

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group (NSPG): Records, 1981-1987  
**Folder Title:** NSPG 0076 11/07/1983 [Iran-Iraq; October 1983 Lebanon Marine Bombing] (1)  
**Box:** 91306

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

**Withdrawer**

DLB 1/29/2007

**File Folder** NSPG 0076 11/07/1983 [IRAN-IRAQ; OCTOBER 1983  
LEBANON MARINE BOMBING] (1 OF 2)

**FOIA**

F1772

**Box Number** 91305

JOYCE BATTLE

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33320	NOTE	DON FORTIER TO BOB KIMMITT, RE: IRAN-IRAQ <i>R 3/25/2008 NLRRF1772</i>	1	10/28/1983	B1
33322	AGENDA	NSPG MEETING, OCTOBER 31, 1983 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	2	ND	B1
33323	FORM	SCHEDULE PROPOSAL -RE: NSPG MEETING <i>R 3/25/2008 NLRRF1772</i>	1	10/31/1983	B1
33324	MEMO	DONALD FORTIER, PHILIP DUR TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: NSPG ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR...NOVEMBER 7, 1983 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	11/4/1983	B1
33326	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: IRAN-IRAQ WAR <i>R 3/25/2008 NLRRF1772</i>	1	10/27/1983	B1
33328	PAPER	DISCUSSION PAPER, RE: IRAN-IRAQ WAR <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	17	ND	B1
33329	PAPER	TAB 1 - SOVIET REACTION	1	ND	B1
33330	PAPER	READINESS TO RESPOND TO A CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF <i>D 1/14/2008 F1772</i>	5	10/21/1983	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

**Withdrawer**

DLB 1/29/2007

**File Folder** NSPG 0076 11/07/1983 [IRAN-IRAQ; OCTOBER 1983  
LEBANON MARINE BOMBING] (1 OF 2)

**FOIA**

F1772

**Box Number** 91305

JOYCE BATTLE

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33331	PAPER	CHEMICAL WARFARE IN IRAQ <i>PAR 1/14/2008 F1772</i>	2	ND	B1 B3
33332	PAPER	SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR R. C. MCFARLANE NSPG: U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	3	ND	B1
33333	MEMO	PHILIP DUR TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: NSPG FOLLOW-ON <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	11/4/1983	B1
33334	PAPER	TALKING POINTS FOR ROBERT MCFARLANE <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	ND	B1
33335	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO [THE PRESIDENT], RE: NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING, NOVEMBER 7, 1983 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	3	11/5/1983	B1
33336	AGENDA	NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING....NOVEMBER 7, 1983 <i>R 2/21/2012 F1772/1</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

Date:

11/14/83  
Situation Room  
2:00 pm-3:00pm

Subject:

none

Participants:

The President  
The Vice President  
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

State:

Secretary George P. Shultz  
Lawrence Eagleburger

Defense:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA:

Mr. William J. Casey

JCS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr.  
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

White House:

Mr. Edwim Meese, III  
Mr. James A. Baker, III  
Mr. Robert C. McFarlane  
Admiral John M. Poindexter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 2, 1997  
By CH NARA, Date 3/19/02

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

Date:  
11/7/83  
12:10-1:40  
Roosevelt Room

Subject:  
Iran-Iraq

Participants:  
The President  
State:  
Secretary George P. Shultz  
Defense:  
Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger  
Energy:  
Secretary Donald P. Hodel  
CIA:  
Mr. William J. Casey  
OMB:  
Dr. Alton Keel  
USUN:  
Amb Jeane J. Kirkpatrick  
JCS:  
General John W. Vessey, Jr.  
White House:  
Mr. Edwin Meese, III  
Mr. James A. Baker, III  
Amb Robert C. McFarlane  
Admiral John M. Poindexter  
NSC:  
Mr. Donald Fortier  
OVP:  
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By            NARA, Date 1/29/07

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 29 OCT 83 16

TO KIMMITT

FROM FORTIER

*dlb 1/29/07*

DOCDATE 28 OCT 83

3

KEYWORDS NSPG  
IRAQ

IRAN  
AGENDA

SUBJECT AGENDA FOR NSPG MTG ON 31 OCT RE IRAN - IRAQ WAR

---

ACTION	NFAR PER KIMMITT	DUE	STATUS C	FILES IF
--------	------------------	-----	----------	----------

---

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS

REF#	LOG	NSCIFID <i>NSPG0076</i>	( B / B )
------	-----	-------------------------	-----------

---

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
--------------------	----------	-----------------	-----	-----------

---

DISPATCH	W/ATTCH	FILE	(C)
----------	---------	------	-----

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

33320  
SYSTEM II  
91314

SECRET WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

October 28, 1983

NOTE FOR BOB KIMMITT

As I said at the staff meeting this morning, we need to reach decisions on contingency plans for an escalation of the Iran-Iraq War. Concrete guidance can then be provided to the Armitage team which will be in the region and in a position to begin active planning with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman. If you believe we can locate a satisfactory time for the meeting (we arbitrarily chose Monday morning), I will discuss the issue with John Poindexter this afternoon so that we can get the agenda out later today.

Don Fortier

Attachment (Agenda)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1772 #33320

BY CW NARADATE 3/25/68

SECRET WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT  
Declassify OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

33322

AGENDA

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING  
White House Situation Room  
Monday, October 31, 1983  
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon

U.S. Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War

- I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .Robert C. McFarlane
- II. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT. . . . .William J. Casey
  - A. Current development in the latest Iranian offensive
  - B. Likelihood of Iraqi air strikes on critical Iranian economic targets
  - C. Adequacy of U.S. intelligence assets to monitor Iranian counteractions
  - D. Likely Soviet response in the event U.S. intervenes to defend shipping
- III. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY. . . . .George P. Shultz
  - A. Efforts to obtain a ceasefire in the Gulf
  - B. Promoting U.S. policy toward the protection of civil aviation and freedom of navigation
  - C. U.S. policy toward efforts to reopen the Iraq-Syria pipeline
  - D. Consultations with moderate Arabs and key Allies
    - 1. Freedom of navigation
    - 2. Defense of critical Gulf oil facilities and transshipment points
- IV. MILITARY PLANNING AND FORCE DEPLOYMENTS. . . . .Caspar Weinberger  
GEN John Vessey
  - A. Status of current contingency plans
  - B. Cooperation/collaboration with Gulf Arabs and key Allies
    - 1. Planning
    - 2. On-Scene coordination
  - C. Force readiness
    - 1. Deterring/countering Iranian mining threat
    - 2. Protection of shipping
    - 3. Defense of critical oil facilities

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR #33322

BY RW NARA DATE 2/11/12

- D. Measures to improve U.S. military posture in the region
  - 1. Improving force closure times with likely warning indicators
  - 2. Precautionary deployments
    - a. Tactical air deployments
    - b. Mine countermeasures
    - c. Counter-sapper defense
  
- V. ISSUES FOR DECISION. . . . .Robert C. McFarlane
  - A. Consultations with Gulf Arab states
  - B. Consultations with key Allies
  - C. Guidance for contingency planning
    - 1. Mining threats
    - 2. Attacks on civil aviation and shipping
    - 3. Attacks on Gulf oil facilities



