

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File:  
Records

**Folder Title:** Greece (06/17/1981-10/23/1981)

**Box:** RAC Box 15

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*Last Updated: 09/22/2023*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KML 10/20/2011

**File Folder** GREECE (06/17/1981-10/23/1981)

**FOIA**

M11-412

**Box Number** 15

DRAENOS

2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121463	CABLE	ATHENS 09512 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	5	6/17/1981	B1
121464	CABLE	ATHENS 10132 <b>D 11/7/2012 M412/1</b>	1	6/26/1981	B1
121465	CABLE	STATE 217076 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	3	8/15/1981	B1
121466	CABLE	ATHENS 13225 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	8/17/1981	B1
121467	CABLE	ATHENS 13295 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	2	8/18/1981	B1
121468	CABLE	STATE 237033 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	2	9/4/1981	B1
121469	CABLE	STATE 203062 <b>D 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	3	7/31/1981	B1
121470	CABLE	STATE 237033 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	2	9/4/1981	B1
121471	CABLE	ATHENS 14839 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	5	9/12/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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M11-412

**Box Number** 15

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2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
121472	MEMO	DENNIS C. BLAIR AND JAMES M. RENTSCHLER THROUGH CHARLES P. TYSON TO RICHARD ALLEN RE GREEK PRESIDENT (WITH NOTATIONS) <b>R 11/5/2015 M412/1</b>	1	9/22/1981	B1	
121473	MEMO	L. PAUL BREMER III TO RICHARD ALLEN RE GREEK PRESIDENT'S REQUEST <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	9/15/1981	B1	
121474	MEMO	RICHARD ALLEN FOR THE PRESIDENT RE ELECTIONS <b>D 11/5/2015 M412/1</b>	1	10/8/1981	B1	B2 B3
121475	CABLE	ATHENS 17488 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	5	10/23/1981	B1	
121477	CABLE	ATHENS 17082 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	2	10/19/1981	B1	

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE196  
STU5809  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHTH #9512/01 1681925  
ZNY SSSSS/BBBBB ZZH  
O 171923Z JUN 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3832  
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEAEEA/DCA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUETIIA/DIRNSA FT MEADE MD PRIORITY  
RUEADWD/CSA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1296  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0554  
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY  
RUFDNSI/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY  
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY  
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY  
RUFRRSHH/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 ATHENS 09512  
FXDIS - MILADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
DEPT PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE  
USNATO PLEASE PASS EAGLEBURGER  
EO 12065 RDS 3 06/17/01 (MCCLOSKEY, ROBERT J.) OR-M  
TAGS MARK MASS GR

SUBJ U.S.-GREEK DECA NEGOTIATIONS: SUSPENSION

1. ~~(SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT)~~
2. FOREIGN MINISTER MITSOTAKIS INFORMED ME THIS EVENING THAT THE GOG HAD TAKEN THE DECISION TO SUSPEND THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL AFTER THE COUNTRY'S ELECTIONS. THE DECISION, MITSOTAKIS SAID, WAS REACHED AT A LEADERSHIP MEETING EARLIER TODAY, ADDING THAT IT WOULD BE FORMALIZED AT A CABINET MEETING AT MIDDAY TOMORROW, JUNE 18, WITH A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO FOLLOW. THE DECISION WAS UNANIMOUS AMONG THE LEADERSHIP, HE SAID.
3. MITSOTAKIS ASSURED ME THAT THERE WAS A SINCERE INTENTION ON THE PART OF THE GOG TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT AND ON THIS POINT THERE WAS NO DISSENT WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP; AND THE GOVERNMENT RECOGNIZED THE GOODWILL ON PART OF THE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121463

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

PAGE 55

SELECTED SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/19/81//170

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

USG AS WELL. MUCH HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AND ALTHOUGH SEVERAL ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO BOTH SIDES REMAINED UNRESOLVED, THE DECISIVE FACTOR WHICH COMPELLED SUSPENSION WAS TIME. THE FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED THAT HE HAD ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS EMPHASIZED THE TIME FACTOR AND THE GOG HAD SUCCESSIVELY ALLOWED DEADLINES TO PASS IN THE INTERESTS OF CONCLUDING AN AGREEMENT. INDEED, THE LAST EXTENSION (PRESUMABLY THAT OF JUNE 15) WAS GIVEN BY HIMSELF AND ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY. BUT NOW IT HAD BECOME OBVIOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT THAT EVEN IF AGREEMENT WERE REACHED TODAY, IT COULD NOT BE APPROVED BY THE PARLIAMENT BY JULY 15.

4. MITSOTAKIS NOTED THAT WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP THE QUESTION OF SIGNING THE DOCUMENT BUT NOT SUBMITTING IT TO THE PARLIAMENT UNTIL AFTER ELECTIONS HAD BEEN RAISED. HE DID NOT KNOW, HE SAID, WHETHER THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN ACCEPTABLE TO THE USG BUT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ULTIMATELY CONCLUDED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE WORST OPTION, IN EFFECT TURNING THE ELECTION INTO A PLEBISCITE ON THE BASES. MITSOTAKIS SAID THAT HE HAD TOLD HIS COLLEAGUES THAT EVEN IF NEW DEMOCRACY WERE TO WIN 45 PERCENT OF THE VOTE, THE OTHER 55 PERCENT WOULD HAVE VOTED AGAINST THE AGREEMENT. MOREOVER, TO HAVE TAKEN THIS OPTION WOULD HAVE VIRTUALLY FORCED THE OPPOSITION TO TAKE A MORE DEFINITIVE STAND AGAINST THE BASES.

5. TURNING TO THE MODALITIES OF THE GOG DECISION TO SUSPEND AND TO ITS PUBLIC ACCOUNCEMENT, MITSOTAKIS SAID THAT THE DECISION WAS TAKEN BY THE LEADERSHIP AT NOON TODAY (JUNE 17) BUT WOULD NOT BE ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY UNTIL AFTER THE "PETIT CABINET" WOULD BE CONVENED AT NOON TOMORROW. HE SAID THE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARING A STATEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS AND REMAINS TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON THE MILITARY AND SUPPORTING FACILITIES; THE NEGOTIATIONS WERE CARRIED ON IN A SPIRIT OF GOOD-WILL BUT SEVERAL ISSUES COULD NOT BE RESOLVED DUE TO THE TIME FACTOR;

THE STATUS OF THE FACILITIES WILL REMAIN THE SAME UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS; AND  
THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, IF STILL IN POWER, WILL RESUME NEGOTIATIONS.

