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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KDB 3/30/2016

File Folder CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMISSION - KISSINGER
BIPARTISAN COMMISSION (12/12/83-1/5/84)

FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 27

SKINNER

488

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
174419	MEMO	R. SIMS TO R. MCFARLANE RE SUBMISSION OF KISSINGER REPORT	1	12/2/1983	B1
174420	SCHEDULING MEMO	RE 1/6/84 MEETING WITH KISSINGER	2	1/5/1984	B1
174421	TALKING POINTS	RE 1/6/84 MEETING WITH KISSINGER	1	ND	B1
174422	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE TALKING POINTS AND PRESS STATEMENT FOR BIPARTISAN COMMISSION REPORT	1	1/11/1984	B1
174423	TALKING POINTS	RE BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA REPORT	1	ND	B1
174424	SCHEDULING MEMO	RE 1/11/84 MEETING WITH NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA	3	1/10/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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FOIA

F03-002/5

Box Number 27

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488

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
174425	SUMMARY	NSC STAFF EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA	10	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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UNCL. CITED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 12 DEC 83 18

TO MCFARLANE

FROM NORTH

3/30/16 CDB

DOCDATE 12 DEC 83 /

KEYWORDS CENTRAL AMERICA COMM AP

SUBJECT: SP RE PRES MTG W/ NATL BIPARTISAN COMMIS ON CENTRAL AMERICAN

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 12 DEC 83 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSC/FID (VL)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
North	5 12/12	Mcfarlane approved w/ comments		
	5 12/13	FFA		
	12/14	Kimmit SGD memo to Ryan		RR, ON
	1/9	Recd Revised Ryan memo		ON, CT, RIC

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

9013

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 14, 1983

TO: Robert M. Kimmitt

FM: Fawn Hall

In accordance with Mr. McFarlane's comments on attached package, I contacted COL North by ham radio in-flight to Venezuela (11:30 a.m.).

COL North confirms Dr. Kissinger's concurrence in the approach and proposed date for meeting. He notes this depends on whether report is finished on schedule (indicated time is: first week of January).

Attached is the schedule proposal that Mr. McFarlane authorized you to sign after the Dr. Kissinger's concurrence was sought.

Thank-you.

P.S. Attached is duplicate original.
Original has not yet been located.

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

National Security Council
The White House

RECEIVED

83 DEC 12 P 4: 26

System #

I

Package #

9013

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Executive Secretary	1	1C	
John Poindexter	2	X	
Wilma Hall	3 —	ref to Wilma, etc	
Bud McFarlane	4	M	A
John Poindexter			
Executive Secretary			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

I never did get a debrief on the meeting with HAK. I assume you will go along with his recommendation.



D

12 P 5: 19

5

RECEIVED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1/5/84

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *fjr*

SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: The meeting with the Commission on Central America, previously scheduled for January 6 at 11:00 am, is moved to January 11 at 11:00 am.

DATE:

TIME:

DURATION: 60 minutes

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

REMARKS REQUIRED:

MEDIA COVERAGE:

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION:

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc: R. Darman	C. McCain
R. Deprospero	J. Rosebush
K. Duberstein	R. Scouten
B. Elliott	B. Shaddix
D. Fischer	W. Sittmann
C. Fuller	L. Speakes
W. Henkel	WHCA Audio/Visual
E. Hickey	WHCA Operations
G. Hodges	A. Wrobleski
	Nell Yates

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9013

6

White House
By 008

123, 1987
3/39/8
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1983

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*

REQUEST: Meeting with National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America

PURPOSE: Presentation of Presidential Report

BACKGROUND: The National Bipartisan Commission will have
completed its report by the first week of
January. The report should be presented to
the President by the Commission soon enough
so that its recommendations and salient
points can be included in the President's
State of the Union Address. The report
should be presented prior to the arrival of
the delegation from the People's Republic of
China on January 9, 1984.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: Two previous meetings with the entire
Commission.