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

11/2/83

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*

SUBJ: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: Lunch with National Security Planning Group

DATE: November 7, 1983

TIME: 12:00 noon

DURATION: 60 minutes

LOCATION: Roosevelt Room

REMARKS REQUIRED: No

MEDIA COVERAGE: No

FIRST LADY  
PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc: R. Darman	C. McCain	R. Kimmitt
R. Deprospero	J. Rosebush	R. Jackson
K. Duberstein	R. Scouten	
B. Elliott	B. Shaddix	
D. Fischer	W. Sittmann	
C. Fuller	L. Speakes	
W. Henkel	WHCA Audio/Visual	
E. Hickey	WHCA Operations	
G. Hodges	A. Wrobleski	
	Nell Yates	

General Responsibilities

- \_\_\_\_\_ Prepare and submit briefing paper to Richard Darman's Office by 3:00 pm of the preceding day. (14 copies)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Submit a complete, confirmed list of staff and attendees, identified by title, as well as the actual starting and completion times, to the President's Diarist, Office of Presidential Appointments and Scheduling within five (5) days after the event. (7560)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinate with David Fischer on Presidential involvement and itinerary. (x2168)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinate with Mark Weinberg in the Press Office (x2100) if applicable. Indicate home towns of participants.
- \_\_\_\_\_ If remarks are required, coordinate with the Speechwriters Office (x6266) well in advance.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinate with Photographers Office, (x4050) if applicable.
- \_\_\_\_\_ If participant brings a gift, contact Mary Power (x7133) for handling.
- \_\_\_\_\_ If any foreign visitor or dignitary is to be involved, please coordinate with Charles Tyson of the NSC (x3440).

West Wing Meetings

- \_\_\_\_\_ Notify and clear all participants. (Full name, social security number, date of birth).
- \_\_\_\_\_ Arrange parking with West Wing ushers and inform gate of arrival time and number of vehicles.
- \_\_\_\_\_ If tent name cards are needed, send a list of names to Muffie Brandon's office (x7064) 48 hours in advance.
- \_\_\_\_\_ All room arrangements (chairs, notepads, pencils, etc.) should be made through Carl Jones (x2275) or Nell Yates (x2605).
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinate with the Advance Office for Rose Garden events. (x7565).

Residence Events

- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinate with the Social Secretary's office (x7064) for all arrangements.
- \_\_\_\_\_ Coordinate with the Advance Office for Presidential Arrangements and logistical support. (x7565)
- \_\_\_\_\_ Send guest list to Social Secretary's office, preferably three weeks prior to the event.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
91315

33323

October 31, 1983

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director  
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*

REQUEST: National Security Planning Group Meeting

PURPOSE: To discuss US policy and objectives in  
the Iran-Iraq war.

BACKGROUND: In light of the impending transfer of  
French Strike Aircraft to Iraq and the  
potential this has for widening the Gulf  
war, we need to review our policy and  
objectives. The meeting will discuss  
the findings of a recent SIG paper and  
consider issues which require decisions.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: At the October 18, 1983, NSPG on Lebanon  
and the Middle East, it was agreed that  
this should be the subject of a separate  
NSPG.

DATE AND TIME: Early this week (October 31 - November 4)

LOCATION: White House Situation Room.

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Vice President,  
Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger,  
Secretary Hodel, William Casey, Jeane  
Kirkpatrick, Robert C. McFarlane

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: See agenda

REMARKS REQUIRED: None.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Not applicable.

RECOMMENDED BY: National Security Council.

OPPOSED BY: None.

PROJECT OFFICERS: Geoffrey Kemp, Donald Fortier,  
Philip Dur.

~~SECRET~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1772 #33323

CI NARA DATE 3/25/88

MEMORANDUM  
~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SYSTEM II  
91315

October 31, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*  
PHILIP DUR *pd*

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for NSPG on Iran-Iraq

Attached is a Schedule Proposal for an NSPG on Iran-Iraq as discussed at the Senior Staff meeting today. The date and time have been left for you to fill in.

Attachment  
as stated

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 26, 1997  
By dlb NARA, Date 1/29/07

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
91295

33324

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET WITH TOP SECRET/UMBRA ATTACHMENT~~

SENSITIVE

ACTION

November 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER *DF*  
PHILIP A. DUR *W*

SIGNED

SUBJECT: NSPG on U.S. Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War  
Monday, November 7, 1983, 12:00 noon - 1:00 p.m.

Attached is a memorandum on the Iran-Iraq War NSPG, which we recommend you transmit to the President. We need to be ahead of the curve on this one, both to look serious in the eyes of affected regional states and to be concretely prepared to respond to attacks on critical facilities. We will keep you posted on events on the ground in the time remaining between now and the NSPG.

At Tabs II through IV are additional papers you may wish to review before the meeting. Talking points for your use are at Tab V.

*Geoff Kemp*  
Geoff Kemp concurs.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve  Disapprove

That you approve a Kimmitt memo at Tab VI forwarding the meeting agenda to the invited agencies.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I McFarlane/President
  - Tab A List of Participants
  - Tab B Agenda, NSPG Meeting
- Tab II SIG Paper
- Tab III Memo prepared by Intelligence Community
- Tab IV Intelligence memo in Iraqi CW capabilities
- Tab V McFarlane Talking Points
- Tab VI Kimmitt memo forwarding NSPG meeting agenda
- Tab VII Clearance roster for NSPG attendees

~~SECRET WITH TOP SECRET/UMBRA ATTACHMENT~~  
Declassify OADR

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRRF 1772#33324  
BY *fw* NARA DATE *2/21/12*

October 27, 1983

03 10 1983 P10: 54

33326

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Iran-Iraq War

The attached discussion paper, forwarded by the SIG, addresses a number of issues regarding US policy to deter, prepare for, or counter an escalation of the Iran-Iraq War. It also examines but makes no recommendation on the issue of possible changes in US policy toward Iraq.

The SIG approved a number of near-term diplomatic, energy and politico-military measures the US should take to deal with the problem of escalation. The SIG is forwarding for consideration at an upcoming NSC meeting several issues regarding what US policy should be in response to an escalation of the war. These issues are identified on pages 1 and 2 of the attached paper. Finally, the SIG is providing for NSC discussion a list of illustrative measures for restoring a balance between Iran and Iraq.

The DOE does not concur with this paper.

*Charles Hill*

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachment: As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

NLRR F1772 #33326

BY Gi NARADATE 3/25/08

14  
33328

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~

DISCUSSION PAPER

Summary/Recommendations

At the SIG meeting held on October 24, 1983, SIG principals agreed that the following near-term diplomatic, energy, and politico-military measures should be taken to deter escalation of the war, reassure the Gulf states, and prepare for possible US military involvement to preserve freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz and to defend the Gulf states against Iranian attack:

- Implement or continue the near-term diplomatic and energy measures aimed at deterring or preparing for escalation (Section III).
- Begin consultations with the Gulf states and our Allies on near-term politico-military measures (Section III).
- Begin contingency planning and pre-escalation military activity with our Allies and the Gulf states following NSC decisions regarding US policy for military action and for protecting shipping.
- The relevant Departments (DOE, Treasury, State) should review possible domestic energy and economic measures and implement recommendations (Section VI) to minimize the impact of a possible oil cutoff.

