and its ground, naval and air forces in Europe.

## REDEPLOYMENT

The issue of redeploying American forces touches raw European nerves like no other. The slightest hint of altering present arrangements jangles sensibilities; it evokes fears of American withdrawal and prospects of European neutralism. But if present trends continue, it is certain to become a central issue in the alliance relationship. Before dealing with it in the context of a program of NATO reform, a few facts must be noted:

1) The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s, when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation—to react to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. Massive retaliation paradoxically required that the total forces on the Continent be kept below the level required for conventional defense. NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by doing anything to suggest that a Western response would be limited to nonnuclear means. Hence the American conventional deployment in Europe reflected political, not military, criteria: it was intended to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation and to leave the Soviets no doubt that this would be the consequence of even a conventional war. European conventional forces represented a similar political decision: they too were conceived as a trip wire for our nuclear riposte. From the birth of NATO a full conventional defense has been part neither of its strategy nor of its efforts.

2) This situation became anomalous when the growth of Soviet strategic forces deprived general nuclear war of much of its credibility. Yet NATO deployment has been essentially unaffected by the change. NATO has improved its conventional defenses but has not closed the gap in such forces. As the current NATO commander made clear recently, even counting the five American divisions that have remained in Europe, the alliance is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet ground attack for more than a few days. European ambivalence continues 35 years after NATO's creation. Our allies remain unwilling to develop forces strong enough to provide an alternative to nuclear weapons—and yet much of their public opinion shies away from even thinking about nuclear deterrence.

3) Were we to start all over again, we would therefore hardly repeat the decision of the '50s in today's circumstances. Let us assume a group of wise men and women from both sides of the Atlantic came together to plan a global strategy unconstrained by the past. Assume further that it started from the premise that ultimately the defense of the West is indivisible and that European security should be viewed under the aspect of the defense of the West in Europe—as a thoughtful French observer, Francois de Rose, put it. Such a group would almost surely conclude that the sensible division of responsibilities would be for Europe, with economic resources and manpower exceeding those of the Soviet Union, to concentrate on the conventional defense of the Continent. To maintain the global balance of power—by definition as essential for Europe as for

**“If nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent to even conventional attack, a gradual withdrawal of up to half of our ground forces would be logical.”**

America—the U.S. would emphasize highly mobile conventional forces capable of backing up Europe and contributing to the defense of, for example, the Middle East, Asia or the Western Hemisphere.

Such a division of responsibilities would also enable our military establishment to shift some of its intellectual energies and scientific research from a hypothetical esoteric war in an area where we have major allies to the defense of regions where conflict is much

more likely. In such regions our allies are less prone to see their interests immediately engaged, and the countries being threatened are in a worse position to assist in the defense effort.

**E**ven if we were to start all over again, an irrefutable case would exist for maintaining considerable American ground forces in Europe. This would be essential to keep our allies from feeling abandoned and to eliminate any Soviet misunderstanding that the defense of Europe no longer reflects a vital American interest. In a new division of responsibilities we should also preserve and preferably strengthen existing U.S. land-based airpower on the Continent. And we should continue our responsibility for both strategic and tactical nuclear defense, assuming that we and the Europeans could agree on a strategy for the latter. American intermediate-range missiles should remain in Europe to “couple” the nuclear defenses of both sides of the Atlantic so long as European leaders desired them. No change in naval deployments would be involved.

Why then is such a division of responsibilities not realized? The principal obstacle is psychological. For all their criticisms of American policy, Europeans dread a return to isolationism in the U.S. Americans fear that any tinkering with deployment would drive Europe into explicit neutralism. And some in the Pentagon would rather maintain our troops in Europe in a less than rational deployment than return a portion to the U.S., where they are more exposed to congressional budget cutters.

In my view, persisting in a deployment that is losing its rationale accelerates these attitudes. Pacifism and neutralism are on the march in Europe even under the present setup; isolationism in America is not yet so vocal but is being powerfully encouraged by endless allied disputes. An alliance that cannot agree on its political premises cannot sustain itself by clinging to military arrangements decided a generation ago in totally different circumstances. With current trends the issue of the rationale for the NATO deployment will become unavoidable. If it arises not as an integral component in a comprehensive design but as a single question of whether to continue stationing American troops in Europe, unilateral changes will be arbitrarily imposed by the potentially most destructive means—the American budgetary process. Then indeed we might see in America a psychological wrench away from Europe and in Europe a panicky resentment against the U.S. A change in deployment without a positive political and strategic purpose, withdrawal for its own sake, might shock our allies into neutralism; it could mislead our adversary and tempt aggression.

