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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KML 10/20/2011

**File Folder** GREECE (10/29/1981-12/24/1981)

**FOIA**

M11-412

**Box Number** 15

DRAENOS

3

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121479	CABLE	ATHENS 17744 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	7	10/29/1981	B1
121489	CABLE	ATHENS 18197 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	11/5/1981	B1
121481	CABLE	ATHENS 18873 <b>PAR 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	6	11/18/1981	B1
121482	CABLE	ATHENS 19607 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	3	12/1/1981	B1
121483	CABLE	ATHENS 19793 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	2	12/4/1981	B1
121484	CABLE	ATHENS 19884 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	4	12/5/1981	B1
121485	CABLE	081237Z DEC 81 <b>PAR 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	12	12/8/1981	B1
121487	MEMO	JAMES W. NANCE TO THE PRESIDENT RE SERCETARY WEINBERGER'S MEETING <b>R 11/5/2015 M412/1</b>	2	12/8/1981	B1
121488	CABLE	ATHENS 20922 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	4	12/24/1981	B1

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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

NLRR M412 #121479

MESSAGE:

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

HCE896

UTS6819

OO RUQMGU RUFHOL RUEHBS RUDKPNQ RUDKFDQ RUEHLD RUFHBG

RUDKSNQ RUEHOT RUFHFR RUEHKJ RUEHRO RUDKGPQ RUFHNA

RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA

RUEHC

DE RUEHTH #7744/01 3021604

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

Q 291559Z OCT 81

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6196

INFO RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE

RUQMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 7726

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0057

RUDDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE

RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

RUFRRSHH/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT

RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE

RUEHTH/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 3880

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 17744

L I M D I S O 2 9 1 5 5 9 Z O C T 8 1

E.D. 12065:GDS 10/29/87 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) DR-M

TAGS: PINT, GR

SUBJECT: MY INITIAL CALL ON PAPANDREOU

REF: ATHENS 17406 (NOTAL)

1. ~~(CONFIDENTIAL-ENTIRE TEXT)~~.

2. SUMMARY: MY FIRST MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU WAS CONDUCTED IN AN EXTREMELY FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE. HIS OBVIOUS INTENTION WAS TO GIVE ME SOME INSIGHT INTO THE WAY HE INTENDS TO ORGANIZE HIS GOVERNMENT AND TO CONVINCE ME THAT HE WOULD PURSUE REASONABLE POLICIES IN AREAS OF DIRECT INTEREST TO THE US. PAPANDREOU ASSERTED THAT HIS PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH KARAMANLIS WERE EXCELLENT AND HE HAD NO DOUBT THAT THE PRESENCE OF KARAMANLIS IN THE BACKGROUND HAD REASSURED MANY GREEKS WHO WOULD NOT OTHERWISE HAVE VOTED FOR PASOK. PAPANDREOU SAID THAT HE WANTED TO STRENGTHEN GREEK-US RELATIONS AND TO CLOSE THE CHAPTER ON PAST MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND RE-CRIMINATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. I PAID MY INITIAL CALL ON GREEK PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU OCTOBER 28 IN THE LATE AFTERNOON. THIS WAS

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

A GREEK HOLIDAY -- OXI DAY -- BUT PAPANDREOU IS OBVIOUSLY WORKING A SEVEN-DAY WEEK AND RECEIVED, IN ADDITION TO MYSELF, THE CHINESE AND HUNGARIAN AMBASSADORS. ALTHOUGH NONE OF THE BILATERAL ISSUES OF DIRECT INTEREST TO US WAS DISCUSSED IN THE HALF-HOUR MEETING, THE GENERAL TONE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WAS EXCEPTIONALLY FRIENDLY AND SEVERAL OF THE POINTS MADE BY PAPANDREOU WERE OF GENERAL INTEREST. OUR INITIAL HANDSHAKE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE IN THE PARLIAMENT BUILDING WAS COVERED BY PRESS AND TELEVISION. PAPANDREOU MADE A WARM STATEMENT OF WELCOME TO WHICH I RESPONDED. BOTH STATEMENTS WERE CARRIED ON GREEK TV AND ARE PROMINENTLY REPORTED TODAY IN THE GREEK PRESS.

4. WHEN NEWSPAPER MEN AND PHOTOGRAPHERS HAD DEPARTED THE PRIME MINISTER LED ME OVER TO THE COFFEE TABLE, ORDERED TWO WHISKIES AND SODA AND WE PROCEEDED TO TALK ABOUT CHANGES THAT HAD OCCURRED IN GREECE SINCE WE HAD FIRST KNOWN EACH OTHER HERE TWENTY YEARS AGO. PAPANDREOU BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE HAD MUCH APPRECIATED THE WARMTH OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS TO HIM AND THE PROMPTNESS WITH WHICH IT HAD BEEN DELIVERED. HE HAD TRIED TO RESPOND IN KIND. HE SAID HE KNEW THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED ABOUT HIM. HE HAD GAINED THE REPUTATION OF BEING ANTI-AMERICAN AND HE HAD SAID HARSH THINGS ABOUT US IN THE PAST. SOME HARSH THINGS HAD ALSO BEEN SAID ABOUT HIM IN THE US. NOW, HE SAID, HE WANTED TO CLOSE THAT CHAPTER AND START A NEW ONE. THAT WAS WHY HE HAD INVITED THE PRESS TO COVER OUR FIRST MEETING AND WHY HE HAD ADDRESSED HIMSELF SO WARMLY TO ME. HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD DEMONSTRATE BOTH TO GREEKS AND TO AMERICANS THAT HE WAS NOT ANTI-AMERICAN.

5. PAPANDREOU THEN TURNED TO PASOK, THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ELECTIONS. HE SAID THAT THE ATMOSPHERE IN GREECE TODAY WAS VERY DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IT WAS IN 1967 BEFORE THE COUP OF THE COLONELS. THE MAN MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CHANGE HE THOUGHT WAS KARAMANLIS. "IF KARAMANLIS HAD NOT BEEN PRESIDENT OF GREECE, PASOK WOULD NEVER HAVE RECEIVED 48 OF THE VOTE," SAID PAPANDREOU. "THERE WERE MANY VOTERS WHO THOUGHT I COULD NOT BE TRUSTED AND ONLY VOTED FOR ME BECAUSE THEY KNEW KARAMANLIS WAS THERE." HIS RELATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT WERE EXCELLENT, HE SAID. "I AM GOING TO BRIEF HIM REGULARLY AND THOROUGHLY ON THE PLANS AND WORK OF THE GOVERNMENT, NOT BECAUSE I HAVE TO BUT BECAUSE I WANT TO." PAPANDREOU NOTED THAT THIS CREATED A MUCH HEALTHIER POLITICAL CLIMATE THAN THE ONE WHICH EXISTED UNDER THE MONARCHY, "IN THOSE DAYS," HE

SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81/A309

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

SAID, "CONSTANTINE USED TO SUMMON MY FATHER TO TATOI LIKE  
A SCHOOLBOY."

6. PAPANDREOU COMPLIMENTED GEORGE RALLIS ON THE TONE OF  
THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN. HE SAID THAT RALLIS HAD BEEN AS  
RESPONSIBLE AS ANYONE FOR THE LACK OF ACRIMONY AND THE  
SMOOTH TRANSITION. HE HOPED THEIR ABILITY TO COMMUNICATE  
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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81/1309

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE898  
STU3496  
DD RUQMGU RUFHOL RUEHBS RUDKPNQ RUDKFDQ RUEHLD RUFHBG  
RUDKSNQ RUEHDT RUFHFR RUEHKJ RUEHRO RUDKGPQ RUFHNA  
RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA  
RUEHC  
DE RUEHTH #7744/02 3021606  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 291559Z OCT 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6197  
INFO RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE  
RUQMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 7727  
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0058  
RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE  
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE  
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
RUFRRSHH/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT  
RUFDAAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE  
RUEHTH/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 3881  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 ATHENS 17744  
L I M D I S O 2 9 1 5 5 9 Z U C T 8 1  
PARLIAMENT. HE HAD BEEN DISTURBED HOWEVER TO SEE THAT  
RALLIS HAD NOT ATTENDED THE OXI DAY RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES  
IN THE CATHEDRAL EARLIER THAT AFTERNOON. AVEROFF HAD  
COME INSTEAD. PAPANDREOU HOPED THIS DID NOT MEAN THAT  
THERE WOULD BE A PERSONAL BREAK BETWEEN RALLIS AND HIM-  
SELF. "HE HAS A DIFFICULTY," PAPANDREOU SAID, "IN  
SEPARATING POLITICAL FROM PERSONAL DIFFERENCES." AT THIS  
POINT I INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT HAVING KNOWN AND ADMIRING  
GEORGE RALLIS FOR MANY YEARS I WAS CONFIDENT THAT HE  
WOULD, AS LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION, CONTINUE TO CONDUCT  
A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE GOVERNMENT. HE HAD  
JUST SUFFERED A STINGING DEFEAT AT THE POLLS AND MANY IN  
HIS OWN RANKS WERE BLAMING HIM FOR THE PARTY'S LOSSES.  
IT SEEMED TO ME NATURAL THAT IT WOULD TAKE A LITTLE TIME  
TO GET BACK IN THE MOOD FOR DIALOGUE.  
7. I THEN ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER HOW HE HAD ORGANIZED  
PASOK, SAYING THAT THE QUALITY OF THE PARTY'S POSTERS  
AND LITERATURE, THE NUMBER OF PASOK OFFICES IN THE  
PROVINCES AND THE OBVIOUS CARE WITH WHICH THE PARTY HAD  
BEEN ORGANIZED AT THE GRASSROOTS WERE IMPRESSIVE. I

SENSITIVE

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

## MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

COMMENTED THAT HE HAD NOT LEARNED HOW TO ORGANIZE THAT WELL POLITICALLY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. PAPANDREOU REPLIED BY SAYING THAT HE HAD CONSCIOUSLY USED AMERICAN POLITICAL TECHNIQUES IN BUILDING PASOK AND IN CONDUCTING THE PASOK CAMPAIGN. WITHOUT REFERRING DIRECTLY TO THE QUESTION OF HOW THE PARTY WAS FINANCED, HE SAID THAT HIS OBJECTIVE WAS TO BUILD A SELF-SUSTAINING, DUES-PAYING MEMBERSHIP OF 250,000 PASOK SUPPORTERS. I ASKED WHAT PASOK'S MEMBERSHIP NOW WAS AND THE PRIME MINISTER SAID ABOUT 70,000. IN ANY EVENT, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT A STABLE PARTY STRUCTURE IN GREECE COULD ONLY BE CREATED ON THE BASIS OF POLITICAL PARTIES THAT HAD PARTY ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS AND NOT JUST PERSONALITIES.

