

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Country File:
Records

Folder Title: Greece (12/26/1981-05/10/1982)

Box: RAC Box 15

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digitized-textual-material>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Inventories, visit:

<https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/white-house-inventories>

Contact a reference archivist at: **reagan.library@nara.gov**

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/research-support/citation-guide>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Last Updated: 09/22/2023

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KML 10/20/2011

File Folder GREECE (12/26/1981-05/10/1982)

FOIA

M11-412

Box Number 15

DRAENOS

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121490	CABLE	ATHENS 20924 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	12/26/1981	B1
121491	CABLE	SAME TEXT AS DOC 121490 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	12/26/1981	B1
121492	CABLE	STATE 342559 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	4	12/30/1981	B1
121493	CABLE	ATHENS 2219 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	2/9/1982	B1
121494	CABLE	ATHENS 0679 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	6	1/14/1982	B1
121495	CABLE	ATHENS 0725 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	2	1/15/1982	B1
121497	MEMO	KENNETH DEGRAFFENREID TO WILLIAM CLARK RE LETTER R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	1/22/1982	B1
121503	CABLE	ATHENS 0941 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	4	1/19/1982	B1
121504	CABLE	STATE 016720 R 3/18/2013 M412/1	1	1/22/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

Withdrawer

KML 10/20/2011

File Folder GREECE (12/26/1981-05/10/1982)

FOIA

M11-412

Box Number 15

DRAENOS

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121496	PROFILE SHEET	RE LETTER <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	1	1/22/1982	B1
121498	CABLE	STATE 035496 <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	2	2/10/1982	B1
121499	CABLE	ATHENS 4134 <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	6	3/14/1982	B1
121500	MEMO	JAMES M. RENTSCHLER TO WILLIAM CLARK RE POSSIBILITY OF MEETING <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	1	4/5/1982	B1
121501	MEMO	JIM RENTSCHLER TO BUD MCFARLANE RE NEGOTIATIONS <i>R 11/5/2015 M412/1</i>	1	4/5/1982	B1
121502	CABLE	ATHENS 7414 <i>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</i>	4	5/10/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

121490 /

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 0924
SIT533 DATE 12/30/81

DTG: 261341Z DEC 81 PSN: 008610
TOR: 360/1523Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB: PIPE, RENT, STEARMAN
WHSR COMMENT: C H E C K L I S T

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #0924 3601341
O 261341Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7185

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 20924
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/26/01 (STEARNS, M.) OR-M
TAGS: PL, UR, PINT, NATO
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU'S REEPPONSE TO
- PRESIDENT REAGAN
REF: A) ATHENS 20922, B) STATE 33901

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT (CLASSIFIED SECRET BY GOG) OF
PRIME MINITER PAPANDREOU'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S LETTER ON POLAND (STATE 339301). II WAS
DELIVERED TO EMBASSY TODAY (DEC. 26) AT 1440 LOCAL.
SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE POUCHED.

3. BEGIN TEXT
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER
24TH, AS WELL AS THE TWO ENCLOSURES (LETTER TO
GENERAL JARUZELSKI AND LETTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV).
I AM FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH YOU, THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL
TO MAKE CLEAR TO BOTH THE POLISH AUTHORITIES AND THE
USSR THAT THE REPRESSION IN POLAND MUST CEASE AND
THAT A GENUINE EFFORT MUST BE UNDERTAKEN TO REACH A
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.
IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I JOINED MY PARTNERS IN THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN A DEMARCHE (BY THE PRESIDENCY
REPRESENTATIVE) IN WARSAW. THE RELEVANT TEXT IS AS
FOLLOWS: "THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE TEN HAVE READ WITH
GREAT CONCERN THE NUMEROUS REPORTS OF THE SUPPRESSION
OF TRADE UNION RIGHTS, INTERNMENT, INHUMAN CONDI-
TIONS OF DETENTION AND EVEN DEATHS IN POLAND IN
RECENT DAYS. THEY DENOUNCE THE GRAVE VIOLATION OF
THE HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE WHICH
IS IMPLIED IN THESE REPORTS. THEY HAVE NOTED THE
MILITARY COUNCIL'S STATED DESIRE TO RETURN TO RENEWAL
AND REFORM, BUT ARE CONCERNED THAT THIS STATED AIM SEEMS
DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE WITH THE ACTUAL SITUATION. IN THEIR
(EARLIER) DECLARATION OF DECEMBER 15 THEIR FOREIGN
MINISTRIES MADE CLEAR THEIR VIEWS. THE TEN
CONSIDER THAT THEY MUST NOW EXPRESS THE GROWING
CONCERN SHARED BY PUBLIC OPINION AND GOVERNMENTS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121490

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 0924

DTG: 261341Z DEC 81 PSN: 008610

ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND. MOREOVER, THEY CONSIDER THAT IN EUROPE, WHERE MUTUAL TRUST IS BASED ON RESPECT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THE CURRENT REPRESSION IN POLAND CONSTITUTES CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THIS ACT WHICH THEY CANNOT IGNORE."

THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD MADE A SIMILAR DECLARATION A FEW DAYS PRIOR TO THE DEMARCH BY THE TEN.

I AM VERY PLEASED TO NOTE THAT THE FIRM STANCE AND STRONG ACTION TO WHICH YOU REFER IN YOUR LETTER DO NOT IMPLY (AT LEAST AT PRESENT) A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESSES IN WHICH YOU ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED. FOR, AS YOU WELL KNOW, THERE IS A RATHER WIDESPREAD FEELING IN EUROPE THAT THE CONTINUATION OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IS OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE IN PREVENTING A TOTAL, FRONTAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. YOU ARE FULLY JUSTIFIED WHEN YOU STATE THAT THE USSR IS DEEPLY COMPLICIT IN THE RECENT TRAGIC DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND. THE USSR DIRECTIVES TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL IN POLAND ARE ACCOMPANIED BY THE THREAT OF A DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION WHICH COULD WELL LEAD TO A BLOODY CONFRONTATION AND TO THE COMPLETE ANNIHILATION OF THE POLISH NATION. FINALLY, I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT WE SHOULD JOIN IN SUCH MEASURES AS WOULD MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES FOR A PEACEFUL EVOLUTION IN POLAND THROUGH A PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. SINCERELY, ANDREAS G.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PAPANDREOU. END TEXT. STEARNS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

121491 3

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 0924
SIT385 DATE 12/30/81

DTG: 261341Z DEC 81 PSN: 008610
TOR: 360/1523Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: RVA NAN COL JP VP SIT EOB
EOB: PIPE, RENT, STEARMAN
WHSR COMMENT: C H E C K L I S T

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #0924 3601341
O 261341Z DEC 81
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7185

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 20924

NODIS
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 12/26/01 (STEARNS, M.) OR-M
TAGS: PL, UR, PINT, NATO
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU'S REEPPONSE TO
- PRESIDENT REAGAN
REF: A) ATHENS 20922, B) STATE 33901

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS TEXT (CLASSIFIED SECRET BY GOG) OF
PRIME MINITER PAPANDREOU'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S LETTER ON POLAND (STATE 339301). II WAS
DELIVERED TO EMBASSY TODAY (DEC. 26) AT 1440 LOCAL.
SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL BE POUCHED.

3. BEGIN TEXT
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
I WAS PLEASED TO RECEIVE YOUR LETTER OF DECEMBER
24TH, AS WELL AS THE TWO ENCLOSURES (LETTER TO
GENERAL JARUZELSKI AND LETTER TO PRESIDENT BREZHNEV).
I AM FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH YOU, THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL
TO MAKE CLEAR TO BOTH THE POLISH AUTHORITIES AND THE
USSR THAT THE REPRESSION IN POLAND MUST CEASE AND
THAT A GENUINE EFFORT MUST BE UNDERTAKEN TO REACH A
NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.
IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I JOINED MY PARTNERS IN THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY IN A DEMARCHE (BY THE PRESIDENCY
REPRESENTATIVE) IN WARSAW. THE RELEVANT TEXT IS AS
FOLLOWS: "THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE TEN HAVE READ WITH
GREAT CONCERN THE NUMEROUS REPORTS OF THE SUPPRESSION
OF TRADE UNION RIGHTS, INTERNMENT, INHUMAN CONDI-
TIONS OF DETENTION AND EVEN DEATHS IN POLAND IN
RECENT DAYS. THEY DENOUNCE THE GRAVE VIOLATION OF
THE HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF THE POLISH PEOPLE WHICH
IS IMPLIED IN THESE REPORTS. THEY HAVE NOTED THE
MILITARY COUNCIL'S STATED DESIRE TO RETURN TO RENEWAL
AND REFORM, BUT ARE CONCERNED THAT THIS STATED AIM SEEMS
DIFFICULT TO RECONCILE WITH THE ACTUAL SITUATION. IN THEIR
(EARLIER) DECLARATION OF DECEMBER 15 THEIR FOREIGN
MINISTRIES MADE CLEAR THEIR VIEWS. THE TEN
CONSIDER THAT THEY MUST NOW EXPRESS THE GROWING
CONCERN SHARED BY PUBLIC OPINION AND GOVERNMENTS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM412 #121491

BY KML NARA DATE 3/12/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 0924

DTG: 261341Z DEC 81 PSN: 008610

ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND. MOREOVER, THEY CONSIDER THAT IN EUROPE, WHERE MUTUAL TRUST IS BASED ON RESPECT OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT, THE CURRENT REPRESSION IN POLAND CONSTITUTES CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THIS ACT WHICH THEY CANNOT IGNORE."

THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD MADE A SIMILAR DECLARATION A FEW DAYS PRIOR TO THE DEMARCH BY THE TEN.

I AM VERY PLEASED TO NOTE THAT THE FIRM STANCE AND STRONG ACTION TO WHICH YOU REFER IN YOUR LETTER DO NOT IMPLY (AT LEAST AT PRESENT) A WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESSES IN WHICH YOU ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED. FOR, AS YOU WELL KNOW, THERE IS A RATHER WIDESPREAD FEELING IN EUROPE THAT THE CONTINUATION OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IS OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE IN PREVENTING A TOTAL, FRONTAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT. YOU ARE FULLY JUSTIFIED WHEN YOU STATE THAT THE USSR IS DEEPLY COMPLICIT IN THE RECENT TRAGIC DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND. THE USSR DIRECTIVES TO THE MILITARY COUNCIL IN POLAND ARE ACCOMPANIED BY THE THREAT OF A DIRECT MILITARY INTERVENTION WHICH COULD WELL LEAD TO A BLOODY CONFRONTATION AND TO THE COMPLETE ANNIHILATION OF THE POLISH NATION. FINALLY, I SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT WE SHOULD JOIN IN SUCH MEASURES AS WOULD MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES FOR A PEACEFUL EVOLUTION IN POLAND THROUGH A PROCESS OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. SINCERELY, ANDREAS G.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PAPANDREOU. END TEXT. STEARNS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

121492 5

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2559
SIT454 DATE 12/30/81

DTG: 300401Z DEC 81 PSN: 012637
TOR: 364/0553Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NLRR M412 #121492

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

MESSAGE:

ROUTINE
DE RUEHC #2559/01 3640552
R 300401Z DEC 81 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO CIA WASHDC 8961
SECDEF WASHDC 4660
WHITE HOUSE 7027
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 342559
NODIS
MILITARY ADDEE HANDLE AS SPEC EXCLUSIVE
FOLLOWING ATHENS 20922 DATED DEC 24 SENT ACTION SECSTATE
BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO:
QUOTE: ~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 20922
NODIS
E. O. 12065: RDS 12/24/96 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PL, GR
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH PAPANDREOU ON POLAND

