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TELEVISION PROGRAM TO "NBC's MEET THE PRESS."

M E E T   T H E   P R E S S

Produced by Betty Cole Dukert

Live/Washington, D.C.

Sunday, September 28, 1980

GUEST:            HENRY A. KISSINGER  
                  Former Secretary of State

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER AND MODERATOR:

Bill Monroe - NBC News

PANEL:

Bill Monroe - NBC News  
Carl T. Rowan - Chicago Sun-Times  
Richard Burt - The New York Times  
Marvin Kalb - NBC News

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MEET THE PRESS

1 MR. MONROE: Our guest today on MEET THE PRESS is  
2 former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

3 Dr. Kissinger, the Iraqi Army seems to be in the  
4 process of taking over Iranian oil installations and terri-  
5 tory at the head of the Persian Gulf. What dangers and what  
6 opportunities, if any, does this present to the U. S. and to  
7 the West?

8 DR. KISSINGER: Well, the most immediate problem is  
9 that the major oil resources at the head of the Persian Gulf  
10 now will be in the hands of the most radical of the OPEC  
11 countries, in terms of pricing, so it will have an effect  
12 on the energy situation.

13 Secondly, it will be one other example where Soviet  
14 arms, Soviet friendship treaties, have brought about a  
15 change in the military -- in the military and political  
16 situation in the area.

17 Third, it is going to have a very serious impact on  
18 the moderate Arab nations in the Persian Gulf who see Iraq  
19 emerging as the hegemonial country in that area.

20 And, fourth, I think it is going to have serious  
21 effects inside Iran which are not necessarily all bad from  
22 our point of view, because it's hard to imagine a government  
23 much more hostile to us than the current one.

24 MR. MONROE: Would you elaborate a little bit on the  
25 possible effects inside Iran which you say might not be all

1 bad?

2 DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think that this war, which I  
3 suspect will be unsuccessful, will force some consideration of  
4 what the present regime has done to Iran in terms of inter-  
5 national isolation, economic impoverishment, and it may bring  
6 about either a change in the regime or a change in orienta-  
7 tion of the regime. But then we come to the second question:  
8 Supposing they want to change orientation, what do they  
9 believe the United States will be able to do for them, given  
10 our performance in that area in recent years, and so that even  
11 if there's a change, they may for reasons of prudence feel  
12 that they have to rely on the Soviets for military support,  
13 rather than on us as they had in the past.

14 MR. MONROE: Do you agree with President Carter's policy  
15 of neutrality?

16 DR. KISSINGER: I agree with President Carter's policy  
17 that in the immediate situation there is nothing we can do.  
18 I regret the sequence of events that got us into a position  
19 where that is -- where those are the only choices left for the  
20 United States.

21 MR. MONROE: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. Our reporters on  
22 MEET THE PRESS today are Carl T. Rowan of the Chicago Sun-Times,  
23 Richard Burt of The New York Times, and Marvin Kalb of NBC  
24 News, permanent member of the MEET THE PRESS panel. We'll be  
25 back with our questions in a minute.

## -- ANNOUNCEMENTS --

MR. MONROE: We'll continue the questions for Henry Kissinger with Mr. Rowan.

MR. ROWAN: Dr. Kissinger, you say you regret the sequence of events that got us into this position in the Persian Gulf area. That reminds me that some Republicans are saying that we wouldn't be in this mess if the Carter Administration had done what it needed to do to prop up the Shah of Iran, instead of undermining him. Do you subscribe to the thesis that this is what got us into this mess?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think that the collapse of the pro-American government in Iran headed by the Shah is one of the geopolitical disasters of the post-war period. He had the largest army in the Persian Gulf, and he was in foreign policy matters unconditionally on our side, and the reason that we had sold him arms was to balance the large influx of Soviet arms into Iraq, so I believe that without the collapse of the Shah of Iran, it would have been absolutely inconceivable that this would happen, but one has to go look at this from an even wider perspective.

In the last three years, there have been Cuban expeditionary forces in Ethiopia. There has been a Communist coup in South Yemen that put in a pro-Soviet government into that strategic area. There have been two coups in Afghanistan, followed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and now -- and

1 the collapse of Iran. All of these together have created the  
2 image in the Persian Gulf that this has happened either by  
3 Soviet troops, or by Soviet coups or by Soviet proxy forces,  
4 and that the United States is an impotent bystander, and has  
5 therefore pushed even the more moderate regimes in that area  
6 in the direction -- in the direction of the radicals, and in  
7 this sense, I agree with the criticism, yes.

8 MR. ROWAN: Now, we know that by mid '78, the Shah was  
9 a sick man, a man who'd virtually given up the fight. Do you  
10 really think there is some way we could have kept that man in  
11 power, given the magnitude of the revolution that was arising  
12 around him?

13 DR. KISSINGER: When you don't have access to all the  
14 details, it is extremely difficult to say what one should have  
15 done tactically in a very complicated situation, but one thing  
16 is clear: If one reads the article of Ambassador Sullivan,  
17 what concerns me is not that his particular recommendation  
18 was rejected, because I frankly believe his particular recom-  
19 mendation was naive, but what concerns me is that there were  
20 three different policies being pursued simultaneously, accord-  
21 ing to his own account, one of them involving the transfer of  
22 the army from the Shah to Bakhtiar, another transferring the  
23 army to Barzigan, a third just to overthrow the Shah on human  
24 rights grounds. When you have three different policies pursued  
25 by the United States, and the President not choosing between

1    them in a revolutionary situation, the least you can say is  
2    that our actions accelerated an extremely difficult situation,  
3    and to what extent the Shah had given up, which you correctly  
4    say, cannot be judged except in reference to the American  
5    performance, which must have been extremely demoralizing for  
6    him.