8. THIS PROMPTED ME TO ASK HOW HE INTENDED TO RUN THE GOVERNMENT. I HAD OFTEN HEARD HIM DESCRIBED AS A MAXIMUM LEADER WHO REFUSED TO DELEGATE POWER. WHEN I HAD KNOWN HIM TWENTY YEARS AGO HE HAD BEEN A GOOD LISTENER AS WELL AS A TALKER AND I WONDERED WHETHER THE POLITICAL WARS OF THE INTERVENING YEARS HAD CHANGED HIM. PAPANDREOU SAID THAT HE THOUGHT HE WAS STILL A PRETTY GOOD LISTENER BUT POLITICS WAS NOT LIKE THE CLASSROOM, ESPECIALLY IN GREECE WHERE FACTIONALISM WAS A NATIONAL TRAIT. HE TRIED, HE SAID, TO BE TOLERANT OF DISAGREEMENT, BUT INTOLERANT OF DISSENTION. HE REALIZED THAT HE COULD NOT RUN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT BY HIMSELF AND THEREFORE INTENDED TO GIVE HIS MINISTERS AS MUCH LATITUDE AS THEY COULD HANDLE. HE COMPLAINED HOWEVER THAT IT WAS HARD TO FIND GOOD PEOPLE.

9. TURNING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE GREEK ARMED FORCES THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE WAS CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT THAT HE STILL NEEDED TO SECURE THEIR FULL CONFIDENCE. "MILITARY ALWAYS THINK THAT SOMEONE FROM THE LEFT IS ANTI-MILITARY," HE SAID. "MY PURPOSE IN TAKING THE PORTFOLIO OF DEFENSE MINISTER WAS TO SHOW THEM THAT I TOOK THEM SERIOUSLY." PAPANDREOU SAID THAT HE INTENDED TO BE DEFENSE MINISTER IN MORE THAN NAME AND EXPECTED TO SPEND ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF HIS TIME AT THE GREEK PENTAGON.

10. AT THIS POINT, THINKING TO NUDGE THE CONVERSATION IN THE DIRECTION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, I SAID TO THE PRIME MINISTER THAT FROM OUR TALKS IN THE PAST I KNEW SOMETHING OF THE CHANGES HE HOPED TO MAKE IN THE ANTIQUATED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC MACHINERY OF GREECE. I WAS NOT FAMILIAR, HOWEVER, WITH HIS VIEWS ON FOREIGN POLICY -- ESPECIALLY THE "CHANGES" THAT HE HAD ADVOCATED IN GREECE'S FOREIGN RELATIONS. PAPANDREOU SAID THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD HAVE AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THIS

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81//309

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

AREA OF PASOK'S POLICY AT LENGTH. HE KNEW THAT THE US  
HAD RESPONSIBILITIES AS A WORLD POWER AND, AS HE HAD  
STATED PUBLICLY, HE DID NOT INTEND TO SPRING SURPRISES  
ON US OR PURSUE A POLICY OF CONFRONTATION. I REPLIED  
THAT HE WOULD FIND MY GOVERNMENT AND ME PERSONALLY READY  
TO DISCUSS ANY ASPECT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AT ANY  
TIME. ON THIS NOTE OUR FIRST MEETING ENDED.  
10. COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT PAPANDREOU IN THIS MEETING  
GAVE NOTHING AWAY. HIS BASIC POSITIONS REMAIN AS THEY  
WERE AND WILL INEVITABLY PRODUCE PROBLEMS IN GREECE'S  
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SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/05/81/1309

SITUATION: CHECK  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: LIST

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE899

STU3499

DD RUOMGU RUFHOL RUEHBS RUDKPNQ RUDKFDQ RUEHLD RUFHBG

RUDKSNQ RUEHOT RUFHFR RUEHKJ RUEHRD RUDKGPQ RUFHNA

RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA RUFHNA

RUEHC

DE RUEHTH #7744/03 3021608

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

Q 291559Z OCT 81

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6198

INFO RUEHDD/NATO COLLECTIVE

RUQMQG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 7728

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0059

RUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE BE

RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

RHFRAAB/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE

RHDLONE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK

RUFRRSHH/USDODCSOUTH NAPLES IT

RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE

RUEHTH/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 3882

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ATHENS 17744  
RELATIONS WITH THE US, WITH NATO AND WITH THE EEC. PAP-  
PANDREOU IS, HOWEVER, MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO CONVINCE  
US THAT WE WILL NOT BE CONFRONTED BY FAITS ACCOMPLI  
AND THAT VIRTUALLY EVERYTHING IS NEGOTIABLE. MEANWHILE  
HIS SHOW OF FRIENDSHIP TO ME AND THE PROMINENT ATTENTION  
GIVEN OUR FIRST MEETING BY THE GREEK MEDIA WILL BE  
AT A MINIMUM, BE A SIGNAL TO LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF GREEK  
FUNCTIONARIES, BOTH CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, THAT YOU DO  
NOT NEED TO OBSTRUCT US GOVERNMENT BUSINESS IN GREECE TO  
PRESERVE YOUR JOB IN A PASOK GOVERNMENT. WHAT HAPPENS  
LATER, WE SHALL SEE. STEARNS

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121489 8  
SENSITIVE

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SITUATION LISTING

DATE 11/10/81//314

SITUATION: CL  
SUBJECT CATEGORY: 11/10

MESSAGE / ANNOTATION:

MESSAGE:

HCE542  
UTS5386  
RR RUFHC  
DE RUEHTH #8197 3091506  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
R 051506Z NOV 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6330  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ATHENS 18197

E.O. 12065: N/A

TAGS: PDIP, US, GR

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM FORMER GREEK PRIME MINISTER RALLIS  
- TO THE PRESIDENT

REF: STATE 287323

RALLIS WAS DELIVERED ON OCTOBER 28. GEORGE RALLIS'S  
RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER WAS RECEIVED AT  
THE EMBASSY TODAY AND IS QUOTED BELOW. THE ORIGINAL  
WILL BE POUCHED TO EUR/SE.

2. BEGIN QUOTE

ATHENS, NOVEMBER 3, 1981

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I AM VERY GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF OCTOBER 26,  
1981 AND FOR YOUR KIND WORDS REGARDING MY PERSON, THE  
ATTACHMENT OF MY PARTY AND OF MYSELF PERSONALLY TO  
GREECE'S TRADITIONAL LINKS WITH THE WESTERN COMMUNITY  
GOES HAND IN HAND WITH MY PROFOUND BELIEF IN THE  
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN OUR COUNTRIES. THE RECENT CHANGE  
OF GOVERNMENT IN GREECE IS PART OF THIS DEMOCRATIC  
PROCEDURE.

IN EXPRESSING MY DEEP APPRECIATION FOR THE INTEREST YOU  
HAVE SHOWN IN THE PROBLEMS AFFECTING GREECE'S SECURITY,  
I WISH TO ADD THE HOPE THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE  
THESE GRAVE PROBLEMS AT HEART TO THE BENEFIT OF  
STABILITY AND PEACE IN THIS SENSITIVE PART OF THE WORLD.

SINCERELY YOURS,

GEORGE RALLIS END QUOTE STEARNS

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NLRR M412 \*121489

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

121481

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 04 ATHENS 8873  
SIT429 DATE 11/20/81

DTG: 181158Z NOV 81 PSN: 016134  
TOR: 322/2038Z

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M412 #121481

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #8873/01 3221159  
O 181158Z NOV 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6542

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 18873

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 11/17/87 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M

TAGS: PARM, PINT, PEPR, NATO, GR

SUBJECT: GREEK FOREIGN POLICY: PAPANDREOU TALKS TO  
- STEPHEN LARRABEE

REF: ATHENS 18856

1. ~~/~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: JOHNS HOPKINS SCHOLAR STEPHEN LARRABEE  
MET WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES  
AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 17. LARRABEE CONCLUDES THAT,

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~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 ATHENS 8873

DTG: 181158Z NOV 81 PSN: 016134

(A) PAPANDREOU IS GENUINELY SORRY NOT TO BE ABLE TO RECEIVE SECRETARY HAIG IN ATHENS ON PROPOSED DATES IN DECEMBER, (B) GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL PROBABLY NOT OPPOSE SPANISH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, (C) PRIME MINISTER IS JUST BEGINNING TO FAMILIARIZE HIMSELF WITH SUBJECT OF TNF, AND, [REDACTED]

13526  
E. O. 12958  
~~As Amended~~  
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

END SUMMARY

3. FORMER NSC STAFFER NOW AT JOHNS HOPKINS, STEPHEN LARRABEE, WHO HAS BEEN IN GREECE FOR PAST TWO DAYS TELEPHONED ME LATE YESTERDAY EVENING PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE TO SAY THAT HE HAD BEEN WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU LATE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON SHORTLY AFTER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PAPANDREOU HAD DECIDED THAT HE WOULD BE UNABLE TO RECEIVE SECRETARY HAIG DECEMBER 12-13. LARRABEE, WHO KNOWS PAPANDREOU REASONABLY WELL, SAID HE THOUGHT WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN FLAVOR OF HIS CONVERSATION. HE WILL BE BACK IN WASHINGTON SOMETIME NEXT WEEK AND WILL CALL EAGLEBURGER AND/OR DILLERY TO LET THEM KNOW HE IS BACK.

