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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

MJD 1/7/2010

File Folder CUBA (01/04/1981-02/21/1981)

FOIA

S09-251

Box Number 29

164

| ID | Doc Type | Document Description | No of Pages | Doc Date | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 82288 | CABLE | HAVANA 0704 <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i> | 3 | 1/4/1981 | B1 |
| 82287 | CABLE | HAVANA 0704 <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i> | 9 | 1/4/1981 | B1 |
| 82289 | PAPER | RE CUBA <i>PAR 8/1/2018 M259/5</i> | 1 | ND | B1 B3 |
| 82290 | CABLE | RE CUBA <i>R 8/1/2018 M259/5</i> | 1 | 1/28/1981 | B1 B3 |
| 82291 | CABLE | HAVANA 551 <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i> | 3 | 1/28/1981 | B1 |
| 82292 | MEMO | ALEXANDER HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT RE CUBA <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i> | 5 | ND | B1 |
| 82293 | CABLE | HAVANA 951 <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i> | 16 | 2/12/1981 | B1 |

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 4, 1981

FROM: USINT Havana 0704

TO: SecState

REF: (A) Caracas 804, (B) Panama 1024, (C) Caracas 889

SUBJ: Cuban Susceptibility to Mexican Demarche on El Salvador

Indications in Refs A and B that some key figures in Panama, Mexico and Venezuela are beginning to swing around to idea of negotiated solution in El Salvador are encouraging. I continue to believe Mexicans have best chance of influencing Castro, if they willing to so involve themselves. In this context, remarks of Mexican Ambassador Martinez to me several days ago may be significant. Mexico, he said, would not be disposed to make isolated demarche, or as part of campaign publicly to embarrass Cuba, but it would be willing to use its influence with Cubans as part of a broader process aimed at bringing about peaceful solution in El Salvador. With such "broader process" now beginning, and Carvajal apparently involved in it, chances of Mexican demarche to Cubans aimed at halting weapons flow would seem to have improved. Presentation to Mexican Government of convincing evidence of Cuban intervention in El Salvador might help further.

I would share Ambassador Luers' skepticism concerning effect of Mexican demarche were it to be carried out in a vacuum. Clearly, Cubans would not give up a profitable venture simply because Mexicans frowned upon it. But Mexican effort, if it is made, would only be one factor in developing equation. With beginning of disintegration old order in Central America, fall of Somoza, of Sir Gairy in Grenada, etc., Cubans concluded that there were, after all, tempting targets of opportunity which they might exploit without great risks.

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Review on February 4, 1987
Derivative State Cable Havana 704

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BY RW NARA DATE 10/8/10

There was little on other side of argument to deter them, possibility of improving relations with us had already dissipated and problems had emerged with countries such as Venezuela, Peru and Panama, which might earlier have exercised some restraining influence on Havana. Investment over the years in the Sandinistas had paid off; things started out well in El Salvador. In this kind of environment, Cubans did indeed begin to swing back (though swing would seem to have been more tactical than strategic) to an approach more reminiscent of the 60's. I would not presume to analyze from Havana the Soviet element in all this, but from evidence we see here it would seem Soviets simply went along. Initiative was basically Cuban.

For a time, Cubans seemed to have everything going their way in El Salvador. World public opinion (thanks to the excesses of the security forces) was against the JRG (the Revolutionary Governing Junta). The military situation favored guerrillas. Cuba's assistance to guerrillas caused it no particular problems with members of international community whose friendship Cuba valued or from whom Cuba wanted something. With everything going so well, there was little incentive for the Cubans to chart a more moderate course. Convinced the Marxist insurgents were going to win, the Cubans were not reluctant to step up assistance to them, thus laying groundwork for same kind of relationship with them, once in power, they now have with Sandinistas. Marxist guerrillas were bent on violence and Cubans saw no reason not to go along.

Environment has now changed, and with it, Cuban perceptions. The "final offensive" of Marxist guerrillas failed. Neither the military offensive nor the strike received any significant public support. International public opinion,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

3

once strongly against the JRG, is now wavering and if JRG can begin to get security forces under control, may swing against guerrillas. Cubans see all this. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez recently stated to ex-Prime Minister Heath that guerrilla offensive was a flop and that guerrillas should now negotiate. This may imply only tactical veer, but it at least confirmed my recognition on Cuban part (which we have heard from other sources as well) of a change in the military situation. They are no longer sure of Marxist guerrilla victory and may now be asking themselves if El Salvador is really a ripe target of opportunity after all. If added to this calculation they begin to feel pressure from Mexico and others, they might indeed pull back. Their whole approach in Central America is geared to the exploitation of opportunities. They did not create the revolutionary dynamic there; they are feeding it and trying to take advantage of it. At the same time, they are sufficiently pragmatic to pull back if they perceive the gains to have become questionable and the price too high. The Mexicans, if they will, could help with that perception.

Smith

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Castro signals Reagan. 'Let's at least talk'

By James Nelson Goodsell

Latin America correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor.
Caracas

Cuba is quietly letting the Reagan administration know that it would welcome a dialogue on issues dividing the two countries.

Although the possibility of any Cuba-United States rapprochement would appear remote, given President Reagan's views on the subject, the Cubans nevertheless do not rule out the possibility.

Indeed, they are letting the US know that they would like to explore it.

Cuban diplomats throughout Latin America have sought out their US counterparts at events during the past month.

Their message: Let's at least talk.

They know perfectly well that Mr. Reagan has taken a hard line on any improvement of relations with Cuba, but the Cuban view holds that this may be more a domestic ploy to satisfy the President's supporters than a hard-and-fast policy decision.

They note, for example, that Mr. Reagan included Ramon Sanchez Parodi, head of the Cuban interest section in Washington, when he invited the Washington diplomatic corps to one of his first receptions.

Mr. Sanchez Parodi, who has been head of the Cuban diplomatic team in Washington since it was set up three years ago, had not been invited to the Carter White House — on the legitimate technicality that he merely headed up a section within the Czechoslovakian Embassy.

That nicety did not seem to bother Mr. Reagan.

★ Please turn to Page 12

From page 1

'Let's at least talk,' Cuba quietly tells Reagan

And Cubans are asking just what it means. They wonder also whether Mr. Reagan may not want a foreign-policy breakthrough like Mr. Nixon's major overture to China.

The Cubans have little to go on — and, moreover, they are most unclear about the people who are being appointed to jobs involving Latin American in the Reagan administration.

Like many other Latin Americans, they know little about James R. Greene, the American Express executive whose name keeps coming up for the post of assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs. They are not aware, for example, that it was Mr. Green who successfully negotiated the difficult US agreement with Peru on expropriation claims dating back to the 1968 takeover of the International Petroleum Company.

On the other hand, they know a great deal about Mr. Reagan's background and his views. They suspect that he is interested in leaving a good mark in the history books, and they wonder if one of the ways he might do this is through a major movement to normalize relations with Cuba.

Specifically, they suggest there is a whole list of issues upon which dialogue could proceed immediately. Among them: the expropriation of US businesses, dating from the time soon after Fidel Castro came to power in 1959; the exchange of culture and technology; the enlargement of the diplomatic presence in each other's capitals; further accords on skyjackers; economic matters; and air routes.

In addition, the Cubans indicate that there could be talks on the Guantánamo naval base on the south coast of Cuba (which the US rents); US spy flights over the island; Cuban demands for indemnification on a variety of issues, and more prisoner exchanges.

They quickly note, however, that there can be no discussion on one issue: the 20-year-old US blockade of the island; it must end, they say.

Moreover, some of the issues the Cubans are willing to discuss — such as Guantánamo, indemnification, and spy flights — would appear to be issues on which the US may not be willing to negotiate any immediate accords.

The Cubans are also adamant that the Cuban troop presence in Angola is essentially a domestic matter comparable to the US troop presence in South Korea, an item that came up only last week with the visit of South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan to the White House. In effect, the Cubans are saying: If you don't like the presence of Cubans in Angola, we don't like the presence of North Americans in South Korea.

The Cubans appear reluctant to discuss El Salvador — and the US contends that the Cubans are actively assisting leftist guerrillas there. Apart from denying they are involved, the issues do not appear to be ones they want to discuss in detail, at least at this moment.

What lies behind the Cuban effort to find accommodation with Washington can only be guessed at. For one thing, Cubans readily admit that the 20-year strain in relations has gone on long enough. They are ready for new

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AMEMBASSY CARACAS 278
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AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 47
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 660
AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 271
AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 65
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 HAVANA 0704

EXDIS
MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 120651 GDS 2/4/87 (SMITH, W.S.) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, CU, ES, MX
SUBJ: CUBAN SUSCEPTIBILITY TO MEXICAN DEMARCHE ON EL SALVADOR
REF: (A) CARACAS 804 (B) PANAMA 1024 (C) CARACAS 889

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT

2. INDICATIONS IN REFS A AND B THAT SOME KEY FIGURES IN PANAMA, MEXICO AND VENEZUELA ARE BEGINNING TO SWING AROUND TO IDEA OF NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR ARE ENCOURAGING. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE MEXICANS HAVE BEST CHANCE OF INFLUENCING CASTRO, IF THEY WILLING TO SO INVOLVE THEMSELVES. IN THIS CONTEXT, REMARKS OF MEXICAN AMBASSADOR MARTINEZ TO ME SEVERAL DAYS AGO MAY BE SIGNIFICANT. MEXICO, HE SAID, WOULD NOT BE DISPOSED TO MAKE ISOLATED DEMARCHE, OR AS PART OF CAMPAIGN PUBLICLY TO EMBARRASS CUBA, BUT IT WOULD BE WILLING TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH CUBANS AS PART OF A BROADER PROCESS AIMED AT BRINGING ABOUT PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR. WITH SUCH "BROADER PROCESS" NOW BEGINNING,



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

RA NAN COL VP
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BY RW NARA DATE 10/8/09

AND CARVAJAL APPARENTLY INVOLVED IN IT, CHANCES OF MEXICAN DEMARCHE TO CUBANS AIMED AT HALTING WEAPONS FLOW WOULD SEEM TO HAVE IMPROVED. PRESENTATION TO MEXICAN GOVT OF CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF CUBAN INTERVENTION IN EL SALVADOR MIGHT HELP FURTHER.