7           MR. ROWAN:  You have written that a President brings to  
8    office everything you're going to get in the field of foreign  
9    policy, that he can't do on-the-job training.

10          DR. KISSINGER:  That's right.

11          MR. ROWAN:  Do you think Ronald Reagan will bring enough  
12    to the office of the Presidency that he'll handle these  
13    problems more effectively than Mr. Carter has?

14          DR. KISSINGER:  I think that Ronald Reagan will bring  
15    to the office a willingness to bring in senior advisors and  
16    a sense of responsibility, which I think will produce a more  
17    measured, a more careful, and a less idiosyncratic foreign  
18    policy than the one that has been carried out in the last few  
19    years, one less geared to the personal prejudices of  
20    individuals, and for that reason I believe it will be a safer  
21    foreign policy and a more mature foreign policy.

22          MR. MONROE:  Mr. Burt?

23          MR. BURT:  Dr. Kissinger, I want to return to this  
24    earlier point you made about the possibility that there could  
25    be this conflict in the Persian Gulf -- could lead to changes

1 in Iran that would not be entirely bad for the United States.  
2 Would you support, or at least support the study in the U. S.  
3 Government of taking advantage of this conflict to perhaps  
4 foster the overthrow of the current government?

5 DR. KISSINGER: I think we are now in a position where  
6 anything that we would do directly would work against our  
7 interests, and of course, the United States Government has an  
8 obligation to look at all possibilities, even those that it  
9 has no intention of carrying out, simply to prepare itself  
10 intellectually.

11 In terms of American geopolitical interests in that  
12 area, our normal relationship would be with Iran, because Iraq  
13 is the most radical of the Arab countries. Despite occasional  
14 flirtations with the West, it attempts to achieve a leadership  
15 over the rest of the Arab countries that is more or less aimed  
16 against our interests. On the other hand, the experience of  
17 the Iranians with the United States is such that I think it is  
18 unlikely that they will believe that we can protect any friend  
19 in that area, having seen how we conducted ourselves towards  
20 the Shah and our inability to protect the hostages, so that  
21 even if there's a change of government and even if they should  
22 become convinced that they should go back to their more tradi-  
23 tional posture, it is not at all clear to me that they'll have  
24 enough confidence to do so.

25 But I think the best we can do under the present

1 circumstances is to let this drama work itself out without our  
2 mixing into it. The important problem is to build a firebreak  
3 so that it cannot happen again.

4 MR. BURT: Well, in order to build up our credibility in  
5 the region, do you think President Carter should have ordered  
6 American naval vessels at least into the southern part of the  
7 Gulf to protect the shipping lanes through the Straits of  
8 Hormuz?

9 DR. KISSINGER: Well, I'm very reluctant to give tactical  
10 prescriptions in the middle of a crisis. Leaving aside the  
11 immediate crisis, I believe it is important for countries to  
12 understand that the industrial democracies cannot permit them-  
13 selves to be strangled in general, and certainly not by the  
14 conflicts of local powers, and that we and our allies must get  
15 together and come to an understanding about how we are going to  
16 protect the Straits of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the  
17 world's oil supplies is moving.

18 MR. MONROE: Mr. Kalb?

19 MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, you talked earlier about  
20 Soviet proxies and Soviet coups. Do you believe that the  
21 Soviet Union is behind Iraq in this war?

22 DR. KISSINGER: I think the Soviet Union is in the  
23 position of somebody who throws a rock down a mountainside that  
24 is covered with boulders, and then claims that it is not  
25 responsible for a passerby being killed, because the rock that

1 killed them is not the rock they threw.

2 When you introduce large quantities of arms into an area  
3 as volatile as the Persian Gulf and give them to a government  
4 that avows aspirations to dominance in that area, you then are  
5 responsible for the consequences, even if the particular event  
6 was not urged by you.

7 I do not believe that the Soviet Union particularly urged  
8 this individual event. On the other hand, the Soviet Union  
9 cannot be surprised if, after the collapse of Iran, which  
10 tended to checkmate Iraq and which was the reason why we tended  
11 to support Iran, with the collapse of Iraq -- Iran -- Iraq had  
12 an option either towards the Arab world or towards Iran. It  
13 chose, for a variety of reasons, to attack Iran also as a warn-  
14 ing to the other moderate Arab countries of what could happen  
15 to them if they crossed Iraqi purposes. So in a geopolitical  
16 strategic sense, I hold the Soviets responsible, and it's  
17 interesting that on the second day of the war one of the Iraqi  
18 top leadership visited Moscow.

