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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name FONTAINE, ROGER: FILES

Withdrawer

KML 9/27/2011

File Folder SOUTH AMERICA [1981]

FOIA

M10-353/1

Box Number 13

DENNISON

56

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
119753	PAPER	RE STATE SUMMARY	1	ND	B1 B3
119754	MEMO	FRED WETTERING TO HORACE RUSSELL & BOB KIMMITT RE AFRICA <i>R 5/18/2015 M353/1</i>	10	11/2/1981	B1
119755	MEMO	FRED WETTERING TO JAMES NANCE RE MEETING <i>R 5/18/2015 M353/1</i>	2	12/3/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 22

Roger:

Secretariat would like
to know the status of
Log # 2820. Should file
be closed out?

jean

Loretta - 3380

*Close-out
10/9/81*

*No, its on
suspend until
further notice*

*Secretariat
notified
JMS*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 18, 1981

UNCLASSIFIEDACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

ROGER FONTAINE

RF

SUBJECT:

South American Speech Outlines (U)

Attached at Tab A are the outlines for the four proposed South American speeches. As you can see they are already extensively detailed. (U)

The four of us agree that the next step is refining dates for the tour and other similar preparations before proceeding with full speech drafts. We can begin doing the former perhaps, if your schedule permits your meeting us within the next week or so.

RECOMMENDATION

That you meet with Bailey, Lord, Nau and Fontaine to plan the next steps.

APPROVE

DISAPPROVE

Set up a convenient time for us to meet.

Attachments

Tab A Outline for Proposed South American speeches

*2) The next question is:
Should the VP give these?
Let's discuss*

1) There is excellent material here - good for speeches. We will need a "hook," an idea for each speech, relating to a central theme - otherwise, one can be accused of offering nothing.

2

I. Development in Latin America - An Example for the World.

Development is working in Latin America. It is working:

- because the people and leaders of your countries desire it and are willing to sacrifice for it,
- because open and pluralistic institutions, which encourage private initiative, are alive and thriving in this hemisphere, and
- because this hemisphere is blessed with abundant resources and talented people.

The record is clear.

- Real annual growth rates from 1970-1978 averaged:
 - 9% in Brazil
 - 5% in Mexico
 - 9% in Ecuador
 - 6% in Colombia
 - 6% in Venezuela
 - 6% in Costa Rica

All of this while real annual growth in the world as a whole averaged less than 3%.

- The highest literacy rates in the developing world.
- Life expectancy rose from 1960-1978
 - from 48 to 56 years in Peru
 - from 47 to 57 years in Guatemala
 - from 58 to 65 years in Mexico
 - from 65 to 71 years in Argentina

There is no basis here for complacency. But there is a basis for pride. Latin America holds a special place in the developing world. It is looked to and admired for its progress and its institutions. The United States shares this admiration and is proud to be a part of this dynamic hemisphere, driven by the energies and initiatives of free people and institutions.

II. Development and Human Liberty

Development is based on the release of human energies, not the dialectic of conflict or the iron law of history. It is chosen, it is willed. People produce social and economic progress, not governments or outside assistance.

Societies that treasure liberty and the individual human being believe that the role of government is to produce the right environment for individual and national initiative, not to displace this initiative. All nations in this hemisphere bear a responsibility to create the right environment for human liberty and energy to flourish, first at home and then within this hemisphere and the world economy.

The United States stands ready to do its share. We believe that the best thing we can do now for our neighbors in this hemisphere and our friends throughout the world is to put our own domestic economic house in order.

- We have created some serious economic problems for ourselves over the past decade, largely through misguided economic policies that encouraged government and handicapped private initiative. Government has spent too much, and

the private sector has produced too little.

We have made mistakes and now we must pay the price.

- The new Administration's economic program imposes a harsh economic discipline on the American people:
 - it cuts popular domestic programs so as to reduce government expenditures and release resources for private initiative
 - it cuts tax burdens so as to encourage greater savings and more work effort
 - it reduces unnecessary regulatory requirements which cost more than the benefits they produce
 - it strikes at the heart of inflation by controlling the money supply and ending the illusion of growth through the creation of paper money.
- Although demanding, this program expresses an unyielding faith in human liberty and initiative. We believe that, given reasonable incentives, people want to work and to improve their social and economic circumstances.

As we succeed in this effort, it will mean renewed prosperity for this region and for the world economy.

- lowering inflation in the U.S. will reduce the cost of U.S. exports to Latin America
- reducing federal expenditures, deregulating American industry and maintaining a steady hand

on monetary growth will release resources for private investment and entrepreneurship, restoring growth to the American market and creating expanded opportunities for Latin American exports to U.S. markets.

In addition, a revitalization of economic activity will also mean renewed appeal for our tradition of open societies and limited government. Economic prosperity is not a consequence of greed, as some would have it; it is a reflection of freedom, of the human desire to improve man's condition and his environment. Protecting individual rights and opportunities is not advanced only or even primarily by rhetoric; it is also and as importantly a matter of giving individuals the opportunity to acquire resources to defend their rights.

III. Development and International Cooperation

On the foundation of sound domestic policies, we can work together to create the right environment for growth in this hemisphere and the world economy. Trade and other relations among independent nations are truly our common responsibility.

