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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KML 10/20/2011

**File Folder** GREECE (05/11/1982-08/17/1982)

**FOIA**

M11-412

**Box Number** 15

DRAENOS

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121505	CABLE	ATHENS 7502 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	5	5/11/1982	B1
121506	CABLE	SECTO 7048 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	2	5/16/1982	B1
121507	CABLE	SECTO 7048 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	2	5/16/1982	B1
121508	CABLE	STATE 138784 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	5	5/20/1982	B1
121509	CABLE	ATHENS 8623 <b>D 11/7/2012 M412/1</b>	2	5/28/1982	B1
121511	CABLE	ATHENS 8922 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	6/4/1982	B1
121512	CABLE	ATHENS 9119 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	6/8/1982	B1
121513	CABLE	ATHENS 9134 <b>PAR 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	6/8/1982	B1 B6
121514	CABLE	STATE 161748 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	6/11/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

KML 10/20/2011

**File Folder** GREECE (05/11/1982-08/17/1982)

**FOIA**

M11-412

**Box Number** 15

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
121515	CABLE	ATHENS 10803 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	7/2/1982	B1
121516	CABLE	ATHENS 11217 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	7/12/1982	B1
121517	CABLE	ATHENS 12027 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	2	7/23/1982	B1
121518	CABLE	STATE 221245 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	2	8/7/1982	B1
121519	CABLE	ATHENS 13067 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	8/10/1982	B1
121520	CABLE	STATE 225864 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	2	8/12/1982	B1
121521	CABLE	ATHENS 13352 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	1	8/14/1982	B1
121522	CABLE	ATHENS 13441 <b>R 3/18/2013 M412/1</b>	2	8/17/1982	B1
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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121505

RECALLED

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02      ATHENS 7502  
SIT909      RECALLED

DTG: 111525Z MAY 82      PSN: 023610  
TOR: 131/1653Z

DISTRIBUTION: RCAL /001  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

OP IMMED  
STU0486  
DE RUEHTH #7502/01 1311532  
O 111525Z MAY 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 # 121505

BY KML NARA DATE 3/12/13

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9418

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 07502

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 5/11/02 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M  
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER) GR  
SUBJECT: (S) SECRETARY'S VISIT TO GREECE: AMBASSADOR'S  
- MEETING WITH KARAMANLIS  
REF: A. ATHENS 7414, B. ATHENS 7315

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS INFORMED THE AMBASSADOR THAT IN HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY HAIG HE WISHES TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF ASSURANCES ON GREECE'S EASTERN FRONTIERS, THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS, AND PROSPECTS FOR A BRIEF ENCOUNTER BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU AT THE NATO SUMMIT. ON THE QUESTION OF ASSURANCES, KARAMANLIS IS THINKING IN TERMS OF SOMETHING RESEMBLING A REAFFIRMATION OF THE KISSINGER LETTER OF 1976. ON THE QUESTION OF THE DECA, HE BELIEVES THE POLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF PAPANDREOU'S CONCLUDING A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT IS GREATER THIS YEAR THAN IT WILL BE HEREAFTER. REGARDING AN ENCOUNTER BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PAPANDREOU, HE UNDERSTANDS NO BILATERALS ARE BEING SCHEDULED, BUT HOPES THE BONN SUMMIT WILL BE SO STRUCTURED THAT PAPANDREOU WILL BE ABLE TO HAVE AT LEAST A FEW WORDS WITH THE PRESIDENT APART FROM GENERAL MEETINGS. END SUMMARY

3. I MET WITH PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS AT THE PRESIDENCY FOR FORTY MINUTES THIS MORNING (MAY 11) TO DISCUSS SECRETARY HAIG'S VISIT. ALSO PRESENT WAS THE CHIEF OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLITICAL OFFICE, AMBASSADOR PETROS MOLYVIATIS.

4. AFTER I HAD FILLED IN KARAMANLIS, AT HIS REQUEST, ON MY RECENT CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON DURING CONSULTATIONS, THE PRESIDENT ASKED ME WHAT SUBJECTS WOULD BE UPPERMOST IN SECRETARY HAIG'S MIND DURING HIS MAY 15 VISIT.

5. I REPLIED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD NO FIXED AGENDA FOR HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GREEK GOVERNMENT, BUT WAS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ISSUES AFFECTING US-GREEK RELATIONS. I SAID THAT IN MY CALL ON PAPANDREOU YESTERDAY, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SINGLED OUT THE EASTERN FRONTIER QUESTION AND US SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO GREECE AS TWO SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE GREEK GOVERNMENT. I DID NOT INFER FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH PAPANDREOU, I SAID, THAT HE EXPECTED CONCRETE DECISIONS TO EMERGE FROM HIS MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY. RATHER, THE PRIME MINISTER APPEARED TO ENVISAGE THE VISIT AS A FURTHER STEP IN THE CONTINUING PROCESS OF DEVELOPING A VIABLE LONG-TERM GREEK-US RELATIONSHIP. I THOUGHT THIS APPROACH WAS PERFECTLY SATISFACTORY TO THE AMERICAN

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ATHENS 7502

DTG: 111525Z MAY 82 PSN: 023610

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6. KARAMANLIS SAID HE COULD APPRECIATE THE NEED TO PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY, BUT HE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVED WE SHOULD NOT LOSE THE OPPORTUNITY PROVIDED BY THE SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MAKE TANGIBLE PROGRESS IN RESOLVING SPECIFIC PROBLEMS.

7. FIRST IN HIS MIND WAS THE QUESTION OF GREECE'S EASTERN FRONTIERS AND GREEK PERCEPTIONS THAT THEY FACED A THREAT FROM TURKEY. HE HAD MENTIONED TO ME IN THE PAST THAT ALL PROBLEMS IN US-GREEK RELATIONS COULD BE EASILY SOLVED IF A WAY COULD BE FOUND TO LAY TO REST GREEK APPREHENSIONS ABOUT TURKEY. SOME KIND OF "GUARANTEE" WAS NECESSARY, EITHER BILATERALLY FROM THE UNITED STATES OR IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO. WHATEVER WAS DONE COULD NOT, OF COURSE, BE IRONCLAD, ANY MORE THAN THE KISSINGER LETTER OF 1976 WAS IRONCLAD, BUT KARAMANLIS FIRMLY BELIEVED THAT UNLESS WE WERE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM, OTHER PROBLEMS WOULD GO UNSOLVED.

8. MY REJOINDER TO THE PRESIDENT COVERED FAMILIAR GROUND. I SAID THAT AS LONG AS THE GREEKS AND TURKS WERE DOING LITTLE TO IMPROVE THEIR OWN RELATIONS, IT WAS UN-REALISTIC TO EXPECT ANOTHER POWER OR POWERS TO SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS FOR THEM. AS KARAMANLIS WELL KNEW, WE WERE NOT DEALING WITH ASSURANCES ABOUT INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED LAND BORDERS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY. AIR SPACE, TERRITORIAL SEA AND SEABED ISSUES WERE ALSO INVOLVED AND WERE EXTREMELY COMPLICATED. THE TURKS WERE

UNDERSTANDABLY SENSITIVE TO ANY IMPLICATION THAT THE US WAS COMMITTING ITSELF TO THE GREEK INTERPRETATION OF ISSUES UNDER DISPUTE AND STILL TO BE NEGOTIATED.

9. AT THIS POINT, MOLYVIATIS ENTERED THE CONVERSATION  
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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02      ATHENS 7502  
SIT910      RECALLED

DTG: 111525Z MAY 82      PSN: 023615  
TOR: 131/1655Z

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WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

OP IMMED  
STU0491  
DE RUEHTH #7502/02 1311534  
O 111525Z MAY 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9419

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 ATHENS 07502

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TO SAY THE WORDING OF THE KISSINGER LETTER HAD BEEN EXPRESSLY DESIGNED TO AVOID THIS IMPLICATION. WORDING TO THE EFFECT THAT THE US CONTINUES TO OPPOSE ATTEMPTS MEANS WENT SOME DISTANCE TOWARD ALLAYING GREEK CONCERNS WITHOUT OVERLY ENGAGING THE UNITED STATES IN THE SUBSTANCE OF AEGEAN ISSUES.

10. KARAMANLIS WAVED ASIDE ANY FURTHER DISCUSSION OF DETAILS BY SAYING HE WAS LESS INTERESTED IN A SPECIFIC FORMULA FOR ASSURANCES THAN IN CONVINCING THE UNITED STATES THAT SOME FORMULA WAS NECESSARY. REFERRING TO MY REMARK ABOUT THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ADDRESSING THE SUBJECT OF ASSURANCES WHILE GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS WERE IN SUCH A TROUBLED STATE, HE SAID IT WAS PRECISELY BECAUSE THEY WERE IN A TROUBLED STATE THAT ASSURANCES WERE NECESSARY. NEVERTHELESS, HE ACCEPTED MY STATEMENT THAT GREECE MUST BE PREPARED TO REOPEN DIALOGUE WITH TURKEY AND HE WOULD CONTINUE TO URGE THIS COURSE OF ACTION ON PAPANDREOU.

11. KARAMANLIS SAID HE WOULD DEFINITELY RAISE THE SUBJECT OF ASSURANCES IN HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY HAIG.

12. THE PRESIDENT WENT ON TO SAY HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO REACH SOME PRELIMINARY AGREEMENTS, IF POSSIBLE, ON THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS DURING SECRETARY HAIG'S VISIT. HE WONDERED WHETHER PAPANDREOU HAD INDICATED TO ME HOW HE INTENDED TO HANDLE THIS SUBJECT WITH THE SECRETARY. I REPLIED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS HAD BEEN FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON THE QUESTIONS OF ASSURANCES AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE. HE HAD INDICATED TO ME THAT GREEK POSITIONS ON THE DECA WERE STILL BEING FORMULATED. WE WERE NOT PUSHING PAPANDREOU ON THE DECA, I SAID, AND THOUGHT THERE WAS SOME VIRTUE IN BUILDING UP A CLIMATE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE BEFORE BEGINNING TO NEGOTIATE.

13. KARAMANLIS SAID HE UNDERSTOOD ALL OF THAT, BUT WE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT THE TIMING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE A DIRECT BEARING ON THE OUTCOME. THE PASOK GOVERNMENT, LIKE ANY OTHER GREEK GOVERNMENT, WOULD FIND ITS POPULAR MANDATE WAS BEING ERODED BY ACCUMULATED ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. PAPANDREOU'S ABILITY TO SIGN A REASONABLE AGREEMENT THIS YEAR WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE GREATER THAN IT WOULD BE NEXT YEAR OR THE YEAR AFTER. FOR THIS REASON, KARAMANLIS THOUGHT SECRETARY HAIG'S VISIT SHOULD, AT A MINIMUM, PERMIT US TO AGREE ON THE TIMETABLE FOR TALKS AND PERHAPS ALSO TO DEFINE SOME OF THE KEY ELEMENTS.

14. THIS ALSO WAS A SUBJECT KARAMANLIS WISHED TO DISCUSS WITH SECRETARY HAIG.

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02      ATHENS 7502

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15. LASTLY, KARAMANLIS SAID HE WANTED TO EMPHASIZE HOW IMPORTANT HE THOUGHT IT WAS FOR PAPANDREOU TO BE ABLE TO SAY AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT MEETING IN BONN THAT HE HAD EXCHANGED VIEWS DIRECTLY WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. I SAID THAT THE TIME AVAILABLE IN BONN SIMPLY DID NOT PERMIT THE PRESIDENT TO SCHEDULE BILATERAL MEETINGS WITH OTHER NATO LEADERS EXCEPT FOR HIS GERMAN HOSTS. AS A PARTICIPANT IN PREVIOUS NATO MEETINGS, KARAMANLIS KNEW THE PROBLEM, I SAID, BUT I HOPED THAT HE WOULD EXPLAIN IT TO PAPANDREOU. I NOTED IN THIS CONNECTION THAT PAPANDREOU HAD NOT, IN HIS VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH ME, RAISED THE SUBJECT OF A BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN.

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16. KARAMANLIS SAID HE WAS NOT TALKING ABOUT A FORMAL MEETING. HE HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT THE OCCASION WOULD BE FOUND IN BONN FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN TO EXCHANGE A FEW WORDS -- "PERHAPS FOR NO MORE THAN FIVE OR TEN MINUTES" -- WITH THE GREEK PRIME MINISTER. THIS SMALL INVESTMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TIME, SAID KARAMANLIS, COULD PRODUCE VALUABLE PSYCHOLOGICAL DIVIDENDS BOTH FROM PAPANDREOU AND FROM GREEK PUBLIC OPINION.

17. THIS SUBJECT KARAMANLIS ALSO SAID HE INTENDED TO MENTION IN HIS MEETING WITH SECRETARY HAIG.

18. BEFORE ESCORTING ME TO THE DOOR, KARAMANLIS SAID WE COULD COUNT ON HIM TO CONTINUE ADVISING PAPANDREOU TO DEVELOP SENSIBLE AND PRUDENT POLICIES IN THE AREA OF

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GREECE'S FOREIGN RELATIONS. THIS MEANT POLICIES THAT WOULD KEEP GREECE IN NATO AND STRENGTHEN GREECE'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE WAS SURE SECRETARY HAIG'S VISIT WOULD MARK A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD THESE OBJECTIVES. HE THEN PAUSED AND SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO HAVE A LITTLE MORE TIME WITH THE SECRETARY; PERHAPS THE SECRETARY COULD MEET WITH HIM AT 7:45 IN THE EVENING RATHER THAN AT 8 O'CLOCK. I ASSURED  
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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01                      ATHENS      5/11 7502  
SIT692                      DATE 05/11/82

DTG: 111525Z MAY 82 PSN: 023617  
TOR: 131/1656Z

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MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #7502/03 1311536  
O 111525Z MAY 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9420

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ATHENS 07502

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KARAMANLIS THE SECRETARY WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO THEIR MEETING AND THAT WE WOULD TRY TO BUILD A LITTLE EXTRA TIME INTO THE PROGRAM.