There is an urgent need for a serious and rapid re-examination of NATO doctrine, deployment and policies, conducted by men and women known for their dedication to Western unity. The group—to be formed immediately after our elections—must begin with one of the most divisive issues before the alliance: an agreement

on the nature and scope of the threat. The group must avoid the tendency of previous such efforts, which set unrealistic goals and thereby magnified the problem. A deadline for completion should be set—certainly no longer than two years.

Theoretically, such a study could lead to one of three outcomes: 1) The group could come to the same conclusions about the optimum division of responsibilities in an agreed global strategy outlined above. Given the dis-

**“We must not let our future pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and neoisolationists who systematically seek to undermine all joint efforts.”**



agreements about the nature of the interests involved in regions outside of Europe and the domestic priorities of most European countries, such a conclusion, however rational, is extremely improbable. 2) The group could agree that the strategic interests of the West require a full conventional defense, but that for practical and psychological reasons, Europe can undertake the required effort only if the present American ground deployment in Europe is maintained intact. 3) The group could decide that the realities of European domestic politics preclude more than the current gradualistic, marginal improvement of defense efforts.

I hope very much that Europe would choose the second option. If Europe should agree to build a full conventional defense and were prepared to express that commitment in unambiguous yearly obligations to increase its forces, the U.S. should accept the judgment that its present ground forces in Europe are an indispensable component. Such a decision might in fact invigorate the conventional arms-reduction talks and in time lead to stability at a lower level. But if Europe should opt for a perpetuation of the present ambivalence or for only a token improvement, then the U.S. will owe it to the overall requirements of global defense to draw certain conclusions. If Europe by its own decision condemns itself to permanent conventional inferiority, we will have no choice but to opt for a deployment of U.S. forces in Europe that makes strategic and political sense. If nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent to even conventional attack, a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion, perhaps up to half, of our present ground forces would be a logical result. To provide time for necessary adjustments, that withdrawal could be extended over five years. To ease the transition further, we could, if Europe agreed, keep the excess ground forces in Europe for a time afterward in a new status analogous to that of the French forces, prepared for use in Europe but also available for use in emergencies outside it. Any withdrawal would make sense only if the redeployed forces were added to our strategic reserve; if they were disbanded, the effect would be to weaken the overall defense.

The proposed redeployment would leave intact air and naval forces, as well as intermediate-range missiles, so long as Europe wants them. A useful byproduct of the process would be a systematic re-evaluation of the existing inventory of very short-range tactical nuclear weapons, a legacy of three decades of *ad hoc* decisions; these weapons now represent at one and the same time an increment to deterrence and the greatest danger of unintended nuclear war because, being deployed so far forward, they are unusually subject to the exigencies of battle.

In this scheme, withdrawal would be not an end in itself—as it will if frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic go much further—but one component of an adaptation to new circumstances extending over some eight years that rededicates the U.S. to the alliance for the indefinite future.

Psychology is immensely important in international relations, especially when policies turn not only on cold, professional assessments of the national interest by trained political leaders, but on public opinion. I would like to believe that restructuring the alliance to give Europeans greater responsibility for their own defense, while important American forces remain in Europe, will be seen not as an abandonment but as an embrace of Europe. It is a means of enlisting Europeans as full partners in the process of decision on which their safety as well as ours depends. For a son of Europe reared on the existing NATO orthodoxy, the very idea of even a partial redeployment is painful—all the more so after Lebanon. But we will not be fulfilling our obligations to the West if we fail to put forward an initiative to forestall the crisis that will otherwise confront us in much worse circumstances.

## POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

By themselves, neither organizational nor doctrinal adaptations can remedy the political incoherence rending NATO. This article has emphasized security issues. However, a few general observations on the alliance's political problems are necessary.

1) Those leaders on either side of the Atlantic who value the alliance, with all its failings, as the ultimate guardian of Western freedom must seek urgently to end political disputes over East-West relations and North-South policy, especially Western conduct in the flash points of conflict in the Third World. The tendency to grandstand before domestic audiences, the growing self-righteousness, will in time make a mockery of the key assumption of the Atlantic Alliance: that we share a common approach to security. Defense requires after all some agreed political purpose in the name of which it is conducted. The Atlantic Alliance must urgently develop a grand strategy for East-West problems and Third World relations applicable for the rest of this century. Otherwise, it will tempt constant pressures and crises.

