

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File:
Records

Folder Title: Cuba (10/15/1981-11/10/1981)

Box: RAC Box 29

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Last Updated: 08/24/2023

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

MDJ 1/8/2010

File Folder CUBA (10/15/1981-11/10/1981)

FOIA

S09-251

Box Number 29

176

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
82414	CABLE	HAVANA 06384 <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i>	2	10/15/1981	B1
82415	CABLE	STATE 277937 <i>R 3/12/2012 M259/5</i>	3	10/19/1981	B1
82416	CABLE	HAVANA 06513 <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i>	3	10/22/1981	B1
82417	CABLE	HAVANA 06546 <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i>	2	10/22/1981	B1
82418	CABLE	HAVANA 06619 <i>R 10/8/2010 M259/5</i>	3	10/26/1981	B1
82419	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN TO THE PRESIDENT RE CUBANS <i>PAR 8/1/2018 M259/5</i>	1	11/10/1981	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

82414

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01

HAVANA 06384 152247Z

ACTION ARA-16

INFO OCT-01

ADS-00

INR-10

SS-15

CIAP-00

EP-08

H-01

NSC-05

NSAE-00

PA-01

RIB-01

ANAE-00

SP-02

/050 W

-----350604 152257Z /11

P 152112Z OCT 81

FM USINT HAVANA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7848

INFO USICA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L HAVANA 06384

F.O. 12065: GDS 10/14/87 (SMITH, WAYNE S.)

TAGS: ETEL PEPR CU US

SUBJECT: COUNTRY TEAM QUESTIONS ESTABLISHMENT OF RADIO MARTI

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. USINT HAVANA COUNTRY TEAM WISHES TO REGISTER DISAGREEMENT WITH DECISION TO ESTABLISH RADIO MARTI. COUNTRY TEAM OF COURSE SUPPORTS IDEA OF GETTING MORE INFORMATION -- ACCURATE AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION -- TO CUBAN PEOPLE, BUT DOES NOT BELIEVE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW RADIO STATION IS BEST OR MOST COST-EFFECTIVE MEANS OF DOING SO. AS WELL AS SEVERAL FLORIDA COMMERCIAL STATIONS, VOA MEDIUM WAVE IS RECEIVED CLEARLY ALL OVER CUBA AND HAS A WIDE LISTENERSHIP. BECAUSE OF ITS OBJECTIVITY, CUBAN CITIZENS HAVE GREAT CONFIDENCE IN ITS ACCURACY. AN EXPANSION OF VOA SERVICES TO INCLUDE PROGRAMS SPECIFICALLY FOR CUBAN AUDIENCE WOULD APPEAR TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF ACHIEVING OBJECTIVE, AND CERTAINLY THE LEAST EXPENSIVE. COUNTRY TEAM WOULD SUGGEST RESUSCITATION OF FORMER "CITA CON CUBA" PROGRAM.

3. NEW STATION, MOREOVER, IS LIKELY TO BE CONSIDERABLY LESS ACCURATE THAN VOA. PERHAPS IT WILL NOT SIMPLY REPEAT EVERY RUMOR PICKED UP ON FLAGLER STREET, BUT IT WILL CERTAINLY HAVE GREATER TENDENCY TO DO SO THAN DOES VOA; CHANCES THAT IT COULD QUICKLY LOSE CREDIBILITY ARE THEREFORE HIGH.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02

HAVANA 06384 152247Z

4. FURTHER, BEYOND SIMPLY GETTING MORE INFORMATION TO THE CUBAN PEOPLE (WHICH, AS INDICATED ABOVE, WE BELIEVE COULD BEST BE ACCOMPLISHED BY VOA), WE ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO THE NEW STATION'S OBJECTIVES. WE MIGHT INDEED RAISE THE LEVEL OF DISCONTENT SOMEWHAT (IF THAT IS AN OBJECTIVE), THOUGH THIS IS NOT LIKELY TO BE ANYTHING CASTRO CANNOT EASILY HANDLE; THE REGIME IS SOLIDLY ENTRENCHED WITH MASSIVE, EFFICIENT AND FANATICALLY LOYAL SECURITY FORCES. BUT CUBANS TEND TO ACT OUT THEIR DISSATISFACTION NOT BY OPPOSING THE REGIME BUT BY TRYING TO GET TO MIAMI. FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WE HAVE CLOSED THE DOOR TO LARGE-SCALE CUBAN IMMIGRATION. THERE IS NO CUBAN REFUGEE PROGRAM AND WE HAVE SAID WE WILL NOT PERMIT ANOTHER MARIEL. ONE EFFECT OF RADIO MARTI, HOWEVER, MAY WELL BE TO ENCOURAGE JUST SUCH AN EXODUS. AN EXODUS WE WOULD THEN HAVE TO TURN BACK.