19 MR. KALB: How do you think the Soviet Union regards the  
20 United States at this point?

21 DR. KISSINGER: I think the Soviet Union regards the  
22 United States with bafflement. They see us unwilling to protect  
23 fundamental geopolitical interests. They see us oscillate  
24 between verbal condemnations and eagerness to resume negotia-  
25 tions on limited topics. I think they see a strategic

1 opportunity, but they are slightly worried that if they push  
2 this strategic opportunity too far, public opinion, the  
3 unpredictability of Americans will suddenly force us to draw  
4 a line where they hadn't expected it, and so they have a mixture  
5 of seeing great opportunities tempered by the fear that America  
6 may suddenly reverse course, contrary to all performance.

7 MR. KALB: Don't you think the Administration is now  
8 trying to draw a line somewhere in the Persian Gulf?

9 DR. KISSINGER: The Administration is trying to draw  
10 a verbal line, but it finds it extremely difficult to think  
11 in terms of balance of power and of articulated -- of articulat-  
12 ing a clear-cut conception of the limitations that it wishes  
13 to insist on. It finds it extremely difficult to strike a  
14 balance between its negotiations and its military strategy,  
15 and puts each of them into watertight compartments where they  
16 cannot support each other, so that in the week of the Iraqi  
17 invasion with Soviet arms of Iran, you have the announcement  
18 of the resumption of talks on theater nuclear forces in Europe  
19 at the very moment when the upheaval in the Persian Gulf, which  
20 was at least partly instigated by the Soviets, is threatening  
21 the very survival of Europe.

22 MR. MONROE: Dr. Kissinger, what about the possible  
23 argument that the whole situation in the Persian Gulf is a  
24 reaction against mistaken American policies in the past in  
25 which you and others participated, the anti-Americanism of the

1 Khomeini regime, a reaction against American domination of  
2 Iran and backing of the Shah, the Iraqi attack the result of  
3 settlements imposed by Iran backed by American arms on Iraq  
4 some years ago, which the Iraqis regarded as humiliating?

5 DR. KISSINGER: Well, of course, I find it very difficult  
6 to grant your premise that mistakes were made in administra-  
7 tions in which I participated, but leaving aside that particular  
8 point, there is a nearly inexhaustible American masochism  
9 according to which whatever goes wrong anywhere in the world  
10 must somehow be our fault, and if you just look carefully  
11 enough through the documents, you will find one that proves  
12 that the United States is at fault.

13 The anti-American radicalism of people like Khomeini is  
14 the result of -- is not so much the result of American mistakes,  
15 but it is a reaction of Islamic fundamentalists to the modern  
16 world, to the process of modernization, to the process of  
17 secularization, which represented some of the best advice in  
18 our terms that the United States gave. It was the result of the  
19 process of economic development as much as anything else.

20 And as for American domination of Iran, our relationship  
21 with Iran was based on reciprocity. We supplied the weapons  
22 by which they maintained a balance of power that was also in  
23 our interests, and it is the collapse of that that I think has  
24 led to the current situation, and I wouldn't be surprised if  
25 many Iranians now look back with some nostalgia to that period

1 when human rights were, bad as they might have been, much less  
2 threatened as now, and Iran was militarily secure.

3 MR. MONROE: Mr. Rowan?

4 MR. ROWAN: Dr. Kissinger, Governor Reagan has around  
5 him numerous advisers who have been very hostile toward you,  
6 because of your role in forging the opening to the People's  
7 Republic of China, your support of detente with the Soviet  
8 Union, your support of the original arms limitation agreement.  
9 Now, given the fact that these men will be coming to power,  
10 don't you have any reservations about supporting Governor  
11 Reagan?

12 DR. KISSINGER: Well, I've said before that Governor  
13 Reagan has not always expressed himself with the same admira-  
14 tion for me that I feel, and therefore many of his advisers  
15 have been even more articulate on that subject.

16 I believe that Governor Reagan, as a Presidential  
17 candidate, faced with the imminence of assuming the responsi-  
18 bilities for the future of this country, has a broader view  
19 than as a candidate for one faction of the Republican Party.  
20 I have had several opportunities for extended talks with him,  
21 and while neither he nor I would wish to maintain that we  
22 agree on every detail, I am convinced that the mainlines of  
23 the foreign policy he would pursue is compatible with my  
24 convictions.

25 And then one has to look at it in terms of alternatives.

1 I am genuinely convinced, and not for partisan reasons, that  
2 the present trend of our foreign policy will lead to disaster  
3 and will lead to a multiplication of crises that we cannot  
4 manage, and this is the reason I'm supporting Governor Reagan.

5 MR. ROWAN: Are you personally convinced that this house  
6 of good relationship with China that you helped build will be  
7 safe in a Reagan administration?

8 DR. KISSINGER: I'm convinced that the relationship with  
9 China will be safe in a Reagan administration. It depends  
10 fundamentally on two elements: One, on the American ability  
11 to maintain the overall balance of power; second, on the  
12 willingness of both sides -- that is, of the People's Republic  
13 and of the United States -- to respect each other's fundamental  
14 principles. I think after the initial flareup in the campaign  
15 that both of these principles are now clearly understood, and  
16 that we will not see a repetition on either side of some of the  
17 attack on the sensitivities of the other.

18 MR. MONROE: Mr. Burt?

19 MR. BURT: Dr. Kissinger, I'd like to ask you a question  
20 about your own role in the foreign policy debate. About this  
21 time last year, you gave several speeches and interviews talk-  
22 ing about the need for a new consensus in American foreign  
23 policy, but last month when the Carter Administration announced  
24 a new nuclear targeting strategy, you criticized that strategy  
25 as being mis-timed; you said that it would confuse our allies.