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: AT A SMALL, INFORMAL GATHERING LAST NIGHT I SPOKE WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU IN FRANK TERMS ABOUT POLAND. HE TOLD ME THAT POLISH AMBASSADOR HAD CALLED ON HIM URGING THAT GREECE AVOID STATEMENTS THAZ WOULD MAKE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S JOB MORE DIFFICULT. THE POLISH AMBASSADOR HAD SAID THAT SOVIET INTERVENTION WAS A REAL DANGER AND THAT IT WAS VITAL THAT THE JARUZELSKI GOVERNMENT BE ENABLED TO RESTORE ORDER. I TOLD PAPANDREOU THAT POLISH AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS WERE UNCONVINCING. REPRESSION WAS REPRESSION, AND I THOUGHT THAT PAPANDREOU, AS LEADER OF A GOVERNMENT WHICH CALLED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ITSELF SOCIALIST AND DEMOCRATIC, HAD A PARTICULAR OBLIGATION TO SPEAK OUT. HE MADE NO PROMISES ON THIS POINT, BUT SAID HE HAD DECIDED TO PERMIT PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION OF THE POLISH SITUATION WHEN PARLIAMENT RETURNS IN EARLY JANUARY. THIS MORNING, PAPANDREOU TELEPHONED ME AFTER RECEIVING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S MESSAGE AND SAIDSHE WOULD BE RESPONDING IN WRITING ON CHRISTMAS DAY. END SUMMARY

3. YESTERDAY EVENING, I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PRIVATE AND INFORMAL DISCUSSION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU. THIS TOOK PLACE IN A SMALL GATHERING WITH OUR WIVES PRESENT.

4. THE SUBJECT WAS OPENED UP BY PAPANDREOU WHO TOLD ME THAT POLISH AMBASSADOR LEWANDOWSKI HAD COME TO SEE HIM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2559

DTG: 300401Z DEC 81 PSN: 012637

ON DECEMBER 22 TO BRIEF HIM ON THE SITUATION. PAPANDREOU HAD MET LEWANDOWSKI BEFORE, HAVING TALKED WITH HIM SEVERAL TIMES WHILE STILL LEADER OF THE OPPOSITION. HE HAD ALWAYS FOUND HIM TO BE A CALM AND EXPERIENCED DIPLOMAT WHO HAD OFTEN EXPRESSED HIS ADMIRATION FOR THE SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT AND HAD NEVER APPEARED DOCTRINAIRE. (AS DEPARTMENT KNOWS, LEWANDOWSKI IS ONE OF POLAND'S MOST EXPERIENCED DIPLOMATS HAVING BEEN ACTIVE AS POLISH ICC COMMISSIONER IN SAIGON IN 1966 IN A SERIES OF DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES WITH THE VIET CONG THAT WERE CONDUCTED WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE US AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS UNDER THE CODE NAME OF OPERATION MARIGOLD.)

5. IN THEIR MEETING ON DECEMBER 22, PAPANDREOU FOUND LEWANDOWSKI A CHANGED MAN. HE SEEMED EXTREMELY DISTRAUGHT, CHAIN SMOKED, AND EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN THAT EVENTS IN POLAND MIGHT SPIN OUT OF CONTROL AND LEAD TO A MASSIVE SOVIET INTERVENTION. THE PURPOSE OF LEWANDOWSKI'S CALL, SAID PAPANDREOU, WAS TO URGE THE GREEK GOVERNMENT TO BE "UNDERSTANDING" OF THE MEASURES THE JARUZELSKI GOVERNMENT WAS OBLIGED TO TAKE TO RESTORE ORDER. ABOVE ALL, LEWANDOWSKI SAID, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT ADD TO THE POLISH GOVERNMENT'S PROBLEMS BY MAKING STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION. IF THE POLISH GOVERNMENT LOST CONTROL, SOVIET INTERVENTION WOULD INEVITABLY FOLLOW AND THIS WOULD NOT BE IN THE INTERESTS OF OTHER EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. I OBSERVED THAT LEWANDOWSKI WAS OBVIOUSLY SPEAKING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS AND HIS DISZRAUGHT FRAME OF MIND MIGHT WELL INDICATE THAT HE WAS NOT CARRYING THEM OUT WITH ANY ENTHUSIASM. I SAID THAT FROM THE STANDPOINT OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES, SOVIET INTERVENTION WOULD CERTAINLY BE A CATASTROPHE BUT JARUZELSKI'S REPRESSION OF THE POLISH WORKERS WAS NO BETTER. PAPANDREOU SAID LEWANDOWSKI HAD ARGUED THAT JARUZELSKI WAS A "POLISH NATIONALIST" AND THAT ONCE INTERNAL ORDER HAD BEEN RESTORED DIALOGUE WITH SOLIDARITY AND THE PROCESS OF INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION COULD BE RESUMED.

7. I REPLIED THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE OPPOSITE WAS THE CASE. IF SOLIDARITY WERE DEFEATED, I DID NOT SEE HOW THE POLISH REGIME COULD RESUME THE DIALOGUE AND I THOUGHT THAT FAR FROM RESUMING THE PROCESS OF INTERNAL LIBERALIZATION, THE JARUZELSKI GOVERNMENT WOULD IMMEDIATELY REPEAL EVEN THOSE REFORMS THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN EFFECTED. THE SOVIETS WOULD INSIST ON THIS.

8. PAPANDREOU SAID LEWANDOWSKI HAD MADE THE POINT THAT LECH WALESA AND THE OTHER SOLIDARITY LEADERS WERE INEXPERIENCED AND SUNREALISTIC. THEY WERE YOUNG AND DID NOT KNOW THAT RASH ACTIONS COULD LEAD TO BLOOD-SHED VIOLENCE AND EVEN WAR.

9. AT THIS POINT MRS. PAPANDREOU INTERVENED TO SAY SHE FOUND LEWANDOWSKI'S REASONING COMPLETELY UNCONVINCING.

~~SECRET~~

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2559
SIT499 RECALLED

DTG: 300401Z DEC 81 PSN: 012638
TOR: 364/0554Z

DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001

ROUTINE
DE RUEHC #2559/02 3640552
R 300401Z DEC 81 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO CIA WASHDC 8962
SECDEF WASHDC 4661
WHITE HOUSE 7028

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 342559

NODIS

MILITARY ADDEE HANDLE AS SPEC EXCLUSIVE
SHE SAID TO HER HUSBAND, "YOU SEEM TO THINK THAT THE
POLISH AMBASSADOR WAS SPEAKING TO YOU HONESTLY, BUT
YOU, YOURSELF, SAID THAT HE USED TO PRAISE WALESA AND
SOLIDARITY. WHEN HE TALKED TO YOU BEFORE, HE APPARENTLY
DID NOT SAY THAT WALESA AND THE OTHER SOLIDARITY
LEADERS WERE RASH AND UNRELIABLE. WHY DO YOU BELIEVE
HIM NOW?"

10. PRIME MINISTER REACTED DEFENSIVELY TO THIS FORCE-
FUL PRESENTATION BY HIS WIFE. HE SAID HE DID NOT
NECESSARILY AGREE WITH LEWANDOWSKI'S REASONING, BUT HE
SYMPATHIZED WITH HIS SITUATION. WE WOULD ALL BEAR HEAVY
RESPONSIBILITY, HE SAID, IF BY INCREASING PUBLIC
PRESSURES ON THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WE OPENED THE DOORS
TO SOVIET INTERVENTION.

11. I THEN SAID THAT I WAS CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS
ONE OF THOSE HISTORIC TURNING POINTS WHEN STATESMEN
COULD NOT AFFORD TO LOOK THE OTHER WAY. IT HAD BEEN
DEEPLY DISAPPOINTING TO ME THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT
HAD NOT BEEN WILLING TO PERMIT DISCUSSION OF THE POLISH
SITUATION IN PARLIAMENT BEFORE THE CHRISTMAS RECESS.
THE GREEK GOVERNMENT PRIDED ITSELF ON BEING DEMOCRATIC
AND SOCIALIST. I DID NOT SEE HOW THE PRIME MINISTER
COULD AVOID SPEAKING OUT IN STRONG TERMS AND GIVING
OTHER PARTIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES AS
WELL. PAPANDREOU THEN SAID, "I HAVE DECIDED TO PERMIT
DEBATE OF POLAND WHEN PARLIAMENT COMES BACK IN EARLY
JANUARY." I SAID THIS WAS GOOD BUT THAT IT SEEMED TO
ME THAT HE HAD AN OBLIGATION TO SPEAK OUT HIMSELF. HE
SAID HE UNDERSTOOD MY VIEWPOINT AND WOULD THINK ABOUT
IT. GREECE HAD ALREADY AGREED TO A SECOND AND STRONGER
EEC STATEMENT ON POLAND. PERHAPS THERE WERE OTHER
THINGS HE COULD SAY IN THE NAME OF GREECE.

12. APPEARING TO THINK ALOUD, HE SAID IT WAS ALREADY
EVIDENT THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN POLAND WERE VERY DIFFERENT
FROM DEVELOPMENTS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968. THE
POLES WERE DIFFERENT. HE KNEW BECAUSE HIS MATERNAL
GRANDMOTHER HAD BEEN POLISH. FURTHERMORE, THE SITUATION
WAS DIFFERENT. IN PRAGUE THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD TRIED
TO LIBERALIZE ITSELF; IN WARSAW THE PEOPLE -- THE
WORKERS -- WERE LEADING THE FIGHT FOR LIBERALIZATION.

13. I AGREED WITH HIM, SAYING THAT NOTHING LIKE THIS
HAD HAPPENED IN EUROPE SINCE THE PARIS COMMUNE OF 1871.
HE SAID, "ONE THING IS CLEAR: THIS REVEALS THE FINAL
MORAL BANKRUPTCY OF THE SOVIET UNION." IT WOULD ALSO,
HE ADDED WITH SOME SATISFACTION, CAUSE SERIOUS PROBLEMS
FOR THE GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE EXTERIOR. FLORAKIS
(LEADER OF MOSCOW-LINE KKE) WAS A STALINIST WHO WOULD

~~SECRET~~

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

8

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 2559

DTG: 300401Z DEC 81 PSN: 012638

ATTEMPT TO JUSTIFY WHATEVER SOVIET UNION DID IN
POLAND.

14. COMMENT: THIS MORNING WE DELIVERED PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S MESSAGE TO PAPANDREOU AT HIS HOUSE IN KASTRI.
SHORTLY AFTER RECEIVING IT HE TELEPHONED ME TO SAY
THAT HE WANTED TO ANSWER THE LETTER AND WOULD HAVE HIS
RESPONSE DELIVERED TO ME AT THE EMBASSY ON CHRISTMAS
DAY FOR TRANSMITTAL TO WASHINGTON.
STEARNS UNQUOTE STOESSEL
BT

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

N
O
D
I
S

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

121493

9

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 2219
SIT853 DATE 02/16/82

DTG: 091540Z FEB 82 PSN: 008648
TOR: 040/1730Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: JP VP EOB SIT
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTE #2219 0401541
O 091540Z FEB 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7913

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATHENS 02219

NODIS

E.O. 12065: GDS 2/9/88 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M

TAGS: OVIP, GR

SUBJECT: GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME VISIT BY

- SECRETARY HAIG

REF: ATHENS 1872

1. (1 - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AMBASSADOR PETROS MOLYVIATIS, POLITICAL COUNSELOR TO PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS, CALLED ME THIS AFTERNOON (FEBRUARY 9) TO SAY THAT HE HAD TALKED WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU THIS MORNING ABOUT A POSSIBLE VISIT TO GREECE BY SECRETARY HAIG (REFTEL).