MITSOTAKIS EMPHASIED AGAIN THAT IT WAS THE GOVERNMENT'S INTENTION TO CONTINUE THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE FACILITIES UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

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PAGE 56

SELECTED SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/19/81//170

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SENSITIVE

PAGE 52

SELECTED SITUATION LISTING

DATE 06/19/81//170

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE197  
STU5834  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHTH #9512/02 1681942  
7NY SSSSS/BBBBB ZZH  
D 171939Z JUN 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3833  
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEAEEA/DCA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUETIIA/DIRNSA FT MEADE MD PRIORITY  
RUEADWD/CSA WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1297  
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0555  
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY  
RUFDNSI/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY  
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY  
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY  
RUFRRSH/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 ATHENS 09512

FXDIS - MILADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
DEPT PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE  
USNATO PLEASE PASS EAGLEBURGER

6. I TOLD THE FOREIGN MINISTER THAT WHILE I REGRETTED THE DECISION, IT HAD ALWAYS BEEN OUR POSITION THAT THE DECISION TO CONTINUE TOWARD AGREEMENT OR NOT WAS THE GREEK GOVERNMENT'S. THE USG, I SAID, HAD MADE A MAJOR EFFORT TO MEET THE GOG'S SUBSTANTIVE AND PRESENTATIONAL CONCERNS BUT THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE NEEDS OF THE GOG WERE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT EXTRAORDINARY, DRIVEN BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF AN ELECTION YEAR. I TOLD HIM THAT WE APPRECIATED HIS ASSURANCE THAT THE EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE FACILITIES WOULD CONTINUE PENDING THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS BUT I WANTED HIM TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE POSITIONS WE OFFERED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO REACH AGREEMENT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE REPEATED IN THE NEXT. MITSOTAKIS SAID THAT HE AGREED THAT THERE WERE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OPERATING IN THIS PREELECTORAL PERIOD AND THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

THE AD REFERENDUM AGREEMENTS OF THIS NEGOTIATION WOULD NOT GOVERN THE NEXT ROUND. HE SAID THAT THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE SUSPENSION AND THAT I SHOULD CONVEY TO SECRETARY HAIG HIS APPRECIATION OF THE EFFORTS OF THE USG TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT.

7. I ASKED MITSOTAKIS IF THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT ISSUE WAS THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO SUSPEND. HE CONFIRMED THAT IT WAS, STRONGLY IMPLYING THAT THE MILITARY REMAINED DISSATISFIED WITH OUR PROPOSALS IN THIS REGARD.

8. ON LEAVING, I EXPRESSED BY CONCERN THAT THE ATMOSPHERE FOLLOWING SUSPENSION NOT GET SO HEATED AS TO AFFECT THE MORAL AND WELL BEING OF THE US FORCES STATIONED HERE, MITSOTAKIS SOUGHT TO ASSUE ME THAT SUCH A CONCERN WAS UNJUSTIFIED, SAYING THAT THE ATTITUDE OF THE GOVERNMENT TOWARD OUR FACILTIES REMAIND THE SAME AND THAT COINCIDENT WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUSPENSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HE WOULD EXPLAIN TO THE PUBLIC WHY THERE MUST BE US FORCES IN GREECE. INDEED, HE SAID, PERHAPS THE SUSPENSION WILL SERVE TO DIFFUSE TENSIONS AND ATTENTION TO THE ISSUE AND WE WILL HAVE A CALMER TIME OF IT UNTIL THE ELECTIONS.

9. THE DCM AND LUCAS TSILAS OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S CABINET, SERVING AS INTERPRETER, WERE PRESENT. MCCLOSKEY

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File

### Withdrawer

KM 10/20/2011  
L

### File Folder

GREECE (06/17/1981-10/23/1981)

### FOIA

M11-412  
DRAENOS

### Box Number

15

2

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
121464	CABLE  ATHENS 10132	1	6/26/1981	B1

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

121465 7

SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 252

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS

SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121465

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

MESSAGE:

HCE244

PP RUEHC RUEHTH RUHNA RUEHMD

DE RUEHC #7076 2270029

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

P 150013Z AUG 81 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 7325

INFO RUHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3896

RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 1837

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 217076

NODIS

ATHENS FOR THE CHARGE

E.O. 12065:RDS-1 8/12/01 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS: NATO, SP, GR

SUBJ: (S) SPAIN AND NATO: GREEK RATIFICATION OF  
THE ACCESSION PROTOCOL

REF: USNATO 4934

1. (~~/~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AS NOTED IN REFTEL, WE ARE CONCERNED THAT A PASOK VICTORY IN THE FALL GREEK ELECTIONS COULD PRODUCE A GOVT WHICH WOULD EITHER OPPOSE OR OBSTRUCT RATIFICATION OF A PROTOCOL OF SPANISH ACCESSION TO THE ALLIANCE. AT THIS POINT WE SEE NO SIGNIFICANT RATIFICATION PROBLEMS ON THE PART OF ANY OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBER. BUT OPPOSITION OR JUST DELAYING TACTICS ON THE PART OF ONLY ONE MEMBER GOVT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO EMBARRASS THE ALLIANCE AND COULD WEAKEN THE SPANISH GOVT, IN VIEW OF THE TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY THIS WOULD GIVE TO DOMESTIC SPANISH OPPONENTS OF ALLIANCE MEMBERSHIP.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN A DEFINITIVE STATEMENT BY THE GOG CONCERNING THE RATIFICATION PROCEDURES IT INTENDS TO FOLLOW. AS INDICATED IN REFTEL, THESE SIGNALS HAVE BEEN

CONFLICTING, WITH AN EARLIER INDICATION THAT THE GOVT WOULD NOT HAVE TO SUBMIT THE PROTOCOL TO PARLIAMENT FOLLOWED BY A LATER STATEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GREEK NATO DEL THAT THE GOG WOULD, AFTER ALL, HAVE TO DO SO.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

4. CONSEQUENTLY, BEFORE WE CONSIDER STEPS TO RESOLVE POSSIBLE GREEK RATIFICATION PROBLEMS, WE NEED A DEFINITIVE READ-OUT ON THE PROCEDURES THE GOG INTENDS TO FOLLOW. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE CANDIDATES PROPOSED IN REFTEL, BUT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR NOW FOR US TO MAKE THE APPROACH. THEREFORE, YOU SHOULD AT THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY CALL ON AVEROFF, IN HIS NEW CAPACITY AS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, OR, IF YOU PREFER, MITSOTAKIS, AND MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- (IN STRICTEST CONFIDENCE) WE EXPECT THE GOS TO ANNOUNCE IN THE NEAR FUTURE ITS INTENTION TO SEEK NATO MEMBERSHIP. A FORMAL REQUEST FOR AN INVITATION TO JOIN THE ALLIANCE WOULD BE FORTHCOMING APPROXIMATELY ONE MONTH THEREAFTER.

-- IT WILL THEN BE OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIANCE AND TO THE GOS FOR THE ACCESSION PROCESS, AND PARTICULARLY THAT PART OF IT INVOLVING RATIFICATION OF THE ACCESSION PROTOCOL BY THE FIFTEEN MEMBER COUNTRIES, TO GO AS SMOOTHLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE.

-- TOWARD THAT END, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HELPFUL FOR US TO KNOW HOW THE GOG, IN VIEW OF GREEK CONSTITUTIONAL/POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS, INTENDS TO CARRY OUT ITS RATIFICATION OF THE PROTOCOL. (FYI OUR HEAD COUNT AT NATO INDICATES THAT ALL BUT TWO MEMBER GOVTS -- CANADA AND BELGIUM -- INTEND TO SUBMIT THE PROTOCOL TO THEIR PARLIAMENTS FOR APPROVAL.)

-- SPECIFICALLY, CAN RATIFICATION BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE GOVERNMENT, OR MUST IT BE CARRIED OUT BY PARLIAMENT? IN EITHER CASE, COULD IT BE ACCOMPLISHED BEFORE THE FALL ELECTIONS, OR WOULD IT HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL AFTERWARD? HOW LONG WOULD THE PROCESS TAKE?

5. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THE GOG HAS MORE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS ON ITS AGENDA. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THEY WILL AGREE THAT SPANISH ACCESSION IS OF GREAT IMPORT TO THE ALLIANCE, AND THEREFORE TO ALL OF US, AND IT IS EQUALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE DO RIGHT BY THE GOS, WHICH WILL BE TAKING THIS DECISION AGAINST SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC POLITICAL OPPOSITION.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BT  
#7076  
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PAGE 1 - 129

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: EU

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE:

NLRR M412 #121466

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

HCE713  
STU0905  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHTH #3225 2291412  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 171412Z AUG 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5015  
BT

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 13225

NODIS

DEPT. PLEASE REPEAT TO MADRID AND USNATO  
E.O. 12065:RDS-1 8/17/01 (KOVNER, MILTON) OR-M

TAGS: NATO, SP, GR

SUBJECT: (S) SPAIN AND NATO: GREEK RATIFICATION OF THE  
ACCESSION PROTOCOL

REF: STATE 217076

1. (~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. CHARGE CALLED ON AVEROF IN HIS CAPACITY AS DEPUTY  
PRIME MINISTER AT NOON AUGUST 17 TO MAKE POINTS REFTEL.  
AVEROF SAID THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION THAT THE GOG WOULD  
SUPPORT SPANISH ACCESSION TO NATO AND THAT IT WAS HIS  
IMPRESSION THAT, DESPITE THE INEVITABLE GRUMBLING FROM  
THE OPPOSITION, THE PROTOCOL NEED NOT, RPT NOT BE RATI-  
FIED BY THE PARLIAMENT. HE UNDERTOOK TO CHECK WITH THE  
MFA LEGAL AUTHORITIES ON THE QUESTION AND CALL ME LATER  
IN THE AFTERNOON. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT IF THE PRO-  
CEDURE DID REQUIRE PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL, HE DID NOT  
SEE HOW THE PROCESS COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO THE  
ELECTIONS. IN THAT EVENT, HE SAID, THE GOG WOULD MAKE  
A STRONG STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF SPANISH MEMBERSHIP.

3. IN A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION MID-AFTERNOON, AVEROF  
SAID THAT THE MFA LEGAL ADVISOR WOULD RETURN TO ATHENS  
ON TUESDAY, AUGUST 18 AND HE WOULD INFORM ME OF HIS  
FINDINGS LATER THAT DAY. KOVNER

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#3225

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\*\*\*\*\*U N C L A S S I F I E D\*\*\*\*\*

FREE 5

11

DATE 09/14/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

RTT: NN P  
ROBI  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #8135 2291509  
O 171441Z AUG 81  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 7345

INFO AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI IMMEDIATE 2013  
BT

UNCLAS STATE 218135  
ATHENS FOR BRADSHAW AND FROMOWITZ  
E.O. 12065:IN/A

TAGS: BEXP, PPDC, GR

SUBJECT: THESSALONIKI INTERNATIONAL FAIR  
PUBLICITY: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE

REF: ATHENS 11783

1. FOLLOWING IS PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE FOR USE AS  
REQUESTED REFTEL. IT CONTAINS MINOR MODIFICATIONS OF  
PREVIOUSLY APPROVED MESSAGE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ENHANCED  
U.S. PRESENCE AT THE FAIR.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE UNITED STATES IS PROUD TO BE A PART OF THE  
PRESTIGIOUS INTERNATIONAL FAIR IN THESSALONIKI,  
SYMBOLIZING THE LONG-STANDING AND ENDURING TIES OF  
FRIENDSHIP AND COMMON VALUES THAT CHARACTERIZE THE

SECSTATE 218135/ATH 8135

DTG: 171441Z AUG 81 PSN: 012305  
TOR: 229/1518Z

\*\*\*\*\*U N C L A S S I F I E D\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 09/14/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF GREECE. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND OUR EXHIBIT INFORMATIVE AND ENJOYABLE.

THE AMERICAN FIRMS EXHIBITING HERE ARE ACTIVELY SEEKING THROUGH TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION TO BRING MANUFACTURING TO NEW AND UNPRECEDENTED LEVELS OF PRODUCTIVITY. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THEIR EMPHASIS ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS THEIR DEDICATION TO THE EFFICIENT USE OF ENERGY. THEIR VERSATILE NEW PRODUCTS ARE PROVING TO BE OF GREAT VALUE TO PEOPLE THE WORLD OVER.

ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, I AM PLEASED TO WELCOME YOU TO THIS EXHIBIT. END TEXT. CLARK

SECSTATE 218135/ATH 8135 DTG:171441Z AUG 81 P8N1 012305  
TORI 229/1518Z

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: EU

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE112  
STU3866  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHTH #3295 2301415  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 181415Z AUG 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5031  
BT

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 13295  
NODIS

DEPT. PLEASE REPEAT TO MADRID AND USNATO  
E.O. 12065:RDS-1 8/18/01 (KOVNER, MILTON) OR-M

TAGS: NATO, SP, GR

SUBJECT: (S) SPAIN AND NATO: GREEK RATIFICATION OF THE  
ACCESSION PROTOCOL.

REF: A. ATHENS 13225 B. STATE 217076

1. ~~(SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. AVEROF'S AIDE CALLED THIS MORNING TO SAY THAT THE  
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER WAS TOLD BY THE MFA THAT THE  
SPANISH ACCESSION PROTOCOL MUST BE RATIFIED BY THE  
PARLIAMENT IN FULL SESSION. APPARENTLY UNCONVINCED,  
AVEROF WAS TO CONSULT WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ON THE  
MATTER AND WOULD CALL ME LATER IN THE DAY.

3. DURING MID-AFTERNOON PHONE CONVERSATION, AVEROF  
TOLD ME THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE  
GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO SUBMIT THE PROTOCOL TO PARLIA-  
MENT IN FULL SESSION AND SINCE THE PARLIAMENT WOULD NOT  
CONVENE BEFORE THE ELECTIONS, HE DID NOT SEE HOW THE  
RATIFICATION PROCESS COULD BE COMPLETED BEFORE THEN.

4. COMMENT: AVEROF'S COMMENTS ABOUT THE DISSOLUTION OF  
THE PARLIAMENT ACCORD WITH OUR UNDERSTANDING OF EVOLVING  
EVENTS. ALTHOUGH STRICT CONSTRUCTIONISTS, PARTICULARLY  
IN THE CENTER, ARGUE THAT THE LIFE OF THE PRESENT PARLIA-  
MENT EXTENDS TO NOVEMBER 19, THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO IS  
THAT IF ELECTIONS ARE HELD IN MID-OCTOBER, THE PARLIAMENT  
WILL BE DISSOLVED AT LEAST ONE MONTH EARLIER THAN THE  
ELECTION DATE. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL TENDER HIS  
RESIGNATION IN MID-SEPTEMBER, AND THE PRESIDENT WILL GIVE  
HIM THE MANDATE TO DISSOLVE THE PARLIAMENT AND TO FORM  
A GOVERNMENT TO CONDUCT THE ELECTIONS. THUS, IF THE  
SCENARIO HOLDS, THE CURRENT PARLIAMENT WHICH IS IN SUMMER  
SESSION AND NOT SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE IN FULL PLENUM  
UNTIL EARLY OCTOBER WILL NOT, IN FACT, CONVENE IN FULL

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NLRR M412 #121467

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

SENSITIVE



SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 125

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS IN  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: EU

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SESSION PRIOR TO THE ELECTIONS. IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE  
TO DELAY ELECTIONS UNTIL MID-DECEMBER, THE PARLIAMENT  
WOULD BE DISSOLVED IN MID-NOVEMBER THUS PERMITTING A  
SHORT BUT FULL PARLIAMENTARY SESSION TO CONVENE IN EARLY  
OCTOBER. OUR CURRENT READING, HOWEVER, MAKES THIS APPEAR  
UNLIKELY. KOVNER

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SENSITIVE

PAGE 1 - 89

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS  
 SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE346  
 UD RUEHC RUEHCH  
 DE RUEHC #7033 2470123  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
 U 040050Z SEP 81 ZFF4  
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
 TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 7628  
 BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 237033

NODIS

STADIS////////////////////////////////////  
 E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 9/3/01 (GOMPERT, DAVID C.)