1 Are you allowing your own partisanship to get in the way of the  
2 creation of a new bipartisan consensus in foreign policy?

3 DR. KISSINGER: No, I -- first of all, let me say that  
4 I'm convinced that after the election, whoever wins, the new  
5 President is going to face, or the new administration is going  
6 to face the most serious crisis in American post-war foreign  
7 policy, and maybe in this century. At that time, all serious  
8 Americans have to rally behind the administration in office,  
9 and I would certainly do my utmost in that sense.

10 Secondly, with respect to the targeting strategy, I  
11 objected to introducing an issue of such extraordinary sensi-  
12 tivity in the middle of an election campaign, where it was  
13 subject to such severe misinterpretation. I have opposed the  
14 strategy of relying on the destruction of civilian populations,  
15 and therefore I generally favor more discriminating targeting,  
16 but I think a subject of such sensitivity having been neglected  
17 for three-and-a-half years could have waited another six months  
18 where it could have been introduced in an atmosphere where it  
19 was less subject to misinterpretation. It was not an attack on  
20 the substance of it, which really continues something that had  
21 been started in previous administrations. It was an attack on  
22 the timing and, Mr. Burt, you will remember that a year-and-a-  
23 half ago when I questioned the premises of the then targeting  
24 doctrine, I was severely criticized by the Administration for  
25 undermining Allied confidence. How much more must it do so if

1 similar views are suddenly announced without warning in the  
2 middle of an election campaign.

3 MR. MONROE: We have about one-and-a-half minutes. Mr.  
4 Kalb?

5 MR. KALB: Dr. Kissinger, President Carter paints a  
6 choice for the American electorate in this election as a war  
7 or peace choice, and he suggests that if he were re-elected it  
8 would be peace, and if Governor Reagan were elected it would  
9 be war. In general terms, what do you think of that kind of  
10 a description?

11 DR. KISSINGER: I think it is very unfair to conduct an  
12 electoral campaign with these slogans. No President would  
13 lightly go to war. The danger of war, however, in my view is  
14 not a rash President pressing a button in a particular crisis.  
15 The danger of war is a foreign policy that permits a multiplica-  
16 tion of crises where the question of war and peace has  
17 constantly to be faced. My worry is that our current policy is  
18 making us crisis prone, and it continually will face the  
19 President with the choice of either permitting events that are  
20 totally contrary to our interests, or having to address the  
21 question of peace and war, so I think the tactic is unfair and  
22 the argument is wrong and nearly the opposite of the truth.

23 MR. MONROE: Do you see any openings in the present  
24 situation that might help us get the hostages back?

25 DR. KISSINGER: I think that the present situation will

1 make the release of the hostages more certain, although by  
2 preoccupying the Iranian government, it may slow it down a  
3 little bit. I have expected the hostages to come out in the  
4 near future.

5 MR. MONROE: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger, for being with  
6 us today on MEET THE PRESS.

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AND TELEVISION PROGRAM TO "ABC NEWS' ISSUES AND ANSWERS."

I S S U E S   A N D   A N S W E R S

Sunday, September 28, 1980

GUESTS:       GEORGE BALL  
Former Undersecretary of State and  
Chairman of a Study on American Policy  
in Iran and the Persian Gulf for President Carter

RICHARD ALLEN  
Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to Governor Reagan

INTERVIEWED BY:

BOB CLARK - ISSUES AND ANSWERS Chief Correspondent

BARRIE DUNSMORE - ABC News Diplomatic Correspondent

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This is a rush transcript for  
the press. Any questions re-  
garding accuracy should be re-  
ferred to ISSUES AND ANSWERS.

1 MR. CLARK: Ronald Reagan, this week, put much of the  
2 blame for the war in Iran and Iraq on President Carter and  
3 what he called his vacillating foreign policy.

4 If Reagan were President and asked you, as his National  
5 Security Advisor, what you would advise him to do to keep the  
6 war from spreading, cutting our vital oil supplies, and possi-  
7 bly escalating into a serious threat to world peace, what  
8 would you advise him to do. Mr. Allen?

9 MR. ALLEN: Mr. Clark, I think our options are somewhat  
10 limited today. Governor Reagan's analysis of President Carter's  
11 policy I think is a correct one. I think we have to assess  
12 how it is that we got to be in such a circumstance, how it is  
13 that our policy has, lacks credibility, how it is that we have  
14 neither the capability, nor apparently the influence to make  
15 events come out in a peaceful manner.

16 I think that the advice that we could only give today  
17 would be to try to mobilize our allies, to try to mobilize  
18 those resources that we have quickly and to bring them to bear  
19 on the situation to try to limit the fighting. It is true  
20 that it is a dangerous situation. We do have to analyze,  
21 however, in my view not only what must be done now, but what  
22 must be done in the future to avoid a repetition of such a  
23 situation.

24 MR. CLARK: Mr. Ball, you headed an advisory commission  
25 last year for President Carter on the Iranian crisis and on

1 the Persian Gulf, the threat to peace there, though you are  
2 now supporting John Anderson for President.

3 MR. BALL: Well, not quite.

4 MR. CLARK: I thought you said on another program a  
5 couple of months ago in answer to a direct question, yes, I  
6 am supporting John Anderson.