3. PAPANDREOU HAD EXPRESSED "ABSOLUTE WILLINGNESS" TO RECEIVE SECRETARY IN ATHENS "WITH FULL HONORS" AND "THE EARLIER THE BETTER." WHILE MOLYVIATIS HAD NOT DISCUSSED POSSIBLE DATES WITH PAPANDREOU, HE SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER EXPECTED TO BE IN GREECE DURING MONTHS OF MARCH AND APRIL. (AS REPORTED SEPTEL, PAPANDREOU'S CHEF DE CABINET CHRISTOS MACHERITSAS TOLD US LAST NIGHT THAT PRIME MINISTER DID NOT EXPECT TO ATTEND NPG IN SAN FRANCISCO MARCH 23-24.) PAPANDREOU IS STILL SCHEDULED TO MAKE HIS POSTPONED TRIP TO CYPRUS FEBRUARY 27-MARCH 1. AS FAR AS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

KARAMANLIS'S MOVEMENTS ARE CONCERNED, MOLYVIATIS SAID THAT PRESIDENT WOULD BE OUT OF GREECE MARCH 3-16 ON A TRIP TO INDIA AND AUSTRALIA, AND APRIL 5-10 TO ITALY.

4. I TOLD MOLYVIATIS THAT I WOULD CONVEY FOREGOING TO WASHINGTON AND LET HIM KNOW REACTION. MOLYVIATIS URGED THAT WE WORK OUT SOME TENTATIVE DATES AND SEE WHETHER A VISIT COULD BE DEFINITELY SCHEDULED. HE SUGGESTED THAT I REPORT BACK TO PAPANDREOU THROUGH HIM SINCE HE WAS NOT SURE WHO ELSE IN GREEK GOVERNMENT WAS PRIVY TO PRIME MINISTER'S THOUGHTS.

5. COMMENT: I REGARD MOLYVIATIS'S COMMENTS AS FIRM INDICATION THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD WELCOME A VISIT BY SECRETARY HAIG TO ATHENS IN NEAR FUTURE. I

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121493

BY KML NARA DATE 3/12/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

10

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 2219

DTG: 091540Z FEB 82 PSN: 008648

FURTHERMORE BELIEVE THAT A VISIT BY SECRETARY AT THIS TIME COULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT -- EVEN DECISIVE -- EFFECT ON POLICIES OF PAPANDREOU GOVERNMENT ON KEY ISSUES. I THEREFORE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT SECRETARY COME TO ATHENS AND THAT I BE AUTHORIZED TO PROPOSE POSSIBLE DATES TO GOG. STEARNS

ATHENS 2219

DTG: 091540Z FEB 82 PSN: 008648

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

121494

11

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 0679
SIT116 RECALLED

DTG: 141808Z JAN 82 PSN: 031995
TOR: 015/0017Z

DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

OP IMMED
STU6773
DE RUEHTH #0679/01 0141820
O 141808Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121494

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7481

BY KM NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 00679

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS- (1) (4) 1/14/02 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, PINT, MARR, MASS, NATO, GR, US
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
REF: ATHENS 417

1. ~~IS~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN A PRIVATE DISCUSSION WITH ME TODAY, PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU STATED THAT GREECE WANTED TO REMAIN IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. THE FORM OF GREECE'S ASSOCIATION WITH NATO WAS TO BE NEGOTIATED BUT NOT THE FACT. DESPITE GREEK RESERVATIONS ABOUT SOME PROVISIONS OF THE NAC COMMUNIQUE ON POLAND, PAPANDREOU UNDERLINED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT AGREED WITH ITS WESTERN PARTNERS ABOUT WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN POLAND AND WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE. THESE EFFORTS REVEALED THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. I TOLD PAPANDREOU THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO MAKE THESE POINTS PUBLICLY AS WELL AS PRIVATELY. IN REFERRING TO THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS, HE SAID HE WISHED TO DEFER RESUMPTION FOR A BIT LONGER AND ASSUMED THAT WAS AGREEABLE TO U.S., "SINCE 1953 AGREEMENT REMAINS IN FORCE." PRIME MINISTER DID NOT FOLLOW UP PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS'S EARLIER SOUNDING ABOUT A VISIT BY SECRETARY HAIG TO ATHENS. THIS, I SUSPECT, WILL BE DONE SEPARATELY EITHER IN ATHENS OR BY AMBASSADOR KARANDREAS IN WASHINGTON. END SUMMARY

3. I MET TODAY (JANUARY 14) FOR ONE HOUR WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU IN HIS OFFICE. NO ONE ELSE WAS PRESENT. PAPANDREOU HAD ARRANGED THIS MEETING BY TELEPHONE YESTERDAY AFTER I HAD RECEIVED A CALL FROM PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS'S POLITICAL ADVISER, AMBASSADOR PETROS MOLYVIATIS, TELLING ME THAT HE HAD BRIEFED PAPANDREOU ON MY JANUARY 11 TALK WITH KARAMANLIS (REFTEL) AND THAT PAPANDREOU HAD SAID HE WOULD FOLLOW UP DIRECTLY WITH ME.

4. ALTHOUGH THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF OUR RELAXED AND RATHER RAMBLING CONVERSATION I CONTINUALLY EXPECTED PAPANDREOU TO RAISE THE SUBJECT OF A VISIT TO GREECE BY SECRETARY HAIG -- OR PERHAPS BROACH THE IDEA OF A VISIT TO WASHINGTON BY HIMSELF -- HE DID NOT DO SO. I CAN ONLY CONCLUDE FROM THIS THAT EITHER HE IS STILL CONSIDERING MATTER OR WILL HAVE IT RAISED BY AMBASSADOR KARANDREAS IN WASHINGTON.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER BEGAN CONVERSATION BY COMPLAINING THAT HE DID NOT HAVE ANYONE WHO COULD SPEAK FOR HIM ON GREEK FOREIGN POLICY. THERE WAS, OF COURSE, FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS, BUT THERE WERE "INSTITUTIONAL" PROBLEMS AT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WHICH RENDERED IT INEFFECTIVE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY. HE

~~SECRET~~

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

12

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 0679

DTG: 141808Z JAN 82 PSN: 031995

NEEDED SOMETHING LIKE THE NSC, BUT WAS NOT SURE THAT THIS WAS FEASIBLE IN THE GREEK SYSTEM. PERHAPS THE LACK OF GOOD ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT CONTRIBUTED TO WHAT PAPANDREOU UNDERSTOOD TO BE MY IMPRESSION THAT HIS FOREIGN POLICY HAD NOT BEEN CLEARLY ARTICULATED.

6. I SAID, SPEAKING FRANKLY, THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THERE WERE TWO PROBLEMS. THE FIRST PROBLEM WAS THAT THERE WERE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE WAY GREEK POLICY ON KEY ISSUES LIKE POLAND WAS BEING EXPLAINED BY DIFFERENT GOG SPOKESMEN AT DIFFERENT TIMES. THE SECOND PROBLEM WAS THAT IT WAS EVIDENT TO ME AS WELL AS TO OTHER FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN ATHENS THAT GREEK FOREIGN OFFICE WAS TOTALLY DEMORALIZED. PERHAPS THESE TWO PROBLEMS WERE RELATED AND COULD BE SOLVED IN THE SAME WAY.

7. PRIME MINISTER ASKED ME WHAT I MEANT BY SAYING GREEK FOREIGN MINISTRY WAS DEMORALIZED. HAD GREEK OFFICIALS COMPLAINED TO ME? I REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE, BUT SAID THAT FOREIGN DIPLOMATS IN ATHENS WERE VIRTUALLY UNANIMOUS IN SAYING THAT CAREER OFFICIALS WERE NOT BEING KEPT INFORMED BY GREEK GOVERNMENT OF WHAT ITS POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES WERE. AS A RESULT, GREEK OFFICIALS WERE RELUCTANT TO EXPRESS ANY OPINION WHATSOEVER. THEIR ANSWER TO QUESTIONS WAS ALWAYS TO REFER THEM TO HIGHER AUTHORITY. IF THAT PROCESS CONTINUED, THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD FIND HIMSELF HAVING TO ANSWER EVERY QUESTION PERSONALLY.

8. PAPANDREOU SAID HE DID NOT REALLY KNOW MANY GREEK DIPLOMATS AND IT WAS THEREFORE HARD FOR HIM TO JUDGE WHO WAS EFFECTIVE AND WHO WAS NOT. I SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT WHILE THERE MIGHT NOT BE MANY PASOK MEMBERS IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, THERE WERE MANY CAPABLE AND PATRIOTIC GREEKS WHO WOULD HELP HIM EXECUTE GREEK FOREIGN
BT

~~SECRET~~

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

13

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 0679
SIT118 RECALLED

DTG: 141808Z JAN 82 PSN: 031998
TOR: 015/0019Z

DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001

OP IMMED
UTS5130
DE RUEHTH #0679/02 0141822
O 141808Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7482

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 ATHENS 00679

NODIS
POLICY IF THEY UNDERSTOOD WHAT IT WAS AND WERE CONVINCED THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAD GREECE'S BEST INTERESTS AT HEART. I RECALLED THAT MORE THAN ONE AMERICAN PRESIDENT HAD FOUND IT USEFUL TO BRIEF SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS HIMSELF AS A GROUP. PERHAPS PRIME MINISTER SHOULD MEET WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY STAFF, EXPLAIN HIS POLICIES TO THEM AND ANSWER THEIR QUESTIONS. THAT IDEA SEEMED TO APPEAL TO PAPANDREOU AND HE SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT IT FURTHER.

9. HE THEN ASKED ME WHETHER I UNDERSTOOD HIS FOREIGN POLICY. DID I, FOR EXAMPLE, UNDERSTAND THAT GREECE WOULD REMAIN IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND WOULD NOT SEEK TO BE NONALIGNED BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER POWERS? I ASKED PAPANDREOU WHETHER HE MEANT THAT GREECE WOULD REMAIN IN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE OR SIMPLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP. HE SAID HE MEANT ALLIANCE, ALTHOUGH WHAT FORM THIS MEMBERSHIP WOULD TAKE REMAINED TO BE NEGOTIATED. THERE WERE SEVERAL POSSIBLE MODELS; THE FRENCH MODEL WAS ONE AND THE NORWEGIAN ANOTHER. AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN THE KARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ALTERNATELY IN AND OUT OF THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF NATO. HE WAS NOT AT THIS POINT ABOUT TO DEFINE THE PRECISE RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO HE FAVORED FOR GREECE, BUT HE WAS STATING EMPHATICALLY THAT WESTERN ALLIANCE WAS WHERE GREECE BELONGED.

