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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 1/7/2010

File Folder CUBA (02/14/1981-04/17/1981)

FOIA

S09-251

Box Number 29

165

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
82295	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE CUBA (SAME ASA 82294) <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i>	1	2/14/1981	B1
82294	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE CUBA <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i>	1	2/14/1981	B1
82296	CABLE	HAVANA 01159 <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i>	2	2/19/1981	B1
82297	CABLE	HAVANA 01768 <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i>	2	3/7/1981	B1
82298	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE CUBA <i>PAR 8/1/2018 M259/5</i>	1	3/9/1981	B1
82299	MEMO	SITUATION ROOM TO ADMIRAL NANCE RE DECLASSIFICATION REQUEST <i>D 8/1/2018 M259/5</i>	1	3/5/1981	B1
82300	CABLE	050235Z <i>D 8/1/2018 M259/5</i>	2	3/4/1981	B1 B3
82301	NSC/S PROFILE SHEET	RE 8101092 <i>R 8/1/2018 M259/5</i>	1	3/5/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
82302	CABLE	130055Z D 8/1/2018 M259/5	2	3/13/1981	B1 B3
82303	CABLE	HAVANA 2027 R 10/8/2010 M259/5	2	3/23/1981	B1
82304	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE CUBA PAR 8/1/2018 M259/5	1	3/18/1981	B1
82307	MEMO	PAULA DOBRIANSKY TO RICHARD ALLEN RE USSR/CUBA R 10/8/2010 M259/5	2	3/25/1981	B1
82308	CABLE	HAVANA 02147 R 10/8/2010 M259/5	2	3/30/1981	B1
82309	CABLE	HAVANA 02150 R 10/8/2010 M259/5	1	3/31/1981	B1
82310	CABLE	HAVANA 02206 R 10/8/2010 M259/5	2	4/2/1981	B1
82311	CABLE	HAVANA 2267 PAR 3/12/2012 M259/5	2	4/6/1981	B1
82312	MEMO	WILLIAM STEARMAN TO RICHARD ALLEN RE CUBA PAR 8/1/2018 M259/5	1	4/9/1981	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
82313	CABLE	HAVANA 2427 R 10/8/2010 M259/5	2	4/13/1981	B1
82314	CABLE	STATE 096810 R 10/8/2010 M259/5	2	4/15/1981	B1
82315	CABLE	STATE 099586 R 10/8/2010 M259/5	2	4/17/1981	B1

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~~SECRET~~

*Ret'd from the Pres.
2/16/88
2374
82295*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: UPI News Report/Cuba

This news report will be of interest!

WASHINGTON (UPI) By Richard C. Gross -- Cuban ground forces and pilots flying Soviet-built MIG warplanes and helicopters are supporting a new government military offensive against guerrillas in southeastern Angola, intelligence sources said today. (U)

They said it is the first time since November the Cubans have backed an offensive by the Marxist government against the forces of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). (U)

The offensive was under way in the African country's southeastern province of Cuando Cubango, the sources said. (U)

The Cubans were flying MIG warplanes and helicopter gunships in support of government forces, they said. There was no indication of how many Cubans were involved in the operation. (U)

UNITA, headed by Jonas Savimbi, has vowed to keep fighting until Cuban forces are withdrawn from Angola. He is seeking aid from the Reagan Administration, but Congress in the mid-1970s forbid U. S. military assistance to UNITA. (U)

Cuban Premier Fidel Castro has said he will pull his troops out of Angola once the government is able to bring the former Portuguese colony under control. Angola is situated on the west-central African coast. (U)

The Soviet Union and Cuba have been the most enthusiastic supporters of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which came to power in 1976. The United States does not recognize the legitimacy of the MPLA regime in Luanda, the capital. (U)

US policy maintains the Angolan Government should be broader based and should not depend for its survival on a Cuban expeditionary force. (U)

NOTE FOR THE PRESIDENT: Savimbi is presently in Morocco, and plans to be in Washington by mid-March. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Review on February 14, 1984

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD9-259/5 #82295

BY RW NARA DATE 10/8/10

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

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BY RUS NARA DATE 10/8/10

I mm
PRECEDENCE

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

11/7/10

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

3

FROM: *The Situation Room*

TO: *Lt Col Maratti for the President*

INFO:

DEX _____

(DAC) 27

GPS _____

LDX _____

PAGES 1

TTY _____

CITE _____

DTG: 142316 Z Feb 81

RELEASED BY: *JMC*

TOR: 142323 Z Feb 81

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

UPI News Report / Cuba

1981 FEB 14 23 17

RECEIVED
14 FEB 81

14 FEB 81

RECEIVED

NSC/S PROFILE

SECRET

ID 8102374

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 30 APR 81 12

4

TO PRES

FROM ALLEN

mm
17/10

DOCDATE 14 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: CUBA

ANGOLA

SUBJECT: UPI NEWS RPT ON CUBAN FORCES IN ANGOLA

ACTION: RETURNED TO NSC/S FOR FILE DUE: STATUS C FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

***** S E C R E T *****

82296

DATE 02/23/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

EOB:ARA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
 DE RUEHUS #1159 0501835
 O 191830Z FEB 81
 FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3687

S E C R E T HAVANA 01159

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 2/18/00 (SMITH, W.S.)

TAGS: ASEC, PEPR, PDIP, CU, ES, US

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO CUBANS ON EL SALVADOR

REF: A) HAVANA 946, B) STATE 39740 C) STATE 41276

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WITH BRIEFINGS IN WASHINGTON, WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA IN MIND, AND GIVEN THAT CUBANS THEMSELVES ARE SO LARGE A PART OF THE PROBLEM, I WOULD AGAIN URGE THAT WE SOON DISCUSS MATTER WITH THEM ALONG LINES INDICATED REF A.

