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(01/11/1986-02/02/1986)
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Last Updated: 7/26/2023

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MORTON, ELAINE: FILES

Withdrawer

RBW 3/1/2010

File Folder LIBYA POLICY: IMPLEMENTATION (01/11/1986-02/02/1986)

FOIA

F95-023/5

Box Number 1

WILLS

8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
86096	NOTE	RE. LIBYA <i>R 1/25/2017 M1061/1</i>	1	1/11/1986	B1
86097	MEMO	CASPAR WEINBERGER TO RR RE. LIBYA <i>R 3/22/2017 M1061/1</i>	2	1/12/1986	B1
86098	MEMO	WILLIAM CROWE TO SECT. OF DEFENSE RE. LIBYA	5	1/11/1986	B1 B3
86099	NOTE	OTTAWA 0285 <i>R 1/25/2017 M1061/1</i>	1	1/13/1986	B1
86100	NOTE	RE. LIBYA <i>R 1/25/2017 M1061/1</i>	1	1/13/1986	B1
86101	CABLE	OTTAWA 00403 <i>R 1/25/2017 M1061/1</i>	2	1/16/1986	B1
86102	CABLE	LONDON 01134 <i>R 1/25/2017 M1061/1</i>	3	1/16/1986	B1
86103	CABLE	ANKARA 00547 <i>R 1/25/2017 M1061/1</i>	2	1/17/1986	B1
86104	CABLE	ATHENS 01089 <i>R 1/25/2017 M1061/1</i>	2	1/18/1986	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MORTON, ELAINE: FILES

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RBW 3/1/2010

File Folder LIBYA POLICY: IMPLEMENTATION (01/11/1986-02/02/1986)

FOIA

F95-023/5

Box Number 1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
86105	CABLE	PARIS 02754 [ATTACHED TO DOC. 86104 <i>R 1/25/2017 M1061/1</i>	2	1/21/1986	B1
86106	CABLE	BRUSSELS 0955 <i>R 1/25/2017 M1061/1</i>	2	1/22/1986	B1
86107	MEMO	JOHN WHITEHEAD TO SEC. OF STATE RE. TRIP TO CANADA AND EUROPE <i>R 1/25/2017 M1061/1</i>	4	1/24/1986	B1
86108	REPORT	RE. LIBYA <i>D 4/24/2017 M1061/1</i>	4	1/30/1986	B1 B3
86109	REPORT	RE. LIBYA <i>PAR 4/24/2017 M1061/1</i>	2	1/31/1986	B1 B3

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~~SECRET~~

86096

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SITUATION ROOM NOTE

January 11, 1986

~~SECRET~~

Libyan Situation Report as of 0700 EST

Reaction from Tripoli: Embassy Madrid was told the most noteworthy aspect of Qadhafi's Thursday meeting with the European ambassadors was his conciliatory tone. Qadhafi avoided his usual extreme and threatening language. He was obviously concerned at the U.S. measures and sought to win European neutrality if not support.

State Department has received no information on any Americans wanting to leave Libya.

International Reactions: Prime Minister Mulroney announced Canada will further decrease commercial ties with Libya, includes ban on sale of high-technology and oil-drilling equipment, and refusal to provide insurance coverage for Canadian companies seeking new business in Libya.

The Washington Post cites the Italian and Austrian foreign ministers as stating the terrorists who attacked the Rome and Vienna airports were not trained in Libya but in the Syrian-controlled Bekaa Valley, Lebanon.

Prime Minister Thatcher rebuffed the President's call for sanctions as an effective way to halt terrorism. She also said retaliatory strikes would lead to "greater chaos" and did not believe in attacks "that are against international law...one has to fight it by legal means."

Embassy Paris reports the French, while they have not yet closed the door on applying sanctions, are unlikely to take any new actions except those that could conceivably emerge from the EC. On the other hand, the government might be willing to strengthen measures already in place such as steady decline in economic and trade ties, and to announce its intention not to undercut our actions.

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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NLRR M1061/1 # 86096

BY EW NARA DATE 1/25/17

SYSTEM II PROFILE

~~TOP SECRET~~ *RW 3-1-10*

ID 8690072

RECEIVED 29 JAN 86 13

TO PRESIDENT

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 12 JAN 86

CROWE, W

11 JAN 86

KEYWORDS: LIBYA

JCS

MILITARY POSTURE

SUBJECT: US RESOLVE & CAPABILITY AGAINST LIBYA / POSSIBLE NAVAL ACTION IN GULF
OF SIDRA

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE:

STATUS S

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

STARK

MCDANIEL

COMMENTS **STAFFED PER FORTIER**

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DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

12:15 pm - 1/29/86

Van -- don't know what has happened to originals of these 2 memos but Don Fortier has asked that these two copies be treated as originals and sent to Jim Stark for Urgent Staffing. Copy pls to Rod McDaniel. Many thanks.