4. LARRABEE SAID THAT PAPANDREOU APPEARED GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT HIS INABILITY TO RECEIVE SECRETARY HAIG IN ATHENS ON THE DATES PROPOSED. HE TOLD LARRABEE HIS INITIAL REACTION HAD BEEN THAT SECRETARY'S VISIT TO GREECE WOULD BE A TIMELY AND IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY TO CLARIFY GREEK GOVERNMENT POLICY. THIS HAD LED HIM TO AUTHORIZE DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER FOTILAS TO GIVE ME GREEN LIGHT. ACCORDING TO PRIME MINISTER, HE HAD NEGLECTED TO CHECK HIS PROGRAM CAREFULLY ENOUGH AND HAD ONLY DISCOVERED LATER THAT HE WAS ALREADY COMMITTED TO RECEIVING ARAFAT IN THE SAME TIME FRAME. SINCE ARAFAT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04 ATHENS 8873

DTG: 181158Z NOV 81 PSN: 016134

VISIT HAD ALREADY BEEN POSTPONED ONCE OR TWICE, PAPANDREOU HAD NOT FELT FREE TO SUGGEST ANOTHER CHANGE TO PLO LEADER.

5. LARRABEE SAID HE HAD EXPRESSED SOME INCREDULITY TO PAPANDREOU THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD PASS UP OPPORTUNITY TO MEET SECRETARY HAIG IN ATHENS SO SOON AFTER ASSUMING OFFICE. LARRABEE VENTURED AS HIS PERSONAL OPINION THAT SECRETARY'S VISIT WOULD HAVE HAD SYMBOLIC AS WELL AS PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE SINCE IT WOULD HAVE SHOWN CLEARLY THAT USG WAS PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE AT HIGH LEVEL WITH NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT. FURTHERMORE, GREEK GOVERNMENT MIGHT NOW BE FACED WITH SITUATION IN WHICH SECRETARY HAIG WAS OBLIGED TO VISIT ANKARA WITHOUT HAVING OPPORTUNITY TO HEAR GREEK VIEWS IN ATHENS.

6. PAPANDREOU SEEMED TO LISTEN ATTENTIVELY TO THESE POINTS, LARRABEE SAID, AND WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER HE SHOULD SEND ANOTHER NOTE EXPLAINING FURTHER HIS REGRET THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO SEE SECRETARY HAIG IN ATHENS AND HIS HOPE THAT MEETING IN BRUSSELS WOULD BE POSSIBLE. LARRABEE OBSERVED TO ME OVER THE TELEPHONE THAT HE COULD NOT SAY WHY GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD CHANGED SIGNALS SO ABRUPTLY, BUT HE DID BELIEVE THAT PAPANDREOU WAS SINCERELY DISAPPOINTED NOT TO BE ABLE TO RECEIVE SECRETARY IN GREECE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. LARRABEE THEN RAISED SUBJECT OF SPANISH NATO MEMBERSHIP, EXPRESSING THE VIEW THAT GREECE WOULD BE ILL ADVISED TO OPPOSE WISHES OF SPANISH GOVERNMENT AND NATO ALLIES. PAPANDREOU REFERRED TO GREEK GOVERNMENT TIES WITH SPANISH SOCIALISTS, BUT SPOKE IN SUCH A RELAXED WAY ABOUT ENTIRE SUBJECT THAT LARRABEE INFERRED THAT GOG WOULD PROBABLY GO ALONG WITH SPANISH GOVERNMENT'S WISHES.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 181158Z NOV 81 PSN: 016134

8. PAPANDREOU ASKED LARRABEE ABOUT TNF MODERNIZATION, SAYING THAT HE COULD UNDERSTAND SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT SHORTENED REACTION TIME AVAILABLE TO THEM IN THE EVENT THAT PERSHING II'S AND CRUISE MISSILES WERE INTRODUCED INTO WESTERN EUROPE. LARRABEE SAID HE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT IF PAPANDREOU UNDERSTOOD SOVIET CONCERNS, HE SHOULD ALSO UNDERSTAND WESTERN EUROPEAN CONCERNS ABOUT REACTION TIME AVAILABLE TO THEM IN FACE OF SOVIET SS-20'S IN

ATHENS 8873

DTG: 181158Z NOV 81 PSN: 016134

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 8873  
SIT428 DATE 11/20/81

DTG: 181158Z NOV 81 PSN: 016137  
TOR: 322/2039Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #8873/02 3221201  
O 181158Z NOV 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6543

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 18873

EXDIS

EASTERN EUROPE. LARRABEE TOLD ME THAT WHILE PAPANDREOU  
WAS GENERALLY CONVERSANT WITH SUBJECT OF TNF, HE SEEMED  
TO REALIZE THAT HE HAD MUCH TO LEARN ABOUT INTRICACIES  
OF THIS SUBJECT. PERHAPS FOR THIS REASON PAPANDREOU  
HAD ENCOURAGED LARRABEE TO DISCUSS SUBJECT AT SOME  
LENGTH AND HAD POSED SEVERAL QUESTIONS.

13526  
E.O. 12958  
~~As Amended~~  
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 181158Z NOV 81 PSN: 016137



MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

11. COMMENT: LARRABEE IS AN EXTREMELY OBJECTIVE AND  
ASTUTE OBSERVER OF GREEK AFFAIRS AND MADE THE MOST OF  
HIS SHORT VISIT HERE. I RECOMMEND SOME FOLLOW UP AT  
WASHINGTON END. STEARNS

ATHENS 8873

DTG: 181158Z NOV 81 PSN: 016137

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

121482

15

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 9607  
SIT692 DATE 12/02/81

DTG: 012209Z DEC 81 PSN: 033070  
TOR: 336/0046Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEH TH #9607/01 3352210  
O 012209Z DEC 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6758  
AMEMBASSY MADRID NIACT IMMEDIATE 1063  
USMISSION USNATO NIACT IMMEDIATE 0779

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 19607

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/1/01 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M  
TAGS: NATO, SP, GR  
SUBJECT: SPAIN AND NATO: GREEK RESERVATION  
REF: STATE 317623

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I SAW ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER PAPOULIAS AT 10:00 THIS EVENING. OTHER NATO AMBASSADORS AND I HAD BEEN SEEKING TO CONTACT HIM THROUGHOUT AFTERNOON AND EARLY EVENING BUT HAD BEEN TOLD THAT HE WAS EITHER UNAVAILABLE OR IN CONFERENCE.

3. I COVERED POINTS IN REFTEL, EMPHASIZING THAT ADHERENCE TO PREVIOUSLY AGREED PROCEDURES FOR SPANISH ACCESSION WERE A MATTER OF THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO US, TO THE SPANISH, AND TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. NAC MEETING SCHEDULED FOR THIS AFTERNOON HAD BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL TOMORROW MORNING. IT WAS THEREFORE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR SECRETARY GENERAL ON BEHALF OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE COUNCIL TO RESPOND POSITIVELY TO SPANISH INITIATIVE AT THAT TIME. I REMINDED PAPOULIAS THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT AND OTHER NATO MEMBERS HAD CONCURRED IN THESE PRELIMINARY PROCEDURES AND IT WAS TOO LATE TO CHANGE THEM.

4. PAPOULIAS REPLIED THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD INTERPOSE NO OBJECTION TO THESE PROCEDURES. I ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANT THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED THAT SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD EXPRESS WARMTH IN RESPONDING TO SPANISH INITIATIVE. PAPOULIAS SAID GREEK GOVERNMENT UNDERSTOOD THIS, ALTHOUGH GREEK GOVERNMENT RESERVED THE RIGHT TO DECIDE HOW MUCH OF SECRETARY GENERAL'S ENTHUSIASM IT SHARED. I SAID THAT NEVERTHELESS IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR EXCHANGE OF COMMUNICATIONS TO TAKE PLACE ON THE BASIS OF COMPROMISE WORDING AGREED TO BY

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121482

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 012209Z DEC 81 PSN: 033070

DUTCH. COULD I REPORT TO WASHINGTON THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT ACCEPTED THIS AND WOULD NOT OBJECT EITHER PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY? PAPOULIAS SAID I COULD DO SO.

5. I THEN DESCRIBED TO PAPOULIAS THE PROCEDURES ENVISAGED FOR DECEMBER 10, EMPHASIZING THAT GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD HAVE TO SIGN PROTOCOL THAT DAY. IN VIEW OF WHAT PAPOULIAS HAD JUST TOLD ME, COULD I ADVISE WASHINGTON THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO TRAVEL ENTIRE ROUTE WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE LEADING TO SPANISH ACCESSION? PAPOULIAS SAID THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT WAS AGREEING TO PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS BUT HAD NOT DEFINITELY DECIDED WHAT ITS FINAL DECISION WOULD BE ON SPANISH ACCESSION. THIS DECISION WOULD BE MADE BY PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU. AS PAPOULIAS UNDERSTOOD TIME TABLE, THERE WOULD BE TWO OPPORTUNITIES FOR GREEK GOVERNMENT TO EXPLAIN ITS POSITION. FIRST WOULD BE THE DPC, AND SECOND WOULD BE AT THE DECEMBER 10 NAC MINISTERIAL. I SAID IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT DPC WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FORUM TO PRESENT GREEK VIEWS ON SPANISH ACCESSION. I ASSUMED THAT DECEMBER 10 NAC MINISTERIAL WOULD PROVIDE BETTER OCCASION TO EXPLAIN "NUANCES" OF GREEK ATTITUDE. PAPOULIAS REPEATED THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE BY PRIME MINISTER EITHER ON WHAT ULTIMATE GREEK ATTITUDE WOULD BE OR HOW IT WOULD BE EXPRESSED.

6. IN TAKING MY LEAVE OF PAPOULIAS, I REPEATED TO HIM MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THAT U.S. ATTITUDE ON THIS MATTER WAS SHARED BY ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE AND THAT ALL NATO AMBASSADORS IN ATHENS WOULD BE MAKING SIMILAR DEMARCHE. PAPOULIAS SAID HE HAD ALREADY RECEIVED A NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR APPOINTMENTS FROM MY NATO COLLEAGUES.

7. COMMENT: WE HAVE EVIDENTLY CLEARED THE PROCEDURAL HURDLE. PAPOULIAS WAS EXPLICIT IN SAYING GREECE WOULD NOT INSIST ON LAST MINUTE CHANGES IN ARRANGEMENTS PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO BY NATO MEMBERS.