3. I WOULD SHARE AMB LUERSI SKEPTICISM CONCERNING EFFECT OF MEXICAN DEMARCHE WERE IT TO BE CARRIED OUT IN A VACUUM. CLEARLY, CUBANS WOULD NOT GIVE UP A PROFITABLE VENTURE SIMPLY BECAUSE MEXICANS FROWNED UPON IT. BUT MEXICAN EFFORT, IF IT IS MADE, WOULD ONLY BE ONE FACTOR IN DEVELOPING EQUATION. WITH BEGINNING OF DISINTEGRATION OLD ORDER IN CENTRAL AMERICA, FALL OF SOMOZA, OF SIR GAIKY IN GRENADA, ETC., CUBANS CONCLUDED THAT THERE WERE, AFTER ALL, TEMPTING TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY WHICH THEY MIGHT EXPLOIT WITHOUT GREAT RISKS. THERE WAS LITTLE ON OTHER SIDE OF ARGUMENT TO DETER THEM. POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH US HAD ALREADY DISSIPATED AND PROBLEMS HAD EMERGED WITH COUNTRIES SUCH AS VENEZUELA, PERU AND PANAMA, WHICH MIGHT EARLIER HAVE EXERCISED SOME RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON HAVANA. INVESTMENT OVER THE YEARS IN THE SANDINISTAS HAD PAID OFF, THINGS STARTED OUT WELL IN EL SALVADOR. IN THIS KIND OF ENVIRONMENT, CUBANS DID INDEED BEGIN TO SWING BACK (THOUGH SWING WOULD SEEM TO HAVE BEEN MORE TACTICAL THAN STRATEGIC) TO AN APPROACH MORE REMINISCENT OF THE 60'S. I WOULD NOT PRESUME TO ANALYZE FROM HAVANA THE SOVIET ELEMENT IN ALL THIS, BUT FROM EVIDENCE WE SEE HERE IT WOULD SEEM SOVIETS SIMPLY WENT ALONG. INITIATIVE WAS BASICALLY CUBAN.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3281

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 AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 48
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 661
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 HAVANA 0704

EXDIS
 MILITARY ADEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM, ONCE IN POWER, THEY NOW
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6. ENVIRONMENT HAS NOW CHANGED, AND WITH IT, CUBAN
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 INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION, ONCE STRONGLY AGAINST
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 NO LONGER SURE OF MARXIST GUERRILLA VICTORY AND MAY NOW
 BE ASKING THEMSELVES IF EL SALVADOR IS REALLY A RIPE

TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY AFTER ALL. IF ADDED TO THIS CALCULATION THEY BEGIN TO FEEL PRESSURE FROM MEXICO AND OTHERS, THEY MIGHT INDEED PULL BACK. THEIR WHOLE APPROACH IN CENTRAL AMERICA IS GEARED TO THE EXPLOITATION OF OPPORTUNITIES. THEY DID NOT CREATE THE REVOLUTIONARY DYNAMIC THERE; THEY ARE FEEDING IT AND TRYING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY ARE SUFFICIENTLY PRAGMATIC TO PULL BACK IF THEY PERCEIVE THE GAINS TO HAVE BECOME QUESTIONABLE AND THE PRICE TOO HIGH. THE MEXICANS, IF THEY WILL, COULD HELP WITH THAT PERCEPTION.

SMITH
BT

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 00

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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 AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 65
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 HAVANA 0704

EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

F.D. 19000; GDS 2/4/87 (SMITH, W.S.) OR-M

TAGS: REPR, CU, ES, MX

SUBJ: CUBAN SUSCEPTIBILITY TO MEXICAN DEMARCHE ON EL SALVADOR

REF: (A) CARACAS 804 (B) PANAMA 1024 (C) CARACAS 809

1. ENTIRE TEXT

2. INDICATIONS IN REFS A AND B THAT SOME KEY FIGURES IN PANAMA, MEXICO AND VENEZUELA ARE BEGINNING TO SWING AROUND TO IDEA OF NEGOTIATED SOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR ARE ENCOURAGING. I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE MEXICANS HAVE BEST CHANCE OF INFLUENCING CASTRO, IF THEY WILLING TO GET INVOLVED THEMSELVES. IN THIS CONTEXT, REMARKS OF MEXICAN AMBASSADOR MARTINEZ TO ME SEVERAL DAYS AGO MAY BE SIGNIFICANT. MEXICO, HE SAID, WOULD NOT BE DISPOSED TO MAKE ISOLATED DEMARCHE, OR AS PART OF CAMPAIGN PUBLICLY TO EMBARRASS CUBA, BUT IT WOULD BE WILLING TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH CUBANS AS PART OF A BROADER PROCESS AIMED AT BRINGING ABOUT PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN EL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SALVADOR. WITH SUCH "BROADER PROCESS" NOW BEGINNING, AND CARVAJAL APPARENTLY INVOLVED IN IT, CHANCES OF MEXICAN DEMARCHE TO CUBANS AIMED AT HALTING WEAPONS FLOW WOULD SEEM TO HAVE IMPROVED. PRESENTATION TO MEXICAN GOVT OF CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF CUBAN INTERVENTION IN EL SALVADOR MIGHT HELP FURTHER.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE: 003

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3281

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 AMEMBASSY MEXICO 874
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA 267
 AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA 48
 AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 661
 AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE 272
 AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 66
 RUESSD/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO 63
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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 HAVANA 0704

EXDIS
 MILITARY ADEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BE ASKING THEMSELVES IF EL SALVADOR IS REALLY A RIPE
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 THE GAINS TO HAVE BECOME QUESTIONABLE AND THE PRICE
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 WITH THAT PERCEPTION.
 SMITH

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TOR: 040/17:38Z

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1.6.81.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(P)
has seen
14

January 24, 1981

SECRET ATTACHMENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *for*

SUBJECT: Increasing Cuban Support for
Revolution in Central America

The attached item from the January 24 Morning Summary (Department of State) merits your attention.

Attachment

SECRET ATTACHMENT


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1/27/86 UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

13524
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 b(1), 1.4c

4. INCREASING CUBAN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA

Cuba is continuing to step up support for insurgency in Central America. Growing numbers of Guatemalan and Honduran leftists, in addition to Salvadoran insurgents, are receiving guerrilla training in Cuba, and clandestine arms shipments from Cuba appear to be increasing. Havana is urging Central American communist parties to adopt more militant policies and unite their efforts with those of other revolutionary groups.

* * *



A recent [redacted] report stated that 415 Guatemalans had completed the latest course.

Evidence is also mounting that Cuban-supplied weaponry is being transshipped from Nicaragua to El Salvador by air and surface routes through Honduras. Moreover, in November, Castro promised to supply Guatemalan insurgents with 63 tons of arms, according to a generally reliable source.

Other sources recently reported that Cuba doubts that the Salvadoran left can carry a "final offensive" to a successful conclusion, and is advising a return to hit and run tactics. Cuban-trained elements from other Latin American revolutionary groups reportedly are being readied to assist this effort. We cannot confirm reports of Cuban advisers with guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala, but a small number may well have been sent, at least temporarily.

Castro is now trying to prepare the Honduran Communist Party to lead an armed revolution within two years, [redacted] but for the time being wants to keep Honduras a relatively peaceful corridor for aid to insurgents in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Cuba continues to cultivate sympathy for Central American revolutionaries in discussions with Latin American and Western European leaders, stressing the "pluralist" aspects of the FSLN and other movements and the pressing need for social change. At the same time, however, Castro is trying to hasten the creation of a one-party state in Nicaragua, which he believes essential to the revolutionary process elsewhere in Central America.

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NLRR M259/S #82289

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BY RW, NARA DATE 8/1/18

*Reva
filed*

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- CUBAN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE ATTENDED PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN'S FIRST DIPLOMATIC RECEPTION TUESDAY NIGHT, BUT A TOP REAGAN ADVISER INSISTED IT HAD "NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE."

IT WAS THE FIRST TIME IN 19 YEARS THAT A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT ATTENDED THE TRADITIONAL WHITE HOUSE RECEPTION FOR FOREIGN DIGNITARIES GIVEN BY NEW PRESIDENTS.

"IT'S VERY INTERESTING," SAID RAMON SANCHEZ PARODI, HEAD OF THE CUBAN INTERESTS SECTION IN WASHINGTON, WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE INVITATION FOR HIM AND HIS WIFE.