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, GR

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GREEK AMBASSADOR,  
 SEPT 2--REQUEST FOR PRESIDENTIAL INVITATION

1. (~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING CALL ON DAS GOMPERT SEPT 2 (SEPTELS),  
 AMBASSADOR TZOUNIS MENTIONED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED A  
 POSSIBLE KARAMANLIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES WITH THE  
 PRESIDENT DURING HIS JUST CONCLUDED LEAVE IN ATHENS.  
 KARAMANLIS IS "FAVORABLY INCLINED" AND WOULD ACCEPT AN  
 INVITATION FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO VISIT IN 1982 IF IT  
 WERE EXTENDED BEFORE THE OCTOBER 18 GREEK NATIONAL  
 ELECTION.

3. TZOUNIS EXPLAINED THAT KARAMANLIS WAS "ANXIOUS"  
 THAT THE INVITATION BE EXTENDED BEFORE THE ELECTION IN  
 ORDER TO AVOID ANY AWKWARDNESS THAT WOULD ARISE  
 AFTERWARD, WHOEVER IS ELECTED. MOREOVER, AS PRESIDENT  
 UNTIL 1985 AND ABOVE PARTY POLITICS, AN INVITATION TO  
 KARAMANLIS WOULD NOT BE PERCEIVED AS INTERFERENCE IN  
 GREEK INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE IN A  
 TANGIBLE WAY THAT GREEK-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE IN A  
 GOOD STATE. IT WOULD ALSO SIGNAL U.S. CONFIDENCE IN

CONTINUED GOOD RELATIONS WHATEVER THE ELECTION RESULT.  
 KARAMANLIS, HE SAID, WOULD BE A KEY FIGURE NO MATTER  
 WHO WAS PRIME MINISTER SINCE SEVERAL POSSIBLE OUTCOMES  
 (INCLUDING COALITION, MINORITY GOVERNMENT, ANOTHER  
 ELECTION) WOULD REQUIRE SOMEONE WHO REPRESENTED

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NLRR M412 \*121468

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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PAGE 1 - 90

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/16/81//259

SITUATION: NODIS  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: OUT

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

STABILITY, AN ARBITER ON WHOM "THINGS" WOULD DEPEND.

4. TZOUNIS OBSERVED THAT IT HAS BEEN 20 YEARS SINCE THE HEAD OF A GREEK GOVERNMENT OR THE HEAD OF STATE HAS OFFICIALLY VISITED THE U.S. HE NOTED THAT KARAMANLIS AS PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN INVITED TO VISIT IN 1976 AND HAD ACCEPTED, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY HAD DECLINED BECAUSE OF HIS APPREHENSIONS THAT THE VISIT WOULD EXACERBATE ANTI-U.S. SENTIMENT ENGENDERED AMONG GREEKS BY THE CONTINUING CYPRUS CRISIS. TZOUNIS ALSO VAGUELY RECALLED UNSPECIFIED PREVIOUS DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON DURING WHICH THE POSSIBILITY OF A KARAMANLIS VISIT HAD BEEN RAISED AND THAT HE HAD SIMPLY FOLLOWED UP WITH KARAMANLIS WHEN HE WAS ON HOME LEAVE.

5. GOMPERT MENTIONED HOW CROWDED THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE WOULD BE, EVEN IN 1982, AND HOW DIFFICULT IT WOULD BE TO GET AN INVITATION ISSUED QUICKLY ENOUGH. HOWEVER, HE UNDERTOOK TO PURSUE THE IDEA.

6. ACTION REQUESTED: WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR ADVICE ON THIS SUGGESTION ON AN URGENT BASIS, INCLUDING YOUR ASSESSMENT OF HOW IT IS LINKED TO ELECTION POLITICS, HOW SUCH AN INVITATION WOULD BE READ IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, AND THE PROS AND CONS OF A VISIT UNDER ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ELECTION OUTCOME. HAIG  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

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Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File

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GREECE (06/17/1981-10/23/1981)

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M11-412  
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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE:

HCE346

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O 040050Z SEP 81 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 7628

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 237033

NODIS

STADIS:////////////////////

E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 3 9/3/01 (GOMPERT, DAVID C.)

TAGS: PEPR, PINT, GR

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GREEK AMBASSADOR,  
SEPT 2--REQUEST FOR PRESIDENTIAL INVITATION

1. (X-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING CALL ON DAS GOMPERT SEPT 2 (SEPTELS), AMBASSADOR TZOUNIS MENTIONED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED A POSSIBLE KARAMANLIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES WITH THE PRESIDENT DURING HIS JUST CONCLUDED LEAVE IN ATHENS. KARAMANLIS IS "FAVORABLY INCLINED" AND WOULD ACCEPT AN INVITATION FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO VISIT IN 1982 IF IT WERE EXTENDED BEFORE THE OCTOBER 18 GREEK NATIONAL ELECTION.

3. TZOUNIS EXPLAINED THAT KARAMANLIS WAS "ANXIOUS" THAT THE INVITATION BE EXTENDED BEFORE THE ELECTION IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY AWKWARDNESS THAT WOULD ARISE AFTERWARD, WHDEVER IS ELECTED. MOREOVER, AS PRESIDENT UNTIL 1985 AND ABOVE PARTY POLITICS, AN INVITATION TO KARAMANLIS WOULD NOT BE PERCEIVED AS INTERFERENCE IN GREEK INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE IN A TANGIBLE WAY THAT GREEK-AMERICAN RELATIONS WERE IN A GOOD STATE. IT WOULD ALSO SIGNAL U.S. CONFIDENCE IN

CONTINUED GOOD RELATIONS WHATEVER THE ELECTION RESULT. KARAMANLIS, HE SAID, WOULD BE A KEY FIGURE NO MATTER WHO WAS PRIME MINISTER SINCE SEVERAL POSSIBLE OUTCOMES (INCLUDING COALITION, MINORITY GOVERNMENT, ANOTHER ELECTION) WOULD REQUIRE SOMEONE WHO REPRESENTED

SENSITIVE



PAGE 1 - 192

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/10/81//253

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

STABILITY, AN ARBITER ON WHOM "THINGS" WOULD DEPEND.