19. COMMENT: WHILE KARAMANLIS'S REMARKS ARE BROADLY CONSISTENT WITH WHAT PAPANDREOU SAID TO ME YESTERDAY ABOUT HIS EXPECTATIONS FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, IT IS HARD FOR ME TO TELL HOW CLOSELY THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER ARE KEEPING EACH OTHER INFORMED. THERE MAY BE SOME JOCKEYING FOR POSITION GOING ON BEHIND THE SCENES. WHETHER THIS IS THE CASE OR NOT, WE CAN RELY ON KARAMANLIS TO USE HIS INFLUENCE IN CONSTRUCTIVE WAYS. HE IS PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO GREECE REMAINING IN NATO AND HAVING CLOSE TIES WITH THE UNITED STATES. THE TREND OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT'S FOREIGN POLICY SUGGESTS HIS ADVICE IS NOT GOING UNHEEDED. STEARNS

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121506

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY IN 7793 DTG: 160840Z MAY 82 PSN: 031768  
SIT034 TOR: 136/1028Z

DISTRIBUTION: WPC /004

OP IMMED  
STU2361  
DE RUEHLH #7793 1360845  
O 160840Z MAY 82  
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ATHENS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM412 #121506

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6767

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 7048

NODIS  
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY HAIG  
DEPT PASS TO THE WHITE HOUSE  
E.O. 12065: RDS-3 5/16/02 (DILLERY, E.)  
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR) GR  
SUBJECT: SEC/PRES-VISIT TO ATHENS, MAY 15-16, 1982

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU STRUCK EXACTLY THE  
RIGHT NOTE ABOUT THIS VISIT WHEN HE SAID IN A TOAST  
MAY 15 "WE MAY NOT HAVE SOLVED ALL OUR PROBLEMS BUT I  
THINK WE HAVE LAID THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A PRODUCTIVE  
RELATIONSHIP IN THE FUTURE." THE VISIT WAS MORE NOTE-  
WORTHY FOR THE DEMANDS THE GREEKS DID NOT MAKE THAN FOR  
THE POSITIONS THEY TOOK. WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO BE  
SURE, THE STRONG INDICATION IS THAT PAPANDREOU RECOGNIZES  
THAT THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP IS VITAL TO GREECE AND MAY  
BE PREPARED TO ABANDON SOME TRADITIONAL POSITIONS TO  
ACCOMPLISH THIS.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY IN 7793 DTG: 160840Z MAY 82 PSN: 031768

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3. PAPANDREOU MADE ALL THE STANDARD POINTS ON CYPRUS AND ON GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS BUT HE DID IT WITHOUT EMOTION THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED SO MANY OF THESE EXCHANGES IN THE PAST. HIS OWN PRESS STATEMENT FOLLOWING OUR THREE HOUR MEETING COULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY US.

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4. THIS SOUNDS ALMOST TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE. SINCE 1974, U.S.-GREEK RELATIONS HAVE CONSISTED OF A LITANY OF COMPLAINTS BY THE GREEKS AND A STUBBORN DEFENSE ON OUR PART. THE DOOR IS NOW CLEARLY OPEN TO A MORE RATIONAL APPROACH TOWARD THE RELATIONSHIP ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD NOT DECEIVE OURSELVES THAT ACTUAL AGREEMENTS WILL BE EASY TO ACHIEVE. HARD BARGAINING LIES AHEAD.

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5. BOTH THE GREEKS AND THE TURKS AGREED TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ON CYPRUS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. THIS WAS A MAJOR DEPARTURE FROM AT LEAST THE RHETORICAL STANCE OF PAPANDREOU. IT SHOULD ENABLE US TO GET REAL NEGOTIATIONS GOING AT AN EARLY DATE.

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6. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE GREEKS WILL HAVE TO BE CREATIVE ON CYPRUS AND IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH TURKEY. SURPRISINGLY THEY DID NOT SAY THAT THE ONLY THING NEEDED WAS CONCESSIONS BY TURKEY.

7. IN SUM, PAPANDREOU IS RESPONDING WELL TO THE CAREFUL, POSITIVE POLICY YOUR ADMINISTRATION HAS FOLLOWED SINCE HE CAME INTO OFFICE IN OCTOBER 1981.

HAIG

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121507

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY IN 7793  
SIT683 DATE 05/19/82

DTG: 160840Z MAY 82 PSN: 030821  
TOR: 136/1028Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

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WHSR COMMENT: PLEASE ADVISE ON FURTHER DISSEMINATION

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MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHLH #7793 1360845

O 160840Z MAY 82

FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6767

~~SECRET~~ SECTO 7048

NODIS

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM SECRETARY HAIG

DEPT PASS TO THE WHITE HOUSE

E.O. 12065: RDS-3 5/16/02 (DILLERY, E.)

TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR) GR

SUBJECT: SEC/PRES-VISIT TO ATHENS, MAY 15-16, 1982

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU STRUCK EXACTLY THE RIGHT NOTE ABOUT THIS VISIT WHEN HE SAID IN A TOAST MAY 15 "WE MAY NOT HAVE SOLVED ALL OUR PROBLEMS BUT I THINK WE HAVE LAID THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP IN THE FUTURE." THE VISIT WAS MORE NOTE-WORTHY FOR THE DEMANDS THE GREEKS DID NOT MAKE THAN FOR THE POSITIONS THEY TOOK. WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO BE SURE, THE STRONG INDICATION IS THAT PAPANDREOU RECOGNIZES THAT THE U.S. RELATIONSHIP IS VITAL TO GREECE AND MAY BE PREPARED TO ABANDON SOME TRADITIONAL POSITIONS TO ACCOMPLISH THIS.

3. PAPANDREOU MADE ALL THE STANDARD POINTS ON CYPRUS AND ON GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS BUT HE DID IT WITHOUT EMOTION THAT HAS CHARACTERIZED SO MANY OF THESE EXCHANGES IN THE PAST. HIS OWN PRESS STATEMENT FOLLOWING OUR THREE HOUR MEETING COULD HAVE BEEN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WRITTEN BY US.

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5. BOTH THE GREEKS AND THE TURKS AGREED TO INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS ON CYPRUS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL. THIS WAS A MAJOR DEPARTURE FROM AT LEAST THE RHETORICAL STANCE OF PAPANDREOU. IT SHOULD ENABLE

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NLRR M412 #121507

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

9

PAGE 02 OF 02 USDEL SECRETARY IN 7793 DTG: 160840Z MAY 82 PSN: 030821

US TO GET REAL NEGOTIATIONS GOING AT AN EARLY DATE.

6. I EMPHASIZED THAT THE GREEKS WILL HAVE TO BE CREATIVE ON CYPRUS AND IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH TURKEY. SURPRISINGLY THEY DID NOT SAY THAT THE ONLY THING NEEDED WAS CONCESSIONS BY TURKEY.

7. IN SUM, PAPANDREOU IS RESPONDING WELL TO THE CAREFUL, POSITIVE POLICY YOUR ADMINISTRATION HAS FOLLOWED SINCE HE CAME INTO OFFICE IN OCTOBER 1981.  
HAIG

USDEL SECRETARY IN 7793 DTG: 160840Z MAY 82 PSN: 030821

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121508

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# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 8784 DTG: 202131Z MAY 82 PSN: 037015  
SIT270 DATE 06/02/82 TOR: 140/2200Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

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MESSAGE:

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DE RUEHC #8784/01 140215Z  
O 202131Z MAY 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 2181  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 5325  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 0712  
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9938  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6423  
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7564  
CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9374

INFO USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IMMEDIATE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 138784  
NODIS  
MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/16/02 (MCANAWAY, C.)  
TAGS: OVIP (HAIG, ALEXANDER M., JR.)  
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MAY 15, 1982 MEETING WITH  
KARAMANLIS

1. (ENTIRE TEXT).

2. SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY MET WITH PRESIDENT  
KARAMANLIS ON MAY 15, 1982 AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE  
IN ATHENS. THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON PAPANDREOU, THE  
NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT, GREEK-TURKEY RELATIONS, GREEK  
DESIRE FOR A SECURITY GUARANTEE, AEGEAN AND CYPRUS  
PROBLEMS, US-GREEK RELATIONS, AND NATO COMMAND AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS. AMBASSADOR STEARNS AND ACTING  
DAS THOMAS ACCOMPANIED THE SECRETARY. PETROS  
MOLYVIATIS, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PRESIDENCY,  
INTERPRETED FOR PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS.

3. THE SECRETARY BEGAN THE DISCUSSION BY COMMENTING  
THAT HE HAD A VERY GOOD AND BROAD-RANGING DISCUSSION  
THAT AFTERNOON WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU.  
KARAMANLIS REPLIED THAT HE WAS INDEED HAPPY TO HEAR  
THAT; IT WAS IMPORTANT TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST  
AND UNDERSTANDING, ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF GREECE,

WHICH HAS A NEW GOVERNMENT. THE FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF  
THE NEW GOVERNMENT HAD CREATED CERTAIN DOUBTS.  
THEREFORE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP THE RIGHT

CLIMATE, AND SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS MUST BE CLEARED  
UP. THESE MISUNDERSTANDINGS WERE CAUSED BY THE WAY  
THINGS WERE HANDLED. KARAMANLIS ASKED THE SECRETARY  
HIS IMPRESSIONS OF THE VISIT TO TURKEY.

4. TURKEY

THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE TURKS WERE PRIMARILY  
CONCERNED WITH THEIR INTERNAL PROBLEMS. THEY HAD BEEN  
ON THE VERGE OF ANARCHY. HE RECALLED TELLING FORMER  
PRESIDENT CARTER THAT THE SITUATION WAS SO BAD THAT  
SOMETHING HAD TO HAPPEN AND IF THE MILITARY DID NOT  
INTERVENE IT WAS LIKELY THAT TURKEY WOULD FOLLOW THE  
PATH OF IRAN. KARAMANLIS REPLIED THAT THE REAL  
QUESTION WAS GOING TO BE HOW THE MILITARY COMPLETED THE  
INTERVENTION. THAT WAS THE REAL PROBLEM. THE  
SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE KNEW GENERAL EVREN VERY WELL  
AND HAD IN FACT INTRODUCED HIM INTO THE NATO COMMUNITY  
WHILE HE WAS SACEUR. THE SECRETARY UNDERScoreD THE  
FACT THAT EVREN IN THE TURKISH SENSE WAS A TRUE  
DEMOCRAT. HE HAD ABSOLUTE CONFIDENCE THAT, DUE TO  
EVREN'S SENSITIVITY REGARDING THE MILITARY TAKEOVER, HE  
WOULD DEFINITELY MEET THE SCHEDULE FOR A RETURN TO  
DEMOCRACY. THERE HAD BEEN REMARKABLE ACCOMPLISHMENT  
UNDER THE MILITARY REGIME, INCLUDING THE RETURN TO LAW  
AND ORDER, A MAJOR DROP IN INFLATION, AND A 40 PERCENT  
INCREASE IN EXPORTS. MOST OF THE EXPORTS WERE DESTINED

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FOR THE MIDDLE EAST RATHER THAN EUROPE. THE SECRETARY  
ALSO COMMENTED THAT THE COUNTRY APPEARED COMPLETELY  
DIFFERENT FROM 1979. THE STREETS WERE CLEAN, THE  
CHILDREN WERE BETTER DRESSED, AND HE SAW REAL SIGNS OF  
HOPE.

5. KARAMANLIS VIEW OF TURKISH SITUATION.

KARAMANLIS REPLIED THAT IN HIS VIEW IT WILL BE VERY  
DIFFICULT FOR THE TURKISH MILITARY TO UPHOLD THEIR  
TIMETABLE FOR A RETURN TO DEMOCRACY. HE HOPED IT WOULD  
HAPPEN, BUT HE REALLY DID NOT THINK THAT THE REGIME  
SHOULD BE PRESSURED, BECAUSE THE SITUATION WAS  
POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE. THE TRANSITION SHOULD BE DONE  
GRADUALLY. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HIMSELF HAD NO  
TIMETABLE, BUT THE TURKS WERE VERY SENSITIVE AND HAD  
BEEN CONFUSED BY CRITICISM FROM NORTHERN EUROPE.  
KARAMANLIS OBSERVED THAT GREECE HAD GONE THROUGH THAT

BEEN KEPT OUT OF EUROPE, WHEREAS THE ALLIES FELT THE  
NECESSITY TO TAKE GOOD CARE OF TURKEY. THE TURKS WERE  
IN SUCH A DIFFICULT SITUATION THAT THEY SHOULD TRY TO  
SETTLE THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH GREECE. HE HAD TOLD THEM  
SO. GREECE AND TURKEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO FOCUS ON  
THEIR INTERNAL PROBLEMS. HE HAD MADE REASONABLE AND  
MODERATE PROPOSALS TO THE TURKS WITH NO RESULTS. HE  
FOUND IT UNPLEASANT TO HAVE TO INVOLVE THE UNITED  
STATES IN THEIR QUARRELS. BUT WHETHER THEY WANTED IT  
OR NOT, THEY BOTH BELONG TO THE SAME ALLIANCE. HE  
REALIZED THAT, WHEN THE UNITED STATES TRIED TO HELP,  
THE RESULT WOULD BE BOTH COUNTRIES DISPLEASED. IT WAS,

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TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 2182  
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AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 0713  
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NODIS  
MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
NEVERTHELESS, OBVIOUS WHICH SIDE WAS IN THE WRONG.  
BECAUSE GREECE MIGHT HAVE COMMITTED SOME FOOLISH  
MISTAKES, TURKEY ENDED UP USING FORCE DURING THE CYPRUS  
TRAGEDY.