RICHARD ALLEN, THE WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, TOLD REPORTERS, "ALL INTEREST SECTIONS ARE TRADITIONALLY INVITED. DON'T READ ANY SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE INTO IT."

SANCHEZ PARODI WAS AMONG THE 170 FOREIGN AMBASSADORS AND DIPLOMATS ON HAND FOR THE WHITE TIE AFFAIR. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME CUBA WAS REPRESENTED SINCE THE UNITED STATES BROKE RELATIONS WITH CUBA AFTER FIDEL CASTRO TOOK POWER.

MIGUEL MARTINEZ, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE CUBAN INTERESTS SECTION, SAID ATTENDANCE BY SANCHEZ PARODI AND HIS WIFE WAS "PURE PROTOCOL."

HE SAID THE "ONLY REASON" THE CUBANS WERE INVITED TO THE REAGAN WHITE HOUSE WAS THAT THERE WERE NO REPRESENTIVES OF THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT IN WASHINGTON FOUR YEARS AGO AFTER JIMMY CARTER TOOK OFFICE.

REAGAN TOOK A HARD LINE TOWARD CUBA DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN.

THE CUBAN INTEREST SECTION, WHICH HAS A U.S. COUNTERPART IN HAVANA, WAS ESTABLISHED SHORTLY AFTER CARTER ASSUMED THE PRESIDENCY. IT IS HOUSED IN THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN EMBASSY.

UPI 01-27-81 11:50 PES

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NLRR 0259/5 #82292

BY *bu* NARA DATE 8/1/18

FBIS 19

XINHUA: REAGAN RECEIVES PRC AMBASSADOR CHAI ZEMIN

04280730 BEIJING XINHUA IN ENGLISH 0723 GMT 28 JAN 81

(TEXT) WASHINGTON, JANUARY 27 (XINHUA)--PRESIDENT AND MRS. RONALD REAGAN MET FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ENVOYS AT A RECEPTION HE GAVE IN THEIR HONOR IN THE WHITE HOUSE TONIGHT.

THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THE PRESIDENT FORMALLY RECEIVED THE AMBASSADORS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES SINCE HIS INAUGURATION A WEEK AGO.

IN A BRIEF AND CORDIAL CONVERSATION WITH THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR, CHAI ZEMIN, PRESIDENT REAGAN EXPRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. AND CHINA WILL CONTINUE TO GROW.

VICE-PRESIDENT GEORGE BUSH, SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG, COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT EDWIN WEESE, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANT RICHARD ALLEN WERE AMONG THE TOP LEVEL OFFICIALS PRESENT ON THE OCCASION.

28 JAN 0839Z JH/KK



Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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COPY 11 OF 13 COPIES

SECRET N00341

PAGE 01 HAVANA 00585 282328Z
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SECRET HAVANA 0585

NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 12865: RDS-1 1/28/00 (SMITH, WAYNE S.)
TAGS: PINT, PINS, PDIP, PEPR, CU, NU, ES
SUBJ: SHIFTING CUBAN VIEW OF SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR

REF: (A) STATE 22193 (R) HAVANA 551

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT

2. SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR CAME UP DURING MIDNIGHT CONVERSATION (JAN 27) WITH JLP ON OTHER SUBJECTS (SEPTEL). AS I HAVE IN THE PAST, I EMPHASIZED THAT CONFLICT THERE WAS MATTER OF MARKED CONCERN TO USG. WE WERE NOT AGAINST CHANGE; ON CONTRARY, WE VERY MUCH FAVORED THE VARIOUS REFORMS INITIATED BY JRG. WE HAD NO SYMPATHIES WITH EXTREME RIGHT WING WHICH WISHED TO BLOCK THOSE REFORMS, BUT NEITHER WOULD WE COUNTENANCE TAKE-OVER ON PART OF LEFT-WING TERRORISTS. SO LONG AS CUBA WAS AIDING AND ABETTING THESE INSURGENTS, IT QUIXOTIC TO IMAGINE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN US-CUBAN RELATIONS; ATMOSPHERE WOULD SIMPLY NOT BE CONDUCTIVE.

3. JLP RESPONDED THAT IT WAS US RATHER THAN CUBA WHICH WAS MAJOR ARMS SUPPLIER IN EL SALVADOR. IT DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND HOW US COULD GIVE ARMS TO SAME PEOPLE WHO HAD MURDERED AMERICAN NUNS AND LABOR REPS.

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BY AW NARA DATE 10/8/00

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Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02

HAVANA 00585 282328Z

4. I NOTED THAT JRG NOW INVESTIGATING THOSE MURDERS AND THAT US WAS ASSURED THOSE RESPONSIBLE WOULD BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE, EVEN IF THEY TURNED OUT TO BE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY FORCES. REASONS FOR RESUMPTION OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE SHOULD BE CLEAR, LEFT-WING GUERRILLAS HAD LAUNCHED ALL-OUT OFFENSIVE AGAINST LEGITIMATE GOVT. WE HAD NO DOUBT THAT CUBA, PERHAPS THROUGH THIRD COUNTRIES, WAS DIRECTLY ASSISTING THAT EFFORT. US HAD NO INTENTION OF STANDING ASIDE. WE MIGHT HAVE SOME DIFFERENCES WITH JRG, BUT WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT SEE IT SWEEP ASIDE BY GUERRILLAS WHO WISHED TO IMPOSE THEIR IDEAS AT GUN POINT. CUBA SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT CLEARLY. IT SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE STRENGTH OF OUR RESOLVE. WE SUPPORTED PEACEFUL CHANGE IN EL SALVADOR (AND ELSEWHERE) AND OF COURSE WANTED TO SEE AN END TO THE BLOODSHED. BUT WE WOULD NOT SEE MARXIST GUERRILLAS OVERTHROW THE LEGITIMATE GOVT. CUBA SHOULD PULL IN ITS HORNS AND ADVISE ITS GUERRILLA FRIENDS IN SALVADOR TO GO THE SAME.

5. JLP RESPONDED THAT WHILE CUBA MIGHT BE HELPING ITS FRIENDS IN EL SALVADOR, IT DID NOT CONTROL SITUATION THERE. "YOU ARE HELPING YOUR FRIENDS, WE MAY BE HELPING OURS. IN OUR PROPAGANDA, WE ARE PROBABLY BOTH EXAGGERATING THE ASSISTANCE AND INFLUENCE OF THE OTHER."

6. UP TO THIS POINT JLP RESPONSE WAS RATHER STANDARD ONE WE HAVE HEARD BEFORE. SHIFT CAME, HOWEVER, WHEN HE ADDED THAT BLOODSHED SHOULD BE STOPPED. CUBA HAD NOT BEEN AND IS NOT NOW OPPOSED TO NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES IN EL SALVADOR. SOME ON LEFT THERE HAVE INDICATED INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS. NEITHER US NOR JRG HAS REALLY EXPLORED THE POSSIBILITIES. CUBA COULD NOT DICTATE TO SALVADORAN FRIENDS; IN FINAL ANALYSIS, DECISION WAS UP TO THEM. CUBA COULD, HOWEVER, GIVE ADVICE FOR WHAT IT WAS WORTH. EL SALVADOR WAS INDEED POLARIZED, BUT IT UNTHINKABLE THAT ONLY OPTION WAS FOR TWO SIDES TO GO ON KILLING ONE ANOTHER

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PAGE 03 HAVANA 00585 282328Z

UNTIL THERE NO ONE LEFT IN COUNTRY. IMAGINATIVE STATESMANSHIP WAS NEEDED. IT WOULD BE IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST IF FIGHTING STOPPED, GOVT WITH FULL SUPPORT OF PEOPLE WERE ALLOWED TO EMERGE, AND TENSIONS IN AREA COULD BE REDUCED.

7. I COMMENTED THAT CUBA COULD MAKE IMMEDIATE CONTRIBUTION TO REDUCING THOSE TENSIONS BY HALTING ASSISTANCE TO INSURGENTS IN SALVADOR. JLP RESPONDED THAT FORBEARANCE WOULD HAVE TO BE MUTUAL. SOLUTIONS COULD NOT BE FOUND ON UNILATERAL BASIS. CUBA WOULD NOT URGE SALVADORAN FRIENDS TO NEGOTIATE ONLY TO SEE THEM GUNNED DOWN BY SECURITY FORCES, AS HAD BEEN FATE OF FRD LEADERS A FEW WEEKS AGO. SOLUTIONS WOULD NOT BE EASY, FOR THIS WAS AN EQUATION IN WHICH VARIOUS SIDES HAD LITTLE CONFIDENCE IN ONE ANOTHER.