5. AGAINST THIS BACKDROP OF QUESTIONABLE NEED OR EFFECTIVENESS,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 1

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M04-25915 #82414

BY RW NARA DATE 10/8/10

SANDBERG DENNIS A
91 HAVANA 6384

11/02/81 175547 PRINTER: LD

CONFIDENTIAL

WE SHOULD WEIGH CAREFULLY THE FACT THAT ESTABLISHMENT OF RADIO MARTI WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY OBVIATE ANY CUBAN COOPERATION IN EFFORTS TO AVOID INTERFERENCE IN ONE ANOTHER'S FREQUENCIES. IN FACT, SOME 20 YEARS AGO USG DECIDED AGAINST SETTING UP SUCH A STATION PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE FINDING, AFTER AN EXHAUSTIVE TECHNICAL STUDY, THAT WE WERE TOO VULNERABLE TO CUBAN RETALIATION. IN THE FORM OF DELIBERATE INTERFERENCE WITH OUR COMMERCIAL FREQUENCIES (DEPT MAY WISH TO CONTACT PETIPED AME ROBERT A. STEVENSON WHO DIRECTED THE STUDY -- PRESENTLY RESIDING IN VIENNA, VA.) WHILE USINT DOES NOT HAVE THE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE TO CONCLUDE THAT THAT REMAINS THE CASE, IT IS OUR IMPRESSION THAT IT DOES. THE CUBANS ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL REACT TO RADIO MARTI BY MOUNTING A SYSTEMATIC CAMPAIGN TO INTERFERE WITH AS MANY US FREQUENCIES AS POSSIBLE. ONCE THEY HAVE THEIR TWO 500 THOUSAND WATT STATIONS ON LINE, THEIR CAPACITY TO BLOT OUT COMMERCIAL STATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE UNITED STATES WILL BE TREMENDOUSLY EN-

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03

HAVANA 06384 152247Z

HANCED.

SMITH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

N VVZCZ

SENSITIVE

82415 3

PAGE 1 - 155

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

EHA612

DD RUEADWW

DE RUEHC #7937 2920214

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 190148Z OCT 81 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO XWHCA WASHDC IMMEDIATE

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 277937

NODIS

WHCA PASS SECRETARY HAIG'S PARTY AT WILLIAMSBURG
E.O. 12065: RDS 2 10/18/01 (ENDERS, THOMAS U)

TAGS: PINS, NU, PEPR, CU

SUBJECT: CUBAN SPECIAL FORCES (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

FOR SECRETARY HAIG/TDSEC 0011

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ENDERS

1. ~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS AGREED WE HAVE WORKED UP A PLAN TO USE THE
PRESENCE OF SPECIALCUBAN UNIT AS JUSTIFICATION TO
FORCE A SHOWDOWN WITH NICARAGUA, CONSISTING OF AN
ULTIMATUM FOLLOWED UP IF NECESSARY BY COLLECTIVE ACTION
TO BLOCKADE WITH COLOMBIA AND OTHERS, AND A DEFENSIVE
ACTION IN THE RIO TREATY FRAMEWORK, WE THINK WE HAVE
ONLY ABOUT HALF THE VOTES, WELL SHORT OF THE TWO-THIRDS
NEEDED TO AUTHORIZE INTERVENTION).

3. HOWEVER, NONE OF THE AGENCIES RECOMMEND IT TO
YOU AT THE PRESENT TIME. NOR DO I. OUR REASONING
IS:

-- BLOCKADE PUTS US IN THE POSITION OF ACTING AGAINST
THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE RATHER THAN THE NICARAGUAN GOVERN-
MENT: IT WOULD REDUCE THEIR INCOME BY ABOUT HALF
IMMEDIATELY. THE COUNTRY IS SELF-SUFFICIENT IN FOOD,
BUT THE ENTIRE MODERN SECTOR WOULD BE RUINED. THAT
WOULD TAKE OUT THE MAIN OPPOSITION GROUPS, WHICH INDEED
MIGHT MAKE COMMON CAUSE WITH THE GOVERNMENT. AND
IF THE SANDINISTAS SURVIVED A BLOCKADE, THEY WOULD
EMERGE ENORMOUSLY STRENGTHENED.