8. I HAVE JUST RECEIVED A CALL FROM FRG AMBASSADOR SIGRIST SAYING THAT PAPOULIAS HAD TELEPHONED HIM SHORTLY AFTER I HAD DEPARTED FROM FOREIGN MINISTRY. PAPOULIAS HAD GIVEN SIGRIST SAME MESSAGE HE HAD GIVEN ME. SIGRIST, HOWEVER, HAD NOT ASKED PAPOULIAS WHETHER GOG HAD MADE FINAL DECISION TO ACCEPT SPANISH ACCESSION. WHEN I TOLD HIM WHAT PAPOULIAS HAD SAID TO ME, HE AGREED IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR HIM TO TRY AND SEE PAPANDREOU TOMORROW MORNING (DECEMBER 2) IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS HE RECEIVED FROM BONN EARLIER TODAY. I TOLD SIGRIST THAT

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DTG: 012209Z DEC 81 PSN: 033070

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01            ATHENS 9607  
SIT691            DATE 12/02/81

DTG: 012209Z DEC 81 PSN: 033073  
TOR: 336/0047Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #9607/02 3352212  
O 012209Z DEC 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6759  
AMEMBASSY MADRID NIACT IMMEDIATE 1064  
USMISSION USNATO NIACT IMMEDIATE 0780

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 19607

EXDIS  
I WOULD NOT DECIDE WHETHER TO APPROACH PAPANDREOU MYSELF  
UNTIL LEARNING HOW HE HAD FARED. (HAVING APPARENTLY  
OBTAINED GREEK CONCURRENCE IN PROCEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS,  
IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO APPROACH PAPANDREOU LATER ON  
SUBSTANCE. IN ANY CASE, NO SENSIBLE JUDGMENT ON THIS  
POINT CAN BE MADE UNTIL SIGRIST HAS CARRIED OUT HIS  
INSTRUCTIONS).

9. FOR MADRID, AMBASSADOR TODMAN: DEPUTY FOREIGN  
MINISTER MANUECO TELEPHONED ME FROM MADRID EARLIER THIS  
EVENING, PRIOR TO MY TALK WITH PAPOULIAS, TO ASK MY  
READING OF SITUATION HERE AND TO TELL ME SPANISH PRIME  
MINISTER WAS STILL ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT PAPANDREOU BY  
PHONE. I TOLD MANUECO THAT I WOULD BE REPORTING RESULTS  
OF MY DEMARCHE TO PAPOULIAS AND WAS SURE THAT YOU WOULD  
PASS ON RESULTS TO HIM.

10. FINAL COMMENT: I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT DELAY IN REACH-  
ING PAPOULIAS WAS OCCASIONED BY HIS NEED TO CONSULT WITH  
PRIME MINISTER, AND THAT HIS STATEMENTS TO ME ACCEPTING

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRECEDURAL ARRANGEMENTS CAME FROM PAPANDREOU. STEARNS

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~~SECRET~~

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

121483  
18

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 9793  
SIT089 DATE 12/04/81

DTG: 041040Z DEC 81 PSN: 036981  
TOR: 338/1512Z

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEH TH #9793 3381042  
O 041040Z DEC 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6826

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 2436  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 5567  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 6101  
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 1070  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 7650  
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0782  
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 0224  
BT

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 19793

EXDIS  
DEPT PASS SECRETARY  
EUR FOR GOMPERT FROM AMBASSADOR  
LONDON ALSO FOR EAGLEBURGER/PRICE  
DUBLIN FOR EAGLEBURGER/PRICE ONLY  
E. O. 12065: RDS-1 12/04/01 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M  
TAGS: NATO, SP, GR  
SUBJECT: SPAIN-NATO: GREEK ABSTENTION  
REF: STATE 320983 TOSEC 140055

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT).
2. I AM URGENTLY COORDINATING WITH MY FRG, UK, FRENCH AND ITALIAN COLLEAGUES TO PREPARE OUR JOINT DEMARCHE TO PAPANDREOU PER REFTEL. HOWEVER, I AM VERY CONCERNED THAT THE LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS FOR THIS DEMARCHE TO THE PRIME MINISTER BE UNASSAILABLE. THE GOG HAS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EVIDENTLY DONE ITS NATO HOMEWORK AND SEEMS TO THINK IT HAS FOUND A PROCEDURAL WAY TO ABSTAIN FROM THE PROTOCOL SIGNING CEREMONY WITHOUT BLOCKING SPANISH ACCESSION. AS SOME IN WASHINGTON ARE AWARE, THE DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER IS KRISTOS MACHERITSAS, WHO FOR MANY YEARS WAS THE MFA INTERNATIONAL LAWYER AND WHO IS WELL VERSED IN NATO LEGAL PROCEDURES.

3. IN THIS REGARD WE HERE HAVE NOTED AN IMPORTANT INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE LEGAL JUDGMENT IN PARA 3 REFTEL THAT GREEK FAILURE TO SIGN THE PROTOCOL ON DECEMBER 10 WOULD NOT LEGALLY PREVENT THE RATIFICATION PROCESS FROM PROCEEDING, AND THE FIRST AND THIRD TALKING POINTS IN PARA 4, WHICH LINK ACCESSION TO GREECE'S SIGNATURE OF THE PROTOCOL. IN THIS CONNECTION BRITISH AMB SUTHERLAND HAS JUST CALLED TO

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 041040Z DEC 81 PSN: 036981

SAY THAT LEGAL ADVISORS AT FCO CONCUR WITH OUR LAWYERS  
THAT GREEK SIGNATURE NOT ESSENTIAL.

4. I BELIEVE IT VITAL TO BE CRYSTAL CLEAR IN OUR  
DEMARCHÉ. WE CANNOT, THAT IS, PRESENT LEGAL  
ARGUMENTS FOR THE ESSENTIALITY OF GREECE'S SIGNING THE  
PROTOCOL IF THERE IS DOUBT ON THIS POINT. WE WOULD  
ONLY BECOME INVOLVED IN A LEGALISTIC DISCUSSION WITH  
THE GREEKS WHICH WOULD BE TIME-CONSUMING AND PROBABLY  
INCONCLUSIVE. IT IS PREFERABLE THEREFORE TO MAKE OUR  
CASE ON THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF A GREEK FAILURE TO  
PARTICIPATE IN SIGNING CEREMONY. WE SUGGEST REWORDING  
THE TALKING POINTS AS FOLLOWS:  
- 1) THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT HAS MADE IT CLEAR TO US  
THAT FOREIGN MINISTER PEREZ-LLORCA CANNOT COME TO  
BRUSSELS IF ANY NATO COUNTRY DOES NOT SIGN THE PROTOCOL  
OF ACCESSION ON DECEMBER 10. FAILURE OF ANY NATO MEMBER  
TO SIGN THE PROTOCOL WOULD BE AN UNMERITED REBUFF TO A  
FRIENDLY STATE, AND VERY PROBABLY COULD RESULT IN  
BLOCKING SPANISH ENTRY.  
2) WE MUST KNOW THEREFORE WHETHER GREECE WILL SIGN  
THE PROTOCOL NEXT WEEK IN BRUSSELS.  
3) IN ADDITION TO ALLOWING THE ACCESSION PROCESS  
TO MOVE FORWARD BY SIGNING THE PROTOCOL, WE URGE THE  
GREEK GOVERNMENT TO LEND ITS SUPPORT TO THE SUCCESS AND  
DIGNITY OF THE HISTORIC EVENT IN BRUSSELS NEXT WEEK.

5. PLEASE ADVISE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY DONE SO, DEPARTMENT MAY WISH  
TO REPEAT ATHENS 19775, WHICH CONTAINS OUR BEST  
JUDGMENT REGARDING THE GREEK STANCE ON THIS ISSUE, TO  
APPROPRIATE ADDRESSEES. STEARNS

ATHENS 9793

DTG: 041040Z DEC 81 PSN: 036981

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~~SECRET~~

121484

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 9884  
SIT424 DATE 12/07/81

DTG: 051723Z DEC 81 PSN: 038645  
TOR: 339/2026Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHTH #9884/01 3391725  
O 051723Z DEC 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6847

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 1073  
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 0226  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 19884

EXDIS  
DEPARTMENT PASS SECRETARY; DUBLIN (FOR EAGLEBURGER)  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1, 12/5/01 (KOVNER, MILTON) OR-M  
TAGS: NATO, SP, GR  
SUBJECT: SPAIN-NATO ALLIANCE: GREEK POSITION

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. ON BEHALF OF THE ALLIANCE, UK AMBASSADOR SUTHERLAND MET WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU FOR 40 MINUTES DECEMBER 5 IN AN ATTEMPT TO CLARIFY GREEK INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO SIGNING THE PROTOCOL OF SPANISH ACCESSION ON DECEMBER 10. ALTHOUGH PAPANDREOU REFUSED TO GIVE ANY ASSURANCES ABOUT GREECE'S SIGNATURE, HE DID SAY THAT GREECE WOULD NOT BLOCK THE PROCEDURES FOR SPANISH ACCESSION BUT COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT THE PROCEDURES WOULD BE CARRIED THROUGH ALL THE WAY TO RATIFICATION; THAT THE PRESENT PHASE (I.E., INCLUDING DECEMBER 10) WOULD BE "ALL RIGHT"; AND THAT THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD GO TO BRUSSELS.
  2. AMBASSADOR SUTHERLAND SHARED HIS REPORTING CABLE WITH
- MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

US AND THE GERMAN, ITALIAN, FRENCH AND CANADIAN AMBASSADORS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD GIST IT TO THE OTHER NATO AMBASSADORS IN ATHENS. TEXT OF UK CABLE FOLLOWS:  
BEGIN TEXT:

1. I TOLD PAPANDREOU THAT AS SENIOR NATO AMBASSADOR IN ATHENS AND SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF ALL MY COLLEAGUES IN THE ALLIANCE ACCREDITED AND RESIDENT HERE I WANTED TO CLARIFY THE INTENTIONS OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WITH REGARD TO THE SIGNATURE IN BRUSSELS ON 10 DECEMBER OF THE PROTOCOL ON SPANISH ACCESSION. THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND ALL THE GOVERNMENTS ON WHOSE BEHALF I SPOKE ATTACHED VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE TO UNANIMITY ON THIS ISSUE. EVEN IF AN ABSTENTION BY GREECE WOULD NOT, FROM A STRICTLY LEGAL POINT OF VIEW, NECESSARILY PRE-

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121484

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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~~SECRET~~

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 051723Z DEC 81 PSN: 038645

VENT SPAIN FROM ACCEDING, THE ABSENCE OF A UNANIMOUS WELCOME WOULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE ALLIANCE, REBUFF A FRIENDLY STATE AND IN PRACTICE MIGHT WELL OBSTRUCT SPANISH ACCESSION. ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAD WELCOMED SPANISH ACCESSION AND ALL MEMBERS SHOULD THEREFORE HAVE AN OBLIGATION TO FORWARD THE PROCESS.