8. COMMENTS DESPITE HIS OSETIES, JLP IS A DOVE. HE CLEARLY FAVORS IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH US AND MODERATE CUBAN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH. WE SHOULD TAKE THESE PERSONAL PROCLIVITIES INTO ACCOUNT IN ANALYZING ABOVE REMARKS. EVEN FOR JLP, HOWEVER, THIS IS A SHIFT. IN PAST, HIS ATTITUDE HAS BEEN THAT WHILE CUBA HAD NOTHING AGAINST NEGOTIATIONS, EL SALVADOR WAS TOO POLARIZED FOR THAT TO BE FEASIBLE; TWO SIDES WOULD SIMPLY HAVE TO FIGHT IT OUT. NOW, HE SEEMS TO HAVE COME AROUND TO SEEING MERIT IN CEASEFIRE. FIGHTING IT OUT IS NO LONGER SEEN AS ONLY FEASIBLE OPTION. THIS PROBABLY COMES AS RESULT OF REALISTIC ASSESSMENT IN WAKE OF "FINAL OFFENSIVE'S" FAILURE. IF JLP'S SHIFT REFLECTS GENERAL RETHINK ON CUBAN SIDE, THEY MAY BE IN MOOD TO TEMPORIZE. IF SO, WE MIGHT BEGIN TO THINK OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORT BEYOND THAT ENVISAGED BY JRG. WE FULLY AGREE WITH REF A THAT LOGICAL FIRST STEP IN ANY DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE WOULD BE JRG TO GRN, BUT WE WOULD HOPE THAT MEXICO CAN BE ENGAGED EARLY ON IN THE PROCESS (AS SUGGESTED REF B) AND POINTED IN THE DIRECTION OF HAVANA. SMITH

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NO DISSEMINATION

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

January 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK ALLEN
 FROM: JANET Colson *of*
 BUD NANCE
 SUBJECT: Fort Chaffee, The Cubans and
 Representative John Paul Hammerschmidt.

As you directed, I called Mr. Garrick in California and read Tab (A) to him. He told me Dr. Martin Anderson worked these problems and asked that I contact him. I contacted Dr. Anderson, and he said since 150 troops were involved this was a national security problem and we would have to coordinate. Since I have seen more than 150 troops in the VD Ward at one time, it was difficult for me to see this as a national security problem. However, at this point I decided it would be easier to get the information for you than coordinate.

The Department of Health and Human Services is responsible for the Cuban refugee problem. General guidance comes from the Cuban Haitian Task Force. To satisfy the former governor of Arkansas, the Army originally had 1200 troops at Fort Chaffee. This has slowly been reduced to 500. This 500 consists of 2 MP companies and 1 rifle company. Their responsibility is external security and they will only be used in case of a riot where the regular guards can't handle the situation.

Of course, the Army wants to get out of the guard business. They knew they were going to have trouble when they proposed the reduction to 350 but they wanted to "sound the waters" and see to what extent the flak would be. It has been significant. Their plan is to meet with representatives from DOD, Justice and local leaders to reach a compromise. What the Army really wants is an OK to reduce to 350 troops when the Camp population reduces to 4500 Cubans.

I have briefed Ann Agnew on this and she is going to meet with a member of Friedersdorf's staff to take necessary action.

cc: Agnew

I have also talked to Bob S. The Army will move slowly on anything they do and

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 26, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: DICK ALLEN
FROM: MAX FRIEDERSDORF *M-F*
SUBJECT: Fort Chaffee, the Cubans and
Representative John Paul Hammerschmidt

Representative John Paul Hammerschmidt (R-Ark.) phoned today to urge reconsideration of the Army proposal to reduce from 500 to 350 the number of troops based at Ft. Chaffee where the Cuban immigrant population remains at 5,475.

Hammerschmidt said the situation is still highly emotional and volatile in Western Arkansas.

Hammerschmidt said he will attack any decision to reduce troop strength on both the merits and politics of the situation.

He wanted to know who had the action on this matter here at the White House, and stressed that we need to be aware of the situation and on top of developments.

Hammerschmidt's administrative assistant, Ray Reed, is well informed on the issue, served 30 years in the Army and should be considered a source for consultation on the issue, according to the Congressman.

cc: John Dressendorfer

RECEIVED 10 MAR 81 14

TO ALLEN

FROM FRIEDERSDORF, M

DOCDATE 26 JAN 81

NANCE

29 JAN 81

KEYWORDS: REFUGEES

CUBA

HAMMERSCHMIDT, JOHN

SUBJECT: FORT CHAFFEE RE CUBAN REFUGEE SITUATION

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

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(C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

RE: 0162

The President's note says:

I believe the proposal (the new approach) is something we should talk about. Now that we have no Monroe Doctrine I can see where we have a chance to lose a point by just cancelling the agreement.

RR

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The President has seen _____

SECRET ATTACHMENT

January 30, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT: "Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreement"

You requested a memorandum on the subject of our Kennedy-Khrushchev Agreements resulting from the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.

The attached memorandum from Secretary Haig addresses the subject and makes policy recommendations.

I would appreciate any comments or reactions you may have to this memorandum.

cc: Edwin Meese, III

I believe the proposal (the new approach) is something we should talk about. Now that we have no Monroe Doctrine I can see where we have a chance to lose a point by just cancelling the agreement.

SECRET ATTACHMENT

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1/7/10

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
Subject: Analysis of the 1962 US-USSR
Understanding on Cuba

Background

The US-USSR Understanding resulting from the 1962 Cuban missile crisis consists of a Soviet undertaking not to introduce "offensive weapons" into Cuba and a US pledge not to invade Cuba. The Understanding applies to nuclear weapons and to missiles, bombers, and other delivery systems capable of launching a strategic nuclear attack. In a 1970 clarification, the Soviets further agreed not to establish a naval base or military/naval facility in Cuba. This applies principally to the servicing in or from Cuba of submarines and surface combatants capable of carrying nuclear weapons that can be used for strategic attack and to facilities in Cuba for servicing such vessels.

The 1962 Understanding is subject to varying interpretations, because it was never formalized in a single document subscribed to by both sides. Over the years, the Soviets have persistently tested its limits. They have carried out visits to Cuba of varying duration and using varying combinations of naval task forces. They are assisting Cuba in constructing a naval facility at Cienfuegos, the specific purpose of which is unclear, and have delivered to Cuba increasingly sophisticated, but apparently non-nuclear weaponry, most recently MIG-23 aircraft. The Carter Administration conducted a vigorous round of diplomatic exchanges with the Soviets in the fall of 1979 on the issue of the MIG-23's. The Soviets asserted that the aircraft represented only a

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modernization of earlier MIG versions, denied that they were "offensive weapons," and reaffirmed the Soviet adherence to the 1962 Understanding.

The Brigade

In August 1979, US intelligence confirmed the existence of a 2,600-3,000 man combat unit in Cuba. Archival searches indicate that the unit, or precursor elements, have been in Cuba since the early 1970's and possibly as far back as 1962. However, in recent years, our intelligence indicated, the Soviets had upgraded the training and equipment of the brigade.

President Carter publicly called the unit's presence "a matter of serious concern" and said that the United States would not accept the maintenance of the "status quo" with respect to the brigade. The Administration raised the matter privately with the Soviets, who told the USG that the brigade was "a training center," assured us that the unit would not be enlarged or given additional capabilities, and did not pose any threat to Cuba's neighbors.

President Carter then informed the American public of these Soviet assurances, and announced five measures to firm up our posture in the region (increased surveillance of Cuba, assurance that no Soviet unit in Cuba will be used to threaten US or Hemispheric security, establishment of a Caribbean Task Force Headquarters in Key West, expanded military maneuvers in the Caribbean, and increased economic assistance for the region). The matter was then closed. The net effect was that the US has, in fact, accepted the status quo with regard to the brigade.

Assessment of the Understandings

The US-USSR Understandings do not specifically address the presence or level of Soviet ground forces in Cuba, although some unilateral statements could be cited as relevant to Soviet ground troops.

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Nevertheless, we have basic reasons for putting down markers about the limits of US tolerance over Soviet/Cuban activities staged in and from Cuba. The intent of the 1962 Understanding was to prevent Cuba from becoming a threat to the security of the US -- and to countries friendly to us in the Hemisphere. It is this basic intent which needs to be reasserted in light of Cuba's military and subversive actions in recent years, and Cuba's increasingly close military collaboration with the Soviet Union. The weakness of the Carter Administration's policy was that the US allowed the Soviets to exploit the ambiguities in the Understandings, while not doing the same thing ourselves.

Our Options

We could unilaterally, and without reference to any specific new Soviet or Cuban activity, renounce the Understandings. Renunciation would certainly lay down a clear marker to the Soviets, Cubans and others, but we should weigh carefully both the advantages and disadvantages of the terms of the Understandings. Also, absent a clear Soviet or Cuban provocation, this action would give away an important element of leverage in our overall relations with the Soviets.

I recommend instead a new approach which seeks to use the Understandings to advance US interests. The basic strategy would be to insist on a strict and consistent interpretation of the Understandings, formulated and presented very clearly to the Soviets and Cubans and leaving no doubt about the US reaction to any further testing of these specific limits. Elements of this approach could include the following:

- (1) A clear and firm presentation to the Soviets of the US intention, beginning immediately, to oppose any Soviet actions in Cuba which we deem inconsistent with our strict interpretation of the Understandings.

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(2) An equally clear and frank presentation to the Soviets of the limits of US tolerance over the growing Cuban and Soviet military/subversive activities in this Hemisphere as well as in other regions, both within and apart from the context of the Understandings.

(3) A clear message to the Soviets that breach of the above considerations will prompt US denunciation of the Understandings and the taking of other measures.

(4) An equally clear message to the Cubans about the limits of tolerance of their adventurist activities in the Hemisphere and elsewhere.