6. KARAMANLIS CONTINUED THAT THESE WERE PROBLEMS WHICH  
MUST BE SOLVED. IF THEY WERE ALLOWED TO CONTINUE  
NOBODY COULD PREDICT WHAT FURTHER PROBLEMS MIGHT  
ARISE. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO TELL THE SECRETARY WHAT  
THOSE PROBLEMS WOULD BE, BUT HE COULD SAY THAT IT WOULD  
BE USEFUL IF THE U.S. WOULD INTEREST ITSELF IN A  
DISCREET MANNER. THE CYPRUS TRAGEDY CONTINUED TO BE  
UNACCEPTABLE. AFTER ALL THEY WERE NOT IN AFRICA OR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ASIA BUT IN FREE EUROPE. A FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE  
SITUATION LIMITED THE WEST'S CAPACITY TO ACCUSE THE  
SOVIETS FOR WHAT THEY WERE DOING IN OTHER PARTS OF THE  
WORLD.

7. AEGEAN

KARAMANLIS SAID THE SECRETARY KNEW ABOUT THE PROBLEMS  
CREATED BY TURKEY. THERE WERE SOLUTIONS, RATHER EASY  
IN HIS VIEW, IF THEY FOUND THE NECESSARY UNDERSTANDING  
AND POLITICAL COURAGE, AND IF THE GOVERNMENTS WERE  
READY TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY. HE HAD REPEATEDLY MADE  
PROPOSALS. WHILE THE TURKS ADMITTED THE PROPOSALS WERE  
MODERATE, THEY HAD LACKED THE COURAGE TO GO AHEAD.  
GREECE COULD HAVE SOLVED SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS BY

EXPANDING ITS TERRITORIAL WATERS. IN THIS FASHION BOTH  
THE CONTINENTAL AND AIRSPACE PROBLEMS WOULD HAVE BEEN  
80 PERCENT SOLVED. HE HAD BEEN PATIENT OVER THE YEARS,  
ALTHOUGH PROVOKED ALMOST DAILY. THEY NEEDED FRESH  
IDEAS TO ACHIEVE A NEW SOLUTION. THEY MUST FIND  
SOLUTIONS BECAUSE THE SITUATION WAS BAD FOR EVERYBODY,  
AND HE WANTED RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES TO BE AS

CLOSE AND WARM AS POSSIBLE. HE HAD DEPLOYED PRESISTENT  
EFFORT ON THIS MATTER EVER SINCE HIS RETURN TO OFFICE.

8. U.S. AND GREECE

KARAMANLIS EMPHASIZED THERE WERE NO BILATERAL PROBLEMS  
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREECE. ON THE CONTRARY,  
GREECE HAD REASONS FROM THE PAST TO BE GRATEFUL FOR  
U.S. HELP. HE WANTED TO REPEAT AND UNDERLINE THE  
REASON FOR THE BITTERNESS OF THE GREEKS. THEY FELT  
THREATENED BY TURKEY. ALTHOUGH TURKEY MIGHT SAY IT HAD  
NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS, THE FACT WAS TURKEY WAS STILL  
OCCUPYING CYPRUS. IT WAS NATURAL THE GREEK PUBLIC FELT  
BITTER WHEN THE U.S. HELPED TURKEY. IT WAS NECESSARY  
TO RECOGNIZE THAT THIS SITUATION WAS EXCLUSIVELY DUE TO  
PSYCHOLOGICAL REASONS. HE THEN SOUGHT TO EXPLAIN THE  
ORIGINS OF THE MALAISE THAT AFFECTED US-GREEK  
RELATIONS. THE GREEKS HAD NO HOSTILITY TO THE UNITED  
STATES. IN FACT, GREECE USED TO BE THE MOST PRO-NATO  
COUNTRY IN EUROPE BECAUSE OF THE HELP RECEIVED FROM THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

UNITED STATES AND THE MILLIONS OF GREEKS LIVING IN THAT  
COUNTRY. AS ARISTOTLE SAID, "THE BITTERNESS BETWEEN  
RELATIVES IS ALWAYS DEEPER THAN THE BITTERNESS BETWEEN  
STRANGERS." THE GREEKS SAID THEY HAD BEEN BROTHERS  
WITH AMERICA; WHY DID THE AMERICANS DO THIS TO GREECE?  
KARAMANLIS ASKED THE SECRETARY TO BELIEVE HIM WHEN HE  
SAID HE KNEW HIS OWN COUNTRY WELL, AND THE GREEKS WERE  
MORE EMOTIONAL THAN LOGICAL. HE ATTACHED GREAT  
IMPORTANCE TO ANY EFFORT TO DISSOLVE THE CURRENTLY  
EXISTING CLIMATE OF FEAR. THE GREEKS NEEDED TO BE  
CONVINCED THEY WERE NOT IN DANGER. THAT WAS WHY THEY  
PERSISTED IN SEEKING A SECURITY GUARANTEE AND A BALANCE  
IN THE AID PROVIDED GREECE AND TURKEY. THESE WERE  
QUESTIONS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR GREECE ALTHOUGH THEY  
WERE, IN FACT, ONLY ANODYNE FOR TURKEY AND NATO.  
ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE OBJECTIVES WOULD LEAVE GREECE  
FEELING PROTECTED AND SECURE, THEREBY LEADING DIRECTLY  
TO SOLUTIONS FOR THE OTHER PROBLEMS.

9. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE, OF COURSE, MUST SPEAK  
FRANKLY. NOBODY NEEDED TO BURNISH THE PRO-WEST,  
PRO-UNITED STATES, AND PRO-NATO CREDENTIALS OF  
PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS. KARAMANLIS OBSERVED THAT THIS  
HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY APPRECIATED. WHEN HE  
RETURNED TO OFFICE, HE FOUND AN EXPLOSIVE ANTI-US  
ATTITUDE IN GREECE, AND HE HAD TRIED TO IMPROVE IT STEP  
BY STEP. WHEN HE PULLED GREECE OUT OF NATO IN 1974, HE  
SAID HE WOULD RETURN WHEN NATO SOLVED THE CYPRUS  
PROBLEM. BUT IN FACT HE HAD RETURNED GREECE TO NATO  
WITHOUT A CYPRUS SOLUTION. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD  
TELL KARAMANLIS WHAT HE HAD TOLD THE PRIME MINISTER

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 2184  
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AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 0715  
USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9941  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6426  
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7567  
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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 STATE 138784  
NODIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
ENORMOUSLY IF IT WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE FOR GREECE'S  
BASIC SECURITY. THIS WAS A MATTER OF GREAT IMPORTANCE  
TO THE GREEKS AND OF LITTLE CONCERN TO ANYONE ELSE.  
THE SEVEN-TEN RATIO WAS ANOTHER MATTER THAT FELL INTO  
THIS CATEGORY.

13. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT HE WAS NOT WORRIED;

THERE WAS ALREADY AN ADDITIONAL 40 MILLION DOLLARS FOR  
GREECE IMPOSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. AND  
THE ADMINISTRATION HAD NOT EVEN ASKED FOR IT. SO HE  
WAS NOT WORRIED. KARAMANLIS RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD  
HAVE BEEN BETTER IF THIS HAD BEEN DONE IN THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ADMINISTRATION'S NAME BECAUSE IT WAS BOTH A  
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND ACTUAL PROBLEM. THE SECRETARY  
COMMENTED THAT WE HAD A SEVEN-TEN PROBLEM, ALTHOUGH THE  
ADMINISTRATION NEVER ASKED FOR SEVEN-TEN. KARAMANLIS  
SAID THAT HE HAD REQUESTED THE RATIO FROM PRESIDENT  
FORD, AS THE SECRETARY WOULD RECALL, AND THAT HE HAD  
DONE SO IN ORDER TO GET THE EMBARGO LIFTED. THE  
SECRETARY WARNED THAT THE ISSUE WAS DANGEROUS IN  
CONGRESS BECAUSE WE SHOULD BE LOOKING AT THE QUESTION  
OF NEED AND NOT SETTING A FIRM RATIO. THE SECRETARY  
SAID A SIMILAR SITUATION EXISTED WITH THE SO-CALLED  
SECURITY GUARANTEE. BEFORE THE ELECTION IT WOULD HAVE  
BEEN LESS OF A PROBLEM, BUT, OF COURSE, WITH THE  
ELECTION OF PAPANDREOU THINGS HAD CHANGED. KARAMANLIS  
UNDERScoreD THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THESE  
MATTERS BOTHERED THE TURKS SO MUCH IF THEY WERE INDEED

WITHOUT BAD INTENTIONS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE THOUGHT  
THEY COULD LOOK TOWARDS INCREASING SUCCESS IN SOLVING  
THESE PROBLEMS BUT THEY WOULD JUST NEED A LITTLE MORE  
TIME. KARAMANLIS REMINDED THE SECRETARY THAT THE  
SECRETARY HAD SAID THAT THEY SHOULD NOT ALLOW TIME TO  
SPIN OUT. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE  
FEASIBLE TO HAVE A GUARANTEE AS THE FIRST STEP WITHOUT  
PROGRESS ON CYPRUS OR THE OTHER BILATERAL PROBLEMS.  
KARAMANLIS RESPONDED THAT A GUARANTEE WAS NEEDED ONLY  
BECAUSE GREECE SENSED DANGER. IT COULD CREATE A BETTER  
CLIMATE, WHICH WOULD LEAD TO SOLUTIONS. HE HAD TALKED  
WITH LUNS IN DECEMBER AND LUNS SAID HE WOULD HELP SEE  
IF THE ALLIES COULD FIND A FORMULA COINED IN GENERAL  
TERMS, WITHOUT MENTIONING TURKEY. LUNS HAD BEEN  
ENTHUSIASTIC, AND SAID IT COULD BE A WORKABLE  
SOLUTION. KARAMANLIS WONDERED WHY TURKEY COULD NOT  
ACCEPT SOMETHING LIKE THAT. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT  
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS SITUATION REMINDED US THAT ALL  
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS IF NOT NIPPED IN THE BUD CAN  
BECOME DANGEROUS. THE SECRETARY UNDERScoreD HOW VERY  
CONSCIOUS HE WAS OF GREEK CONCERNS, AND SAID THE U.S.  
WOULD RESPOND AS SENSITIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY AS IT  
COULD. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD TOLD HIM THAT HE WANTED  
BASE TALKS AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT AND HE HAD RESPONDED  
THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARED TO FOLLOW ANY  
SCHEDULE GREECE FEELS APPROPRIATE OR THE RIGHT TIMING.

14. NATO COMMAND AND CONTROL

SECSTATE WASHDC 8784 DTG: 202131Z MAY 82 PSN: 037028  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

KARAMANLIS OBSERVED THAT GREECE ALSO HAD PROBLEMS WITH  
THE TWO NATO HEADQUARTERS, AND, OF COURSE, HAIG WAS  
QUITE AWARE OF IT. TOO AWARE, SAID THE SECRETARY.  
KARAMANLIS SUGGESTED THAT THE PROBLEMS SHOULD BE  
SETTLED SOON, BECAUSE HE HAD KNOWN THE SAME PROBLEMS  
WHEN HE WAS PRIME MINISTER AND HAD PUT PRESSURE ON HIS  
MILITARY TO FIND SOLUTIONS. AS THE SECRETARY KNEW,  
THEY MUST SPEED UP THE PROCESS BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL  
SITUATION IN GREECE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD BEEN  
HAPPY TO BE RELIEVED OF THE NATO HEADQUARTERS PROBLEM  
AND KARAMANLIS REPLIED THAT, NEVERTHELESS, THE  
SECRETARY STILL KNEW THE PROBLEM VERY WELL AND COULD  
INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME.

15. KARAMANLIS SAID THE SECRETARY'S TALKS IN GREECE  
AND TURKEY OPENED THE WAY TO PROMOTE A SOLUTION. THEIR  
DUTY WAS TO BROADEN THE ROAD. HE HAD CALLED IN THE  
TURKISH AMBASSADOR TWO MONTHS AGO AND TOLD HIM THAT  
TURKEY AND HIS OWN GOVERNMENT SHOULD CEASE PROVOCATIONS  
AND LOWER THE RHETORIC. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAD  
COMPLIED WITH THIS REQUEST, BUT THE TURKS HAD SAID THAT  
A DIALOGUE MUST BEGIN BEFORE THEY COULD LOWER THE  
RHETORIC. KARAMANLIS SAID HE HAD TRIED TO GIVE THE  
SECRETARY A TRUE PICTURE OF THE PROBLEMS IN THE HOPE OF  
HELPING TO FURTHER A SOLUTION. THE SECRETARY SAID HE  
SHOULD KNOW THAT THE U.S. WOULD MAKE ITS VERY BEST  
EFFORT. KARAMANLIS SAID THAT THE SECRETARY WOULD OF  
COURSE BE IN CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT, BUT IF THERE  
WERE A PARTICULAR ISSUE THE SECRETARY WISHED TO RAISE

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13

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 8784 DTG: 202131Z MAY 82 PSN: 037029  
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TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 2185

AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 5329

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 0716

USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 9942

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6427

WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7568

CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9378

INFO USNMR SHAPE IMMEDIATE

USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IMMEDIATE

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 STATE 138784

NODIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
WITH HIM HE SHOULD BE CONTACTED THROUGH AMBASSADOR  
STEARNS. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT, OF COURSE, THIS  
WAS VERY IMPORTANT BECAUSE KARAMANLIS WAS VERY WELL  
KNOWN AND TRUSTED BY THE TURKS, AND IT MIGHT BE  
NECESSARY TO ASK HIM FOR HIS HELP. KARAMANLIS REPEATED  
THAT IF THE MOMENT CAME THAT HE COULD BE HELPFUL THE  
SECRETARY SHOULD GO THROUGH THE AMBASSADOR. THE  
SECRETARY SAID THAT, AS KARAMANLIS WELL KNEW,  
AMBASSADOR STEARNS HAD BEEN HAND-PICKED FOR HIS  
ASSIGNMENT.