DATE AND TIME: Anytime on Friday, January 6, 1984

DURATION: 45 minutes (to include press coverage)

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS: National Bipartisan Commission members,
Secretary of State, and appropriate White
House staff

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Initial photo opportunity followed by
presentation of report by the Commission to
the President.

REMARKS REQUIRED: To be provided by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: Photo opportunity in Cabinet Room and
follow-on remarks by Commission Chairman and
the President.

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

PROJECT OFFICER: Robert M. Kimmitt and Oliver L. North

(CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9013

7

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

White House

3/70/76

December 12, 1983

By

Date

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH *P*

SUBJECT: Presidential Scheduling Request: Meeting with
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America

At Tab A is our revised proposal for the presentation of the Commission's report to the President. Based on this suggested scenario, we have prepared a scheduling request which would have the Commission present its report on Friday, January 6, 1984.

The scheduling request at Tab I includes the considerations originally forwarded at Tab A. Absent instructions to the contrary, North will brief Kissinger on this plan during the Commission trip December 12-15, 1983.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Bob Kimmitt to initial and forward the schedule proposal at Tab I.

Approve ☒

Disapprove ☐

Bob
Bob Sims concurs.

Attachments

Tab I - Schedule Proposal

Tab A - Revised Proposal

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

North call him & support his approach, seek his concurrence, then sign & forward.

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Box Number

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174419 MEMO

1 12/2/1983 B1

R. SIMS TO R. MCFARLANE RE SUBMISSION OF
KISSINGER REPORT

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

12/14

Harald:

This was in my box
late this afternoon
around 1800.

I don't know where
it has been. But
at least it was
found. Kimmitt has
signed my duplicate
original -- so I destroyed
the first one. Favor

**MEMORANDUM
OF CALL**

Previous editions usable

TO: _____

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

OF (Organization) _____

☐ PLEASE PHONE ► ☐ FTS ☐ AUTOVON

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU
☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE _____

RECEIVED BY _____ DATE _____ TIME _____

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018 STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)
Prescribed by GSA
☆ GPO : 1982 O - 361-529 (210) FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

9013

9

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

December 14, 1983

TO: Robert M. Kimmitt

FM: Fawn Hall

In accordance with Mr. McFarlane's comments on attached package, I contacted COL North by ham radio in-flight to Venezuela (11:30 a.m.).

COL North confirms Dr. Kissinger's concurrence in the approach and proposed date for meeting. He notes this depends on whether report is finished on schedule (indicated time is: first week of January).

Attached is the schedule proposal that Mr. McFarlane authorized you to sign after the Dr. Kissinger's concurrence was sought.

Thank-you.

P.S. Attached is duplicate original.
Original has not yet been located.

UNCLASSIFIED EYES REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 05 JAN 84 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM NORTH

DOCDATE 05 JAN 84

MENGENS

05 JAN 84

KEYWORDS: CENTRAL AMERICA

AP

KISSINGER, HENRY A

SUBJECT PRES MTG W/ KISSINGER ON 6 JAN RE NATL BIPARTISAN COMMIS ON CENTRAL
AMER

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / 6)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

Pres *IP 1/05 for information* *2P, 6P, JTB, WDP*
CAN 0 6 1984 *Pres noted* *on, ME*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

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174420	SCHEDULING MEMO RE 1/6/84 MEETING WITH KISSINGER	2	1/5/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Box Number

27

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
174421	TALKING POINTS RE 1/6/84 MEETING WITH KISSINGER	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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14

913

RECEIVED

National Security Council
The White House

84 JAN 5 P 4:42

System # II
Package # 90013
RA

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WFM</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>IC</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>		<u>A</u>
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information	<u>A = Action</u>	R = Retain	D = Dispatch	N = No further Action
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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS Should be seen by: ASAP
Page 2, Tab I being redone. (Date/Time)

REC ED
84 JUN 5 P5 01

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90013

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED

White House G-2

January 5, 1984

By CLAS

DATE 3/3/96

15

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER NORTH ^P
CONSTANTINE MENGES