-- QUARANTINE (ARMS ONLY) WON'T AFFECT THE WAR IN
EL SALVADOR (NICARAGUA IS SWIMMING IN SMALL ARMS)
NOR PRESSURE THE SANDINISTAS.

-- BLOCKADE/QUARANTINE COSTS AS MUCH (TWO CARRIER

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M09-259/3 #82415

BY RW NARA DATE 3/12/12

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

GROUPS, ONE AS A REACTION FORCE TO DEAL WITH CUBA)
AS A MOVE AGAINST CUBA -- BUT EVEN IF SUCCESSFUL
BUYS MUCH LESS.

4. WE HAVE DISCUSSED TWO OTHER OPTIONS: (A) USING
THE REPORT TO JUSTIFY A CENTRAL AMERICAN/CARIBBEAN
MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENTAL, OR (B) GOING
IMMEDIATELY TO THE CUBAN OPERATION. IN LATTER CASE
WE WOULD MAKE OUR ULTIMATUM (GET THE SPECIAL FORCES
OUT OF NICARAGUA AND THE TROOPS OUT OF AFRICA) IN
HAVANA, AND FOLLOW UP WITH THE PETROLEUM BLOCKADE.

1. DEFENSE (CARLUCCI, ;URMAN, WEST) WOULD LIKE TO
GO FOR OPTION (A). I THINK THERE ARE STRONG ARGUMENTS
FOR OPTION (B) -- IF WE CAN GET GOOD ENOUGH EVIDENCE
TO PERSUADE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THE SPECIAL FORCES
ARE REALLY THERE.
AND THE OPTIONS ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.

-- IF WE DON'T CALL THE CUBAN/NICARAGUAN ON THIS
THRESHOLD, THE MIGS AND OTHER SPECIAL FORCES WILL
BE SOON BEHIND; AND OUR FRIENDS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
WILL CONCLUDE WE ARE NOT SERIOUS;

-- COSTS NO MORE (ALTHOUGH RISKS MUCH HIGHER) THAN
THE NICARAGUAN OPERATION;

-- DEALS WITH THOSE RESPONSIBLE, RATHER THAN THE
SURROGATES;

-- WOULD BE THE FIRST INTRODUCTION OF CUBAN COMBAT
TROOPS ON THE MAINLAND -- SOMETHING ALL AMERICAN
PRESIDENTS SAID THEY WOULD PREVENT.

6. SUGGESTED PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO THE EVANS AND
NOVAK STORY IS:

,
QUOTE:

1. IT IS OUR LONGSTANDING POLICY NOT TO CONFIRM OR
DENY REPORTS OF THIS KIND.

2. HOWEVER, WE CONTINUE TO LOOK WITH THE UTMOST GRAVITY
UPON THE EXTERNAL SUPPLY OF ARMS AND ADVLSERS FROM
CUBA TO NICARAGUA AND, ULTIMATELY, TO THE BATTLEFIELDS
OF EL SALVADOR.

4-1
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 157

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

3. AT THE VERY LEAST, REPORTS OF THIS SORT GIVE URGENCY TO THE PROVISION OF ADEQUATE MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THREATENED COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. WE HAVE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THESE COUNTRIES UNDER REVIEW TO DETERMINE THEIR ADEQUACY.
END QUOTE.

7. ABOVE REPRESENTS THE EFFORTS OF PAUL GORMAN, BING WEST AND CIA'S CLARRIDGE, EACH OF WHOM IS TALKING TO HIS PRINCIPALS. I'LL BE REVIEWING WITH BUD AND JERRY IN THE MORNING. CLARK

BT

#7937

NNNN

SENSITIVE

82416 5
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 20

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE845
STUB147
OO RUEHC RUEHSD
DE RUEHUB #6513 2951827
ZNY SSSSS ZZH PROCESS MCN AND PARA 7 SVCD.
Q 221821Z OCT 81
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUESMG/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0227
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO 0174
RUESAL/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 0115
BT

~~SECRET~~ HAVANA 06513

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 10/22/02 (SMITH, W.S.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR MILI PINS CU ES