16. THE SECRETARY CLOSED BY ASSURING KARAMANLIS THAT  
HE WOULD TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY EVERYTHING KARAMANLIS HAD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SAID, AND HE INTENDED TO DISCUSS IT WITH PRESIDENT  
REAGAN. HE NOTED THAT HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE  
GOVERNMENT OF GREECE HAD BEEN SUCCESSFUL, AND HE  
THOUGHT HE SAW THE FINE HAND OF KARAMANLIS BEHIND IT.

KARAMANLIS RESPONDED BY OBSERVING THAT HE HAD URGED  
BOTH THE GREEK AND THE AMERICAN SIDES TO HAVE THE  
SECRETARY MAKE THIS VISIT. HAIG

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14

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 8784 DTG: 202131Z MAY 82 PSN: 037029  
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KARAMANLIS RESPONDED BY OBSERVING THAT HE HAD URGED  
BOTH THE GREEK AND THE AMERICAN SIDES TO HAVE THE  
SECRETARY MAKE THIS VISIT. HAIG

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AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 8031  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATHENS 08922

EXDIS  
E.O. 12065: GDS 6/4/88 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M  
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, GR, US, IT  
SUBJECT: PAPANDREOU'S REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT WITH  
PRESIDENT REAGAN  
REF: ROME 13290

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PAPANDREOU HAS NOT, IN MEETINGS WITH THE  
AMBASSADOR, RAISED THE SUBJECT OF A PRIVATE MEETING  
WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN; NOR DID HE MAKE A SPECIFIC  
REQUEST DURING SECRETARY HAIG'S VISIT HERE. THE  
GREEK PRESS, INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT PRESS, HAS  
CONTINUED TO SPECULATE ABOUT A REAGAN-PAPANDREOU  
MEETING IN BONN, BUT THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE  
INSPIRED BY THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF. NEVERTHELESS,  
WE ARE CERTAIN THAT PAPANDREOU WOULD WELCOME --  
AND MAY EVEN EXPECT -- AN OPPORTUNITY IN BONN FOR  
A BRIEF EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH THE PRESIDENT.

3. IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE BEFORE DEPARTING ATHENS  
ON MAY 16, SECRETARY HAIG RESPONDED TO A QUESTION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A REAGAN-PAPANDREOU MEETING  
AS FOLLOWS: "WITH RESPECT TO THE UPCOMING SUMMIT  
IN BONN, I THINK THERE IS ONLY ONE SET OF BILATERALS  
DISCUSSED THAT IS NOW SCHEDULED BETWEEN PRESIDENT  
REAGAN AND THE CHANCELLOR OF WEST GERMANY AS THE  
HOST GOVERNMENT FOR THE SUMMIT. THIS DOES NOT  
PRECLUDE WHATEVER DISCUSSIONS WILL OCCUR ON THE  
MARGINS AND DURING THE FREQUENT OPPORTUNITIES THAT  
OCCUR DURING BREAKS AND SOCIAL EVENTS WHICH I AM  
QUITE CONFIDENT WILL AFFORD AN OPPORTUNITY FOR  
DISCUSSION."

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE BELIEVE THAT A SHORT  
MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRIME MINISTER  
PAPANDREOU IN THE MARGINS OF THE BONN SUMMIT WOULD  
HAVE A SIGNIFICANT AND FAVORABLE AFFECT ON U.S. -

GREEK RELATIONS.

5. AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT: SINCE PAPANDREOU HAD  
OPPORTUNITY TO REQUEST APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT  
REAGAN IN RECENT DISCUSSIONS WITH SECRETARY HAIG BUT  
DID NOT CHOOSE TO DO SO, I SUSPECT STREMMENOS'  
INITIATIVE IS MORE INSPIRED BY A DESIRE TO PROMOTE  
HIMSELF WITH PAPANDREOU THAN TO PROMOTE A MEETING  
BETWEEN PAPANDREOU AND THE PRESIDENT. TO KEEP  
CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION WITH GOG UNAMBIGUOUS IT  
WOULD THEREFORE BE BEST FOR WASHINGTON TO RESPOND  
TO THIS FEELER -- IF FEELER IT IS -- THROUGH GREEK  
EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON OR US EMBASSY IN ATHENS.  
STEARNS

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M412 # 121511  
BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

121512

18

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      ATHENS 9119      DTG: 081211Z JUN 82 PSN: 006903  
SIT021      DATE 06/11/82      TOR: 159/1412Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #9119 1591211  
O 081211Z JUN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9926  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 5715  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 6223  
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 8039  
BT

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 09119

EXDIS - FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BURT  
E.O. 12065: RDS- (1) (4) 6/8/97 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M  
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, NATO, IT, US, GR  
SUBJECT: PAPANDREOU REALISTIC ABOUT APPOINTMENT WITH  
- PRESIDENT REAGAN  
REF: A. STATE 153729, B. ATHENS 8922, C. ROME 13290

1. ~~1~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I SAW PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU LAST NIGHT AT HIS SUBURBAN RESIDENCE. NO ONE ELSE WAS PRESENT. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT MY REQUEST TO ENABLE ME TO ASCERTAIN PAPANDREOU'S MOOD ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE BONN SUMMIT AND, IF NECESSARY, TO CORRECT ANY MISCONCEPTIONS HE MIGHT HAVE ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY OF SCHEDULING A BILATERAL APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN DURING THE SUMMIT.

3. PAPANDREOU SAID THE GREEK PRESS STORIES SPECULATING ABOUT A REAGAN-PAPANDREOU MEETING IN BONN DID NOT REFLECT HIS OWN EXPECTATIONS. WHILE THIS WOULD BE HIS FIRST NATO SUMMIT, HE REALIZED OPPORTUNITIES FOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BILATERAL MEETINGS WERE LIMITED. IN HIS OWN CASE, HE HAD JUST RECEIVED CONFIRMATION THAT HE WOULD BE MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT, BUT HE HAD NO OTHER SCHEDULED BILATERALS.

4. I SAID I WAS PERSONALLY CONFIDENT THAT IN THE MARGINS OF THE MAIN MEETINGS AND OTHER SCHEDULED EVENTS THERE WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PAPANDREOU TO MEET AND CONVERSE WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID SECRETARY HAIG HAD INDICATED THIS WHEN IN ATHENS. PAPANDREOU THOUGHT THE LIKELIEST OPPORTUNITY FOR INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS OF THIS KIND WOULD BE DURING THE DAY WHEN THE SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS WERE SCHEDULED TO CRUISE ON THE RHINE.

5. HOWEVER THE OPPORTUNITY AROSE, PAPANDREOU SAID HE

WOULD LIKE TO REGISTER WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN GREECE'S CONCERNS FOR ITS OWN SECURITY AND ITS DESIRE TO FIND A REMEDY WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.

6. I SAID IT SEEMED TO ME THAT GREEK PRESS SPECULATION, IF ALLOWED TO CONTINUE, MIGHT LEAD TO A WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIED IMPRESSION THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD "REBUFFED" PAPANDREOU IF NO BILATERAL OCCURRED. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE WAS AWARE OF THE PROBLEM AND WOULD TAKE CARE OF IT. HE SAID HIS DEPUTY MINISTER FOR PRESS, DIMITRI MAROUDAS, WOULD BE WITH HIM IN BONN AND THEY WOULD MAKE CERTAIN THERE WAS NO MISUNDERSTANDING. STEARNS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121512  
BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

121513

19

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 9134  
SIT022 DATE 06/11/82

DTG: 081307Z JUN 82 PSN: 006901  
TOR: 159/1410Z

GOVERNMENT THAT IT WISHED FEWER VISITS TO GREEK PORTS  
BY U. S. NAVAL VESSELS.

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHNT #9134 1591307  
O 081307Z JUN 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9930  
NATO COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

INFO USNMR SHAPE BE  
USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT  
BT

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 09134

EXDIS  
MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
E.O. 12065: GDS 6/8/88 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M  
TAGS: PEPR, CGEN, MILI, NATO, GR, US  
SUBJECT: PAPANDEOU'S VIEWS ON HIS MEETING WITH SACEUR,  
- U.S. FLEET VISITS  
REF. ATHENS 08983

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN THE COURSE OF A PRIVATE MEETING LAST NIGHT WITH  
PRIME MINISTER PAPANDEOU PRIMARILY DEVOTED TO OTHER  
SUBJECTS, THE PRIME MINISTER BRIEFLY REFERRED TO HIS  
MEETING WITH GENERAL ROGERS ON JUNE 4.

3. PAPANDEOU SAID HE WAS

MORE DETAILED  
EXCHANGES WITH SHAPE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE THROUGH  
HELLENIC MILITARY CHANNELS, BUT THE PRIME MINISTER WAS  
GLAD THAT HE NOW HAD SOME PERSONAL RAPPORT WITH GENERAL  
ROGERS AND THOUGHT THIS WOULD PROVE HELPFUL.

4. PAPANDEOU NOTED THAT GENERAL ROGERS HAD RAISED THE  
QUESTION OF EXCESSIVE SENTENCES METED OUT TO U.S.  
SEAMEN GUILTY OF INFRACTIONS OF GREEK LAW DURING RECENT  
FLEET VISITS. GENERAL ROGERS HAD ASKED WHETHER THE  
SEVERITY OF THE SENTENCES WAS A "SIGNAL" FROM THE GREEK

5. PAPANDEOU SAID HE HAD REPLIED

6. AS FAR AS THE FOUR CASES UNDER APPEAL WERE CONCERNED,  
PAPANDEOU SAID THAT I WAS AWARE THAT THE  
CASE WAS BEING HEARD ON JUNE 11 AND THE PRIME MINISTER  
HAD TAKEN STEPS TO ASSURE THAT PROMPT ACTION WOULD ALSO  
BE TAKEN ON THE OTHER CASES. STEARNS

FOIA(b)(6)

ATHENS 9134

DTG: 081307Z JUN 82 PSN: 006901

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRRM412 #121613

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

13526  
E.O. 12958  
~~As Amended~~  
Sec. 3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

121514

20

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 1748 DTG:112300Z JUN 82 PSN 014312  
CITE: BU 1748 TDR 101 23011

SINGEREL, DONALD T REGAN LHT TO R4

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SECSTATE WASHDC 1748

DTG:112308Z JUN 82 PSN 014312

S T: CKLS EOB  
EDE:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #1748 1622329  
O 112308Z JUN 82  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121514

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 2688  
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 1593  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0435  
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 1118  
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 1761  
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6032  
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 7875  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 161748  
BRUSSELS ALSO PASS TO EEC, PARIS ALSO PASS TO OECD  
E.O. 12065: GDS 6/11/88 (BASORA, ADRIAN A.)  
TAGS: EFIN, ETRD  
SUBJECT: LETTER TO EC FINANCE MINISTERS

1. PLEASE IMMEDIATELY CONVEY (ON JUNE 12 IF AT ALL POSSIBLE)  
THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM SECRETARY REGAN TO THE MINISTERS  
ATTENDING THE EC MINISTERIAL IN LUXEMBOURG ON MONDAY, JUNE

14. FOR LUXEMBOURG: PLEASE ATTEMPT TO DELIVER INFO COPY OF  
THE MESSAGE TO THE EC DELEGATION ON MONDAY MORNING. FOR  
PARIS: PLEASE DELIVER TO DELORS AND JOBERT. IMMEDIATE  
DELIVERY IS NECESSARY TO COUNTER FRENCH CLAIMS THAT US IS  
PREPARED TO ACCEPT ONLY CATEGORY ONE CHANGES AND DELAY OTHER  
CHANGES OF THE AGREEMENT. THE LETTER FOLLOWS:

2. BEGIN TEXT. DEAR MR. MINISTER: LEST THERE BE ANY CON-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

FUSION AS TO THE US GOVERNMENT'S POSITION ON THE CHAIRMAN'S  
COMPROMISE ON THE ARRANGEMENT ON EXPORT CREDITS, I WISH TO  
REITERATE THAT THE UNITED STATES ALREADY ACCEPTED THIS COM-  
PROMISE AND DOES NOT AGREE TO EXTENSION OF THE ARRANGEMENT  
ON EXPORT CREDITS BEYOND JUNE 15.