10. I SAID THIS WAS A POSITION DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE PASOK PROGRAM. PAPANDREOU DENIED THIS, SAYING THAT THE PASOK PROGRAM TRIED TO DEFINE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVES RATHER THAN OBJECTIVES THAT COULD BE REALIZED IN THE SHORT TERM. EVEN SO, HE CLAIMED, PASOK PLATFORM DID NOT CALL FOR GREECE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE "ALLIANCE" BUT FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM "NATO," WHICH WAS INTENDED TO REFER ONLY TO THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

11. I SAID THAT, ADMITTEDLY, NO POLITICAL LEADER SHOULD BE CALLED TO ACCOUNT FOR EVERY INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN HIS PROGRAM AND HIS PLATFORM. NEVERTHELESS, IT SEEMED TO ME THAT THE INCONSISTENCIES IN WHAT PAPANDREOU WAS SAYING TO ME AND WHAT THE PASOK CAMPAIGN SLOGANS HAD SAID TO EVERYONE REQUIRED THAT SOME EFFORT BE MADE TO RECONCILE THE TWO. MY JOB AS AMBASSADOR WAS COMPLICATED BY THE FACT THAT THERE WERE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WHAT PAPANDREOU SAID PRIVATELY AND WHAT HE SAID PUBLICLY. I URGED ON HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF MAKING HIS PRO-WESTERN ORIENTATION CLEAR TO THE PUBLIC.

12. PAPANDREOU NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH WITH RESPECT TO POLAND GREECE HAD RESERVED ITS POSITION ON SANCTIONS AND ON THE SENTENCE OF THE NAC COMMUNIQUE CHARACTERIZING ALL EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AS RIGID AND TOTALITARIAN, GREECE HAD JOINED THE OTHER MEMBERS IN CONDEMNING MILITARY RULE AND HOLDING THE SOVIETS RESPONSIBLE FOR REPRESSION IN POLAND.

~~SECRET~~

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

15

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 0679

DTG: 141808Z JAN 82 PSN: 031998

PERHAPS IT WOULD HAVE BEEN HELPFUL TO GREECE'S RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIANCE AND PARTICULARLY WITH THE UNITED STATES NOT TO HAVE EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THESE POINTS. HE WAS NOT PERSONALLY CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT SANCTIONS WOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT ON SOVIET BEHAVIOR (ESPECIALLY WHEN GRAIN WAS CONTINUING TO FLOW TO THE SOVIET UNION) AND THOUGHT THAT GREECE, AS A BALKAN COUNTRY, SHOULD ENCOURAGE LIBERALIZING TRENDS IN EASTERN EUROPE RATHER THAN LUMPING ALL REGIMES TOGETHER AS MINIATURE REPLICAS OF THE SOVIET UNION.

13. I SAID THAT WE DID NOT HAVE ANY ILLUSIONS THAT SANCTIONS WOULD BRING THE SOVIET UNION TO ITS KNEES, BUT WE DID BELIEVE THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO PROVIDE TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF OUR SUPPORT OF THE POLISH WORKERS AND THEIR STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM. PAPANDREOU INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT, IN HIS VIEW, POLISH WORKERS OF SOLIDARITY REPRESENTED "TRUE" SOCIALISM; WESTERN SUPPORT WAS THEREFORE SOMEWHAT HYPOCRITICAL SINCE SIMILAR ACTION BY WESTERN WORKERS WOULD BE UNSYMPATHETICALLY REGARDED BY THEIR GOVERNMENTS. I SAID IT SEEMED TO ME THAT IT WAS WRONG TO TRY TO DRAW A PARALLEL. THERE WERE NO SOLIDARITY UNIONS IN THE WESTERN WORLD BECAUSE THERE WAS NO REPRESSION OF THE WORKERS BY THE STATE.

14. PRIME MINISTER DID NOT DISPUTE THIS POINT DIRECTLY, ALTHOUGH HE SPOKE OF DIFFERENT "HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN EASTERN AND WESTERN EUROPE." HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IN ANY CASE, THERE

COULD BE NO DOUBT THAT WHAT WAS HAPPENING IN POLAND DEMONSTRATED THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM. I SAID AGAIN THAT, AS HE KNEW, I AGREED WITH HIM ON THIS POINT AND HOPED THAT HE WOULD HAVE OCCASION TO SAY THE SAME THING PUBLICLY. NOTHING WOULD HAVE A MORE SALUTARY

BT

~~SECRET~~

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 0679
SIT119 RECALLED

DTG: 141808Z JAN 82 PSN: 031999
TOR: 015/0020Z

DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001

OP IMMED
STU6779
DE RUEHTH #0679/03 0141824
O 141808Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7483

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ATHENS 00679

NODIS

AFFECT ON GREECE'S RELATIONS WITH ITS WESTERN ALLIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. PRIME MINISTER SAID HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT I WAS RECOMMENDING. HE WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO CHOOSE HIS WORDS CAREFULLY ON SUBJECT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS BECAUSE HE COULD NOT EXPOSE HIMSELF TO CHARGES THAT HE WAS ABANDONING PASOK PRINCIPLES. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO BE CONSIDERED INCONSISTENT OR UNRELIABLE BY GREECE'S ALLIES.

15. PAPANDREOU THEN ASKED ME WHETHER UNITED STATES WAS ANXIOUS TO START THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. I REPLIED THAT THE TIMING WAS UP TO THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND THAT WE WERE READY TO JOIN THEM AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WHENEVER THEY WISHED. PRIME MINISTER SAID HE PREFERRED TO DELAY A BIT LONGER. HE COULD NOT SAY AS YET WHEN GOG WOULD PROPOSE RESUMPTION, BUT IN THE MEANWHILE HE ASSUMED THAT THE STATUS QUO WAS SATISFACTORY TO US "SINCE THE 1953 AGREEMENT IS STILL IN EFFECT." I SAID AGAIN THAT THE INITIATIVE WOULD BE HIS AND THAT WE APPRECIATED THE CONTINUING COOPERATION WE WERE RECEIVING FROM GREEK MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO ENSURE THE SMOOTH FUNCTIONING OF OUR FACILITIES.

16. AS I ROSE TO LEAVE, PAPANDREOU SAID HE HAD APPRECIATED SECRETARY HAIG'S STATEMENT ABOUT GREECE AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF THE NAC COMMUNIQUE IN BRUSSELS. THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT ON TURKEY AT HIS BRUSSELS PRESS CONFERENCE WAS, HOWEVER, BEING INTERPRETED IN GREECE AS SUPPORT FOR THE TURKISH MILITARY REGIME, ESPECIALLY, SAID PAPANDREOU, BECAUSE THE SECRETARY ON TELEVISION HAD APPEARED TO SPEAK WITH SUCH EMOTION. I SAID IT SEEMED PROBABLE TO ME THAT THE SECRETARY'S "EMOTION" HAD BEEN DIRECTED AT THE QUESTIONER WHO SEEMED TO BE DRAWING A PARALLEL BETWEEN THE SITUATION IN TURKEY AND THE SITUATION IN POLAND. I DOUBTED THAT HE WAS DEFENDING MILITARY GOVERNMENT PER SE IN TURKEY. AS PAPANDREOU KNEW, THERE WERE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SITUATIONS. PRIME MINISTER SAID HE RECOGNIZED THIS. IN POLAND THERE WAS A REAL, WIDESPREAD REVOLT BY POLISH WORKERS AGAINST MARTIAL LAW. IN TURKEY THERE WAS NOTHING THAT COULD BE SO DESCRIBED. ALTHOUGH, HE ADDED, AS ONE WHO HAD BEEN IMPRISONED BY A MILITARY REGIME, HE COULD NOT SAY IT WAS A FORM OF GOVERNMENT HE FAVORED FOR ANY COUNTRY.

17. COMMENT: I SUSPECT THAT PAPANDREOU'S FAILURE TO HAIG MAY BE A MATTER OF TIMING. THE SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE REMARKS ON TURKEY WERE REPORTED IN THE GREEK PRESS AFTER MY MEETING WITH KARAMANLIS AND, IN THE CASE OF AFTERNOON PAPERS, AFTER THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE CALLED TO ARRANGE MY APPOINTMENT WITH HIM. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THEREFORE THAT HE DECIDED NOT TO RAISE THE SUBJECT YET BUT STILL TO USE THE APPOINTMENT AS A WAY TO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

17

RECALLED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 0679

DTG: 141808Z JAN 82 PSN: 031999

MAKE SOME ADDITIONAL POINTS ABOUT GREEK FOREIGN POLICY.
I THINK, IN OTHER WORDS, THAT WHEN GREEK PRESS COMMENT
HAS SUBSIDED WE WILL BE SOUNDED OUT ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S
WILLINGNESS TO COME TO ATHENS. WHILE THIS MAY BE DONE
HERE IN ATHENS, IT MIGHT ALSO BE RAISED BY AMBASSADOR
KARANDREAS IN HIS FIRST MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY.
STEARNS
BT

~~SECRET~~

National Security Council
The White House

112

RECEIVED

Package # 2261

02 APR 5 P 6:37

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>		<u>R</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

Recommend no meeting.
For Mrs. Mehta on phone - she said
spoke to her - they might be a social
occasion here or in NY.
20 April '82

~~SECRET~~

121495 18

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 0725
SIT634 DATE 01/29/82

DTG: 151327Z JAN 82 PSN: 032680
TOR: 015/1503Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: REV EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #0725 0151329
O 151327Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7498

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 00725

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS- (1) (4) 1/15/97 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PINR, GR
SUBJECT: PAPANDREOU AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTRY
REF: ATHENS 679

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM YESTERDAY (RETEL), PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU LEFT ME WITH THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT HE RECOGNIZES THAT FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS IS INEFFECTIVE. ALTHOUGH PAPANDREOU DID NOT REFER DIRECTLY TO HARALAMBOPOULOS WHEN HE MENTIONED HIS DISSATISFACTION WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT HE IS LOOKING AROUND FOR A REPLACEMENT.

3. AT ONE POINT IN OUR CONVERSATION, PRIME MINISTER ASKED ME WHAT I THOUGHT OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KAROLOS PAPOULIAS. I SAID I THOUGHT PAPOULIAS' S HEART WAS WITH THE THIRD WORLD BUT THAT I FOUND HIM INTELLIGENT, STRAIGHTFORWARD, AND AGREEABLE. PAPANDREOU THEN SAID THAT HE, TOO, LIKED PAPOULIAS AND HAD CONFIDENCE IN HIM, BUT THOUGHT HE WAS HANDICAPPED BY NOT SPEAKING ENGLISH. WHEN I NOTED THAT PAPOULIAS WAS REPORTED TO SPEAK FLUENT GERMAN AND ITALIAN, PAPANDREOU SAID THIS

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WAS TRUE BUT THESE WERE LESS USEFUL LANGUAGES IN DIPLOMACY THAN ENGLISH OR FRENCH. HE SAID PAPOULIAS SPOKE SOME FRENCH BUT NOT WELL ENOUGH TO DISCUSS SENSITIVE OR COMPLICATED SUBJECTS.

4. THESE REMARKS BY THE PRIME MINISTER SEEMED TO BE MADE WITH THE UNSPOKEN ASSUMPTION THAT HE WAS CONSIDERING PAPOULIAS FOR A HIGHER JOB. THIS SEEMED MORE APPARENT WHEN HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT "ANOTHER PROBLEM" WITH PAPOULIAS WAS THAT HE HAD JOINED PASOK RATHER LATE. ACCORDING TO PAPANDREOU, PAPOULIAS HAD WORKED WITH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS RATHER THAN SOCIALISTS IN GERMANY AND THEREFORE LACKED A RELIABLE PASOK CONSTITUENCY.