Wilma



~~TOP SECRET~~
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

86097
SYSTEM II
90072

January 12, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Libya: Possible Naval Action in the Gulf of Sidra (TS)

(TS) In considering the attached "stair step" options for US naval operations in the Gulf of Sidra, we must bear in mind the purposes which such actions would serve and the objectives we would hope to achieve. Such actions would be a demonstration of US resolve, reinforcing the economic sanctions we have already put into effect. They would keep Libya in a state of sustained uncertainty and establish a pattern of activity that would put Libya clearly on notice that the US is prepared to respond vigorously to any further Libyan supported terrorist acts. They would make clear our long-standing position that the US does not accept Libyan territorial claims in international waters.

(TS) Possible naval actions range from merely maintaining a significant naval presence outside the Gulf of Sidra, to limited air and sea operations at the edges of Libyan claimed waters, to sea/air operations south of the 32° 30' N closing line. Such operations could occur at night, dusk, or during daylight hours when Libyan sea and air patrols are active.

(TS) We will need to consider what preparatory or advance notifications are required in each case. For a significant challenge, prior Congressional consultations, consultations with allies and possible notification of friendly states in the region should be considered. We should also take into account that as soon as such consultations begin, the exercise will become a headline item in the US and international media. We will need to try to minimize the kind of publicity that has the effect of unifying the Libyan people in support of Qhadafi and the Arab world in support of Libya. Otherwise the actions we take could be self-defeating.

(TS) The more direct our challenge is to Qhadafi's territorial claims and the more visible it is internationally, the more likely it is that Qhadafi will respond militarily. Our latest intelligence indicates that Libyan pilots have been instructed to fire on unidentified aircraft approaching the Libyan FIR. At the very least we would be giving Qhadafi the option whether to respond directly or to use our excursion as justification for

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BY RW NARA DATE 3/22/17

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acquiring the SA-5s and other sophisticated Soviet equipment to protect Libyan territory. We will need to think through the sequence of actions that might follow a Libyan response and the effect that it would have on the Europeans and regional states.

(TS) We are now in the position to hold out the possibility of military action as leverage on the Europeans if they do not join us in imposing sanctions. Military actions could undermine Libya's internal opposition and give Qhadafi a powerful psychological handle to rally Arab support. He would attract sympathy as the underdog, as he did in the previous Gulf of Sidra incident.

(TS) Another consideration is the timing of a possible challenge relative to the time in which the remaining American citizens in Libya would be trying to leave. Qhadafi might seize the pretext for interfering with their departure, forcing us to face the prospect of a military evacuation in a hostile environment. The pretext could be calibrated to appear non-hostile -- even benign; i.e., he could argue that prospective US military action makes it unsafe for people to leave (closing the airport).

(TS) Finally, we must recognize that the Gulf of Sidra challenge, while legally justified, does not have a clear linkage to the recent provocation that gave rise to it. We might thus look ineffective in dealing with the provocation, being forced to resort to some lesser, extraneous option.

(TS) On balance, I would recommend that we delay the Freedom of Navigation challenge until 16 days after a deployment order is given to AMERICA to join the two CVBG's in the Med. This would give us the option of recalling the AMERICA if we get some satisfactory European responses on economic sanctions, or proceeding with the FON challenge if that is the course decided on. I would be glad to respond to any questions you might have, or discuss this further if you wish.

Sigs

Attachment

~~TOP SECRET~~

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name

MORTON, ELAINE: FILES

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RB 3/1/2010
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File Folder

LIBYA POLICY: IMPLEMENTATION (01/11/1986-02/02/1986)

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F95-023/5
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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
86098	MEMO WILLIAM CROWE TO SECT. OF DEFENSE RE. LIBYA	5	1/11/1986	B1 B3

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86099 11
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SITUATION ROOM NOTE

January 13, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Canadian Decision on Libyan Sanctions

After his announcement of sanctions against Libya, Prime Minister Mulroney called our ambassador to express his hope the action would be well received in Washington. He also said:

- o "No way was I going to let Ronald Reagan stand alone against Qadhafi."