3. FIRM DEMARCHE WHICH MAKES IT CLEAR WE KNOW WHAT HAS BEEN GOING ON AND THAT IT MUST STOP, BUT WHICH AT SAME TIME HOLDS OUT POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVED RELATIONS IF CUBANS DO COOPERATE, COULD HAVE USEFUL IMPACT HERE. AS IN DEALINGS ACROSS THE BOARD WITH CUBANS, IDEA TO IMPRESS UPON THEM IS THAT THERE ARE PENALTIES TO CHALLENGING OUR INTERESTS, BUT BENEFITS IF THEY ACCOMMODATE US.

4. TIMING MAY BE RIGHT FOR SUCH A DEMARCHE. CUBANS REALIZE OFFENSIVE FAILED AND I HAVE IMPRESSION THEY ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC AS TO FUTURE PROSPECTS OF GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR. IN CONVERSATION OVER WEEKEND WITH JOSE ANTONIO ARBEZU OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S FOREIGN RELATIONS DIVISION, HE DESCRIBED SITUATION IN WAKE OFFENSIVE'S OBVIOUS FAILURE AS "AN IMPASSE" AND NOTED THAT CONDITIONS MIGHT THUS BE FAVORABLE FOR A CEASE FIRE AND A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT. I SAID NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE AMONG SALVADORAN PARTIES AND REITERATED OUR DETERMINATION NOT

***** S E C R E T *****

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M09-259/5#82296

BY RW NARA DATE 10/3/00

~~*****SECRET*****~~

DATE 02/23/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO LET GUERRILLAS TAKE POWER.

5. ARBEZU MAY SIMPLY HAVE BEEN SPEAKING FOR EFFECT, I.E. TO
HINT AT MORE WILLINGNESS ON CUBAN SIDE TO PULL IN THEIR HORNS
THAN IN FACT EXISTS. I DO NOT SEE THAT WE WOULD LOSE ANYTHING,
HOWEVER, BY TESTING THEM THROUGH SORT OF DEMARCHE SUGGESTED IN
REF A.
SMITH

PSN: 009267

TOR: 051/01158Z

HTG: 191830Z FEB 81

~~*****SECRET*****~~



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

RA Nan Vp
Pipes/steerman Fountain

~~SECRET~~

NGD 383

PAGE 01 HAVANA 01768 071920Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 /001 W

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0 071800Z MAR 81
FM USINT HAVANA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4231

S E C R E T HAVANA 1768

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 3/7/2000 (SMITH, W.S.)

TAGS: PEPR, CU, UR

SUBJ: CUBAN IRRITATION OVER SOVIET CHARGE'S STATEMENTS

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT

2. DURING CONVERSATION WITH JLP ON OTHER SUBJECTS MARCH 4, I MENTIONED TO HIM THAT I HAD SEEN U.S. TELEVISION INTERVIEW WITH SOVIET CHARGE BESSMERTNKYH ON MARCH 1 IN WHICH LATTER, AS I RECALLED, STATED THAT BOTH SOVIET AND CUBAN GOVERNMENTS HAD CATEGORICALLY DENIED CHARGES MADE IN U.S. WHITE PAPER. I WAS SURPRISED TO HEAR THAT, I SAID, SINCE I HAD NEVER SEEN OR HEARD ANY SUCH CUBAN DENIAL. IN FACT, I NOTED, JLP HIMSELF HAD OBVIOUSLY ALWAYS BEEN CAREFUL IN PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS NOT TO MAKE ANY SUCH DENIALS -- DENIALS WHICH OBVIOUSLY WOULD HAVE BEEN UNTRUE.

3. JLP BECAME QUITE AGITATED AND SAID I MUST BE WRONG; SURELY SOVIET CHARGE HAD NOT MADE SUCH STATEMENT. CUBA WOULD SPEAK FOR ITSELF. FURTHER, HE SAID, IF CUBA EVER SAID TO US THAT IT WAS NOT SENDING ARMS TO EL SALVADOR, THAT WOULD BE THE TRUTH. I WOULD BE NOT ONLY DISHONORABLE BUT FOOLISH AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO LIE ABOUT SO IMPORTANT AN ISSUE (HE LEFT UNSAID, ONE IN WHICH OTHER SIDE WOULD SO EASILY FIND YOU OUT).

4. I SAID CUBAN SIDE COULD EASILY FIND OUT EXACTLY WHAT SOVIET

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO9-259/5-#82297

BY RAV NARA DATE 10/8/10

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Department of State

8
**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

HAVANA 01768 071920Z

CHARGE HAD SAID. JLP AGREED AND MATTER WAS DROPPED. EVENING MARCH 6, HOWEVER, JLP'S SECRETARY CALLED TO SAY THEY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO GET TEXT OR OTHERWISE CONFIRM SOVIET CHARGE'S REMARKS. THEY WONDERED IF I COULD GET TEXT THROUGH MY CHANNELS. I SAID I WOULD TRY.

5. COMMENT: IF CUBANS HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO CONFIRM SOVIET CHARGE'S REMARKS, IT MAY WELL BE BECAUSE THEY ARE GETTING RUN-AROUND FROM SOVIETS. AS WE SHOULD EXPLOIT ANY POTENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CUBANS AND SOVIETS, I WOULD LIKE TO PROVIDE TEXT--OR AT LEAST THAT PORTION OF INTERVIEW IN WHICH CHARGE DENIED CHARGES. UNFORTUNATELY, I CANNOT REMEMBER ON WHICH SUNDAY TV INTERVIEW (MARCH 1) SOVIET CHARGE APPEARED, BUT I ASSUME THAT CAN EASILY BE DETERMINED IN WASHINGTON. WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF TEXT COULD BE OBTAINED AND FORWARDED ASAP.
SMITH

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

REC'D. S/S MAR 10 1981

1082

9

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

On March 5, you noted in an item presented by Admiral Nance at the morning intelligence briefing that Cuban officials had told a [redacted] that "the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had decided to embark on a worldwide campaign against the new Administration of the US Government, emphasizing US intentions to intervene politically and militarily in Central America."

You asked whether it would be possible for us to publicize such a decision by the 26th Party Congress. Admiral Nance made an inquiry and the Latin American division of the CIA indicated that it does not believe its source would be compromised if a phrase, [redacted] [redacted] were eliminated.

