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Mondale

"President Royo, Mrs. Royo, distinguished heads of delegations, members of Congress, honored guests and friends. This is indeed a proud day for the people of Panama. And it is a proud day for the people of the United States. Together on this moving occasion, our two nations rejoice as we write a new chapter in the history of our hemisphere. We meet at the magnificent Canal of Panama. For 65 years it has stood as a triumphant symbol of civilization, of the engineering, medical, and entrepreneurial genius of the 20th century. But from this moment forward the Panama Canal takes on a second symbolic meaning. It becomes two success stories; both of technology and of political ideals; both of engineering wizardry and of diplomatic vision; both of the conquest of nature and the cooperation of cultures. We now seal a relationship between two independent nations to guarantee the operation and defense of one of the world's key waterways, working together in mutual interest and for mutual benefit. The United States and Panama can be confident in our ability to achieve our shared objectives. I am here today to say that we will honor in full the terms of the Treaty. We will keep the Canal operating smoothly just as it has been since its opening in 1914. It will remain a safe and sure route of transit for the commerce of the entire world. Today the United States and Panama settle more than the future of the Canal. For as President Carter has said these treaties mark the commitment of the United States to the belief that fairness and not force should lie at the heart of our dealings with the nations of the world. Our partnership is the outcome not of the politics of confrontation but of a common search for justice. A politics not of domination or dependence but of mutual interest and aspiration. And other countries of the world near and far can draw a meaning of what Panama and the United States have accomplished. For both our countries have acted with restraint and responsibility. Both achieved long-standing goals, and both have strengthened their capacity for independent action and influence on the global scene. Panama has long been a crossroads of world commerce. Today Panama also stands at the midpoint of a new heartland of emerging democracy. In Quito, in La Paz, we have just witnessed free elections and a successful transition to civilian rule. In Lima a new constitution has been adopted. In Santo Domingo elections brought an orderly transfer of power for the first time in our century. In Managua winds of democratic progress are stirring where they have long been stifled. In Honduras, the return to constitutional rule and elections is underway. From the Dominican Republic to the North, from the Andean states to the South we celebrate today a remarkable advance toward effective democratic institutions. This move toward more open and democratic societies is an indigenous process, not a formula imposed from elsewhere without regard to the diversities of the people concerned.

It is a dynamic and evolving order reflecting national diversities alive to aspirations for human rights, and responsive to the drive to participate in the political process. The process of the past two years refutes the claim that only authoritarian methods can provide the social discipline for wellbeing and growth. Instead, as the Quito declaration states, the best way to guarantee the prosperity of people is to provide a climate of freedom and enforcement of human rights under new forms of social democracy. These are the ideals we enshrine in our Panama Canal treaties.

As 15 years of negotiations reach their moment of fulfillment today, let us pay tribute to the countless thousands who have made and still make the Canal great. To the French pioneers who launched its history, to the Americans, and Barbadians, and Jamaicans, and people literally from every nation in the world who built the Canal against such overwhelming odds. To the Panamanians and Americans whose hard work day after day has maintained its efficient operation and to those who will continue that crucial work by staying on with the Panama Canal Commission. The creation of the Canal, as its superb historian has written, "was one of the supreme human achievements of all time, the culmination of a heroic dream of four hundred years, and of more than 20 years of phenomenal effort and sacrifice. The fifty miles between the oceans were among the hardest ever won by human effort and ingenuity. And no statistics on tonnage or tolls can begin to convey the grandeur of what was accomplished. The Canal is an expression of that old and noble desire, to bridge the divide, to bring people together." So today let us celebrate a new bridging of the divide, a new drawing together. For 65 years the Panama Canal has joined the oceans. Now and forevermore it will join our ideals.

Thank you."

Press Release
Albrook Field, Panama
October 1, 1979

MAY 14, 1980

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON
CUBAN REFUGEES

After consultations with senior advisers and with Congress, and in the spirit of the San Jose Conference, the President has decided to take the following steps to welcome the Cuban refugees in a legal and orderly process:

1. We are prepared to start an airlift or a sealift immediately as soon as President Castro accepts this offer. Our Government is chartering two large, sea-worthy ships, which will go to Key West to standby, ready to go to Cuba. To ensure a legal and orderly process, all people will have to be screened before departure from Cuba. Priority will be given to political prisoners, to close relatives of U.S. permanent residents, and to persons who sought freedom in the Peruvian Embassy and in our Interest Section last month. In the course of our discussions with the Congress and with the Cuban-American community, the international community and the Cuban Government, we will determine the number of people to be taken over the next twelve months. We will fulfill our humanitarian responsibilities, and we hope other governments will adjust their previous pledges to resettle Cuban refugees to take into account the larger problem that has developed. This will provide a safe and orderly way to accommodate Cubans wishing to enter the U.S.
2. Tomorrow, we will open a Family Registration Office in Miami to receive the names of close Cuban relatives of U.S. permanent residents who will be eligible for immigration.
3. The Coast Guard is now communicating with these vessels illegally enroute to or from Cuba and those already in Mariel Harbor to tell them to return to the United States without taking Cubans on board. If they follow this directive, they have nothing to fear from the law. We will do everything possible to stop these illegal trips to Cuba. We will take the following steps to ensure that the law is obeyed:
 - (a) The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) will continue to issue notices of intent to fine those unlawfully bringing Cubans to this country. As fines become due, they will be collected.
 - (b) All vessels currently and unlawfully carrying Cubans to this country will henceforth be seized by the Customs Service.
 - (c) Anyone who tampers with or seeks to move a ship to Cuba which has been seized will be subject to separate criminal prosecution.

MORE

- (d) The Coast Guard will continue to review each vessel that returns to the United States for violations of boat safety law. Those found to be in gross violation of the law will be subject to criminal prosecution and additional fines. Furthermore, boats which are found to be safety hazards will be detained.
- (e) Any individual who has been notified by INS for unlawfully bringing Cubans into the country and who makes another trip will be subject to criminal prosecution and the boat used for such a repeat trip will be seized for forfeiture proceedings.
- (f) Law enforcement agencies will take additional steps, as necessary, to implement this policy and to discourage the unlawful boat traffic to Cuba.

- 4. Castro has taken hardened criminals out of prison and mental patients out of hospitals and has forced boat owners to take them to the U.S. Thus far, over 400 such prisoners have been detained. We will not permit our country to be used as a dumping ground for criminals who represent a danger to our society, and we will begin exclusion proceedings against these people at once.
- 5. These steps will make clear to the Government of Cuba our determination to negotiate an orderly process. This is the mission of the three-government delegation established by the San Jose Conference last week. Our actions are intended to promote an international solution to this problem. We intend to continue our consultations with the participants of the San Jose Conference and consider additional steps the international community should take to resolve this problem.

In summary, the U.S. will welcome Cubans, seeking freedom, in accordance with our laws, and we will pursue every avenue to establish an orderly and regular flow.

The President continues to be greatly concerned about the Haitians who have been coming to this country on small boats. He has instructed appropriate federal agencies to receive the Haitians in the same manner as others seeking asylum. However, our laws never contemplated and do not provide adequately for people coming to our shores in the manner the Cubans and Haitians have. We will work closely with the Congress to formulate a long-term solution to this problem and to determine the legal status of these "boat people" after the current emergency situation is controlled.

The Cuban American community has contributed much to Miami, the State of Florida, and to our country. The President understands the deep desire to reunite families which has led to this situation. He calls upon the Cuban-American community to end the boat flotilla and help bring about a safe and orderly resolution to this crisis.

DEFENSE POLICY/WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Reagan

I. Weapon Systems

Reagan and the Republican Platform call for massive rearmament in both conventional and nuclear forces. While both Reagan and the Republican platform list specific weapon systems which they would fund, it appears that Reagan favors an arms race as an end in itself -- as a means for challenging Soviet industrial capacity:

"If we start an arms buildup, they (the Soviets) will understand that the alternative to legitimate limitation is our industrial might and power turned to a military buildup."

Wall Street Journal
June 3, 1980

Reagan has been a constant supporter of all weapon programs. In fact, he has never publicly opposed any major weapon system in the last 15 years.

Neutron Bomb

Reagan strongly opposed any funding cuts in the development of the neutron bomb. He views the neutron bomb as "an offensive weapon that could bridge the gap for conventional weapons." (New York Times, May 6, 1980)

Reagan has called the neutron bomb the closest thing to the ideal weapon.

"Very simply it is the dreamed of death ray weapon of science fiction. It kills enemy soldiers but doesn't blow up the surrounding countryside or destroy villages, towns and cities. It won't destroy an enemy tank -- just kill the tank crew.

"Now some express horror at this and charging immortality, portray those who would use such a weapon as placing a higher value on property than human life. This is sheer unadulterated nonsense. It is harsh sounding, but all war weapons back to club, the sling and the arrow, are designed to kill

the soldiers of the enemy. With gunpowder and artillery and later bombs and bombers, war could not be confined to the battlefield. And so came total war with non-combatants outnumbering soldiers in casualties."

Reagan Radio Transcript
March 1978 - April 1978

Reagan supports deployment of the neutron bomb in almost every available delivery system.

"I favor development and deployment of the neutron warhead for U.S. theatre nuclear forces, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, artillery and bombs."

Washington Post
April 24, 1980

MX Missile

Reagan supports development of the MX Missile system. However, because it will be years before the system is deployable, he has called for a faster remedy.

"To prevent the ultimate catastrophe of a massive nuclear attack, we urgently need a program to preserve and restore our strategic deterrent. The Administration proposes a costly and complex new missile system. But we can't complete that until the end of this decade. Given the rapidly growing vulnerability of our land based missile force, a faster remedy is needed."

Address to Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations
March 17, 1980

Cruise Missile

Reagan is a strong advocate of the cruise missile.

"You've got a weapon system they can't counter ...The cruise missile could be just that."

Los Angeles Times

Reagan has attacked the Carter Administration for delaying production of the cruise missile.

"We have an administration that in three years has done away with...the cruise missile...and you could go on with weapon after weapon..."

San Jose News

March 10, 1980

Republican Platform

The Republican platform calls for development of virtually every weapon system under consideration:

- "o the earliest possible deployment of the MX missile in a prudent survivable configuration;
- o accelerated development and deployment of a new manned strategic penetrating bomber that will exploit the \$5.5 billion already invested in the B-1, while employing the most advanced technology available;
- o deployment of an air defense system comprised of dedicated modern interceptor aircraft and early warning support systems;
- o acceleration of development and deployment of strategic cruise missiles deployed on aircraft, on land, and on ships and submarines;
- o modernization of the military command and control system to assure the responsiveness of U.S. strategic nuclear forces to presidential command in peace or war; and
- o vigorous research and development of an effective anti-ballistic missile system, such as is already at hand in the Soviet Union, as well as more modern ABM technologies."

1980 Republican Platform

B-1 Bomber

In 1976, when the Senate voted to delay a decision on building the B-1 bomber, Reagan criticized its action.

"The action in the Senate must have been good news in Moscow. They must have been toasting in the Kremlin."

Washington Post
May 22, 1976

Similarly, when President Carter cancelled production of the B-1, Reagan questioned the decision.

"I don't think that the current administration is doing what should be done - not when it cancels the B-1 bomber, which is probably the foremost advance in aircraft that has ever been -- or has been presented since we went to the jet engines..."

Face the Nation
May 14, 1978

Y-C 14

Reagan criticized the Carter Administration for cutting funding for the Boeing YC-14:

"All of this sounds reassuring, doesn't it? But there is a kicker in the story - Last December the Administration cancelled the YC-14 program in one of its 'national security' or perhaps I should say 'insecurity' decisions.