In terms of US-Soviet relations, maintenance of the Understandings on a new basis of strict interpretation has the chief advantage of sending a clear signal that the years of unresisted Soviet probing are over; henceforth Soviet moves will incur prompt and demonstrable costs.

In terms of US-Allied/Hemispheric relations, the US would be perceived by some as once again insisting on strict and fair observance of international obligations incurred by other states, particularly on the part of our adversary, the Soviet Union. Others would see it as an effort by the new Administration to pick a fight.

In terms of US-Cuban relations, Castro would be fully aware that Cuban actions prejudicial to US security interests, in this Hemisphere and elsewhere, will no longer go unpunished.

Finally, an approach based on maintenance of the Understandings based on our strict interpretation provides us a form of leverage over and linkage to Soviet behavior elsewhere, including

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those strategic areas where Cubans are also acting as Soviet surrogates. In the final analysis, a Soviet/Cuban breach of (a) our strict interpretation or the Understandings and/or (b) Soviet actions elsewhere (e.g. Soviet intervention in Poland), would then permit us to move at that point toward actual denunciation of the Understandings.

Conclusion

On balance, my current view is that maintaining the Understandings with strict interpretation offers at least the possibility of giving the Soviets pause before they exceed our limits and, equally, gives us a "hanging sword" countermeasure to take when and as these limits are exceeded, in the Caribbean or elsewhere. In any event, renunciation of the Understandings should not be undertaken lightly since we would have to weigh all of the consequences, including the absence of the present Understandings' prohibition of the introduction of "offensive weapons". This would require careful attention in order not to recreate conditions similar to those of the 1962 crisis.

In view of the importance of this matter, I would suggest that Cap Weinberger and I review the matter and all of its implications on a close-hold basis.

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 30 JAN 81 19

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TO PRES

FROM ALLEN

MD
11/7/10

DOCDATE 30 JAN 81

KEYWORDS: USSR

CUBA

SUBJECT: KENNEDY - KHRUSHCHEV AGREEMENT RE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO PRES

DUE: 04 FEB 81 STATUS C FILES PA

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 30 JAN 81 19

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TO. PRES

FROM ALLEN

1/17/10

DOC DATE 30 JAN 81

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KEYWORDS: USSR

CUBA

SUBJECT: KENNEDY - KHRUSHCHEV AGREEMENT RE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

ACTION: COMMENTS/CONCURRENCE

DUE: 04 FEB 81 STATUS P FILES

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DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WH9R COMMENT:

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3503

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 HAVANA 00951
EXDISE.O. 12065; GDS 2/11/87 (SMITH, W.S.) DR-M
TAGS: PEPR, CU, USSUBJECT: THE US-CUBAN EQUATION: SUGGESTIONS FOR A POLICY
REF: HAVANA 0946

1. 9-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AS THE SECRETARY HAS INDICATED A FULL REVIEW OF OUR CUBA POLICY IS SOON TO BEGIN, THE FOLLOWING RUMINATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR A NEW APPROACH MAY BE COGENT. HOPEFULLY, THE PROPOSED REASSESSMENT WILL PRODUCE WHAT WE HAVE NEVER HAD: A REALISTIC POLICY WITH CLEAR AND SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. FOR SOME 26 YEARS OR MORE, OUR CUBAN POLICY HAS BEEN LONG ON EMOTIONAL REACTION, SHORT ON THOUGHTFUL ANALYSIS. BY AND LARGE, IT HAS BEEN GUIDED BY A STRABISMIC HOSTILITY LITTLE CALCULATED TO ACHIEVE REASONED OBJECTIVES. MORE RECENT EFFORTS WERE OFTEN BASED ON MISPERCEPTIONS OF CUBAN REALITY AND FREQUENTLY REFLECTED AN INCONSONANCE BETWEEN GOALS AND ACTIONS WHICH SIMPLY CONFUSED THE CUBANS AS TO WHAT IT WAS WE REALLY WANTED. FOR EXAMPLE, WE PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED THAT THE FREEDING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS WAS ONE OF OUR PRINCIPAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBJECTIVES IN CUBA. YET, WHEN IN THE FALL OF 1978 THE CUBANS INDICATED THEIR INTENTION TO PAROLE MOST SUCH PRISONERS, WE DRAGGED OUR FEET IN ADMITTING THEM TO THE US (THUS SUGGESTING INDIFFERENCE) AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER STAGED AIR AND NAVAL MANEUVERS OFF

*****S E C R E T*****

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR MD9-259/5 #82293
BY RW NARA DATE 10/8/00

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE CUBAN COAST, AS IF TO PUNISH THE CUBANS FOR ACCED-
ING TO OUR WISHES, THERE WERE SOME GAINS FROM THE
INCHOATE DIALOGUE BEGUN IN 1977, ESPECIALLY IN THE
FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, BUT, AS SUGGESTED ABOVE, ITS
SALIENT FEATURE WAS FRUSTRATION. THIS WAS NOT INEVI-
TABLE. ON THE CONTRARY, IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS
BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND HAVANA COULD BE USED TO ADVAN-
TAGE. GUILILESS GOODWILL WILL CERTAINLY NOT ACHIEVE
OUR OBJECTIVES, BUT NEITHER WILL INTRANSIGENT HOSTILITY
AND A REFUSAL TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES. THE CUBANS HAVE
INDICATED AN INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS. WE
SHOULD NOT SHUN A DIALOGUE WITH THEM. INDEED,
SOME OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES (E.G., REDUCING
SOVIET INFLUENCE, AND SECURING CUBAN GUARANTEES TO
RESPECT OUR IMMIGRATION LAWS) CAN BE FURTHERED BY
NEGOTIATIONS. UNMITIGATED HOSTILITY, ON THE OTHER
HAND, WOULD LEAVE CASTRO NO CHOICE BUT TO FURTHER
EXPAND HIS MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIET
UNION. THREATS WILL NOT CAUSE HIM TO PULL IN
HIS HORNS IN CENTRAL AMERICA; ON THE CONTRARY, THEY
SIMPLY PROVOKE GREATER TRUCULENCE. WE MUST, OF COURSE,
ASSURE OUR OWN SECURITY, MUST RESIST THE EXPANSION OF
CUBAN INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
AND MUST MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE CUBANS THAT SO LONG AS
THIS OUTTHRUSTING CONTINUES, NONE OF THE THINGS
THEY MOST WANT FROM US (E.G., A LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO,
DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, ETC.) CAN BE FORTHCOMING. MEAN-
WHILE, HOWEVER, WE LOSE NOTHING BY DISCUSSING WITH
THE CUBANS URGENT MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST -- SUCH
AS THE IMMIGRATION QUESTION. QUITE THE OPPOSITE,
INCREASED ENGAGEMENT IS MORE LIKELY TO PLACE RESTRAINTS
ON CASTRO THAN THREATS. WHAT IS NEEDED, IN THE FINAL
ANALYSIS, IS A BALANCED POLICY WHICH PROVIDES INDUCE-
MENTS TO THE CUBANS TO ADOPT A MORE MODERATE POSTURE
AND WHICH REWARDS POSITIVE STEPS ON CUBA'S PART, BUT
WHICH MAKES IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT WE WILL NOT BE
PUSHED AND THAT TRUCULENT DEFIANCE WILL GAIN THEM
NOTHING. IN SUM, OUR BASIC POSTURE TOWARD CUBA SHOULD
BE THAT WHILE WE WISH TO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS SOME
MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST (SUCH AS THE IMMIGRATION
ISSUE AND IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS) AND WHILE IT WOULD
BE OUR PREFERENCE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, THERE CAN BE
NO NORMALIZATION, NOR EVEN A FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVE-
MENT IN RELATIONS, SO LONG AS CUBA IS INTERVENING
IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF HER NEIGHBORS. END
SUMMARY.

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34

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

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*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHUB #0951/02 0431345
O 121320Z FEB 81
FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3504

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 06 HAVANA 00951
EXDIS

2. INDEX
OBJECTIVES-----PARAGRAPH 3
ASSUMPTIONS-----PARAGRAPH 4
NEED FOR A BALANCED POLICY-----PARAGRAPH 5
STATEMENT OF BASIC US POSTURE-----PARAGRAPH 6
INITIAL STEPS-----PARAGRAPH 9

3. OBJECTIVES.
PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES TOWARD WHICH OUR POLICY
ACTIONS AND DECISIONS SHOULD BE AIMED WOULD SEEM TO BE
THE FOLLOWING:
A) TO PREVENT ANY THREAT TO US SECURITY.
ESSENTIALLY, THIS MEANS MAKING CERTAIN NO STRATEGIC
WEAPONS (OR OTHER OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS WHICH MIGHT
SERIOUSLY THREATEN THE US) ARE PLACED IN CUBA, I.E.,
THAT THE US-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING OF 1962 IS UPHELD.
B) TO REDUCE SOVIET INFLUENCE.
WE SHOULD AIM AT EXPANDING CUBA'S MARGIN FOR MANEUVER IN
TAKING INDEPENDENT DECISIONS AND DISTANCING THEMSELVES
FROM SOVIET POLICIES AND ACTIONS. AT BEST, THIS IS A
DIFFICULT ASSIGNMENT. CUBA CANNOT SARUPTLY FOREGO
ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS TOO
ECONOMICALLY DEPENDENT AT THIS POINT FOCTHAT TO BE
POSSIBLE. FURTHER, A REDUCTION OF CUBAN-SOVIET
TIES WILL BE MORE DIFFICULT TO BRING ABOUT NOW
THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN A YEAR AGO. AS CASTRO
HAS SENSED NEW TENSIONS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND
A MORE THREATENING US ATTITUDE TOWARD CUBA, HE HAS
MOVED CLOSER TO MOSCOW, OBVIOUSLY CONCLUDING THAT
THIS IS NOT IME FOR AN EQUIVOCAL POSITION ON CUBA'S
PART. GREATER CUBAN INDEPENDENCE FROM MOSCOW MUST
BE PRECEDED BY (1) AN EASING OF TENSIONS, THUS