- Trade, investment and finance form the broad and solid base of economic relations in this hemisphere. More so than with any other part of the world, our relations build on mutual advantage, not paternalism or charity. U.S. aid to Latin America is only 10% of total aid to Latin America, while U.S. manufactured

- imports from Latin America represent over 50% of total Latin American manufactured exports
- Cooperation to improve the practices, rules and institutions of international economic relations is a tradition among the nations of this hemisphere. Let's be frank. We have had our differences in the discussions to improve the international economic system. But while we are working on those differences, our economic relations have flourished.
 - Aid continues to be an important ingredient of development in certain countries of Latin America. Poverty persists, affecting as much as 40-50% of the population in some countries. It is particularly acute in the Caribbean and the remote areas of the Andean mountains. Efforts to deal with this problem cannot flag. We must find acceptable, that is nonpatronizing, ways to provide help, and we must ensure that this help leads to self-sustaining results, not the ignominy of perpetual charity.

IV. Development and Justice

In these respective domestic and international efforts, we build on our past success and proud tradition. This hemisphere is unique.

- It combines a tradition of relative peace and insulation from wars and self-defeating conflicts with the principles of political freedom and

economic opportunity. What other region knows as much progress and as little war?

- It offers irrefutable evidence of the economic and social accomplishments of open and pluralistic societies. Let other systems compare their results with ours. We accept peaceful competition. The pluralist system needs no defense. Its rival has failed in every instance in this hemisphere and elsewhere.
- It moves forward inspired by a history of religious and social concern for justice and human fulfillment.

Argentina Speech: Outline

I. Human Rights and American Foreign Policy

-- The error of view that human rights are being downgraded by the new Administration; distinction of urgent and ultimate priorities;

-- The error of view that human rights inescapably conflict with the other purposes and requirements of U.S. foreign policy:

- Opposing terrorism does not contradict support for human rights but essential precondition for it;

- Opposing Soviet imperialism and its surrogates an equally integral part of a human rights policy, as the expansion of Soviet power and Communist political systems is the most fundamental threat to human rights in contemporary world;

-- Importance of keeping in view fact that preservation of the independence and identity of peoples and nations is first task of any genuine human rights policy, and this requires maintaining military strength sufficient to deter threats to this.

II. What are Human Rights?

-- Much of the controversy and confusion on this subject can be avoided by making clear what we mean by human rights;

-- Not a meaningless phrase which serves any and all as a weapon to bludgeon other nations for own political convenience, nor a disguised instrument of western or American cultural

imperialism, but an idea which lies at the heart of what we mean by civilization and human dignity; it is something for which all decent men should care.

-- Human rights are the rights guaranteed to men under law in any civilized or humane society -- e.g. the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of life, liberty or property, or the right not to be subjected to degrading treatment such as torture or exile under brutal conditions;

-- Rights so understood not a creation of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, but a heritage common to moral-cultural traditions of many diverse societies -- for example, the Catholic tradition of the Latin world;

-- Essential to distinguish between human rights and human aspirations: human rights are ordinarily within the power of governments to respect or violate, while human aspirations -- to democratic forms of government or to particularly economic or social conditions -- depend on a variety of factors which are slow to change and difficult to affect;

-- Clearly a close relation between democratic governments and respect for human rights; yet equally mistaken for democracies to be complacent about own human rights record (the founders of American regime very aware that popular passions could threaten unpopular individuals and minorities) and to be skeptical of human rights observance by non-democratic states; no reason why states with political systems different

from our own cannot meet a high human rights standard; ideally we would like to see all nations move toward democratic or representative political institutions, but we are sensitive to the cultural/historical obstacles to this and do not believe it is either right or wise to try to impose our own institutions on others;

-- Further, we reject the attempt to dilute and distort the meaning of human rights by asserting the existence of certain "economic and social rights"; this merely a device by regimes and movements of the left to excuse violations of civil and political rights;

-- That we reject this notion does not mean we are unsympathetic to the economic and social aspirations of the less developed nations; rather, it derives from our view of the nature of economic development and social progress;

-- We believe it is time to expose the myth that there is a necessary conflict between respecting civil/political rights and improving economic and social conditions: much more progress in these areas in countries that uphold basic freedoms and rule of law.

III. Implementing a Human Rights Policy

-- Some regard a policy of active support for human rights as interference in internal affairs of other nations; we fully subscribe to principle of non-interference, but point out that human rights standards possess the force of international law, and must be a concern of all responsible governments;

-- We intend to pursue such a policy, then, within the context of our commitment to international law-abidingness, and in coordination with other like-minded nations; our policy will no longer have the character of a unilateral crusade, but will be developed in close connection with appropriate private, regional and international organizations;

-- We recognize that little is served by public lecturing of other governments on their human rights behavior; our general approach will be that of private diplomacy;

-- We also recognize that little is served by pursuing a human rights policy which constantly threatens the fundamental stability of our relationships with allied and friendly nations around the world; such a policy is unlikely to contribute much to the cause of human rights, while greatly strengthening the position of our common adversaries;

-- But none of this diminishes our commitment to human rights; we are convinced that such an approach will prove to be much more effective than the approach we have pursued in the past, and will provide a more satisfactory basis for U.S. collaboration with the nations of this hemisphere and of the world.

Outline of Speech to be Made in Brazil

I. The Hemisphere, the United States and Brazil

We are both expansive countries of continental scope. The pioneer and the cowboy. Opening up the interior with people of all races. Great resources of earth and man and spirit. Representatives of great traditions and cultures.

The Hemisphere and what it stands for -- let's see the record of the century:

Peace

Progress

Order ("Ordem e Progresso")

The word "America" has a meaning in the world, and not just geographic -- it stands for peace and progress and human dignity -- a much better record on all than the rest of the world -- ask the millions who have come and are coming -- from Europe, Russia, Asia.