The following issues are forwarded by the SIG to the NSC for decision at an upcoming NSC meeting:

- Should the US intervene militarily (with our Allies) to prevent minelaying or conduct mine-clearing operations in the international and non-belligerent territorial waters?

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F1772 #33328  
BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/12

- Should the US respond militarily (with our Allies), at the request of a non-belligerent state, to prevent or defend against an attack on the non-belligerent's territory or oil facilities?
- Should the US respond militarily with our Allies to protect shipping in the Gulf? An NSC decision is required on what ships we would protect and where.
- Should the US, under certain circumstances, initiate military action prior to an overt Iranian military move?
- Should the US respond unilaterally in the above situations if our Allies declined to participate?
- What are the limits on US military involvement in the event of escalation (i.e., what targets will be attacked)?
- Should the US continue to pursue diplomatic action to reopen the Iraqi pipeline through Syria?

The Department of Energy non-concurs with this paper and recommends deletion of Section VI, International Energy Contingency Planning and Section VII, Measures to Improve Relations with Iraq. It is DOE's understanding that the White House will be establishing an interagency group to examine the energy implications of a disruption of Persian Gulf oil and they believe that addressing the issue in this paper would be premature. DOE also feels that the issue of US policy toward Iraq requires more analysis; specifically, they are concerned about possible Israeli reactions and the US ability to repair/restore damaged Iraqi oil facilities to allow the export of oil.

## I. Introduction

The threat of escalation of the Iran-Iraq war to the Persian Gulf poses a serious danger to Gulf oil supplies, which are essential to the security and well being of the noncommunist world. In order to deter, or, if necessary deal with a stoppage or curtailment of Gulf oil exports, we need to agree on: 1) measures to deter escalation, reassure our friends in the Gulf and prepare for military involvement, if necessary; 2) how and under what circumstances we would intervene with military force, and what the military mission would be; and 3) energy policy actions and contingency plans, which are integrated into an overall strategy. Some of the near-term and longer-term military

measures discussed in this paper would require action under the War Powers Resolution and close consultations with the Congress.

## II. Background and Setting

Iraq, threatened with a foreign exchange crisis because the war has curtailed its oil exports and fearing defeat by Iran in a war of attrition, is seeking to change the strategic situation to its advantage.

It is doing so by threatening to use the French supplied Super Etendard aircraft and Exocet missiles against Iranian oil targets and shipping in the Gulf, either to: 1) cutoff Iranian access to oil markets and foreign exchange earnings; or 2) deter Iran from further attacks on Iraq's Gulf oil facilities so that Iraq can repair these and resume oil exports through the Gulf, to ease its economic crisis.

Iran has responded by threatening to close the Gulf to all oil exports if Iraq uses the new weapons to cutoff Iran's oil exports. Iraq is also exploiting the new weapons, even before delivery, to "internationalize" the conflict. It hopes that fears of escalation will force the West to intervene diplomatically to Iraq's advantage. Alternatively, Iraq foresees that if Iran resumes attacks on Iraqi oil shipments, Iraq uses the Etendard/Exocets, and Iran moves to close the Gulf, the West will intervene militarily against Iran, somehow bringing an end to the war.

It is not clear that Iran would actually close the Gulf if Iraq uses the new weapons. But Iran has the military capability to attack Gulf Arab oil installations and to limit or prevent neutral shipping in the Gulf, at least for a while. We must, therefore, take Iran's threats seriously.

## III. Near Term Measures

The SIG agreed that the US should take certain near-term diplomatic and politico-military measures prior to an expansion of the war as deterrents and to be prepared for a crisis. Preliminary discussion of some of those measures and a US offer to consult in more detail will be made during the Armitage-Raphel trip to Oman and Bahrain next week. Other near-term measures will require fundamental policy decisions before they can be undertaken. The near-term diplomatic and politico-military actions are described as follows:

Diplomatic Strategy:

-- Encourage a de facto ceasefire in the Gulf. Our broad strategy is to achieve a strategic balance between the belligerents that would reduce the threat of escalation in the Gulf and ultimately lead the two sides to negotiate.

Our immediate objective is a de facto ceasefire in the Gulf, whereby neither side would attack the other's Gulf oil facilities or exports. This would benefit both sides: Iran would be protected from Iraqi attacks on its oil exports or terminals; Iraqi and third country oil targets in the Gulf would be protected from retaliation and closure of the Gulf, which Iran has threatened; Iraq could thus ensure exports of oil through the Gulf, thereby reducing the strategic disadvantage which is now driving it toward escalation.

We should pursue such a de facto ceasefire in the UN Security Council, where discussion on a balanced resolution with incentives for both belligerents is underway. We should also pursue bilaterally efforts to obtain cooperation by both Iran and Iraq in a de facto ceasefire, whether or not the Security Council acts.

-- Reopening of Iraq's pipeline through Syria. There was no SIG agreement on further action to open Iraq's pipeline through Syria. In light of the lack of Saudi and GCC success in gaining Syrian agreement and the inherent risks in giving Syria more leverage over the moderate Arab states, the issue of whether to continue this effort requires further interagency study. However, reopening the pipeline is another means of reducing pressure on Iraq to attack Iranian oil targets in the Gulf by increasing Iraq's oil revenues and alleviating its debilitating financial situation. It would also significantly lessen the financial burden of the Gulf states which provide considerable funds to Iraq and export their own oil on Iraq's account.

Persuading Damascus to reopen the pipeline is a long range prospect and the Saudis have indicated that their efforts with Syria have so far met with failure. If Syria were to acquiesce however, it might extract a price or undue leverage over Saudi Arabia and the moderate Arab states at a time when we are hoping to reduce Syrian influence in Lebanon.

-- Continue to stress our commitment to freedom of navigation in the Gulf. However, we should avoid statements that might raise tensions unnecessarily or provoke unwarranted concern in the international oil markets, thus adversely affecting oil prices.

-- Deter Iran's threat against civil aviation. We should continue our current diplomatic efforts with the Secretary General of the ICAO and with states friendly to Iran to discourage Iran from carrying out this threat.

-- Encourage renewed mediation attempts in the Iran-Iraq war by the UN Secretary General. The SYG has the respect of both belligerents and a new mission by his envoy Olaf Palme could be useful at the appropriate time. In connection with renewed UN involvement, we should explore prospects for international action on war damages as a means of establishing greater Iranian confidence in international efforts to end the war.

-- If there is a crisis, pursue diplomatic efforts to obtain a ceasefire to avoid the need for intervention. We would carry out intensive bilateral and multilateral efforts to obtain a ceasefire in order to avoid, if possible, the last resort of military involvement. Such measures would include engaging the UN Secretary General and organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council in public and diplomatic efforts to achieve a ceasefire. We would examine the option of persuading Allied and other states who are major weapons suppliers to both belligerents to suspend all sales as a means of leverage. We would also explore the possibility of action in the UN Security Council to accomplish a ceasefire, although we would not encourage involvement by the Secretary General or the UNSC in a way that might make it more difficult for us and our Allies to act militarily, if this becomes necessary, or which would provide a basis for Soviet intervention.