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REDUCING THE URGENCY OF CUBA'S NEED FOR A SOVIET SHIELD AGAINST US MILITARY ACTION, AND (2) BY A LESSENING OF CUBA'S RELIANCE ON THE USSR FOR ECONOMIC SUPPORT. HENCE, NO IMMEDIATE BREAKTHROUGH CAN BE EXPECTED. EVEN SO, THE US SHOULD KEEP FIRMLY IN MIND THE GOAL OF REDUCING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN CUBA. THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE THAT THE CUBANS, UNDER THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES, WOULD LIKE TO HAVE MORE MARGIN FOR MANEUVER. INDEED, GIVEN THE CHANCE, CUBA WOULD PROBABLY HOPE TO MOVE IN THE SAME DIRECTION AS ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA, IN TERMS OF ESTABLISHING ITS INDEPENDENCE OF ACTION.

C) TO RESTRAIN CUBAN ADVENTURISM ABROAD. OUR MOST IMMEDIATE GOAL IS TO TURN BACK CUBAN EFFORTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA. IN DOING SO, WE SHOULD UNDERSTAND CLEARLY THAT CUBA HAS NOT BEEN PUSHED BY MOSCOW INTO A MORE ADVENTURIST POLICY HERE OR ANYWHERE ELSE. ON THE CONTRARY, THE INITIATIVE IS CUBAN AND FLOWS FROM THEIR CALCULATION THAT EASILY EXPLOITABLE TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY ARE EMERGING IN CENTRAL AMERICA. THE CUBANS DID NOT CREATE THE REVOLUTIONARY DYNAMIC THERE; THEY SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT. THEY HAVE TAKEN SOME RISKS IN THE PROCESS, BUT REMAIN ESSENTIALLY CAUTIOUS. THEY HAVE SUPPLIED ARMS, MONEY AND TRAINING. THEY HAVE NOT AND WILL NOT COMMIT REGULAR CUBAN COMBAT UNITS. US EFFORTS IN THE AREA SHOULD BE ADDRESSED: (1) TO MAKING CERTAIN THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY DO NOT PRESENT THEMSELVES. THE OLD ORDER IS COLLAPSING IN SEVERAL CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES. WE MUST MAKE CERTAIN THAT VACUUMS ARE NOT LEFT IN THE WAKE OF THAT COLLAPSE AND SHOULD DO WHAT WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE MODERATE, DEMOCRATIC ELEMENTS TO STEP INTO THE BREACH. (2) TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE CUBANS THAT THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPLOITATIONS ARE IN FACT NARROWER THAN THEY HAD IMAGINED AND THE COST LIKELY TO BE HIGH. WE SEEM TO BE ON THE RIGHT TRACK IN EL SALVADOR. ESSENTIALLY, THE CONCLUSION WE SHOULD WISH THE CUBANS TO DRAW IS THAT THEY ARE GOING TO LOSE ANYWAY IN EL SALVADOR AND ARE MEANWHILE USELESSLY SACRIFICING BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE US AND A NUMBER OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES; HENCE, THE BEST THING THEY CAN DO IS TO PULL IN THEIR HORNS AND URGE THEIR LEFTIST ALLIES TO SUE FOR PEACE. THERE IS SOME ENCOURAGING EVIDENCE THAT SOME CUBANS MAY BE COMING AROUND TO THAT CONCLUSION. AT LEAST, A FEW CUBAN OFFICIALS ARE NOW TALKING IN

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

37

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TERMS OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

PSN: 000781

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DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHUB #0951/03 0431407

O 121320Z FEB 81

FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3505

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 06 HAVANA 00951

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-- IN AFRICA, THE CUBANS GIVE EVIDENCE OF WANTING TO REDUCE OR PERHAPS EVEN WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES FROM ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA, BUT THE ANGOLAN AND ETHIOPIAN GOVTS, FEARING ATTACKS FROM SOUTH AFRICA AND SOMALIA, RESPECTIVELY, WILL NOT AGREE TO THAT. THE CUBAN POSITION, HOWEVER, IS AT LEAST STATIC, AND, ACCORDING TO INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, THEIR TROOPS STRENGTH IN BOTH ANGOLA AND ETHIOPIA MAY EVEN HAVE BEEN REDUCED OVER THE PAST YEAR.

D) TO ASSURE CUBAN RESPECT FOR OUR IMMIGRATION LAWS. IT IS PATENTLY IN OUR INTERESTS TO SECURE A CUBAN GUARANTEE THAT THERE WILL BE NO MORE MARIELS, TO GET THEM TO TAKE BACK SOME OF THE CRIMINALS, MENTALLY ILL AND OTHER UNDESIRABLES SENT OVER IN THE MARIEL SEALIFT. TWO ROUNDS OF TALKS WERE HELD ON THIS SUBJECT AND THE TWO SIDES WERE VERY NEAR AGREEMENT. THE CUBANS AT THIS POINT ARE WAITING FOR US TO SUGGEST A THIRD ROUND.

E) TO SECURE ECONOMIC GAINS.

US-CUBAN TRADE IS NOT LIKELY TO BE LARGE INITIALLY -- PERHAPS NO MORE THAN \$500 MILLION BOTH WAYS DURING THE FIRST YEAR AFTER THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO. THIS WOULD PROBABLY INVOLVE ONLY A FEW COMPANIES, HOWEVER; HENCE, THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE TO EACH WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT. A SETTLEMENT OF THE SOME TWO BILLION DOLLARS IN US CLAIMS AGAINST CUBA WOULD ALSO REPRESENT A NET GAIN FOR THE US.

F) TO BRING ABOUT IMPROVEMENTS IN HUMAN RIGHTS. OUR DIALOGUE WITH CUBA DID PRODUCE LAUDABLE GAINS IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS. ALL AMERICAN PRISONERS WERE RELEASED. SO WERE MOST CUBAN POLITICAL PRISONERS. EMIGRATION WAS LOOSENED AND OVER 100,000 MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO

***** S E C R E T *****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

VISIT FAMILY MEMBERS STILL LIVING ON THE ISLAND. THERE REMAINS MUCH ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT, HOWEVER, APPROXIMATELY 1,000 POLITICAL PRISONERS REMAIN (WHOM THE CUBAN AUTHORITIES ARE NOT LIKELY TO RELEASE UNTIL THE US LIVES UP TO ITS EARLIER COMMITMENT TO ACCEPT FOR ENTRY POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED PRIOR TO AUG 1 OF 1978).

4. ASSUMPTIONS:

A) CASTRO IS FIRMLY SEATED IN POWER. THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO CHANCE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE THAT HE OR THE SYSTEM HE HAS IMPOSED ON CUBA WILL BE OVERTHROWN. EXILE DECLARATIONS TO THE CONTRARY ARE BASED ON A GOOD DEAL OF WISHEFUL THINKING AND NOT MUCH ELSE. IT IS TRUE THAT CUBA WILL NEVER BE QUITE THE SAME AFTER LAST YEAR'S APRIL-MAY CRISIS. CRACKS APPEARED IN THE SECURITY SYSTEM. THE LEADERSHIP WAS SEEN TO BE FALLIBLE, AND NOW FACES A WHOLE RANGE OF NEW SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. BUT THERE WAS AND IS NO THREAT TO THE SURVIVAL OF THE SYSTEM. CASTRO STILL HAS AT LEAST THE TACIT SUPPORT OF THE GREAT MAJORITY OF CUBANS AND THE BACKING OF A POWERFUL SECURITY APPARATUS. THE ENTHUSIASM HAS GONE OUT OF THE REVOLUTION, BUT CASTRO REMAINS ITS UNCHALLENGED LEADER. IGNORING HIM WILL NOT MAKE HIM GO AWAY. TO UNSEAT HIM WOULD COST THE US FAR MORE IN BLOOD, TREASURE AND DAMAGED PRESTIGE THAN THE PROBLEM WARRANTS. WE MUST FIND SOME BETTER WAY TO DEAL WITH HIM.