"Meanwhile, by some strange coincidence the Soviet Union just happens to be going full-speed ahead on an airplane building program. And the plane they are building looks for all the world like a mirror image of the YC-14. Well, why not? The YC-14 is the most advanced idea in cargo transport of combat forces and equipment in the world today."

Reagan Radio Broadcast
June, 1978

MILITARY POLICY

Bush

"My view is, get a good SALT Treaty and sign it. My view is, strengthen defense. So I think the linkage that I got from your question is though I know others feel that way, I think it is; and my view has always been judge the Treaty on its merits, and if it's good, go ahead. Strengthen defense; yes, we're going to have to do that. You see, when President Carter came in he took out of the Ford budget the B-1, the neutron, improvement of the Navy. And there was one other major area -- MX -- the mobile missile. And he took all this out, shifted that money over into the social side of the equation, in terms of spending, and I think those priorities were wrong. I think we're getting too weak."

CBS Face the Nation
page 8
October 7, 1979

Bush

"For even if the Carter administration were able to convince the American people that it hasn't failed in its responsibility to maintain our nation's strategic capabilities -- and I, for one, believe the people are wise enough to see through this orchestrated campaign -- the Soviet Union is all-too-aware of our country's diminished military, naval and strategic power.

"The men in the Kremlin know, as Governor Reagan has pointed out, that in the past fifteen years the United States has lost its deterrent advantage over the Soviet Union in all but a handful of military categories -- and if current trends continue, they'll surpass us even in those.

"It's a frightening thought. But in this crucial year of decision, the operative phrase in that thought is, obviously, "if current trends continue."

World Affairs Council, Pittsburgh
September 5, 1980

Carter Record on Defense Programs:
Claims and Reality.

The Administration's defense budgets and programs demonstrate its clear commitment to preserving our national security in the face of sustained Soviet challenge. This record stands in clear contrast to the performance--if not the rhetoric--of preceding Republican administrations.

Some have claimed that "Ford would have done more than President Carter has done." It is always easier to claim what might have been done than to actually deliver. Again, the President's record is noteworthy--four years of sustained real growth, in contrast to eight years of real decline.

e The last "real" Ford budget was the one for Fiscal Year 1977, submitted in 1976; before GOP primaries stimulated a series of interim changes, and before the President's defeat in November 1976 left his officials just before leaving office free to propose a budget that did not have to meet the standards of realism and consistency required of a budget that must be defended and executed by its authors.

e Claims that strategic programs planned by the Ford Administration were vitiated by President Carter are based on a combination of misleading assertions and oversimplification. These charges simply don't stand up under scrutiny.

-- We already had 100 "extra" Minuteman missiles (missiles without launchers) in the inventory. Keeping the production line in a stand-by status (as suggested by Ford) at a cost of as much as \$300 million a year, made no sense at all, and this Administration wisely declined to do it.

-- Ford's covered trench-mobile MX missile might have been operational in FY 84, as he projected, but the system as designed would have been much less capable than the carefully studied design now undergoing full scale development by the Carter Administration.

-- Meeting a FY 79 IOC for the TRIDENT SSBN, as projected by the Republicans, was clearly impossible as early as 1975. Shipyard management and industrial delay problems which plagued the TRIDENT program under previous administrations have now been cleared up. The first TRIDENT submarine is at sea now and will be on patrol next year.

-- The B-1 would not be as effective a way to maintain the third leg of our deterrent--in the face of vigorous Soviet air defense programs--as would the Administration's dynamic program of ALCM development, production and deployment. The ALCM contractor has been recently selected, and the program is on schedule. Work on design, construction and eventual procurement of a new ALCM carrier aircraft is also underway and on schedule. We now project an 1982 IOC for the first full squadron of B-52s, each aircraft equipped with 16 missiles. (Funding has also been requested for new penetrating bomber technology for a 1990s replacement to the B-52.)

-- Finally, the Carter Administration has assigned high priority to realistic ground- and sea-launched cruise missile programs, with the result that we will have a GLCM available for deployment in Europe as soon as the infrastructure is available to receive it. In December our NATO allies endorsed this deployment as one element of the Alliance's TNF modernization program. A SLCM program is proceeding in parallel with the counterpart ground-launched project. By contrast, no decisions on full-scale development of any cruise missile were made by the Republicans until the last few days of the Ford Administration.

• This Administration has responded wisely to the adverse trends in the military balance (trends which arise from a doubling of Soviet military spending in the last twenty years while ours remained level) and to increased dangers to U.S. interests through steady increases in defense budgets, culminating in substantial growth in the FY 81 defense budget. Our current Five Year Defense Program projects continued real growth in defense spending through FY 1985.

In the first year of this Administration, we placed the major weight of our efforts behind improving NATO's early conventional combat capability, primarily through the Alliance's Long Term Defense Program and the three percent real growth commitment. We next turned to the problem of modernizing our strategic Triad. Most recently, we have taken steps to modernize our theater nuclear forces in Europe. Thus, programs in each of these areas are underway and have momentum. We are now concentrating special attention and resources on improving our capabilities to deal with the threats and crises around the world and, in particular, we are acting to expand the improvement (begun two years ago) in our ability to get men and equipment quickly to potential areas of conflict and to retain our preeminence at sea in an era of new technologies.

Not only has the President's commitment to growth in Defense capability been steady over three years, but key planning to meet contingencies such as the present crisis in the Persian Gulf has been underway for some two years. Critics have tried to claim that our healthy increase in 1981 Defense spending was a last minute concoction in response to Afghanistan, and that our Rapid Deployment Forces were likewise an eleventh hour invention.

The contrary is true, and we have the public record to prove it. Our 1981 program was built last summer, with important emphasis--pre-hostage and pre-Afghanistan--on expanded capabilities to deploy forces worldwide, outside the NATO theater. That program and the emphasis was formulated during the early fall of 1971 and briefed to the Congress by Secretary Brown in early December, before the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan. While some members in the Congress (which has cut every Carter defense budget by \$1B or more) have only recently "recognized" the need for sustained real growth, President Carter has been requesting and urging support for such defense budgets since his inauguration.

The Carter modernization thrust spans the entire defense program, with impressive capabilities now and in the future:

- For the Army, more than doubling the prepositioned combat equipment in NATO to allow rapid reinforcement of our Allies, the new XM-1 tank, IFV armored vehicle, and the Roland air defense missile.

- For the Navy and Marines, the Trident missile and continued Trident submarine production, the AEGIS fleet air defense cruiser, new TAKX Marine Maritime Prepositioning ships, the F-18/A-18 fighter and attack aircraft, and more FFG-7 frigates for protection of supply convoys.

- For the Air Force, the MX missile and the air-launched cruise missile (a far more capable alternative to the B-1) to modernize and strengthen our strategic capability; twenty-six fully equipped tactical fighter wings, many with new F-15, F-16 and A-10 aircraft; the KC-10 advanced cargo/tanker aircraft to speed rapid deployment; and the CX transport aircraft to expand our ability to airlift men and equipment anywhere on the globe.

In addition, we are strengthening our nation's ability to respond forcefully in a crisis by reinstituting registration for potential military service. This registration of

young men shortens the time it will take us to mobilize in the face of any military contingency, and it will tend to increase enlistments, especially in our reserve forces.

In sum, the record of President Carter is a measured, responsible performance that reflects his consistent, long-term commitment to our nation's security.

AN OVERVIEW OF MAJOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS

This paper presents a brief overview of the major defense programs in the Carter Administration's Five Year Defense Program.

SUMMARY OF PROGRAMS

A. Strategic Forces

1. MX - In order to meet the challenge posed by the vigorous Soviet ICBM program, we will deploy 200 new MX inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in a mobile and survivable basing mode. Each MX will be equipped with 10 warheads, compared to three on each of our current MINUTEMAN III missiles.

2. TRIDENT - We are modernizing the sea-based leg of the strategic TRIAD with two major programs. The new highly-accurate TRIDENT I missile will be placed on POSEIDON submarines. This missile's longer range will enable submarines equipped with it to patrol an ocean area 10 times larger, thus making them more difficult for the Soviets to detect and destroy. The new TRIDENT submarine, the first of which is scheduled to go on patrol next year, has more (24) and larger missile tubes than the POSEIDON boats, is quieter, and can remain on patrol much longer.

3. Air-Launched Cruised Missile - The long-range, deadly-accurate air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) is the key to the modernization of the third leg of the TRIAD, our bomber force. Our plans are to deploy over 3,000 ALCMs on 151 of our B-52 bombers. The ALCM can be launched from a bomber that is far outside the range of Soviet air defenses. This program will provide an effective retaliatory force well into the 1980s and beyond.

4. New Strategic Aircraft - To hedge against unexpected vulnerabilities in the B-52/ALCM system, we are continuing to investigate designs for a new cruise missile carrier and a new manned penetrating bomber.

B. Forces for NATO

1. NATO Long Term Defense Program (LTDP) - This Administration has reaffirmed our historic commitment to the defense of Western Europe against the Warsaw Pact. In 1978, NATO adopted the LTDP (proposed by the United States in 1977), which provides for long-term planning and co-operative efforts among the United States and our NATO allies. We and our NATO allies are committed to increasing real defense spending (after inflation) by three percent per year through the mid-1980s, in order to bolster our conventional capabilities to deter -- and, if necessary, to defeat -- Warsaw Pact aggression.

2. Theater Nuclear Forces - Theater nuclear forces (TNF) provide an important link between conventional and strategic nuclear capabilities, demonstrating our willingness to use nuclear weapons, if necessary, in support of our NATO allies. The Soviet build-up in their own long-range theater nuclear forces (especially the BACKFIRE bomber and the SS-20 missile) cannot go unanswered by NATO. Thus, modernization of our long-range TNF is a top priority. In December 1979, the Alliance decided to deploy in Europe 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) beginning in 1983 and replace 108 of our older PERSHING IA missiles with longer-range PERSHING II missiles.

3. Pre-positioned Equipment - Our NATO reinforcement objectives can be met only if we severely reduce the demand on our limited airlift assets during the early stages of a conflict. To accomplish this, we are going to preposition more equipment in Europe. We have programmed enough additional equipment for three divisions in Europe by 1982 and are considering further increases.

4. Readiness and Sustainability - In order to increase both the readiness of our forces in Europe as well as their ability to fight for longer periods of time, we are programming increases in spare parts, munitions, support structure and training, war reserves, and other key support items. In the FY 1981 budget request, 63 percent of the \$59 billion defense logistics dollars are dedicated to support peacetime material readiness programs.

C. Mobility Forces

Our long-term mobility objective is to be able to support the concurrent demands of a world-wide NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict and those of a non-NATO contingency. We will meet those demands with a carefully balanced program of forward deployed forces, airlift, sealift and prepositioned equipment.

1. Airlift - We are moving ahead with plans for the CX transport, which will carry outsized cargo (such as heavy tanks) over intercontinental ranges and have the capability to operate into small, austere airfields. We are considering two alternatives for the CX: a totally new aircraft and an existing aircraft (or modified version), like the C-5 or 747. To support deployment of our general purpose forces, we have programmed a new tanker-cargo aircraft, the KC-10. The KC-10 will have a unique long-range, large off-load capacity and the ability to carry cargo in addition to fuel. We are also enhancing our Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) program, under which commercial aircraft are converted to carry military passengers or cargo during a crisis.