However, the Soviet division has "severe reservations" about the statement itself. A memorandum at Tab A explains those reservations. It is surprising to read the Soviet division's evaluation of the Congress, which identifies "the tone of the Congress and particularly Brezhnev's speech" to have "generally stressed forthcomingness and peace."

Given the disagreements, the Latin American division has deferred to the Soviet division regarding interpretation of the statement.

Whether a formal declaration of the 26th Party Congress was made, it is clear that the Soviets are gearing up for a major campaign against this Administration. I would have preferred to interpret the Latin American comments and proceeded with the information that a campaign against the new Administration is quite likely.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

~~SECRET~~

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

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BY *rw* M259/5 #82298
NARA DATE 8/1/18



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165

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82299	MEMO SITUATION ROOM TO ADMIRAL NANCE RE DECLASSIFICATION REQUEST	1	3/5/1981	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5 March

*I did a memo
to P on
this*

Bud--

Attached is Ann's findings from the CIA.

From what is said I don't believe credibility is necessarily to be served from what we now know and I wouldn't recommend mentioning the CPSU Congress' or decisions, and instead would suggest nothing more "quoteable" than "We believe the Soviets have decided to embark on a world-wide campaign against the new administration, emphasizing US intentions to intervene politically and militarily in Central America."

Frank Shatt

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FROM SITUATION ROOM

DOCDATE 05 MAR 81

SHOTT

05 MAR 81

ALLEN

09 MAR 81

KEYWORDS: USSR

CUBA

PANAMA

INTELLIGENCE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M259/5 #2301

BY

RW

N

TE

8/1/88

SUBJECT: PUBLICATION OF DECISION OF 26TH PARTY CONGRESS TO EMBARK ON CAMPAIGN
AGAINST NEW ADMINISTRATION

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO PRES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

PIPES ✓

FONTAINE ✓

GREGG ✓

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(C / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET ATTACHMENT

March 13, 1981

Mr. President:

Please glance at this intelligence
information report.



Richard V. Allen

SECRET ATTACHMENT

WD
11/7/16

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DATE 03/23/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA, NAN, COL, VP

EOB: ARA

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHCR #2027 0801830

O 211725Z MAR 81 ZFF-4

FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4433

S E C R E T HAVANA 2027

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 3/21/2000 (SMITH, WAYNE S.) OR-M

TAGS: DEPR, PINR, CU, US

SUBJECT: CUBAN REACTION TO US STATEMENTS

1. 9-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I SAW JLP EVENING MARCH 20. HE EXPRESSED MARKED PESSIMISM REGARDING US-CUBAN RELATIONS. CUBA UNDERSTOOD US POSITION ON EL SALVADOR, HE SAID, AND WAS PREPARED TO BE REASONABLE. US SHOULD ALREADY HAVE SEEN SOME EVIDENCE OF THAT. SECRETARY'S STATEMENTS BEFORE CONGRESS, HOWEVER, SEEMED TO TAKE THAT NOT AT ALL INTO ACCOUNT; RATHER, THEY SEEMED TO REFLECT HARDENED HOSTILITY TOWARD CUBA AND DETERMINATION TO HAVE CONFRONTATION. CUBA, HE SAID, WOULD HAVE PREFERRED REDUCTION OF TENSIONS AND IMPROVED RELATIONS; IT UNDERSTOOD THAT SOME "COMPROMISES" WERE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THAT. IF, HOWEVER, US WAS BENT ON CONFRONTATION, CUBA WOULD HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO DEFEND ITSELF BY WHATEVER MEANS IT COULD.

3. I REPLIED THAT US WAS OF COURSE SERIOUS ABOUT TERMINATION OF CUBAN SUPPORT TO GUERRILLAS IN EL SALVADOR, AND ELSEWHERE. SECRETARY'S STATEMENTS, I THOUGHT, WERE MEANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT. ON OTHER HAND, US WAS NOT INTERESTED IN CONFRONTATION FOR SAKE OF CONFRONTATION. CHANGES IN CUBAN POSTURE WOULD BE NOTED AND TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

USINT HAVANA 2027

DTG: 211725Z MAR 81 PSN: 049387
TOR: 080/2009Z

DECLASSIFIED

*****S E C R E T*****

NLRR MDA-259/5#82303

BY RW NARA DATE 10/8/10

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

20

DATE 03/23/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. COMMENT: IT DOES SEEM TO ME THAT WE HAVE MADE OUR POSITION
CLEAR TO CUBANS AND THAT WE GAIN NOTHING BY GIVING THEM
IMPRESSION THEY ARE DAMNED WHETHER THEY DO OR DON'T.
SMITH

USINT HAVANA 2027

DTG: 1211725Z MAR 81 PSN: 049367
TOR: 080/2009Z


~~*****S E C R E T*****~~


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

21

Dick

F.Y.I.





THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Allen:

Attached is a proposed memorandum for the President on the Cuban Euroloan you requested on Saturday.

Situation Room

Brufed
3/2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONSECRET-SENSITIVEMarch 18, 1981
*Bruford to P
3/23*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Euroloan to Cuba

Last Friday [] a French government-owned bank, confirmed that the bank was pulling out of a 13-member consortium of West European, Soviet, and Arab banks which had been making arrangements to loan Cuba \$66 million. Such a move is most unusual, and perhaps unprecedented. The action follows discussions Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet had in Washington with Secretaries Regan and Baldrige in which they expressed our concern about a French government-owned bank taking the lead in a syndicated Cuban loan. The French pull out does not, however, necessarily mean the loan will not go through because another bank could replace [] (S)

Although most governments in the West long ago terminated or curtailed their official aid to Cuba, a fair number of lending institutions continue to make loans to Havana due to its excellent reputation as a credit risk and the untested theory that Moscow might act as guarantor in the case of a default. If Havana is successful in securing the loan, and it had reportedly been oversubscribed, Castro is likely to tout it as a financial and political victory. In the past he has been quick to point out that Cuba's continuing, normal economic relations with most non-communist countries underscores its broad acceptance as a "legitimate world actor." CIA comments that in view of the growing third world criticism of Cuba's support of Soviet intervention and its own activities in the Caribbean basin, Havana will have more incentive than ever to publicize the loan. (S)