B) THREATS AND PUNITIVE MEASURES WILL GAIN US LITTLE. OVER THE PAST 20 YEARS WE HAVE TRIED INTIMIDATION, SUPPORT FOR INVASION, SABOTAGE, ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS, BLACK PROPAGANDA, AND AN ECONOMIC EMBARGO AGAINST CUBA. NONE OF THESE TACTICS REALLY WORKED. IT IS AN ARTICLE OF FAITH WITH THE CUBANS THAT THEY WILL NEVER CONCEDE TO THREATS AND NEVER NEGOTIATE UNDER PRESSURE. INDEED, THERE IS NOTHING CASTRO LIKES MORE, OR IS MORE ADEPT AT, THAN PLAYING THE ROLE OF PLUCKY LITTLE VICTIM OF THE BIG US BULLY. GRATUITOUS THREATS PLAY RIGHT INTO HIS HANDS. OUR CLUMSY APRIL 6, 1980 ANNOUNCE-

PSNI 000784

TOR: 044/02140Z

FTG: 121320Z FEB 81

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHUB #0961 0431510

O 121320Z FEB 81

FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3506

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 6 HAVANA 0961

EXDIS.
 MENT OF LARGE-SCALE AIR AND AMPHIBIOUS MANEUVERS AT THE GUANTANAMO NAVAL BASE, FOR EXAMPLE, INTIMIDATED THE CUBANS NOT A WHIT, BUT IT DID RESULT IN CONSIDERABLE SYMPATHY FOR CASTRO (EVEN AMONG FRIENDS SUCH AS THE COSTA RICANS), GAVE CASTRO THE CREDIBLE EXTERNAL THREAT HE BADLY NEEDED AT THE TIME, AND, ON ANOTHER LEVEL OF PERCEPTION, IMPRESSED UPON HAVANA AGAIN THE NEED FOR A CONTINUING MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH MOSCOW. THE ANNOUNCED MANEUVERS, THEN, WERE TOTALLY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. FORTUNATELY, THIS WAS EVENTUALLY APPRECIATED AND THEY WERE CANCELLED -- BUT NOT BEFORE THEY HAD BEEN EXPLOITED BY CASTRO AND HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE CUBAN DECISION TO OPEN MARIEL.

--AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE, EXCEPT UNDER THE MOST COMPELLING OF CIRCUMSTANCES (I.E., A REAL THREAT TO US SECURITY, AS IN 1962), A NAVAL BLOCKADE OF CUBA, EVEN IF IN RETALIATION FOR SOME SOVIET MOVE ELSEWHERE, IS LIKELY TO BE DECIDELY COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. SOME OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES--THE UK, CANADA AND JAPAN--ARE AMONG CUBA'S PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS. THEY WOULD OPPOSE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BLOCKADE AND MIGHT EVEN REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE IT. IT WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH OUR ALLIES, BUT IT WOULD NOT FORCE THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW FROM, SAY, AFGHANISTAN OR POLAND. ON THE CONTRARY, THE SOVIETS WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME THE DIVERSION OF ATTENTION FROM THEIR AGGRESSIONS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD (AND IT WOULD DIVERT ATTENTION). MANY NEUTRAL OBSERVERS WOULD SEE IT AS THE USSR COMMITTING AGGRESSION AGAINST ONE SMALL COUNTRY, THE US AGAINST ANOTHER. FINALLY, THE SOVIETS WOULD ALMOST UNQUESTIONABLY CHALLENGE A BLOCKADE (AND IF THEY DIDN'T, THE CUBANS WOULD), THUS LEADING TO A SHOOTING WAR. IN SUM, A BLOCKADE WOULD NOT SERVE OUR PURPOSES. IT WOULD DISRUPT OUR OWN

*****S E C R E T*****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

ALLIANCES, DIVERT ATTENTION FROM SOVIET AGGRESSION AND POSSIBLY LEAD TO OPEN HOSTILITIES.

C) UNDER EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES, LITTLE IF ANYTHING CAN BE GAINED BY TURNING THE CLOCK BACK.

HESITANT MOVES TOWARD IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS NEVER EVEN REACHED THE POINT OF LIFTING THE BAN ON SALE OF MEDICINES TO CUBA. IN THE PROCESS OF ABROGATING THE FEW STEPS THAT WERE TAKEN, WE WOULD LOSE MORE THAN WE WOULD GAIN. TO WITI

(I) THE INTERESTS SECTION, THROUGH THE US INTERESTS SENIOR LEVELS OF THE CUBAN GOVT. TO CLOSE USINT WOULD BE TO CUT OFF THOSE COMMUNICATIONS AND AT THE SAME TIME TO GIVE UP A USEFUL LISTENING POST IN HAVANA AND A MEANS OF PROTECTING AMERICAN CITIZENS.

(II) THE FISHING AGREEMENT. THE AGREEMENT ALREADY IMPOSES SUCH RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS ON THE CUBANS THAT THEY HAVE FOUND IT WELL NIGH IMPOSSIBLE TO FISH ECONOMICALLY WITHIN OUR 200-MILE FISHING CONSERVATION ZONE. THEY SENT UP NO VESSELS IN 1978 OR 1979 AND TOOK ONLY 145 TONS OF FISH--AN ECONOMIC LOSS--IN 1980.

THE CUBANS REMAIN INTERESTED IN FISHING IN OUR ZONE, HOWEVER, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVED TERMS IS A BARGAINING CHIP FOR THE FUTURE. TO ABROGATE THIS AGREEMENT SIGNED BY THE EXECUTIVE AND ACCEPTED BY THE CONGRESS WOULD, THEN, HARM CUBA ALMOST NOT AT ALL. IT WOULD GIVE AWAY SOME DEGREE OF BARGAINING POWER WITHOUT GAINING ANYTHING.

(III) TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA. IN THE HELSINKI AGREEMENTS, THE US PUSHED THE CONCEPT OF A FREE FLOW OF PEOPLE AND IDEAS ACROSS BORDERS. EFFORTS TO HALT TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA WOULD CONTRADICT THAT POSITION. IT WOULD, MOREOVER, BE DIFFICULT TO PRESENT AMERICAN CITIZENS FROM TRAVELLING TO CUBA, FOR US COURTS HAVE RULED THAT NO ACTION CAN BE TAKEN AGAINST AN AMERICAN WHO USES HIS PASSPORT TO TRAVEL ANYWHERE HE WISHES, EVEN TO A DENIED AREA. TO DENY CUBAN RESIDENTS OF THE US THE POSSIBILITY OF VISITING FAMILIES IN CUBA WOULD BE OVERLY HARSH. FINALLY, AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE VISITS OF THE CUBAN-AMERICAN COMMUNITY CLEARLY WORKED IN OUR FAVOR. CASTRO EARNED SOME FOREIGN CURRENCY, BUT THE VISITS HAD A DEVASTATING IMPACT IN CUBA. THE

PSNI 000786

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RTG: 121320Z FEB 81

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DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHUB #0951 0431520

O 121320Z FEB 81

FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3507

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 6 HAVANA 0951

EXDIS

RETURN OF 100,000 EXILES, ALL WELL FED AND WELL
HEELED, SHOWED UP BY COMPARISON THE SORRY STANDARD OF
LIVING ENDURED BY CUBANS ON THE ISLAND. MORALE SLUMPED.
THE CASTRO REGIME EVENTUALLY REDUCED THE VISITS TO A
BARE MINIMUM -- 600 PER MONTH RATHER THAN THE 10,000
MONTHLY FIGURE DURING MOST OF 1979. CASTRO DOES NOT
WISH TO TAKE THE ONUS OF CUTTING OFF THE VISITS HIMSELF.
HE WOULD PROBABLY BE DELIGHTED IF WE DID IT FOR HIM.
WE SHOULD NOT OBLIGE HIM. ON THE CONTRARY, WE SHOULD
WISH TO SEE TRAVEL EXPANDED. THE MORE OUTSIDERS TRAVELLING
TO CASTRO'S CUBA, THE MORE LIGHT WE CAN LET IN, THE
BETTER FOR OUR OVERALL POSITION.

D) A SOVIET INVASION OF POLAND WOULD FURTHER SOUR THE
ATMOSPHERE.

THE INCREASED TENSIONS FOLLOWING ANY SOVIET INTERVENTION
IN POLAND WOULD FURTHER COMPLICATE US-CUBAN RELATIONS.
WE SHOULD MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE CUBAN GOVT
EVEN THEN, BUT SHOULD CUBA ENDORSE THE INVASION,
AS IT WOULD BE LIKELY TO DO, WE SHOULD FREEZE ANY
MOVEMENT TOWARD IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS UNTIL WE
HAVE HAD TIME TO FULLY ASSESS THE SITUATION.