SUBJECT: CUBANS PUSH IDEA OF NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS
IN EL SALVADOR

REF: A) STATE 272906; B) HAVANA 6110

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH MEXICAN AMBASSADOR (PROTECT) SEVERAL DAYS AGO, FIDEL CASTRO ELABORATED ON POSITION HE HAD TAKEN DURING ANDREOTTI VISIT (REF A), I.E., THAT HE STRONGLY FAVORS POLITICAL SOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR AND HAS ENCOURAGED FRENTE TO NEGOTIATE. CASTRO REMARKED TO MEXICAN THAT WHILE US AND JUNTA ON ONE SIDE EMPHASIZED ELECTIONS AND CUBANS AND FRENTE ON OTHER STRESSED NEGOTIATIONS, TWO POSITIONS MAY NOT BE SO FAR APART. ACCORDING TO CASTRO, FRENTE IS READY TO NEGOTIATE WITH JUNTA WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS

WHAT MUST BE NEGOTIATED, CASTRO WENT ON, ARE THE CONDITIONS FOR A CEASEFIRE AND THEN THE GUIDELINES FOR ELECTIONS. MEXICAN AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT CASTRO HAD NOT EVEN MENTIONED NOTION THAT FRENTE SHOULD SHARE POWER DURING TRANSITION PERIOD; RATHER, HE HAD IN EFFECT ACCEPTED CONCEPT OF ELECTORAL SOLUTION, ADDING ONLY THAT IN ORDER TO GET FROM THE TRENCHES TO THE BALLOT BOXES, THERE MUST BE TALKS BETWEEN THE JUNTA AND THE FRENTE. WITHOUT SOME KIND OF GUARANTEES, CASTRO NOTED, GUERRILLAS COULD NOT LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS; OTHERWISE, THEY WOULD SIMPLY END UP AS HEADLESS CORPSES.

3. CASTRO HAD ALSO STRESSED TO MEXICAN THAT GUERRILLAS ARE BY NO MEANS DEFEATED. ON CONTRARY, HE SAID, THEY ARE IN VERY STRONG POSITION. HE ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER, THAT NEITHER SIDE IS LIKELY TO BREAK THE MILITARY STALEMATE ANY TIME SOON. BY THE TIME ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER WINS, HE CONCLUDED, THE COUNTRY WOULD BE IN

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD9-259/5 #82416

BY RW NARA DATE 10/9/10

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

RUINS; HENCE, THE ONLY SANE ALTERNATIVE IS TO END BLOODSHED AND BRING ABOUT POLITICAL SOLUTION.

4. IN LUNCHEON CONVERSATION OCT 21, VICE MINISTER OF FOREIGN RELATIONS RICARDO ALARCON, ON INFORMAL BASIS, CONFIRMED ALL OF THE ABOVE TO USINT CHIEF. ALARCON FURTHER STATED THAT IT HIS UNDERSTANDING FRENTE WAS NO LONGER DEMANDING RESTRUCTURING OF NATIONAL GUARD AS A PRECONDITION TO NEGOTIATIONS, THOUGH, HE NOTED, THAT MIGHT INDEED BE ONE OF THE ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED IN THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS.

5. ALARCON STRESSED THAT WHILE CUBA HAD ENCOURAGED FRENTE TO NEGOTIATE, IT DOES NOT CONTROL LATTER'S DECISIONS. FRENTE MAKES ITS OWN DECISIONS. IN THIS CASE, THERE WAS CONCERT OF VIEWS. ALSO, ALARCON STATED, CUBAN MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR GUERRILLAS IS NOW AT VERY LOW LEVEL. THERE ARE ABSOLUTELY NO CUBAN ADVISORS IN EL SALVADOR, NOR IS CUBA SENDING ARMS. WHEN CHALLENGED ON THIS POINT BY USINT CHIEF, ALARCON ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME ARMS MIGHT BE GOING TO NICARAGUA TO BOLSTER THAT COUNTRY'S DEFENSES, BUT NONE WERE GOING TO EL SALVADOR. IF SOME OF THE ARMS IN THE FORMER WERE FINDING THEIR WAY INTO THE LATTER, THAT WAS NOT BY CUBA'S DESIGN, AND, ANYWAY, HE CONCLUDED, THE QUANTITY COULD NOT BE SIGNIFICANT. ARMS RECEIVED FROM CUBA COULD NOT BE A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN THE SALVADORAN SITUATION AT THIS POINT, ALARCON INSISTED, THOUGH HE IMPLIED THIS MIGHT NOT REMAIN THE CASE IF NEGOTIATIONS DID NOT START SOON. HE ADDED THAT NO MATTER WHAT US MIGHT SAY PUBLICLY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES, HE WAS SURE US INTELLIGENCE COULD CONFIRM THAT NO ARMS WERE GOING TO EL SALVADOR FROM CUBA AND THAT THERE COULD NOT BE MORE THAN A TRICKLE GOING IN FROM NICARAGUA, A TRICKLE, HE INSISTED OVER WHICH HE ASSUMED NICARAGUAN GOVT HAD LITTLE CONTROL. USINT CHIEF SAID THAT NOT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF SITUATION.