2) The U.S. cannot lead the alliance or even contribute to its cohesion if we do not restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy. Ever since the Viet Nam War, we have disquieted our friends and confused, where we have not emboldened, our adversaries by periodic wide swings on essential elements of our policies. But the national interest does not change every four or eight years. At

some point the national interest must be accepted by our public as clearly recognizable and constant. Otherwise, we shall become a source of dangerous instability, still relevant for our power but irrelevant for our ideas. A presidential election year is probably not an ideal time to forge a bipartisan consensus. But whoever wins the presidential election faces no more important and urgent challenge than to restore the element of bipartisanship to our foreign policy.

3) European governments must meet head-on the disturbing trends toward pacifism and neutralism in their countries. These movements are led by people of conviction; they cannot be defused by accommodation. They can only be resisted with a compelling vision of a new future. If European governments continue to humor those who profess to see the danger to the peace in a bellicose America, not an intransigent Soviet Union, they will find themselves making concession after concession and will become hostages of their critics.

The current condition of the alliance cries out for a rethinking of its structure, its doctrine and its unifying purposes. The creativity and courage with which we approach this challenge will determine whether the alliance enters a new and dynamic period or gradually withers.

I have outlined proposals to reinvigorate allied cohesion by defining clear responsibilities for each side of the Atlantic, to be implemented over a period of years. On that basis European leaders could defend cooperation with the U.S. as something they sought as a matter of their own conviction and in their own national interest. American leaders would have a rational, understandable policy to defend and would benefit from dealing with a more equal partner. A new era of allied creativity and American dedication could give inspiration to the generation that has come to maturity since World War II and since the postwar crises that infused NATO's founders with their sense of common purpose.

We must not let our future pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and neoisolationists who systematically seek to undermine all joint efforts. The nations bordering the North Atlantic need above all faith in themselves and the will to resist the siren calls of those who use fear and panic as instruments of policy or domestic debate. In the end we must fulfill our trust: to preserve and strengthen a North Atlantic alliance that represents the hope of human dignity and decency in our world. ■






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# THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

## OFF-THE-RECORD SESSION WITH SELECTED WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENTS

DATE: Thursday, March 15, 1984  
PLACE: The Residence - Library  
TIME: 5:00 pm (30 minutes)  
FROM: Larry Speakes 

### I. PURPOSE

For the President to get together with key White House reporters in an informal, off-the-record setting.

### II. BACKGROUND

This is the first in a series of sessions that will give the President the opportunity to get to know better the regular correspondents who cover him on a daily basis.

### III. PARTICIPANTS

The President	
Helen Thomas	United Press International
Jim Gertzenzang	Associated Press
Bill Groody	Mutual Broadcasting
Jerry O'Leary	Washington Times
Sam Donaldson	ABC
George Skelton	Los Angeles Times
Frank vander Linden	Sacramento Union
Tom DeFrank	Newsweek
Leslie Stahl	CBS
Chris Wallace	NBC
Bill Plante	CBS

### IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer only

### V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

The President greets his guests and chats informally with them.



## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PHOTO OPPORTUNITY WITH CONGRESSMAN DON FUQUA (D-FLORIDA),  
CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE,  
AND OFFICIALS OF THE NATIONAL SPACE CLUB

DATE: Thursday, March 15, 1984

LOCATION: The Oval Office

TIME: 4:45 p.m. (10 minutes)

FROM: M. B. Oglesby *MB*

### I. PURPOSE/BACKGROUND

The Goddard Trophy is being awarded to Congressman Fuqua by the National Space Club at a dinner on Friday evening March 16, which you are unable to attend.

Congressman Fuqua chairs the House Science and Technology Committee with authority over NASA and space related activities. On March 13, the Space Science and Applications Subcommittee, which Mr. Fuqua previously chaired, passed the NASA FY 85 budget including the \$150 million which you recommended for the Space Station initiative. Congressman Fuqua supported the Space Station.

This photo session will afford you an opportunity to recognize Congressman Fuqua for his leadership in space related activities and specifically for his support of the Space Station.

Further, the photo session will send an important message to the Congress reaffirming your commitment to the Space Station as a means to maximize space technology for peaceful means.

Select Members of the Science and Technology Committee and Space Caucus have been invited and may attend.