2. Sealift - Even with enhanced airlift to augment our sealift capability, much of the equipment our troops will need in combat must be carried by ship. We are purchasing eight commercial SL-7 cargo ships and converting them to RO/RO (Roll-on/Roll-off) ships. These fast ships can carry large amounts of equipment to European seaports in four days, and the Persian Gulf in two weeks, from U.S. ports on the East coast.

3. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) - In order to be able to respond rapidly to the requirements of a non-NATO contingency, we have designated certain of our land, sea, and air forces for the RDJTF. The forces available to the RDF include both heavy and light Army and Marine units, naval carrier battle groups, and tactical fighter and airlift wings. In a non-NATO contingency, we would initially deploy our light ground forces and tactical aircraft, with emphasis on speed and mobility, followed by heavy armored RDF forces, as dictated by the requirements of the particular contingency.

4. Maritime Prepositioning - Since rapidly deployable light forces are not adequate for sustained combat, we also need a capability to deploy heavy armored forces rapidly. A major initiative to that end is our program to buy new Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS). By prepositioning equipment, supplies and ammunition, these new ships will enable us to rapidly deploy an armor-heavy Marine division anywhere in the world. In the interim, we are currently prepositioning equipment for certain Marine units on seven specially configured commercial ships, which are now en route to the Indian Ocean to provide a flexible and rapid response capability for non-NATO contingencies.

D. Other Modernization Programs

1. Tactical Air - We are completing a major modernization of our tactical air (TACAIR) forces. Air Force units are now being equipped with the F-15, the world's best fighter; the highly reliable F-16 multi-purpose fighter; and the A-10, close air support and interdiction aircraft. Navy TACAIR units are now flying the F-14, which, with its sophisticated PHOENIX missile system, provides a significant air defense capability. We are also programming a new F/A-18 multi-purpose fighter/attack aircraft. To complement our TACAIR systems, we are also continuing to buy one more example of U.S. state-of-the-art military technology, the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, which provides early detection, warning, and command and control for our TACAIR forces.

2. XM-1 - The XM-1 main battle tank will provide a significant improvement in our ability to counter the Warsaw Pact armored threat. The XM-1 now carries a 105mm gun which can be fired accurately, day or night, even while the tank is moving at speeds up to 40 mph. In 1984, we will arm the MX-1 with a new, German-designed 120mm gun, which will insure its ability to counter the enemy threat into the 1990s.

3. Naval Forces - We are modernizing our naval forces both by building new ships and by updating existing ones. Our current plans call for expanding our fleet to a full 550 ships. We will maintain our force of 12 operating aircraft carriers through the year 2000 by continuing the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). We are maintaining the best anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability in the world by procuring new attack submarines and frigates, and improving surveillance, detection and other ASW related equipment. We are continuing to build the AEGIS air defense ships which allow our naval forces to operate in "high-threat" areas. With its phased-array radar and automated control systems, AEGIS will substantially increase our capability to protect carrier battle groups against heavy air-to-surface missile attacks. Our ability to conduct amphibious operations will be enhanced by our program to buy new LSD-41 amphibious ships and TAKX maritime prepositioning ships. Our FY 1981 program calls for procurement of a total of 97 new ships, including guided missile frigates, oilers, mine countermeasure ships and cargo ships. These programs fully exploit the technological lead the U.S. holds in naval force development. The vast capabilities of U.S. naval power cannot be measured in terms of numbers alone. Our technological superiority has kept our Navy "second to none."

E. People Programs

Ensuring that we have capable and motivated people for our military forces is one of our top priority defense objectives. While we have placed greater emphasis on improving our recruiting programs, we have found that increased retention of senior enlisted men and women as well as officers in certain critical skills is essential.

To help meet the needs of our servicemen and women, President Carter has supported an 11.7 percent pay increase and proposed a comprehensive Fair Benefits Package, which includes:

- increased flight pay and sea pay;
- expanded reenlistment bonuses;

- a variable housing allowance for high-cost areas within the U.S.;
- higher reimbursement rates for travel required to assume a new assignment;
- family separation allowances for lower enlisted ranks;
- continuation bonus for pilots;
- a dental plan for dependents; and
- baby care for dependents under two years of age.

We are confident that enactment of this proposal will greatly reduce the exodus of many of our most experienced and valuable military men and women and help provide the quality of life our people in uniform deserve.

USE OF FORCE/U.S. RESOLVE

Reagan

Reagan's record is replete with examples of suggestions that force be used to temper international disturbances. While he was governor, Reagan called upon President Johnson to escalate the Vietnam war, using nuclear threats.

"...no one would cheerfully want to use atomic weapons...But...the last person in the world who should know we wouldn't use them is the enemy. He should go to bed every night being afraid that we might."

Los Angeles Times
July 3, 1967

Over the last 12 years, Reagan has suggested or implied that American military forces be sent to Angola, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Lebanon, the Middle East, North Korea, Pakistan, Portugal, Rhodesia, Vietnam (after our troops had been sent home) and has hinted at retaking the Panama Canal.

When questioned on his frequently used pledge -- "no more Taiwans, no more Vietnams" -- Reagan elaborated, describing the circumstances in which he would use combat troops, naval forces or air strikes to defend an ally:

"Well, it's a little bit like a Governor with the National Guard...You use whatever force is necessary to achieve the purpose..."

New York Times
June 2, 1980

Bush

We live in a nuclear age when no rational world leader can fail to recognize that a war between major powers risks the future existence of man on this planet.

Yet that risk hasn't deterred the leaders of the Soviet Union from aggression against its neighbor, Afghanistan -- or the reckless use of troops from its satellite, Cuba, in military ventures in the Middle East and Africa -- or from boldly placing a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba itself.

Certainly, the leaders of the Soviet Union don't seek a military confrontation with the United States. Throughout Soviet history, their penchant for aggression has always been for the easy, helpless mark -- from Poland in 1939, to Afghanistan in 1980.

But like Hitler at Danzig forty-one years ago, the Soviets' perception of the leading nation in the west as vacillating and militarily weak could one day result in a major power confrontation with unthinkable consequences.

The seizure of Danzig proved to be unacceptable to Britain and France. But Hitler miscalculated -- a miscalculation that led to war -- because the national leadership of Britain and France had already accepted the "unacceptable" in the seizure of the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Forty-one years later, America's leadership has accepted what was once described as "unacceptable" -- the stationing of a Russian combat brigade in Cuba.

In and of itself, that brigade doesn't pose a critical threat to American security. But President Carter's erratic response to the Soviets' action in this instance -- a policy of bluff-and-backdown--could well lead the men in the Kremlin to some future miscalculation -- an act of aggression that would force an American president to take measures leading to the confrontation no one wants.

This is what Ronald Reagan means when he says "We must make unmistakably plain to all the world that we have no intention of compromising our principles, our beliefs or our freedom. Our reward will be world peace; there is no other way to have it."

World Affairs Council
September 5, 1980

Carter

The maintenance of national security is my first concern, as it has been for every President before me.

As I stated one year ago in Atlanta: "This is still a world of danger, a world in which democracy and freedom are still challenged, a world in which peace must be re-won every day."

We must have both the military power and the political will to deter our adversaries and to support our friends and allies.

We must pay whatever price is required to remain the strongest nation in the world. That price has increased as the military power of our major adversary has grown and its readiness to use that power been made all too evident in Afghanistan.

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I see five basic goals for America in the world over the 1980's:

-- First, we will continue, as we have over the past three years, to build America's military strength and that of our allies and friends. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other nation will have reason to question our will to sustain the strongest and most flexible defense forces.

-- Second, we will pursue an active diplomacy in the world, working -- together with our friends and allies -- to resolve disputes through peaceful means and to make any aggressor pay a heavy price.

State of the Union Address
January, 1980

Carter

As I said in my State of the Union Address -- an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

The purpose of my statement was to eliminate the possibility of any gross miscalculations by the Soviets about where our vital interests lie, or about our willingness to defend them. I am sure this is well understood.

Over the past year, we have made major strides in improving our capabilities to resist successfully further Soviet aggression in the region. Our efforts are designed to show the Soviets that we are both willing and able to deny them control over this vital region.

Persian Gulf Commitment

Carter

"Our world is one of conflicting hopes, ideologies and powers. It is a revolutionary world which requires confident, stable and powerful American leadership -- and that's what it is getting and that's what it will continue to get -- to shift the trend of history away from the specter of fragmentation and toward the promise of genuinely global cooperation and peace.

"So we must strive in our foreign policy to blend commitment to high ideals with a sober calculation of our own national interests.

"Unchanging American ideals are relevant to this troubling area of foreign policy and to this troubled era in which we live. Our society has always stood for political freedom. We have always fought for social justice and we have always recognized the necessity for pluralism. Those values of ours have a real meaning, not just in the past, 200 years ago or 20 years ago, but now, in a world that is no longer dominated by colonial empires and it demands a more equitable distribution of political and economic power.

"But in this age of revolutionary change, the opportunities for violence and for conflict have also grown. American power must be strong enough to deal with that danger and to promote our ideals and to defend our national interests.

"That's why the foreign policy which we've shaped over the last three years must be based simultaneously on the primacy of certain basic moral principles -- principles founded on the enhancement of human rights -- and on the preservation of an American military strength that is second to none. This fusion of principle and power is the only way to ensure global stability and peace while we accommodate to the inevitable and necessary reality of global change and progress."

World Affairs Council of Philadelphia
May 9, 1980

STEALTH

Reagan

Ronald Reagan charged yesterday that President Carter's administration compromised national security for "purely political purposes" and "a two-day headline" by leaking secret plans to build a new bomber that could evade radar.

Speaking to a businessmen's luncheon at an outdoor rally in Jacksonville, Florida on his first Southern trip of the fall campaign, the Republican presidential nominee accused the Pentagon of giving the editor of the Armed Forces Journal details of the top-secret "stealth" program, then calling a news conference to announce it "because of 'leaks' to the press."

The "leak" involved, he said, "some of the most tightly classified, most highly secret weapon information since the Manhattan Project" -- the development of the atomic bomb during World War II.

September 4, 1980

Statement at Jacksonville Rally

Bush

"Suddenly we hear of plans for a new weapon in our strategic arsenal -- the highly-classified "Stealth" bomber -- which we're told gives us an edge over the Soviets. And while the Defense Secretary professes outrage that information regarding this new weapon has been leaked, we can only wonder at the coincidence that the leak occurred at the very time that President Carter's re-election campaign was stressing his new-found interest in our national defense posture.

"All of this may sound and look reassuring in terms of our country's ability to conduct a foreign policy based on strength -- but to those who remember history, the desperation of these administration efforts is ominous."

World Affairs Council Speech
September 5, 1980

Carter

I had one question inside that I thought I'd better repeat to you all because you're going to get it in the transcript. I was asked about the Republican allegations concerning whether we have revealed the information about the Stealth airplane improperly. This is an absolutely irresponsible and false charge by Governor Reagan and by a carefully orchestrated group of Republicans.

As a matter of fact, no impropriety has been committed. The only thing that has been revealed about the Stealth development which is a major technological evolutionary development for our country, is the existence of the program itself. When I became President in 1977 the existence of the Stealth program then was not even classified. It was unclassified. Public testimony had been given on it and a contract to develop a Stealth device was done with an open and published contract. We classified the Stealth program in the springtime of 1977.

Since that time it has grown because of its importance and the major nature of it more than a hundredfold. Lately large numbers of people were involved in the knowledge of Stealth and also the development of it. Literally thousands of workers have been involved in this project and we have had to brief several dozen Members of the House and Senate and the crucial members of their staffs in preparation for large expenditures of funds for this major technological improvement in our nation's defense.