3. CHANGES FOR CATEGORY I WITHOUT AGREEMENT ON THE OTHER  
ELEMENTS OF THE COMPROMISE ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED  
STATES. I UNDERSTAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN SHARES  
THIS VIEW. I URGE YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMPROMISE PROPO-  
SAL AT THE JUNE 14 EC MINISTERIAL. ITS REJECTION AND THE  
EXPIRATION OF THE OECD ARRANGEMENT WOULD HAVE PROFOUND  
EFFECTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~SECRET~~

121515

21

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      ATHENS 0803      DTG: 021443Z JUL 82 PSN: 044203  
SIT583      DATE 07/19/82      TOR: 183/1630Z

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ATHENS 0803

DTG: 021443Z JUL 82 PSN: 044203

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEH 03 1831443

O 021443Z JUL 82

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0519

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1003

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-2 7/2/02 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M

TAGS: PEPR, EG, GR

SUBJECT: LEBANON: DESTINATION FOR THE PLO ONCE IT  
LEAVES BEIRUT

REF: STATE 183277

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. PRIME MINISTER ANDREAS PAPANDREOU'S STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AND HIS VOCIFEROUS DENUNCIATION OF THE ISRAELI MOVE INTO LEBANON LEAD US TO BELIEVE HE MIGHT WELL BE WILLING TO DEMONSTRATE SOLIDARITY WITH THE PALESTINIANS -- AND STRENGTHEN HIS CREDENTIALS WITH THE THIRD WORLD -- BY ACCEPTING AT LEAST SOME OF THE PLO PERSONNEL. WHILE A DIFFICULT DOMESTIC SITUATION, INCLUDING GROWING UNEMPLOYMENT, WOULD MILITATE AGAINST RESETTLEMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF PLO (UNLESS SUBSIDIZED BY OTHERS) PAPANDREOU MIGHT ALSO BE RECEPTIVE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PLO HEADQUARTERS HERE. THE RELATIVELY WIDESPREAD PUBLIC SYMPATHY FOR THE PALESTINIANS -- EVIDENCED EARLIER THIS WEEK BY A RALLY FOR PALESTINIAN CHILDREN WHICH ON SHORT NOTICE DREW A CROWD OF MORE THAN 50,000, INCLUDING MRS. PAPANDREOU AND SEVERAL MINISTERS OF GOVERNMENT -- WOULD APPEAR TO MAKE SUCH A MOVE A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

POLITICALLY ATTRACTIVE ONE FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT.

3. ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME OF THE PALESTINIANS AND/OR A PLO OFFICE HERE WOULD BE COMPLICATED BY PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE THAT WE WERE ENCOURAGING SUCH A MOVE. FOREIGN MINISTER HARALAMBPOULOUS PAID AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA SOME MONTHS AGO, AND AN APPROACH BY THAT GOVERNMENT IN CONCERT WITH OTHERS, MIGHT BE MORE PRODUCTIVE. THERE IS A SAUDI AMBASSADOR RESIDENT IN ATHENS.  
STEARNS

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121515

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

121516 22

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      ATHENS 1217      DTG: 121510Z JUL 82 PSN: 000420  
SITS38      DATE 07/19/82      TOR: 193/1806Z

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SIT: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEH 1217 1931523  
O 121510Z JUL 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0649

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 1217

NODIS  
FOR UNDER SECRETARY EAGLEBURGER FROM STEARNS  
E.O. 12065: GDS 7/12/88 (STEARNS, MONTEAGLE) OR-M  
TAGS: MARR, OVIP (PAPANDREOU, ANDREAS) GR, US  
SUBJECT: (S) PAPANDREOU'S INTEREST IN VISITING WASHINGTON

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN A PRIVATE MEETING THIS MORNING WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU, HE MENTIONED TO ME THAT HE INTENDED TO MAKE AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO CANADA IN OCTOBER. PAPANDREOU ASKED WHETHER I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE FEASIBLE FOR HIM TO MAKE A SHORT WORKING VISIT TO WASHINGTON, PREFERABLY JUST BEFORE, BUT POSSIBLY JUST AFTER, HIS CANADIAN VISIT.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE REALIZED SECRETARY HAIG'S RECENT RESIGNATION AND THE FACT THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD NOT YET FORMALLY ASSUMED HIS NEW POSITION MIGHT AFFECT OUR REACTION TO SUCH A VISIT. WHAT HE HAD IN MIND, HE SAID, WAS AN INFORMAL, BUT OFFICIAL VISIT OF NO MORE THAN TWO-THREE DAYS WHICH WOULD ENABLE HIM TO MEET AGAIN WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND FOR THE FIRST TIME WITH SECRETARY-DESIGNATE SHULTZ. PAPANDREOU REALIZED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S AND ALSO THE SECRETARY'S AGENDA WOULD ALREADY BE CROWDED, BUT NEVERTHELESS, IF THE VISIT COULD BE FITTED INTO THEIR SCHEDULES, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD HAVE A

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON GREEK-US RELATIONS AND MIGHT GIVE IMPETUS TO THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS WHICH, PRESUMABLY, WOULD JUST HAVE GOTTEN UNDERWAY.

4. IN THE LATTER CONNECTION, PAPANDREOU SAID HE HAD RECENTLY INSTRUCTED HIS STAFF TO BEGIN PREPARING A MEMORANDUM OUTLINING THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE GREEK POSITION. HE WOULD PASS THIS ALONG TO ME FOR WASHINGTON'S PERUSAL WHENEVER IT WAS READY. WHILE THE PRIME MINISTER HAD ASKED FOR THE MEMORANDUM BY THE END OF JULY, HE THOUGHT THAT, "THIS BEING GREECE," IT WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE IN FINAL SHAPE BEFORE THE MIDDLE OF AUGUST.

5. ASSUMING THIS TIMETABLE WAS ADHERED TO, THERE WOULD BE TIME FOR US TO STUDY THE GREEK PROPOSALS AND PERHAPS CLARIFY THEM AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL BEFORE THE PRIME

MINISTER DEPARTED FOR HIS CANADIAN TRIP.

6. I RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ME AT THIS DISTANCE TO COMMENT ON WHETHER A WORKING VISIT TO WASHINGTON WOULD BE REALISTIC IN LATE SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER. AS THE PRIME MINISTER HIMSELF HAD STATED, THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE WAS ALREADY CROWDED, AND I WAS SURE THAT A GREAT MANY FOREIGN LEADERS WOULD BE COMPETING FOR THE EAR OF THE NEW SECRETARY OF STATE. AT THE SAME TIME, I WAS AS CONFIDENT AS HE THAT IF SUCH A VISIT PROVED FEASIBLE, IT COULD HAVE AN EXTREMELY CONSTRUCTIVE EFFECT ON OUR RELATIONS AND PERHAPS SIMPLIFY A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT BILATERAL PROBLEMS THAT WE WOULD BE TRYING TO SOLVE IN THE COMING MONTHS.

7. I ASSURED PAPANDREOU I WOULD REPORT HIS INTEREST IN COMING TO WASHINGTON IN EXACTLY THE WAY HE HAD EXPRESSED IT: HE WAS NOT "REQUESTING" A VISIT IN THE FALL BUT WANTED TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THIS WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD IN MIND, AND REPEATED THAT FROM HIS OWN STANDPOINT, THE END OF SEPTEMBER WOULD BE IDEAL.

8. COMMENT: THE GREEK GOVERNMENT IS STILL A ONE-MAN SHOW AND THE MAN'S NAME IS PAPANDREOU. I KNOW HOW HEAVILY CHARGED THE PRESIDENT'S CALENDAR MUST ALREADY BE AND SECRETARY SHULTZ'S SOON WILL BE. IF I DID NOT FIRMLY BELIEVE A SHORT VISIT BY PAPANDREOU IN SEPTEMBER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WOULD SAVE US ALL A GREAT DEAL MORE TIME LATER, I WOULD NOT EVEN RAISE THE SUBJECT. AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE COME A LONG WAY WITH THIS GREEK GOVERNMENT AND ITS PRIME MINISTER. THIS IS AN OPPORTUNITY TO GO FARTHER.  
STEARNS

ATHENS 1217

DTG: 121510Z JUL 82 PSN: 000420

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM412 #121516

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/17

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

121517 23

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      ATHENS 2027      DTG: 231249Z JUL 82 PSN: 015787  
SIT639      DATE 08/10/82      TOR: 204/1430Z

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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHNT #2027/01 2041252  
O 231249Z JUL 82 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 08070

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 12027

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-4 7/23/02 (KOVNER, MILTON) OR-M

TAGS: PGOV, GR, US

SUBJECT: CHRISTOS MACHERITSAS ON THE BASE NEGOTIATIONS

REF: ATHENS 11217

1. ~~1~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: DURING CALL BY DCM ON CHRISTOS MACHERITSAS, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER, LATTER CLARIFIED GOG THINKING ON NEXT STEPS IN BASE NEGOTIATIONS. GREEK MEMORANDUM SETTING FORTH PARAMETERS OF DISCUSSION WILL BE SUBMITTED SOON TO EMBASSY FOR WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION. SHOULD USG TAKE STRONG ISSUE WITH ITS CONTENT, DISCUSSIONS COULD BE HELD EITHER IN ATHENS OR IN WASHINGTON. MACHERITSAS DENIED THAT FINAL DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO DESIGNATE DEPUTY SECRETARY KAPSIS HEAD OF THE GREEK NEGOTIATING TEAM, VOLUNTEERING THAT KAPSIS HAD NEITHER THE REQUISITE BACKGROUND NOR THE EXPERIENCE FOR THE TASK AND THAT AS A "POLITICAL" FIGURE HE WOULD BE APT TO INJECT PERSONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BOTH THE DISCUSSIONS AND OUTCOME. ADDING THAT HE HIMSELF WOULD MAKE THE BETTER CANDIDATE, HE URGED THAT WASHINGTON SELECT AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL COUNTERPART AS HEAD OF THE U.S. TEAM. MACHERITSAS SAID THAT GOG

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HAD ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT U.S. BASES WOULD REMAIN IN GREECE, AND HE WAS HIGHLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE OUTCOME. HE ASKED THAT HIS CANDID REMARKS BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING JULY 22 FAREWELL CALL BY DCM ON CHRISTOS MACHERITSAS, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TO THE PRIME MINISTER, LATTER CLARIFIED GOG PROCEDURAL APPROACH TO FORTH-COMING BASE NEGOTIATIONS. MACHERITSAS SAID THAT HIS STAFF WOULD COMPLETE BY THE END OF NEXT WEEK THE MEMORANDUM MENTIONED BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE AMBASSADOR (REFTEL) AND FOLLOWING APPROVAL BY THE KYSEA (FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL OFFENSE COUNCIL) IT WOULD BE SUBMITTED THROUGH THE EMBASSY FOR WASHINGTON CONSIDERATION. THE MEMORANDUM, HE SAID, WOULD NOT BE IN THE FORM OF A DRAFT AGREEMENT

BUT RATHER A CONCEPTS PAPER OR PARAMETERS THAT WOULD GOVERN THE DISCUSSIONS. ASKED WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT FOLLOW ITS SUBMISSION, MACHERITSAS SAID THAT IF THE USG COULD AGREE ENTIRELY WITH ITS CONTENTS (WHICH HE THOUGHT UNLIKELY), THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES COULD PROCEED FORTHWITH; IF THE USG HAD ONLY MINOR PROBLEMS WITH THE PROPOSALS, THEY COULD BE RESOLVED IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE AMBASSADOR AND; IF THE USG TOOK STRONG ISSUE WITH ITS TERMS, PERHAPS A ROUND OR TWO OF DISCUSSION ABOUT THE MEMORANDUM COULD BE HELD EITHER IN ATHENS OR WASHINGTON.

4. ON THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES, MACHERITSAS CONFIRMED THAT THE GOG INTENDS TO PRESENT A DRAFT OF ITS OWN AND WILL INSIST THAT IT BE THE BASIS OF DISCUSSION. IF THE US ALSO SUBMITTED A DRAFT, THEN BOTH WOULD BE ON THE TABLE WITH THE GOG INSISTING THAT ITS DRAFT TAKE PRECEDENCE, AND THE US DRAFT BE CONSIDERED AN "OVERLAY" ON THE GREEK ONE. ON THE QUESTION OF THE CHIEF GREEK NEGOTIATOR, THE DCM NOTED THAT THE GREEK PRESS APPEARS TO HAVE ALREADY PLACED DEPUTY MINISTER KAPSIS IN THE ROLE. MACHERITSAS RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT NO FINAL DECISION HAS BEEN MADE AND THAT HE PERSONALLY HOPED THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE THE CASE, ALTHOUGH CLEARLY KAPSIS WOULD BE INVOLVED IN ANY DISCUSSION OF THE MEMORANDUM. CAUTIONING THAT HIS VIEWS BE TREATED WITH UTMOST CONFIDENCE,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

HE SAID THAT KAPSIS HAD NEITHER THE BACKGROUND NOR THE EXPERIENCE TO LEAD THE GREEK NEGOTIATING TEAM; MORE IMPORTANT, AS A MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT AND NOW A "POLITICAL" FIGURE, HE WOULD BE ALMOST CERTAIN TO INJECT PERSONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN BOTH THE DISCUSSIONS AND THEIR OUTCOME. PRESSED AS TO WHO HE THOUGHT MIGHT BETTER FULFILL THE ROLE, MACHERITSAS SAID THAT HE HOPED HE HIMSELF WOULD HEAD THE GREEK DELEGATION AND URGED THE DCM TO ADVISE WASHINGTON OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SELECTING AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL NEGOTIATOR TO HEAD THE US DELEGATION.