5. MY CONCLUSION FROM THE FOREGOING IS NOT NECESSARILY THAT PAPOULIAS HAS THE INSIDE TRACK TO REPLACE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121495

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

19

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 0725

DTG: 151327Z JAN 82 PSN: 032680

HARALAMBOPOULOS. I DO BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT PRIME MINISTER IS LOOKING FOR A WAY TO KICK HARALAMBOPOULOS UPSTAIRS OR EASE HIM OUT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN A RELATIVELY DIGNIFIED AND PAINLESS WAY. STEARNS

ATHENS 0725

DTG: 151327Z JAN 82 PSN: 032680

~~SECRET~~

121497

20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 22, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: KENNETH deGRAFFENREID *kd*SUBJECT: Forgery: Clark-Stearns Letter on US Policy,
viz Greece

On January 19 Embassy Athens received a copy of a crude forgery of a purported September 1981 letter from then Deputy Secretary Clark to Ambassador Stearns. The letter is outrageous and suggests US support for a Greek army coup. The forgery was mailed to at least one Athens daily which did not print it (but which informed the US Embassy). In most of these cases, however, forgeries are widely distributed and this one may surface in less responsible media in the near future.

State has authorized the Embassy to alert the Greek Government and to be ready to respond immediately should the forgery become public. Jim Rentschler and I concurred.

The forgery was reported under the new procedures on Soviet "active measures," although there is as yet no conclusive evidence on its authorship.

Attachments

Tab I Cable from AMEMBASSY Athens to SECSTATE,
January 19, 1982
Tab II Cable from SECSTATE to AMEMBASSY Athens,
January 22, 1982

cc: Jim Rentschler

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM412 *121497

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on January 22, 1988

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

121503

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

21

PAGE 01 OF 03 ATHENS 0941
SIT306

DTG: 191553Z JAN 82 PSN: 042483
TOR: 019/1620Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001
WHSR COMMENT: PER REQUEST 1/22/82

OP IMMED
STU5741
DE RUEHTh #0941/01 0191554
O 191553Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 # 121503

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7565

INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0186
NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 00941
SECSTATE FOR EUR/SE
USICA FOR PGM/G, EU
E.O. 12065: N/A
TAGS: PROP, GR
SUBJECT: SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES: LETTER RELEASED TO
- ATHENS DAILY
REF: 81 STATE 28758

1. SUMMARY. POST RECEIVED COPY OF DISINFORMATION
LETTER JAN 19 WHICH WAS ON FACSIMILE OF STATE
DEPARTMENT STATIONERY WITH FORMER UNDER SECSTATE CLARK
FORGED SIGNATURE INCLUDING ATTACHMENT PURPORTING TO
CONTAIN INSTRUCTIONS TO AMBASSADOR ON U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY FOR 1981 TOWARDS GREECE. TEXT FOLLOWS WITH
ORIGINAL COPY BEING FORWARDED TO PARS BY POUCH.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

22

PAGE 02 OF 03 ATHENS 0941

DTG: 191553Z JAN 82 PSN: 042483

2. LETTER TEXT: SEPTEMBER 23, 1981. DEAR AMBASSADOR:
ENCLOSED YOU CAN FIND AN EXCERPT FROM AN ANALYSIS
DEALING WITH THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN GREECE
PREPARED BY A RESEARCH INSTITUTE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK
OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S PROGRAMMED STUDIES.
PLEASE, GIVE YOUR ATTENTION TO THE IDEAS OF THE
EXCERPT'S CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDER THEM TO BE CORRECT.
I SHOULD LIKE TO RECOMMEND YOU TO USE THE EXCERPT IN
YOUR DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. YOURS TRULY, SIGNED WILLIAM
CLARK WILLIAM P. CLARK.
AMBASSADOR MONTEAGLE STEARNS
ATHENS

3. ATTACHMENT TEXT: GREECE (1981). IN THE LONG TERM
INTEREST OF THE U. S. FOREIGN POLICY WE HAVE TO SUPPORT
THE NEW DEMOCRACY PARTY IN GREECE, ESPECIALLY THE
INCUMBENT MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MR. EVANGELOS AVEROFF
TOSITSAS, WHO BELONGS TO THE TRUE FRIENDS OF
THE UNITED STATES AND REALLY UNDERSTANDS WHAT ARE
THE UNITED STATES NEEDS IN THE SOUTH-EAST WING OF THE
N. A. T. O.

HOWEVER, IF THE PANHELLENIC SOCIALIST MOVEMENT'S
VICTORY IN THE OCTOBER 18 ELECTION COULD NOT BE
PREVENTED, IT WOULD BE FOR US AN IMPERATIVE TO
RE-CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF SUPPORTING SOME LIBERAL
GROUPS WITHIN THE PANHELLENIC SOCIALIST MOVEMENT,
INCLUDING MR. GEORGIOS MAVROS WHO, AS WE HAVE FOUND
OUT, PROMISED TO JOIN THIS SOCIALIST PARTY TOGETHER
WITH HIS WELL-KNOWN GROUP. FURTHERMORE, IT COULD BE
INDISPENSABLE TO ENHANCE THE INFLUENCE OF THE NEW
DEMOCRACY PARTY IN ORDER TO BLOCK ANY NEW ATTEMPT
OF THE UPCOMING GREEK GOVERNMENT'S INITIATIVES THAT
MIGHT HARM OUR PLANS IN UPHOLDING OF U. S. BASES IN GREECE.
IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE FUTURE POLITICAL SITUATION
IN GREECE MAY BECOME ONCE AGAIN UNSTABLE, IT WOULD
HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO EXCLUDE EVEN THE PREPARATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

23

PAGE 03 OF 03 ATHENS 0941

DTG: 191553Z JAN 82 PSN: 042483

FOR AN ACTION TO BE CARRIED OUT BY THE RELIABLE ARMY OFFICERS WHO WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE A DECISIVE STEP THAT COULD AT THE MOST CONVENIENT MOMENT COUNTERBALANCE THE EXPECTED POLITICAL ATTITUDES OF THE EAST BLOCK IN THE CRISIS AREAS.

THE MAIN TASK WILL BE TO DEVOTE THE ATTENTION OF THE USE OF THE GREEK ARMY FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME, TO EVALUATE IT IN PRACTICAL TERMS INCLUDING CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH ACTION FROM GLOBAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. CLOSER CONTACTS WITH CHOOSSED MILITARY PERSONS SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED, AND WE SHOULD PROCEED IN THIS DIRECTION SO AS TO KEEP OUR INITIATIVES CONCEALED.

WE SHOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT TO THE POSSIBILITY TO UTILIZE THE RECENT EXAMPLE OF TURKEY, WHOSE MILITARY GOVERNMENT WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC INCLUDING OUR ALLIES WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL RESERVATION. THIS FACT NOTWITHSTANDING, LEADS US TO THE CONCLUSION THAT AN EVENTUAL MILITARY ACTION IN GREECE SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH POSITIVE GESTURES BY THE FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS. THUS THE ACTION ITSELF WOULD NOT BE PRESENTED LIKE A PURE MILITARY COUP.

SPECIAL ATTENTION SHOULD BE ALSO PAID TO THE U.S. -GREEK AGREEMENT ON MILITARY CO-OPERATION. WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACT IN THIS RESPECT IS THE STATUS OF OUR MILITARY BASES IN GREECE. ANY DELAYS IN THIS FIELD ARE UNDESIRABLE; THEY IMPAIR U.S. CREDIBILITY IN THE

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. AT THE SAME TIME THEY ALSO
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

24

PAGE 01
SIT307

ATHENS 0941

DTG: 191553Z JAN 82 PSN: 042484
TOR: 019/1621Z

DISTRIBUTION: JP /001

OP IMMED
STU5742
DE RUEHTh #0941/02 0191556
O 191553Z JAN 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7566

INFO USICA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0187
NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 00941
COMPLICATE OUR NOBLE EFFORTS TO FORM A WIDE FRONT TO
COUNTER THE SOVIET THREAT. END TEXT.

4. LETTER WAS MAILED TO ATHENS PRO-GOG DAILY, TO VIMA,
IN PLAIN ENVELOPE WITH JAN 15, 1982 POSTMARK FROM
ATHENS' SYNTAGMA SQUARE POST OFFICE. IT WAS TURNED
OVER TO USICA BY JOHN KARTALIS, DIPLOMATIC AND
POLITICAL COLUMNIST, AT LUNCH JAN 19 WITH USICA
INFORMATION OFFICER RICHARD OVERTURF. KARTALIS
INDICATED TO VIMA SAW THROUGH THE FORGERY AT ONCE
AND PLANNED NO USE OF THE DOCUMENT. BUT, BECAUSE
THE FORGERY WAS PROBABLY SENT TO OTHER PAPERS, KARTALIS
WARNED WE MIGHT SEE IT IN PRINT WITHIN A DAY OR TWO.
AS NECESSARY, WE WILL ADVISE ON SUBSEQUENT
DEVELOPMENTS. STEARNS
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

121504

25

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01
EOB928

SECSTATE WASHDC 6720
AN011987

DTG: 220246Z JAN 82 PSN: 041198
TOR: 022/0657Z CSN: HCE584

DISTRIBUTION: DEGR-01 GREG-01 LORD-01 PIPE-01 RENT-01 STER-01
MYER-01 /007 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:

EOB:

OP IMMED /ROUTINE
DE RUEHC #6720 0220614
O R 220246Z JAN 82 ZEX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 9781

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 016720
E.O. 12065: GDS (1/21/83) (MONTGOMERY, HUGH)

TAGS: PROP, UR, GR

SUBJECT: SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES: FORGED LETTER

REF: ATHENS 941

1. APPRECIATE FULL REPORT ON CLARK-STEARN'S FORGERY.
2. EMBASSY MAY WISH, AT ITS DISCRETION, TO INFORM GOG THAT WE ARE AWARE THAT THE FORGERY IS CIRCULATING AND EMBASSY INTENDS TO ISSUE A STATEMENT IF IT IS SURFACED. WE BELIEVE PRIOR KNOWLEDGE WITHIN GOVERNMENT MAY HELP TO LIMIT IMPACT IF AND WHEN FORGERY BECOMES PUBLIC.
3. SHOULD THE FALSE CLARK-STEARN'S LETTER SURFACE IN LOCAL MEDIA, WE SUGGEST POST SHOULD PUT OUT IMMEDIATE STATEMENT ALONG LINES THAT LETTER IS AN OBVIOUS AND CLUMSY FORGERY. NO SUCH LETTER HAS BEEN SENT BY JUDGE CLARK NOR RECEIVED BY AMBASSADOR STEARN'S. IT WAS CLEARLY CONCOCTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF HARMING US-GREEK RELATIONS. THE AUTHOR OF THE FORGED TEXT WAS CLEARLY NOT A NATIVE ENGLISH SPEAKER. ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOT IN A POSITION TO IDENTIFY POSITIVELY THE AUTHOR OF THE FORGED TEXT, IT WAS SOMEONE WHO IS A FRIEND NEITHER OF THE US NOR OF GREECE. DEPARTMENT WILL PUT OUT A SIMILAR STATEMENT IF ASKED.
4. AFTER ACTUAL DOCUMENT RECEIVED WE WILL PROVIDE MORE DETAILED TECHNICAL ANALYSIS. HAIG
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121504

BY KNL NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
THE WHITE HOUSE,

26.