7 MR. BALL: If the election were held today I would vote  
8 for President Carter.

9 MR. CLARK: Oh, you would. We'll phrase our questions in  
10 a slightly different tone then. But if President Carter then  
11 asked you today for advice on what to do about what is going  
12 on at the moment, about the war between Iran and Iraq, what  
13 would you advise him?

14 MR. BALL: I think we have to be extremely circumspect  
15 at the moment because we're not very popular either in Iraq,  
16 and certainly not in Iran. What we can do has been suggested,  
17 is, is limited. We don't have great options. I think that what  
18 we must do is to concert as closely as possible with other  
19 nations, particularly our Western allies, Japan and so on that  
20 have vital interests to the area, so that any initiative  
21 undertaken is not a solely United States unilateral initiative.

22 Now as far as being prepared to, to inject military force  
23 into the area, I think we must be prepared to do it. I think  
24 a great mistake was made in 1972 when the British withdrew  
25 and Mr. Nixon did not at that time establish an American

1 presence in the area, but turned everything over to the Shah.  
2 This started us down a very dubious route. And when the Shah  
3 collapsed then there was a vacuum created. We have to be in a  
4 position where we can move in and take what defense actions  
5 are necessary.

6 MR. DUNSMORE: Mr. Allen, that brings to mind one of the  
7 Governor's principle preoccupations, the Soviet Union and it's  
8 efforts to always exploit whatever international crisis there  
9 may be.

10 Do you see the Soviets exploiting this situation and  
11 being the ultimate beneficiaries of it?

12 MR. ALLEN: I think there's the prospect of that, Mr.  
13 Dunsmore, and I think we have to be ever alert to devise  
14 strategies even under our present circumstances to try to  
15 checkmate the Soviet Union should it try to expand it's influ-  
16 ence in the area.

17 We believe that the drawdown in American prestige, cred-  
18 ibility, and certainly our strength, our capability to put  
19 our military force where and when necessary and hopefully in  
20 concert with our allies is traceable to a series of actions.  
21 The last defense program that was put down by President Ford  
22 was a defense program that was designed to provide what  
23 Governor Reagan calls the margin of safety throughout the  
24 decade of the 80's. Due to vacillating policies, which was  
25 mentioned earlier in the question by Mr. Clark, due to an

5  
1 inconsistency on the part of the Carter Administration, and  
2 due partly to some mistakes that were in existence when the  
3 Carter Administration came to power, we have a very precar-  
4 ious situation. We don't have the capability to put ourselves  
5 on the spot and to defend our interests. It's high time that  
6 we decided what are our vital interests, what is our national  
7 interest and take the appropriate steps to develop the means  
8 to defend those interests when required.

9 MR. DUNSMORE: Well I think the President has defined  
10 the lifeline of the West as the Persian Gulf, the Strait of  
11 Hormuz, and said we would do what is necessary to protect it.

12 I'm wondering, however, what specifically Governor Reagan  
13 would do in, for example, the case of a Soviet move into, into  
14 Iran at this time?

15 MR. ALLEN: Well Governor Reagan's overriding concern is  
16 to maintain the peace. And essentially being a man of peace,  
17 he has to look at the tools that are available to him to main-  
18 tain that peace. We think that a crash effort is going to have  
19 to be made in a new Administration to rebuild American credi-  
20 bility, particularly among our allies. Unless we're prepared  
21 to take concerted actions with our allies, we are going to  
22 remain in deep trouble over the long term. I see no alternative  
23 to that. At the same time, it's going to require a very con-  
24 scious, pragmatic and prudent policy of rebuilding America's  
25 capability to defend those interests. Now military is only one

1 part of that. And Governor Reagan believes strongly that the  
2 main need is to shape a policy according to a long range  
3 plan which will, in fact, defend our interests in that very  
4 critical area.

5 MR. CLARK: We want to speak more later about a long  
6 range plan, but we are facing -- I think you would each agree  
7 -- in the current war, a potential crisis that could explode  
8 on us within the next two or three weeks, even sooner than  
9 that. It might blow away. It might not get to the critical  
10 stage at all. But Mr. Ball, you said a moment ago that we  
11 would have to be in position to inject military force into the  
12 Persian Gulf area. What sort of force could we inject?

13 MR. BALL: Well, obviously, efforts are being made to  
14 establish some forward-basing arrangements, or at least some  
15 forward facilities that can be used with prepositioned supplies.  
16 We have increased the presence in the Indian Ocean. I'm not  
17 trying to -- going to defend all of American defense arrange-  
18 ments because quite frankly I can't believe that we're going  
19 to have an adequate defense capability there or any other  
20 critical point in the world until we face the very hard fact  
21 that without a, a Selective Service, without a draft, we're  
22 not going to have an effective Army. We have an Army of  
23 unemployables right now. And I don't find Governor Reagan  
24 coming out and espousing a draft. It seems to me he's made it  
25 quite clear he doesn't want one. And how he expects to have an

1 adequate defense force without it, I don't know.

2 MR. CLARK: Let's ask Mr. Allen. You have indicated there's  
3 going to have to be a very substantial buildup of our military  
4 readiness around the world. How do you accomplish this without  
5 a draft?