This Hemisphere is not for outside meddling. It will run its own affairs. The Monroe Doctrine (unilateral) was replaced by the Inter-American system (esp. Rio Treaty) which will now be revitalized and become an instrument to free the shackled energies of the peoples of the Hemisphere (Allen Doctrine). The economic policies of the Reagan Administration.

Recapitulation "Pelo menos esta parte do mundo . . ."

II. The World, the United States and Brazil

The example the U.S. and Brazil can offer the world.
Past mistakes, present policies, future realizations.

-- In economics

Productivity
Creativity
Liberty

-- In politics

Humanism
Concern
Discipline

-- In international relations

Tolerance
Trade
Investment
Security

III. Brazil

A country of the past, present and future. An example to the Hemisphere, the LDCs and the world. A faithful friend whose maturity we recognize and support. Capable of making its own internal and external decisions, which we respect. Recognition of our past mistakes. We have much to learn from each other and together we can move forward. Technology and the creativity of the human spirit know no boundaries. Areas of collaboration:

Peace

Security

Economic growth (recognize their financial problem here)

Science and technology

Sugar/alcohol/gasohol/Caribbean project here

Not all in international relations is conflict and war. Brazil and the U.S., through 160 years of peaceful and fruitful collaboration in the same part of the world and with many opportunities for conflict, have shown that. In the crucial period ahead, no relationship we have anywhere in the world is dearer and more important to us than our relationship with Brazil.

cc: Henry Nau
Carnes Lord

Outline of Speech to Be Made in Venezuela

I. Hemispheric Security

The protection of inter-American security and the improvement of the instruments of peacekeeping in this hemisphere are vital concerns of this Administration.

Security has always been a concern of every American republic. Nearly all the nations of this hemisphere had to fight for their independence. That struggle was often long and bitter, but in retrospect it was worth it. Once having achieved independence, there was a need to preserve and protect it from hostile outside forces.

The question from the beginning of the 19th century was how best to protect one's independence? Individually, collectively, or collectively with some American states in but others out? Bolivar, in his Jamaica Letter in 1815 and for the next eleven years, urged a confederation of Spanish American states only. Others, including Henry Clay, wanted North American participation as well.

By 1830, North Americans had lost interest; kept the Monroe Doctrine a unilateral declaration; and turned isolationist. The Spanish American states persevered in the face of Spanish threats in the 1850s and 1860s.

But the problem did not go away, and new threats arose. In the 1930s and 1940s, this hemisphere was

threatened by both fascism and nazism. Gradually the American states formed a set of principles and institutions that provided the basis of mutual protection. Today, the Soviets and the Cubans have offered another challenge.

The forms and institutions contributing mutual security have never been perfected. After all, independent and sovereign nations jealous of their freedom are not going into binding agreements lightly. But we have always in the end recognized the importance and value of our system, and worked to improve it.

II. Underlying US Principles

We believe this hemisphere has prospered in peace and has remained secure for the most part because it has remained outside superpower confrontation. The United States ardently supports the continuation of that. We are opposed to anything that threatens the peace and security of this hemisphere. We wish it to be a permanent zone of peace -- free of the conflict that racks the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and even Europe -- much as President Herrera Campins has already outlined.

We are opposed to intervention. We are opposed to destabilizing other countries. Infiltration of men and weapons across national boundaries is the utter denial of the American system that took years to build and form a consensus around. Permitting such to continue in Central America would mean the end of peace in the region and ultimately the hemisphere. It would mean, in short, the Africanization of Central America; perhaps eventually all the Americas.

III. Nature of the Threat

When extra-hemispheric forces aid and abet this process -- forces hostile to genuine national independence and human liberty -- then the problem is made all the worse and more dangerous. Their intention is radically at variance to the political principles that most of the American republics have always espoused, and the resources available to these hostile forces simply exacerbate the problem. Instead of hundreds dying, there are and will be thousands -- even tens of thousands.

Has this form of extra-hemispheric intervention just happened? Of course not. It is no secret that Cuba, for twenty years to a great or lesser degree depending on circumstance and opportunity, has led the fight against the American republics. It could not do so without the tacit permission at least and often the active support of the Soviet Union. The Cuban regime's basic political and economic principles are at radical variance with the inter-American system. Its leaders are convinced that it ultimately cannot survive in a free hemisphere. Cuba therefore must export its principles by force to other nations or run the risk of isolation and finally dissolution from within.

IV. Our View of the Americas

What does this tell us about the future of the American hemisphere?

First, the Americas remains a special place. North and South Americans have increasingly agreed on this

fundamental assumption during the last two centuries. In Arthur Whitaker's formulation: "...somehow or other the peoples of the Western Hemisphere were tied together by a special relationship which set them apart from the rest of the world." Jefferson and Bolivar; Moreno and Clay all played a part in the development of this idea.

Jefferson, for example, once wrote: "America has a hemisphere to itself. It must have a separate system of interest which must not be subordinated to those of Europe. The insulated state in which nature has placed the American continent should so far avail it that no spark of war kindled in the other quarters of the globe should be wafted across the wide oceans which separate us from them." Jefferson, however, was wrong on one major point.

We have agreed on the need for mutual protection. But none of us accept the notion that the Western Hemisphere must isolate itself from the rest of the world. That is clearly impossible and unwise. All the American republics have legitimate interests in other parts of the world. Moreover, our intercourse with the rest of the world should increase, not decrease. If nothing else, to provide the rest of the world appropriate examples. But the problems of protecting the hemisphere -- our physical security and our way of life -- remain.