Package # 0389 RECEIVED

82 JAN 22 P 7: 13

	<u>TO</u>	<u>SEEN</u>
JANET COLSON	_____	_____
BUD ^{McF.} NANCE	<u>2</u>	_____
JOHN POINDEXTER	<u>1</u>	<u>De</u>
JACQUE HILL	_____	_____
JUDGE CLARK	<u>3</u>	_____
JANET COLSON	_____	_____

DISTRIBUTION

CY TO VP	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO MEESE	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO BAKER	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO DEEVER	_____	SHOW CC	_____

COMMENTS

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8200389

121496

27

RECEIVED 22 JAN 82 19

TO CLARK

FROM DE GRAFFENREID

DOCDATE 22 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: GREECE

USSR

STEARNS

INTELLIGENCE

DECLASSIFIED

SUBJECT: FORGERY OF A CLARK - STEARNS LTR RE US FORN POLICY

NLRRM412 #121496

BY KNL NARA DATE 3/18/13

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

RENTSCHLER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(M / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

C 1/23 noted by Paimdexter KD

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

PA

(C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

121498

28

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5496
SIT970 DATE 02/16/82

DTG: 100337Z FEB 82 PSN: 009580
TOR: 041/0705Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHC #5496 0410355
O 100337Z FEB 82 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 7190

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 035496 TOSEC 030075
NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM EAGLEBURGER
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 02/09/02 (EAGLEBURGER, LAWRENCE S.)

TAGS: OVIP, GR

SUBJECT: (C) POSSIBLE VISIT TO GREECE BY SECRETARY

REF: ATHENS 22)9

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. FROM REFTTEL (BEING REPEATED TO YOU), IT APPEARS THAT PAPANDREOU MAY BE BECOMING SOMEWHAT ANXIOUS ABOUT HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH US. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, THERE IS NO REASON TO FORCE THE PACE WITH GREECE. THINGS ARE QUIET ON BILATERAL FRONT -- OUR DEFENSE FACILITIES IN GREECE ARE OPERATING SMOOTHLY. THE ONLY ISSUE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WHICH IS TROUBLING IS THE POSTURING BY BOTH SIDES IN THE GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONSHIP. WE CONTINUE TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO BE THROWN INTO THE MIDDLE BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY ON THIS ONE. ON THE OTHER HAND, A; MONTY SUGGESTS, SOME GOOD COULD COME OUT OF EXPOSING PAPANDREOU MORE FULLY TO OUR VIEWS. IN SU;, HO-EVER,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IF IT WERE JUST A QUESTION OF GOING TO GREECE AT AN EARLY DATE, I WOULD RECOMMEND THAT YOU PLAY A BIT "HARD TO GET."

3. THAT SAID, THERE ARE SOME GOOD REASONS FOR YOU TO GO TO TURKEY IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. YOU HAVE TRAVELED TO EUROPE THREE TIMES SINCE YOUR ABORTED ANKARA VISIT. THE TURKS HAVE THIS VERY MUCH IN MIND AND ARE BEGINNING TO THINK THAT THERE MAY BE A DARKER REASON BEHIND YOUR FAILING TO CARRY OUT THE PLANNED TRAVEL. THE TURKS ARE ALSO FEELING VERY ISOLATED- BECAUSE OF RECENT ACTIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE, AND CONSIDER THEMSELVES PRESSED BY THE GREEKS ON THE AEGEAN. A VISIT BY YOU TO TURKEY WOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR SUPPORT FOR EVREN BUT, MORE IMPORTANT, YOU COULD

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 # 121498

BY KAL NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 5496

DTG: 100337Z FEB 82 PSN: 009580

ENCOURAGE THE GOT TO MAINTAIN THE POLICY OF RESTRAINT
THAT WOULD SERVE THEM BEST ON THESE ISSUES. IF YOU GO
TO TURKEY YOU ALSO WOULD HAVE TO OFFER TO STOP IN
ATHENS.

4. MY RECOMMENDATION IS THAT YOU TRY TO WORK VISITS TO
ATHENS AND ANKARA INTO YOUR NEXT TRIP TO EUROPE, HOPEFULLY
WITHIN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS OR SO. STOESSEL

SECSTATE WASHDC 5496

DTG: 100337Z FEB 82 PSN: 009580

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

121499

30

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 4134
SIT881 DATE 03/26/82

DTG: 141417Z MAR 82 PSN: 001250
TOR: 077/0148Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEH TH #4134/01 0731424
O 141417Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIAT 8448

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 04134

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS- (1) 3/14/97 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M
TAGS: PEPR, NATO, MASS, GR, TU, SP, CY
SUBJECT: INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH PRIME MINISTER
- PAPANDREOU

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN A WIDE-RANGING PRIVATE TALK, PAPANDREOU TOLD AMBASSADOR HE WANTED TO DISCUSS WITH SECRETARY HAIG, SECRETARY WEINBERGER, AND EVENTUALLY WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN THE QUESTION OF A SECURITY GUARANTEE, PERHAPS A REFORMULATION OF THE KISSINGER LETTER, AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE ON BEST POSSIBLE TERMS. COMMENTING ON RELATIONS WITH TURKEY, HE SAID HE WAS PREPARED TO AUTHORIZE RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL. REGARDING GREEK RATIFICATION OF SPANISH ACCESSION TO NATO, HE SAID HIS MILITARY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT IMPLICATIONS FOR COMMAND BOUNDARIES IN AEGEAN, BUT HE WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER PROMPT ACCESSION AS A GESTURE OF GOOD WILL. ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, HE SAID HE WOULD NOT TORPEDO THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS BUT BELIEVED THAT SOME FORM OF INTERNATIONALIZATION, SHORT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, WAS NECESSARY TO REVIVE INTEREST IN CYPRUS. END SUMMARY

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. PRIME MINISTER AND MRS. PAPANDREOU CAME TO HOUSE LAST NIGHT (MARCH 13) FOR INFORMAL DINNER AND I HAD OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ALONE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER ABOUT A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS OF CURRENT INTEREST. WHILE HE DID NOT EXPRESS NEW VIEWS, HE DID AMPLIFY SOME FAMILIAR ONES AND BECAUSE, AS USUAL, HE GAVE IMPRESSION OF THINKING ALOUD ABOUT SOME ASPECTS OF GREEK POLICY, IT WAS POSSIBLE TO DRAW INFERENCES ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH HIS POLICIES ARE LIKELY TO DEVELOP. SINCE I WILL BE LEAVING FOR CRETE IN A FEW HOURS, I AM DICTATING THIS MESSAGE AS A SUMMARY MEMCON WITH PAPANDREOU'S COMMENTS DRAWN TOGETHER UNDER SEPARATE TOPICS. I WILL LEAVE TO DEPARTMENT HOW TO HANDLE LATERAL DISTRIBUTION OF SECTIONS OF THIS MESSAGE WITH WHICH OTHER ADDRESSEES SHOULD BE FAMILIAR. I WOULD ASK ONLY THAT SUCH LATERAL DISTRIBUTION BE ON A HIGHLY SELECTIVE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121499

BY KMI NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

31

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 4134

DTG: 141417Z MAR 82 PSN: 001250

BASIS AND WITH NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION.

4. FOLLOWING ARE PAPANDREOU'S COMMENTS ON PRINCIPAL SUBJECTS OF CURRENT INTEREST:

5. POLITICAL LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WITH U. S.

- IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, PAPANDREOU SAID HE WISHED TO DISCUSS WITH SECRETARY HAIG, SECRETARY WEINBERGER, AND EVENTUALLY WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN THE QUESTION OF GREECE'S SENSE OF INSECURITY. SUCCESSIVE GREEK GOVERNMENTS HAD EXPRESSED THIS IN DIFFERENT WAYS. HOWEVER THEY EXPRESSED IT, THE FEELING OF INSECURITY HAD BEEN BEDEVILING GREECE'S RELATIONS WITH NATO AND WITH THE UNITED STATES ALMOST FROM THE MOMENT GREECE AND TURKEY HAD ENTERED THE ALLIANCE. THE REASON WAS THAT THIS SENSE OF INSECURITY WAS NOT POLITICAL BUT NATIONAL.

- IN DISCUSSING WHAT COULD BE DONE WITH SECRETARY HAIG, PAPANDREOU WOULD WISH TO EXPLORE VARIATIONS OF THE KISSINGER LETTER OR PERHAPS EVEN DISCUSS WHETHER A REAFFIRMATION OF THE LETTER WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO ALLAY GREEK FEARS. THERE WAS ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM THE PRIME MINISTER WOULD WISH TO TACKLE WITH BOTH SECRETARY HAIG AND SECRETARY WEINBERGER. THIS WOULD BE AMOUNTS, TYPES AND TERMS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE. IT WAS OBVIOUSLY THE UNITED STATES' INTENT TO PRESS AHEAD WITH MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF ASSISTANCE TO TURKEY. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD MADE NO PUBLIC

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CRITICISM OF OUR AID PROGRAM TO TURKEY, EVEN THOUGH THE GREEK OPPOSITION WAS CHARGING THAT THE PAPANDREOU GOVERNMENT HAD FAILED TO PRESERVE THE 7 TO 10 RATIO. IN FACT, AS PAPANDREOU HAD TOLD THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE IN BRUSSELS, HE WAS LESS INTERESTED IN A FIXED RATIO THAN IN OBTAINING GENUINELY USEFUL AMERICAN EQUIPMENT ON TERMS GREECE COULD AFFORD. PAPANDREOU WAS AWARE THE UNITED STATES WAS GIVING NOTHING AWAY FREE AND FROM THIS STANDPOINT LARGE AMOUNTS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO A POOR COUNTRY LIKE TURKEY MIGHT CREATE AS MANY PROBLEMS AS IT SOLVED. THAT, HOWEVER, WAS NOT GREECE'S PROBLEM. WHAT PAPANDREOU, AS AN ECONOMIST AND NOT A MILITARY MAN, COULD SAY WAS THAT HE WANTED TO PROTECT GREECE EFFECTIVELY AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE COST. IN PRACTICE, THIS WOULD MEAN SOME COMBINATION OF A SECURITY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

32

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 4134
SIT880 DATE 03/26/82

DTG: 141417Z MAR 82 PSN: 001253
TOR: 077/0150Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #4134/02 0731425
O 141417Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8449

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 ATHENS 04134

NODIS

GUARANTEE AND CAREFULLY CHOSEN TYPES OF MILITARY
HARDWARE ON THE BEST POSSIBLE TERMS.

- CONCLUDING THIS PORTION OF OUR DISCUSSION, THE
PRIME MINISTER SAID HE HOPED SECRETARY HAIG WAS AWARE
HE WOULD BE WELCOME IN ATHENS WHENEVER HE COULD MAKE
THE TRIP. IF, AS HE EXPECTED, PAPANDREOU ATTENDED THE
DPC MEETING IN MAY, HE HOPED HE WOULD HAVE THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR A BILATERAL MEETING WITH SECRETARY
WEINBERGER. LATER, EITHER IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
NATO SUMMIT OR ON ANOTHER OCCASION, THE PRIME MINISTER
LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING PRESIDENT REAGAN.

6. RELATIONS WITH TURKEY.

- IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE PRIME MINISTER,
I SAID IT SEEMED TO ME THAT ONE REASON FOR THE
RELUCTANCE OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WESTERN
EUROPEANS TO PROVIDE GUARANTEES OR ASSURANCES TO GREECE
WAS THAT THE GREEK GOVERNMENT ITSELF SEEMED TO BE
DOING SO LITTLE TO REDUCE TENSIONS WITH TURKEY. NO
THIRD PARTY COULD DO MORE FOR THE GREEKS AND TURKS
THAN THEY WERE PREPARED TO DO FOR THEMSELVES. WITH
ALL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION APPARENTLY
CLOSED, THE GREEK-TURKISH DIALOGUE HAD BECOME LITTLE
MORE THAN A SLANGING MATCH. I NOTED THE CURRENT
EXCHANGE OF RECRIMINATIONS BETWEEN PAPANDREOU AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TURKISH PRIME MINISTER ULUSU WAS UNLIKELY TO ENCOURAGE
ANYBODY ELSE TO ENTER THE FRAY.