2. I MADE ALSO THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- -- IF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT DID NOT SIGN THE PROTOCOL IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR OTHER MEMBERS AND IMPOSSIBLE FOR SOME TO INITIATE THE PROCESSES FOR RATIFICATION. SIGNATURE OF THE PROTOCOL WAS OF COURSE SUBJECT TO PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR ALL MEMBERS.

- -- THE DECISION TO APPLY FOR MEMBERSHIP OF NATO WAS TAKEN BY A FREELY ELECTED SPANISH GOVERNMENT AND HAD BEEN APPROVED BY DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN SPAIN. WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER, SENOR PEREZ-LLORCA, CANNOT COME TO BRUSSELS IF ANY REPEAT ANY NATO COUNTRY DOES NOT SIGN THE PROTOCOL OF ACCESSION ON 10 DECEMBER.

- -- THE STABILITY OF DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN IS A MATTER OF CONCERN TO US ALL AND IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY REGRETTABLE IF GREECE, WHICH NOT SO LONG AGO HAD EMERGED FROM A DICTATORSHIP, WERE TO BE THE ODD MAN OUT.

- -- ABSENCE OF A UNANIMOUS WELCOME COULD SERIOUSLY DAMAGE THE ALLIANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AT A PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE TIME WHEN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE SOVIET/UNITED STATES TALKS IN GENEVA HAD JUST BEGUN.

-

-

- -- WE MUST THEREFORE KNOW WHETHER GREECE WOULD SIGN THE PROTOCOL NEXT WEEK IN BRUSSELS.

3. PAPANDREOU INTERJECTED A NUMBER OF COMMENTS WHILE I WENT THROUGH THESE POINTS. ON PARAGRAPH 2 (II) (FREELY ELECTED SPANISH GOVERNMENT) HE SAID HE HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH FELIPE GONZALEZ. THE SPANISH SOCIALIST OPPOSITION WERE MUCH OPPOSED TO SPANISH ACCESSION AND DEMANDED A REFERENDUM. GONZALEZ WOULD PROBABLY BE PRIME MINISTER IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT WITHIN A YEAR AND A HALF. THIS WAS SOMETHING THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. PAPANDREOU ACCEPTED MY REPLY THAT GONZALEZ HAD NOT CHALLENGED THE

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 9884  
SIT423 DATE 12/07/81

DTG: 051723Z DEC 81 PSN: 038648  
TOR: 339/2028Z

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WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #9884/02 3391733  
O 051723Z DEC 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 19884

EXDIS  
LEGALITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE CORTES WHEREBY  
SPANISH ACCESSION TO NATO WAS APPROVED.

4. ON PARAGRAPH 3 (III) ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING DEMOCRACY IN SPAIN, PAPANDREOU ASKED WHETHER NATO HAD BEEN ANY HELP IN PRESERVING OR RESTORING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS IN TURKEY. I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT THE INFLUENCE OF NATO ALLIES WAS A FACTOR IN ASSISTING THE RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC RULE IN TURKEY.

5. PAPANDREOU'S GENERAL RESPONSE TO THE REPRESENTATIONS WAS THAT GREECE HAD MANY UNSOLVED AND DIFFICULT QUESTIONS TO SETTLE WITH NATO. TOUCHING ON THE AEGEAN, GREECE'S BORDERS, CYPRUS, AND THE EXTENT OF MILITARY AID TO TURKEY. IN CONSIDERING SPANISH ACCESSION, GREECE, WHICH DID NOT WISH TO BLACKMAIL THE ALLIANCE, NEVERTHELESS WAS OBLIGED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE REACTIONS OF THE GREEK PEOPLE, WHO WOULD ASK THEIR PRIME MINISTER WHY HE MEEKLY AGREED TO THE EXPANSION OF NATO, IN THE INTERESTS OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE, WHEN THE ALLIANCE LEFT UNSOLVED GREECE'S PARTICULAR PROBLEMS. HIS GOVERNMENT HAD TO PUT GREEK INTEREST FIRST AND NOT THE INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE. MEMBERSHIP OF NATO WAS ONLY OF INTEREST TO GREECE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT SERVED TO PROTECT GREEK INTERESTS. HE AND HARALAMPOPOULOS WOULD BE SAYING THIS IN BRUSSELS NEXT WEEK.

6. PAPANDREOU SAID HE HAD NO INTENTION TO BLOCK WHAT THE ALLIANCE JUDGED TO BE SO IMPORTANT, AND NO DESIRE FOR CONFRONTATION, BUT AT SOME POINT NATO MUST STOP AND TAKE NOTE OF GREEK DEMANDS. GREECE WOULD NOT BLOCK THE PROCEDURES FOR SPANISH ACCESSION, BUT COULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT THE PROCEDURES WOULD BE CARRIED THROUGH ALL THE WAY TO RATIFICATION BY THE GREEK PARLIAMENT. THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER SHOULD

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 9884

DTG: 051723Z DEC 81 PSN: 038648

THEREFORE COME TO BRUSSELS.

7. PAPANDREOU SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND FULLY WHY THE ALLIANCE REGARDED SPANISH ACCESSION AS SO IMPORTANT, SINCE SPAIN WAS NOT A CRITICAL AREA IN THE EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION. I REPLIED THAT NATO WAS THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THAT SPAIN DID INDEED HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE TO PLAY IN IT BOTH MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY.

8. TO THE POINT THAT MY REPRESENTATIONS WERE PRIMARILY ADDRESSED TO THE POLITICAL ARGUMENTS AND NOT THE LEGALITY OF ACCESSION IN THE ABSENCE OF GREECE'S SIGNATURE, PAPANDREOU SAID THAT HE ACCEPTED THAT RATIFICATION COULD NOT PROCEED UNLESS ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAD SIGNED THE PROTOCOL. HE SAID THAT THE PRESENT PHASE (I.E. INCLUDING 10 DECEMBER) WOULD BE "ALL RIGHT." BUT HE COULD ONLY GUARANTEE THIS PHASE. CONDITIONS MIGHT CHANGE BEFORE THE RATIFICATION PROCESSES WERE COMPLETED. GREECE MIGHT NO LONGER BE IN NATO; OR GREECE'S PROBLEMS WITH NATO MIGHT HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. HE ADDED THAT WHILE HIS "VISION" WAS OF THE DISSOLUTION OF BOTH MILITARY BLOCS, HE ACCEPTED THAT WITH THE WARSAW PACT NOT GOING TO DISAPPEAR NATO HAD TO EXIST TOO. BUT IT MUST EXIST TO PROTECT ITS MEMBERS. I COMMENTED THAT THE VERY STRONG REASONS FOR GREECE REMAINING IN NATO WERE RELATED NOT ONLY TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE ALLIANCE BUT ALSO TO SOME OF GREECE'S BALKAN NEIGHBORS. I BELIEVED FOR EXAMPLE THAT YUGOSLAVIA SAW THE DANGERS OF DISTURBING THE PRESENT BALANCE IN THE SOUTH EASTERN AREA OF THE ALLIANCE.

9. TO MY RENEWED URGING THAT PAPANDREOU SHOULD STATE THAT GREECE WOULD SIGN THE PROTOCOL ON 10 DECEMBER, SINCE OTHERWISE THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD NOT COME, PAPANDREOU REPEATEDLY REPLIED "LET HIM COME", BUT REFUSED TO GIVE AN ASSURANCE ABOUT GREECE'S SIGNATURE. HE STATED IN TERMS THAT HE WAS NOT GOING TO REVEAL HIS TACTICS, THAT THE ALLIANCE AND THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD HAVE TO TAKE A RISK. BUT NOTHING HE SAID SUGGESTED THAT GREECE WOULD ACTUALLY WITHHOLD HER SIGNATURE. END TEXT. STEARNS

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121485

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SLD BRUSSELS 0961  
SIT358 DATE 01/19/82

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041608  
TOR: 342/1337Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NANCOL JP SIT  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE YDHAQH #0961 3421237  
O 081237Z DEC 81 ZYH ZFF 6/3  
FM SLD BRUSSELS

TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO SSO DIA  
STATE/RCI

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M412 #121485

BY KM NARA DATE 3/18/13

13526

E.O. 12958

As Amended

Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE BRU 0849 EYES ONLY SECTION 1 OF 6  
EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY  
WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT  
SSO DIA INFO FOR DEPSECDEF CARLUCCI  
STATE/RCI INFO FOR SECRETARY HAIG  
FROM SECRETARY WEINBERGER  
SUBJECT: MY MEETING WITH PAPANDREOU  
BEGIN SUMMARY:

1. I MET WITH PAPANDREOU FOR NEARLY AN HOUR IN HIS HOTEL SUITE IN BRUSSELS SOON AFTER MY ARRIVAL LAST EVENING. THE MEETING WAS MOST CORDIAL, AND I BELIEVE WE ESTABLISHED A SOUND BASIS FOR ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH GREECE'S REMAINING IN THE MILITARY FRAMEWORK OF THE ALLIANCE. PAPANDREOU, TOO, SEEMED PLEASED WITH OUR MEETING, AND HE ENCOURAGED ME TO VISIT GREECE AT AN EARLY DATE.

2. PAPANDREOU AGREED WITH ME THAT FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSIONS SUCH AS THE ONE WE WERE HAVING WERE THE ONLY WAY TO DEAL WITH OUR PROBLEMS, AND HE ASKED THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE. I REMINDED HIM THAT WE HAD REFRAINED FROM MAKING PUBLIC COMMENTS BASED ON THE MANY PRESS REPORTS ABOUT WHAT HE HAD SAID OR BELIEVED, AND HE TOLD ME HOW MUCH HE APPRECIATED OUR BEHAVIOR.