5. NEED FOR A BALANCED POLICY.

THE US MUST OF COURSE ASSURE ITS SECURITY. IT MUST
BE PREPARED (AND MUST MAKE CERTAIN MOSCOW
AND HAVANA KNOW IT IS PREPARED) TO USE MILITARY
FORCE SHOULD THE 1962 US-SOVIET UNDERSTANDING BE
VIOLATED OR SHOULD CUBAN TROOPS (OR SOVIET TROOPS
STATIONED IN CUBA) BE DEPLOYED TO NEARBY TROUBLE
SPOTS SUCH AS NICARAGUA. NEITHER IS A LIKELY DENOU-
EMENT, HOWEVER (IF FOR NO OTHER REASON THAN BECAUSE
OF THE CREDIBILITY OF A STRONG US REACTION), AND WHILE
THE IMPLICIT THREAT OF FORCE IS NECESSARY TO ASSURE OUR

***** S E C R E T *****

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SECURITY NEEDS, WE CANNOT ACHIEVE OUR OTHER OBJECTIVES THROUGH UNRELENTING HOSTILITY AND CONFRONTATION. ON THE CONTRARY, THE MORE THREATENING THE US POSTURE, THE MORE TIGHTLY THE CUBANS MUST HANG ONTO THE MAILED SOVIET FIST AND THE LESS LIKELY WE ARE TO LEVER CUBA AWAY FROM THE SOVIET UNION. MEASURES WHICH TEND TO ISOLATE CUBA FROM US, AND FROM THE REST OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE WORK AGAINST OUR LONG-TERM INTEREST IN DRAWING CUBA, OVER TIME, TOWARD THE WESTERN ORBIT. CLEARLY, TOO, THE LIBERALIZATION OF CUBAN SOCIETY, WITH ALL THAT IMPLIES IN TERMS OF A LESS CIRCUMSCRIBED LIFE FOR THE CUBAN PEOPLE AND A MORE MODERATE OPTIC THROUGH WHICH TO LOOK OUT AT THE WORLD, CAN ONLY COME ABOUT IN THE WAKE OF REDUCED US-CUBAN TENSIONS. SO LONG AS CUBA IS ON A WAR FOOTING, DISCIPLINE WILL BE AS NEAR ABSOLUTE AS THE AUTHORITIES CAN MAKE IT. IT WAS AS THE RESULT OF SOME EPHEMERAL REDUCTION IN TENSIONS IN 1977-78 THAT THE CUBANS ANNOUNCED IN THE SUMMER OF THE LATTER YEAR THEIR INTENTION TO RELEASE POLITICAL PRISONERS. THEY DID RELEASE MOST, BUT THEIR DISPOSITION TO COMPLETE THE PROCESS EVAPORATED AS TENSIONS AGAIN INCREASED.

6. ENGAGEMENT, THEN, IS A NECESSARY INGREDIENT IN MOVING CUBA IN THE DIRECTION WE DESIRE. BUT WE CANNOT LIFT ALL SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA AND RUSH TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WHILE SHE IS STILL INVOLVED IN ADVENTURES OVERSEAS PREJUDICIAL TO OUR INTERESTS. TO DO SO WOULD CONFUSE OUR ALLIES AND POSSIBLY THE CUBANS THEMSELVES. SHOULD WE BE SO FOOLISH AS TO MAKE ALL THE MAJOR CONCESSIONS HAVANA WANTS (LIFTING THE EMBARGO, ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, ETC.) WITHOUT FIRST HAVING SEEN, SAY, A MUTING OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THE RESULT WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE CONDUCT WE FIND OBJECTIONABLE. WE MUST NOT RPT NOT REWARD (AND MUST NOT BE PERCEIVED AS REWARDING) ACTIONS WHICH THREATEN OUR INTERESTS AND/OR THOSE OF OUR ALLIES.

7. THUS, WHILE SOME OF OUR OBJECTIVES COULD BEST BE HANDLED BY RAPID NORMALIZATION WITH CUBA, OTHERS DICTATE A STAND-FAST, EVEN ADVERSARIAL, POSTURE. IN FORMULATING AN EFFECTIVE APPROACH, WE MUST STRIKE A BALANCE BETWEEN THESE COMPETING NEEDS. WHAT IS INDICATED, THEN, IS AN EQUILIBRATED POLICY CLOSELY GEARED TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THIS IMPLIES A CARE-

~~*****S E C R E T*****~~

44

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FULLY ORCHESTRATED MIX OF INDUCEMENTS AND ADMONITIONS,
THE FORMER TO ENCOURAGE CUBA TO ADOPT A MORE MODERATE
POSTURE AND ADDRESS OUR CONCERNS, THE LATTER TO PUT
DOWN MARKERS WHEN THEY DO NOT.

PSNI 000700

TORI 044/02143Z

BTG: 121320Z FEB 81

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DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
 DE RUEHUB #0951 0431540
 O 121320Z FEB 81
 FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3508

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 6 HAVANA 0951
 EXDIS

8. STATEMENT OF OUR BASIC POSTURE.

TAKING ALL THE ABOVE FACTORS INTO ACCOUNT, THE BASIC US POSITION TOWARD CUBA SHOULD BE THAT WHILE WE WISH TO MAINTAIN A DIALOGUE WITH THEM AND TO DISCUSS SOME MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST, THERE CAN BE NO NORMALIZATION, NOR EVEN A FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS, SO LONG AS CUBA IS INTERVENING IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF HER NEIGHBORS. THE SECRETARY, INDEED, SET THE TONE FOR THIS POSITION DURING HIS CONFIRMATION HEARINGS. IT IS A POSTURE WORTHY OF A POWERFUL COUNTRY FACING A SMALL ONE. IT IS FIRM BUT NOT BULLYING (AND THUS DOES NOT PLAY INTO CASTRO'S HANDS). WE INDICATE OUR WILLINGNESS TO TALK, DO NOT TAKE RETROGRESSIVE MEASURES FROM WHICH WE WOULD LOSE MORE THAN WE WOULD GAIN, AND DO NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF MONOR STEPS TO PLACE OUR RELATIONSHIP ON A MORE RATIONAL BASIS (STEPS SUCH AS AN ANTI-HIJACKING AGREEMENT AND IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES). BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE THINGS CUBA MOST WANTS FROM US CANNOT BE FORTHCOMING SO LONG AS ITS AGGRESSIVE EFFORTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, AND TO A LESSER EXTENT IN THE CARIBBEAN, CONTINUE. IN SHORT, IF THE CUBANS WISH US TO ADDRESS THEIR CONCERNS, THEY MUST ALSO ADDRESS OURS.

9. INITIAL STEPS.

THE POSTURE SUGGESTED IN PARAGRAPH EIGHT ESSENTIALLY IS ONE OF NOT MOVING AHEAD TO ANY SIGNIFICANT DEGREE UNTIL WE SEE EVIDENCE OF MODERATION IN THE CUBAN APPROACH. IT THEREFORE IMPLIES A LOW-LEVEL OF ACTIVITY IN US-CUBAN BILATERAL RELATIONS. WE NEED SAY OR DO LITTLE. THERE ARE SOME INITIATIVES, HOWEVER, WHICH

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WE MIGHT USEFULLY TAKE:

A) MARKER TO THE CUBANS ON THEIR ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

A DEMARCHE ALONG THESE LINES HAS ALREADY BEEN RECOMMENDED (REFTEL).

B) A CLEAR ENUNCIATION OF OUR POSITION. USINT SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO INDICATE TO SENIOR LEVELS OF THE CUBAN GOVT THAT THE BASIS US POLICY TOWARD CUBA IS AS OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH EIGHT ABOVE, EMPHASIZING THAT WHILE IT WOULD BE OUR PREFERENCE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS, THE CONDITIONS FOR THAT WILL NOT EXIST SO LONG AS CUBA CONTINUES TO INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF HER NEIGHBORS.

C) RESUME TALKS ON IMMIGRATION MATTERS. THIS IS AN URGENT MATTER OF PENDING BUSINESS WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED QUICKLY--AND WHICH IS MORE IN OUR INTERESTS THAN IN CUBA'S TO RESOLVE. WE SHOULD INDICATE TO THE CUBANS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO MOVE TO A THIRD ROUND OF TALKS.

D) INITIATE CULTURAL AND SPORT EXCHANGES. ONE WOULD EXPECT THAT IT WOULD BE CUBA, FEARING CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PENETRATION, WHICH WOULD BE RESISTING US CULTURAL AND SPORTS PRESENTATIONS. RATHER THAN THAT, IT IS THE US WHICH HAS TIMIDLY AND INEXPLICABLY HELD BACK ON SUCH PRESENTATIONS. WE SHOULD CORRECT THAT IMMEDIATELY.

THE CUBAN PEOPLE ARE HUNGRY FOR THINGS AMERICAN--TO SEE OUR MOVIES, OUR INNOVATIONS IN THE PERFORMING ARTS, WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN AMERICAN PAINTING IN THE PAST 20 YEARS, AND, MOST OF ALL, TO SEE AMERICAN BASEBALL TEAMS COMPETE AGAINST CUBA'S BEST. CUBA HAD A LONG ASSOCIATION WITH US. NOSTALGIA IS STRONG. THE ATTRACTION OF THE US WAY OF LIFE IS THE STRONGEST CARD WE HAVE TO PLAY. INDEED, WERE WE EVER ABLE TO BRING ITS FORCE FIELD FULLY TO BEAR ON CASTRO'S FRAGILE SOCIALIST SOCIETY, IT IS DOUBTFUL THE LATTER COULD ENDURE INTACT. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, WE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY INITIATE AN IMAGINATIVE PROGRAM OF CULTURAL AND SPORTS PRESENTATIONS, E.G., SEND THE ALVIN AILEY DANCE GROUP, FLOOD THE ISLAND WITH AMERICAN MOVIES, AND, ABOVE ALL, ENCOURAGE AN EXHIBITION BASEBALL GAME BETWEEN A MAJOR LEAGUE US TEAM AND ONE OF CUBA'S BEST. NOTHING COULD BETTER EMPHASIZE THE AFFINITIES WHICH STILL EXIST BETWEEN OUR TWO PEOPLES BETTER THAN EXHIBITION BASEBALL GAMES. BASEBALL IS CUBA'S NATIONAL GAME, AS IT IS OURS; IT IS A GAME THE SOVIETS DO NOT

*****S E C R E T*****

47

DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EVEN PLAY.
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