It's obvious that the Republicans have taken what is a major benefit to our country and tried to play cheap politics with it by alleging that we have violated our nation's security. The fact is that we have enhanced our nation's security and we took an unclassified program under the previous Republican administration, classified it, and have been successful for three years in keeping the entire system secret.

Statement to Newspapers
September 9, 1980

STEALTH

1. This is a major technological advantage to us. It is an important achievement that will affect the military balance in the coming years. It is one of a number of major technological advantages that the U.S. possesses. These technological advantages weigh heavily in the military balance and keep us second to none. In addition to stealth, these include anti-submarine warfare, precision guided munitions (smart bombs) and the cruise missile. We have publicly discussed our advantages in these other technologies in the past and will continue to do so in the future, because it is important that our potential enemies, our allies and the American people understand our military strengths. This is an essential factor in deterring war.

2. As with the other programs, we have kept secret the technical and operational details of stealth that give us an advantage.

3. Secrecy on the details of stealth combined with our technological achievements will enable us to keep ahead of the Soviets in this program for decades to come.

4. Programs to make aircraft less visible to radar have existed for 20 years. When this Administration came into office, stealth was a low-level technology program and its existence was not classified as secret. The program had been dealt with in open testimony and in open contracts. In the spring of 1977, stealth was turned into a major development and production program [do not say what vehicles we will produce] and the existence of the new program was classified at the highest level. The funding level is now more than 100 times larger than it was in early 1977 and there have been major achievements in the program.

5. Hundreds of contractor personnel are now working on stealth and over 40 members of Congress and Congressional staff members were briefed on the existence of the program and provided varying details about it before the August 11-14 leaks. The increasing size of the program and the increasing numbers of persons aware of it made certain that its existence would have come out in the near future.

[H.A.S.C. No. 94-8]

HEARINGS
ON
MILITARY POSTURE

AND

H.R. 3689

[H.R. 6674]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION
FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL
YEAR 1976 AND 1977

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

Part 4 of 4 Parts

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUB-
COMMITTEE TITLE II, H.R. 6674

HEARINGS HELD MARCH 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20,
21, 24, 25; AND APRIL 9, 11, AND 14, 1975



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1975

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March 24, 197

4929

Written Statement of Dr. George H. Heilmeyer, Director,
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

INTRODUCTION

This is my first appearance before this Committee, having assumed my present position of Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency in late-January. I would like to describe my background and what I bring to ARPA. I would also like to explain the role of ARPA, and my own view of the unique approach and contribution of ARPA to the solution of Defense problems. Finally, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will leave for the record a description and explanation of the ARPA programs that are included in the President's budget and respond to any questions the Committee may have concerning the program, my background and views.

I bring to this job a sense of commitment, a low tolerance for bureaucratic shuffling, a record as a market-oriented technologist and a determination to give the country a fair return on its R&D investment. I also bring a unique perspective to the job in that, in addition to my industrial R&D experience, I have also viewed ARPA from the vantage point of a position in the Office of the Director of

navigation systems. That is, am which we call HOWLS,

to ARPA by the Director. Hostile weapons location has any or armies, I should say, apt to take a fresh look at

and identification area is the work on what we call "sanc-

ed optics, as well as some ing systems.

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a, Dr. Heilmeyer, in your

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at promise for eliminating

certain degradations, they cannot in principle compensate for film or sensor errors since they act on the light before it reaches these elements. Thus, ARPA is also investigating postdetection compensation techniques which enhance an image after it has been formed and recorded. While these techniques are generally less efficient at correcting atmospherically induced errors, they are effective in removing blur due to instrument errors and in enhancing contrast in particular areas of the image. Here, ARPA's main thrust has been the development of computerized methods of blur removal when the precise mathematical representation of the cause of the blur is initially unknown.

The effectiveness and ability of offensive weapons systems to reach their targets are directly related to the susceptibility of the systems to early warning detection and track. The ability to control the radar cross section(RCS) of air vehicles can decrease their detectability and thus improve the overall effectiveness of offensive systems. Both passive and active techniques as well as vehicle design parameters are being employed to control RCS. Vehicle design practices have been established but are generally compromised by mission constraints in an actual design. Passive technology is fairly well established. The active techniques under

investigation, while as yet unproven, do offer the potential for high RCS reduction and minimum air vehicle redesign. To be effective the active RCS control technology must demonstrate adaptive wide band control through large variations in target aspect angles for targets which are roughly the same size as the incident energy wavelength. Several new techniques as well as new design practices are being evaluated to determine their capability to control RCS.

ARPA is currently developing advanced imaging radars operating at both microwave and laser frequencies. There are, however, limitations in resolution, image detail, and range. The first approach to overcome these limitations is ARPA's modification of the one hundred twenty foot diameter Haystack radar in Massachusetts by the addition of a new RF box and signal processing system. This system uses a more advanced form of the data processing technique previously developed. Operational testing at the system level is scheduled to begin in FY77. The second approach is the development of a wideband laser radar operating at 10.6 μm wavelength. Operational testing of the laser radar is scheduled to occur in FY78. Compared to the costs of the various concepts of the past decade, the ARPA investment in imaging radars has been extremely modest (\$28.4M FY72-75), while the information that has and will be provided is significant.

An RPV radar demonstration is being started to provide destroyer escort and smaller ships with ocean surveillance. This RPV radar could

August 9, 1976, Aerospace Daily

XST: Name being heard for the new stealth aircraft being built at Lockheed under sponsorship of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DAILY, July 23) is the XST, which may stand for "experimental, stealth (or silent), tactical." Aircraft also may have a new missile. Ben Rich, Kelly Johnson's successor as head of Lockheed's "Skunk Works," is playing the key role in the program. Johnson, although formally retired, has continued working two or three days a week at Lockheed and is given major credit for convincing the military that the plan can be built.

August 2, 1976, Aviation Week

Development of a small fighter intended to demonstrate 'stealth, or low signature, technologies under contract from Air Force Flight Dynamics Laboratory, funded by Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

May 5, 1975, Commerce Business Daily: Air Force gives
them copies of all contract summaries (p. 21 col 2)

A--HIGH STEALTH AIRCRAFT DESIGN STUDY.

Contr F-33615-75-C-2056 (F-33615-75-R2056)

funded by ASD/YRPHM, 513/255-4036 (A119),

Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433

July 28, 1976, Aerospace Daily from an Air Force contract
(p. 19 col 3)

A--LOW RCS VEHICLE DESIGN HANDBOOK (Additional Work,
Time, and Money) Contr F-3361S-75C-3094 (F-3361S-75R3094)
funded by AFFDL/FES, 513 255-5066, Wright-Patterson AFB,
Oh 45433.

[H.A.S.C. No. 95-4]

HEARINGS
ON
MILITARY POSTURE

AND
H.R. 5068
[H.R. 5970]

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS
FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978

BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

Part 3 of 6 Parts
Book 2 of 2 Books

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
TITLE II

HEARINGS HELD FEBRUARY 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 22, 23, 24, 25,
MARCH 7, 16, AND 28, 1977



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WRITTEN STATEMENT OF DR. GEORGE H. HEILMEIER

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

TECHNOLOGICAL INITIATIVE AND
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES OF THE 1980'S

I. INTRODUCTION

When I appeared before this committee last year, I outlined
an investment strategy which focused on some key questions whose
answers are deeply rooted in advanced technology. There is
little doubt in my mind that these questions could become the
national security issues of the 1980's. Let me review them
briefly:

- Are there technologies on the horizon that could make possible a space-related use of high energy lasers and could such a laser system in the hands of the Soviets threaten our vital satellite network and strategic deterrent capability? Conversely, could such a laser serve the United States in some defensive way?
- Are there technologies on the horizon that can provide surveillance capable of detecting aircraft and warning us of missile launches?
- Is a new class of undersea surveillance systems possible that could detect and localize submerged submarines at great range with sufficient accuracy to target them? What are the limits of ocean hearing? Can the oceans really be made "transparent?"
- What is the nature of armor on the battlefield of the future? Are there technologies that could permit unique tradeoffs to the age-old parameters of mobility, agility, armor, and firepower? Could such technologies result in a new and better class of lower-cost armored vehicles?

- What can technology do about the seemingly endless spiral of increasing costs? For example, can we dramatically reduce the cost of jet engines by making them out of new types of ceramics instead of costly and strategically critical metallic superalloys? Can the sophistication and low cost represented by the pocket calculator and digital watch be used to simplify the maintenance problems of our equipment and make it more reliable?
- What are the technological initiatives in the command and control area that could enable us to use our current forces more effectively? For example, can packet switching, intelligent terminals, or computer-based decision aids significantly improve command and control?
- Can we develop a new class of airborne systems with the capability of "assured penetration" of enemy air defense systems?
- Are there technological breakthroughs possible which could lower the cost or greatly increase the speed, range, and endurance of small undersea vehicles?

Even two years ago some of these questions would have seemed like something out of a modern day Jules Verne novel. However, as a result of DARPA initiatives, while difficult technical problems remain, the technologies to answer each of these questions in the affirmative are on the horizon today and require little in the way of major, unknown, conceptual breakthroughs to make visionary answers to these questions a reality. But what are the implications to our security assuming that we or the

• Soviets are successful?

For a moment, I'd like you to consider:

- Space Defense - Both the United States and Russia depend heavily on space assets. Ponder the consequences of a space associated system that could protect our own satellite resources while possessing the capability to destroy enemy satellites in a surgical and timely manner.



THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

**PROGRAM OF
RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT
TEST AND
EVALUATION
FY 1978**

**STATEMENT
BY
THE HONORABLE
MALCOLM R. CURRIE
DIRECTOR OF
DEFENSE RESEARCH
AND ENGINEERING**

**TO THE 95th CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION 1977**

o Cruise missiles -- already changing military thinking -- are in their infancy and offer revolutionary potential. Future characteristics such as "zero CEP" accuracy at large stand-off ranges and supersonic dash, at relatively low cost, will fundamentally change land, sea, and air warfare.

o High energy lasers.

o New forms of undersea submarine detection.

o New capabilities in space, including satellites used for targeting, missile guidance and surveillance.

o Applications of the Space Shuttle.

~~o Aircraft with low observables to make them virtually undetectable and with V/STOL capabilities.~~

o New forms of defense against ballistic missiles.

All of these and others will dominate future thinking and our future programs. A vigorous technology base must be created now.

NATO STANDARDIZATION

There is increasing recognition of the importance of achieving efficiencies and improved effectiveness through standard and interoperable systems in NATO.

I feel the US should take the lead in bringing this about through a policy of international cooperation with our Allies which will encompass joint industrial programs, licensing both ways, and co-production.

We have been pursuing this goal vigorously. We have made a great deal of progress despite the complexities of national interests, international economic factors, and industrial pressure groups here and abroad. But we still have a long way to go. The Culver-Nunn legislation has been very supportive of this effort.

Mr. President, as the controversy over the stealth program continues, let me address a few of what I consider to be the essential points.

First, despite the recent flurry of charges from past, current, and would-be public officials, there is simply no evidence of planned, high-level Administration leaks about stealth. In fact, not only has the current Administration increased spending on stealth one-hundred fold, but three years ago it, for the first time ever, classified the very existence of the program, and since has kept knowledge of it restricted to a named list of individuals.

Second, going back at least as far as 1976, there have been published reports of attempts to reduce radar detectability, to make aircraft "invisible," as it were. It is inconceivable to me that Soviet analysts missed these various references, so we can assume they have been aware for some time that the U.S. was engaged in such efforts.