3. PAPANDREOU SAID HE CONSIDERED SECURITY AS GREECE'S NUMBER ONE PROBLEM -- [REDACTED] BUT HE WAS NOT ENTERING THESE DISCUSSIONS FROM A DOGMATIC POSITION, AND HE WOULD NOT MAKE ANY UNILATERAL MOVES WITHOUT PRIOR DISCUSSION. [REDACTED]

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. DESPITE NEWSPAPER REPORTS ABOUT HIS NEED FOR SOME NATO GUARANTEE [REDACTED] ALL HE SOUGHT WAS A GENERAL FORMULA COVERING ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. REGARDING ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID, PAPANDREOU DID NOT SEEK A FIXED RATIO [REDACTED] AND ON THE SO-CALLED ROGERS AGREEMENT THAT COVERED THE RETURN OF GREEK FORCES TO NATO'S INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE, HE ARGUED THAT IT DID NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATELY FOR [REDACTED] THE ALLOCATION OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES. HE PREFERRED THE STATUS QUO. [REDACTED]

5. I TOLD HIM THAT I CONSIDERED NATO'S SOUTHEASTERN FLANK TO BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO US AND TO NATO. I ALSO AGREED THAT SECURITY SHOULD BE GREECE'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVE, BUT IT SEEMED TO

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 OF 02 SLD BRUSSELS 0961

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041608

ME THAT THE BEST WAY TO INSURE THAT SECURITY WAS TO HAVE GREECE AS A FULL-FLEDGED MEMBER OF A STRONG NATO. THIS WAS NOT ONLY THE BEST DEFENSE AGAINST THREATS EXTERNAL TO NATO, BUT, I STRESSED, ALSO THE BEST INSURANCE AGAINST INTERNAL FRICTION. HE DID NOT DISAGREE.

6. WHILE THE MEETING DID NOT REMOVE THE PROBLEMS FOR NATO  
[REDACTED] I BELIEVE IT DID ESTABLISH AN  
ATMOSPHERE THAT WILL HELP TO CONTAIN THE MOST DIVISIVE ISSUES.  
I DO NOT THINK HE INTENDS TO JUMP OFF THE DEEP END, BUT WE'LL  
KNOW MORE BY THE TIME HE DEPARTS BRUSSELS ON THURSDAY. END SUMMARY.  
SLD NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATE

SLD BRUSSELS 0961

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041608

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SLD BRUSSELS 0962  
SIT357 DATE 01/19/82

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041601  
TOR: 342/1333Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE YDHAQH #0962 3421237  
O 081237Z DEC 81 ZYH ZFF 6/3  
FM SLD BRUSSELS

TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO SSO DIA  
STATE/RCI

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE BRU 0849 EYES ONLY SECTION 2 OF 6  
EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY  
WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT  
SSO DIA INFO FOR DEPSECDEF CARLUCCI  
STATE/RCI INFO FOR SECRETARY HAIG  
FROM SECRETARY WEINBERGER

7. ATTENDEES AT THE MEETING WERE AS FOLLOWS: ON THE US SIDE: SECRETARY WEINBERGER, AMBASSADOR BENNETT, DR. IKLE AND MAJOR GENERAL SMITH. ON THE GREEK SIDE: PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU, FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS, DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER DROSSOYANNIS, LT. GENERAL KOURIS AND DIP. COUNSELOR MACHERITSAS.

8. AFTER AN OPENING EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, SECRETARY WEINBERGER TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER THAT HE WAS PLEASED THAT THE LATTER WAS ATTENDING THE DPC MEETING AS DEFENSE MINISTER. HE REGARDED NATO AS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT PART OF OUR INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS WHICH HAD PROTECTED THE PEACE, PARTICULARLY THE PEACE IN EUROPE, FOR MANY YEARS. THE SECRETARY APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR BOTH PARTIES TO LEARN FIRST HAND EXACTLY WHAT THE OTHER'S VIEWS ARE, BECAUSE IF THESE RESPECTIVE VIEWS WERE DETERMINED ONLY FROM READING THE PRESS, THEY WOULD CERTAINLY BE DISTORTED. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT HE AND OTHER US OFFICIALS HAD BEEN VERY CAREFUL NOT TO COMMENT OR TO ISSUE STATEMENTS BASED ON PRESS STORIES ON THIS MATTER, AND HE PERSONALLY HAD A FIRM POLICY NOT TO SAY ANYTHING ON THE SUBJECT UNTIL HEARING FROM THE PRIME MINISTER PERSONALLY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

9. THE PRIME MINISTER, TOO, FOUND DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS TO BE VERY IMPORTANT, FOR IT WAS TRUE THAT A NEWSPAPER DIALOGUE COULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE. MOREOVER, HE BELIEVED THAT THIS KIND OF DIRECT FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSION SHOULD NOT BE THE LAST BETWEEN THE TWO OF THEM, BUT ONLY THE FIRST. THE PRIME MINISTER ASSURED THE SECRETARY THAT HE DID NOT START FROM ANY DOGMATIC POSITION, AND THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT NEITHER DID HE.

10. SUMMARIZING IN CAPSULE FORM, HE SAID THAT THE FIRST PROBLEM FOR GREECE WAS THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY. IT WAS THE ONLY PROBLEM -- IT WAS THAT SIMPLE, AND DIFFICULT. AS FAR AS THE THREAT FROM THE WARSAW PACT IS CONCERNED, NATO CLEARLY DID OFFER SOME GUARANTEE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT AUTOMATIC. IT WAS TRUE THAT OVER THE LAST 15 YEARS THE POLITICAL CLIMATE BETWEEN GREECE'S NORTHERN NEIGHBORS (I.E., USSR), AND GREECE HAD IMPROVED, E.G., THERE HAD BEEN CULTURAL EXCHANGES, ETC. BUT THESE RELATIONS, OF COURSE, COULD ONLY CONTINUE SO LONG AS THERE WERE NO CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS.

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SLD BRUSSELS 0962

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041601

SLD NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATE

SLD BRUSSELS 0962

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041601

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SLD BRUSSELS 0963  
SIT356 DATE 01/19/82

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041632  
TOR: 342/1404Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE YDHAQH #0963 3421237  
O 081237Z DEC 81 ZYH ZFF 6/3  
FM SLD BRUSSELS

TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO SSO DIA  
STATE/RCI

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE BRU 0849 EYES ONLY SECTION 3 OF 6  
EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY  
WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT  
SSO DIA INFO FOR DEPSECDEF CARLUCCI  
STATE/RCI INFO FOR SECRETARY HAIG  
FROM SECRETARY WEINBERGER

11. AT THIS POINT, PAPANDREOU OBSERVED THAT IT WOULD BE MOST  
USEFUL FOR THE SECRETARY TO COME TO GREECE, AND HE EXTENDED THE  
DIRECT INVITATION. CONTINUING, THE PRIME MINISTER STATED THAT

[REDACTED]

GREECE WAS SPENDING SOME 6.8 PERCENT OF  
GNP ON DEFENSE (MORE THAN THE US AND EVERY OTHER NATO NATION), BUT  
THIS WAS DONE AT THE EXPENSE OF EDUCATION, HEALTH, AND DEVELOPMENT.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

12. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT SUCH LEVELS OF DEFENSE SPENDING  
REQUIRED DIFFICULT DECISIONS, AND THE PRIME MINISTER RESPONDED THAT  
THEY WERE INDEED BUT THAT THEY WERE HIS FIRST PRIORITY.

[REDACTED]

THE PRIME MINISTER THEN  
MENTIONED THAT JUST AS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD MENTIONED DISMANTLEMENT  
OF SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES IN HIS ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL (WHICH  
HAD BEEN GREECE'S CHOICE A LONG TIME AGO), [REDACTED]  
HE REPEATED THAT THE KEY PROBLEM FOR GREECE IS SECURITY.  
JUST AS THE UNITED STATES WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE CHANGING STRATEGIC  
BALANCE AND THE FEELING THAT IF THERE WERE NO CHANGE WAR WOULD BE  
MORE LIKELY (A PROPOSITION WITH WHICH HE AGREED), [REDACTED]

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SLD BRUSSELS 0963

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041632

[REDACTED] WHAT THE UNITED STATES WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ON A GLOBAL BASIS WAS EXACTLY WHAT GREECE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ON A REGIONAL BASIS.

13. THIS LEAD TO A DISCUSSION OF MILITARY AID. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT RATIOS, FOR HE DID NOT BELIEVE IN RATIOS. BUT GREECE DID NEED ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT. HE THEN OBSERVED THAT THE SECRETARY MAY HAVE READ IN THE PRESS ABOUT THE NEED FOR SOME KIND OF GUARANTEES [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE HASTENED TO ADD THAT ALL HE REQUIRED WAS A GENERAL FORMULA ONLY -- HE DID NOT NEED MORE.  
SLD NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATE

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SLD BRUSSELS 0964  
SIT355 DATE 01/19/82

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041641  
TOR: 342/1420Z

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE YDHAQH #0964 3421237  
O 081237Z DEC 81 ZYH ZFF 6/3  
FM SLD BRUSSELS

TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO SSO DIA  
STATE/RCI

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE BRU 0849 EYES ONLY SECTION 4 OF 6  
EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY  
WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT  
SSO DIA INFO FOR DEPSECDEF CARLUCCI  
STATE/RCI INFO FOR SECRETARY HAIG  
FROM SECRETARY WEINBERGER

14. THE PRIME MINISTER NEXT TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF THE  
ROGERS' AGREEMENT ON GREECE'S RETURN TO NATO. HE AGREED THAT IT

16. THE SECRETARY COMPLIMENTED THE PRIME MINISTER ON A VERY  
LUCID PRESENTATION, AND HE FOUND VERY LITTLE WITH WHICH TO DISAGREE.  
BEFORE PROCEEDING TO ADDRESS EACH OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S POINTS,  
THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD HAVE ADEQUATE  
OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE VERY SAME AND PERHAPS OTHER ISSUES  
WITH SECRETARY HAIG, FOR HE HAD RAISED SOME ISSUES WHICH WERE  
BEYOND THE PROVINCE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

17. RESPONDING TO EACH OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S POINTS, THE  
SECRETARY BEGAN BY AGREEING WITH THE PROPOSITION THAT GREECE  
OCCUPIES AN IMPORTANT GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION. IT WAS, THEREFORE,  
IMPORTANT TO SEE THAT THE SOUTHEASTERN FLANK OF NATO RECEIVED AS  
MUCH ATTENTION AS THE CENTRAL REGION AND NORTHERN FLANK, AND HE  
OBSERVED THAT HIS RECENT TRIP TO SWEDEN WAS DESIGNED TO FOCUS

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SLD BRUSSELS 0964

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041641

INCREASED ATTENTION ON NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK. HE OBSERVED THAT GENERAL MACARTHUR HAD TOLD HIM THAT WHEN MAKING AN ATTACK, THE FLANKS ARE THE WAY TO GO, AND HE FELT THE SOVIETS, TOO, MIGHT HAVE SUCH A STRATEGY. GREECE WAS ENORMOUSLY IMPORTANT TO US. MOREOVER, HE WAS DELIGHTED TO HEAR THAT THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD NOT MAKE UNILATERAL MOVES WITHOUT PRIOR DISCUSSION. IT WAS FOR THAT REASON THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAD AVOIDED MAKING STATEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF PRESS REPORTS, AT WHICH POINT THE PRIME MINISTER INTERVENED TO AGAIN EXPRESS HIS APPRECIATION FOR THAT.