V. What Are We Protecting?

Our way of life has been under development for two centuries. It is rooted in self-government and non-intervention.

We aspire to republican governments based on law. We believe that governments must protect life, liberty, and property -- all basic human rights. We believe government is best when it is composed of institutions that are representative and responsive to the people. And we believe governments are made continually responsive, and therefore, legitimate by being subjected to the test of free elections.

In this hemisphere we have not always practiced these principles. But even for those who do not observe them, these principles are so powerful and compelling, at least lip service is paid them. These principles have, in short, become the test of all American governments. The degree governments are not based on them in this hemisphere places that regime at a powerful disadvantage. And in no other area of the world has this set of principles been found so compelling and so universal.

VI. How Do We Protect Them Best?

There is no blueprint in Washington. We know the danger is real. That danger is now widely perceived in this hemisphere. A satisfactory defense of our principles can only come from discussion and freely given consensus -- not the dictate of one of its members. Moreover, even if there was widespread agreement on what to do, no one country can do it all. All must assume their responsibilities.

Thus, only through common agreement and common effort will our hemisphere be made secure from outside attack (in whatever form it takes) and from breaches of the peace generated entirely among ourselves.

Additional Soviets Sent to War Zone In South Angola

By Jay Ross

Washington Post Foreign Service

LUBANGO, Angola, Sept. 2 — The Soviet Union today sent more military advisers to Lubango, the nerve center for the Angolan Army's increasingly serious war against South Africa in the southern part of this country.

The arrival of three Soviet advisers, adding to the approximately 20 known to be here, plus the confirmed presence of some Cuban troops close to the war front, appeared to increase the possibility that the volatile southern African region could become a center of East-West conflict.

The Soviets, along with about 200 Angolan troops, flew here just one day after South Africa announced that it had captured a Soviet adviser and killed several others in fighting against what it called a combined force of Angolans and Namibian guerrillas last week in southern Angola. Angola denies that there are any guerrillas within 200 miles of the border of Namibia.

South Africa has defied U.N. directives that it end its administration of Namibia (South-West Africa) and it has charged that guerrillas of the Southwest Africa People's Organization, who are fighting for independence, are operating out of bases in southern Angola.

The 20 Soviet advisers can be seen each day in Lubango, about 100 miles north of the Namibian border, as they take their meals at the once-fashionable Grande Hotel da Huila. They stay close together and wear sidearms and the same Eastern Bloc camouflage uniforms as the Angolans but without markings of rank.

Angola acknowledges having Soviet advisers and says they are necessary because the country is under increasingly heavy military attack from South Africa.

The United States estimates that there are about 15,000 Cuban troops and fewer than 1,000 Soviet advisers in Angola. Cuban troops have been stationed here for about six years. The presence of communist forces has become a barrier to normalization of relations with the United States, which Angola seeks. Angola has said the Cubans will leave once independence is achieved for Namibia, which borders it on the south, but that if South Africans continue to invade, it will ask for assistance.

The Angolan Cabinet met in Luanda today and the Angolan news agency Angop said later that the country felt "conditions" were right for invoking mutual defense treaties with the Soviet Union and Cuba as well as Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which provides for collective defense of a member facing outside aggression. But there was no indication Angola was actually invoking the treaties.

As the only Western journalist allowed into the war area since the start of the current fighting last week, I found my movements severely restricted by Angolan authorities. The provincial director of information for Angola's ruling party, Joao Castro, ordered me today to stop reporting and put me on the first plane back to Luanda, the capital. Lubango is the capital of Huila Province, one of four in the south placed under a state of emergency.

I saw the three arriving advisers, carrying briefcases and AK47 rifles with polished wooden stocks, and the Angolan troops while I was waiting at the Lubango airport for a flight to Luanda. All flights now are military as commercial service has been stopped for almost two weeks because, according to Angola, South Africa is interfering with air space.

Diplomats concurred that the three advisers were Soviets. They were separated from the Angolan troops when they left the plane and were greeted by a Soviet adviser based in Lubango.

In Lubango, Angolans were somewhat miffed by South Africa's trumpeting of the capture of a Soviet adviser and the killing of others during the invasion. They heard the news by international means. The Angolan radio has yet to report on the South African claim.

South Africa contends that the Soviet presence is proof of Soviet collusion with SWAPO but most African nations, even the moderate ones, line up on Angola's side saying that South Africa is the aggressor because of its frequent attacks into Angola.

The African nations maintain SWAPO has the right to carry out attacks into Namibia from Angolan soil because the South African occupation is illegal and the United Nations has recognized SWAPO as the sole legitimate authority in Namibia.

The U.S. decision to stand alone Monday and veto a Security Council condemnation of the South African invasion is expected to cause considerable African criticism and decrease any possibility for improvement in relations with Angola. It could also lead to an increased Soviet-Cuban presence, although Western diplomats say they believe Angola is trying to avoid such a move.

Castro, information director here, said: "Angola is an independent country. We are free to choose our friends. They are helping us."

He was speaking at dinner in the Grande Hotel where the Soviets were having their evening meal.

The apparent commander of the Soviet group at the hotel is over six feet tall and about 200 pounds, with a large shock of wavy, graying hair. He always sits at the head of a table of about 10 Russians, occasionally joined by one Angolan. The other Soviets sit in groups of two, four or six without mixing with Angolans.