Later in the day, Under Secretary Taylor spoke to the ambassador to indicate the entire cabinet shared Mulroney's sentiments and had voted unanimously for the sanctions. (C)

Ottawa 0285

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NLRR M106/1 # 86099
BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/17

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SITUATION ROOM NOTE

January 13, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Craxi Responds to Letter on Libya

In a reply to your letter on Libya, Prime Minister Craxi states his support for your objective of isolating states involved in terrorism, but argues that we should now emphasize political and moral determination rather than military action. He has decided therefore:

- o To suspend arms deliveries to Libya and deny some spare parts for previously delivered equipment.
- o To act strongly against any Italian firms which try to undercut U.S. efforts by providing replacement services.
- o To explore further efforts for reducing Italian trade and exposure in Libya.
- o To urge the European Community to adopt similar actions.

In providing this information to our embassy, the prime minister's diplomatic advisor stressed that Craxi had taken the lead in these decisions and overcome some hesitation by members of his cabinet. (C)

Embassy Rome

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/17

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Department of State

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PAGE 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 00403 160016Z

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Whitehead trip

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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NLR #86101

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BY

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NARA DATE 1/25/17

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Department of State

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FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6605

~~SECRET~~ OTTAWA 00403

NODIS

DEPTO 10001

~~FOR THE SECRETARY ONLY FROM DEPUTY SECRETARY WHITEHEAD~~

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (WHITEHEAD, JOHN C.)
~~SUBJECT: MY TALKS IN OTTAWA~~

2. ~~THE DAY IN OTTAWA WAS AN EXCELLENT START TO MY TRIP.~~
THE TEMPERATURE WAS TEN BELOW ZERO BUT THE ATMOSPHERE WAS
VERY WARM. PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY FINDS QADHAFI EVERY
BIT AS HATEFUL AS DOES THE PRESIDENT. HE HAS ALREADY
TAKEN STRONG MEASURES AGAINST LIBYA AND WILL CONSIDER
SOME FURTHER STEPS WHICH WE SUGGEST HE WILL HELP
US WITH MITTERRAND AND WITH OTHERS. WE ALSO TALKED
WITH FINANCE MINISTER MIKE WILSON, WHOM I KNEW FROM
INVESTMENT BANKING DAYS, AND WITH ACTING SECRETARY OF
STATE JIM KELLEHER. BOTH WERE ALSO VERY POSITIVE ON
OUR EFFORTS. WE HELD A LARGE PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH I
THINK WENT WELL AND WHICH I HOPE WILL PLAY POSITIVELY
IN EUROPE TOMORROW. WE'RE OFF TO LONDON TONIGHT WHERE
I KNOW THE WEATHER WILL BE A LOT CHILLIER. DETAILED
CABLES FOLLOW.

NILES

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

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INCOMINGPAGE 02 OF 04 LONDON 01134 162122Z
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FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0820

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 01134

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM WHITEHEAD

DEPTO: 10005

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (WHITEHEAD, JOHN C.)

SUBJECT: MY TALKS IN LONDON

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING OUR HOUR AND A HALF TALK TODAY, JANUARY 16, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE WAS ABSOLUTELY RIGID IN STATING AND RESTATING HMG REFUSAL TO TAKE ANY ADDITIONAL ACTION WITH RESPECT TO LIBYA WHICH WOULD SMACK OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. OBVIOUSLY UNDER TIGHT INSTRUCTIONS FROM MRS. THATCHER, NONE OF OUR ARGUMENTS HAD ANY EFFECT, ALTHOUGH I TOLD HIM FRANKLY AT THE OUTSET THAT BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES PERCEIVED HER STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN PRESS AS A FIGURATIVE SLAP IN THE FACE TO THE PRESIDENT. HOWE DID AGREE TO PRESS THE OTHER EC MEMBERS HARD TO EMULATE THE U.K. IN CLOSING OR TIGHTENING CONTROLS ON LIBYAN PEOPLES BUREAUS, LIMITING ADMITTANCE, AND IMPOSING CLOSE SURVEILLANCE ON LIBYANS; AN EMBARGO ON ARMS SALES AND ELIMINATING EXPORT CREDIT GUARANTEES.

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NLRR MIDG/11 #86102

BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/17~~SECRET~~NODIS
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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 04 LONDON 01134 162122Z

C02/02 006052 NOD718

3. IT IS HARD TO JUDGE THE LIKELY EFFECT OF STATED U.K. POLICY NOT TO UNDERCUT OUR SANCTIONS OR FALL IN BEHIND US SINCE HOWE CLAIMED THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD TAKE NO ACTION, EVEN HORTATORY, TO PREVENT BRITISH CITIZENS FROM TRAVELLING FREELY TO OR TAKING JOBS IN LIBYA. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THEM TO COME HOME ON SAFETY GROUNDS. I MADE VERY CLEAR OUR STRONG DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THIS ATTITUDE AND NOTED IT WOULD CREATE MORE DIFFICULTIES IN CONVINCING OTHERS TO ADOPT SANCTIONS. IF OUR EFFORT TO GENERATE ENOUGH COLLECTIVE PRESSURE TO STOP QADHAFI'S SUPPORT OF TERRORISM SHOULD FAIL IT WOULD LEAVE US NO RECOURSE BUT TO CONSIDER AGAIN THE USE OF FORCE.