5. MACHERITSAS CONCLUDED THIS PHASE OF THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT AS PESSIMISTIC OF SUCCESS AS HE WAS AT THE OUTSET OF THE PREVIOUS NEGOTIATION, HE WAS HIGHLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THIS ROUND WOULD SUCCEED. ONCE HAVING AGREED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE US BASES WOULD REMAIN IN GREECE AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO RESTRICTIVE TIME TABLE FOR THEIR REMOVAL -- A SIGNIFICANT DEPARTURE FROM PAPANDREOU'S PRE-ELECTION PLATFORM FOR WHICH MACHERITSAS CLAIMS

ATHENS 2027

DTG: 231249Z JUL 82 PSN: 015787

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M412 #121517

BY KML NARA DATE 3/8/13

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24

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01            ATHENS 2027  
SIT637            DATE 08/10/82

DTG: 231249Z JUL 82 PSN: 015789  
TOR: 204/1430Z

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DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001  
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WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: MCF JP VP SIT EOB

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEH TH #2027/02 2041254

O 231249Z JUL 82 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0871

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 12027

NODIS

SUBSTANTIAL CREDIT -- THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROCEED  
RAPIDLY TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

6. MACHERITSAS AGAIN URGED THAT HIS COMMENTS BE  
TREATED CONFIDENTALLY SAYING THAT THERE WERE THOSE  
WHO WOULD BE CERTAIN TO EXPLOIT HIS FRANKNESS WITH  
THE DCM TO HIS DISCREDIT. STEARNS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

121518

25

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1245  
SIT089 DATE 08/16/82

DTG: 071926Z AUG 82 PSN: 036955  
TOR: 219/2127Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #1245 2191955  
O 071926Z AUG 82  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000  
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000  
AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0000  
USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0000  
DIRNSA FT MEADE PRIORITY  
DCA WASHDC PRIORITY  
USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY  
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE PRIORITY  
USCINEUR VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY  
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON PRIORITY  
CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN PRIORITY  
USDOCSOUTH NAPLES IT PRIORITY  
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 221245  
EXDIS; FOR AMBASSADOR; MILADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MARR, GR, US, MILI  
SUBJECT: (S) US-GREEK DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS

REF: ATHENS 12647

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE GOG HAS NOW GONE FORMALLY AND PUBLICLY ON THE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RECORD IN SOME DETAIL CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF  
BASE PROPOSALS FOR EARLY SUBMISSION TO THE U.S., WITH  
HEAVY ATHENS PRESS PLAY. AND REFTEL INDICATES GREEK  
PROPOSALS ARE EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED ("A HEFTY  
PACKAGE").

3. ACCORDINGLY, WE NOW QUESTION WHETHER THERE IS ANY  
PERCENTAGE IN STILL TRYING TO HEAD OFF GREEK  
PRESENTATION AND WHETHER WE COULD DO ANY MORE THAN  
BRIEFLY DELAY IT WITHOUT ANY EFFECT ON ITS CONTENT.  
MOREOVER, CONTINUED U.S. PUSH FOR PRIOR FREE EXCHANGE  
OF VIEWS ON MAJOR ELEMENTS OF A NEW AGREEMENT AND  
AGENDA AND PROCEDURES FOR NEGOTIATIONS -- BE THIS  
LABELED "PRELIMINARY EXPLORATION" OR "FIRST NEGOTIATING

ROUND" -- NOW RISKS MISLEADING THE GREEKS. THEY COULD  
GAIN IMPRESSION THAT WE HAVE SOMETHING SPECIAL UP OUR  
SLEEVE TO PUT FORWARD, WHICH WILL ONLY LEAD TO  
DISAPPOINTMENT AND FEELING THAT WE ARE ENGAGED IN  
DELAYING TACTICS.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, WE DO NOT WANT GOG TO CONCLUDE  
THAT THEY WILL DECIDE UNILATERALLY HOW THE NEGOTIATIONS  
WILL PROCEED, NOR THAT THEIR PROPOSALS WILL SERVE AS  
THE EXCLUSIVE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.  
THUS, THOUGH WE HAVE UNTIL NOW DELIBERATELY LEFT  
INITIATIVE TO GREEKS ON START OF NEGOTIATIONS, TIME HAS  
COME ACTIVELY TO ENGAGE WITH THEM IN WORKING OUT  
PRECISELY HOW WE PROCEED FROM HERE AND SET OUT CLEAR  
U.S. VIEWS.

5. THEREFORE, WE REQUEST AMBASSADOR TAKE EARLIEST  
OPPORTUNITY TO RELAY FOLLOWING TO PAPANDREOU AND KAPSIS:

-- WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE JULY 31 GOG PRESS  
ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE KAPSIS-BERLIND CONVERSATION THAT  
FAIRLY DETAILED BASE PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED FOR  
REVIEW AND APPROVAL BY PM AND KYSEA FOR TRANSMISSION TO  
WASHINGTON SOME TIME THIS MONTH.

-- THIS WILL OF COURSE MARK THE EFFECTIVE START OF THE  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BASE NEGOTIATIONS. AS BERLIND TOLD KAPSIS, WE HAD  
THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO BEGIN -- AS IS  
FREQUENTLY DONE IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS -- WITH A FIRST  
ROUND DEVOTED TO FREE DISCUSSION OF THE MAJOR ELEMENTS  
OF AN AGREEMENT AND THE AGENDA AND PROCEDURES FOR  
FURTHER ROUNDS, BEFORE EITHER SIDE PUT FORTH WRITTEN  
FORMAL PROPOSALS. SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CAN HELP  
ESTABLISH THE BASIC PURPOSES AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE  
SIDES BEFORE EITHER IS PUT IN A POSITION OF HAVING TO  
ADVOCATE OR RESPOND TO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. THIS CAN  
SOMETIMES REDUCE THE RISK OF INITIAL MISUNDERSTANDING  
AND SETTING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN CONCRETE AT THE OUTSET.

-- THAT SAID, YOU NOW SEEM TO BE COMMITTED TO GIVING US  
FORMAL PROPOSALS AT THE OUTSET AND ASSUMING YOU CHOOSE  
TO PURSUE THIS LINE, WE ARE, OF COURSE, READY TO  
RECEIVE THEM WHENEVER THEY ARE READY. WE WOULD IN ANY  
CASE WISH TO APPROACH THE FIRST NEGOTIATING ROUND AS AN  
OCCASION FOR BOTH REPEAT BOTH SIDES TO EXCHANGE VIEWS  
ON MAJOR ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT, NOT SIMPLY AS AN  
OCCASION FOR THE U.S. TO RESPOND TO GREEK PROPOSALS.

-- IN ANY EVENT, WHETHER THE NEGOTIATIONS START WITH  
YOUR HAVING GIVEN US PROPOSALS OR WITH A FREE  
DISCUSSION, WE THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT WE QUICKLY REACH  
AN UNDERSTANDING ON WHERE AND WHEN AND HOW THE  
NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN SO THAT WE CAN PLAN ACCORDINGLY  
AND AVOID ANY CONFUSION.

-- ACCORDINGLY, WE PROPOSE THAT AS SOON AS YOU ARE  
READY WE WORK OUT A COORDINATED PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT  
STATING THAT WE HAVE AGREED TO HAVE OUR DELEGATIONS  
MEET IN ATHENS OR WASHINGTON ON A DATE CERTAIN TO  
COMMENCE THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND NAMING OUR CHIEF  
NEGOTIATORS.

-- WE ARE PREPARED TO HAVE THE FIRST ROUND IN ATHENS OR  
WASHINGTON AS YOU CHOOSE AND COULD ENVISAGE ALTERNATING  
SUBSEQUENT ROUNDS BETWEEN THE CAPITALS. AS FOR DATE,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

26

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 1245

DTG: 071926Z AUG 82 PSN: 036955

ASSUMING YOU INTEND TO GIVE US YOUR PROPOSALS LATE THIS MONTH OR EARLY NEXT MONTH, WE WILL WANT, SAY, THREE OR FOUR WEEKS TO REVIEW THEM AND PREPARE OUR OWN POSITIONS BEFORE OUR DELEGATIONS MEET. THIS DOES NOT, OF COURSE, PRECLUDE CONTACTS BETWEEN US IN THE INTERIM THROUGH

SECSTATE WASHDC 1245

DTG: 071926Z AUG 82 PSN: 036955

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

-- IN THIS CONNECTION, I WANT TO TELL YOU PRIVATELY THAT REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW -- WHOM YOU AND OTHER GOG OFFICIALS MET DURING HAIG'S ATHENS VISIT -- IS BEING APPOINTED SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY AND U.S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR FOR THESE TALKS WITH PERSONAL RANK OF AMBASSADOR. HE WILL LEAD A SMALL NEGOTIATING TEAM AND THE EMBASSY AND I WILL OF COURSE BE WORKING CLOSELY WITH HIM.

-- WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO HAVE A WASHINGTON-BASED SENIOR OFFICIAL DEVOTED FULL TIME TO THE NEGOTIATIONS TO FACILITATE THEIR CONDUCT AND MANAGEMENT IN WASHINGTON AS WELL AS ATHENS. BARTHOLOMEW HAS EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN WESTERN SECURITY COOPERATION AND IN NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS NATURE, INCLUDING AS FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT'S BUREAU OF POLITICO MILITARY AFFAIRS. HIS CURRENT ROLE AS SPECIAL CYPRUS COORDINATOR WILL BE REASSIGNED.

-- WE WOULD OF COURSE APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON THE COURSE I HAVE OUTLINED. SHULTZ

SECSTATE WASHDC 1245

DTG: 071926Z AUG 82 PSN: 036955

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

121519

25

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      ATHENS 8/10 3067      DTG: 101457Z AUG 82 PSN: 040136  
SIT605      DATE 08/10/82      TOR: 222/1541Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: NODIS/CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #3067 2221457  
O 101457Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1174

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 13067

NODIS  
FOR UNDERSECRETARY EAGLEBURGER AND EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
DESIGNATE BURT FROM STEARNS  
E.O. 12356: DNG: CO 8-10-92  
TAGS: MARR, MILI, OVIP, GR., 7  
SUBJECT: (S) U.S.-GREEK DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS AND  
- PAPANDREOU'S INTEREST IN VISITING WASHINGTON  
REF: A. STATE 221245, B. ATHENS 12828, C. ATHENS 12647,  
- D. ATHENS 11217

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. I SHALL BE SEEKING EARLY MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER  
PAPANDREOU TO DISCUSS IN GREATER DETAIL MODALITIES OF  
U.S.-GREEK DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS. BEFORE I DO SO, HOWEVER,  
I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT I HAVE SOME INDICATION OF  
PROSPECTS FOR PAPANDREOU TO BE RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON ON  
SHORT WORKING VISIT AT END OF SEPTEMBER OR IN EARLY  
OCTOBER (REFTEL D). IT IS EVIDENT PRIME MINISTER  
CONTINUES TO EXERCISE CLOSE PERSONAL SUPERVISION OVER  
DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK POSITION. BEFORE DECIDING ON  
FORMAL OPENING OF DECA NEGOTIATIONS, HE WILL CERTAINLY  
WANT TO KNOW WHETHER WASHINGTON VISIT IS FEASIBLE.

3. DESPIT ALL THE GREEK PRESS COMMENT ABOUT DEVELOPMENT  
OF GREEK POSITIONS, MEETINGS OF KYSEA, ETC., I DOUBT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

MUCH DETAILED WORK HAS BEEN DONE ON THE GREEK SIDE.  
PRESS COMMENT THUS FAR HAS BEEN LITTLE MORE THAN A  
REHASH OF FAMILIAR ELEMENTS OF GREEK POSITION, SUCH AS  
ANNUAL REVIEW AND GREATER GREEK CONTROL, WHICH GO BACK  
MANY YEARS. IT IS LOGICAL TO SUPPOSE THAT STIMULATION OF  
PRESS COMMENT AT THIS TIME BY GREEK GOVERNMENT IS DESIGNED  
TO GIVE GREEK PUBLIC OPINION IMPRESSION OF PROGRESS  
RATHER THAN TO DEFINE PUBLICLY POSITIONS GOG WILL TAKE  
WHEN NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS  
INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT PRO-GOVERNMENT "TO VIMA" THIS  
MORNING IS ALREADY HINTING AT FURTHER SLIPPAGE AND  
SUGGESTING THAT FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS MAY NOT BEGIN UNTIL  
OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER. ALL OF THIS IS A SURE SIGN THAT  
GREEK SIDE HAS CONSIDERABLE WORK STILL TO DO BEFORE  
GREEKS ARE READY TO SIT DOWN AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE A  
SHORT WORKING VISIT BY PAPANDREOU TO WASHINGTON WOULD  
PROVIDE A VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO IMPRESS AMERICAN  
PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES ON THE MAN WHO WILL HAVE THE  
LAST WORD ON WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS SUCCEED OR FAIL. SINCE  
PAPANDREOU, AS WE KNOW, IS NOT BY NATURE CONFRONTATIONAL,  
WE WOULD, I THINK, BE BEGINNING NEGOTIATIONS IN FAVORABLE  
CIRCUMSTANCES. STEARNS

ATHENS 8/10 3067

DTG: 101457Z AUG 82 PSN: 040136

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM412 #121519

BY KML NARA DATE 3/18/13

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

121520

28

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 5864 DTG:121954Z AUG 82 PSN: 043574  
S11934 DATE 08/16/82 TOR: 224/2234Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #5864/01 2242007  
O 121954Z AUG 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 3953

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7948  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 225864  
NODIS  
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BURT  
E.O. 12356: DNG: CO 8/11/92  
TAGS: MARR, MILI, OVIP, GR  
SUBJECT: US-GREEK DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS AND  
PAPANDREOU'S INTEREST IN WASHINGTON VISIT

REFS: A) ATHENS 13067 B) STATE 221245 C) ATHENS 12828  
D) ATHENS 12647 E) ATHENS 12027 F) ATHENS 11217 G)  
STATE 212132 H) STATE 200013

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ ENTIRE TEXT).