Energy Considerations:

To minimize the disruptive effects of a severe reduction in oil exports from the Gulf, we should estimate now the probable effects on supply and distribution of various levels of curtailment, and the potential economic consequences for the US and world economy. This should lead to interagency agreement on appropriate responses and actions. Moreover, interagency public affairs guidance should be developed and consultations should begin with our Allies and with major oil companies on pre- and post-disruption actions which could be taken to minimize the disruptive effects of an oil cutoff. Additionally, Congress could be briefed. Cabinet-level statements could be issued to dampen or dispel unwarranted public fears over another energy crisis.

The Department of Treasury will be providing a preliminary assessment of the economic and financial implications of a disruption of Persian Gulf oil supplies.

Politico-Military Actions:

-- Multilaterally, discuss within NATO the broad guidelines of US policy and plans. Such discussions will be consistent with our pledge to consult on out-of-area issues/deployments and would set the stage for bilateral discussions.

-- Intensify contingency planning consultations with the UK and France to determine Allied attitudes toward military cooperation, and consider approaching Italy. Detailed planning such as agreement on a multinational plan for preserving freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf and a concept for a division of responsibility in the event that one or more of the Gulf states is attacked by Iran will require NSC decisions regarding US policy for military intervention before commitments can be made.

-- Seek agreement for combined naval exercises with the US from the UK, France, New Zealand, Australia, and Italy.

-- Launch a new round of consultations with appropriate GCC states on combined military cooperation. These consultations would seek to determine Gulf state attitudes towards military cooperation with us in various escalation contingencies. Once NSC decisions are made on US policy regarding the limits on US military involvement in the event of escalation, we should also seek to make progress in the following areas: combined contingency planning; combined exercises and US/Allied deployments (e.g., combined air defense/TACAIR exercises in Saudi Arabia and Oman); US use of facilities and host nation support; increased naval cooperation between USCINCCENT and the Saudi and Omani Navies; upgrading GCC air defense and air/sea surveillance capabilities.

-- In response to heightened indications that the Iraq-Iran war may escalate or spread within the Gulf regions: be prepared to agree to Gulf state requests for an increased US military presence (e.g., TACAIR, naval and AWACS deployments); offer expanded intelligence sharing with selected Gulf states, including provision of near-real time data on warning indicators; begin planning and preparations for multinational protection of shipping; and recommend to the Gulf states that they increase their air defense readiness and ask what assistance they may need. Discussions with Gulf states on these issues

will also require NSC decisions on US policy for military intervention.

#### IV. Escalation Issues

##### General Policy for Military Intervention

The SIG agreed that the US should respond militarily to belligerent attempts to mine international or non-belligerent territorial waters, belligerent attacks on shipping and belligerent attacks on the oil facilities or territory of a non-belligerent asking for US support. It was not determined whose shipping we would protect or where we would protect them, i.e., only in international waters, territorial water of belligerents, etc. The SIG recommends that the NSC review and decide on which option we should adopt to protect shipping.

Military intervention, if necessary, should be carried out to the maximum extent possible in concert with our Allies and regional friends, under international sanction, and in accordance with US domestic legal requirements. The use of military force should be considered under the following circumstances:

- If there are firm indications of imminent actions by either belligerent that would cutoff or significantly curtail Gulf oil exports, or that would threaten the security of friendly Gulf producer states. (Preemptive military action.)
  
- If military threats or acts by either belligerent result in a cutoff or major curtailment of Gulf oil exports, or, in the event of military threats or acts against friendly Gulf producer states, and they request our assistance. (Responsive military action.)

The type of military action and when it is to be initiated is a fundamental decision to be made by the National Command Authority. Decisions on responsive military action should take into account: 1) outcome of diplomatic efforts to restore the flow of oil; 2) the potential impact on the US and the international economy; and 3) the political reaction of area states and US Allies, in light of our pledge to keep the Gulf open.

Given the possibility that escalation of the war could be gradual, rather than bolt-out-of-the-blue, the SIG discussed the issue of waiting until Iran makes an overt military move before responding militarily. The SIG agreed that increased US military presence in the region (deterrent deployments) could deter hostile Iranian actions. If, however, deterrence fails, the US should be prepared to use forces as prescribed in the military mission.

Given the possibility that escalation of the war may occur incrementally and that diplomatic measures may fail to control that escalation, the SIG determined that preemptive military measures merit consideration. The SIG concluded that there are certain circumstances in which the US might consider preemptive military action to defend shipping or Gulf state territory prior to overt Iranian attacks. The SIG agreed that upon receipt of reliable strategic warning, we might initiate passive military measures (e.g., convoying of shipping or increased naval patrols). The SIG further agreed that if there were tactical warning of Iranian attacks, preemptive use of military force to engage those Iranian aircraft or ships about to initiate hostile activity might be warranted.

In considering the merits of US military action, the SIG recognized that the US might not receive reliable strategic or tactical intelligence. Given Allied concern about precipitous military action and the ability of the international community to withstand a short-term closure of the Gulf, US Allies--and possibly even some Gulf states--may not support US action prior to overt Iranian military moves. Lack of Allied/Gulf state support for US measures would undercut the political legitimacy of US military intervention and could make it more difficult for the US to conduct sustained military operations in the Gulf should this prove necessary to maintain freedom of navigation.

Escalatory actions by the belligerents which would warrant a military response include:

1) Iranian Mining

If Iran mines the Strait of Hormuz and this significantly affects shipping, the US would conduct mineclearing operations with the contributions of others (e.g., the Saudis, Omanis, French and British) in both international and non-belligerent waters to neutralize the threat. The US does not possess adequate military capability to conduct mineclearing operations unilaterally in a timely fashion. At a minimum, we must work with either the French, the Saudis, or the Omanis. We may also

want to consider pre-crisis deployment of mine-countermeasure (MCM) assets.

The US would conduct such operations in international waters (which, for purposes of this paper, includes the Omani portion of the Strait of Hormuz) with or without others (to the extent the latter is possible and if efforts to engage our Allies or regional states failed) and with or without the request of Gulf states or other shipping nations. We would not conduct mineclearing operations in the territorial waters of a non-belligerent state without a request by that state.

### 2) Iranian Threats or Attacks on the Territory or Oil Facilities of Non-Belligerent Gulf States

In either event, the US should cooperate with any Gulf state that requests our assistance or facilitate assistance provided by others. We should, under most circumstances, provide only defensive forces in order that our response appear measured and, therefore, less likely to draw in the Soviets. To the extent possible we would want to involve other friendly or allied states outside the Gulf.