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

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MESSAGE:

HCE913  
UTS8007  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHTH #4839/01 2550947  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 120944Z SEP 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5462  
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NLRR M412 \*121471

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 2 ATHENS 14839

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 9/12/87 (STEARNS, MONTEASLE) DR-M

TAGS: PINT, GR

SUBJECT: (U) PRIME MINISTER RALLIS'S VIEWS ON GREEK ELECTIONS

1. (X - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. IN A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF HIS ELECTORAL PROSPECTS, PRIME MINISTER RALLIS TOLD ME THAT HE WAS GAINING GROUND STEADILY AND WOULD BEGIN THIS WEEK-  
END TO HIT PAPANDREOU HARD ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES. RALLIS BELIEVED THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD REASONABLE CHANCE OF BEING RETURNED TO POWER WITH PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY AND THAT PAPANDREOU HAD PROBABLY PEAKED.  
END SUMMARY

3. I PAID MY FIRST CALL ON PRIME MINISTER RALLIS SEPTEMBER 11 AT HIS OFFICE IN PARLIAMENT. RALLIS RECEIVED ME ALONE AND WE TALKED FOR ABOUT 30 MINUTES ON A WIDE RANGE OF SUBJECTS (TWO OF WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTED BY SEPTELS). IT WAS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT HIS MAIN PRE-  
OCCUPATION WAS OCTOBER 18 GREEK ELECTIONS AND HIS CHANCES OF RETURNING TO OFFICE WITH PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY.

4. RALLIS STARTED CONVERSATION BY RECALLING THAT HE AND I HAD FIRST MET IN 1958 SHORTLY AFTER HE AND SMALL GROUP OF OTHER MINISTERS HAD BROKEN WITH KARAMANLIS, BROUGHT DOWN HIS GOVERNMENT AND PROVOKED ELECTIONS OF MAY 1958, WHEN, BECAUSE OF INTRICACIES OF ELECTORAL LAW, COMMUNISTS HAD TEMPORARILY APPEARED TO BE SECOND LARGEST OPPOSITION PARTY IN GREECE. RALLIS RECALLED THAT HE HAD SPENT TWO YEARS IN POLITICAL WILDERNESS BUT STILL BELIEVED THAT PRINCIPLE UPON WHICH HE HAD RESIGNED 23 YEARS AGO -- NEED TO ISOLATE COMMUNISTS FROM NON-COMMUNIST PARTIES IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS -- WAS VALID. IN PERIOD AFTER HIS BREAK WITH KARAMANLIS, HE CONTINUED, MANY PEOPLE CONSIDERED THAT HIS POLITICAL CAREER WAS OVER. THEY HAD

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

BEEN WRONG, JUST AS THOSE WHO WERE CLAIMING THAT NEW DEMOCRACY HAD LOST UPCOMING ELECTIONS WERE WRONG.

5. WHEN KARAMANLIS HAD MOVED TO PRESIDENCY A YEAR AGO AND RALLIS HAD ASSUMED LEADERSHIP OF GOVERNMENT, NEW DEMOCRACY'S FORTUNES HAD BEEN AT LOW EBB. IF ELECTIONS HAD BEEN HELD THEN, RALLIS THOUGHT THAT PARTY MIGHT NOT HAVE RECEIVED MORE THAN 20-25 PERCENT OF THE POPULAR VOTE. SINCE THEN, PRIME MINISTER WAS CONVINCED THAT NEW DEMOCRACY HAD REGAINED SIGNIFICANT STRENGTH. "PAPANDREOU HAS MADE AT LEAST TWO TACTICAL MISTAKES," RALLIS ASSERTED, "FIRST WAS NOT TO INSIST ON EARLY ELECTIONS; SECOND WAS TO ACCEPT ATMOSPHERE OF POLITICAL DETENTE WITH NEW DEMOCRACY" WHICH HAD EFFECT OF INHIBITING PAPANDREOU FROM GOING ALL OUT TO ATTACK GOVERNMENT EARLIER.

6. AT THIS POINT, I OBSERVED THAT "DETENTE" BETWEEN PARTIES HAD ALSO WORKED TO GOVERNMENT'S DISADVANTAGE SINCE RALLIS HAD BEEN SLOW TO CONFRONT PAPANDREOU ON KEY ISSUES. PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE HAD ALWAYS BEEN A SLOW STARTER, BUT THAT HE INTENDED TO HIT PAPANDREOU HARD FROM NOW ON. HE REFERRED IN THIS CONNECTION TO AN INTERVIEW HE HAD JUST GIVEN TO MARIO MODIANO OF LONDON TIMES WHICH, HE SAID, CAME DOWN HARD ON FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HIMSELF AND PAPANDREOU. HE PLANNED TO AMPLIFY THESE THEMES IN MAJOR SPEECH HE WOULD MAKE THIS WEEKEND IN THESSALONIKI.

7. RALLIS THEN GRUMBLED ABOUT HIS LACK OF PRESS SUPPORT, BOTH GREEK AND FOREIGN. WHEN I OBSERVED THAT FOREIGN PRESS COMMENT SHOULD NOT HURT HIM WITH GREEK ELECTORATE, HE DISAGREED SAYING "GREEKS BELIEVE ANYTHING THEY READ IN FOREIGN PRESS AS THOUGH IT CAME FROM ORACLE." TO MY REMARK THAT AT LEAST TWO MORNING PAPERS, ACROPOLIS AND KATHIMERINI, WERE GIVING HIM CONSISTENT SUPPORT, RALLIS COMPLAINED THAT THE FORMER HAD ONLY BECOME VIGOROUS SUPPORTER THREE MONTHS AGO AND LATTER WAS "TOO INTELLECTUAL" TO BE WHOLEHEARTEDLY IN FAVOR OF ANYTHING. NEVERTHELESS, PRIME MINISTER CONCEDED THAT GREEK PRESS WAS BEGINNING TO PAY ATTENTION TO WHAT HE REGARDED AS KEY ISSUES IN CAMPAIGN. HE CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN, HOWEVER, THAT FOREIGN PRESS HAD TO LEAD THE WAY. AS THOUGH TO UNDERLINE THIS POINT, RALLIS SAID THAT AFTER HIS MEETING WITH ME HE WAS GOING DIRECTLY TO ADDRESS A LUNCHEON MEETING OF THE FOREIGN PRESS ASSOCIATION IN ATHENS. (WHILE RALLIS WAS LUNCHING WITH FOREIGN PRESS CORRESPONDENTS, I WAS LUNCHING WITH HIS OLD FRIEND AND SOMETIME CRITIC, MRS. HELEN VLACHOU, THE OWNER OF KATHIMERINI, WHO SAID TO ME DRYLY, "GEORGE THINKS IT IS A WASTE OF TIME

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SENSITIVE

24

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

TO HAVE LUNCH WITH GREEK JOURNALISTS.""  
8. RALLIS THEN DISCUSSED REASONS WHY HE THOUGHT CONDI-  
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PAGE 1 - 360

SITUATION LISTING

DATE 09/30/81//273

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE914  
STU8389  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHTH #4839/02 2550950  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 120944Z SEP 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5463  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 14839

EXDIS

TIONS WERE LOOKING MORE FAVORABLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT, ALTHOUGH INFLATION WAS BAD, WAGES HAD RISEN FASTER. IN COUNTRYSIDE GREEK FARMERS WERE SETTING BETTER PRICES FOR THEIR CROPS THAN EVER BEFORE. UNEMPLOYMENT WAS LESS THAN TWO PERCENT. PROBLEMS WERE PROBLEMS OF PROSPERITY, NOT OF PENURY. PAPANDREOU HAD NOT SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THE MAJORITY OF GREEK VOTERS THAT GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN MISTAKEN IN LEADING GREECE INTO THE COMMON MARKET. TANGIBLE BENEFITS OF EEC MEMBERSHIP WERE BEGINNING TO BE FELT. IN THIS CONNECTION, RALLIS ARGUED THAT HIS MUCH-CRITICIZED CAMPAIGN DEVICE OF TRAVELING THROUGH VILLAGES TO HAND OUT EEC REGIONAL FUNDS DIRECTLY TO VILLAGERS WAS JUSTIFIED BY IRRESPONSIBLE ATTACKS PAPANDREOU HAD MADE ON EFFECTS OF COMMON MARKET MEMBERSHIP ON GREEK ECONOMY.