Third, as the stealth program continued to become larger and more expensive, its existence would have had to be made public in the near future anyway. The existence of a program of this size, with hundreds of contractor personnel and government officials

involved, could not be kept secret much longer--under any circumstances.

Fourth, a rash of press reports of stealth occurred last month leaving the Pentagon no practical recourse but to acknowledge the existence of the program--admittedly slightly earlier than they wanted to or would have had to, in the absence of such press reports I do not see how, in August 1980, the Soviets, who already knew from open literature about such work, could have been tricked into believing that there really was no such program. They are not naive men in the Kremlin, although some in this country apparently would have us believe they are.

Lastly, the Pentagon has now drawn a clear line between what little has been declassified regarding stealth and everything else about the program. It behooves all of us to honor that line and to do all we can to see that others do as well.

Let me also make two observations in passing. One is that I cannot help but be struck by what one distinguished journalist has called the "selective indignation" on the part of some of those who are most loudly and fervently decrying alleged leaks about stealth. One wonders why all of these same voices were not raised in indignation when earlier leaks occurred about U.S. negotiating positions during SALT or about various Soviet strategic programs. One merely wonders; one doesn't know why.

The second observation involves current allegations that the incumbent Secretary of Defense has broken tradition and engaged in what are described as unusual, if not unprecedented activities, such as replying to charges made by political candidates about defense policy. I have not researched this matter closely and my memory is far from perfect, but I do seem to recall other Secretaries of Defense--in both Republican and Democratic Administrations--addressing party platform committees, correcting inaccurate allegations about defense matters, at times even using very strong language while replying.

It is not unusual for national security matters to become issues in a campaign. It is not unusual for challengers to make criticisms, and it is not unusual for incumbents to make replies.

Best we get diverted into partisan exchanges that obscure the real issues, let me offer my opinion that the most important question to be answered after the stealth dust settles is: in a democratic society, yet one which has real adversaries around the world, how do we protect our most vital secrets while not losing the freedoms which define our system and our way of life? The answers are not obvious or easy. They involve questions of policy, of law, of ethics, of freedom of the press, of justice. These are the matters to which this body must return.

Mr. Speaker, the overriding concern in the matter of the stealth program is whether the Soviets have benefitted from recent publicity of the program. A secondary, but nonetheless very important concern is whether the Carter Administration orchestrated leaks of classified information about the program for political gain--and thereby giving the Soviets a head start in countering stealth technology.

I don't know about the infrared signature of stealth aircraft, but I do know that, so far, this controversy has generated far more heat than light.

Let me try to shed some light on this matter, in part by putting it in a broader context and by laying out a fuller chronology of events. From much of the current controversy, even the moderately attentive observer would get the impression that the whole affair began with a meeting on August 18, 1980, between Dr. William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Benjamin Schemmer of the Armed Forces Journal. In fact, there is much more history to be reckoned with.

Virtually since the invention of radar, scientists have been working to develop ways to offset it--to blind radars, to fool radars, to make objects less detectable by radar. As in many areas of high technology, the United States has been in the vanguard of this work. The professional journals and the trade press have published articles about such research over the years.

Contrary to the impression recently left by former President Ford and Dr. Kissinger, the U.S. effort in this area was not highly classified until 1977. In the ~~spring~~^{fall} of that year, after recognizing the true potential of stealth, the Carter Administration turned it into a major development and production program; compartmentalized it, and classified even the existence of this new, intensified program. This is the first important landmark in the chronology of stealth.

The second is in June 1978, when Ben Schemmer of the Armed Forces Journal came to Dr. Perry with an article about stealth--an article 98 percent of which, Mr. Schemmer testified, came from unclassified sources, yet which contained so much sensitive information that Dr. Perry, invoking our national security interest, asked Mr. Schemmer not to print it. To his credit, Mr. Schemmer agreed--but let me emphasize that Mr. Schemmer did not initiate the notion of restraint; Dr. Perry did.

And the secret held for over two years, despite a dramatic expansion of the scope and size of the program, and therefore the number of people who had to--and did--know about it.

The third landmark is a series of stories this summer, beginning with a June 28 Washington Post article describing a new bomber that "could be made invisible to enemy radar through highly secret gadgetry."

Then in the second week of August, three stories in rapid succession:

-- August 11 -- Aviation Week and Space Technology refers to "the advanced technology 'stealth' bomber." Two sentences in the article are worth highlighting in our search for who leaked what to whom and when:

"Several in the Senate contend Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering William J. Perry oversold the 'stealth' aircraft in order to stop a Senate amendment for a new but more conventional bomber. Perry's stealth bomber, one senator complained, is too small, will cost \$14-15 billion for 50 aircraft and cannot be ready by 1987, the date requested by Congress."

-- August 14 -- the Washington Post publishes the article that Gen Ellis of SAC has said "brought the

The key point is that, while there had been occasional public references to such work over the years, the summer of 1980 brought a rapid-fire series of such stories--this at a time when more and more people--members of the House and Senate, their staffs, Defense Department and other executive branch officials, and contractors--were being brought in on the Stealth program as it continued to grow in size and intensity and cost.

As members of this House know well, there is a world of difference between rare and scattered references to an issue and a flurry of stories about one.

After this flurry of articles, a period of intense activity began at the Pentagon--and, again, the chronology is important.

-- August 14 -- the date of the last two stories - Dr. Perry sends Secretary Brown new security guidelines for stealth, declassifying the existence of the program, but drawing a tight circle around sensitive technical and operational details.

-- August 16 -- Secretary Brown, Dr. Perry, and Air Force Secretary Mark meet and give final approval to the new guidelines,

order additional Congressional briefings, and decide on an August 22 press conference to announce the existence of the stealth program.

-- August 18 -- With Brown's approval, Perry meets with Schemmer, tells him of the August 22 press conference and indicates what has been declassified. Perry offers to let Schemmer print the story of what has been declassified, one day in advance of the press conference--because Schemmer has honored Perry's 1978 request to hold AFJ's earlier stealth story.

-- August 19 -- Schemmer shows Perry his new article, and--at Perry's request--agrees to delete about a dozen items, several of which Perry felt were particularly important from a security point of view.

-- August 20 -- Perry gives SECRET stealth briefings to four Congressional committees, specifying what has been declassified and what remains classified at SECRET level, and

states that all other stealth information remains compartmented at the highest security level.

-- August 21 -- Schemmer article appears.

-- August 22 -- Secretary Brown, Dr. Perry, and Gen Kelly Burke hold a press conference. They confirm: 1.) that a stealth program exists, 2.) that tests have been conducted, 3.) that stealth does not involve a single technical approach, and 4.) that stealth technology could be applied to many military vehicles. Following the new guidelines, they emphasize that operational and technical details will be protected at the highest security level.

Now, Mr. Speaker, we come back to the key question--did the Soviets benefit from DoD's public acknowledgement of stealth's existence?

The answer, I believe, clearly is no. You don't have to be a Washington veteran or an intelligence expert to know that the Soviets read Aviation Week, Aerospace Daily, the Washington Post, and other important journals and newspapers. They watch American

television news as well. So, they had seen, over the years, a number of reports in respected and authoritative publications about a U.S. program that had real consequences for Soviet defense. Well before Brown's August 22 press conference, Soviet scientists and engineers--and, no doubt, Soviet intelligence agents--were hard at work on stealth and possible countermeasures.

They weren't tipped off by Harold Brown on August 22, or by the Schemmer article on August 21. And nothing Harold Brown could have said on August 22 could have turned them off. Given the public reports over the years, and given the importance of U.S. stealth capabilities to the Soviets, does anyone seriously believe that, had Harold Brown said "no comment," "neither confirm nor deny," or "stories about Stealth are a bunch of baloney," the Kremlin would have breathed a sigh of relief and told the scientists, engineers, and KGB agents working on stealth to go back to other projects?

The second question, Mr. Speaker, is whether the Carter Administration orchestrated stealth leaks for political gain? Unlike Mr. Schemmer in his sworn testimony before a Committee of this House, I will not engage in speculation about other people's motives.

As to leaks this summer, Aviation Week cites "several in the Senate," not administration sources. The Washington Post says its June 28 article was based on interviews "with defense specialists

in Congress and the Carter Administration." It does not say only with DoD officials.

As for the Armed Forces Journal, in 1978 it was Schemmer who came to Perry with the story--not the other way around. It was Perry who asked Schemmer not to go public--not the other way around. In August of this year, Perry--who as a contractor and as a defense official has been working with classified material for years--says he gave Schemmer no classified information in 1978 or in 1980. Schemmer, whose publication regularly--one is tempted to say routinely--prints classified information, says his sources for the 1978 article included people in Congress, in the White House, and at the Pentagon. Contrary to what some may believe, the Armed Forces Journal was not a virgin as far as classified information is concerned.

In conclusion, let me summarize: Secretary Brown's August 22 press conference did not tip off the Soviets. Earlier press accounts had. In August 1980, no other response could have turned the Soviets off.

Until three years ago, the existence of Stealth was not classified. For the past three years it has been, even to the point that you yourself, Mr. Speaker, have indicated you were not aware of it.

An investigation is underway to find the source of the earlier leaks. A tight security circle has been drawn around operational and technical details of the program.

The August 21 Schemmer article was not the excuse or the occasion or the trigger for the August 22 press conference. Earlier press reports led to that course.

Who leaked what to whom, when, how, and why is a matter for the investigators. As testimony before a Committee of this House has revealed, there are real and serious problems in maintaining security and investigating breaches of it. By and large, these problems are not a function of executive policy, but rather a function of the law. Legislation is written in this building, not in the Pentagon. And it is to legislation regarding secrecy and security that those of us in this building should turn our attention. There is much important and difficult work to be done, and I say full speed ahead.

MILITARY MANPOWER/REGISTRATION/DRAFT

Reagan

Reagan opposes both the President's move to reinstate draft registration and any peacetime draft.

"I do not favor a peacetime draft or registration."

Acceptance Speech
July 17, 1980

He also challenges the underlying premise for registration.

"Indeed, draft registration may actually decrease our military preparedness, by making people think we have solved our defense problem..."

Quoted by Senator Hatfield
Congressional Record
June 4, 1980

Asked for an alternative to the peacetime draft, Reagan calls for a buildup of reserves. (It is not clear if he favors the same buildup as an alternative to registration.)

"There is a need for a million-man active reserve, a reserve that is equipped with the latest weapons, trained in them and combat ready. We've allowed (our reserve force) to deteriorate very badly. It is must too small, it is not equipped with the latest weapons and it doesn't have the training."

National Journal
March 8, 1980

To finance this force, Reagan would rely on pay incentives.

Q: So you believe we can have a million-man reserve strictly on a volunteer basis?

Reagan: yes.

Q: How, with pay incentives?

Reagan: Yes, it could be pay incentives.

National Journal
March 8, 1980

Bush

"I also support draft registration for both men and women, and I would like to see an immediate investigation of the readiness of our military troops. If the facts demand it, we should not hesitate to increase financial incentives for those in uniform or even to return to the draft. I am confident that our young people will rally to the flag as the need is there."

Bush

"I think that we have to have draft registration....I don't know whether we need a draft now. But when we do need it, I'm going to say so. A fair draft with not a lot of exemptions that would prevent people from serving, letting rich kids to ahead and get a PhD, while some poor ghetto kid gives his life in the service of his country....It'll be men and women. That doesn't mean that women will fight, go on the line or in the trenches. But I believe in women's rights and opportunities and I believe that women should have to serve their country."