~~SECRET~~

REVIEW ON MARCH 17, 2001
CLASSIFIED BY MULTIPLE SOURCES

DECLASSIFIED PART
NLR 17259/5 #82304
BY AW
DATE 8/11/8

MEMORANDUM

82387

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 25, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
THROUGH: RICHARD PIPES *RP*
FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY *PD*
SUBJECT: Soviet Defense Commitment to Cuba (S)

Recent Soviet statements on the nature of their defense commitment to Cuba have revealed Moscow does not want to be drawn into a potential U.S.-Cuban confrontation, because Soviet efforts to engage in a dialogue with the new Administration would be hindered. However, despite Soviet reluctance to commit itself publicly to a security guarantee to Cuba, it should not be assumed that the USSR is writing off its defense commitments to Havana. (S)

In the last few months, some Soviet pronouncements which support the above two contentions include:

-- In December 1980, Party Secretary Konstantin Chernenko's speech to the Cuban Party Congress eschewed anti-U.S. rhetoric and emphasized the need to resolve problems through negotiation. He stressed Soviet willingness to cooperate with the "broadest political and social forces" and asserted this could be accomplished through detente. He did not refer to a U.S. threat to Cuba and only mentioned the U.S. by name once -- in regard to Rapid Deployment Forces.

-- In early February, the First Deputy Minister of Defense Ogarkov visited Havana -- the first such high-level visit in over a year. While his visit clearly reflected continued Soviet support for Cuba, a divergence of views on the nature of the USSR's defense commitment surfaced. For example, Moscow ignored a February 11 Havana rally at which Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro referred to the alleged U.S. threat and Soviet/Cuban solidarity in crises. However, Ogarkov's rally remarks as reported only by Havana, merely implied that Cuba's defense was contingent upon its own armed forces combat readiness and quality of training.

-- On February 23, Brezhnev's speech before the 26th Party Congress made no mention of El Salvador. Moreover, he reasserted Moscow's right to react to requests for bolstering the defenses of established Third World regimes in Afghanistan, Angola and Ethiopia, but failed to extend any guarantee to Cuba. Rather, he only alluded to Cuba in a listing of socialist nations.

~~SECRET~~

Review March 25, 1981.

NOT HAS SEEN

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 1104-25915-82387

BY RWS NARA DATE 10/8/10

-- Castro's speech at the 26th Party Congress intended to spur increased public support for Cuba from Moscow only drew ambiguous expressions of routine Soviet support. Pravda carried a full version of Castro's Congress speech, but the February 24 TASS report omitted those passages which implied a Soviet commitment to defend Cuba. TASS did not report Castro's remarks implying that Moscow, having received Cuba's endorsement on its policies toward Afghanistan and Poland, must now enhance its support for Cuba. However, TASS did reiterate Moscow's support for normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations.

-- In Brezhnev's talks with Castro on February 26, Brezhnev only expressed routine, unspecified support for Cuba's efforts to build socialism and to thwart "another anti-Cuba campaign" waged by "U.S. imperialist circles."

-- Lastly, Soviet officials in private conversations have made a concerted effort to inform the U.S. that their support for Cuba is not absolute. (S)

In sum, the Soviet Union has manifested caution in extending a new security guarantee to Cuba. Clearly, Moscow does not want to be drawn into a potential U.S.-Cuban confrontation lest it hinder Soviet efforts to foster a dialogue with the U.S. (S)

Furthermore, it appears that recent Soviet statements on their defense commitment to Cuba are reflective of Soviet global tactics. That is, the Soviets are signalling the U.S. that they will not interfere in Central America in return for our non-interference in Poland and Afghanistan. Essentially, by promoting the notion of "spheres of influence" in which the superpowers are free to intervene to protect their "vital" interests, the USSR hopes to use U.S. involvement in El Salvador as a cover for its potential invasion of Poland. Clearly, Moscow does not expect total U.S. acquiescence to Soviet aggression in Poland; but, it is the degree and extent of American reaction which the Soviets hope to modify. (S)

Interesting memo.
Thanks -
Per
8/29

RECEIVED 27 MAR 81 17

TO ALLEN

FROM DOBRIANSKY

DOCDATE 25 MAR 81

PIPES

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

10/1/71/10

KEYWORDS: USSR

CUBA

SUBJECT: SOVIET DEFENSE COMMITMENT TO CUBA

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

FONTAINE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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(D /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 4/1 noted by RVA

RP, FC, Pd

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W/ATTCH

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4

82358 27

SENSITIVE

PAGE 330

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 302112Z MAR 81 ZFF4
FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4524

INFO AMEMBASSY MANAGUA IMMEDIATE 0169
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0128
AMEMBASSY PANAMA 0315
AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA 0549
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0075
USSOUTHCOM QUARRY HGTS

~~SECRET~~ HAVANA 02147

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/30/87 (SMITH, W.S.) DR-M
TAGS: PINS, FAIR, CU
SUBJECT: SAHSA HIJACKING; DEMARCHE TO CUBANS
REF: A) STATE 79838; STATE 79968

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT.
2. I CALLED CUBAN OFFICIAL CLOSE TO PRESIDENT CASTRO AND DELIVERED MESSAGE NOON MARCH 29, EMPHASIZING STRONGLY THAT CUBA SHOULD REFUSE ASYLUM TO SAHSA HIJACKERS AND SHOULD PROSECUTE THEM OR RETURN THEM TO HONDURAS IF THEY SHOWED UP HERE.
3. CUBAN OFFICIAL SAID HE UNAWARE OF STATE OF PLAY, BUT WOULD PASS MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT CASTRO. I CALLED BACK AGAIN MORNING MARCH 30 TO EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO MATTER AND TO URGE THAT IF DECISION HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE TO GRANT ASYLUM, IT BE RECONSIDERED.
4. I MADE FORMAL DEMARCHE TO MINISTRY FOREIGN RELATIONS AT 3 P.M. MARCH 30, MAKING ALL SAME POINTS ALREADY RAISED IN OTHER CHANNEL. MINISTRY OFFICIAL TOOK CAREFUL NOTES BUT WAS NONCOMMITAL. CUBA, HE REMARKED, WAS INDEED INTERESTED IN STOPPING HIJACKING, MARITIME AS WELL AS AERIAL. IT HAD GIVEN EVIDENCE OF THIS BY RETURNING HIJACKERS TO