4. I SUMMARIZED OUR POSITION IN A BRIEF CONVERSATION LATER WITH HOME SECRETARY HURD AND ASKED HIM TO SEEK SOME MEANS OF FURTHER ACTION BY THE U.K. STRESSING THAT ADDITIONAL ACTION IS VERY IMPORTANT BOTH TO COMBAT TERRORISM AND TO AVOID A US-UK CONFRONTATION. WE WOULD HENCEFORTH REFER TO QUOTE MEASURES UNQUOTE RATHER THAN QUOTE SANCTIONS UNQUOTE SINCE HMG CAN APPARENTLY NEVER APPLY THE LATTER WITHOUT NEW LEGISLATION BUT SHOULD BE ABLE TO APPLY SOME OF THE FORMER, IF ONLY BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION RATHER THAN LAW OR DECREE.

5. IN MY PUBLIC STATEMENTS I HAVE PLAYED UP WHAT HMG HAS DONE, CALLED FOR CONCERTED LONG-TERM EFFORTS AND SAID WE WILL CONSULT FURTHER. WHILE TAKING THE HIGH GROUND, I DID NOT HIDE OUR BASIC DISAGREEMENT OVER QUOTE TACTICS UNQUOTE.

6. BRITAIN IS PREOCCUPIED BY THE WESTLAND SCANDAL AND IT WAS HARD TO GET THEIR ATTENTION. I THINK I

MADE SOME PROGRESS, MAYBE A LITTLE MORE THAN I EXPECTED, AND IF YOU APPROVE I WOULD LIKE TO TRY AND SEE MRS. THATCHER WHEN I AM IN EUROPE AGAIN EARLY IN

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

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PAGE 04 OF 04 LONDON 01134 162122Z

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FEBRUARY IN THE LONG RUN, I CANNOT BELIEVE THAT
BRITAIN WILL NOT BE WITH US ON THIS. PRICE.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

86103

18

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Department of State

PAGE 02 OF 03 ANKARA 00547 172242Z
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O 172342Z JAN 86 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9391

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 00547

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM WHITEHEAD

DEPTO: 10009

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (WHITEHEAD, JOHN C.)
SUBJ: MY TALKS IN ROME, JANUARY 17, 1986

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE ATMOSPHERE IN ITALY TODAY WAS 180 DEGREES DIFFERENT FROM LONDON YESTERDAY. THE ROME AIRPORT TRAGEDY HAS STIRRED THE ITALIANS OUT OF THEIR LETHARGY ABOUT QADHAFI. NEW STRICTER REGULATIONS ON ARMS SALES TO LIBYA WENT INTO EFFECT TODAY AND OTHER MEASURES ARE BEING CONSIDERED. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ARE DIFFICULT FOR ITALY BECAUSE OF THE VERY SIZE OF THEIR TRADE WITH LIBYA WHICH IS ALMOST TEN TIMES THE SIZE OF OURS. IN A NEARLY TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH CRAXI AND ANDREOTTI I CHALLENGED ITALY, AS THE LEADING COUNTRY ON THE MEDITERRANEAN AND LIBYA'S LARGEST TRADING PARTNER, TO TAKE THE LEADERSHIP ROLE IN PRESSURING EUROPE TO INCREASE COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON LIBYA AND THUS AVOID THE NEED TO CONSIDER MILITARY MEASURES AGAIN. I PLEDGED OUR UNQUALIFIED SUPPORT AND OF COURSE WE HAVE ALREADY GONE

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NLRR MID61/1 #86103

~~SECRET~~

BY

RW

NARA DATE

1/25/17



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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 03 ANKARA 00547 172242Z

C02/02 006046 NOD746

FURTHER THAN ANY OF OUR ALLIES ARE LIKELY TO GO.

3. THERE IS GREAT NERVOUSNESS HERE ABOUT THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS OF ANY MILITARY ACTION. SUBSEQUENT MEETINGS WITH INTERIOR MINISTER SCALFARO AND DEFENSE MINISTER SPADOLINI REINFORCED THE PRINCIPAL SESSION, ALTHOUGH IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT ANDREOTTI IS LESS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT ADDITIONAL MEASURES THAN THE OTHERS.