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President concerning Dr. Kissinger meeting with the President Friday, January 6, 1984, at 9:30-9:45 a.m. in the Oval Office.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8490026

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 09 JAN 84 20

TO MCFARLANE

FROM NORTH

DOCDATE 09 JAN 84

MENGES

09 JAN 84

NORTH

10 JAN 84

16

KEYWORDS CENTRAL AMERICA

AP

KISSINGER, HENRY A

SUBJECT: PRES MTG W/ NATL BIPARTISAN COMMIS ON CENTRAL AMER W/ PRES TALKING
POINTS & PRESS RELEASE

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR INFO

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8490033

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
Pres	IP 4/10	for information		VP
Mcfarlane	X JAN 1 1 1984	a/o Pres for info		
Pres	IP JAN 1 1 1984	for information via PAB		VP, GM, JM, MS
	JAN 1 1 1984	Press statement released		
C	JAN 1 1 1984	Pres noted		on, MS

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

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174422	MEMO MCFARLANE TO REAGAN RE TALKING POINTS AND PRESS STATEMENT FOR BIPARTISAN COMMISSION REPORT	1	1/11/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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19

TAB

A

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174423	TALKING POINTS RE BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA REPORT	1	ND	B1

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20

TAB

B

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

21

For Immediate Release

January 11, 1984

STATEMENT BY THE PRINCIPAL PRESS SECRETARY

The President met this morning with the members of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America to receive their report. He noted that their report is impressive in the depth of its analysis and in the scope and creativity of its recommendations.

He praised the Commission for their bipartisan approach. He also commended them for the task that they have performed for all Americans in defining the threat to our national security posed by the crisis in Central America. The President agrees with the Commission's report that our response must include increased support for democratic development, improved living conditions, human rights, and security assistance.

The Commissioners, in their report, note that our level of effort must be increased substantially in order for democracy to prevail in the region. They expressed their concern for the urgent nature of the situation. The President agrees with their observation that more must be done in the near and mid-term in order for their longer range recommendations to be effective.

Within its overall recommendations for U.S. assistance, the Commission has recognized the immediate need for significantly increased levels of aid to El Salvador. The report also urges the Administration and the Congress to work together to achieve greater predictability in this funding. The President fully supports these objectives.

Finally, the President emphasized the extraordinary degree of bipartisan consensus the group achieved during their intensive six month effort. He commended the ability of the group, which represents the entire political spectrum, to arrive at a common understanding of the issues. The President specifically cited Lane Kirkland, Bob Strauss, and the other members of the "loyal opposition" in this regard. He observed that this very fact gives substance to their hope "that the nation, too, as it learns more about Central America...will find its way to a united determination."

#

*Released
P. H. S.*

724

RECEIVED
6 JAN 10 8:11

National Security Council
The White House

System # II

Package # 90026

Follow on ra

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	<u>1</u>	<u>WAL</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>		
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>✓</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: ASAP

(Date/Time)

Recommend you take to 0930.

RECEIVED

84 JAN 11 11:30

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SYSTEM II
90026 Follow-on

23

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

January 10, 1984

White House Guidelines / AUGUST 1987
By COB NARA, Date 3/30/86

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH
CONSTANTINE MENGES

SUBJECT: Presidential Talking Points and Press Statement
for the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission
on Central America

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President forwarding talking points (Tab A) for his use at the meeting with the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. Also attached is a press statement for use by the Principal Deputy Press Secretary (Tab B).