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN CEL VF
EA,ARA,WEUR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M09-259/5 #82308
BY RW NARA DATE 10/8/10

PSN:003779

DTG:302112

TDR:0900031

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 331

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

US LAST SEPTEMBER, SINCE THEN, THERE HAD NOT BEEN A SINGLE HIJACKING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IN PRESENT CASE, HE COULD NOT SAY WHERE MATTERS STOOD, BUT HE ASSURED ME OUR VIEWS WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

5. CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE ORGAN GRAMMA THIS MORNING SIMPLY REPORTS THAT 15 PRISONERS HAVE BEEN RELEASED FROM HONDURAN JAILS AND THAT FOUR HIJACKERS ARE IN CUSTODY PANAMANIAN AUTHORITIES WHILE AWAITING SAFE CONDUCT TO "COUNTRIES TO WHICH THEY WISH TO GO AND WHICH ARE WILLING TO ACCEPT THEM."

6. COMMENT: CUBANS HIGHLY VALUE AIR CANADA FLIGHTS INTO HAVANA. DEMARCHE ON PART OF CANADIAN EMBASSY HERE, THEN, AS SUGGESTED REF B, COULD BE MOST USEFUL.
SMITH

BT

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 352

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
 IMMEDIATE

U 310027Z MAR 81 ZFF4
 FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4527

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ HAVANA 02150

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y MRN TO READ 2150 VICE 2148
 E.O. 12065: GDS 3/30/87 (SMITH, W.S.)

TAGS: PDIP, PPDC, CU

SUBJECT: CASTRO EXPRESSES WISHES FOR PRESIDENT'S RAPID RECOVERY

REF: STATE 80229

1. FOREIGN MINISTER MALMIERCA CALLED ME TO MINISTRY AT 6 P.M.
 MARCH 30 TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR INFO IN REFTEL (WHICH I
 HAD EARLIER TRANSMITTED TO MINISTRY). PRESIDENT CASTRO, HE SAID,
 HAD ASKED THAT I BE CALLED IN AND REQUESTED TO EXPRESS TO MY
 GOVERNMENT ON HIS BEHALF PROFOUND CONCERN OVER THIS LAMENTABLE
 ACT OF VIOLENCE AND HIS MOST SINCERE WISHES FOR PRESIDENT'S RAPID
 RECOVERY.

2. MALMIERCA ADDED PERSONAL COMMENT THAT ATMOSPHERE OF REASON
 IN WHICH COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD MIGHT CONSTRUCTIVELY DISCUSS THEIR
 DIFFERENCES COULD ONLY BE FURTHER DAMAGED BY ACTS OF TERRORISM
 AND VIOLENCE. ATTACK AGAINST ANY WORLD LEADER THUS INJURED ALL AND
 WAS IN INTEREST OF NONE. HE ADDED HIS EXPRESSIONS OF REGRET TO
 THOSE OF PRESIDENT CASTRO AS WELL AS WISHES FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S
 RAPID RECOVERY.

SMITH

BT

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN COL VP
 ARA

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD9-259/5 #82309

BY RW NARA DATE 10/8/00

PSN:005255

DTG:310027

TOR:0902141

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 350

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

O 311717Z MAR 81
FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4537

UNCLAS HAVANA 2163

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PPDC SOPN PEPR CU

SUBJ: CUBAN REACTION TO ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST PRESIDENT
REAGAN

REF: HAVANA 2150

1. ONLY HOURS AFTER THE ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON MARCH 30, PRESIDENT CASTRO FORWARDED A MESSAGE EXPRESSING HIS "PROFOUND CONCERN OVER THIS LAMENTABLE ACT OF VIOLENCE AND MOST SINCERE WISHES FOR THE PRESIDENT'S RAPID RECOVERY."

2. USINT HAS RECEIVED NUMEROUS PHONE CALLS FROM OTHER CUBAN OFFICIALS AND FROM THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS CONDEMNING THE CRIMINAL ATTACK AND EXPRESSING BEST WISHES FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEEDY RECUPERATION.

3. CUBAN MEDIA HAVE REPORTED ATTACK ON PRESIDENT IN UNUSUALLY COMPLETE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD MANNER. CCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE ORGAN GRANMA PROVIDES ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF ATTACK AND OF PRESIDENT'S CONDITION BASED ON AP AND OTHER NON-SOCIALIST WIRE SERVICE REPORTS. THERE HAS BEEN NO EDITORIAL COMMENT OR EFFORTS TO GIVE ATTEMPT POLITICAL TWIST.

4. IN ADDITION, ALL JAMMING OF VOICE OF AMERICA HAS BEEN DROPPED. LATTER'S SPANISH LANGUAGE SERVICE TO LATIN AMERICA CAME IN LIKE A BELL ON MEDIUM WAVE MORNING OF MARCH 31. APPARENTLY, CUBAN GOVT WANTS ITS PEOPLE TO BE FULLY AND RELIABLY INFORMED ON THIS ISSUE.