6. ALARCON REMARKED THAT IT WAS TO BE HOPED NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN QUICKLY. THIS IS OPPORTUNE MOMENT AND SHOULD NOT BE LOST, HE ASSERTED. FOR ITS PART, CUBA WOULD PREFER TO SEE A POLITICAL SOLUTION. HOWEVER, IF US AND JUNTA INSIST ON TRYING TO FORCE A MILITARY VICTORY, THE FRENTE IS IN A STRONG POSITION TO CARRY THE WAR FORWARD INDEFINITELY, AND CUBA WOULD HAVE NO RECOURSE BUT TO STAND BY ITS FRIENDS. CONSEQUENCES OF CONTINUING BLOODSHED, HOWEVER, COULD BE TRAGIC FOR ALL SIDES.

7. (#)

THEMSELVES,

USINT CHIEF MADE NO COMMENT.

8. COMMENT: ALARCON'S REMARKS ARE ESPECIALLY INTERESTING COMING FROM HIM, ONE OF THE MOST NOABLE OF THE HARDLINERS.

SMITH

BT

#6513

SENSITIVE

7

PAGE 1 - 22

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NNNN

SENSITIVE

82417 8
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 23

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81/1296

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE803

STU7833

DD RUEHC RUEHSD

DE RUEHUB #6546 2952250

ZNY SSSSS ZZH//RECD IN SYS WITHOUT MCN PROCESSED WITH ZERDES

U R 222220Z OCT 81

FM USINT HAVANA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA

RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO

RUESAL/SAN SALVADOR

BT

~~SECRET~~ HAVANA 06546

EXDIS

E.O. 12065 RDS-1 10/22/02 (SMITH, WAYNE S.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR MILI CU ES NU

SUBJECT: CUBANS DENY ANY TROOPS SENT TO NICARAGUA, OR EL SALVADOR

REF: A) STATE 279647; B) USICA 53779; C) HAVANA 6513

1. S-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. KEY CASTRO AID JOSE LUIS PADRON OCT 22 VEHEMENTLY AND CATEGORICALLY DENIED ALLEGATIONS IN OCT 19 EVANS-NOVAK COLUMN, I.E., THAT SOME 500-600 CUBAN BLACK BERETS HAD BEEN AIRLIFTED TO NICARAGUA AND THEN INFILTRATED INTO EL SALVADOR TO BLOW A BRIDGE.

3. PADRON STATED THAT THERE ARE NO CUBAN TROOPS IN NICARAGUA. "NOT 500, NOR 50, NOR ANY SPECIAL FORCES HAVE BEEN AIRLIFTED TO NICARAGUA AS ALLEGED BY EVANS-NOVAK PIECE," HE ASSERTED. ALLEGATION, HE DECLARED, IS CUT FROM WHOLE CLOTH, ADDING THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO HIDE A UNIT THAT LARGE AND THUS POINTLESS TO DENY IT IF REPORT WERE TRUE. PADRON WENT ON TO SAY, "THERE ARE NO CUBAN TROOPS IN NICARAGUA; THERE ARE NONE IN EL SALVADOR; NEITHER ARE THERE ANY CUBAN ADVISERS IN EL SALVADOR." WHEN ASKED IF THERE WERE, THEN ADVISERS IN NICARAGUA, PADRON SAID THAT YES, OF COURSE, THERE WERE A FEW; "YOU KNOW ALL ABOUT THAT," HE NOTED.

4. PADRON REMARKED THAT FREOTE AND JUNTA SEEMED CLOSER TO NEGOTIATIONS IN EL SALVADOR (REF C). WAS EVANS-NOVAK PIECE A PROVOCATION AIMED A SPOILING ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, HE ASKED RHETORICALLY?