It appears that few of the Russians speak Portuguese. They also refused to speak to me.

(Cont)

(Cont)

A number of the advisers seem to be well into middle age, with thinning hair and paunches. Some carry briefcases and if they were not wearing camouflage uniforms many could pass as the typical American traveling salesman.

The Soviets stand out because of their inability to speak Portuguese, their size and their light complexion. There are whites in the Angolan Army because of the Portuguese colonial past but most are darker and smaller than the Russians.

Soviet civilian advisers in Lubango make no effort to keep a low profile. Two of them, Alexander Bronchatov, an official of Komsomol, the Soviet Communist Party youth organization, and Sergei Krylov, a physician, were in the reception line at the ornate mansion of the former Portuguese governor to welcome a U.S. congressional delegation led by Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-Mich.) last month.

Bronchatov, who speaks vernacular American English although he said he has never been to the United States, told of his hopes for working with the youth wing of the country's ruling party, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

He does not speak Portuguese. "It's quite a problem," he said.

Speaking before the recent South African invasion, Krylov, the physician, said that the hospital in Lubango handles "quite a lot of" war casualties including victims of an antigovernment guerrilla group supported by South Africa.

The Grande Hotel where the Soviet military advisers are staying was a favorite during colonial days of South African tourists. South African men often found it a convenient place to escape Pretoria's rigid laws against interracial sexual relations.

Today the swimming pool is empty, the bar is usually closed and running water is a rarity.

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

R. Fontaine
(Remind) 23

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119754

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

November 2, 1981

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M3531 #119754

BY RW NARA DATE 5/18/15

MEMORANDUM FOR HORACE RUSSELL ✓
BOB KIMMITT

FROM: FRED WETTERING

SUBJECT: Africa: FY 83 Security Assistance Rankings

I have just seen the State ranking sheet for FY 83 security assistance programs. I understand OMB will be holding meetings on this shortly. If there is a possibility of the bottom-ranked programs facing the ax, I have considerable problem with State's rankings. (C)

In Africa, the President has made in face-to-face discussions or in correspondence specific commitments to certain African leaders. We obviously must protect these commitments. These include: Sudan (not yet made but will be on November 20), Kenya, Mauritius, Liberia, and Gabon. In addition, the Vice President has made commitments regarding Niger. Cabinet-level officials have made commitments on FY 83 security levels to the above as well as to Zimbabwe, Zaire, Senegal and Somalia. (C)

As a result, I believe the following need to be advanced in priority:

- Zaire - 2 from 102
- Sudan - 3 and 4 from 97,98
- Somalia - 2 from 96
- Kenya - 3 from 95
- Kenya - 3 from 79
- Sudan - 2 from 63
- Gabon - 2 from 81

I believe the following could be lowered in priority:

- Seychelles - 1 from 34
- Cameroon - 1 from 54
- Djibouti - 1 from 33

Let's discuss if you have questions, problems with the above.

cc: Joan Sagerson, OMB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

RANK	COUNTRY	THE INCREMENT					COUNTRY CUMULATIVE					OVERALL CUMULATIVE				
		GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS
		FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR
80	Cameroon (4030-2)	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	10	500	1978	1044	735	3840.4
81	Gabon (4080-2)	-	-	-	-	.4	-	-	-	-	3	500	1978	1044	735	3840.8
82	Turkey (3080-3)	-	-	25	-	15	-	250	300	100	165	500	1978	1069	735	3855.8
83	Greece (3040-3)	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	280	500	1978	1069	735	3875.8
84	El Salvador (5120-4)	-	10	15	-	10	-	105	50	-	10	500	1988	1084	735	3885.8
85	Jamaica (5170-3)	-	-	1.5	5	-	-	-	6.5	55	-	500	1988	1085.5	740	3885.8
86	East Carib (5100-3)	-	-	-	5	-	-	15	4.5	15	1	500	1988	1085.5	745	3885.8
87	Costa Rica (5070-3)	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	60	-	500	1988	1085.5	755	3885.8
88	Dom Rep (5090-2)	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	-	5.5	500	1988	1089.5	755	3885.8
89	Suriname (5250-1)	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	500	1989	1089.5	755	3885.8
90	Honduras (5160-2)	-	-	4.5	15	-	-	-	9	25	5.5	500	1989	1094	770	3885.8
91	SRF (0400-3)	-	25	-	-	-	-	125	-	-	-	500	2014	1094	770	3885.8

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R. Fontaine

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
ROUTE SLIP

TO <u>Fred Wetters</u>	Take necessary action <input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Approval or signature <input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Comment <input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Prepare reply <input type="checkbox"/>
_____	Discuss with me <input type="checkbox"/>
_____	For your information <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
_____	See remarks below <input type="checkbox"/>

FROM Joan Segerson DATE 10/28/81

REMARKS

I have attached a copy of the State rank sheet for FMSCR and ESF programs for 1983. Horace Russell also has a copy.

Please direct any of your comments either directly to me or through Horace or Bob Kimmett. I'd prefer it if you didn't discuss the ranking with State since this is the official submission and can't really be changed from their end. It's now our job to recommend to Stockman, and eventually the President, country programs and levels for those programs for 1983.

Call if you have any questions. Please feel free to show it to Roger, but ask him to direct his comments the same way.

Our meeting with Stockman is on the 20th at 5:00 P.M. We will have to finalize our recommendations and issue papers early in November in preparation for this meeting.