## II. PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

NASA Administrator James Beggs  
Dave Wilkinson, President, National Space Club

Congressman Don Fuqua (D-Florida)  
Mrs. Nancy Fuqua  
Congressman Larry Winn (R-Kansas), Ranking Republican  
Member; Science and Technology Committee  
Congressman Harold Volkmer (D-Missouri), Chairman,  
Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications  
Congressman Manuel Lujan (R-New Mexico), Ranking Republican  
Member, Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications  
Congressman Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii), Co-Chairman,  
Congressional Space Caucus

Craig Fuller  
Robert McFarlane  
M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Jay Keyworth

## III. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer Only.

## IV. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Greet Congressman and Mrs. Fuqua, followed by photo of Mr.  
Fuqua and Mr. Wilkinson with the Goddard Trophy.

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Attachment: Talking Points

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION FOR MEETING WITH CONGRESSMAN DON FUQUA

- Don, it is a great pleasure to acknowledge your award of this year's Goddard Trophy by the National Space Club -- they couldn't have selected a more deserving person.
- We have really appreciated your leadership in the development of our nation's space program. It will be even more important in the months and years ahead.
- I am grateful for your support of our space station package during markup this week. I hope you will continue to shepherd this initiative through your full committee and help us in the appropriations process.
- The manned space station is really the next logical step for future development in space and we welcome the fact that you and other leaders recognize it should be pursued on a bipartisan basis.
- Our commercial and international partners also have a growing interest in this effort. Jim Beggs has just given me some encouraging information on his trip to Europe and Japan.



-- I want you to know that we are all together on this and trust you will join us in getting behind moving the space station all the way through the legislative process this year.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

BR

MEETING WITH GOP HOUSE AND SENATE FISCAL LEADERSHIP

Date: Thursday, March 15, 1984  
Location: The Cabinet Room / ROSE GARDEN ANNOUNCEMENT  
Time: 4:30 p.m.  
From: M. B. Oglesby, Jr. *Bo*

I. PURPOSE

To announce an agreement with Republican Congressional Leadership on a deficit reduction package.

II. BACKGROUND

After a series of meetings with Congressional Republicans, we have finally reached an agreement. The package includes three basic elements:

- First, we have agreed to save \$43 billion over 3 years from the non-defense portion of the budget. These savings include entitlement reforms, a farm program target price freeze, the pending reconciliation bill's Federal pay cap and COLA delays, and a three-year freeze and cap on non-defense discretionary programs.
- Second, we have agreed to close certain tax loopholes to raise revenues by \$48 billion over three years. There would be no increase in tax rates.
- Third, we have agreed to changes in defense spending which will amount to budget authority reductions over the next three years of approximately \$57 billion -- and 3-year defense outlay savings of about \$40 billion.

The enactment of all these proposals will save \$18 billion in interest payments on the Federal debt. This would bring the 3-year total savings to some \$150 billion -- a substantial downpayment on the deficit.

III. PARTICIPANTS

See attachment.

IV. PRESS PLAN

Open press coverage.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

President and GOP Members leave Cabinet Room to Rose Garden steps to make announcement.

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Attachments: Participants List  
Talking Points



## PARTICIPANTS

The President  
The Vice President  
Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan  
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger  
OMB Director David Stockman

Senator Howard Baker (R-Tennessee)  
Senator John Tower (R-Texas)  
Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska)  
Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nevada)  
Senator Pete Domenici (R-New Mexico)  
Senator Bob Dole (R-Kansas)

Congressman Bob Michel (R-Illinois)  
Congressman Trent Lott (R-Mississippi)  
Congressman Silvio Conte (R-Massachusetts)  
Congressman Delbert Latta (R-Ohio)  
Congressman Barber Conable (R-New York)

Regrets: Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Oregon)  
Senator Jake Garn (R-Utah)

## Staff

James A. Baker  
Richard Darman  
Bud McFarlane  
M. B. Oglesby, Jr.  
Jack Svahn  
Dennis Thomas  
Pamela Turner  
Al Keel

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH  
GOP HOUSE AND SENATE FISCAL LEADERSHIP

- I believe all of our hard work has paid off and we have an agreement that is acceptable to all of us.
- We all realize how important it is for us to maintain a unified Republican approach and I want to thank each and every one of you for your help and support.
- Ask if anyone has any questions or comments -- then proceed with the group to the Rose Garden for the announcement.