Birmingham, Al, Post-Herald
October 5, 1979

Bush

"It would be an equitable draft if we need it. It would be a non-sexist draft if we need it....But that main thing is that it would be a fair draft."

Champaign, IL, Daily Illini
January 31, 1980

Bush

"I favor registration....I'm not convinced we need the draft, but if we ever should, it ought to be men and women, exemption proof and with a limited period of exposure."

Political Profiles
page 6
1979

Bush

"I voted for the volunteer Army. (But) we might have to go to a draft, and if we do it's going to be a fair-play draft. Not any exemption for a rich kid to get his PhD, and the poor kid gets the rifle."

Christian Science Monitor
January 24, 1980

Carter

"At home, over intense opposition, as you know, but with great help from the American Legion, we have won the fight for peacetime draft registration. We need the ability to mobilize quickly and effectively, and we have shown our resolve to both friend and foe alike.

It should be clear to everyone who studies national security or defense that our work to keep American the strongest nation in the world is not finished. There are no laurels on which to rest. There are no victories which are final. There are no challenges which have disappeared magically. But we've resumed a firm and steady course of diplomacy and defense preparedness to lead our allies and our friends and ourselves with confidence toward the challenges facing the world of today and the world of tomorrow. "

Address to American Legion
Convention
August, 1980

Defense Manpower--Overview

President Carter has been explicit in his opposition to a peacetime draft; he has submitted legislation for a fair benefits package to improve military pay and benefits; he has cut military attrition, and (measured against the years of the prior administration) improved military reenlistment rates. In addition he has corrected major weaknesses that arose during the prior administration with respect to our pool of mobilization manpower.

Specifically:

- First term attrition (the drop-out rate of those who sign up for military service but do not complete their terms) has fallen from 37% in 1976 to 30% in 1978.

- Conversely, reenlistment rates for DoD as a whole are up from 50% in 1976 to 53% now. (The reenlistment rates of first termers are up, particularly in the Army. Career reenlistment rates are down. The net effect is a modest plus.)

- As a general matter DoD has been within 1.5% of its active force manpower pools in every Carter year--a better record than in the prior two administrations.

- Virtually all of the particular items recommended by critics of this Administration's military pay and benefits policy (right down to the nitty gritty item of increasing the allowance for mobile homes) were first publicly recommended by this Administration.

- Beyond that, the Administration has been vocal in support of many important benefits that go beyond those endorsed by its critics. Among these are improvements in the military medical insurance program (CHAMPUS) under which the President has proposed the creation of dental and other benefits. The Administration also supports a variable housing allowance. It introduced--and supports--legislation that would permit larger pay raises for the military than for civilian government employees.

This Administration has not proposed reducing any in-service benefits,* and, as noted, has proposed numerous additions. An Administration proposal with respect to

* Note, it may be argued that the President's paid parking operation is such a diminution, but it more or less incidentally affects only a small fraction of military personnel.

military retirement (first advanced by an independent commission on the subject: would add \$7 billion to military pay and benefits over the next 20 years, while saving tens of billions of dollars over the longer term.

• It should be noted that selected reserves (i.e., reserves in units) strength declined dramatically every year during the last administration, while it has increased during the last two Carter years; that individual reserve strength declined even more dramatically during the last administration, but has been reversed by Carter programs; and that in reinstituting peacetime registration this Administration has restored an important standby mobilization capacity that the previous administration had abandoned for budgetary reasons.

Defense Manpower Policies

The 1970's: Requirements

As the 1970's ended, the U.S. fielded its leanest active and reserve armed force since the 1950's: slightly over two million active duty members; a little over one million reservists (attached table 1). This leanness resulted from a number of things, but it was in no small measure the product of some important doctrinal changes concerning force structure that were made in the first half of the seventies. Four of these are noteworthy.

- Worldwide manpower requirements were adjusted downward by President Nixon, from a program objective to be prepared for 2 1/2 wars simultaneously to a less demanding scenario that envisaged a major European war and a smaller contingency elsewhere.

- At the same time, a concept of global "total force planning" was embraced, which placed greater reliance than in the past on the armed forces of allies and regional powers to supply initial forces and the first line of defense for many warfare possibilities.

- Within U.S. manpower assets, in 1973 a concept of "total force planning" was also adopted, one which placed less heavy reliance on the active forces and much more on the activation and emergency mobilization of reserves, and which worked some shifts of wartime functions and assets from the active to the reserve structure; and

- The all-volunteer (or "zero" draft) force replaced the partial conscript manning scheme that had existed from 1948 to 1972.

Two other factors were at work in the early seventies as well: the Vietnam conflict ended, and with it came a drawdown of the strength increases that had begun in 1964; and the increasing sophistication of modern weaponry, plus the need for forward deployments and rapid responses (made vivid in the 1973 Yom Kippur War) were inexorably forcing shifts to smaller but more experienced forces that had been the case in the first two post-war decades.

For the remainder of the decade, defense manpower strategy consisted of:

* In part for budgetary reasons, in part to reflect the changing role of China in U.S. strategic concerns about Asia and the Pacific.

-- To be augmented in the first instance in an emergency by a call-up of reserves;

-- To be augmented additionally by call-ups of pretrained individuals subject to call-up and by a resumption of conscription in the context of a mobilization.

The Administration refined, but did not make fundamental changes, in these manpower policies.

The 1970's: Resources

The Defense manning performance in the remainder of the decade was mixed. Despite some periodic shortfalls in enlistments, the active forces were generally successful in meeting recruiting goals (Table 2); and since 1974, had never been more than one-and-one-half percent below authorized strength (Table 3). First term reenlistments remained strong. At the same time, reserve strengths lagged notably behind the active forces (Table 2), and the Services experienced a significant--almost chronic--slippage in retention of more experienced enlisted members. (The problem is particularly serious in the Navy, where second term reenlistment rates have fallen 15 points over the last five years.)

This mixed yield took place in a context that circumstantially favored military manning needs in a couple of ways, but which otherwise was not very sustaining. The Services benefitted for most of the decade from two things in combination.

- The demographics--the baby boom legacy-- worked to our advantage. By the time it peaked in 1978, the prime recruiting pool (males, 17-21) topped ten million.

- We met a smaller manpower requirement in the post-Vietnam seventies than we had at any time since 1950.

But other factors were not favorable, and more than offset these cushions.

- The relative value of military compensation eroded notably beginning in 1973;

- There was a similar erosion in the uniqueness of the advantages that military service had long offered youth. No longer was the military the major source of initial jobs and training, nor the principal stepping stone to higher education. A bounty of federal programs in place by mid-decade (basic educational opportunity grants, CETA, the Job Corps, Young Adult Conservation Corps, Youth Opportunity Acts, and various counter-cyclical programs) now compete for young people.

- The G.I. Bill was replaced in 1977 by an educational package for service personnel that is seen by many young people as much less attractive (and, as a matter of benefits, is in fact less attractive);

- The U.S. embraced all-volunteer manning with a compensation and incentive structure that is long on tradition but short on flexibility. The military retirement system (which the Administration studied and has proposed sweeping changes in) is a notable example--a structure built on perverse incentives, such that a person has little inducement to stay after 20 years, and no incentives to say for less. We have no rewards to offer the youth who would give 10 or 15, but not 20, years of service to country.

In embracing the AVF in 1973, the nation's policy changed faster than its structures; its philosophy outpaced its budgets and programs in some key respects.

Administration Policy

There are two cornerstones:

- In the absence of an exigent international circumstance, the nation's military manpower requirements are best met on an all-volunteer basis. Current military manning problems seem most capable of solution in an AVF context. A return to a peacetime draft is neither necessary nor desirable at this time. So long as our recruiting needs continue to be met, and so long as the demands on the armed forces can be met with present force levels, a return to the draft is neither prudent nor required.

- The nation's ability to augment its forces in an emergency had eroded in mid-decade, however, and requires a reinvigoration. The reinstitution this summer of peacetime registration has been taken as a precautionary step to save crucial time in the event the nation had to mobilize in an emergency. (It was always intended that the AVF be augmented by conscription in such emergency circumstances.)

With the baby boom legacy receding (the prime recruiting pool in 1992 will be 20 percent smaller than its 1978 level) and with tougher competition for recruits, DoD has embraced two general strategies.

- First, we can reduce demand by managing the force in ways that permit us to need fewer recruits from the marketplace. DoD is already firmly embarked on such a course in three respects: reversing the trend of the 1970's toward high attrition (i.e., wash-outs) of first term personnel, pruning manpower requirements in weapons systems acquisition and design, and improving our long term retention of those who do join up.

• Second, we can expand supply, by embracing policies that would make more people eligible for military service, and would make service more attractive to those who are eligible. DoD is doing the first of these by increasing the enlistment of women for non-combat positions. It is also studying whether some of its physical entrance standards--many of these adopted in the draft era when supply was virtually unlimited--bear a sound relationship to required performance. The yield from this measure will be finite, however, to do the second--increase the attractiveness of service--will require some hard decisions. There has been a serious downward slide in the comparative value of military pay and benefits for junior personnel. Other federal programs that require no service obligations offer highly valued lures to youth. In educational assistance, we now have the G.I. Bill without the G.I.

We have made considerable headway, but certainly not enough, in both strategies since 1977. And there is nothing to suggest that the strategies themselves are not inherently appropriate.

Are the Services enlisting the "right kinds of people?" "The right quality?" The short answer is that there is no sure test to tell. True military readiness is difficult to measure and appraise; on-job performance can be graded, but its relationship to the testable characteristics of candidates for service remains a vague and imperfectly documented one.

Historically, the caliber of incoming recruits has been described using two surrogate measures: graduation from high school and entrance test scores.

By the first of these, high school graduation--a good predictor of a candidate's staying power and adaptability to discipline but not of his on-job performance--the Services have experienced a decline since mid-decade. At the same time, however, the staying power of both graduates and non-graduates (measured by attrition rates) has been improved in recent years, largely through better management of recruits after they join.

As for the second, we have recently found that in entrance tests--used to predict "trainability"--we have inadvertently inflated the scores of lower-scoring personnel in recent years, such that the Services have been mislabeling large numbers of recruits as having higher "aptitude" levels. The significance of these mischaracterizations may not, however, be very profound. DoD has now undertaken a special analysis of the relationship between these scores and the job performance of those whose scores were inflated. The first (but still tentative) findings suggest that most of the low scoring people have successfully completed training and are performing adequately.

The relationship of these predictors to "quality"--and the relationship of what a recruit brings to the military and what military service itself produces in the way of eventual "quality"--are imprecise, at best approximate, ultimate unsure. Neither the AVF's critics nor its supporters have an indisputable formula for measuring such things.

DEFENSE FORCE READINESSS

Bush

"I am clearly in favor and continue to be of a three-ocean Navy, and that means we should commence work on a nuclear carrier. The first year of this, a lot of this spending, this extra spending would be to catch up in conventional types of categories where we've gotten behind, and inventory. We've gotten behind in maintenance. We've gotten behind in a lot of just plain replacing of obsolete items."

Wall Street Journal
February 19, 1980

Mondale

"It is not wrong to ask whether we are strong enough to provide for this nation's defenses: that is how we keep the peace. But it is utterly wrong to assume we are behind. The truth is that today there is no American General or Admiral who would propose to trade our defense forces with those of any other nation--now, or in the foreseeable future."

Commonwealth Club
Address, September 5, 198

Carter

"Yes. The answer is yes. I don't want to go into detail now because the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of Defense today are answering an article that was published in the New York Times this morning on the front page saying that some of our Army divisions were not prepared for combat, did not enjoy combat readiness."