If you are interested in seeing the decision sheets for each country, they are available in our office. There are two many to copy and send me. As many of them are not very helpful.

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE
(in millions of dollars)
PRIORITY RANKINGS of FMSCR AND ESF

RANK	COUNTRY	THE INCREMENT					COUNTRY CUMULATIVE					OVERALL CUMULATIVE				
		GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS
		FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR
1	Israel (2040-1)	500	525	-	210	900	500	525	-	210	900	500	525	-	210	900
2	Israel (2040-2)	-	-	-	-	300	500	525	-	210	1200	500	525	-	210	1200
3	Egypt (2020-1)	-	500	400	200	500	-	500	400	200	500	500	1025	400	410	1700
4	Egypt (2020-2)	-	-	-	-	400	-	500	400	200	900	500	1025	400	410	2100
5	Jordan (2050-1)	-	10	-	5	42	-	10	-	5	42	500	1035	400	415	2142
6	Jordan (2050-2)	-	-	-	5	8	-	10	-	10	50	500	1035	400	420	2150
7	Lebanon (2060-1)	-	5	-	-	15	-	5	-	-	15	500	1040	400	420	2165
8	Lebanon (2060-2)	-	3	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	15	500	1043	400	420	2165
9	Mid. East Reg. (2160-1)-	11.5	-	-	-	-	-	11.5	-	-	-	500	1054.5	400	420	2165
10	Mid. East Reg. (2160-2)-	3.5	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	500	1058	400	420	2165
11	Turkey (3080-1)	-	200	275	100	150	-	200	275	100	150	500	1258	675	520	2315
12	Greece (3040-1)	-	-	-	-	200	-	-	-	-	200	500	1258	675	520	2515
13	Greece (3040-2)	-	-	-	-	60	-	-	-	-	260	500	1258	675	520	2575

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RANK	COUNTRY	THE INCREMENT					COUNTRY CUMULATIVE					OVERALL CUMULATIVE				
		GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS
		FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR
14	Portugal (3060-1)	-	20	50	-	10	-	20	50	-	10	500	1278	725	520	2585
15	Spain (3070-1)	-	12	-	-	250	-	12	-	-	250	500	1290	725	520	2835
16	Cyprus (3020-1)	-	5	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	500	1295	725	520	2835
17	Korea (1030-1)	-	-	-	-	170	-	-	-	-	170	500	1295	725	520	3005
18	Philippines (1060-1)	-	50	-	-	50	-	50	-	-	50	500	1345	725	520	3055
19	Thailand (1080-1)	-	10	50	-	15	-	10	50	-	15	500	1355	775	520	3070
20	Thailand (1080-2)	-	-	-	-	18	-	10	50	-	33	500	1355	775	520	3088
21	Indonesia (1020-1)	-	-	-	-	35	-	-	-	-	35	500	1355	775	520	3123
22	Indonesia (1020-2)	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	40	500	1355	775	520	3128
23	Malaysia (1040-1)	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	10	500	1355	775	520	3138
24	Malaysia (1040-2)	-	-	-	-	2.5	-	-	-	-	12.5	500	1355	775	520	3140.5
25	Pakistan (2100-1)	-	83	-	42	275	-	83	-	42	275	500	1438	775	562	3415.5
26	Sudan (4260-1)	-	50	40	-	-	-	50	40	-	-	500	1488	815	562	3415.5

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RANK	COUNTRY	THE INCREMENT					COUNTRY CUMULATIVE					OVERALL CUMULATIVE				
		GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS
		FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR
27	Tunisia (2120-1)	-	-	45	-	50	-	-	45	-	50	500	1488	860	562	3465.5
28	Yemen (2130-1)	-	-	10	-	5	-	-	10	-	5	500	1488	870	562	3470.5
29	Morocco (2070-1)	-	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	-	30	500	1488	870	562	3500.5
30	Oman (2090-1)	-	5	-	10	25	-	5	-	10	25	500	1493	870	572	3525.5
<u>31</u>	Kenya (4130-1)	-	10	20	-	-	-	10	20	-	-	500	1503	890	572	3525.5
<u>32</u>	Somalia (4250-1)	-	25	20	-	-	-	25	20	-	-	500	1528	910	572	3525.5
<u>33</u>	Djibouti (4060-1)	-	2	-	-	1.5	-	2	-	-	1.5	500	1530	910	572	3527
<u>34</u>	Seychelles (4230-1)	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	500	1532	910	572	3527
<u>35</u>	Mauritius (4190-1)	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	500	1534	910	572	3527
36	El Salvador (5120-1)-	-	45	-	-	-	-	45	-	-	-	500	1579	910	572	3527
37	El Salvador (5120-2)-	-	35	25	-	-	-	80	25	-	-	500	1614	935	572	3527
38	Jamaica (5170-2) 21	-	-	1	45	-	-	-	1	45	-	500	1614	936	617	3527
39	East Carib. (5100-1)	-	10	-	10	1	-	10	-	10	1	500	1624	936	627	3528