SMITH

BT

***** WHSR COMMENTS *****

RA NAN COL VP
ARA

PSN:005161

DTG:311717

TOR:0902045

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

PAGE 351

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SENSITIVE

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PAGE 425 SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:
IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR MD9-259/5 #82310
BY RW NARA DATE 10/11/10

Q 021625Z APR 81
FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4569

INFO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0132
AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 0320

~~SECRET~~ HAVANA 02206

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 4/2/2000 (SMITH, WAYNE S.)
TAGS: PINS, EAIR, PEPR, CU, PN, CA
SUBJECT: SAHSA HIJACKING: CUBANS MAY NOT GIVE REFUGE
REF: A) HAVANA 2147 B) OTTAWA 1913 C) PANAMA 2904

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT.
2. KEY CUBAN OFFICIAL TOLD ME IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE NIGHT OF APRIL 1 THAT CUBA PROBABLY RPT PROBABLY WILL NOT ACCEPT THE SAHSA HIJACKERS. FINAL DECISION HAD NOT YET BEEN MADE, HE CAUTIONED, BUT OUR DEMARCHE OF MARCH 29 (REF A) HAD CALLED PRESIDENT CASTRO'S ATTENTION TO MATTER AND HE HAD STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT TAKING THEM OFF PANAMA'S HANDS. OFFICIAL HIMSELF WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO DOING SO, NOTING THAT IT WOULD DAMAGE CUBA'S IMAGE AND THAT CUBA WOULD GAIN NOTHING IN THE PROCESS. CUBA WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO HIJACKING. TO ACCEPT SAHSA HIJACKERS MIGHT SUGGEST THAT IT WAS NOT. IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE GOOD FOR PANAMANIAN; THEY COULD THEN WASH THEIR HANDS OF MATTER AND PASS HOT POTATO TO CUBA. "WHY SHOULD WE TAKE IT?" HE ASKED RHETORICALLY.
3. I AGAIN URGED THAT CUBA REFUSE ASYLUM TO HIJACKERS AND NOTED THAT GOVERNMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH BONN DECLARATION WERE COMMITTED TO SUSPENDING AIR LINKS WITH COUNTRIES WHICH GAVE REFUGE TO HIJACKERS. CANADA, I NOTED, WAS SIGNATORY OF BONN DECLARATION.
4. MEANWHILE, CANADIAN AMB TOLD ME AFTERNOON APRIL THAT HE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE DEMARCHE BUT EXPECTED THEM FROM ONE MOMENT TO NEXT AND PLANNED TO GO IN IMMEDIATELY

***** WSHR COMMENTS *****

RA NAM COL VP
ARA

SENSITIVE

PAGE 426

SITUATION(S) MESSAGE(S) LISTING

DATE 04/07/81//097

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ONCE THEY WERE IN HAND.

5. COMMENT: I DO NOT WISH TO RAISE FALSE HOPES, BUT I DO BELIEVE
THERE IS NOW AT LEAST GOOD CHANCE CUBANS WILL NOT RPT GRANT
ASYLUM TO THESE HIJACKERS, ESPECIALLY IF CANADIANS WEIGH IN TODAY,
AS IT WOULD SEEM FROM REF B THEY WILL.
SMITH

BT

SENSITIVE

82311

DATE 04/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA NAN COL VP
EOB: ARA,EEUR
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHCR #2267 0961843
O 061830Z APR 81
FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4611

~~SECRET~~ HAVANA 2267

NDDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 4/6/80 (SMITH, W.S.) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, MILI, CU, UR, PL

~~SUBJ: CUBAN MOBILIZATION MAY BE RELATED TO POLAND~~

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT

2. I UNDERSTAND [REDACTED]
CUBAN ARMED FORCES ARE NOW ON ALERT.

3. CONFIRMATION OF THIS IS SEEN IN REPORTS FROM
VARIOUS CUBAN ACQUAINTANCES OF USINT AND OTHER
DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS THAT FRIENDS AND FAMILY MEMBERS
IN RESERVES HAVE BEEN MOBILIZED DURING PAST WEEK OR SO.

4. SOME OF THE MILITARY MOVEMENT AROUND ISLAND, DRILLING
OF MILITIA, ETC, ARE DOUBTLESS RELATED TO PREPARATIONS
FOR MAY DAY RALLY. MOST LIKELY EXPLANATION FOR ALERT
ITSELF, HOWEVER, IS POLISH SITUATION. SOVIETS MAY
EVEN HAVE INFORMED CUBANS THAT CHANCES OF INTERVENTION
ARE HIGH.

5. ONE OF CASTRO ENTOURAGE COMMENTED GLUMLY TO VISITING AMERICAN
DR. BERNARDO BENES, ON APRIL 3 THAT IN EVENT OF
SOVIET INVASION OF POLAND, CASTRO KNEW PERFECTLY
WELL SOVIETS WOULD ABANDON CUBA TO ITS FATE. EVEN

USINT HAVANA 2267

DTG: 061830Z APR 81 PSNI 014168
TOR: 007/0423Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR 109-259/3#8231/

BY RW NARA DATE 3/12/12

13526
E.O. 12065
3.3(b)(1)
Sec.

*****~~SECRET~~*****

35

DATE 04/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SO, SHOULD US MOVE AGAINST CUBA, LATTER WOULD HAVE
NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO FIGHT TO THE LAST.

6. VARIOUS WESTERN MEMBERS OF DIPLOMATIC ROPS HERE
HAVE SPECULATED THAT SHOULD SOVIETS GO INTO POLAND,
THEY MIGHT EVEN WELCOME US MOVE AGAINST CUBA WHICH
WOULD TAKE ATTENTION AWAY FROM THEIR OWN ACT OF
AGGRESSION AND DIVIDE WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.
SMITH

USINT HAVANA 2207

DTG:001830Z APR 81 PSN: 014100
TOR: 097/0423Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

~~TOP SECRET~~

1897

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

~~TOP SECRET~~

INFORMATION

April 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: WILLIAM L. STEARMAN

SUBJECT: Cuban Developments

Fear of possible Poland-related U.S. moves against Cuba may explain the current alert status in Cuba and the current deployment of a Soviet Navy Task Group to Cuban waters. In his April 7 Prague speech, Brezhnev also apparently felt it necessary to assure the Cubans that "the Soviet Union firmly and invariably supports and will continue to support the fraternal Cuban people." (TS [redacted]) *important point*