If Iran attacks Saudi Arabian oil facilities, we could, in the first instance, offer to assist, if necessary, in the repair and restoration of damaged installations. The objective would be to reestablish exports rapidly. While this could involve replacement of equipment with long manufacturing leadtimes, which would necessarily require oil industry participation, the US government could provide assistance by assessing the damage and advising the Saudis on containment of further damage. The latter might involve assistance with active defenses (i.e. deploy air defense assets) to deter further attacks. We also would need to determine the extent to which we would support Saudi military actions against Iran, if the Saudis chose to retaliate.

If Iran attacks Kuwait, we should be prepared to assist in response to a Kuwaiti request. Kuwait did not request our support after the previous Iranian attack on its territory at the outset of the war, and probably would not do so again. We should encourage the UK to defend Kuwait, perhaps with US logistics and lift support.

### 3) Interdiction of Neutral Commercial Shipping

The Iranians also have some capability of using air and naval assets to interdict commercial shipping either in international or non-belligerent territorial waters. It is important to note that both belligerents have declared maritime exclusionary zones and warned that they would fire in

these zones. Portions of Iran's exclusionary zone extend close to Kuwait, but permit unrestricted entry into Kuwait port and oil terminals. With regard to protection of shipping, we would remain outside the exclusion zones. (This was the concept of operations in the 1980 plan for protection of shipping.) We would not recognize, however, any further extension of exclusionary zones into the international waters of the Persian Gulf or Strait of Hormuz.

Prior to an unlawful threat or attack by Iran against neutral shipping, the US would not respond militarily to appropriate Iranian naval stop and search actions against neutral vessels in international waters, except in the unlikely event that this seriously (and impermissibly) curtailed neutral shipping in the Gulf and, thus, oil exports.

The options for protecting shipping are:

A. Protect all commercial shipping in international waters, regardless of its port of origin or destination.

This option would require protecting both Iranian and Iraqi commercial shipping as well as protecting non-belligerent (including Soviet) shipping bound to and from belligerent ports. It is not clear that any of our Allies would participate in such an operation, which might encounter permissible use of force by the belligerents.

Implementation of this option could, however, help alleviate Iraq's short-term financial problem if it were able to reopen oil export facilities in the Gulf, which could dampen Iraqi incentive to continue attacks on Iranian oil exports. It should be recognized that US/Allied protection of all commercial shipping, if done in conjunction with an Iraqi effort to reopen its Gulf oil export terminals, could be perceived by Iran as a move to improve US relations with Iraq. This perception would be heightened if France participated in this operation, although Iran would benefit as well. It might also make the US a belligerent, by protecting belligerent shipping or escorting vessels in belligerent waters or vessels carrying contraband. It could also require the US to protect arms shipments by the Soviets.

B. Protect neutral shipping (in international and, if requested, non-belligerent territorial waters) regardless of port of origin or destination.

This option would also involve a high risk of compromising US neutrality and of direct US/ Allied involvement in the conflict because it would require protection of ships bound to or

from belligerent ports. Non-belligerent ships would be handed off by us to belligerent naval units near their territorial waters. It is unlikely that US Allies would participate in this operation. As with option one, however, protection of commercial shipping destined for Iraq could help Iraq export oil.

C. Protect neutral shipping bound to or from neutral ports (in international or, if requested, non-belligerent territorial waters).

This option avoids the problem of ship hand-offs to belligerents and poses the least risk to a multinational force. It would present the strongest case for U.S. use of defensive force and would be the most attractive option for Allied cooperation. It would lessen the likelihood of inadvertent US/Allied involvement in the hostilities, while fulfilling our commitment to freedom of navigation throughout the international waters of the Persian Gulf. A US/Allied guarantee of safe transit to Gulf Arab ports would demonstrate concern for the security and well-being of the Gulf states. Protecting only non-belligerent shipping bound to or from neutral ports (in international and non-belligerent waters) would not assist Iraqi oil exports. Consequently, it runs the least risk of hostilities with Iran. In implementing this option we would have to consider which non-belligerent vessels to protect (e.g. Soviet ships) and how to ensure they are not carrying contraband destined for a belligerent.

A policy that protects only neutral ships going to non-belligerents' ports would still likely be perceived by Iran as evidence that the US is siding with Iraq. However, the Iranians already regard all the GCC states as Iraqi allies, because they provide financial assistance to Iraq (e.g., direct cash transfers or sale of oil on Iraqi account) and, in the case of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, allow their ports to be used for the transshipment of arms to Iraq. In addition, Iran has repeatedly denounced the US and the Saudis as being its principal enemies. Thus, although our ensuring safe transit of neutral ships going to Gulf state ports, while doing nothing to protect ships carrying on trade with Iraq would probably be construed by the Iranians as a unfriendly act, it would not qualitatively change Tehran's perceptions of US intentions.

US Military Intervention Without a Request from Other States or Without Participation by Our Allies.

US naval intervention to protect neutral shipping in the Gulf without a request from regional states or from shipping

nations would be more difficult to sustain domestically and internationally. It is likely that at least one Gulf state, such as Oman, would request our intervention or that Gulf states or shipping nations could be prompted to make such a request. However, if there is no such request and there is a stoppage or curtailment of shipping and oil exports that would meet our other criteria for intervention, the SIG agreed that we should be prepared unilaterally to deploy and use naval force in international waters of the Gulf, to the extent that this would be useful to deter further attacks or threats and to bring about a resumption of shipping and oil exports.

The smaller Gulf states--notably Kuwait, UAE and Qatar--might find multinational Allied support more politically acceptable than unilateral US military deployments. Allied military involvement would provide an international framework within which the US could act militarily to guarantee oil supplies. This show of western resolve would lessen the risk of provoking an escalatory Soviet response and turning US military involvement in the Gulf into a US-Iranian confrontation. In addition, Allied participation in a military response would obtain far greater domestic and international support than unilateral action by the US.

We expect from recent consultation with the UK that, so long as our military actions are modest in extent, founded on such principles as freedom of navigation and Gulf state requests for assistance, and are accompanied or preceded by political initiatives, the British may participate with us. Regarding the French, we are less sure. If none of our Allies agree to join us, we should be prepared to act alone to fulfill our commitments to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf and the security of the Gulf states. A failure to do so would not only have serious consequences for the international economy, but also shatter Gulf state confidence in US reliability and the credibility of our security assurances.

#### V. Mission Considerations

Fundamental policy decisions are required regarding what the military forces deployed to the area are expected to accomplish (i.e., whether to deter, preempt, and/or defend against attack). These decisions must be determined prior to any US deployment, inasmuch as the presence of military forces in an area implies a willingness to use those forces to attain stated objectives. Should the NSC decide to defend the Gulf states and freedom of navigation, the SIG recommends that any

forces deployed as a deterrent to escalatory actions should have a mission which allows a response to attacks on shipping or non-belligerent territory. Otherwise, we could have US forces in the area watching while non-belligerents or neutral shipping come under attack. Consideration must also be given to matters of hot pursuit, attacks on hostile forces inside claimed territorial waters or national airspace, and attacks on hostile forces which have returned to their home bases. Such decisions should take into account the War Powers Resolution and Congressional views.

The escalatory implications of such acts, the possibility that they could make the US a belligerent or provoke Soviet involvement, and the potential effects on the multilateral character of our military approach to escalation in the Gulf, require the mission assigned to be carefully crafted. The CIA has concluded (Tab 1) that the Soviet reaction to US military action in the Gulf -- and to limited US strikes against Iranian territory -- is likely to be limited.