Bob Sims concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

*REapproved
and returned
TPs.*

Attachments

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President
Tab A - Talking Points
Tab B - Press Statement

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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174424	SCHEDULING MEMO RE 1/11/84 MEETING WITH NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISION ON CENTRAL AMERICA	3	1/10/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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27

TAB

A

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMISSION - KISSINGER
BIPARTISAN COMMISSION (12/12/83-1/5/84)

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174425 SUMMARY

10

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B1

NSC STAFF EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN
COMMISSION ON CENTRAL AMERICA

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Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America



January 1984

EMBARGOED FOR WIRE TRANSMISSION AND RELEASE
UNTIL 3:00 PM EST, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 11TH, 1984

921

RECEIVED

National Security Council
The White House

84 JAN 9

P 7:58

System #

II

Package #

90026

RQ

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	1	W.C.M.	
Bob Kimmitt	2	K	
John Poindexter	3		
Wilma Hall	4		
Bud McFarlane	5	M	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: ASAP Aue Danner

(Date/Time)

At most, I think we should send President the exec summary at Tab A. 3pm 1/10/84

Exec summary being smoothed. Attached

RECEIVED

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SYSTEM II
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

40

~~SECRET~~

January 9, 1984

ACTION

White House
By CAS : 313976

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH
CONSTANTINE MENGES

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President regarding the Wednesday, January 11, 1984, 11:00 a.m. meeting with the National Bipartisan Commission. Your memo summarizes for the President the major points of the report. Talking points for the President are being prepared and will be forwarded separately.

The final copy of the executive summary is not yet available. We will forward this for inclusion tomorrow morning. The version attached is North's working copy. Please note that in your memo to the President there is a comment that Administration spokespersons are being asked to say nothing about the report other than that it is being reviewed by the President. We should try to get everybody to stick to this line.

A clearance list for the meeting is attached at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President
- Tab A - Report of the National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America
- Tab II - Clearance List

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

~~Executive Summary of~~
~~Information Sheet on~~ the Report of the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America

OUTLINE

The report, which is dedicated to Sen. Henry Jackson, consists of the following chapters:

1. Introduction and basic themes.
2. - Places crisis in larger hemispheric context.
3. - Provides historical perspective.
4. - Examines prospects for economic and political development; presents recommendations.
5. - Discusses social issues -- health and education particularly -- and makes recommendations.
6. - Explores security issues and recommends U.S. action.
7. - Looks at diplomatic aspects and offers recommendations on pursuing negotiated settlements.
8. - Conclusion.

On security and diplomatic issues, the report deals with El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Costa Rica. Panama and Belize are included for discussion of development programs.

MAJOR THEMES

-- The crisis in Central America is acute. Its roots are indigenous -- in poverty, injustice and closed political systems. But world economic recession and Cuban-Soviet-Nicaraguan intervention brought it to a head.

-- The crisis will not wait. It must be addressed at once and simultaneously in all its aspects. Ultimate resolutions depend on economic progress, social and political reform. But insurgencies must be checked if lasting progress is to be made on these fronts.

-- Indigenous reform, even indigenous revolution, is no threat to the U.S. But the intrusion of outside powers exploiting local grievances for political and strategic advantage is a serious threat. Objective of U.S. policy should be to reduce Central American conflicts to Central American dimensions.

-2-

-- United States has fundamental interests at stake: Soviet-Cuban success and resulting collapse of Central America would compel substantial increase in our security burden or redeployment of forces to detriment of vital interests elsewhere.

-- As a nation we have deep and historic interest in promotion and preservation of democracy. Report concludes that pluralistic societies are what Central Americans want and are essential to lasting solutions. In this case our strategic interests and our ideals coincide.

-- Central Americans desperately need our help and we have a moral obligation to provide it. The U.S. and other nations can make a difference. But in the end solutions will depend on the efforts of Central Americans themselves.

-- Although there is urgent need for action, no quick solutions can be expected. U.S. must make a long-term commitment and stick to a coherent policy.

-- That policy can and should be bipartisan. Commission found wide consensus on principles and objectives.

Political and Economic Development

-- Central American economies grew substantially during the 60's and early 70's. But income distribution was highly inequitable, except in Costa Rica and Panama.

-- Trend toward more pluralistic political systems in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua reversed in early 70's.

-- World recession and rising political violence had catastrophic effect on region's economies in late 70's, early 80's. All have declined dramatically. El Salvador's gross domestic product is off 25% since 1978.