- PAPANDREOU SAID HE HAD DECIDED TO AUTHORIZE
FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBOPOULOS TO MEET WITH TURKISH
FOREIGN MINISTER TURKMEN. THIS WOULD BE STATED,
PROBABLY PUBLICLY, IN THE NEAR FUTURE BY DEPUTY
FOREIGN MINISTER PAPOULIAS. SINCE PAPANDREOU DID NOT
WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION OF GIVING WAY TO TURKISH
PRESSURE, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD DEFINE ITS
POSITION CAREFULLY. IT WOULD, THAT IS, STATE GREECE'S
WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN "DIALOGUE" WITH TURKISH
GOVERNMENT BUT NOT TO "NEGOTIATE." I OBSERVED THAT
WHATEVER THE PROCESS WAS CALLED, IT APPEARED TO ME
ESSENTIAL TO GET THE GREEK AND TURKISH GOVERNMENTS BACK
IN NORMAL CONTACT AT A RESPONSIBLE POLITICAL LEVEL.
THIS WOULD HAVE THE ADDITIONAL MERIT OF MAKING IT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

33

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 4134

DTG: 141417Z MAR 82 PSN: 001253

EASIER FOR THIRD PARTIES TO DECIDE WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THEY COULD DO TO ASSIST THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION.

7. SPANISH ACCESSION TO NATO.

- SAYING THAT GREECE RISKED DEFEATING ITS OWN PURPOSES WHEN IT PLAYED THE SPOILER IN NATO, AS IT HAD AT THE DECEMBER DPC, I TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER HE COULD EARN GOOD WILL BY MOVING AHEAD PROMPTLY TO RATIFY SPANISH ACCESSION TO NATO. HE SAID HIS MILITARY WERE CONCERNED THAT SPANISH ACCESSION WOULD OPEN UP THE QUESTION OF COMMAND BOUNDARIES IN THE AEGEAN. HE WAS BEING TOLD THAT BEFORE GREECE RATIFIED, THERE SHOULD BE SOME STATEMENT BY NATO THAT SPANISH ACCESSION WOULD NOT LEAD TO RENEGOTIATION OF COMMAND BOUNDARIES IN THE AEGEAN.

- I SAID IT DID NOT SEEM TO ME THAT SPANISH ACCESSION WOULD AFFECT AEGEAN COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. I DID THINK, HOWEVER, THAT ANY EFFORT TO EXTRACT FROM NATO SOME FORMULA OF WORDS SPELLING THIS OUT WOULD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND DOOMED TO FAILURE. IF GREECE REALLY WANTED THE HELP AND UNDERSTANDING OF ITS NATO ALLIES, THEN THE GREEK GOVERNMENT SHOULD DEMONSTRATE GOOD WILL BY QUICK RATIFICATION OF SPANISH ACCESSION.

- PRIME MINISTER SAID HE WOULD TALK TO HELLENIC AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. KOURIS ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF AEGEAN COMMAND BOUNDARIES. HE WAS NOT OPPOSED TO MAKING A "BEAU GESTE" TO NATO BY MOVING

ATHENS 4134

DTG: 141417Z MAR 82 PSN: 001253

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AHEAD QUICKLY, BUT WANTED TO BE SURE HE WAS NOT LETTING HIMSELF IN FOR FUTURE TROUBLE IN THE AEGEAN.

- IN A FINAL AND ALMOST UNRELATED COMMENT ON SPANISH ACCESSION, PAPANDREOU OBSERVED THAT HE WAS CONVINCED THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REACT IN SOME WAY WHEN SPANISH FORMALLY ENTERED NATO. I ASKED WHETHER HE MEANT INCREASED SOVIET PRESSURE ON YUGOSLAVIA AND HE SAID NOT NECESSARILY, BECAUSE THE YUGOSLAVS HAD SHOWN THEY WERE HARD TO PRESSURE. HE DID NOT KNOW, HE SAID, WHERE THE REACTION WOULD OCCUR, BUT WAS PERSONALLY CONVINCED THERE WOULD BE ONE.

8. CYPRUS.

- THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE DID NOT INTEND TO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

34

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 4134
SIT879 DATE 03/26/82

DTG: 141417Z MAR 82 PSN: 001256
TOR: 077/0151Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #4134/03 0731427
O 141417Z MAR 82 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8450

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ATHENS 04134

NODIS

TORPEDO THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, BUT THEY SEEMED TO BE AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY. FROM THE GREEK STANDPOINT, THEY CREATED THE ADDITIONAL DISADVANTAGE OF APPEARING TO LEGITIMIZE THE TURKISH TROOP PRESENCE IN NORTHERN CYPRUS. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER NOT TO HAVE STARTED DOWN THIS ROAD, BUT KARAMANLIS HAD DONE SO AND THE PRESENT GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT TAKE UPON ITSELF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENDING THESE TALKS.

- WHAT PAPANDREOU BELIEVED WOULD BE USEFUL FROM THE GREEK STANDPOINT WOULD BE TO REVIVE INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. WHEN I ASKED HOW HE PROPOSED TO DO THIS, PAPANDREOU REPLIED THAT KYPRIANOU FAVORED AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE BUT THAT HE, HIMSELF, WAS LESS ATTRACTED TO THIS IDEA. FOR ONE THING, THE TURKS WOULD REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE AND FOR ANOTHER, IT WOULD BE HARD TO PUT TOGETHER A CONFERENCE THAT DID NOT AGGRAVATE THE PROBLEM RATHER THAN SOLVE IT. HE HAD IN MIND, HE SAID, THE ROLE OF "OMBUDSMAN" OR "CATALYST" FOR WILLY BRANDT. IN THIS SCENARIO, BRANDT WOULD TRAVEL AROUND TO VARIOUS CAPITALS AND EXPLORE IDEAS FOR NEW APPROACHES TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM.

- I SAID I COULD NOT SEE MUCH OF A ROLE FOR BRANDT OR ANYONE ELSE UNTIL GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS HAD IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY. FROM A THEORETICAL STANDPOINT, THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS OUGHT TO PROVIDE A GOOD FORUM

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO DISCUSS COMPONENTS FOR A SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT. IN A SENSE, IT WAS HELPFUL THAT AN EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT WOULD REQUIRE SOME KIND OF A TRADE OFF BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL AND TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS. SINCE IT WOULD BE A DEAL INVOLVING APPLES AND ORANGES, AND NOT JUST ONE OR THE OTHER, THE NEGOTIATORS OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO STRIKE A REASONABLE BARGAIN IF THE CLIMATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY WERE BETTER.

- THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT DISAGREE WITH THIS DIRECTLY BUT REPEATED THAT THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS WERE NOT PRODUCING RESULTS. PREVIOUS GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD GIVEN UP ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. PAPANDREOU HAD FELT A WAVE OF HOPE THAT SOMETHING COULD STILL BE DONE WHEN HE VISITED CYPRUS. HE DID NOT WANT TO DASH THAT HOPE BY REFUSING TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THE PROBLEM.
STEARN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

35

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 4134

DTG: 141417Z MAR 82 PSN: 001256

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2261

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 5, 1982

INFORMATION

NOTED

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JAMES M. RENTSCHLER

SUBJECT: Exiled Greek King and Queen in U.S.

Re your query about the possibility of a meeting with Constantine, exiled King of Greece, and his Queen, this should be avoided. The present Greek leadership would view such a meeting as provocative, a fact which could well complicate our already problematic relationship with Papandreou and his PASOK confederates.

As a matter of fact, even the previous Greek government would have frowned on such a meeting. EUR/STATE, with whom I checked out the above reaction, fully concurs and notes that State would discourage a meeting between the exiled Greek royalty and any U.S. official, even at the working level. That's probably a bit too stringent, but I do believe we should discourage any Cabinet or sub-Cabinet contacts - these would not help promote any discernible U.S. interest we have in Greece nowadays.....

DB Dennis Blair concurs.

Judge Clark has spoken with Mrs. Mehta on 4-20-82. She said there might be a social occasion here or in New York.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121500

BY KM NARA DATE 3/18/13~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on 4/5/88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8202261

37

RECEIVED 05 APR 82 16

TO CLARK FROM RENTSCHLER DOCDATE 05 APR 82

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

KEYWORDS: GREECE

AC

21 10/20/11

SUBJECT: COMMENTS RE POSSIBLE VISIT OF THE EXILED KING & QUEEN

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION DUE: STATUS IX FILES

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO
CLARK

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO
C 4/21 CLARK NOTED 2C✓

DISPATCH W/ATTCH FILE (C) 4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

2334

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

April 5, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD MCFARLANE

FROM: JIM RENTSCHLER *J.R.*

SUBJECT: Reg Bartholomew and Greek Base Negotiations

Reg Bartholomew called me to ask if I could make a pitch on his behalf for a brief meeting with you sometime late this week or early next. Reason: Reg will be taking over pointman duties on the U.S./Greece base negotiations, will be shortly meeting with Fred Ikle on that subject, and feels that it will be useful to have your views as well.

I believe Reg's request is sensible and that if you could spare a few minutes sometime in the near future - no rush - it would be helpful for our overall objectives in the base negotiations. In addition to the substantive grasp which you have of the base issue, Reg could draw on the fact of the meeting itself, i.e., evidence that the White House is directly involved in the process. This could strengthen his hand when he meets his Greek counterparts.

RECOMMENDATION:YESNO*zpcm*

— That you meet briefly with Bartholomew during the week of April 12-16.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412/1 #121501

BY CN NARA DATE 11/5/15CONFIDENTIAL

Review on 4/5/88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 13

Brian / Judy Lane,

I'm returning this RCM approved
memo through the system for
Judy to contact Reg Bartholomew
re. seeing Bud McFarlane this
week.

Thanks.

Sally Sherman

RECEIVED 05 APR 82 16

TO CLARK

FROM RENTSCHLER

DOCDATE 05 APR 82

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

24 10/20/11

KEYWORDS: GREECE

AC

BARTHOLOMEW, REG

SUBJECT: REQUEST APPT W/ BARTHOLOMEW RE GREEK BASE NEGOTIATIONS

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 06 APR 82 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF #

LOG

NSCIFID

(M /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

C 4/13 McFarlane approved LE ✓

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

dam

~~SECRET~~

121502

41

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 7414
SIT532 DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 101557Z MAY 82 PSN: 021986
TOR: 130/1750Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #7414/01 1301559
O 101557Z MAY 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9381

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 07414

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 5/10/02 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M

TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER)

SUBJECT: (S) SECRETARY'S VISIT TO GREECE:- AMBASSADOR'S
- MEETING WITH PAPANDREOU

REF: ATHENS 7315

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: BEFORE DEPARTING FOR ALGIERS, PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU INFORMED AMBASSADOR HE IS LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY HAIG ON MAY 15 AS A FURTHER STEP IN THE PROCESS OF REDEFINING AND STRENGTHENING US-GREEK RELATIONS. PAPANDREOU DOES NOT EXPECT DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OR FIRM AGREEMENTS WHILE SECRETARY IS IN ATHENS, BUT DOES WISH TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON QUESTION OF ASSURANCES REGARDING SECURITY OF GREECE'S EASTERN BORDERS AND RELATED QUESTION OF FUTURE SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR GREECE. PAPANDREOU MAY SEEK TO REGISTER GOG POSITION ON AEGEAN COMMAND AND CONTROL ISSUES, BUT UNDERSTANDS THIS SUBJECT IS MORE APPROPRIATE FOR DISCUSSION IN NATO CONTEXT. ON CYPRUS, PAPANDREOU EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER KYPRIANOU'S DECISION TO CO-OPERATE WITH AKEL AND IMPLIED THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT MAY WITHDRAW SUPPORT FROM KYPRIANOU IN FORTHCOMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. REFERRING TO INCREASINGLY SHARP

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CRITICISM OF PASOK GOVERNMENT BY GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY, PAPANDREOU STATED THAT HIS MAIN CONCERN IS OVER COMMUNIST INFLUENCE AMONG UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. END SUMMARY

3. I MET WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU AT HIS RESIDENCE IN KASTRI FOR 45 MINUTES IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FOR ALGERIA WHERE HE WILL BE SPENDING THE NEXT FOUR DAYS ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT.