9. I COMMENTED THAT IF RALLIS WAS CONFIDENT OF HIS SUPPORT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, I WONDERED WHETHER HE INTENDED TO SPEND MORE TIME CAMPAIGNING IN URBAN CENTERS. HE HAD PROVED HIMSELF IN THE PAST AN EXCELLENT URBAN VOTE GETTER, HAVING IN ONE OR MORE GREEK ELECTIONS POLLED MORE INDIVIDUAL VOTES IN ATHENS THAN ANY OTHER CANDIDATE IN GREECE. RALLIS SAID THAT HE WOULD BE TURNING HIS ATTENTION TO URBAN VOTERS, STARTING IN THESSALONIKI AND ENDING IN ATHENS, BUT HE RECOGNIZED THAT PAPANDREOU WAS A MORE EFFECTIVE MASS ORATOR THAN HE WAS. "I WILL NEVER BEAT PAPANDREOU AS A DEMAGOGUE," HE SAID. THIS LED RALLIS TO COMMENT ON THE PASOK LEADER'S WELL-KNOWN UNPREDICTABILITY AND INCONSISTENCY. THE PRIME MINISTER RECALLED THAT HE HAD SPENT MANY HOURS IN FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSION WITH PAPANDREOU WHO ALWAYS APPEARED REASONABLE AND COMPLIANT UNTIL HE MET THE PRESS OR ADDRESSED A PUBLIC MEETING. RALLIS SAID THAT AFTER GREECE AND TURKEY HAD REACHED AGREEMENT ON WORKING LEVEL WHICH

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

HAD ENABLED GREECE TO RETURN TO NATO MILITARY STRUCTURE, HE HAD BRIEFED PAPANDREOU CAREFULLY ABOUT WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED TO. PAPANDREOU HAD SAID TO HIM WITH APPARENT EMOTION, "MR. PRIME MINISSER, YOU HAVE DEFENDED GREEK INTERESTS AND I WILL NEVER ATTACK YOU FOR DOING THAT," RALLIS SAID THAT, BY THAT TIME, HE HAD BECOME SOMEWHAT CYNICAL ABOUT PAPANDREOU'S PROFESSIONS OF NONPARTISANSHIP. THEREFORE, AFTER MEETING WITH PASOK LEADER, HE HAD COMMENTED TO AN AIDE THAT HE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF ARMISTICE ON QUESTION OF GREECE'S RETURN TO NATO LASTED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. "I WAS WRONG," HE SAID TO ME. "IT LASTED ONLY 24 HOURS."

10. I ASKED RALLIS WHETHER KARAMANLIS COULD EXERCISE RESTRAINING INFLUENCE ON PAPANDREOU WHERE DEBATE OVER NATIONAL ISSUES WAS CONCERNED. RALLIS SAID THAT KARAMANLIS WOULD NEVER TAKE RISKS. "PERHAPS HE IS RIGHT TO ADHERE TO LETTER OF CONSTITUTION," HE SAID. "BUT, SOMETIMES I THINK HE IS TOO CONCERNED TO PROTECT HIS OWN POSITION. SOMETIMES YOU HAVE TO TAKE RISKS."

11. AS I STOOD UP TO TAKE MY LEAVE OF THE PRIME MINISTER, HE SAID TO ME, "YOU KNOW I HAVE ANIMAL INSTINCT ABOUT POLITICS." WHAT WAS HIS INSTINCT TELLING HIM NOW ABOUT THE ELECTIONS, I ASKED HIM. WAS THE NEWS GOOD? "NOT GOOD," HE SAID, "BUT BETTER THAN IT WAS."

12. COMMENT: I HAVE GIVEN FULL FLAVOR OF THIS CONVERSATION BECAUSE I THINK IT ACCURATELY REFLECTS RALLIS'S MOOD AS WELL AS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF HIS PERSONAL POSITION. THE PRIME MINISTER IS AN EXCELLENT MAN, CONCEDED EVEN BY HIS OPPONENTS TO BE HONEST, CONSISTENT AND PRINCIPLED. HE HAS AN OBJECTIVITY WHICH IS RARE AMONG GREEK POLITICIANS AND WHICH, IN THE PAST, MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE TENDENCY OF GREEK AND FOREIGN POLITICAL OBSERVERS TO UNDERRATE HIM. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE FOR US TO DO SO NOW. STEARNS

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MEMORANDUM

5364

SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

September 22, 1981

OBE

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: DENNIS C. CLAIR/JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Greek President Karamanlis' Request for  
Invitation to Visit the United States

Greek President Karamanlis has requested an invitation to visit the United States and meet with the President "sometime in 1982." He wants the invitation to be publicly extended to him before the October 18 Greek elections. Ambassador Stearns from Athens, State Department (Tab II) and we all recommend against the invitation. Pre-election dabbling of this sort is of dubious value. (S)

If you concur, Chuck Tyson can sign the memo at Tab I to State giving our approval for their recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Chuck Tyson to inform State Department that the NSC recommends against a invitation to Karamanlis.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove ✓

Tab I Tyson to Bremer memo  
Tab II State memo

DECLASSIFIED  
NLFR M412/1 12/21/472  
BY C15 NARA DATE 11/5/15

SECRET

Review on September 9, 2001  
Reason: State RDS-3

I think he  
should be  
invited, and  
before the  
election. Wouldn't  
we want to talk  
to Papandreu if he's  
in? Too risky?  
How about a verbal invitation?  
let's help the guy if we can!

## THE WHITE HOUSE

5364

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

September 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Greek President's Request for Invitation to  
Visit the U.S.

Your memo of September 15 informed Richard Allen of the invitation and stated the Department's intention to discourage President Karamanlis. The NSC staff concurs in your recommendation not to extend a presidential invitation, and approves your approach to the Greek government on this matter. (S)

Charles P. Tyson

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2009  
BY VERA KML, DATE 10/20/11

~~SECRET~~

Review on September 9, 2001  
Reason: State RDS-3





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 15, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Greek President's Request for Invitation  
to Visit the U.S.

As you know, Greek President Karamanlis has solicited an invitation to visit the U.S. in 1982 and to have that invitation proffered before the October 18 Greek election.

The Department of State believes such an invitation would be very useful in 1982 because it would be a strong statement of our support for democratic government and would demonstrate that Greece is a key NATO ally with whom we have close relations. However, we believe it is inadvisable for us to issue an invitation before the Greek election since it could be portrayed by socialist opposition leader Papandreu as an American judgment that he will defeat Rallis and become the next Prime Minister. We have decided, therefore, to reply that the question of an invitation is being sympathetically considered at the highest levels of the USG, but that time is simply too short to permit one to be issued before October 18.