5. USINT COMMENTS ON EVANS-NOVAK ALLEGATIONS FOLLOW BY

SEPTEL

SMITH

BT

#6546

NNNN

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM04-259/5#82417

BY RW NARA DATE 10/8/10

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 24

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81/1296

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SENSITIVE

SENSITIVE

82418

10

PAGE 1 - 208

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81/7309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE950
STU5531
DD RUEHC
DE RUEHUB #6619 2992310
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 262240Z OCT 81
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8027
INFO RUEMSG/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 234
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 748
RUESAL/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR 120
BT

~~SECRET~~ HAVANA 06619

EXDIS

E.O. 12065 GDS 10/26/87 (SMITH, W.S.) DR-M

TAGS: PEPR MILI CU NU

SUBJECT: USINT SKEPTICISM WITH RESPECT TO REPORTS OF CUBAN TROOPS
IN NICARAGUA

REF: A) HAVANA 6546 B) HAVANA 6588

1. S--ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: USINT DOUBTS THAT CUBANS WOULD SEND TROOPS, I.E.,
MILITARY UNITS, TO NICARAGUA. RISKS WOULD BE HIGH AND GAINS
QUESTIONABLE. IT SEEMS EVEN LESS LIKELY THAT CUBA WOULD INTRODUCE
LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS ON CLANDESTINE BASIS SINCE CHANCES OF DIS-
COVERY WOULD BE EXTREMELY HIGH. CUBANS MIGHT WELL, HOWEVER, FLOAT
FALSE INFORMATION IN HOPES OF PROVOKING OVERREACTION ON
PART OF US. END SUMMARY

3. LEAVING ASIDE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CUBAN DENIALS (REFS A AND B),
USINT WOULD BE VERY SKEPTICAL OF ANY REPORTS THAT 500-600 CUBAN ELITE
MININT SPECIAL FORCES HAD BEEN AIRLIFTED TO NICARAGUA (OR, FOR THAT
MATTER, THAT ANY OTHER CUBAN UNITS HAVE BEEN SENT THERE). CUBANS
ALREADY HAVE SOME MILITARY ADVISERS THERE, SOME OF WHOM MAY
WELL BE GIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS.
HAVANA MIGHT INDEED AUGMENT NUMBER OF SUCH ADVISERS AND/OR
SEND ON CLANDESTINE BASIS SMALL SPECIAL TEAMS FOR SOME
SPECIFIC PURPOSES AS WE HAVE SUGGESTED IN PAST, HOWEVER,
WE BELIEVE CUBANS ARE MOST UNLIKELY TO SEND TROOPS, I.E. MILITARY
UNITS, TO NICARAGUA, AND CERTAINLY NOT TO EL SALVADOR. TO DO
SO OPENLY WOULD RISK PUNITIVE US MEASURES AGAINST CUBA AND/OR
NICARAGUA.

4. IF ANALYZED IN CONTEXT OF EXTERNAL THREATS, NICARAGUANS
WOULD PROBABLY NOT NEED CUBA'S HELP AGAINST HONDURAN OR SALVADORAN
MILITARY ANYWAY, AND, AGAIN, INVOLVEMENT OF CUBAN TROOPS WOULD
IMPLY HEAVY RISKS -- RISKS WHICH CUBANS WOULD NOT BE INCLINED TO

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD9-259/5#82418

BY RW

NARA DATE 10/8/17

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

ACCEPT GRATUITOUSLY.

5. IN CONTEXT OF INTERNAL THREATS, COMMITMENT OF CUBAN TROOPS WOULD PROBABLY ONLY BE CONTEMPLATED, GIVEN THE HIGH RISKS, AS A LAST RESORT. ACCORDINGLY, CUBANS MIGHT WELL CALCULATE THAT IF SITUATION SO DESPERATE THAT IT COULD ONLY BE SAVED BY INTRODUCTION OF CUBAN TROOPS (IF EVEN THAT WOULD DO THE TRICK, WHICH WOULD BE PROBLEMATIC), IT WOULD PROBABLY BE TOO FAR GONE TO MAKE THE RISK WORTHWHILE. MOREOVER, GIVEN UNPOPULARITY OF CUBANS AMONG NICARAGUAN POPULACE, COMMITMENT OF CUBAN TROOPS MIGHT EXACERBATE RATHER THAN PUT DOWN INTERNAL UPRISING, A WRINKLE OF WHICH CUBANS FULLY COGNIZANT. IN FINAL ANALYSIS, TO COMMIT THEIR OWN TROOPS IN NICARAGUA, CUBANS WOULD HAVE TO BE WILLING TO PLACE IN JEOPARDY THE SECURITY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION ITSELF. NICARAGUA IS IMPORTANT TO THEM, TO BE SURE, BUT NOT THAT IMPORTANT. AS THEY WOULD PROBABLY RATIONALIZE, THERE CAN ALWAYS BE OTHER NICARAGUAS SO LONG AS CUBA ITSELF SURVIVES. TO RISK EVEN THAT WOULD BE IRRATIONAL. FURTHER, WHILE WE WOULD DEFER TO JUDGMENT OF AMEMBASSY MOSCOW, IT WOULD SEEM TO US ON FACE OF IT THAT GIVEN HIGH RISKS AND CONCOMITANT PRESSURES ON SOVIETS, LATTER WOULD TRY TO RESTRAIN CUBANS FROM ANY COMMITMENT OF THEIR OWN TROOPS.