6 MR. ALLEN: Well Governor Reagan has been quite firm in  
7 his preference for maintaining the all volunteer army. His  
8 charge is that it has not been allowed to work. That adequate  
9 pay and adequate arrangements are not made for our military.  
10 The benefits are slipping. There's no incentive. We're facing  
11 a situation in which our key people, technicians, pilots, and  
12 others are being lost at the rate that can only be described  
13 as a hemorrhage. This must be repaired. We must first of all  
14 turn our attention to the human side of our military problem,  
15 that is, the personnel. We have to pay them in a way that is  
16 sufficient to keep them, keep their incentive and the morale  
17 high. We have to provide the kinds of benefits that will allow  
18 them to stay in so they won't be eligible for food stamps, for  
19 example, they won't have to moonlight. This is a tragic situa-  
20 tion that has come about, brought about by the specific policies  
21 of the Carter Administration.

22 Then we have to make sure that the incentives for people  
23 to come into the armed forces are there. Governor Reagan wants  
24 to give the all volunteer army a chance to work. Only in the  
25 circumstances of a national emergency such as the days that

1 immediately preceded Pearl Harbor, for example, has he indicated  
2 that he would countenance instituting a military draft.

3 Now let me just say that the projection of American power  
4 into that critical region which we're discussing here today is  
5 not going to be done by ground troops. Even the rapid deploy-  
6 ment force, which seems more like a, an election year device  
7 to indicate readiness and to paper over the defense policies  
8 and the record of the Carter Administration, cannot do that.  
9 It's not in place now. And by every admission, will not be in  
10 place for a number of years to come.

11 MR. CLARK: So what. If we have a President Reagan in the  
12 White House in January and have a real crisis in the Middle  
13 East, what do you do in this interim period before we can  
14 depend on a rebuilt American military presence?

15 MR. ALLEN: As I've indicated, you do the best you can.  
16 Of course, there is a limited military deployment in the Indian  
17 Ocean today. We are arranging for bases. I, myself, visited  
18 Oman and had a look at the proposed base on Masirah Island and  
19 flew the Hormuz Strait earlier this summer. We do what we can  
20 with what we've got, and we try to mobilize our allies on the  
21 basis of a policy that is consistent, principled and firm in the  
22 defense of our joint interests.

23 MR. CLARK: Now let me, if I may, quote to you Joseph  
24 Cherber (phonetic), who is one of Governor Reagan's advisors  
25 on the Middle East, and seems to be much more alarmed than you

1 are about the current state of military readiness, and about  
2 what we have to do to overcome that. He's just written a book  
3 and he proposes these things. He says the United States should  
4 immediately station ground forces in the Middle East to halt  
5 any aggressive move by Russia. We should revive the draft and  
6 triple, triple the defense budget over the next three years.

7 Are there others in the Reagan camp who agree with that  
8 or is Mr. Cherber (phonetic) all on his own?

9 MR. ALLEN: Well in writing my introduction to Joe  
10 Cherber's book, I indicated that I don't agree with him on  
11 everything.

12 MR. CLARK: You also said some very complimentary things  
13 about him.

14 MR. ALLEN: I indicated that people should read this book.  
15 This is a point of view. This is characteristic of the Reagan  
16 team. We do have a variety of points of view. Governor Reagan  
17 does not support a draft, and we do not now have any specific  
18 or hard numbers as to what should be done with respect to the  
19 defense budget. We're looking at this very carefully and over  
20 the course of the next months -- we have been working on it for  
21 the last four or five months -- over the course of the next  
22 months, we will have those numbers.

23 MR. DUNSMORE: I think there are some questions that Mr.  
24 Ball would like to answer and I think perhaps we'll save those  
25 for the next part of the program. Shall we?

1 MR. CLARK: All right. We'll take a short break here and  
2 be back in just a moment with more ISSUES AND ANSWERS.

3 (Announcements.)

4 MR. CLARK: Our guests are Richard Allen, Governor Reagan's  
5 chief advisor on national security, and George Ball, former  
6 Undersecretary of State, and with me, is ABC News Correspondent  
7 Barry Dunsmore.

8 MR. DUNSMORE: Mr. Ball, what are your thoughts on the  
9 possibility of a Reagan Administration and a Reagan-run world  
10 starting in January?

11 MR. BALL: I'm rather appalled by the prospect. I'm not  
12 satisfied that the Governor has well-formulated views or that  
13 he has an adequate experience. He has in the past, at least,  
14 said some very reckless things before he came under the  
15 discipline of some iron characters, like my friend Mr. Allen  
16 sitting next to me. And I find it rather, rather terrifying  
17 thought, quite frankly.

18 MR. DUNSMORE: In the present context, do you see something  
19 happening under a Reagan Administration that would not happen,  
20 for example, with President Carter?

21 MR. BALL: Well I have no idea what would happen under a  
22 Reagan Administration. This is really my problem. I think as  
23 far as President Carter's concerned several things can be said.

24 First of all, there is, I believe, an understanding on  
25 the part of President Carter that the problems in the Middle

1 East are primarily political problems, and secondarily defense  
2 problems. They only become defense problems when there is a  
3 political failure.