-- Even with successful stabilization programs and restored political stability, per capital wealth in 1990 would only be three-quarters of what it was in 1980.

-- There must be substantial increase in outside assistance.

-- Commission believes economic development cannot be separated from political and social reform. Objective must be parallel development of pluralistic societies and strong economies with far more equitable distribution of wealth.

-- We propose a program of U.S. assistance designed to promote economic growth, democratization and greater social equity.

-3-

--We encourage the greatest possible involvement of the US private sector in the stabilization effort. Recommend the formation of an emergency action committee of private sector personalities to provide advice on new private-public initiatives to spur growth and employment.

Recommendations: An Emergency Stabilization Program

-- A \$400 million supplemental in FY '84 over and above the \$477 million now in the budget for the seven countries. There is urgent need to stabilize economies now going downhill very fast. X

-- Focus this assistance on labor-intensive infrastructure projects and housing. Unemployment is a critical problem -- politically and economically.

-- Establish a program to provide U.S. Government guarantees for short-term trade credits. External credit has dried up. Without it economies cannot be reactivated.

-- Provide an emergency loan to the Central American Common Market to permit the reactivation of this vital organization. Lack of resources in the Market to settle trade accounts among the countries has stalled it.

-- U.S. Government should take an active role in the efforts to resolve the external debt problems of Central America and should encourage the countries that have not done so to seek multilateral rescheduling.

-- Also encourage commercial banks to renegotiate at the lowest possible interest rates.

-- U.S. and Central American leaders should meet at an early date to discuss impediments to and opportunities for economic, political and social development.

Medium and Long-Term

-- Commission estimates \$24 billion in net external exchange inflows needed to 1990 to foster a growth rate of 3 percent per capita, returning these countries to pre-recession levels of per capita wealth. About half -- \$12 billion -- is expected to come from international institutions, other donor countries and loans and investments from private sector sources.

-- U.S. Government will have to provide as much as \$12 billion if these financing needs are to be met.

-- We propose in this context a program of \$8 billion over next five fiscal years (FY85-89) in USG assistance. This would be divided very roughly into about \$6 billion in appropriated funds and about \$2 billion in guarantees, insurance, etc.] X

7/36 44

--Compared with current projections, FY 85 - FY 89, based on FY 83 totals plus inflation, these contributions would constitute an increase of about \$ 2.8 billion in appropriated funds and \$.7 billion in contingent liabilities over the five year period.

-- Urge that Congress authorize multi-year funding of this program. Commission believes firm, long-term commitment is essential.

-- To give form and structure to the development effort suggest establishment of the Central American Development Organization (CADO). Perhaps 1/4 of U.S. aid could be channelled through CADO.

-- CADO would consist of the United States and those countries of the seven willing to commit themselves to internal democracy and reform. Continued membership to depend on demonstrated progress toward those goals. Adherence to regional security pact also required.

-- Nicaragua could participate by meeting these condtions.

-- CADO's principal body would be Development Council with tripartite, ILO-style representation. Would assess program and progress toward economic growth, democratization, reform and preservation of human rights.

-- Other democracies would be invited to join.

Additional Recommendations

-- Expanded assistance from the USG for democratic institutions and leadership training -- neighborhood groups, cooperatives, binational centers and visitor programs for leaders of labor unions, local governments and other organizations.

--Require a firm commitment by the Central Americans to economic policies, including reforms in tax systems, to encourage private enterprise and individual initiative, to create favorable investment climates, to curb corruption where it exists, and to spur balanced trade.

-- Urge extension of duty-free trade to Central America by other major trading nations.

--Review non-tariff barriers to imports from Central America with a view toward using whatever flexibility that exists within the framework of multilateral agreements, etc. to favor Central American products.

-5-

-- Establishment of the Central American Development Corporation -- a privately owned venture-capital company which could be initially financed by a loan from the USG.

-- Recommend that the United States join the Central American Bank for Economic Integration.