"We've added, including a bill I signed yesterday to increase the pay and benefits of military personnel, we've added about \$4 billion since I've been in office to improve the quality of military persons, to improve the retention rate among vital trained petty officers primarily and also to help with recruitment."

"We've had remarkable success that we did not anticipate really with the registration for the draft with about 93 percent of the young people who were eligible registering for the draft. About 15 percent of those who registered expressed a desire to know more about career opportunities in the military forces. There was a place on the form that they could check there, which I think will help us with recruitment in the future."

"The spirit within the military is very good. They've had some onerous assignments that I've given them, for instance, the longterm stationing of aircraft carriers and the support ships in the north Indian Ocean. They've performed superbly in that respect. I visited a lot of the military bases. I happen to be a professional military man by training and I've found them to be well trained. so I would guess that our military forces are in good condition."

New Jersey Editors Weekly
September 9, 1980

STATUS OF U.S. DIVISIONS

The New York Times article of September 9 on Army readiness was factual and accurate, but fell short of a reasonable explanation of the situation. Forward deployed divisions, the combat force of that 45% of the Army which is overseas, are maintained at highest status.

State-side divisions have the mission to deploy overseas where needed, to reinforce forward deployed units, or to go to areas where required. The status of state-side divisions is forecast to improve significantly over the next several months for several reasons:

- Recruiting for the past year has fully met objections and those soldiers are now beginning to arrive in units.
- NCO shortages will be improved, as the Chief of Staff of the Army announced the other day, as balancing of forces by reduction of overstrengths in forward deployed forces takes effect.

These actions take about six months to work, and we can expect to see reasonable improvements in the status of state-side units within the next six months.

The situation is not as dreary as it might appear on the surface.

The Army's Units Status Report classifies divisions as "fully ready" to "not ready" according to personnel, equipment, and training conditions. A division rated low is one of these resource areas is capable of operating with two of its three brigades if required to deploy immediately. In addition, assets could be quickly shifted from one division to improve the readiness of another division. Even though personnel challenges prevail, the Army could cross level resources in the United States to respond to a crisis. This would provide earlier deploying force full combat capability. In any event, the Unit Status Report is an indicator of a division's resource picture and the time required to bring it to full capability -- excellent for flagging divisions rather than a measure of combat readiness.

It is common practice among all armed forces to man units in peacetime at lower levels than would be required in wartime.

It is also important to recognize that the Soviets keep the majority of their divisions at less than full combat readiness.

Force Readiness

a. Aircraft Readiness (including spares parts)

- Over the past several years the Defense budget has generally provided enough spare parts to support the peacetime flying hour program fully. However, we are continuing to build war reserve inventories of spare parts and it will be several years before those inventories will be adequate to support all of our combat air forces at wartime sortie rates in a major conflict for the full combat durations for which we plan.

- The claim that our hardware and spares posture is such that "only half the planes can fly" is inaccurate. This assertion seems to be based on a misinterpretation of the so-called aircraft "mission-cable (MC)" rate. MC rates are not a measure of wartime readiness. They are an index of the peacetime performance of our logistics support system--not a measure of our ability to fly sorties in wartime.

- We should not expect MC rates to even approach 100%, for two reasons--first, even under the best of conditions, significant maintenance downtime (much of it scheduled preventative maintenance and inspections) must be expected as an unavoidable cost of doing business; second, we cannot predict with certainty which aircraft components will fail when, where, or how often. It is not practical or wise to buy enough spare components to protect completely against the uncertainty involved, and we typically stock to about 85% spares availability.

- If we were to make a transition to war from our normal day-to-day peacetime posture, we would selectively defer nonurgent periodic inspections and preventive maintenance; we would also, of course, have unlimited access to our war reserve spares and would, as necessary, cannibalize serviceable components from out-of-commission aircraft to maximize our wartime sortie capability.

b. Navy Ship Aviation/Readiness

- Today, the Navy's inventory of active deployable ships stands at 455. One hundred two of our ships are deployed. Two hundred eighty-nine (64%) are reporting combat ready. 85 ships are in programmed maintenance, a category which includes overhaul, selected restricted availability, and post shakedown availability. Seventeen ships are not combat ready* because of elective maintenance

* "Not Combat Ready" means that the unit has insufficient resources to meet warfighting demands in a projected combat environment. However, units being deployed in this category can execute planned operations in a peacetime environment.

(this is work that is done during scheduled upkeep periods), and fifteen others are in a corrective maintenance category, having sustained casualties to combat essential equipment. The remaining 49 are deficient principally in areas of personnel, training and supply.

- Of 157 deployable active Navy squadrons, 36 report their primary degraded area as personnel and 15 report not combat ready for the remaining resource areas.

- Recognizing the inevitability under existing requirements that units reporting not combat ready may be required to forward deploy, the Navy has recently initiated an assessment procedure which is required thirty days prior to deployment for all units reporting not combat ready in personnel. This assessment either offers a final opportunity for improvement measures or furnishes the basis for operational limitations in the interests of safety. In the past the Navy has augmented ships with personnel from other duty stations to meet critical skill shortages. The fleet commanders administer this level manning policy in order to spread manpower shortages throughout the fleet. Use of this practice has been infrequent. However, there will probably be some necessary increases in this practice for ships on station in the Indian Ocean.

c. Divisions

- Our forward deployed Army divisions are well-equipped, well-trained, and at a high state of readiness. Within the United States, the 82nd Airborne Division is maintained at a high state of readiness. Many of the remaining divisions in the United States have serious personnel problems, primarily due to shortages of combat arms NCOs.

- We are taking numerous steps to improve our division readiness by alleviating personnel shortages. In recruiting, we are expanding bonus programs that are keyed toward critical skills. We are also supporting legislation now in Congress to improve educational benefits, including provisions that would pass on unused educational benefits to dependents. To alleviate the shortage of middle-grade NCOs, we are working to expand bonus programs to include mid-range NCOs (6-10 years' service) in infantry, armor, field artillery, and other selected skills.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF LEADERSHIP

Bush

"The Carter Administration, despite its sudden recognition of the American people's concern over our nation's ability to defend itself, has shown no understanding of the lessons of modern history."

"Under a Reagan presidency, however, the reversal of those ominous trends will serve as a keystone of a foreign policy based on just such an understanding: a foreign policy that proceeds from strength--not simply military strength, but the strength of our alliances--and the reinforcement of those alliances by America's being true to its word in our dealings with other nations."

World Affairs Council
Pittsburgh, September 5,

Bush

"We don't have the luxury of dealing with one problem while the others languish...They are interrelated, and so must our handling of them be."

"The message will be loud and clear around the world: The United States means to maintain her security and to retain the ability to stand by her friends."

Boston Globe
September 8, 1979

Mondale

"We will also stake the contest on the paramount issue the Republicans tried to raise in Detroit--the question of national strength. We gladly accept that challenge."

"The President of the United States has an enormous job. He's charged with the most powerful responsibility to be found in the world--the burden of nuclear power. He is the leader of the civilized world. He must defend its freedom. He must grasp the complexities of our difficult world. He must protect our security by freeing our dependence on foreign oil."

"And to do all of that, we must have a strong President. Yet last month Ronald Reagan spent two days on national television drawing up a plan to divide the Presidency and weaken its powers. Anyone who seeks the Presidency--and in his first serious act convenes a Constitutional Convention in his hotel room to weaken the office he's seeking--does not understand the Constitution, the Presidency, or what national security is all about."

D.N.C. Acceptance Speech
August 1980

NAVAL BALANCE VIS-a-VIS USSR

Reagan

Reagan has criticized the Carter Administration for slashing Navy programs.

"In 1969, Admiral Thomas Moorer, then Chief of Naval Operations, told Congress that a Navy of 850 ships should be attained by 1980. By the end of this fiscal year only 5 or 6 weeks away, our conventional Navy will consist of only 415 active ships. Carter has slashed the Navy shipbuilding program in half, and has provided for -- at the very best -- a one-and-a-half ocean Navy for a three-ocean global requirement."

Reagan Speech to
American Legion
August 20, 1980

Reagan calls for a reversal in this trend.

"We must immediately reverse the deterioration of our naval strength, and provide all of the armed services with the equipment and spare parts they need."

Reagan Speech to
American Legion
August 20, 1980

The Republican Platform calls for building more aircraft carriers, submarines, and amphibious ships:

"Republicans pledge to reverse Mr. Carter's dismantling of U.S. naval and Marine forces. We will restore our fleet to 600 ships at a rate equal to or exceeding that planned by President Ford. We will build more aircraft carriers, submarines, and amphibious ships. We will restore naval and Marines aircraft procurement to economical rates enabling rapid modernization of the current forces, and expansion to meet the requirements of additional carriers.

1980 Republican Platform

Bush

"A stronger Navy for us, a three-ocean Navy, is essential."

Political Profiles
page 9
1979

Carter

Naval Forces

"Seapower is indispensable to our global position--in peace and also in war. OUR shipbuilding program will sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s and we will continue to build the most capable ships afloat.

"The program I have proposed will assure the ability of our Navy to operate in the high threat areas, to maintain control of the seas and protect vital lines of communication--both military and economic--and to provide the strong maritime component of our rapid deployment forces. This is essential for operations in remote areas of the world, where we can not predict far in advance the precise location of trouble, or preposition equipment on land."

State of the Union Address
January 1980

Mondale

"It has been said that our Navy is inferior to the Soviet Navy, because they have more ships. But the number of ships alone is a false measure. It assumes that one of their coastal patrol ships is the equal of one of our aircraft carriers, and that one of their diesels is as capable as one of our modern Trident nuclear submarines. The truth is that the technology of our carriers, of our submarines, and our new surface ships is far more advanced than theirs. Moreover, from frigates on up, we have a two-to-one advantage over the Soviets in Surface combat tonnage. All of these factors must be weighed for any serious and realistic assessment of the strength of our Navy -- a strength that is unsurpassed on the high seas.

Commonwealth Club
September 5, 1980

Naval Balance Vis-a-Vis Soviet Union

- The CNO stated earlier this year that the U.S. Navy is the best in the world and has improved in capability relative to a year ago. The Navy believes that, in conjunction with our allies, we currently possess a slim margin of superiority over the maritime forces of the Soviets.

- Current estimates indicate that the Soviets are continuing to emphasize qualitative improvements and that the trend toward construction of larger surface combatants and auxiliaries will result in a moderate decrease in overall Soviet Navy force levels over the next decade. For example, the total of Soviet principal surface combatants (carriers, cruisers, destroyers and frigates) and general purpose submarines is projected to decline by 5-10% over the next decade.

- Conversely, our naval forces are projected to grow from current levels (about 540 total ships) to about 590 ships by the mid-1980s and remain at this level through the late 1980s, based on Navy force projections that reflect a shipbuilding program generally consistent with the 5-year plan submitted to Congress last January (roughly 19-20 new construction ships per year). Projections beyond the late 1980s are more difficult to make due to the uncertainties associated with future shipbuilding plans, ship designs and costs, and the retirement schedules of existing ships. Furthermore, our threat projections become increasingly uncertain beyond the late 1980s thus making detailed capability assessments extremely speculative.

- In addition to the projected growth in the number of ships in our Navy -- in terms of both major combatants and support ships -- our naval force structure will undergo major qualitative improvements through the 1980s. Such qualitative improvements are not reflected in numbers comparisons but are taken into account in capability assessments. Some examples:

- Our 12 deployable carrier battle groups will be maintained and strengthened by the addition of two CVNs, AAW improvements with new CG-47 Aegis cruisers and upgrades to other guided missile ships, and ASW improvements such as towed tactical array sonars and new LAMPS MK III ASW helicopters. 12 deployable aircraft carrier battle groups represent the minimum offensive capability required to meet peacetime needs and wartime demands in the face of Soviet opposition.