SLD NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATE

SLD BRUSSELS 0964

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041641

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SLD BRUSSELS 0965  
SIT354 DATE 01/19/82

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041666  
TOR: 342/1442Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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O 081237Z DEC 81 ZYH ZFF 6/3  
FM SLD BRUSSELS


TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO SSO DIA  
STATE/RCI

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE BRU 0849 EYES ONLY SECTION 5 OF 6  
EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY  
WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT  
SSO DIA INFO FOR DEPSECDEF CARLUCCI  
STATE/RCI INFO FOR SECRETARY HAIG  
FROM SECRETARY WEINBERGER

18. CONTINUING, THE SECRETARY STATED THAT SECURITY INDEED WAS THE PRIME OBJECTIVE, AND NATO HAD BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE OVER THE YEARS. HE BELIEVED IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT NATO KEEP AS STRONG, VITAL AND UNITED AS POSSIBLE. HE WAS INTERESTED TO HEAR OF GREECE'S GOOD RELATIONS WITH THEIR "NORTHERN NEIGHBORS," BUT HE POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD CONTINUED TO INCREASE THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH AT A STEADY, SUSTAINED RATE EVEN DURING THE SO-CALLED PERIOD OF DETENTE. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ZERO OPTION PLAN, FOR IT PROVIDED A GOOD CLEAR-CUT, SIMPLE PROPOSAL, AND THAT IT HAD HAD AN EXCELLENT RECEPTION. HE OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOT REJECTED OUTRIGHT THE ZERO OPTION PROPOSAL IN GENEVA, AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEGUN IN A REASONABLE ATMOSPHERE.

19. THE SECRETARY STATED THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS



20. THE SECRETARY THEN OBSERVED THAT HE WAS VERY INTERESTED IN ONE POINT THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE -- THAT GREECE HAS NATO PROTECTION AGAINST THE SOVIET THREAT. HE PREFERRED TO THINK THAT NATO ALSO PROVIDES SECURITY AND INTERNAL PROTECTION TO EACH OF ITS MEMBERS. FACING THE STRONG SOVIET THREAT ALSO, IN HIS VIEW, PROVIDED A STRONG FORCE FOR KEEPING THE ALLIANCE TOGETHER. THE 15 -- AND SOON 16 -- NATO MEMBERS CONSTITUTED STRONG PROTECTION. THIS WAS IN FACT THE EQUIVALENT OF STRONG FAMILY PRESSURES WHICH TEND TO KEEP INDIVIDUAL FAMILY MEMBERS SECURE.

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SLD BRUSSELS 0965

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041666

THE SECRETARY FOUND VERY INTERESTING THE PRIME MINISTER'S MENTION OF A "GENERAL FORMULA," AND HE NOTED THAT GREECE HAD MADE VERY PRAISEWORTHY EFFORTS TO ENHANCE ITS OWN DEFENSE. BUT THE SECRETARY BELIEVED THAT BY STRENGTHENING THE NATO FRAMEWORK AND BY REMAINING UNITED, NATO WOULD BE BETTER ABLE TO DETER ATTACK FROM OUTSIDE, AND THIS WOULD PROTECT EACH MEMBER. THIS WAS THE ESSENCE OF OUR OWN UNITED STATES VIEW -- WE DID NOT INTEND TO SEEK MILITARY SUPERIORITY, BUT ONLY ENOUGH STRENGTH TO DETER AGGRESSION. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED FOR A VERY LARGE INCREASE IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET. WITH REGARD TO THE OTHER SUBJECTS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD RAISED, THEY WERE MATTERS BETTER LEFT TO OTHER DEPARTMENTS OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

SLD NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATE

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

35

PAGE 01 OF 02 SLD BRUSSELS 0966  
SIT351 DATE 01/19/82

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041670  
TOR: 342/1444Z

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NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

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DE YDHAQH #0966 3421237  
O 081237Z DEC 81 ZYH ZFF 6/3  
FM SLD BRUSSELS

TO WHITE HOUSE

INFO SSO DIA  
STATE/RCI

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE BRU 0849 EYES ONLY SECTION 6 OF 6  
EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY  
WHITE HOUSE FOR THE PRESIDENT  
SSO DIA INFO FOR DEPSECDEF CARLUCCI  
STATE/RCI INFO FOR SECRETARY HAIG  
FROM SECRETARY WEINBERGER

21. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT WITH THE FOREGOING. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE GENERAL FORMULA WAS THE PLACE TO START. IN HIS VIEW, THE THING THAT WOULD STRENGTHEN NATO THE MOST WOULD BE TO RELIEVE THE STRAIN BETWEEN MEMBERS. WITH REGARD TO THE ROGERS' AGREEMENT, HE BELIEVED THAT IT CONTAINED, AS HENRY KISSINGER ONCE SAID, A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CALCULATED AMBIGUITY. AND HE OBSERVED THAT IT IS A NATO -- NOT A US -- AGREEMENT, AND PROCEDURES ARE THERE TO DEAL WITH IT. IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DESIGN A FORMULA TO THE EFFECT THAT THE BEST WAY TO CARRY OUT NATO'S PRIMARY MISSION WAS TO ENSURE THAT EACH MEMBER NATION MUST BE SECURE TO ENABLE THEM TO CONCENTRATE THEIR STRENGTH ON DETERRING ATTACK BY A COMMON ENEMY.

22. REGARDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE, THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT IT WAS A VERY IMPORTANT PART OF OUR SECURITY PROGRAM, FOR IT WAS ONE OF THE WAYS TO ACHIEVE REAL STRENGTH. THE SECRETARY WAS INTERESTED TO HEAR THAT THE PRIME MINISTER DIDN'T BELIEVE IN RATIOS OR FORMULAS, FOR HE, TOO, BELIEVED THAT THE AMOUNTS OF MILITARY AID SHOULD BE BASED ON EACH COUNTRY'S NEEDS. ANY REJECTION OF A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRECISE FORMULA (WHICH FORMULA, INCIDENTALLY, WAS A CREATION OF OUR CONGRESS) WOULD BE NO INDICATION THAT WE DID NOT THINK GREECE DID NOT NEED MILITARY AID. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE CONGRESS HAD NOT YET ENACTED THE ADMINISTRATION'S MOST RECENT AID PROPOSALS, BUT HE HOPED THAT THIS WOULD BE SETTLED SOON. HE OBSERVED THAT GAINING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL OF SUFFICIENT MILITARY AID WAS ALWAYS A FIGHT, BUT WE WANTED TO HELP AND TO BE OF AS MUCH ASSISTANCE AS WE CAN. BUT HE ADDED THAT US MILITARY AID WAS DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR, AND WITH THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO, MEMBERS OF NATO.

23. FINALLY, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT THE FOUNDATION EXISTS FOR CONTINUED WARM RELATIONS WITH GREECE. HE HAD MANY CLOSE GREEK FRIENDS, AND HE EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S INVITATION TO VISIT GREECE.

24. THE MEETING CONCLUDED AT 1850 WITH A SHORT DISCUSSION OF WHAT WOULD BE SAID TO THE PRESS. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE TWO WOULD APPEAR TOGETHER WITH EACH MAKING A SHORT AGREED UPON STATEMENT

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SLD BRUSSELS 0966

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041670

AND WITHOUT TAKING QUESTIONS.

REVW 08 DEC 01

SLD NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATE

SLD BRUSSELS 0966

DTG: 081237Z DEC 81 PSN: 041670

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121487

39

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

December 8, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM

JAMES W. NANCE *Bud*

*DR*

SUBJECT:

Secretary Weinberger's Meeting with Prime Minister Papandreou

Secretary Weinberger sent you the following report today.

Begin Text:

I met with Papandreou for nearly an hour in his hotel suite in Brussels soon after my arrival last evening. The meeting was most cordial, and I believe we established a sound basis for addressing the problems associated with Greece's remaining in the military framework of the alliance. Papandreou, too, seemed pleased with our meeting, and he encouraged me to visit Greece at an early date.

Papandreou agreed with me that face-to-face discussions such as the one we were having were the only way to deal with our problems, and he asked that these discussions continue. I reminded him that we had refrained from making public comments based on the many press reports about what he had said or believed, and he told me how much he appreciated our behavior.

Papandreou said he considered security as Greece's number one problem -- security against Turkey. But he was not entering these discussions from a dogmatic position, and he would not make any unilateral moves without prior discussion. In addition, he believed that if the problem in the Aegean were settled, Greece and Turkey could live together as good neighbors.

~~SECRET~~

REVIEW ON DECEMBER 8, 2001  
CLASSIFIED BY ADMIRAL NANCE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR *M4121*, #121487

BY *CW* NARA DATE 11/5/15

~~SECRET~~

Despite newspaper reports about his need for some NATO guarantee against Turkey, all he sought was a general formula covering all members of the alliance. Regarding economic and military aid, Papandreou did not seek a fixed ratio between Greece and Turkey. And on the so-called Rogers agreement that covered the return of Greek forces to NATO's integrated military structure, he argued that it did not provide adequately for the protection of Greek airspace and the allocation of command responsibilities. He preferred the status quo. On Cypress, he offered to withdraw all Greek forces if Turkey would do the same, leaving Cyprus to solve its own internal problems.

I told him that I considered NATO's southeastern flank to be of great importance to us and to NATO. I also agreed that security should be Greece's primary objective but it seemed to me that the best way to insure that security was to have Greece as a full-fledged member of a strong NATO. This was not only the best defense against threats external to NATO, but, I stressed, also the best insurance against internal friction. He did not disagree.