-- Technical and financial support for export promotion efforts and a USG review of non-tariff barriers to Central American exports.

-- Expanded availability of insurance guarantees for new investments from the U.S. Government's Overseas Private Investment.

-- Increased focus in assistance programs on small business and accelerated agricultural development -- particularly in production of food for domestic consumption.

-- Strengthen financial underpinning of efforts to broaden land ownership to include governments promptly allocating resources as they become available to ensure effective compensation to former landowners.

Health and Education:

-- Democracy and prosperity in the region require accelerated human development. Hunger, disease and illiteracy sap a people's vitality and impede the growth of viable democratic institutions.

-- Literacy rates are unacceptably low in several countries (e.g. Guatemala 45%, El Salvador 63%, Honduras 60%) handicapping education efforts seriously.

-- Malnutrition -- perhaps 50 % of population -- also handicaps education by sending physically and mentally underdeveloped children to school. Malnutrition has sunk back to 1950s levels as a result of the present crisis.

-- Goals should include a reduction of malnutrition, elimination of illiteracy, expanded education, health, and housing opportunities.

-- Initial efforts must be to increase food assistance to Central America through the PL 480 programs.

-- Commission calls for formation, under direction of the Peace Corps, of a Literacy Corps and a Central American Teachers Corps.

-- To meet needs in higher education, U.S. government scholarships should be raised to approximately 10,000 over 4-6 years, a level comparable to Cuban and Soviet Union efforts.

-6-

-- Educational reform can also be encouraged in the areas of technical and vocational education, through the expansion of the International Executive Service Corps, and through closer cooperation with Central American universities to improve the quality of education.

-- Judicial systems in Central America can be strengthened by providing resources for training judges, judicial staff, and public prosecutors.

-- Continuation and expansion of existing programs for disease control and eradication, as well as immunization and oral rehydration.

-- Training of primary health workers, especially nurses, should be expanded and the means developed to integrate private and public financing of health services.

-- Assistance programs should target area's severe housing shortage.

-- Training of public administrators required to improve public service.

-- US Government should provide more resources to meet critical problem of refugees and displaced persons -- more than one million of them need help.

Security Issues

In El Salvador there are two separate conflicts: (1) between those seeking democratic reform and those seeking to retain their privileges; (2) Marxist-Leninist guerrillas against those who oppose Marxism-Leninism.

In discussing the latter we identify three general propositions about such guerrilla movements:

- (1) They depend on external support. Without it they are unlikely to succeed.
- (2) They develop their own momentum which reform alone cannot stop.
- (3) Victorious, they create totalitarian regimes, even though they have enlisted support of democratic elements in order to project democratic, reformist image.

-- External support comes from Soviet Union, Cuba and now Nicaragua. Cuba has developed into a leading military power through Soviet assistance. Since Sandinista victory, Soviets have come around to support Cuban strategy of armed road to power in Central America.

-- There are serious strategic implications for the United States in Soviet-Cuban support for armed insurgency in the region.

*Corrected
Equit
Should
be
highlighted*

-- Triumph of hostile forces there could require us to devote large resources to defend our southern approaches.

47
WHY REQUIRE
CERTIFICATION
THEN?

--This would mean either greatly increased defense burden by the United States, or some reduction in our commitments elsewhere.

-- Threat to our shipping lanes in the Caribbean.

-- Increased violence and dislocation in the area from which we could not isolate ourselves.

-- Erosion of our power to influence events worldwide as we are perceived unable to influence events close to home.

El Salvador

-- The war is stalemated, a condition to the ultimate advantage of the guerrillas.

-- U.S. military assistance is inadequate to permit modern, humane and successful counter-insurgency.

-- Commission recommends that U.S. provide significantly increased levels of military assistance for greater mobility, more training, higher force levels and more equipment.

--Commission noted that Defense Department believes \$400 million military assistance budget total in FY 84 and FY 85 would enable government to break the stalemate.