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RANK	COUNTRY	THE INCREMENT					COUNTRY CUMULATIVE					OVERALL CUMULATIVE				
		GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS
		FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR
40	East Carib. (5100-2)	-	5	4.5	-	-	-	15	4.5	10	1	500	1629	940.5	627	3528
41	Costa Rica (5070-1)	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	-	30	-	500	1629	940.5	657	3528
42	Dom Rep (5090-1)	-	-	-	-	5.5	-	-	-	-	5.5	500	1629	940.5	657	3533.5
43	Haiti ⁵¹⁵⁰ (5120-1)	-	-	-	-	.3	-	-	-	-	.3	500	1629	940.5	657	3533.8
44	Honduras (5160-1)	-	-	4.5	10	5.5	-	-	4.5	10	55	500	1629	945	667	3539.3
45	Panama (5200-1)	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	500	1629	945	667	3543.3
46	Panama (5200-2)	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	500	1629	945	667	3544.3
47	Zimbabwe (4330-1)	-	32	-	43	-	-	32	-	43	-	500	1661	945	710	3544.3
48	So. Afr.Pro. (4340-1)	-	60	-	10	-	-	50	-	-	-	500	1721	945	710	3544.3
49	Zaire (4310-1)	-	10	15	-	-	-	10	15	-	-	500	1731	960	710	3544.3
50	Liberia (4140-1)	-	20	15	-	-	-	20	15	-	-	500	1751	975	710	3544.3
51	Liberia (4140-2)	-	12	-	-	-	-	32	15	-	-	500	1763	975	710	3544.3
52	Senegal (4220-1)	-	10	5	-	-	-	10	5	-	-	500	1773	980	710	3544.3
53	Niger (4200-1)	-	5	5	-	-	-	5	5	-	-	500	1778	985	710	3544.3

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RANK	COUNTRY	THE INCREMENT					COUNTRY CUMULATIVE					OVERALL CUMULATIVE				
		GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT, LUANS		GUARANTEED LUANS
		FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR
54	Cameroon (4030-1)	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	5	500	1778	985	710	3549.3
55	Gabon (4080-1)	-	-	-	-	2.6	-	-	-	-	2.6	500	1778	985	710	3551.9
56	Rwanda (4210-1)	-	-	-	-	1.5	-	-	-	-	1.5	500	1778	985	710	3553.4
57	Ecuador (5110-1)	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	500	1778	985	710	3557.4
58	Ecuador (5110-2)	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	6	500	1778	985	710	3559.4
59	Peru (5220-1)	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	500	1778	985	710	3563.4
60	Peru (5220-2)	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	6	500	1778	985	710	3565.4
61	Colombia (5060-1)	-	-	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	12	500	1778	985	710	3577.4
62	SRF (0400-1)	-	75	-	-	-	-	75	-	-	-	500	1853	985	710	3577.4
63	Sudan (4260-2)	-	20	20	-	-	-	70	60	-	-	500	1873	1005	710	3577.4
64	Tunisia (2120-2)	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	45	-	60	500	1873	1005	710	3587.4
65	Morocco (2070-2)	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	50	500	1873	1005	710	3607.4
66	El Salvador (5120-3)	-	15	10	-	-	-	95	35	-	-	500	1888	1015	710	3607.4

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RANK	COUNTRY	THE INCREMENT					COUNTRY CUMULATIVE					OVERALL CUMULATIVE				
		GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS
		FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR
67	Jamaica (5170-2)	-	-	4	5	-	-	-	5	50	-	500	1888	1019	715	3607.4
68	Costa Rica (5070-2)	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	50	-	500	1888	1019	735	3607.4
69	SRF (0400-2)	-	25	-	-	-	-	100	-	-	-	500	1913	1019	735	3607.4
70	Turkey (3080-2)	-	50	-	-	-	-	250	275	100	150	500	1963	1019	735	3607.4
71	Portugal (3060-2)	-	-	25	-	5	-	20	75	-	15	500	1963	1044	735	3612.4
72	Spain (3070-2)	-	-	-	-	50	-	12	-	-	300	500	1963	1044	735	3662.4
73	Spain (3070-3)	-	-	-	-	100	-	12	-	-	400	500	1963	1044	735	3762.4
74	Korea (1030-2)	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	190	500	1963	1044	735	3782.4
75	Korea (1030-3)	-	-	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	210	500	1963	1044	735	3802.4
76	Thailand (1080-3)	-	-	-	-	8	-	10	50	-	41	500	1963	1044	735	3810.4
77	Indonesia (1020-3)	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	50	500	1963	1044	735	3820.4
78	Oman (2090-2)	-	-	-	-	15	-	5	-	10	40	500	1963	1044	735	3835.4
79	Kenya (4130-2)	-	15	-	-	-	25	20	-	-	-	500	1978	1044	735	3835.4

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RANK	COUNTRY	THE INCREMENT					COUNTRY CUMULATIVE					OVERALL CUMULATIVE				
		GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS	GRANTS		DIRECT LOANS		GUARANTEED LOANS
		FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR	ESF	FMSCR
92	Israel (2040-3)	-	-	-	50	-	500	525	-	260	1200	500	2014	1094	820	3885.8
93	Egypt (2020-3)	-	-	-	50	-	-	500	400	250	900	500	2014	1094	870	3885.8
94	Jordan (2040-3) 2050	-	-	-	-	25	-	10	-	10	75	500	2014	1094	870	3910.8
95	Kenya (4130-3)	-	5	15	-	-	-	30	35	-	-	500	2019	1109	870	3910.8
96	Somalia (4250-2)	-	-	10	-	-	-	25	30	-	-	500	2019	1119	870	3910.8
97	Sudan (4260-3)	-	-	15	-	-	-	70	75	-	-	500	2019	1134	870	3910.8
98	Sudan (4260-4)	-	-	25	-	-	-	70	100	-	-	500	2019	1159	870	3910.8
99	Tunisia (2120-3)	-	-	25	-	10	-	-	70	-	70	500	2019	1184	870	3920.8
100	Morocco (2070-3)	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	50	-	50	500	2019	1234	870	3920.8
101	Zimbabwe (4330-2)	-	-	-	-	3	-	32	-	43	3	500	2019	1234	870	3923.8
102	Zaire (4310-2)	-	15	5	-	-	-	25	20	-	-	500	2034	1239	870	3923.8
103	Botswana (4010-1)	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	5	500	2034	1239	870	3928.8