The SIG recommends that forces deployed to the region (pre- or post-escalation), be empowered to defend non-belligerent shipping or territory, should escalation occur. Decisions to attack hostile forces at their bases or in the belligerent's territorial waters or national airspace should be reserved for the NCA.

## VI. International Energy Contingency Planning

In the face of a real or threatened major interruption of world oil supplies, such as that which could result from an escalation of the Iran-Iraq war, a number of energy policy measures can be taken which offer the potential to alleviate immediate pressures on world oil supplies, and thus provide major oil consuming countries flexibility in the use and timing of other possible measures, including military actions. These energy policy actions would be directed at maximizing oil supplies from other sources, minimizing unwarranted consumer reactions that could aggravate the oil market situation, and coordinating these efforts with other major oil consuming countries.

Specific international energy contingency planning actions that could be taken include:

-- Encourage immediate production increases by oil producers and increase efforts to expand overland exports by Persian Gulf producers.

-- Convene an emergency meeting of the International Energy Agency Governing Board to review the potential for supply interruption and possible response measures, including but not limited to drawdowns of government controlled oil stocks.

-- Work with private oil market participants, in particular major oil companies, to mitigate potential speculative price increases, and to avoid hoarding.

-- Promote better public understanding of energy supply issues and the mechanisms already in place to deal with emergencies.

These together with other possible domestic energy and economic measures should be reviewed as quickly as possible so that they can be integrated with contingency planning underway for diplomatic and military action.

#### VII. Measures to Restore the Iran-Iraq Equilibrium

In addition to considering policy issues bearing on maintaining freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf and defending friendly Gulf states from Iranian attack, the SIG considered the question of restoring the balance between Iraq and Iran by providing political and military support for Iraq in its war with Iran and means of helping Iraq avoid defeat. A list of measures was analyzed by an interagency working group and reviewed by SIG principals, but the SIG made no recommendations.

The prime U.S. objective in the Iran-Iraq War has been to prevent either side from achieving a clear military victory in the war and political domination of the Gulf. In the past a policy of strict neutrality served our purpose; but circumstances have changed, and Iraq may now be losing a war of attrition. For that reason a series of measures have been examined which could shore up Iraq both militarily and politically.

These measures were considered in terms of:

- how beneficial they were to Iraq, did they help militarily or politically;
- how likely they were to exacerbate current and future relations with Iran, whether they would make Iran more or less

likely to move toward a negotiated settlement, and their impact on our efforts to obtain Iranian acquiescence in a de facto ceasefire in the Gulf.

- what Gulf state, Allied, Soviet, Syrian, and Israeli reactions might be; and
- how Congress and the American public might react.

The focus of discussion was on measures which: 1) provided tangible but measured and discrete support for Iraq; 2) would reduce Iraq's perceived sense of isolation and remove Iraq's incentive to escalate, which would provoke Iranian reaction and draw the West into the conflict to maintain access to Persian Gulf oil; and 3) would not substantially increase Iranian incentives to escalate in the Gulf.

The likelihood of the Soviets gaining an advantage with Iran as a result of such measures was judged to be minimal. Gulf states would support such measures so long as these steps assisted Iraq without generating threats to the Gulf states. French support was also assumed for measures assisting Iraq, though the support of other Allies would likely be inversely proportional to the degree of assistance afforded Iraq. The Israeli reaction would be negative in most cases, but could be manageable if consultations were undertaken in advance. Congressional and U.S. public attitudes would be affected by the Israeli reaction, but were judged to be manageable, although most of the recommended measures would not require Congressional approval. Moreover, while support for Iraq is quite limited in the U.S., Iran enjoys an even less favorable image.

Significant measures on behalf of Iraq which were discussed are set forth below. It was accepted that possible steps to assist Iraq should be taken within the framework of a continued declaratory policy of neutrality between Iran and Iraq. Measures 1-6 would not publicly reveal any shift in US neutrality. Subsequent measures considered in this paper either represented an overt shift in our neutrality policy (e.g., arms sales to Iraq) or were ambiguous.

1. Promote a de facto cease fire in the Gulf by diplomatic measures, including action in the UN Security Council.

2. Encourage France to provide Iraq with technical assistance and military advice, such as on the use of the Iraqi Air Force in close air support tactics.

3 Improve intelligence support in a low-key, non-visible manner including closer-to-real-time tactical intelligence and general intelligence on Iranian weapons systems, operational techniques, logistics practices, vulnerabilities, and tactical/strategic countermeasures to Iranian activities;

4. Cooperate covertly with France to provide military equipment so that Iraq could better protect its oil export facilities, e.g. land and seaborne air and anti-ship defense systems;

5. Commence consultations with the Allies regarding measures such as these to ensure that Iraq does not succumb to Iran;

6. Urge continued Arab subvention of the Iraqi war effort, including especially weapons purchases (the US might offer to sell US weapons to the moderate Arab to offset their transfers to Iraq of non-US arms);

7. Promote the restoration of Iraqi oil exports through technical assistance and provision of necessary parts and equipment to reopen Iraq's Gulf oil terminals as rapidly as possible;

8. Offer Iraq a visit by one or more senior U.S. officials, commencing with a State Department official;

9. Consider adding Iran to the terrorist list; and

10. Urge allies and friends to take similar anti-terrorist measures, the net result of which would be to further curtail arms sales to Iran.

Two other options were also considered by the SIG, which were determined to have significant advantages and disadvantages:

● Consideration was given to permitting third countries to sell Iraq US-controlled military items (licensed production, resale of US-origin arms, etc.). This step would respond to the requests of a number of our friends, including Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. It would allow us to provide real military capability to Iraq without our being directly involved ourselves. Any such transfer, however, would require US permission and Congress would have to be informed. The disadvantages of this step are that this would be seen as a significant departure from our declaratory policy of neutrality. This could undercut efforts to achieve a defacto ceasefire and to avoid escalation in the Gulf, by indicating U.S. partnership. Also, reactions

from Israel and the Congress are likely to be no less negative toward third party sale to Iraq of U.S.-controlled items than to direct U.S. sales.

● Consideration was also given to allowing Jordan and/or Egypt to send combat units to Iraq with their US origin equipment. Jordan asked for permission to deploy Jordanians equipped with US origin arms in 1982. We responded negatively, but our analysis of the law is that it would permit the use of US-origin arms if they remain in Egyptian or Jordanian hands and were used only as part of collective defense. The deployment of Egyptian or Jordanian units would demonstrate Arab solidarity, give a morale boost to Iraqi forces, and could deter Iran from continuing the war. On the other hand, Jordan and Egypt probably would not be in a position to offer large forces that could make a military difference. If we were to encourage this, we might be expected to pay. Also, Israel's reaction would be very negative, as in the case of the Jordanian "strike force". Finally, Egypt might not wish to strain its relations with Israel in this way.