-- Assistance is to be conditioned through legislation on terminating death squads, progress toward democracy and establishment of the rule of law.

-- In Guatemala, such assistance should only be provided if the same terms are met.

--Increased military assistance also needed for Honduras to build a credible deterrent and to meet renewed efforts at insurgency.

--Inability to assist constabulary forces in El Salvador impedes our human rights objectives, and affects our security objectives negatively in both El Salvador and Costa Rica. Congress should review Section 660 of the Security Assistance Act and consider amendment to permit funds for training and support to Central American law enforcement agencies.

-- Commission concludes that U.S. security interests are importantly engaged in Central America. Larger program of military assistance needed, as well as expanded support for economic growth and social reform.

-- Success will depend on an end to massive violations of human rights and the neutralization of external support for the insurgencies.

The Search for Peace

-- A successful U.S. political strategy in Central America requires resources to promote economic growth, vigorous efforts to advance democracy and reform; other inducements and penalties. The other side must understand that, as a general rule, there are certain circumstances when a resort to force may be necessary.

-- General strategic objective of U.S. diplomacy in Central America should be to reduce the civil wars, national conflicts and military preparations to Central American dimension.

-- Specifically, we should seek to stop the war and killing in El Salvador. Create conditions under which Nicaragua becomes peaceful and democratic member of Central American community. And open way for democratic development in all countries.

-- Commission calls for negotiations between guerrillas and government to be elected in March to establish conditions for later legislative and municipal elections in which all could participate: electoral commission with FMLN-FDR representation, cease-fire and end to all violence; international observation of elections.

-- Adequate economic and military assistance from U.S. can help to achieve such a settlement.

-- Commission believes military stalemate works against rather than for a political settlement based on the popular will.

-- In Nicaragua, consolidation of Marxist-Leninist regime would create permanent security threat. Nicaragua's mainland location makes it a crucial steppingstone to promote armed insurgency in Central America. Cuban personnel (2,000 military advisers and 6,000 civilian officials), several hundred Soviet, East European, Libyan and PLO advisers, extensive arms deliveries (13,000 tons in 1983) add an external dimension to the threat posed by Nicaragua to its neighbors.

-- What gives the current situation its special urgency is the external threat posed by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, supported by Cuban military strength, backed by Soviet weapons, guidance and diplomacy, and integrated into the Cuban network of intelligence and subversion.

-- Central American leaders believe pluralist political order essential to long-term security.

-- An alternative would be attempt at containment. But that would threaten militarization of isthmus -- creation of garrison states. Democracy would wither. And U.S. could find itself as surrogate policeman.

-- Commission proposes comprehensive regional settlement based on

- (1) Respect for sovereignty and non-intervention.
- (2) Verifiable commitments to non-aggression and an end to all attempts at subversion -- covert or overt.
- (3) Limitations on arms and sizes of armed forces. Prohibition of foreign forces, bases and advisers.
- (4) Commitment to internal pluralism and free elections in all countries.
- (5) Provision for verification of all agreements.
- (6) Establishment of an inter-government council to meet regularly to review compliance.
- (7) Adherence to the overall agreement would be required for membership in the Central American Development Organization.

-- U.S. would support the agreement and provide assistance; and would commit itself to respect results of elections within countries as long as principles of pluralism at home and restraint abroad observed.

-- Commission's proposal based on and amplifies 21 points of the Contadora Group.

-- Commission fully endorses Contadora efforts.

-- Finally, majority of Commission opposes dismantling existing incentives and pressures for the region in Managua to negotiate seriously.

-- As for Cuba, Commission sees little possibility of

This should
be first
to all
that we say

- Economic
- Covert
- Humanitarian support

-- As for Soviet Union, establishment of Soviet military base in Nicaragua is not the major concern since before that could have happened crisis would have reached proportions not containable in Central American dimensions.

-- Little promise in negotiating with Soviet Union over Central America. Soviets would seek cast such negotiations in terms of sphere of influence, an unacceptable concept for the U.S.