4. I'VE CONTINUED TO HOLD PRESS CONFERENCES WHEREVER I GO AND THEY SEEM TO HAVE GONE WELL. I SENSE THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE IS PROBABLY MORE ANTI-QADHAFI THAN THE GOVERNMENTS AND THAT THEREFORE THE TIDE MAY BE TURNING SLOWLY IN OUR FAVOR.

5. IN SUMMARY, I THINK ITALY CAN BE A STRONGER ALLY THAN WE HAD EXPECTED, IF WE INVEST THE NECESSARY TIME TO THE FOLLOW-UP. DETAILED CABLES FOLLOW. WE'RE ON TO TURKEY TONIGHT.

STRAUSZ-HUPE

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

86104

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Department of State

PAGE 02 OF 03 ATHENS 01089 182110Z
ACTION NODS-00

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~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 01089

NODIS

~~FOR THE SECRETARY FROM WHITEHEAD~~

DEPTO: 10012

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (WHITEHEAD, JOHN C.)
SUBJECT: MY TALKS IN ANKARA: JANUARY 18, 1986

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEST.
2. TURKEY WAS VERY INTERESTING, PARTICULARLY MY TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH PRIME MINISTER OZAL. I HAD NOT REALIZED THAT TURKEY WAS ONE OF THE 35 ISLAMIC NATIONS THAT VOTED UNANIMOUS SUPPORT OF QADHAFI AND CRITICISM OF U.S. SANCTIONS IN FEZ LAST WEEK (ALTHOUGH OZAL SAYS HE HAS PUBLICLY DENIED THAT ANY VOTE WAS EVER TAKEN AND THAT TURKEY HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE RESOLUTION).
3. ~~TURKEY HAS~~ FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH QADHAFI, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE LITTLE RESPECT FOR HIM. THEY DON'T CONSIDER HIM THE PRINCIPAL TERRORIST AS WE DO BECAUSE THEY HAVE MORE SERIOUS TERRORIST PROBLEMS FROM THE ARMENIANS AND THE KURD AND FROM SYRIA. ECONOMICALLY, THEIR SALES TO LIBYA HAVE DROPPED TO LESS THAN \$60 MILLION IN 1985 FROM \$300 MILLION IN 1981, NOT BECAUSE THEY'VE STOPPED SELLING TO LIBYA BUT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MID611 #86104

~~SECRET~~

BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/17



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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 03 ATHENS 01089 182110Z

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BECAUSE LIBYA CAN'T AFFORD TO BUY. THEY BUY LOTS OF OIL
FROM LIBYA, SOME \$250 MILLION LAST YEAR, AND CAN'T STOP
BECAUSE IF THEY DO LIBYA WILL DEFAULT ON THE NEARLY ONE
BILLION DOLLARS OF DEBTS THEY OWE TO TURKISH CONTRACTORS,
ALL OF WHOM THE GOVERNMENT HAS GUARANTEED. THEY HAVE
PUT THEMSELVES IN A DIFFICULT BOX. THEY THINK THE WAY TO
BRING GADHAFI DOWN IS TO DOWNPLAY HIS SIGNIFICANCE AND LET
HIM GO BROKE, WHICH THEY THINK WILL HAPPEN SOON. THEY
THINK THE KIND OF THING WE HAVE DONE, OR ANY FUTURE
MILITARY ACTION, ONLY GIVES HIM SELF-SERVING PUBLICITY,
LETS HIM BLAME HIS IMPENDING DOWNFALL ON US AND PERMITS
HIM TO GET SUPPORT FROM OTHER ARABS IN THE NAME OF ISLAMIC
UNITY. THEY URGE QUIET ACTION BUT LESS RHETORIC.
INTERESTING.

*Italy is
in
same
fix*

4. JUST AS WITH ITALY, THEIR HEART IS IN THE RIGHT PLACE
THEY TELL US THERE HAVE BEEN NO SALES OF STRATEGIC
MATERIALS OR ARMS TO LIBYA SINCE 1982, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE
NOT BEEN WILLING TO ANNOUNCE THE LATTER. WE PRESSED THEM
TO DO SO. IN GENERAL, THEY ARE VERY TOUGH AND VERY
EXPERIENCED ON TERRORISM, GRATEFUL FOR OUR PAST HELP AND
EAGER TO COOPERATE MORE CLOSELY WITH US ON SUCH THINGS
AS INFORMATION-SHARING AND AN INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
TREATY. THEY ARE ALSO VERY EAGER THAT THE PEACE PROCESS
MOVE FORWARD NOW AND ARE WILLING TO PLAY A ROLE. ALTHOUGH
~~I CERTAINLY DIDN'T MAKE A NICKEL HERE ON GETTING SUPPORT~~
~~FOR OUR SANCTIONS. THE AMBASSADOR THINKS WE LEFT HIM WITH~~
~~A LOT OF THINGS TO WORK ON FURTHER. WE SHALL SEE.~~
DETAILED CABLES FOLLOW. ON TO ATHENS TONIGHT. WE'RE
NEARLY HALF THROUGH. KEELEY