A Soviet Navy Task Group consisting of the 9,500-ton cruiser Kara and two Krivak-class cruisers should arrive in the Caribbean tomorrow (April 10). The Kara is, according to State/INR, "the most capable surface combatant yet deployed to the area." (A U.S. frigate has begun shadowing them.) This will be the 21st Soviet Navy deployment to the Caribbean, and it is expected to exercise with the recently beefed-up Cuban Navy and to circumnavigate the Gulf of Mexico (as have past such deployments). (TS [redacted])

In Cuba itself, there has been ship and aircraft dispersal, and various military installations have been placed on alert. New antiaircraft sites have been established in the Havana area. On April 6, two Soviet TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft that flew to Cuba last week were active off the East Coast of the United States. (TS [redacted])

cc: Robert Schweitzer
Roger Fontaine
Richard Pipes

~~TOP SECRET~~

Review on April 8, 2011
Derivative Classification by
Director, CIA

DECLASSIFICATION

BY *RW* DATE 8/1/18
#82312

RVA HAS SEEN

RECEIVED

1897

37

81 APR 9 P 4: 53

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

OK 9/1606

A 9/1900

Mr 14/1

cid 14/0720

OK 14/0735

OK

I saw him earlier!

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

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NSC/S PROFILE

~~TOP SECRET/CODEWORD~~

ID 8101897

38

RECEIVED 09 APR 81 17

TO ALLEN

FROM STEARMAN

DOCDATE 09 APR 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*my
4/2/80*

KEYWORDS: CUBA

USSR

MILITARY POSTURE

SUBJECT: CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS W/ RUSSIA

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

SCHWEITZER ✓

PIPES ✓

FONTAINE ✓

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC/FID

(M / *B*)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 4/14 noted by Allen *SR/SC/FO/RA*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

DATE 04/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RA NAN COL VP
EOB: ARA
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHUB #2427 1031840
O 131810Z APR 81
FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WARHDC IMMEDIATE 4732

S E C R E T HAVANA 2427
NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 4/13/00 (SMITH, W.S.) OR-M
TAGS: EAIR PINS ASEC PDIP CU US
SUBJ: CUBAN COMMENTS ON US PROTEST NOTES
REF: STATE 86935

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT

2. DURING CONVERSATION WITH JOSE LUIS PADRON ON
APRIL 10 I EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT STATEMENT ON CUBAN
REP AT ICAO REGIONAL SECURITY SEMINAR. OUR TWO
COUNTRIES HAD BEEN ABLE TO COOPERATE RATHER EFFECTIVELY
IN SEVERAL RECENT HIJACKINGS; I COULD SEE NOTHING THAT
WOULD HAVE OCCASIONED SUCH AN ATTACK, AND THE CHARGES
MADE BY THEIR REP HAD BEEN GROUNDLESS AND RATHER SILLY.

3. JLP SAID CUBAN REP AT ICAO SEMINAR HAD ACTED
WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. STATEMENT HAD BEEN HIS OWN.
"HAD HE BEEN ACTING ON INSTRUCTIONS," JLP NOTED,
"YOU CAN BE SURE INSTRUCTIONS WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCU-
RATE; HE WOULD HAVE RAISED REAL COMPLAINTS RATHER THAN INACCURATE
DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENTS OF LONG AGO."

4. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE THAT CUBAN REP HAD ACTED AS
HE HAD, JLP CONCEDED. GOC WAS OPPOSED TO HIJACKING
AND US SAID IT WAS TOO. TWO SIDES HAD RECENTLY

USINT HAVANA 2427

DTG: 131810Z APR 81 PSN: 024320
TOR: 104/1311Z

*****S E C R E T*****

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 109-25915 #82313

BY RW NARA DATE 10/8/05

DATE 04/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

COOPERATED RATHER EFFECTIVELY IN FIELD OF AERIAL HIJACKING. CUBANS HAD RETURNED HIJACKERS TO US IN SEPT, THUS HALTING SPATE OF HIJACKINGS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. AT OUR REQUEST, THEY HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT SAHSA HIJACKERS -- AND REFUSED, HE EMPHASIZED, AT SOME COST TO CUBA. NOW THAT US HAD RAISED MATTER TO LEVEL OF DIPLOMATIC PROTEST NOTE, HOWEVER, RATHER THAN SIMPLY ANSWERING AT ICAO SEMINAR, GOC WOULD HAVE NO RESOURSE BUT TO ANSWER THAT NOTE. USG HAD LISTED VARIOUS ITEMS. GOC HAD COMPLAINTS OF ITS OWN TO LIST. WHAT, FOR INSTANCE, OF ALL THE MARITIME HIJACKERS WHO HAD FOUND REFUGE IN US? ONLY HIJACKERS OF ONE BOAT HAD EVEN BEEN PROSECUTED, AND THEY HAD BEEN RELEASED. AND WHAT OF INCIDENT AT MIAMI AIRPORT ON FEB 22 IN WHICH LIVES OF SOME 50 PASSENGERS AND CREW ABOARD CUBANA PLANE HAD BEEN ENDANGERED? THIS COULD ONLY BE SEEN AS SERIOUS TERRORIST ATTEMPT INVOLVING AIRCRAFT AND SAFETY OF PASSENGERS, YET MIAMI AUTHORITIES SEEMED TO BE TREATING IT LIGHTLY. IT WAS GOC'S UNDERSTANDING THAT MAN RESPONSIBLE HAD BEEN RELEASED ON VERY LIGHT BAIL.

5. I SUGGESTED IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR ALL SIDES IF CUBAN NOTE WERE PHRASED IN CONSTRUCTIVE TERMS. IMPORTANT THING WAS TO COOPERATE WITH ONE ANOTHER IN EFFORTS TO HALT HIJACKINGS. THOSE EFFORTS WOULD NOT BE FURTHERED IF WE GOT LOCKED INTO PROCESS OF RECITING TO ONE ANOTHER TRANSGRESSIONS OF PAST.