L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

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NLRR M412 #121473

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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RDS-3 9/9/01

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RECEIVED

81 SEP 23 A10: 37

DB -

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

Do we drop back to

point on this?

We can either do

nothing - in which case

matter will die of its own

weight - or take Dick's

note as indication to

proceed - in which case

we'd think we need a

SIG discussion. ~~Re: (a)~~

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

He/we  
cant  
move on  
own own,  
can we?

Comments:

"I think he should be invited, and before the election. Wouldn't we want to talk to Papandrea if he's in? Too risky? How abt a verbal invitation? Let's help the guy if we can!"

RECEIVED 15 SEP 81 19

TO ALLEN

FROM BREMER

DOC DATE 15 SEP 81

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)~~24~~ 10/20/11

KEYWORDS: GREECE

VISIT

KARAMANLIS, CONSTANT

SUBJECT: GREEK PRES REQUEST FOR INVITATION TO VISIT THE US

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR ALLEN

DUE: <sup>10/7</sup>~~17 SEP~~ 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RENTSCHLER

TYSON

OBE n1 Ben  
 10/18 Greek Election  
 JR 2/20/81

COMMENTS IF APPROPRIATE

REF# 8126331

LOG

NSC/FID

( J / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

RVA	X	9/22	for decision	9/26	
		10/06	RVA disapproved recom w/ comment		
Blain/Rentschler		10/06	for further action		CT ✓
	C	10/20	OBE per Rentschler		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE ~~SECRET~~ (C)

PA



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

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### Withdrawer

KM 10/20/2011  
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### File Folder

GREECE (06/17/1981-10/23/1981)

### FOIA

M11-412  
DRAENOS

### Box Number

15

2

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
121474	MEMO  RICHARD ALLEN FOR THE PRESIDENT RE ELECTIONS	1	10/8/1981	B1 B2 B3

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

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SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE:

NLRR M412 \*121475

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

HCE027  
STU9972  
DD RUEHC  
DE RUEHTH #7488/01 2961605  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
D 231558Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6139  
INFO RUHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0732  
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1615  
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 1774  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 1037  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUQKSDE/NAVSUPPACT SOUDA BAY GR PRIORITY  
RUKRATB/7206ABG HELLENIKON AB G PRIORITY  
RULRAAA/7276ABG IRAKLION AS GR PRIORITY  
RUQKSA/NAVCOMMSTA NEA MAKRI GR PRIORITY  
RUFLELA/CDR558USAAG ELEVSIS GR PRIORITY  
RUDDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY  
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY  
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY  
RUFRRSHH/USDNCSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY  
RUFDAAB/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY  
RUFRRQQ/COMSIXTHFLT

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 17488  
BELGRADE FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER  
LIMDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 10/20/91 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) DR-M  
TAGS: US, GR, NATO, MILI, MPOL  
SUBJECT: DEALING WITH PASOK AND PAPANDREOU  
REF: A. ATHENS 17233, B. ATHENS 17029, C. ATHENS 16799

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. BEGIN SUMMARY: INITIAL TONE ADOPTED BY PAPANDREOU GOVT HAS BEEN MODERATE AND HIS CABINET APPOINTMENTS ALSO SEEM TO COME FROM THE CENTER OF THE PASOK SPECTRUM. WE CAUTION, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN UNDER THE MOST OPTIMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF PASOK INTENTIONS, A DIFFICULT ADJUSTMENT IN US-GREEK RELATIONS WILL BE NECESSARY. UNTIL THE POLICIES OF THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT HAVE BEEN MADE CLEAR WE PLAN TO CARRY ON OUR NORMAL RANGE OF ACTIVITIES

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SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AND TO ASSUME THERE WILL BE NORMAL GREEK COOPERATION, IF OUR RELATIONS WITH GREECE SHOULD WORSEN, WE WANT THE RESPONSIBILITY TO BE CLEARLY THAT OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. END SUMMARY

3. WHAT SEEMS CLEAR IN RETROSPECT IS THAT GREECE HAD ITS FIRST EUROPEAN ELECTION LAST SUNDAY. IRONIC AS IT MAY BE IN THE LIGHT OF ANDREAS PAPANDREOU'S ANTI-NATO, ANTI-EEC CAMPAIGN, GREECE FROM NOW ON IS GOING TO LOOK MORE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LESS BALKAN THAN IT DID BEFORE. GREECE ENTERED EUROPE ECONOMICALLY AT THE BEGINNING OF 1981; IT ENTERED EUROPE POLITICALLY IN OCTOBER.

4. THIS WAS THE FIRST GREEK ELECTION IN THE COUNTRY'S MODERN HISTORY THAT WAS FOUGHT OUT OF THE SHADOW OF THE ROYALIST-VENIZELIST SPLIT AND WAS DECIDED BY ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ISSUES. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS IS A HEALTHY AND LONG-OVERDUE DEVELOPMENT WHICH, IF CONSOLIDATED, CAN PRODUCE THE KIND OF STABLE, FLEXIBLE AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL STRUCTURES THAT GREECE NEEDS. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER ANDREAS PAPANDREOU AND PASOK WILL PROVE THEMSELVES PRAGMATIC ENOUGH AND OPEN-MINDED ENOUGH TO ACHIEVE THAT CONSOLIDATION.

5. WE HAVE SAID (REFTEL A) THAT IT IS PROBABLE THAT A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF MIDDLECLASS, MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD GREEKS VOTED FOR PAPANDREOU NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF WHAT THEY BELIEVED HE WOULD DO, BUT BECAUSE OF WHAT THEY DID NOT BELIEVE HE WOULD DO. HIS RADICAL PROPOSALS TO PULL GREECE OUT OF EEC AND NATO AND TO "SOCIALIZE" THE GREEK ECONOMY NEVER HAD MUCH RESONANCE OUTSIDE OF THE COMMITTED LEFT WING OF PASOK. PAPANDREOU HIMSELF SEEMED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THIS AS THE CAMPAIGN WORE ON BY HEDGING AND TRIMMING HIS POSITION ON THESE FEATURES OF THE PASOK PROGRAM. HIS INITIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS SINCE BEING SWORN IN AS PRIME MINISTER -- IN WHICH HE HAS REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WILL REPRESENT "ALL" GREEKS -- ARE IN THE SAME SPIRIT.

6. IF THIS IS A REAL CHANGE OF ATTITUDE AND NOT JUST OF TACTICS, THE PASOK EXPERIENCE MAY PROVE LESS UNSETTLING TO GREECE THAN WE FEARED. IT WILL NOT, HOWEVER, SPARE THE UNITED STATES FROM THE NEED TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS IN US-GREEK RELATIONS THAT ARE BOUND TO BE DIFFICULT AND EVEN PAINFUL. OUR RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN SO CLOSE FOR SO LONG, AND INCLUDES SO MANY PRIVILEGED ACTIVITIES, THAT EVEN A MODEST MOVE TO BRING IT IN LINE WITH GREECE'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON OUR PROGRAMS AND REPRESENTATION. AT THE SIMPLEST LEVEL, WE ARE FAR AND

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SITUATION LISTING

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SUBJECT CATAGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AWAY THE LARGEST FOREIGN MISSION IN GREECE AND HAVE  
BEEN THE BENEFICIARIES OF PREFERENTIAL GREEK TREATMENT  
IN AREAS RANGING FROM PROCEDURES FOR ASSIGNING XA LICENSE