4 I think that we have a very long way to go to improve  
5 our relationships, key relationships in the Middle East. I think  
6 this of prime importance. I would see a better opportunity of  
7 this happening under President Carter than under Governor  
8 Reagan. President Carter has, it seemed to me, in the course of  
9 the Camp David negotiations shown some appreciation of the  
10 necessity to come with grips, say, with the Palestinian issue,  
11 which I think is a key festering issue. I think he's shown a  
12 certain sensitivity to the main political interest that we have  
13 in the area. And I would hope that more and more we're going to  
14 think of the Middle East in terms of an overall United States  
15 policy and not be deflected by a lot of pressures that we get  
16 from special interests in the area.

17 MR. CLARK: I think that we have to give Mr. Allen a chance  
18 to say some reassuring things to Mr. Ball about Governor Reagan  
19 as President Reagan.

20 MR. ALLEN: I think the bottom line really for 1980 is are  
21 we better off than we were four years ago? Are we more secure?  
22 Is our foreign policy respected? Do we have the credibility  
23 that permeated the policies of the United States when President  
24 Ford left office? And on all counts I think the answer is  
25 clearly no. The measurements are not hard to make.

1        In addition, we find ourselves slipping behind the Soviet  
2 Union in strategic nuclear power, and we're inferior in vir-  
3 tually a rather conventional method of estimating defense  
4 capabilities. These are problems that concern the American  
5 people. Governor Reagan has been speaking to these problems  
6 effectively throughout a long primary season and since his  
7 nomination in Detroit. And he's going to continue to elaborate  
8 his position on these issues. His speeches have stressed very  
9 carefully that he regards the maintenance of world peace as  
10 the overriding objective for American foreign policy.

11       But to say that, doesn't really make it happen. You have  
12 to pursue policies that will work together, or allow you to  
13 work together in concert with allies, and then you have to  
14 pursue policies here at home that will mobilize our strength.  
15 So in calling for a new foreign policy, Governor Reagan has  
16 said that it really has to meet three broad requirements.

17       The first is that it should be a foreign policy the  
18 American people can understand and support. Secondly, since we  
19 can't be strong abroad without being strong at home, it's of  
20 extreme importance that we develop our economic strength. And  
21 here comes the link to the Reagan domestic economic program,  
22 which is imaginative and farsighted.

23       And third, we have to restore that vital margin of safety  
24 which is very, very important to maintain our security in a  
25 dangerous decade.

1 MR. CLARK: Well Mr. Allen, Governor Reagan has also  
2 spoken not only of safety and military security, but of  
3 military superiority. And that is the thing that troubles some  
4 people who listen to his comments. The price of regaining  
5 American military superiority in the world. What is that price?  
6 Is there anything in what Governor Reagan has said so far in  
7 his campaign that would tell the American people what the price  
8 is going to be to accomplish all this?

9 MR. ALLEN: Permit me to respond, Mr. Clark, by reminding  
10 you that that is the call of the Republican Platform. We don't  
11 see what all the difficulty is about. The Carter Administration  
12 on the one hand, claims that we are superior, that we are the  
13 strongest nation on earth, and on the other hand, attacks  
14 Governor Reagan for -- and the Republican Party, in it's unani-  
15 mous call for restoring the kind of superior American defense  
16 that the American people want and need, and know that we need  
17 for this dangerous decade.

18 We don't mean to imply as Republicans, weapon for weapon  
19 matching with the Soviet Union in order to achieve superiority.  
20 What we need to do is to restore the margin. And the margin is  
21 that cushion of power that has maintained the peace for 35 years.  
22 It's now gone. And it's gone as a specific result of the actions  
23 of the Carter Administration over the past four years in  
24 slashing that last defense budget laid down by President Ford.  
25 That's the real problem. That's the debate and that's the issue.

1 And the further issue, of course, is the Carter national  
2 security record for 1980, which President Carter apparently  
3 refuses to debate. There was a splendid opportunity to do this  
4 last Sunday evening in Baltimore. Two candidates showed up and  
5 a debate was held. We think that President Carter ought to have  
6 been there.

7 MR. CLARK: Well I would have to note at this stage that  
8 it is Governor Reagan who is refusing to accept the new invita-  
9 tion from the League of Women Voters for a one-on-one debate,  
10 is it not?

11 MR. ALLEN: After President Carter debates Mr. Anderson  
12 one-on-one, then Governor Reagan will participate in a debate.

13 MR. DUNSMORE: Mr. Ball, getting back to the crisis that  
14 the world is facing at the moment and the war between Iraq and  
15 Iran. Do you have any specific ideas or a plan that you think  
16 might be useful in bringing this crisis to an end?

17 MR. BALL: I don't think there's very much that the United  
18 States can do other than encourage such third party instrumen-  
19 talities as may be available. For example, the Islamic group  
20 which President Zia is representing. To some extent the U.N.,  
21 although I think it's pretty well disabled from being effective  
22 in this situation. We have to watch the situation evolve in  
23 the next few days and see more clearly just what direction it's  
24 going to take. But I don't think there's anything of a very  
25 sensational kind that America can do at this point.

1 MR. DUNSMORE: What do you think the likelihood is that  
2 this conflict could spread to other Persian Gulf countries,  
3 or in fact, bring in the Soviet Union in one form or another?

4 MR. BALL: Well I think it could spread if, for example,  
5 the Iraqi were to make any effort to regain those two little  
6 islands at the mouth, in the Straits of Hormuz, for example.  
7 This would create some very big problems.