4. PAPANDREOU WAS IN A RELAXED AND AFFABLE MOOD AND SAID HE WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING WITH SECRETARY HAIG ON MAY 15. AFTER REVIEWING THE PROGRAM BRIEFLY AND ASKING ME TO TELL HIM ABOUT OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECRETARY'S PARTY, PAPANDREOU OBSERVED THAT HE HAD NO FIXED AGENDA FOR DISCUSSIONS AND VISUALIZED THE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 *121502

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~

42

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 7414

DTG: 101557Z MAY 82 PSN: 021986

SECRETARY'S VISIT AS ONE FURTHER STEP, ALBEIT AN IMPORTANT ONE, IN CONTINUING PROCESS OF DEFINING LOGICAL LONG-TERM RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND THE US. PAPANDREOU COMMENTED THAT FOR THIS REASON AND BECAUSE THE TIME AVAILABLE TO HIM TO PREPARE FOR HIS MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY WOULD BE LIMITED (HE RETURNS FROM ALGIERS LATE THURSDAY), THE GREEK GOVERNMENT DID NOT EXPECT THE MEETINGS TO PRODUCE DETAILED AGREEMENTS.

5. I SAID THAT FROM MY TALK WITH THE SECRETARY IN WASHINGTON, I BELIEVED THIS APPROACH WAS ENTIRELY SATISFACTORY FROM THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW. THE U.S. SIDE WOULD NOT HAVE A FIXED AGENDA, BUT THE SECRETARY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WHATEVER SUBJECTS THE PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT DESERVED PRIORITY ATTENTION.

6. PAPANDREOU SAID THE TWO SUBJECTS UPPERMOST IN HIS MIND WERE THE QUESTION OF ASSURANCES ON THE SECURITY OF GREECE'S EASTERN FRONTIERS AND, AS A COROLLARY OF THAT, THE QUESTION OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE. PAPANDREOU SAID HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT TURKEY FIGURED EVER MORE PROMINENTLY IN THE SOUTHWEST ASIAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN PLANS OF THE US. HE REFERRED TO AN ARTICLE BY CLAUDIA WRIGHT IN THE FORTHCOMING EDITION OF THE BRITISH JOURNAL, THE NEW STATESMAN, WHICH HE SAID "DOCUMENTED" THE ROLE WASHINGTON ENVISAGED FOR TURKEY IN OUR REGIONAL STRATEGY.

ATHENS 7414

DTG: 101557Z MAY 82 PSN: 021986

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. I SAID IT SEEMED TO ME UNLIKELY THAT CLAUDIA WRIGHT AND THE NEW STATESMAN WERE PRIVY TO THE INNERMOST THOUGHTS OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, BUT THAT IT WAS OBVIOUS FROM THE MAP THAT TURKEY WAS WELL PLACED TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE BOTH STRATEGICALLY AND POLITICALLY, IF IT WERE DISPOSED TO DO SO. IT SEEMED TO ME, HOWEVER, THAT DISCUSSIONS OF GREEK-US RELATIONS EXCLUSIVELY IN THE CONTEXT OF US-TURKISH RELATIONS DISTORTED THE SUBJECT. IN THIS CONNECTION, I RECALLED THAT WHEN I HAD LAST SEEN PAPANDREOU BEFORE GOING TO WASHINGTON, HE HAD STATED HE HAD PROPOSED A MORATORIUM ON RECRIMINATIONS TO THE TURKS AND THAT ANKARA'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN POSITIVE. I ASKED HIM WHETHER THE MORATORIUM WAS STILL IN EFFECT. PAPANDREOU REPLIED THAT AS FAR AS THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WAS CONCERNED, IT WAS STILL IN EFFECT. NOT ONLY HAD THE TENOR OF PUBLIC COMMENT IMPROVED ON BOTH SIDES, BUT FOR THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS THERE HAD BEEN NO AIR SPACE INCIDENTS. I OBSERVED THAT GREECE'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NATO EXERCISE "DISTANT DRUM"

ATHENS 7414

DTG: 101557Z MAY 82 PSN: 021986

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

43

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ATHENS 7414
SIT531 DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 101557Z MAY 82 PSN: 021987
TOR: 130/1752Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB
EOB:
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHTH #7414/02 1301601
O 101557Z MAY 82
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9382

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 07414

NODIS
HAD BEEN REGRETTABLE. I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY
QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY NEEDED TO ARISE AT ALL IN
CONNECTION WITH NATO EXERCISES. IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING
THAT OPERATIONAL RULES ADOPTED BY THE ALLIANCE FOR
SPECIFIC EXERCISES TRANSCENDED QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY;
THIS WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE ALLIANCE.

8. PAPANDREOU SAID THIS WAS TRUE IN THEORY BUT THAT IN
PRACTICE HIS MILITARY BELIEVED COMMAND AND CONTROL
PROCEDURES ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF NATO EXERCISES
IN THE AEGEAN WOULD CONSTITUTE PRECEDENTS AND WOULD
THEREFORE IMPACT ON QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY. IN THE
CASE OF "DISTANT DRUM," HIS MILITARY ADVISERS HAD TOLD
HIM THAT BECAUSE PARTICIPATING AIRCRAFT WOULD OBSERVE
THE SIX MILE AIR SPACE LIMIT BUT NOT GREECE'S CLAIMED
TEN MILE LIMIT, THE EFFECT OF THE EXERCISE WOULD BE TO
SUPPORT THE TURKISH POSITIONS ON AIR SPACE. GREEK
FORCES WOULD BE GLAD TO PARTICIPATE IN NATO EXERCISES
OUTSIDE THE AEGEAN, HE SAID, BUT COULD NOT DO SO IN THE
AEGEAN IF GROUND RULES WERE NOT CONSISTENT WITH GREEK
NATIONAL LAW.

9. PAPANDREOU ADDED THAT HE WOULD, IN ALL PROBABILITY,
MENTION THESE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS TO THE
SECRETARY, BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT RESOLUTION OF THEM

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOR PURPOSES OF NATO EXERCISES WAS SOMETHING TO BE
TAKEN UP WITH ALLIANCE OFFICIALS. IT WOULD, FOR
EXAMPLE, BE DISCUSSED IN GREATER DETAIL WITH GENERAL
ROGERS WHEN HE VISITED ATHENS IN JUNE.

10. PAPANDREOU THEN TURNED TO THE SUBJECT OF CYPRUS
WHICH HE SAID WAS GIVING HIM HEADACHES. HE STRONGLY
DISAPPROVED OF KYPRIANOU'S DECISION TO COOPERATE WITH
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CYPRUS AKEL. RELATIONS BETWEEN
HIMSELF AND KYPRIANOU WERE BAD AT THE PRESENT TIME.
PAPANDREOU BELIEVED THAT KYPRIANOU'S DECISION HAD BEEN
MOTIVATED BY THE DESIRE TO SHORE UP HIS POSITION PRIOR
TO PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN CYPRUS. KYPRIANOU SEEMED
TO HAVE SUBORDINATED EVERYTHING TO HIS DESIRE TO BE RE-
ELECTED. AS A RESULT, SAID PAPANDREOU, HE HAD OPENED
THE DOOR FOR INTERFERENCE IN CYPRUS'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS BY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

44

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 7414

DTG: 101557Z MAY 82 PSN: 021987

MOSCOW. THE SOVIET UNION, ACCORDING TO PAPANDREOU, HAD ISSUED INDIVIDUAL INVITATIONS TO ALL OF THE CYPRIOT PARTY LEADERS, EVEN INCLUDING CLERIDES, TO VISIT MOSCOW. KYPRIANOU'S ACTION HAD STRENGTHENED THE POSITION OF AKEL AT THE VERY TIME WHEN AKEL SHOULD HAVE BEEN ISOLATED.

11. NOW THE DIRECTION OF EVENTS WOULD DEPEND ON WHATEVER ACTION PAPANDREOU'S FRIEND VASSOS LYSARRIDES TOOK. IF LYSARRIDES WITHDREW FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE AND THREW HIS WEIGHT BEHIND ANOTHER POLITICAL PERSONALITY, THEN KYPRIANOU COULD WELL BE DEFEATED. I ASKED WHAT OTHER PERSONALITY LYSARRIDES WAS LIKELY TO SUPPORT. PAPANDREOU SAID THE BEST CANDIDATE WOULD BE GEORGE IOANNIDES WHO WAS "A QUIET MAN WITHOUT MUCH CHARISMA, BUT WHO WAS HONEST."

12. THESE RUMINATIONS LED PAPANDREOU TO DISCUSS BRIEFLY THE RECENT CRITICISM OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT VOICED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREECE (KKE) AND ITS LEADER, HARILAOS FLORAKIS. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION, PAPANDREOU SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE FLORAKIS COULD DAMAGE HIM WITH SPEECHES, BUT IF HE DECIDED TO TAKE THE FIGHT INTO THE STREETS, THERE COULD BE TROUBLE. PAPANDREOU SAID HE WAS NOT ESPECIALLY WORRIED ABOUT THE LABOR UNIONS WHERE PASOK'S POSITION WAS STRONG ENOUGH TO COUNTER THE KKE, BUT HE DID EXPECT PROBLEMS TO ARISE IN THE UNIVERSITIES WHERE THE COMMUNISTS WERE BETTER ORGANIZED AND MORE POWERFUL.

ATHENS 7414

DTG: 101557Z MAY 82 PSN: 021987

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

13. COMMENT: THERE SHOULD BE NO SURPRISES FROM THE GREEK SIDE DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. PAPANDREOU TOLD ME THAT IF THERE WERE SPECIFIC PROBLEMS THAT HIS STAFF WANTED HIM TO RAISE, HE WOULD TELEPHONE ME FRIDAY EVENING. HE REPEATED, HOWEVER, THAT HE WAS MAINLY INTERESTED IN A GENERAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS DIRECTLY TO THE SECRETARY HIS OWN EXPLANATION OF GREEK PRIORITIES, NEEDS, AND OBJECTIVES. THE ATTACKS ON PAPANDREOU BY THE GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY AND HIS DIFFERENCES WITH KYPRIANOU OVER COOPERATION WITH AKEL ALSO PROVIDE A HELPFUL BACKGROUND FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT.

14. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO TRANSMIT PORTIONS OF THIS MESSAGE, APPROPRIATELY CAVEATED, TO NATO POSTS AND TO NICOSIA. STEARNS

~~SECRET~~