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Department of State

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DEPTO: 10020

~~FOR THE SECRETARY ONLY FROM WHITEHEAD~~

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (WHITEHEAD, JOHN C.), FR
SUBJECT: MY TALKS IN BONN, JANUARY 21, 1986

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WEST GERMANY WENT BETTER THAN WE HAD EXPECTED, IN VIEW OF CHANCELLOR KOHL'S PREVIOUS NEGATIVE REMARKS ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. BY THE WAY, WE NO LONGER SPEAK OF SANCTIONS. THE WORD IS VERBOTEN. WE SPEAK OF TWO KINDS OF POSSIBLE ACTIONS AGAINST QADHAFI: MILITARY MEASURES AND PEACEFUL MEASURES, AND SO FAR NO ONE IS OPPOSED TO THE LATTER.

3. IN BONN WE VISITED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER, ECONOMIC MINISTER BANGEMANN, INTERIOR MINISTER ZIMMERMANN, CHANCELLERY CHIEF SCHAEUBLE, AND A GROUP OF OTHERS AT LUNCH. GERMANY PURCHASES 25 PERCENT OF LIBYA'S OIL EXPORTS AND WE HAMMERED AWAY AT THAT, PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY. THEY MADE NO PROMISES BUT I'D GUESS ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THAT THE NUMBER WILL COME DOWN. THEY SAY A LOT OF WHAT THEY PURCHASE IS PURCHASED IN THE MARKET

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/21/17

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Department of State

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FROM U.S. FIRMS AND THIS MAY BE A HANDLE
TO A POSSIBLE SOLUTION.

4. WE ALSO PRESSED ON REDUCING AIR FLIGHTS FROM AND TO
LIBYA, BETTER SURVEILLANCE OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLES BUREAU
IN BONN AND TERMINATION OF HIGH-TECH SALES TO LIBYA
CONTRARY TO WHAT WE WERE TOLD IN ROME, ANKARA AND ATHENS,
THE GERMANS DENY ANY MILITARY SALES TO LIBYA. THEY ALSO
HAVE NEARLY ELIMINATED NEW GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES OF
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, ALTHOUGH OUTSTANDING GUARANTEES
→ AMOUNT TO \$3 BILLION. THEY HAVE TAKEN THE STRONGEST
POSITIVE MEASURES OF ANYONE TO PREVENT FILLING IN BEHIND
US. THEY REFUSED A LUFTHANSA CONTRACT TO SERVICE LIBYAN
→ PLANES.

5. ~~THE GERMANS AGREED TO CARRY OUR CONCERNS TO THE EC~~
~~FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE NEXT WEEK. IN THE~~
~~COALITION GOVERNMENT ONE DOESN'T FIND A UNIFIED VIEW~~
~~ANYWHERE. BUT I THINK IT IS FAIR TO CONCLUDE THAT~~
~~THEY'RE STRONGLY COMMITTED ON TERRORISM AND AGAINST~~
~~QADHAFI AND WILL FIND A LOT OF WAYS TO HELP. DETAILED~~
CABLES FOLLOW. NEXT STOP GAY PAREE. RODGERS

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8152

~~SECRET~~ BRUSSELS 0955

NODIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN 0955 VICE 10028)

FOR THE SECRETARY ONLY FROM WHITEHEAD

DEPTO: 10028

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (WHITEHEAD, JOHN C.)

SUBJECT: MY TALKS IN PARIS, JANUARY 22, 1986

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PARIS WENT PRETTY WELL TODAY. WE STARTED WITH A NICE BREAKFAST WITH FOREIGN MINISTER DUMAS AND A SECOND HOUR WITH A NUMBER OF HIS AIDES, THEN A GOOD MEETING WITH INTERIOR MINISTER JOXE, AND FINALLY A MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR ATTALI AND CHIEF OF STAFF BIANCO FOLLOWED BY A VERY CORDIAL MEETING WITH MITTERRAND.

3. THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN BATTLING WITH QADHAFI FOR A LONG TIME, PARTICULARLY OVER CHAD, AND HAVE TAPERED DOWN THEIR TRADE A LOT BUT THEY FEEL THEY WOULD LOSE SOME MEASURE OF INFLUENCE IF THEY BROKE OFF COMPLETELY. WE ARGUED THAT THIS SHOULD NOT APPLY TO SUCH THINGS AS SALES OF MILITARY SPARE PARTS, SERVICING OF LIBYAN AIRLINES PLANES, OR

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NLRR MID61 # 86106

~~SECRET~~

BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/17



~~SECRET~~

Department of State

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C02/02 006064 NOD909

600 MILLION DOLLARS ANNUAL OIL PURCHASES. THEY DID PROMISE NOT TO UNDERCUT US AS WE PULL OUT AND WILL CONSIDER THE OTHER THINGS. WE ASKED THEM TO TAKE THE LEAD AT THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING NEXT WEEK TO NOT CONDEMN SANCTIONS PUBLICLY, TO NOT DUCK NAMING QADHAFI AS THE VILLAIN, AND TO NOT LET THEIR MEMBERS HIDE BEHIND EC POLICY AND AVOID INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS. DUMAS WILL DO HIS BEST.

4. MITTERRAND WAS WISE AND WITTY IN DESCRIBING HIS EXPERIENCES WITH QADHAFI. AT ONE POINT HE SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO TALK WITH US ABOUT TAKING OUT THE TRAINING BASES. I DID NOT FEEL IT WAS THE RIGHT TIME OR PLACE TO PURSUE THIS AND LET IT PASS. HE EXPRESSED HIS SKEPTICISM ABOUT TOTAL SANCTIONS. HE BELIEVES WE MUST FIND NEW PIN-POINTED MEASURES TO HURT QADHAFI WITHOUT SEEMING TO HURT THE LIBYAN PEOPLE AND BRINGING IN OTHER ARAB SUPPORT. ✓

→ 5. AT MY BREAKFAST WITH DUMAS THIS MORNING HE ACCEPTED OUR THANKS FOR NOT HAVING PUBLICLY CRITICIZED OUR SANCTIONS AS DID THATCHER AND KOHL. BUT ON THE WAY TO THE AIRPORT WE SAW HIS PRESS RELEASE ON OUR MEETING IN WHICH HE SAID THAT HE EXPLAINED TO ME WHY SANCTIONS DIDN'T WORK! BUT THEN PARIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN A NICE CITY, EXCEPT FOR THE PEOPLE. DETAILED CABLE FOLLOWS. LATE DINNER IN BRUSSELS TONIGHT. SWAEBE

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 27, 1986

RR

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz *GP*

The attached trip report of John Whitehead is well worth the few minutes it will take to look through it.

United States Department of State

Deputy Secretary of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

January 24, 1986

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ RR

TO: The Secretary
FROM: John C. Whitehead JW
SUBJECT: My Mission to Canada and Europe

My consultations in Ottawa and eight European capitals over the past ten days yielded some successes, but it is clear that there remains deep resistance among most of our allies to imposition of economic sanctions on Libya. The term "economic sanctions" immediately evokes a negative response from European governments soured by earlier experiences with sanctions: the Soviet pipeline affair, the Falklands, Poland, and Nicaragua. Moreover, the British claim (rather lamely) that our steps against Libya could undermine their position on South Africa sanctions.

I emphasized at each stop that we did not expect our allies to adopt precisely the same steps that we have taken. I asked only that they consider what "peaceful measures" each of them could take to help achieve our shared objective of forcing Qadhafi to abandon his support for terrorism. Most governments found it easier to contemplate "peaceful measures" than "economic sanctions."

"Peaceful Measures"

In each capital I outlined six areas in which we hoped our allies could be helpful: (1) cutting off or cutting back on imports of Libyan oil, perhaps by asking companies to do so voluntarily; (2) banning sales of arms, spare parts, and sophisticated equipment to Qadhafi; (3) eliminating export credits or guarantees; (4) not filling in behind departing U.S. companies and technicians; (5) cutting back on air services and curbing the activities of Libyan Peoples' Bureaus; and (6) specifically condemning Libya's support for terrorism. Reactions to my suggestions were mixed, but offered some room for hope. Only West Germany showed interest in a sizeable, early cut in oil imports but this depends

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/25/17

- 2 -

partly upon U.S. companies who sell them some 40 percent of the Libyan oil they buy. All except Greece confirmed a ban on arms transfers, although there are a few loose strings with respect to spare parts (France and Italy) and high tech (FRG). New export credits to Libya have been virtually eliminated, albeit for commercial rather than political reasons in most cases. All of the governments on my itinerary promised not to fall in behind us as we pull out of Libya, although some will not do very much to enforce this (UK being the most unresponsive). Tighter controls on Libyan diplomats and aircraft are likely everywhere but no new break-off of relations is in view and cancellation of flights is uncertain.