2. CONCERNING PAPANDREOU'S INTEREST IN VISITING WASHINGTON, WE HAVE BEEN WORKING INTENSIVELY ON THIS SINCE RECEIPT OF REF F. THE PROBLEM WE FACE, AS PAPANDREOU NOTED IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH YOU, IS THE PRESIDENT'S LATE SEPTEMBER EARLY OCTOBER SCHEDULE IS ALREADY JAM PACKED. THREE FOREIGN LEADERS WILL BE VISITING DURING THE MID-SEPTEMBER/MID-OCTOBER TIME FRAME. TWO OF THESE WILL BE STATE VISITS. IN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ADDITION, PRESIDENT HAS AN EXTREMELY HEAVY DOMESTIC SCHEDULE THROUGH NOVEMBER. (FYI: IT APPEARS THAT EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY FOR TWO TO THREE DAY WORKING VISIT, INCLUDING MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, WOULD BE DURING THE FIRST HALF OF 1983. THE PRESIDENT

HAS A FEW COMMITMENTS FOR FOREIGN LEADERS WHOSE VISITS HAD TO BE RESCHEDULED, BUT THE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT YET DEVELOPED RECOMMENDED LIST OF VISITS FOR THE FIRST HALF OF 1983. END FYI)

3. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, YOU SHOULD INFORM PRIME MINISTER THAT REGRETABLELY VISIT COULD NOT BE ARRANGED ON SUCH SHORT NOTICE IN ONE OF THE BUSIEST TIMES IN PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE THIS YEAR. WE HOPE SCHEDULING AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WILL PERMIT ARRANGING AN EARLY

VISIT AND WILL ALSO LOOK FOR EARLY OPPORTUNITY FOR MEETING WITH SECRETARY.

4. WE UNDERSTAND PAPANDREOU'S DESIRE TO PRESENT HIS VIEWS DIRECTLY TO THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG. IN FACT, PAPANDREOU HAS HAD THIS OPPORTUNITY ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING HIS FIRST MONTHS IN OFFICE INCLUDING DECEMBER 1981 MEETINGS WITH SECRETARIES WEINBERGER AND HAIG, THE MAY 1982 HAIG VISIT TO GREECE AND MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AT RECENT BONN SUMMIT.

5. ON THE NEGOTIATIONS, IT MAY WELL BE THAT DESPITE JULY 31 GOG PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT AND RECENT KAPSIS AND MAHERITSAS STATEMENTS TO US, GREEKS WILL NOT SOON BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE US PAPER ON THEIR PROPOSALS AND, IN FACT, MAY NOT HAVE THEIR ACT TOGETHER BEFORE OCTOBER/NOVEMBER. NONETHELESS, THEY ARE NOW GRAPPLING MORE INTENSIVELY WITH THE PROBLEM. AS REFLECTED STEARNS/BARTHOLOMEW CONVERSATIONS, WE CERTAINLY DO NOT WANT TO FORCE THE PACE, BUT WE DO WANT GOG TO BE AWARE, AS THEY CONSIDER THEIR OWN DESIDERATA, THAT HOW WE PROCEED (WHEN THEY ARE READY) IS A MATTER FOR MUTUAL REPEAT MUTUAL DETERMINATION.

SECSTATE WASHDC 5864 DTG:121954Z AUG 82 PSN: 043574  
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

6. SINCE PAPANDREOU WILL BE CALLING THE SHOTS, WE WOULD LIKE TO BE SURE THAT EARLY ON AND BEFORE THE GOG PROPOSALS, WHATEVER THEY MAY BE, TAKE ON FINAL FORM, HE IS AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE JULY 31 GOG PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT AND THE KAPSIS-BERLIND CONVERSATION THAT FAIRLY DETAILED BASE PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL BY PM AND KYSEA FOR TRANSMISSION TO WASHINGTON SOME TIME THIS MONTH.

-- THIS WILL OF COURSE MARK THE EFFECTIVE START OF THE BASE NEGOTIATIONS. AS BERLIND TOLD KAPSIS, WE HAD THOUGHT THAT IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO BEGIN -- AS IS

FREQUENTLY DONE IN SUCH NEGOTIATIONS -- WITH A FIRST ROUND DEVOTED TO FREE DISCUSSION OF THE MAJOR ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT AND THE AGENDA AND PROCEDURES FOR FURTHER ROUNDS, BEFORE EITHER SIDE PUT FORTH WRITTEN FORMAL PROPOSALS. SUCH AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS CAN HELP ESTABLISH THE BASIC PURPOSES AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE SIDES BEFORE EITHER IS PUT IN A POSITION OF HAVING TO ADVOCATE OR RESPOND TO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. THIS CAN SOMETIMES REDUCE THE RISK OF INITIAL MISUNDERSTANDING AND SETTING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN CONCRETE AT THE OUTSET.

-- THAT SAID, YOU NOW SEEM TO BE COMMITTED TO GIVING US FORMAL PROPOSALS AT THE OUTSET AND ASSUMING YOU CHOOSE TO PURSUE THIS LINE, WE ARE, OF COURSE, READY TO RECEIVE THEM WHENEVER THEY ARE READY. WE WOULD IN ANY CASE WISH TO APPROACH THE FIRST NEGOTIATING ROUND AS AN OCCASION FOR BOTH REPEAT BOTH SIDES TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON MAJOR ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT, NOT SIMPLY AS AN

SECSTATE WASHDC 5864 DTG:121954Z AUG 82 PSN: 043574

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

29

# WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 SECSTATE WASHDC 5864 DTG:121954Z AUG 82 PSN: 043552  
SIT933 DATE 08/16/82 TOR: 224/2223Z

SECSTATE WASHDC 5864

DTG:121954Z AUG 82 PSN: 043552

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS

EOB:

WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHC #5864/02 224200Z  
O 121954Z AUG 82 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 3954

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7949  
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 STATE 225864

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM BURT

OCCASION FOR THE U.S. TO RESPOND TO GREEK PROPOSALS.

-- IN ANY EVENT, WHEN YOU ARE READY TO BEGIN, WE THINK  
IT IMPORTANT THAT AT THAT POINT WE REACH AN  
UNDERSTANDING ON WHERE AND WHEN AND HOW THE  
NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN SO THAT WE CAN PLAN ACCORDINGLY  
AND AVOID ANY CONFUSION.

-- I WANT TO TELL YOU PRIVATELY THAT REGINALD  
BARTHOLOMEW -- WHOM YOU AND OTHER GOG OFFICIALS MET  
DURING HAIG ATHENS' VISIT -- IS BEING APPOINTED SPECIAL  
ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY AND U.S. SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR  
FOR THESE TALKS WITH PERSONAL RANK OF AMBASSADOR. HE  
WILL LEAD A SMALL NEGOTIATING TEAM AND THE EMBASSY AND  
I WILL OF COURSE BE WORKING CLOSELY WITH HIM.

-- WE THINK IT IMPORTANT TO HAVE A WASHINGTON-BASED  
SENIOR OFFICIAL DEVOTED FULL TIME TO THE NEGOTIATIONS  
TO FACILITATE THEIR CONDUCT AND MANAGEMENT IN  
WASHINGTON AS WELL AS ATHENS. BARTHOLOMEW HAS  
EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE IN WESTERN SECURITY COOPERATION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND IN NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS NATURE, INCLUDING AS FORMER  
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT'S BUREAU OF POLITICO  
MILITARY AFFAIRS. HIS CURRENT ROLE AS SPECIAL CYPRUS  
COORDINATOR WILL BE REASSIGNED.

-- WE WOULD OF COURSE APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON THE  
COURSE I HAVE OUTLINED. SHULTZ

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

121521 30

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      ATHENS 3352      DTG:141033Z AUG 82 PSN: 045773  
SIT868      DATE 08/16/82      TOR: 226/1159Z

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ATHENS 3352

DTG:141033Z AUG 82 PSN: 045773

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: WPC MCF WHLR JP VP EOB SIT RENT  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: RENTSCHLER FOR ACTION

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEH 3352 2261033  
O 141033Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1243

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ATHENS 13352

E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/14/88  
TAGS: MOPS, IS, LE, GR, FR  
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM PM PAPANDREOU  
ON PLO EVACUATION  
REF: STATE 228228

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE DELIVERED TO EMBASSY AT  
12:15 P.M. (LOCAL) FOLLOWING UNSIGNED MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT  
REAGAN ON PLO EVACUATION FROM LEBANON:

3. QUOTE: MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.A. RONALD  
REAGAN. I WOULD WISH TO EXPRESS THE DEEPEST CONCERN OF  
THE GREEK GOVERNMENT FOR THE POLICY FOLLOWED BY ISRAEL IN  
LEBANON AS WELL AS THE SERIOUS DEVELOPMENTS THAT SUCH  
POLICY MIGHT CAUSE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WHERE MY  
COUNTRY IS ALSO LOCATED. I WOULD ALSO WISH TO EXPRESS THE  
HOPE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY  
THEIR EFFORTS TO STOP THE BLOODSHED IN LEBANON IN ORDER  
THAT PEACE PREVAIL AMONG THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION.  
ON THE OTHER SIDE, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THE NEED FOR  
PALESTINIANS TO DEPART FROM BEIRUT UNDER CONDITIONS THAT  
REALLY GUARANTEE THEIR SAFETY. ANDREAS G. PAPANDREOU.  
ATHENS, AUGUST 14, 1982. END QUOTE.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

4. IN TELEPHONE CALL EARLIER THIS MORNING, MEMBER OF  
PRIME MINISTER'S STAFF (ROUBATIS) INFORMED AMBASSADOR THAT  
GOG WILL ADVISE GREEK PRESS AT 1700 (LOCAL) THAT MESSAGE  
WAS SENT TO PRESIDENT BUT WILL NOT RELEASE CONTENT.

5. COMMENT: IT IS PROBABLE THAT THIS MESSAGE, LIKE  
GOG OFFER TO ACCEPT PLO SIDE AND WOUNDED (REFTEL), IS  
PART OF EFFORT BY GREEK GOVERNMENT TO COUNTER CRITICISM  
THAT IT HAS FAILED TO GIVE PLO EFFECTIVE SUPPORT AS EVENTS  
IN LEBANON REACH MOMENT OF TRUTH. STEARNS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

121522 31

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 3441 DTG: 171444Z AUG 82 PSN: 049521  
SIT254 DATE 08/20/82 TOR: 229/1834Z

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTH #3441/01 2291445  
O 171444Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1262

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 13441

NODIS  
FOR ECR ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BURT FROM STEARNS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MARR, MILI, GR, US  
SUBJECT: PAPANDREOU COMMENTS ON US-GREEK DEFENSE  
NEGOTIATIONS  
REF: A. STATE 225864, B. ATHENS 13067, C. STATE 221245

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. BEGIN SUMMARY. PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU STATES THAT DETAILED GREEK POSITIONS ON US-GREEK DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT YET BEEN FORMULATED. PACE OF DELIBERATIONS ON GREEK SIDE IS SLOW AND GOG MAY DECIDE NOT TO PRESENT US WITH ANYTHING IN WRITING AT OUTSET. GOG MAY IN FACT COME BACK TO US WITH QUESTIONS ABOUT OUR OWN PRIORITIES BEFORE WORKING FURTHER ON THEIR POSITIONS. AMBASSADOR ADVISED PAPANDREOU THAT U.S. NEGOTIATOR WILL BE REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW AND EMPHASIZED VALUE OF PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS TO AVOID MISCALCULATION OR DEADLOCK WHEN NEGOTIATIONS ACTUALLY BEGIN. END SUMMARY.
3. AUGUST 16 WAS GREEK HOLIDAY, FEAST OF THE ASSUMPTION, AND PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU RECEIVED ME IN HIS SUBURBAN VILLA AT KASTRI. ALTHOUGH EARLIER THAT MORNING HE HAD RECEIVED FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER HERNU AND LATER

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IN DAY WAS SCHEDULED TO SEE ALGERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, PAPANDREOU SEEMED UNRUSHED AND WE SPOKE FOR OVER AN HOUR ABOUT SUBJECTS RANGING FROM DECA NEGOTIATIONS TO HIS VACAT ON PLANS. HE TOLD ME HE EXPECTED TO REMAIN IN ATHENS AREA THROUGHOUT SUMMER, WITH EXCEPTION OF A FEW DAYS WHICH HE WILL SPEND ON ISLAND OF KOS WITH A GROUP OF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN ECONOMISTS TO TAKE WHAT PAPANDREOU CALLED A DETACHED LOOK AT WHERE THE GREEK ECONOMY SHOULD BE GOING IN THE NEXT TEN YEARS. OTHER SUBJECTS COVERED IN OUR CONVERSATION WILL BE REPORTED BY SEPTELS. NO ONE ELSE WAS PRESENT AT OUR MEETING.

4. AT CONCLUSION OF OUR MEETING, PAPANDREOU WALKED ME OUT TO MY CAR AND, AS WE HAD AGREED, INFORMED GREEK NEWSMEN WAITING OUTSIDE THAT WE HAD DISCUSSED BILATERAL ISSUES, INCLUDING US-GREEK DEFENSE NEGOTIATIONS. IN

RESPONSE TO QUESTION, PAPANDREOU SAID WE HAD DISCUSSED THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR NEGOTIATIONS RATHER THAN DETAILS AND THAT THIS MEETING DID NOT CONSTITUTE "FIRST ROUND" OF DECA WHICH WOULD OCCUR AT A TIME STILL TO BE DECIDED.

5. I BEGAN OUR DISCUSSION BY TELLING PAPANDREOU THAT MY RECENT MEDICAL TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES HAD ENABLED ME TO TALK ABOUT UPCOMING DECA NEGOTIATIONS WITH KEY AMERICAN OFFICIALS WHO WOULD BE INVOLVED. WHILE WE HAD NO INTENTION TO PUSH GREEK GOVERNMENT, THERE WAS, I THOUGHT, UNDERSTANDABLE CONCERN IN WASHINGTON THAT GREEKS APPEARED TO BE DEVELOPING THEIR POSITIONS WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE KIND OF INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WHICH WOULD GIVE THEM REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF U.S. PRIORITIES AND OBJECTIVES. RECALLING THAT PAPANDREOU HAD ASSURED ME AT OUR FIRST MEETING TEN MONTHS AGO THAT HE WOULD SPRING NO SURPRISES ON US, I SAID THIS WAS AN ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT GROUND RULE TO OBSERVE IN THE DECA NEGOTIATIONS. FOR THIS REASON, I BELIEVED A PRELIMINARY AND INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN GREEK AND U.S. NEGOTIATORS WOULD BE VALUABLE TO BOTH SIDES AND REDUCE DANGER OF MISCALCULATION BY EITHER SIDE. I FEARED THAT IF GREEK GOVERNMENT PRESENTED US WITH DETAILED WRITTEN PROPOSALS AT OUTSET, WE MIGHT FIND OURSELVES IN A DEADLOCK BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS HAD EVEN BEGUN.