The SIG believed it would be necessary to consult with Israel before carrying out any such measures on behalf of Iraq, to gain Israeli understanding and minimize a negative Israeli reaction.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

*Withdrawer*

DLB 1/29/2007

*File Folder*

NSPG 0076 11/07/1983 [IRAN-IRAQ] (1 OF 2)

*FOIA*

F1772

JOYCE BATTLE

*Box Number*

91305

2

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
33329	PAPER  TAB 1 - SOVIET REACTION	1	ND	B1

---

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

**B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**

**B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**

**B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**

**B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**

**B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**

**B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**

**B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**

**B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

**C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.**

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: NSPG MEETINGS

*Withdrawer*

DLB 1/29/2007

*File Folder*

NSPG 0076 11/07/1983 [IRAN-IRAQ] (1 OF 2)

*FOIA*

F1772

JOYCE BATTLE

*Box Number*

91305

2

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
33330	PAPER  READINESS TO RESPOND TO A CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF	5	10/21/1983	B1

---

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

**B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**

**B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**

**B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**

**B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**

**B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**

**B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**

**B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**

**B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

CHEMICAL WARFARE IN IRAQ

SUMMARY

Iraq began an aggressive program to produce CW weapons after the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980. Iraq first used chemical weapons against Iran in mid-1983. Sufficient munitions are currently being produced to allow only periodic use. [REDACTED]

BACKGROUND

Iraq started a chemical warfare program in the 1960's. Early emphasis was on CW protective measures and protective equipment was obtained primarily from the Soviet Union. Additionally, the senior Iraqi CW officer received training in the United States and Soviet Union. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Iraq made a decision to develop and produce chemical warfare munitions. Chemical agent precursors, munitions for filling, pilot plant and full scale production plant equipment and technical expertise were purchased from firms [REDACTED]

The program was designed to develop both mustard and nerve agent munitions. The mustard program was successful, resulting in at least a small scale production capability [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The nerve agent program apparently has encountered technical problems, although small quantities of lethal nerve agent have been produced and tested. [REDACTED]

In the summer of 1982, the Iraqis used tear gas to help repulse a major Iranian offensive in the southern border sector. This use apparently was effective. [REDACTED]

Iraq initiated chemical warfare against Iranian and Kurdish forces in the Northern Iraq-Iran border region in late July and continued periodic use through late August. The decision to use mustard munitions was made by the Iraqi President, possibly to avert an Iranian battlefield success. Iraq's total mustard stockpile was expended. The Iranian response to this use included renewed efforts to provide standard CW protective equipment to its forces and public accusations of Iraqi CW use in several news releases. [REDACTED]

This Memorandum was prepared by the Office of Scientific and Weapons Research of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was coordinated with other members of the Intelligence Community.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F1772 #33331

By LOT, NARA, Date 1/14/08

~~SECRET~~

CI BY [REDACTED]  
DI:CL OADR  
DERIVED FM [REDACTED]

Since August Iran has claimed two additional CW attacks. On 21 October, Iraqi artillery reportedly fired upon Iranian combatants. On 24 October Iraqi aircraft bombed an Iranian village causing civilian casualties. Both occurred in the northern border region. [REDACTED]

Iranian press releases reported only a few casualties and did not address the military impact. The continued Iraqi use of CW and the Iranian effort to provide protective equipment to its troops indicate at least limited success, though the Iraqis were disappointed that the effect was not greater. [REDACTED]

#### FUTURE PROSPECTS

We expect Iraq to continue to employ chemical weapons. Since they have no significant stockpile, the rate at which they can use them will be governed by their production capacity. When they solve their technical difficulties, we anticipate that they will use nerve agents in addition to mustard. [REDACTED]

Iran will continue to emphasize protective measures. [REDACTED]

Iran probably will accuse Iraq of using CW weapons in an international diplomatic forum sometime in the next few months. However, Iran may be having difficulty in providing convincing proof that Iraq has used CW. [REDACTED]

The US does not have sufficient unclassified information available at this time to make a comprehensive public report. [REDACTED]

V  
33332

## SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR R.C. MCFARLANE

## NSPG: U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

- Mr. President, the purpose of our meeting this afternoon is to review the latest intelligence we have on developments in the Gulf War. Second, we seek your approval for near term diplomatic steps to try to guarantee the freedom of shipping in the Gulf and to build support for steps we may have to take to protect shipping and key facilities in the Gulf. Finally, we want to ensure that our military posture is up to the serious challenges we may be facing shortly.
- We cannot ignore of course the energy implications of successful attacks on oil production facilities and Gulf shipping. We have agreed, however, to defer that important subject to another meeting. Our most immediate issue is that of deterrence.
- While we may not be able to reach decisions on all these points at this meeting, we will hopefully frame the issues for subsequent decisions.
- Bill (Casey), would you bring us up to date on the status of the current Iranian offensive and Iraqi counteractions.

- William J. Casey -

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
91295

~~SECRET~~

2

- Secretary Shultz, could you review for us the outline of our proposed diplomatic strategy to contain this war or, in the worst case, coping with threats it might pose to the world community.

- Secretary Shultz -

- Secretary Weinberger, could you and General Vessey briefly review the status of our contingency planning and the issues on which we may want to get the President's decisions.

- Secretary Weinberger, General Vessey -

- Now, Mr. President, I would propose to summarize by simply listing the policy issues which have been tabled thus far:
  - How can we improve our intelligence coverage of this war and the next moves?
  - How do we respond to Iraqi use of CW munitions against Iranian forces and countervalue attacks on Iranian population centers?
  - Should we formally approach the Gulf Arabs to determine their views on whether and how the USG might deter Iranian attacks on their interests and the extent of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

3

SYSTEM II

91295

U.S. assistance they may be looking for--on short notice--if Iran makes good on their threats?

- Should we approach our key allies to propose coordinated actions and supporting plans if the Iranians impede international commerce to the Gulf?
- Do we need to improve or expand our force presence in the area?
- Do we need to predeploy key units such as mine countermeasures helicopters to forward positions or can we live with current force closure times?

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
91340

33333

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 4, 1983

ACTION

SIGNED

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR *hid*

SUBJECT: NSPG Follow-on: Reprisals for October 23 Beirut Bombing

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum which you could send to the President to introduce the discussion of this subject which will follow Monday's NSPG on Iran-Iraq.

It provides a description of the intelligence developed by CIA. It discusses the current status of JCS planning and the parameters which have governed possible target selection. Finally it outlines some of the positive factors which might follow from successful reprisals as well as some of the risks.

Talking points for you to use in introducing the subject are at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve ✓ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President
- Tab II - Talking Points

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR F1772# 33333  
BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/12

~~TOP SECRET~~

SYSTEM II  
91340

~~TOP SECRET~~

43  
33334

COM HAS SEEN

TALKING POINTS FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

- Mr. President, the next subject we need to consider is the intelligence we have on the groups responsible for the October 23 attacks on the MNF and our response.
- Bill Casey has already forwarded the intelligence assessment and the Community's judgement on verifiable targets which you have seen.
- Bill, are there any late intelligence reports?

BILL CASEY

- Now Secretary Weinberger and GEN Vessey would you brief us on the planning which has been done.