6. JLP AGREED AND REITERATED THAT CUBAN WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE WAS SEEN MOST RECENTLY IN ITS POSITIVE RESPONSE TO OUR DEMARCHE REGARDING SAHSA HIJACKERS. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS NOT OVERSEEING DRAFTING OF CUBAN REPLY AND THUS COULD NOT GUARANTEE OUTCOME.
SMITH

USINT HAVANA 2427

DTG: 131810Z APR 81 P8N1 024320
TOR: 104/1311Z

DATE 04/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: ARA
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #0810 1052211
O P 152145Z APR 81 ZFFB
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 6502

INFO WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY 6418
BT

S E C R E T STATE 090810
NDDIS
E.O. 12065 IRDS-3, 4/15/2001 (FRECHETTE, MYLES R.R.)

TAGS: ASEC, PINS, PTER, CU, US

SUBJECT: (U) MURDER OF CUBAN UN DIPLOMAT FELIX GARCIA

REF: HAVANA 2445

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. PLEASE MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS TO PADRON:

-- FBI TOLD CUBANS IN NEW ORLEANS IN OCTOBER 1980 THAT INVESTIGATION WAS LIKELY TO TAKE LONG TIME (FYI FBI POINTED OUT LETELIER INVESTIGATION TOOK TWO YEARS END FYI).

-- FBI IS CONTINUING ITS INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION.

-- FBI BELIEVES IT HAS MADE PROGRESS.

SECSTATE WASHDC 6810

DTG: 152145Z APR 81 PSNI 020201
TOR: 105/2210Z

*****S E C R E T*****

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M04-259/5#82314

BY RW NARA DATE 10/8/10

*****~~SECRET~~*****

42

DATE 04/17/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

-- FBI REMAINS COMMITTED TO MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO BRING
THE GARCIA MURDER INVESTIGATION TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HAIG

SECSTATE WASHDC 6810

DTG:152145Z APR 81 PSNI 026281
TOR: 105/2210Z

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*****~~SECRET~~*****

43
82315

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB: ARA, NUCUN, SCINU
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #9586 1072220
O 172144Z APR 81
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 6533

S E C R E T STATE 099586
EXDIS
E.O. 12065:GDS 4/16/87 (KIRKPATRICK, JEANE J.)

TAGS: PINA, MILI, CU, UR, US

SUBJECT: ALLEGATION THAT THERE IS A NUCLEAR BASE IN CUBA
REF: USINT HAVANA 02251

1. SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT

2. CONCERNING YOUR INQUIRY DERIVING FROM REMARKS AT THE CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL ACTION CONFERENCE. OBVIOUSLY INVOLVED HERE IS A QUESTION OF SEMANTICS. I AM SURE YOU KNOW THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE SUBMARINE BASE AT PUNTA MOVIDA ON CIENFUEGOS BAY HAS THE CAPACITY OF SERVICING NUCLEAR SUBMARINES AND THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE ACCESS TO IT.

3. WHETHER IT IS MORE FREQUENTLY USED BY THE GROWING CUBAN NAVY IS IRRELEVANT TO THE POINT OF GROWING SOVIET NAVAL CAPACITY IN THE CARIBBEAN. FOR THE RECORD, MY COMMENT AT THE CONFERENCE WAS PART OF A LONGER DESCRIPTION OF THE GROWTH OF SOVIET POWER IN THE HEMISPHERE WHICH FIRST

SECSTATE WASHDC 9586

DTG: 172144Z APR 81 PSN: 029354
TOR: 100/0123Z

*****~~SECRET~~*****

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NLRR MD9-259/5 #82315

BY RW NARA DATE 10/8/10

DATE 05/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

APPEARED IN MY ARTICLE "US SECURITY AND LATIN AMERICA," COMMENTARY, JANUARY 1981. THIS DESCRIPTION WAS CAREFULLY THOUGH INFORMALLY CHECKED FOR ME BY HIGH LEVEL US NAVAL AUTHORITIES.

4. THE FULL STATEMENT FROM THE ARTICLE FOLLOWS:

5. "IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS, THE SOVIET UNION HAS BECOME A MAJOR MILITARY POWER WITHIN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. IN CUBA, THE SOVIETS HAVE FULL ACCESS TO THE NAVAL FACILITIES AT CIENFUEGOS, NUCLEAR SUBMARINES, AIRSTRIPS THAT CAN ACCOMMODATE BACKFIRE BOMBERS. FROM THESE, SOVIET NAVAL RECONNAISSANCE PLANES HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS FLOWN MISSIONS OFF THE EAST COAST OF NORTH AMERICA. THEY ALSO HAVE ELECTRONIC-SURVEILLANCE FACILITIES THAT MONITOR AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND CABLE TRAFFIC AND A NETWORK OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES UNDER DIRECT SOVIET CONTROL. AND, OF COURSE, A SOVIET COMBAT BRIGADE. DURING THE SAME FOUR YEAR PERIOD THE SOVIETS HAVE CONTINUED TO FINANCE, TRAIN, AND STAFF A CUBAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WHICH HAS BY NOW BECOME A SIGNIFICANT INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET EXPANSION IN AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SOUTH ASIA AS WELL AS THROUGHOUT THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA. TODAY CUBA POSSESSES A SMALL NAVY; A SIZABLE NUMBER OF SUPERSONIC AIRCRAFT--INCLUDING 11-14'S AND MIG 21'S AND 23'S--THAT CAN BE QUICKLY ARMED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS; MODERN TRANSPORT PLANES CAPABLE OF AIRLIFTING CUBAN TROOPS ANYWHERE IN THE AREA; A HUGE ARMY; AND AN ESTIMATED 144 SAM-2 ANTI-AIRCRAFT MISSILE SITES. THE PRESENCE OF MORE THEN 50,000 CUBAN TROOPS AND MILITARY ADVISERS IN AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST PROVIDES ONE MEASURE OF THE SIZE AND UTILITY OF CUBA'S ARMED FORCES. THE CUBAN ROLE IN TRAINING, SUPPLYING, AND ADVISING REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS THROUGHOUT THE CARIBBEAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA ILLUSTRATES THE HEMISPHERIC IMPLICATIONS OF THIS BUILD-UP." HAIG

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