6. PAPANDREOU SAID DETAILED POSITION HAD NOT YET BEEN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DEVELOPED ON GREEK SIDE. "PACE HAS BEEN VERY SLOW," HE SAID. IN FACT, GREEK SIDE MIGHT NEED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM US BEFORE DEVELOPING THEIR POSITIONS FURTHER. IT MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, BE HELPFUL TO KNOW WHAT VALUE WE OURSELVES ATTACHED TO OUR FACILITIES IN GREECE -- NOT, HE SAID, IN MONETARY TERMS, BUT IN TERMS OF OUR OVERALL SECURITY INTERESTS. WITHOUT COMMENTING SPECIFICALLY ON LATTER POINT, I SAID PRIME MINISTER'S COMMENTS STRENGTHENED MY BELIEF THAT PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN GREEK AND U.S. SIDES WOULD BE HELPFUL IN BRINGING ISSUES INTO FOCUS BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS ACTUALLY BEGAN.

7. I THEN INFORMED PAPANDREOU THAT U.S. NEGOTIATING TEAM WAS IN PROCESS OF BEING SELECTED AND THAT REGINALD BARTHOLOMEW WOULD BE APPOINTED U.S. NEGOTIATOR. IN RESPONSE TO PRIME MINISTER'S QUERY, I DESCRIBED BARTHOLOMEW'S BACKGROUND AND RECALLED THAT HE HAD VISITED ATHENS IN MAY WITH SECRETARY HAIG. I TOLD PAPANDREOU THAT BASED ON MY OWN EXPERIENCE AS U.S. NEGOTIATOR IN

ATHENS 3441

DTG: 171444Z AUG 82 PSN: 049521

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BY KAL NARA DATE 3/18/13

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52

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01  
SIT253

ATHENS 3441  
DATE 08/20/82

DTG: 171444Z AUG 82 PSN: 049522  
TOR: 229/1835Z

DISTRIBUTION: REPT /001

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: CKLS EOB  
EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT:

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTEH #3441/02 2291447  
O 171444Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1263

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 13441  
NODIS

FOR EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BURT FROM STEARNS 1975-76 WHEN I WAS SERVING AS DCM IN ATHENS, I WAS CONVINCED THAT A WASHINGTONBASED OFFICIAL WAS BETTER PLACED TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS ALONG EXPEDITIOUSLY THAN AN EMBASSY OFFICIAL. WE WERE FORTUNATE THAT SOMEONE OF BARTHOLOMEW'S CALIBER WAS AVAILABLE, COMBINING AS HE DID KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF GREECE. HE WOULD, I EMPHASIZED, BE WORKING IN CLOSEST COOPERATION WITH ME AND WITH THE EMBASSY.

8. PAPANDREOU NOTED ALL THIS DOWN ON A PIECE OF PAPER WITHOUT COMMENT. HE SAID HE HIMSELF DID NOT WISH TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH HE WOULD FOLLOW THEM AS CLOSELY AS HIS TIME PERMITTED. HE UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERN ABOUT AVOIDING A DEADLOCK. IN FACT, HE SAID, IT MIGHT BE THAT GREEK GOVERNMENT WOULD PRESENT NOTHING TO US IN WRITING AT THIS STAGE. HE REPEATED THAT GREEK SIDE MIGHT SEEK SOME ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM US OF A GENERAL NATURE. HE WOULD TALK AGAIN WITH HIS COLLEAGUES AND GET BACK IN TOUCH WITH ME, NOT RIGHT AWAY BECAUSE OF GREEK VACATION SCHEDULES, BUT PROBABLY EARLY IN SEPTEMBER.

9. COMMENT: OFFICIAL ATHENS NEWS AGENCY SPECULATES THIS MORNING THAT "NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASES WILL MOST

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PROBABLY OPEN IN THE SECOND HALF OF SEPTEMBER." AS PAPANDREOU'S COMMENTS TO ME MAKE CLEAR, IT IS EXTREMELY UNLIKELY GREEKS WILL BE READY TO DO ANY SERIOUS NEGOTIATING BEFORE OCTOBER OR EVEN LATER. THEY CERTAINLY SEEM TO HAVE GOTTEN THE MESSAGE THAT WE WOULD PREFER NOT TO BE FACED WITH FORMAL AND DETAILED PROPOSALS AT THE OUTSET AND BELIEVE A PRELIMINARY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WOULD FACILITATE THE NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. PAPANDREOU HAS NOT COMMITTED HIMSELF TO SUCH AN EXCHANGE AS YET, BUT HE WILL DOUBTLESS DISCUSS THE IDEA WITH KAPSIS, MACHERITSAS, AND HIS KYSEA COLLEAGUES. IF HE DOES COME BACK TO ME WITH A REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, THIS MIGHT PROVIDE A STRONG ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT FOR PRELIMINARY EXCHANGES, EITHER IN ATHENS OR IN WASHINGTON. STEARNS

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121523 33

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 ATHENS 3443 DTG: 171557Z AUG 82 PSN: 049523  
SIT252 DATE 08/20/82 TOR: 229/1836Z

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EXPECT SOME GESTURE FROM US SIGNIFYING THAT WE RECOGNIZE THAT GREECE'S MOST DISTINGUISHED STATESMAN AND MOST STALWART DEFENDER OF GREECE'S WESTERN TIES IS PAYING AN OFFICIAL VISIT TO OUR NEXT DOOR NEIGHBOR.

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EOB:  
WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

7. KARAMANLIS'S POLITICAL ADVISER, THE ASTUTE, WELL DISPOSED PETROS MOLYVIATIS, IS CURRENTLY ON LEAVE, BUT I WILL TRY TO GET SOME READING FROM HIM ON KARAMANLIS'S PLANS WHEN HE RETURNS TO ATHENS. STEARNS

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHTR #3443 229155Z  
O 171557Z AUG 82  
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1265

~~SECRET~~ ATHENS 13443

NODIS  
FOR EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY-DESIGNATE BURT FROM STEARNS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: OVIP, GR, US  
SUBJECT: PAPANDREOU'S INTEREST IN WORKING VISIT TO  
- WASHINGTON, AND POSSIBLE PRIVATE VISIT BY  
- KARAMANLIS  
REF: A. STATE 225864, B. ATHENS 13441

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT)
  2. IN MY MEETING YESTERDAY WITH PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU, I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT WORKING VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER TIME FRAME WAS NOT FEASIBLE (REFTEL A), BUT THAT WE HOPED SCHEDULING AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS WOULD PERMIT ARRANGING VISIT DURING FIRST HALF OF 1983.
  3. PAPANDREOU REACTED TO THIS NEWS WITHOUT APPARENT SURPRISE AND SAID HIS PROJECTED VISIT TO CANADA ALSO HAD HAD TO BE POSTPONED. HE NOW EXPECTED TO VISIT CANADA NEXT SPRING. PERHAPS THIS TIMING WOULD BE MORE REALISTIC AS FAR AS A SIDE TRIP TO WASHINGTON WAS CONCERNED. I MADE NO COMMENT ON THIS, BUT SAID I WOULD REPORT HIS NEW ITINERARY TO WASHINGTON SO IT COULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT AS WE EXAMINED FUTURE POSSIBILITIES.
- MESSAGE (CONT. NUED):
4. PAPANDREOU SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT KARAMANLIS WOULD VISIT CANADA IN NOVEMBER. I SAID WE HAD RECEIVED NO INFORMATION ON THIS FROM PRESIDENT KARAMANLIS OR HIS STAFF BUT WOULD BEAR IT IN MIND IN THE EVENT KARAMANLIS WAS CONSIDERING A PRIVATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AS WELL.
  5. PAPANDREOU SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER KARAMANLIS HAD THIS IN MIND AND VOLUNTEERED NO COMMENT ON WHETHER HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE.
  6. COMMENT: IN VIEW OF THE POLITICAL MINUET THAT GOES ON WITH KARAMANLIS AND PAPANDREOU, WE SHALL HAVE TO TREAT THE SUBJECT OF A "PRIVATE" VISIT BY KARAMANLIS WITH SOME CARE. IF KARAMANLIS IS IN FACT PLANNING TO GO TO CANADA IN NOVEMBER, HE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY

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34

## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01      ATHENS 3444      DTG: 171558Z AUG 82 PSN: 049528  
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EOB:

WHSR COMMENT: CHECKLIST

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEH 3444 2291559

O 171558Z AUG 82

FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1266

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 2175

AMEMBASSY BOMN PRIORITY 2660

AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0128

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 5768

AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 8349

AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 6267

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USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0949

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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DNG: CO (8/17/88)

TAGS: PEPR, PORG, CY, GR, TU

SUBJECT: PAPANDEOU COMMENTS ON INTERNATIONALIZATION OF  
- CYPRUS QUESTION

REF: ANKARA 06682

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. DURING COURSE OF MY MEETING YESTERDAY WITH PRIME  
MINISTER PAPANDEOU, I NOTED REPORTS THAT CYPRIOT  
PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU INTENDED TO SEEK UNGA DEBATE ON  
CYPRUS QUESTION. I ASKED PAPANDEOU WHAT HIS ATTITUDE  
WAS TOWARDS SUCH A MOVE WHICH, IT SEEMED TO ME, COULD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

IMPAIR PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUED DETENTE IN GREEK-TURKISH  
RELATIONS.

3. PAPANDEOU SAID HE WAS ON RECORD AS FAVORING  
"INTERNATIONALIZATION" OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION, BUT THAT  
ANY DECISION TO SEEK UNGA DEBATE WOULD BE A CYPRIOT  
NOT A GREEK DECISION. HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE STATE  
OF GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS AT THE PRESENT MOMENT AND SAID  
THAT FOR THE PAST MONTH THERE HAVE BEEN NO TURKISH  
PENETRATION OF GREECE'S CLAIMED AIR SPACE -- "NOT EVEN  
THE TEN MILES." PAPANDEOU'S IMPLICATION WAS THAT HE  
WOULD NOT FAVOR THE KIND OF DEBATE IN NEW YORK WHICH  
WOULD PUT GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS BACK WHERE THEY WERE  
BEFORE THE KAPSIS-ALACAM MEETINGS.

4. PAPANDEOU SAID IF CYPRUS DEBATE OCCURRED IN NEW

YORK, GREECE WOULD, OF COURSE, SUPPORT GREEK CYPRIOT  
POSITIONS BUT THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SEEKING DEBATE  
WOULD HAVE TO BE THAT OF KYPRIANOU ALONE.

5. THIS LED PAPANDEOU TO MAKE A NUMBER OF DISPARAGING  
REMARKS ABOUT KYPRIANOU'S LACK OF STATURE AND THE SHORT-  
SIGHTEDNESS OF HIS COOPERATION WITH AKEL. PAPANDEOU  
SAID HE SUSPECTED KYPRIANOU WAS SEEKING UNGA DEBATE  
"AS A WAY TO EMBARRASS GREECE." WHEN I PRESSED HIM  
ON THIS ASTONISHING REMARK, PAPANDEOU SAID HE BELIEVED  
KYPRIANOU EVALUATED THE CHANCES OF GETTING A STRONG  
RESOLUTION OUT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS FALL AS VERY  
UNLIKELY. THAT WAS ALSO THE VIEW OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT.  
IF, THEREFORE, KYPRIANOU WAS PUSHING FOR A CYPRUS DEBATE,  
IT WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY WITH THE EXPECTATION THAT THE  
RESULT WOULD BE LESS FAVORABLE TO CYPRUS AND TO GREECE  
THAN IN THE PAST.

6. THIS MEANT TO PAPANDEOU THAT KYPRIANOU WAS PREPARED  
DELIBERATELY TO RUN RISKS IN NEW YORK AND, IF NECESSARY,  
BLAME HIS FAILURE TO SECURE A STRONG RESOLUTION ON  
THE GREEK GOVERNMENT AND PAPANDEOU PERSONALLY.

7. COMMENT: IN VIEW OF THE BAD BLOOD BETWEEN  
PAPANDEOU AND KYPRIANOU, I DO NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSI-  
BILITY THAT EACH IS POSITIONING HIMSELF TO BLAME  
REVERSES ON THE OTHER. WHATEVER THE EXPLANATION FOR  
PAPANDEOU'S REMARKS, THEY DO NOT SEEM TO REFLECT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

"IRRESISTIBLE PRESSURE" ON THE PART OF THE GREEK GOVERN-  
MENT TO SEEK DEBATE IN NEW YORK. IN FACT, IT HAS SEEMED  
TO ME FOR SOME MONTHS THAT PAPANDEOU WOULD PREFER TO  
AVOID SITUATIONS IN WHICH HE WAS FORCED TO SUPPORT  
KYPRIANOU PUBLICLY. IF KYPRIANOU PERSISTS IN GOING TO  
NEW YORK, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT WILL CERTAINLY SUPPORT  
GOC POSITIONS, BUT I WOULD EXPECT IT TO BE DONE IN SUCH  
A WAY AS TO MINIMIZE THE ADVANTAGE TO KYPRIANOU.  
STEARNS

ATHENS 3444

DTG: 171558Z AUG 82 PSN: 049528

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