SECRETARY WEINBERGER AND GEN VESSEY

- Now we need to consider carefully the political opportunities and the risks. Of special concern is the impact on the internal Lebanese situation.

SECRETARY SHULTZ

- Bill Casey, does the Community have any estimates about likely Syrian reactions...Soviet reactions?

BILL CASEY

- The timing for this operation seems especially critical with the President leaving tomorrow.
- GEN Vessey, when could we execute the reprisals?

GEN VESSEY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1772# 33334

BY RW NARA DATE 2/21/12

Received S S

1983 NOV -5 PM 3:56

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen

SYSTEM II  
91295

THE WHITE HOUSE

**CHRON FILE**

4  
33335

WASHINGTON

November 5, 1983

*RB*

~~SECRET WITH~~  
~~TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING

DATE: Monday, November 7, 1983  
LOCATION: The Roosevelt Room, The White House  
TIME: 12:00 noon - 1:00 p.m.  
FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

I. PURPOSE

To review our diplomatic strategy for trying to limit the scope of the Iraq-Iran conflict. To review our policy toward consultations with Gulf Arab states and key allies on potential developments in the war. To review the adequacy of our military plans and force readiness for dealing with a widening of the war; and to consider precautionary deployments to help us better protect Gulf moderates and deter strikes against shipping and oil facilities.

II. BACKGROUND

Since the beginning of the Administration, we have placed great emphasis on the need to be able to deal effectively with a wide range of threats to the strategically vital area of the Persian Gulf. To this end, we struggled to win Hill acceptance for Saudi Arabia's AWACS; deepened our assistance to threatened states in the region; worked to reduce the influence of Libya and other radicals; initiated the special security program with Jordan; and commissioned a major policy review (NSDD 99) that sets in motion a new strategic dialogue with Israel. All of these concrete measures will count for little, however, if the states in the region lose confidence in us or see that we are manifestly unable to protect them against the threat they worry most about, namely attacks on their internal security and on the oil resources that help to supply, not only wealth, but also legitimacy to many of the current regimes. It is precisely this threat that they and we confront at this moment.

The current threat has its origins in Iraq's growing financial weakness vis-a-vis Iran. Iraq's oil revenues have suffered since the closing of the Iraq-Syria pipeline, while Iran's have not. Iraq's financial weakness is sure to be translated over time into growing weakness on the

~~SECRET WITH~~  
~~TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
Declassify OADR

**DECLASSIFIED**

NLRR # 1772 # 33335

BY RW NARA DATE 2/2/12

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET WITH~~  
~~TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

2

SYSTEM II  
91295

battlefield. Therefore, in part out of desperation, and in part to try to coerce Iran into quickly settling the conflict, Iraq is acquiring new sophisticated aircraft and weaponry to increase its ability to strike at the heart of Iran's oil production and distribution system. Should this happen it is quite plausible that Iran will itself lash out against not only Iraq but other Gulf states as well.

A Senior Interagency Group has outlined several near term diplomatic measures for trying to contain the conflict as well as a series of broader political-military choices.

The diplomatic strategy is not contentious. It would have us supporting a U.N. Security Council effort to secure a de facto ceasefire in the Persian Gulf proper. The SIG also recommends that we continue to stress our commitment to freedom of navigation in the Gulf. Another option discussed is that of supporting Arab efforts to reopen the Iraqi-Syrian pipeline. This would ease Iraq's financial crisis, but it would also put Saudi Arabia further in Syria's debt. This would work against our efforts in Lebanon.

The SIG also discussed various military options at our disposal and recommends a series of consultations with Gulf countries and NATO allies about steps we might want to take to prevent or contain a crisis. The SIG did not, however, deal with the crucial question of how much warning time we are likely to have prior to Iranian attacks, nor did it specify what additional forces we may now need to send to the region to better deter and repel attacks. Some, though not all, of these questions have been addressed by the intelligence community. Finally, we have intelligence information which suggests that Iraq--which has already used mustard gas against Iranian forces--may be about to employ indigenously developed nerve agents as well. We need to consider how we should deal with this issue.

The purpose of the NSPG therefore is: to review the situation on the ground; to assess warning time and the adequacy of our military assets in and near the region at this moment; to decide upon possible additional precautionary deployments; to authorize consultations with allies and Gulf states; and, ultimately, to reach a policy judgment regarding the actual military steps we are prepared to take should escalation occur.

~~SECRET WITH~~  
~~TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECRET WITH  
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

3

SYSTEM II  
91295

III. PARTICIPANTS

See list provided at Tab A.

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photo opportunity.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

- Robert McFarlane will begin the meeting by defining the basic issues we confront.
- Director Casey will then review the situation on the ground and discuss our ability to rapidly monitor developments in the event of a widening war.
- Secretary Shultz will speak next by discussing diplomatic steps to prevent further escalation.
- Secretary Weinberger will then conclude by outlining our current capabilities and continuing plans as well as the possible need for further precautionary deployments.
- A fifteen-minute discussion among Principals will follow.
- Robert McFarlane will summarize the conversation and outline those issues requiring further discussion.

Attachments

Tab A      List of Participants  
Tab B      Agenda, NSPG Meeting


Prepared by:

Donald R. Fortier  
Philip A. Dur

SECRET WITH  
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

47



NSPG Meeting - Monday, November 7, 1983

List of Participants

The Vice President  
The Honorable George P. Shultz  
The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger  
The Honorable Donald P. Hodel  
The Honorable David A. Stockman  
The Honorable Jeane J. Kirkpatrick  
The Honorable William J. Casey  
The Honorable Robert C. McFarlane  
General John W. Vessey, Jr.

NSC

Donald R. Fortier  
John M. Poindexter

Messrs. Edwin Meese, James Baker and Michael Deaver to attend at their discretion.

49



33336

AGENDA

NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING GROUP MEETING  
The Roosevelt Room, The White House  
Monday, November 7, 1983  
12:00 noon - 1:00 p.m.

U.S. Policy Toward the Iran-Iraq War

- I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .Robert C. McFarlane  
(5 minutes)
- II. INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT. . . . .William J. Casey  
(5 minutes)
  - A. Current developments in the latest Iranian offensive
  - B. Iraqi CW weapons capability
- III. DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY. . . . .George P. Shultz  
(10 minutes)
- IV. MILITARY PLANNING AND FORCE  
DEPLOYMENTS. . . . .Caspar Weinberger  
(15 minutes) GEN John Vessey
  - A. Status of current contingency plans
  - B. Cooperation/collaboration with Gulf Arabs and key Allies
  - C. Force readiness
  - D. Measures to improve U.S. military posture in the region
    - 1. Improving force closure times in light of likely warning indicators of an expanded conflict
    - 2. Precautionary deployments of tactical air and mine countermeasures forces
- V. DISCUSSION . . . . . Principals  
(15 minutes)
- VI. ISSUES FOR DECISION. . . . .Robert C. McFarlane  
(10 minutes)
  - A. U.S. posture and public positions on Iran-Iraq War
  - B. Consultations with Gulf Arab states
  - C. Consultations with key Allies
  - D. Policy guidance for contingency planning