- We will continue to modernize and increase the size of our nuclear attack submarine force with both continued SSN-688 procurement and introduction of a more affordable yet fully adequate follow-on submarine (FA-SSN).

- Our overall ASW capabilities will be further strengthened by continued modernization of our highly effective land-based P-3 maritime patrol aircraft forces. Substantial improvements will also be made in our undersea surveillance capabilities with improved SOSUS and introduction of at least 12 SURTASS mobile surveillance systems (TAGOS ships).

Five-Year Shipbuilding Plan

The current five-year shipbuilding plan proposes to build 97 new ships and modernize 5 older ships. This shipbuilding plan incorporates both a shift toward the high end of the mix of combatant ships, and the construction of new maritime prepositioning ships (MPS/TAKX) to support the rapid deployment force.

The five-year shipbuilding program was derived on the basis of the Navy being prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations at sea in support of our national interests. Using information from the Navy's study program, we have reviewed carefully over the past year the roles that can be played by the Navy in a NATO war, non-NATO contingencies, intervention and crisis control, and in promoting strategic deterrence and world wide stability.

The first priority of our naval forces in a NATO war is to ensure the timely delivery of military shipping to Europe with acceptably low losses. Intervention and crisis control, where the chance of direct U.S./USSR conflict is small, generate a need for offensive operations by our carrier and amphibious forces. We are continuing to explore the implications of basing naval forces program planning on forward deployments and intervention outside NATO, rather than exclusively planning scenarios that emphasize the Navy as primarily a sea control force designed to secure the North Atlantic sea lines of communication against Soviet submarines and long range bombers in a NATO war.

It has been estimated that to maintain the fleet at its present level of about 533 ships (active force, naval reserve force, and naval fleet auxiliary force) will require an average of about \$7B (FY 81 \$) in the shipbuilding account annually. The program that is proposed provides for an 11% average real growth over the five-year period. In a war with the Soviets and with the help of our allies, this force would be capable of performing sea control operations in the Atlantic; sea control and projection operations in the Mediterranean; and austere sea control operations in the Pacific.

We need not only realistic estimates of force levels and capability, but also stability in the shipbuilding program to provide a firm industrial base.

The shipbuilding plan supports the Navy's requirements for strategic deterrence and forces to fight a NATO war by:

- Enhancing the capability of our strategic forces by adding 6 Trident submarines.

September 4, 1980

NAVAL POSTURE IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOVIET CARRIER MINSK

Q: What is our naval posture in the Indian Ocean region?

A: We have maintained a strengthened presence in the Indian Ocean since late last year and we have made arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of Northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf.

— The size of our permanent presence in the region, the Middle East Force, was increased to five ships last fall. We currently have 36 ships in the Indian Ocean including two carrier task groups, headed by the carriers DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER and MIDWAY. The 36 ships include 21 combatants and 15 support ships (including the 7 maritime near term prepositioning ships).

--The Soviets currently have 27 ships in the Indian Ocean including 11 combatants and 16 support ships.

--The 40,000 ton Soviet carrier MINSK departed the Vladivostok area last week and is currently operating in the South China Sea (4 Sept). So far, its movements have not indicated a move toward the Indian Ocean.

FYI ONLY: MINSK arrived at Vladivostok on July 3, 1979, after earlier sailing from the Mediterranean, around Africa and across the Indian Ocean. Until MINSK's move last week, the ship had remained at or near Vladivostok.

Source: President's State of the Union address
DoD Press Guidance
CINCPAC

NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Bush

"Suddenly, after long years of administration silence on the subject, the White House, with the help of the defense secretary, is busy orchestrating a massive public relations program to bolster President Carter's image as a Commander-in-Chief who recognizes the Soviet military threat.

"Suddenly, we hear of a presidential directive--PD 59-- which we're told restructures American nuclear strategy in light of a fresh look at Soviet objectives."

World Affairs Council
Pittsburgh
September 5, 1980

Carter

"Recently, there's been a great deal of press and public attention paid to a Presidential directive that I have issued, known as PD-59. As a new President charged with great responsibilities for the defense of this Nation, I decided that our Nation must have flexibility in responding to a possible nuclear attack --in responding to a possible nuclear attack. Beginning very early in my term, working with the Secretaries of State and Defense and with my own national security advisers we have been evolving such an improved capability. It's been recently revealed to the public in outline form by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. It's a carefully considered, logical, and evolutionary improvement in our Nation's defense capability and will contribute to the prevention of a nuclear conflict.

"No potential enemy of the United States should anticipate for one moment a successful use of military power against our vital interest. This decision will make that prohibition and that cautionary message even more clear. In order to ensure that no adversary is even tempted, however, we must have a range of responses to potential threats or crises and an integrated plan for their use."

American Legion Address
August 21, 1980

NATO ALLIES

Reagan

Reagan's primary concern is that if the United States does not appear a strong and dependable ally, the nations of Europe will seek an accomodation with the USSR.

"I think there is every indication that some of our European friends are beginning to wonder if they shouldn't look more toward -- or have a rapprochement with-- the Soviet Union, because they are not sure whether we are dependable or not."

Time
June 30, 1980

To prevent such action, Reagan proposes to consult with the allies and reassure them of our interest in preserving the alliance.

"I think the Reagan Administration, first of all, would do it by action, by consulting with them, making it evident to them that we do value that alliance and want to preserve it."

Time
June 30, 1980

Reagan has stated he would not be adverse to intervening in the affairs of our NATO allies, however.

"To prevent a Communist takeover of Portugal in 1975, Reagan said the United States should have acted 'in any way to prevent or discourage' the Communists, adding 'It was clearly interest to do so.' But he refused to be more specific."

Los Angeles Times
June 1, 1975

Reagan has also suggested that the United States push for an extension of NATO's defensive perimeter into the Middle East.

"There would be nothing wrong with us...appealing to our NATO allies and saying, 'Look, fellows, let's just make this an extension of the NATO Line and you contribute some forces in here too.'"

National Journal
March 8, 1980

Carter

"At the outset of this Administration I emphasized the primacy of our Atlantic relationship in this country's national security agenda. We have made important progress toward making the Atlantic Alliance still more effective in a changing security environment.

"We are meeting the Soviet challenge in a number of important ways:

"First, there is a recognition among our allies that mutual security is a responsibility to be shared by all. We are each committed to increase national defense expenditures by 3% per year. There remains much work to be done in strengthening NATO's conventional defense; the work proceeding under the Alliance's Long Term Defense Program will help achieve this objective.

"Last month, we and our NATO allies took an historic step in Alliance security policies with the decision to improve substantially our theater nuclear capabilities. The theater nuclear force modernization (TNF) program, which includes the deployment of improved Pershing ballistic missiles and of ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, received the unanimous support of our allies. The accelerated deployment of Soviet SS-20 MIRVed missiles made this modernization step essential. TNF deployments will give the Alliance an important retaliatory option that will make clear to the Soviets that they cannot wage a nuclear war in Europe and expect that Soviet territory will remain unscathed."

State of the Union Address
January 1980

Mondale

"Mr. Secretary General, Members of the Council:

In behalf of President Carter, I have come today to NATO Headquarters as a matter of the first priority. I have come to convey to you and the member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance:

- The President's most sincere greetings;
- His commitment--and the full commitment of the United States--to the North Atlantic Alliance as a vital part of our deep and enduring relations with Canada and Western Europe; and
- His dedication to improving cooperation and consultations with our oldest friends, so as to safeguard our peoples and to promote our common efforts and concerns.

The President's conviction concerning NATO's central role is deep-rooted and firm. As he stated in his message to the NATO ministers last month: "Our NATO alliance lies at the heart of the partnership between North America and Western Europe. NATO is the essential instrument for enhancing our collective security. The American commitment to maintaining the NATO Alliance shall be sustained and strengthened under my administration."

Address to North Atlantic
Council
Brussel, Belgium
January 24, 1977

DISARMAMENT/ARMS CONTROL

Reagan

Regardless of political affiliation, almost all public leaders support efforts aimed at reducing conflicts through negotiation. But Ronald Reagan has had doubts about negotiating peace.

"The President wants to end the cold war era of conflict and to substitute an era of negotiations, peaceful settlements of disputes before they flare into war. I am sure every American shares that goal. But are we also aware that every nation in history which has sought peace and freedom solely through negotiation has been crushed by conquerors bent on conquest and aggression."

Speech to World Affairs
Council
October 11, 1972

Mondale

"National strength requires more than just military might: It requires the commitment of the President to arms control.

"If there is one thing that bothers me more than anything else and I think bothers you, it is the fear that someday, somehow, for reasons that don't matter, the world will resort to the final madness of a nuclear holocaust. Reason, common sense, and a decent respect for humanity demand that we stall this nuclear arms race before it bankrupts and destroys us all.

"Without arms control, everything is out of control. Without the SALT treaty we would be forced to waste billions on weapons that buy us nothing.

"And even though it took seven years to negotiate this treaty; and even though our President, and our Secretary of Defense and all the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every NATO ally wants this treaty ratified, Mr. Reagan for the life of him cannot understand why.

"Well, let me say Mr. Reagan: We must have arms control for the life of all of us, and we need a President Jimmy Carter who believes in controlling the madness of nuclear arms."

DNC Acceptance Speech
August 1980

NON-PROLIFERATION

Reagan

A Reagan Administration might not be concerned with pursuing a non-proliferation strategy:

"I just don't think it's (non-proliferation) any of our business."

Washington Post
January 31, 1980

Reagan clarified his assertion by adding:

"I think that all of us would like to see non-proliferation, but I don't think that any of us are succeeding in that. We are the only one in the world that's trying to stop it. The result is we have increased our problems would be eased if this government would allow the reprocessing of nuclear waste into plutonium..."

Monterey, Peninsula Herald
February 3, 1980

Mondale

"Our relationship with Western Europe and our NATO allies can be severely damaged by the defeat of this SALT II treaty. They strongly support it. They've been involved in it all the way. Their interests have been carefully taken into account. Around the world, as you know, there are several so-called threshold nations that are within a short distance of having their own nuclear weaponry. And we have been pleading with them, don't do it. Please don't resort to nuclear weaponry yourself. And the only basis for persuasion that we have is that, despite the fact that we are the holder of the most sophisticated pool of nuclear weaponry in the world we have handled that responsibly and with restraint, and therefore with moral authority we can ask them to refrain from resorting to their own nuclear weaponry.

"All of these things and more will be affected by the outcome of this agreement. I am convinced it is in our interest. I'm convinced it's in our national security interest. And I'm convinced that with the support of the American people, the ratification of this treaty will take the most important step that we can take together for our children. And that is to reduce the possibilities of the final madness, a nuclear war."

L.A. World Affairs Council
July 1979

Mondale

"Third, as we limit and reduce the weapons of existing nuclear states, we must work in concert to insure that no additional nuclear-weapon states emerge over the next decade and beyond.

"The spread of nuclear weapons to an ever-increasing number of countries and regions is a chilling prospect. It brings ever closer the probability of their use. Such proliferation would seriously heighten regional and global tensions. It would impede peaceful commerce in the field of nuclear energy. And it would make the achievement of nuclear disarmament vastly more difficult."

Address to the U.N.
Special Session of
Disarmament
May 1978