8 I would hope that they wouldn't, and I think it's unlikely  
9 that they will. If I read the intentions of President Hussein  
10 it is primarily to regain the Shaat-al-Arab waterway, and to  
11 discourage the Ayatollah from continuing to agitate with the  
12 Shiite community, which is 51 or 2 percent of the population  
13 of Iraq to bring down the present government.

14 I think that what ideally the Iraqi would like to do is  
15 to bring down the Ayatollah's regime because they see that as  
16 a source of continuing agitation, particularly with the fact  
17 that they do have such a very big Shiite population in Iraq.

18 MR. DUNSMORE: On that particular subject, Mr. Allen,  
19 President Sadat has suggested that the United States might take  
20 advantage of this particular situation to get rid of the  
21 Ayatollah. What are your thoughts on that?

22 MR. ALLEN: Well I wouldn't care to comment specifically  
23 on President Sadat's recommendation, although I could say that  
24 a lot of people would certainly find themselves in support; a  
25 lot of American would find themselves in support of President

1 Sadat's recommendation.

2 It's clear that chaos is the next step in Iran. We have  
3 to be very much concerned about that. And of course, the  
4 ultimate beneficiary could be the Soviet Union under the  
5 circumstances of chaos. Perhaps the Iranians have some way of  
6 getting that act together. It'd be our prayer, our hope,  
7 certainly the hope of all Americans that stability could be  
8 restored to Iran in some way.

9 MR. CLARK: What if the Soviet Union did try to take  
10 advantage of the chaos you've just spoken about? Sponsored a  
11 left wing coup that put a pro-Soviet government in power in  
12 Iran, what should we do at that stage? What would President  
13 Reagan do if he were in the White House?

14 MR. ALLEN: Well that's a hypothetical question I can't  
15 answer in great detail. But again, it comes back to identifying  
16 our interests and mobilizing the resources to realize objec-  
17 tives to defend those interests. The Europeans have a very,  
18 very vital stake in peace and tranquility in the area. We have  
19 to do everything we can to restore our credibility with them,  
20 to let them know that we intend to pursue our interests jointly.  
21 The Japanese, for example, can't do anything under the present  
22 circumstances, as we know, because of constitutional limitations.

23 MR. CLARK: And Mr. Ball, I know you have been strongly  
24 against the use of nuclear power, as almost any public official  
25 has in Washington, nuclear force in the world. But are we

1 entering an especially dangerous period in the Middle East  
2 with the shortcomings you have both spoken about in our own  
3 military strength where we might have to lean more heavily on  
4 nuclear power to deter the Soviets from any aggressive move in  
5 the Persian Gulf or in that area generally?

6 MR. BALL: We've been in a very dangerous situation in  
7 the Middle East for quite a long time. I wrote a piece a year  
8 ago and said that I thought that as a matter of statistical  
9 probability that within the next two years there would be a  
10 falling out of two to four million barrels of oil simply as a  
11 result of political instability or some kind of military action  
12 in the area. This is nothing new. I think it's simply reached  
13 a more critical point. But it's a point that one, I think,  
14 could very well have foreseen.

15 MR. CLARK: Could we be forced to retreat into a John  
16 Foster Dulles-type posture of nuclear brinkmanship during this  
17 critical period until we're able to repair and rebuild our  
18 military?

19 MR. BALL: Certainly not. Certainly not. I can't think of  
20 anything that would be more foolhardy than that. In the first  
21 place, you bring very great pressure on the Soviet Union to  
22 respond and it could escalate into a mutually suicidal affair  
23 very fast. I can't think of any responsible leader undertaking  
24 something like that.

25 MR. DUNSMORE: Mr. Allen, you have mentioned allies a

1 number of times. Do you think that the United States is properly  
2 using one of it's key allies in the Middle East right now,  
3 Israel, in this situation? Do you think that there is a role  
4 for Israel to play that we are not using?

5 MR. ALLEN: I don't think so. In this particular situation,  
6 I don't know what that role might be. Of course, we're well  
7 aware of the endemic conflict, of the latent conflict between  
8 Arabs and Jews. Governor Reagan proceeds to an appreciation  
9 of Israel because he believes it's a strategic asset for the  
10 United States. It represents an offsetting power. It's a  
11 stable democracy. It's one to which we are committed over the  
12 long term. We're committed not only on the basis of our  
13 strategic interest in maintaining the territorial integrity  
14 of Israel and it's right to exist, but also based on a deep  
15 moral commitment that we have to the State of Israel. Israel  
16 is an important ally. It must continue to grow. It must continue  
17 to exist. It must be continue to be able to defend itself  
18 against any possible threat to it's existence.

19 MR. CLARK: Mr. Ball, we have about 30 seconds for you. I  
20 know you disagree to some degree on this. You feel much more  
21 strongly about resolution of the Palestinian problem.

22 MR. BALL: Well I think unless we resolve it, Israel is  
23 simply remains for us an enormous inhibition to our achieving  
24 any kind of decent political relations in the areas, the  
25 countries that count most in the area, which are the oil produ-

1 cing areas. I don't see Israel as a strategic asset. I am  
2 certainly committed to the security of the State of Israel.  
3 But I think we delude ourselves when we talk in those terms.

4 MR. CLARK: Gentlemen, thank both of you very much for  
5 being with us on ISSUES AND ANSWERS.

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