6. ABOVE ARE GENERAL REFLECTIONS. REPORTS MENTIONED BY EVANS-NOVAK SOUND EVEN LESS PLAUSIBLE THAN HAVE SOME IN PAST. IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF CUBAN TROOPS COULD GO LONG UNDETECTED; HENCE, THERE WOULD BE LITTLE POINT IN COVERT INTRODUCTION, AND EVEN LESS IN PUBLIC DENIAL. FURTHER, IF PURPOSE OF SENDING TROOPS WAS TO BOLSTER SANDINISTAS, CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION WOULD MAKE LITTLE SENSE. OPPOSITION NOT LIKELY TO BE INTIMIDATED BY THEIR PRESENCE IF LATTER KEPT A SECRET. LIKewise, COVERT INTRODUCTION AND VEHEMENT CUBAN DENIALS WOULD MILITATE AGAINST ANY THEORY THAT PURPOSE WAS TO DEMONSTRATE TO HONDURANS IN WAKE OF HALCON VISTA EXERCISES THAT NICARAGUA HAD FRIENDS WITH WHICH IT TOO COULD CONDUCT MILITARY MANEUVERS.

7. ONLY AS A DESPERATION MEASURE, WE BELIEVE, MIGHT CUBANS SEND TROOPS TO NICARAGUA, A MEASURE SUGGESTING THAT THEY WERE NOT ONLY WILLING TO RISK BUT INDEED WISHED TO PROVOKE A US MILITARY RESPONSE -- A SORT OF "WE'LL GO DOWN BUT FORCE YOU TO EXTREMES AS WE GO" MENTALITY. CIRCUMSTANCES, HOWEVER, DO NOT SUGGEST ANY GOTTERDAMMERUNG SUCH/MIND-SET AT THIS POINT.

8. OF COURSE, KNOWING US SENSITIVITY ON THIS ISSUE, CUBA MIGHT HOPE TO PROVOKE SOME OVERREACTION ON THE PART OF THE US BY FLOATING FALSE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE COMMITMENT OF CUBAN TROOPS.

9. CUBANS ARE GLEEFULLY TELLING OTHER DIPLOMATS IN TOWN THAT LATEST U.S. "ERROR" PROBABLY RESULTS FROM CONFUSING LATEST CONTINGENT OF CUBAN TEACHERS WITH TROOPS.

SMITH

12
SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 210

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81/A309

SITUATION: CHECK
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BT
#6619
NNNN

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen _____

13

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

November 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD V. ALLEN

Dik EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

SUBJECT:

Cubans Making Contingency Plans to Close Its
Diplomatic Interests Section Here

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Havana believes a complete break
in relations between the U.S. and Cuba is imminent [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

- o The Cuban government will not initiate a break in relations unless the U.S. "further provokes" Cuba. However, Havana will use the next major insult or attack from Washington as a "cause celebre" for breaking relations, hoping to portray the U.S. as the "hostile aggressor" and itself as the "aggrieved party."
- o Cuba may opt for a reduction in our respective staffs rather than a total break in relations.

[REDACTED] Cuban fears are generated mainly by the October 29 State Department press conference where Cuba was accused of sending special troops to Nicaragua and State announced we were reviewing ways to bring pressure to bear on Cuba.

- o [REDACTED] it believes the U.S. is on the verge of taking direct military action against Cuba. (S)

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

81 11 10 10 32

~~SECRET~~

REVIEW ON NOVEMBER 9, 2001
CLASSIFIED BY CIA

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLPR M25915 #82419

BY *kw* DATE 8/11/8