November 27, 1981

33

For the Opening of the OAS General Assembly**SOUTH AMERICAN PUBLICS' VIEWS OF OAS AS
PEACEKEEPING FORCE**

A March 1981 Gallup survey in eight South American countries examined public views of the OAS as a peacekeeper. In seven of eight countries, about a quarter perceived the OAS as an effective force for preserving peace. Somewhat more, however, called its performance only "so-so" and a third to a half were either unaware of or unimpressed by the OAS in its peacekeeping role. Only in Ecuador did favorable perceptions predominate.

The prevailing Ecuadoran perception may be linked to their experience early in 1981. In January, Ecuador asked for OAS aid in arranging a cease-fire in border fighting with Peru, which was then arranged due in part to OAS efforts. In the March survey, a majority in Ecuador rated the OAS favorably as a peacekeeper. Peru, on the other hand, had opposed OAS involvement, seemingly to avoid reopening the question of boundaries settled to their satisfaction in the 1942 Rio Protocol. Accordingly, in the March survey, only about a quarter of the Peruvians rated the OAS favorably as a peacekeeping institution.

The question asked in the survey and the results obtained are presented below. The response "does nothing" is somewhat ambiguous: for some it may mean that the OAS is not thought of as an active peacekeeping institution, while for others it may mean that given responsibility for keeping the peace, the OAS fails to take action.

"In your opinion, how well does the OAS act to preserve the peace in South America? Very well, well, so-so ("regular") or doesn't it do anything?"

	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Peru	Venezuela	Uruguay
Very well	8%	6%	3%	3%	29%	4%	5%	4%
Well	20	19	16	22	29	24	20	27
So-so	21	38	35	38	29	43	38	26
Does nothing	13	18	19	23	11	22	19	19
Don't know	38	19	27	14	2	7	18	24
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Prepared by:
Joseph D. Straubhaar and
William J. Millard (PGM/RAR)
724-9036

B-11/27/81

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

December 3, 1981

6973

119755

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: FRED WETTERING *W*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Jonas Savimbi, December 3, 1981

NLRR 17353/1 #119755
BY *RW* NARA DATE 5/18/85

On December 3, 1981 I attended a meeting in Under Secretary (US) Stoessel's office with Angolan leader Jonas Savimbi, President of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola). The meeting was hosted by Under Secretary Stoessel; other attendees included myself, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Chet Crocker, the Angola Desk Officer at State, and four members of the UNITA leadership led by Dr. Savimbi. The following is not a full contact report (one is being done by State which I will submit on receipt) but rather a summary of the highlights of this meeting. (S)

US Stoessel recapitulated our two-track approach to resolving the problems on Southern Africa. He stated that we recognize UNITA as a legitimate political force and we believe UNITA must play a part in the Angolan Government. He noted that we have already been in contact with the MPLA regime and we detected some interest in getting rid of the Cubans. (S)

Dr. Savimbi stated that reconciliation was a longstanding UNITA policy and he and UNITA would meet the MPLA anyplace, anytime without preconditions. He believed the Angolan people were fed up with the Cubans, but he had some doubts if the MPLA leadership has the courage to press the Cubans to leave. He noted that UNITA has had "lower-level" contacts with MPLA black nationalist dissidents who favor reconciliation but unfortunately they were not the top decision-makers. (S)

Dr. Savimbi agreed with observations by Crocker and myself that he had a major PR job to do to shake the label of South African stooge that his enemies had placed on him. He told one anecdote about how he has been resisting repeated pressures from South Africa for UNITA to attack SWAPO. He stated categorically that SWAPO would win any election in Namibia "overwhelmingly" (I agree). He has maintained decent working relations with SWAPO despite the fact that each is supported by an antagonist. He was delighted with his reception in Washington and was pleased that he has been informed about the Southern Africa two-track US policy (Angola and Namibia). He resisted efforts by Stoessel and Crocker to get him to endorse the plan, stating he had just heard it and his people would have to study it, but agreed it sounded good. (S)

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Review 12/3/87

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Savimbi added that his information was that about 3,000 Cuban reinforcements had recently arrived in Angola. But this did not trouble him. The Cubans have avoided significant ground fighting since 1979, he noted, confining themselves to static defense, training, logistics, and specialized support such as air and heavy artillery. The Cubans have too many men in Angola just to train and provide static defense and are thus alienating the Angolan people by being garrisoned on them, but not enough men to affect the civil war or UNITA's fortunes in a decisive manner (a very trenchant observation). (S)

The meeting was very cordial and Dr. Savimbi seemed quite pleased. He already has had a separate meeting with AS Crocker and will meet later today with Eliot Abrams, Wolfowitz and Burt. Tomorrow there will be a general session in which Dr. Savimbi and his people have agreed to field questions from US intelligence analysts at INR/State (Roger Fontaine and I will attend). Savimbi will be in town for about a week. He already has met many senators and will also work the House. (S)

cc:

Fontaine
Shoemaker
Bailey
Gregg

~~SECRET~~