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81/A309

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE029  
STU9977  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHTH #7488/02 2961607  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 231558Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6140  
INFO RUHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0733  
RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 1616  
RUDKRB/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 1775  
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 1038  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUQKSD/NAVSUPPACT SQUAD BAY GR PRIORITY  
RUKRATB/7206ABG HELLENIKON AB G PRIORITY  
RULRAAA/7276ABG IRAKLION AS GR PRIORITY  
RUQKSAA/NAVCOMMSTA NEA MAKRI GR PRIORITY  
RUFLELA/CDR558USAAG ELEVSIS GR PRIORITY  
RUDDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY  
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY  
RHOLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY  
RUFRRSHH/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY  
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY  
RUFRRQQ/COMSIXTHFLT  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 17488

PLATES TO THE GOG'S WILLINGNESS TO PAY THE RENT FOR THE EMBASSY PARKING LOT. MOST OF THESE PRIVILEGES DATE BACK TO THE DAYS OF MASSIVE US ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE. THEY HAVE CONTINUED EITHER BECAUSE THE GREEKS FORGOT THAT THEY EXISTED OR BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WANT TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF THEM. THIS BENIGN INDIFFERENCE IS UNLIKELY TO CONTINUE WITH A PASOK GOVERNMENT. I HAVE ASKED ALL SECTION HEADS OF THE MISSION, UNDER THE COORDINATION OF THE DCM, TO REVIEW THEIR PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES ON AN URGENT BASIS TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS.

7. WHAT THE FOREGOING MEANS IS THAT EVEN UNDER THE MOST OPTIMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF PASOK MOTIVES, INTENTIONS AND CAPABILITIES, A VERY SIGNIFICANT ADJUSTMENT IN THE OFFICIAL LIFE-STYLE OF THE USG IN GREECE WILL BE NECESSARY. IF PAPANDREOU AND PASOK DECIDE TO CHALLENGE

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

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SITUATION: CHECK  
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MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

US INTERESTS MORE DIRECTLY, THE PROBLEM WILL OF COURSE BE PROPORTIONATELY GREATER. IN THIS FIRST WEEK AFTER THE ELECTIONS, WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT JUST GETTING PAPANDREOU'S INITIAL STATEMENTS (AND HIS MINISTERIAL APPOINTMENTS) HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY MODERATE, BUT HE RETAINS THE FLEXIBILITY OF CHOOSING FROM OPTIONS RANGING FROM MODERATE TO CONFRONTATIONAL AS DISCUSSED REFTEL C. 8. IN THESE UNCERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO CONDUCT DEFENSE AND SECURITY BUSINESS WITH THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN SUCH A WAY SO AS TO LEAVE TO THE GREEK GOVERNMENT THE INITIATIVE, SHOULD SUCH THERE BE, FOR ESTABLISHING A MORE HOSTILE TONE OF RELATIONS. WE WANT TO ENSURE THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORSENERED RELATIONS -- IF THIS IS TO HAPPEN -- COMES FROM THE GDG AND NOT THE U.S. THEREFORE, WE INTEND TO CARRY ON OUR NORMAL ACTIVITIES TO THE EXTENT FEASIBLE, UNLESS OR UNTIL PASOK CHANGES THE GUIDELINES. WE DO, HOWEVER, SEE ADVANTAGES IN NOT PRESENTING PAPANDREOU WITH TOO MANY DIFFICULT POLICY DECISIONS TOO SOON IN U.S.-GREEK DEFENSE RELATIONS. IF, AS HE HAS INDICATED, THE DOMESTIC AGENDA WILL RECEIVE HIS FIRST ATTENTION WE SHOULD NOT GIVE HIM ANY REASON TO CHANGE THE ORDER OF BUSINESS, SINCE ANY CHANGE IN THE GUIDELINES UNDER WHICH WE OPERATE IS LIKELY TO BE A CHANGE FOR THE WORSE. 9. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CONCERNED MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN DEFENSE FACILITIES IN GREECE SHOULD ADOPT THE SAME GENERAL APPROACH. ONGOING BILATERAL AND NATO-RELATED MILITARY COORDINATION, PLANNING AND PROJECTS SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL THE GREEKS INDICATE OTHERWISE, HOWEVER, ANY SIGNIFICANT NEW PROJECTS, POLICY INITIATIVES OR HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO GREECE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED CAREFULLY AND CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH THIS MISSION BEFORE BEING UNDERTAKEN. AS WE ENTER INTO WHAT MAY BE A NEW ERA IN GREEK-U.S. RELATIONS, THE NEED FOR THE CLOSE AND EFFECTIVE COORDINATION THIS EMBASSY HAS ENJOYED WITH THE U.S. MILITARY IN THE PAST IS GREATER THAN EVER. 10. AS PATTERNS DEVELOP IN THE DEFENSE AND SECURITY RELATIONSHIP HERE, WE WILL, OF COURSE, KEEP ADDRESSEES CLOSELY INFORMED. STEARNS

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121477

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81/1296

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE309  
STU6898  
OO RUEHC  
DE RUEHTH #7082 2921138  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 191137Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6030  
INFO RUQMUGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1607  
RUDKAR/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0969  
RUQMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 7689  
RUDKSA/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 1270  
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM412 # 121477

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATHENS 17082  
BUCHAREST, SOFIA FOR EAGLEBURGER/PRICE ONLY  
E.O. 12065: GDS 10/19/87 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M  
TAGS: PPDC, PEPR, PINT, GR  
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER-ELECT PAPANDREOU'S RESPONSE

- TO PRESIDENT REAGAN  
REF: A. ATHENS 17071, B. STATE 277945

1. (P) - ENTIRE TEXT)  
2. PRIME MINISTER-ELECT PAPANDREOU'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS WAS DELIVERED TO EMBASSY AT 12:30 P.M. TEXT READS AS FOLLOWS (SIGNED ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED TO DEPARTMENT):

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE THANKS FOR YOUR LETTER OF CONGRATULATIONS ON OUR ELECTORAL VICTORY. LET ME ASSURE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT WE TOO HAVE A DEEP COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC RULE AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM. AND UNDOUBTEDLY THIS IS THE BASIS FOR THE CLOSE TIES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED STATES AND GREECE. WE CONSIDER IT ONE OF OUR PRIMARY TASKS TO STRENGTHEN AND DEEPEN THESE TIES IN THE INTEREST OF DEMOCRACY, PROGRESS AND PEACE. SINCERELY, ANDREAS G. PAPANDREOU. END TEXT

3. COMMENT: SPEED WITH WHICH PAPANDREOU HAS RESPONDED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN IS NOTEWORTHY. HIS LETTER ARRIVED AT EMBASSY ABOUT TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS AFTER EMBOFF HAD DELIVERED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER. SINCE COMMUTING TIME BETWEEN PAPANDREOU'S HOUSE IN KASTRI AND EMBASSY IS ABOUT 30 MINUTES, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT NO TIME WAS WASTED. DEPARTMENT WILL NOTE THAT PAPANDREOU'S RESPONSE ECHOES PHRASEOLOGY OF PRESIDENT'S LETTER WITH

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 10/23/81//296

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

EXCEPTION OF PRESIDENT'S REFERENCE TO "OUR PARTNERSHIP  
AS ALLIES IN THE WESTERN COMMUNITY." STEARNS

BT

#7082

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