Neither Turkey nor Greece will yet condemn Libya publicly, but the EC may agree early next week to specifically condemn Libya, pledge not to undercut our sanctions, and announce a community-wide embargo on arms sales to Libya. This would obviously be a very welcome development, and I emphasized at each stop that a bland outcome of the EC Ministerial would be very disappointing to us and help Qadhafi.

Our party compiled the following informal "report card" rating each country's general response to our proposals. It takes into account measures already in effect and the degree of vulnerability for each country:

Canada	A-	FRG	C+
UK	D+	France	C+
Italy	B+	Belgium	C+
Turkey	C-	Netherlands	B-
Greece	D		

(These are only first semester grades, not finals.)

"Military Measures"

In explaining our call for "peaceful measures," I stressed that the President had set aside the military option for the moment, but reserved the right to resurrect it if Qadhafi's intolerable behavior persisted. I should report to you on what I think allied reaction to possible future military action against Qadhafi would be, although you may not like the conclusions.

- 3 -

As you would expect, the Europeans had strong reservations about the use of force against Libya, emphasizing the risks of alienating the Arab world, ruining the Middle East peace process, and pushing Qadhafi further into the arms of the Soviets. In my judgement, if military force were used against Libya under present conditions, not one of the countries I visited, with the possible exception of Canada, would endorse our action, even if it was precisely pinpointed against terrorist targets and even if it was completely successful. It was my impression that those who know the Middle East best, like Mitterrand, believe that a major attack which badly damaged or brought about the collapse of the Qadhafi regime would be a much better course of action than a limited attack if we finally decided to take military action.

The Arab Factor

One problem that we need to give some creative thought to is how to persuade the Arab world to signal to the Europeans how much they really hate -- and fear -- Qadhafi. Many Europeans believe that our actions thus far have inflated Qadhafi's position to the point where all 35 members of the Islamic Conference supported him and condemned us at Fez last week.

Whatever the actual chain of events at Fez (the Turks claim that the resolution supporting Qadhafi and criticizing us was ramrodded through the conference by the Moroccans without any time for discussion or vote), the Europeans argued that the Fez statement was an indication that our sanctions played into Qadhafi's hands. If moderate Arab governments want us to help them contain Qadhafi, as I believe they really do, then together we must find a way to defuse European anxieties. Otherwise, the Europeans will continue to shrink back from support for our measures for fear of antagonizing the entire Arab world.

Our Commitment to Sanctions

One further thought: I don't know where things stand on the implementing regulations for the January 7-8 measures, but I do know that if U.S. companies which operate in Libya are allowed to use foreign subsidiaries as a means of avoiding the onus of the new measures, our European allies will be loudly critical and we will be charged with setting up sham sanctions and trying to entrap them unless there is

- 4 -

Careful consultation in advance of the decision. They are very attentive to the subject and are looking forward to seeing more details. We must keep them closely informed.

The Road Ahead

On balance, I believe that we have made significant progress in our policy of isolating Qadhafi. He is already beginning to feel the pressure. His earlier bravado has changed to obvious nervousness, and his naive dispatch of "truth squads" to Europe pleading his innocence and accusing the United States of aggression was seen by the Europeans as a sign of weakness.

I think we have regained some of the initiative that was undermined by the immediate negative reactions of Thatcher and Kohl to the President's January 7 announcement. We have at least set our dialogue with our allies on track -- we are now talking of how each of us can help meet the common threat rather than focussing almost exclusively on a sterile debate over the efficacy of "sanctions." That, along with the tentative "peaceful measures" that the Europeans have begun to take, is not a bad foundation to build on, but we have our work cut out for us in the weeks and months ahead. Bob Oakley has a good plan laid out to follow up on the various things we set in motion.

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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
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3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(6)
3.5(c)

West European countries continue to show little evidence of
reducing economic relations with Tripoli.

-- Libyan press is playing up the arrival of a joint
economic delegation from Belgium and Luxembourg
representing major commercial, financial and industrial
firms to discuss economic cooperation between the three
states. (U)

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~~TOP SECRET~~ [Redacted]

3.3(b)(1)
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BY LN NARA DATE 4/24/17

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3.5(c)~~TOP SECRET~~3.3(b)(1)
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