While the meeting did not remove the problems for NATO raised by Papandreou's election, I believe it did establish an atmosphere that will help to contain the most divisive issues. I do not think he intends to jump off the deep end, but we'll know more by the time he departs Brussels on Thursday.

End Text

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Mike Deaver

~~SECRET~~

121488

39

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 0922  
SIT712 DATE 01/12/82

DTG: 241556Z DEC 81 PSN: 013526  
TOR: 364/2126Z

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EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: JUST NOW RECEIVED; LETTER TO PRESIDENT CHECKLISTED 12/26

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHTH #0922/01 3581559  
O 241556Z DEC 81  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7182

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 2 ATHENS 20922  
NODIS  
E.O. 12065: RDS 12/24/96 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, PL, GR  
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH PAPANDREOU ON POLAND

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT A SMALL, INFORMAL GATHERING LAST NIGHT I SPOKE WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU IN FRANK TERMS ABOUT POLAND. HE TOLD ME THAT POLISH AMBASSADOR HAD CALLED ON HIM URGING THAT GREECE AVOID STATEMENTS THAT WOULD MAKE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S JOB MORE DIFFICULT. THE POLISH AMBASSADOR HAD SAID THAT SOVIET INTERVENTION WAS A REAL DANGER AND THAT IT WAS VITAL THAT THE JARUZELSKI GOVERNMENT BE ENABLED TO RESTORE ORDER. I TOLD PAPANDREOU THAT POLISH AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS WERE UNCONVINCING. REPRESSION WAS REPRESSION, AND I THOUGHT THAT PAPANDREOU, AS LEADER OF A GOVERNMENT WHICH CALLED ITSELF SOCIALIST AND DEMOCRATIC, HAD A PARTICULAR OBLIGATION TO SPEAK OUT. HE MADE NO PROMISES ON THIS POINT, BUT SAID HE HAD DECIDED TO PERMIT PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION OF THE POLISH SITUATION WHEN PARLIAMENT RETURNS IN EARLY JANUARY. THIS MORNING, PAPANDREOU TELEPHONED ME AFTER RECEIVING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE AND SAID HE WOULD BE RESPONDING IN WRITING ON CHRISTMAS DAY. END SUMMARY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. YESTERDAY EVENING, I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PRIVATE AND INFORMAL DISCUSSION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU. THIS TOOK PLACE IN A SMALL GATHERING WITH OUR WIVES PRESENT.

4. THE SUBJECT WAS OPENED UP BY PAPANDREOU WHO TOLD ME THAT POLISH AMBASSADOR LEWANDOWSKI HAD COME TO SEE HIM ON DECEMBER 22 TO BRIEF HIM ON THE SITUATION. PAPANDREOU HAD MET LEWANDOWSKI BEFORE, HAVING TALKED WITH HIM SEVERAL TIMES WHILE STILL LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION. HE HAD ALWAYS FOUND HIM TO BE A CALM AND EXPERIENCED DIPLOMAT WHO HAD OFTEN EXPRESSED HIS ADMIRATION FOR THE SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT AND HAD NEVER APPEARED DOCTRINAIRE. (AS DEPARTMENT KNOWS, LEWANDOWSKI IS ONE OF POLAND'S MOST EXPERIENCED DIPLOMATS HAVING BEEN ACTIVE AS POLISH ICC COMMISSIONER IN SAIGON IN 1966 IN A SERIES

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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OF DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES WITH THE VIET CONG THAT WERE CONDUCTED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE US AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS UNDER THE CODE NAME OF OPERATION MARIGOLD.)

5. IN THEIR MEETING ON DECEMBER 22, PAPANDREOU FOUND LEWANDOWSKI A CHANGED MAN. HE SEEMED EXTREMELY DISTRAUGHT, CHAIN SMOKED, AND EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT EVENTS IN POLAND MIGHT SPIN OUT OF CONTROL AND LEAD TO A MASSIVE SOVIET INTERVENTION. THE PURPOSE OF LEWANDOWSKI'S CALL, SAID PAPANDREOU, WAS TO URGE THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO BE "UNDERSTANDING" OF THE MEASURES THE JARUZELSKI GOVERNMENT WAS OBLIGED TO TAKE TO RESTORE ORDER. ABOVE ALL, LEWANDOWSKI SAID, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT ADD TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S PROBLEMS BY MAKING STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION. IF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT LOST CONTROL, SOVIET INTERVENTION WOULD INEVITABLY FOLLOW AND THIS WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF OTHER EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS.

6. I OBSERVED THAT LEWANDOWSKI WAS OBVIOUSLY SPEAKING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS AND HIS DISTRAUGHT FRAME OF MIND MIGHT WELL INDICATE THAT HE WAS NOT CARRYING THEM OUT WITH ANY ENTHUSIASM. I SAID THAT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, SOVIET INTERVENTION WOULD CERTAINLY BE A CATASTROPHE BUT JARUZELSKI'S REPRESSION OF THE POLISH WORKERS WAS NO BETTER. PAPANDREOU SAID LEWANDOWSKI HAD ARGUED THAT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

JARUZELSKI WAS A "POLISH NATIONALIST" AND THAT ONCE INTERNAL ORDER HAD BEEN RESTORED DIALOGUE WITH SOLIDARITY AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION COULD BE RESUMED.

7. I REPLIED THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE OPPOSITE WAS THE CASE. IF SOLIDARITY WERE DEFEATED, I DID NOT SEE HOW THE POLISH REGIME COULD RESUME THE DIALOGUE AND I THOUGHT THAT FAR FROM RESUMING THE PROCESS OF INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION, THE JARUZELSKI GOVERNMENT WOULD IMMEDIATELY REPEAL EVEN THOSE REFORMS THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN EFFECTED. THE SOVIETS WOULD INSIST ON THIS.

8. PAPANDREOU SAID LEWANDOWSKI HAD MADE THE POINT THAT LECH WALESA AND THE OTHER SOLIDARITY LEADERS WERE INEXPERIENCED AND UNREALISTIC. THEY WERE YOUNG AND DID NOT KNOW THAT RASH ACTIONS COULD LEAD TO BLOOD-SHED VIOLENCE AND EVEN WAR.

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9. AT THIS POINT MRS. PAPANDREOU INTERVENED TO SAY SHE FOUND LEWANDOWSKI'S REASONING COMPLETELY UNCONVINCING. SHE SAID TO HER HUSBAND, "YOU SEEM TO THINK THAT THE POLISH AMBASSADOR WAS SPEAKING TO YOU HONESTLY, BUT YOU, YOURSELF, SAID THAT HE USED TO PRAISE WALESKA AND SOLIDARITY. WHEN HE TALKED TO YOU BEFORE, HE APPARENTLY DID NOT SAY THAT WALESKA AND THE OTHER SOLIDARITY LEADERS WERE RASH AND UNRELIABLE. WHY DO YOU BELIEVE HIM NOW?"

10. PRIME MINISTER REACTED DEFENSIVELY TO THIS FORCEFUL PRESENTATION BY HIS WIFE. HE SAID HE DID NOT NECESSARILY AGREE WITH LEWANDOWSKI'S REASONING, BUT HE SYMPATHIZED WITH HIS SITUATION. WE WOULD ALL BEAR HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY, HE SAID, IF BY INCREASING PUBLIC PRESSURES ON THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WE OPENED THE DOORS TO SOVIET INTERVENTION.

11. I THEN SAID THAT I WAS CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THOSE HISTORIC TURNING POINTS WHEN STATESMEN COULD NOT AFFORD TO LOOK THE OTHER WAY. IT HAD BEEN DEEPLY DISAPPOINTING TO ME THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN WILLING TO PERMIT DISCUSSION OF THE POLISH SITUATION IN PARLIAMENT BEFORE THE CHRISTMAS RECESS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE GREEK GOVERNMENT PRIDED ITSELF ON BEING DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIALIST. I DID NOT SEE HOW THE PRIME MINISTER COULD AVOID SPEAKING OUT IN STRONG TERMS AND GIVING OTHER PARTIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES AS WELL. PAPANDREOU THEN SAID, "I HAVE DECIDED TO PERMIT DEBATE OF POLAND WHEN PARLIAMENT COMES BACK IN EARLY JANUARY." I SAID THIS WAS GOOD BUT THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT HE HAD AN OBLIGATION TO SPEAK OUT HIMSELF. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD MY VIEWPOINT AND WOULD THINK ABOUT IT. GREECE HAD ALREADY AGREED TO A SECOND AND STRONGER EEC STATEMENT ON POLAND. PERHAPS THERE WERE OTHER THINGS HE COULD SAY IN THE NAME OF GREECE.

12. APPEARING TO THINK ALOUD, HE SAID IT WAS ALREADY EVIDENT THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND WERE VERY DIFFERENT FROM DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968. THE

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POLES WERE DIFFERENT. HE KNEW BECAUSE HIS MATERNAL GRANDMOTHER HAD BEEN POLISH. FURTHERMORE, THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT. IN PRAGUE THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD TRIED TO LIBERALIZE ITSELF; IN WARSAW THE PEOPLE -- THE WORKERS -- WERE LEADING THE FIGHT FOR LIBERALIZATION.

13. I AGREED WITH HIM, SAYING THAT NOTHING LIKE THIS HAD HAPPENED IN EUROPE SINCE THE PARIS COMMUNE OF 1871. HE SAID, "ONE THING IS CLEAR: THIS REVEALS THE FINAL MORAL BANKRUPTCY OF THE SOVIET UNION." IT WOULD ALSO, HE ADDED WITH SOME SATISFACTION, CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE EXTERIOR. FLORAKIS (LEADER OF MOSCOW-LINE KKE) WAS A STALINIST WHO WOULD ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY WHATEVER SOVIET UNION DID IN POLAND.

14. COMMENT: THIS MORNING WE DELIVERED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO PAPANDREOU AT HIS HOUSE IN KASTRI. SHORTLY AFTER RECEIVING IT HE TELEPHONED ME TO SAY THAT HE WANTED TO ANSWER THE LETTER AND WOULD HAVE HIS RESPONSE DELIVERED TO ME AT THE EMBASSY ON CHRISTMAS DAY FOR TRANSMITTAL TO WASHINGTON. STEARNS

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