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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name FORTIER, DONALD: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 7/2/2008

File Folder IRAN (05/29/1981-12/31/1983)

FOIA

M2008-113

Box Number 90758

FELIPPONE

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
54626	MEMO	WOLFOWITZ TO LINDSTROM RE IRAN STUDY MEMORANDUM <i>R 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	1	5/29/1981	B1
54627	MEMO	FAIRBANKS TO LINDSTROM RE IRAN STUDY MEMORANDUM <i>D 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	3	5/29/1981	B1 B3
54628	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO WOLFOWITZ RE DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL <i>PAR 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	2	12/8/1981	B1 B3
54629	MEMO	WOLFOWITZ TO MCFARLANE RE TALKING POINTS (WITH HANDWRITTEN NOTES ON BACK OF PAGE 4) <i>PAR 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	5	12/14/1981	B1 B3
54630	MEMO	FORTIER TO PAUL W. AND JIM R. RE MOVING AHEAD ON IRAN <i>PAR 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	2	2/22/1982	B1 B3
54631	MEMO	ROCHE TO EAGLEBURGER RE POLICY TOWARD IRAN <i>PAR 9/16/2011 M113/1</i>	4	3/23/1982	B1
54632	MEMO	MCFARLANE AND WOLFOWITZ TO SECRETARY OF STATE RE MEMO ON IRAN <i>R 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	1	9/1/1981	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
54633	MEMO	HAIG TO MCFARLANE ET AL RE POLICY FOR IRAN <i>R 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	1	ND	B1
54634	MEMO	WOLFOWITZ THRU MCFARLANE TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE RE IRAN <i>D 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	7	7/3/1981	B1 B3
54635	MEMO	EAGLEBURGER TO WOLFOWITZ AND VELIOTES RE IRAN-IRAQ <i>R 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	1	4/1/1982	B1
54636	MEMO	ROCHE TO EAGLEBURGER RE POLICY TOWARD IRAN <i>PAR 9/16/2011 M113/1</i>	4	3/23/1982	B1
54637	OUTLINE	RE CURRENT POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT <i>R 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	3	ND	B1
54638	LETTER	WOLFOWITZ TO EAGLEBURGER RE IRAN MEMO <i>R 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	1	4/6/1982	B1
54639	MEMO	ROCHE TO MCFARLANE RE IRAN CONVERSATIONS-ANALYSIS TO ACCOMPANY TALKING POINTS <i>R 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	3	ND	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
54640	MEMO	TO IKLE RE REPORT FROM TEHRAN (HANDWRITING ON BACK OF PAGE 2) PAR 5/27/2011 M113/1	3	ND	B1	
54641	REPORT	RE USSR/IRAN R 5/27/2011 M113/1	1	8/12/1983	B1	
54642	REPORT	RE TEHRAN R 3/29/2012 M113/1	2	8/11/1983	B1	B3
54643	CABLE	131700Z OCT 83 D 3/29/2012 M113/1	1	10/13/1983	B1	B3

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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54626

SECRET

May 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM

TO: NEA/IRN - Ralph Lindstrom
FROM: S/P - Paul Wolfowitz
SUBJECT: Iran Study Memorandum

Like many documents that go through multiple drafts, the Iran study memorandum may have altered its emphasis without anyone being completely aware of it. I am concerned that as the paper now stands it may omit an area that is vital for our Iran policy.

The paper which is about to go to the SIG makes policy recommendations for only two cases -- "those appropriate to the current political turmoil and those which would be appropriate when a more stable government eventually emerges." A third alternative is not dealt with. At the May 22 IG meeting this alternative was defined as anything that is neither the present situation nor an improvement of it. I feel that this leaves a great range of circumstances our policy may have to address. In fact, the study memorandum judges that "at the present time the country seems to be edging toward anarchy or possibly civil war."

If we are not to be caught unprepared by future developments, I think it is important to deal with the third alternative of a worsening of present conditions, which might involve increasing factional conflict, anarchy, civil war, increased Soviet interference, etc. (Charles Fairbanks and Frank Fukuyama made some comments on these cases earlier in the IG process.) We could either formulate recommendations in the paper going to the SIG, or describe the problem clearly and call for its examination, on an urgent basis, by a different group.

I enclose a memorandum examining the aspects of this problem in somewhat greater detail.

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NLRR M08-113#54626

BY RW NARA DATE 5/27/11

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54627 MEMO

3 5/29/1981 B1

FAIRBANKS TO LINDSTROM RE IRAN STUDY
MEMORANDUM

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SECRET

THE COUNSELOR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

December 8, 1981

TO: S/P - Paul Wolfowitz
FROM: C - Robert C. McFarlane *RCM*
SUBJECT: Strategic Dialogue with Israel

On Sunday, December 20, 1981 I will be meeting with David Kimche in Jerusalem. At this meeting I would like to introduce two new topics to our agenda and for this purpose would appreciate your providing the necessary analysis and talking points.

Iran. Because of its historic ties to Iran and the large Jewish population still there, I believe that Israel has much to offer to our thinking on ways to influence change in that country. As a consequence, I would appreciate your development of a concept for our joint cooperation in measures to influence change in Tehran. I have no preconceived notion on the direction this cooperation might take.

It seems to me that one area which may hold potential for the U.S. contribution to this effort is the Turkish connection. If you agree, could you provide your thoughts together with talking points for steps we might take to achieve cooperation through the GOT [REDACTED] in eastern Turkey. Needless to say, this is a sensitive matter and you should not coordinate its development with any other office.

The peace process. In my last meeting, David Kimche again stressed the GOI's interest in using this channel for surfacing any sensitive and private thoughts we might have on the peace process. In this regard, Jim Roche and Dennis Ross came away from their meetings in Jerusalem with several judgements on Israeli misperceptions of U.S. thinking on such key issues as settlements. If you believe it would be

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 (b) (1)

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BY *RU* NARA DATE 5/27/11
ALRR M08-113#54628

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

appropriate, could I ask you to develop these thoughts for my use with Kimche together with any others that come to mind. Again, this is a particularly sensitive matter which I would clear with the Secretary before using. You should not coordinate it with any other Bureau.

Could I ask you to provide analysis of the above points and talking points to my Assistant, Howard Teicher, by Noon on Monday, December 14, 1981.

SECRET/SENSITIVE



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 14, 1981

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: C - Robert C. MacFarlane
FROM: S/P - Paul Wolfowitz

Talking points on Iran for Kimche Meeting (attached).

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NLRR M08-113 #54629
BY RUS NARA DATE 5/27/11

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

TALKING POINTS ON IRAN

-- THERE IS INTENSE CONCERN ABOUT THE FUTURE OF IRAN AT A VERY HIGH LEVEL IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

-- BUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS CONCERN HAS BEEN LIMITED BY STRONG BUREAUCRATIC RESISTANCE AND BY THE SMALL INFLUENCE THE UNITED STATES HAS OVER EVENTS IN IRAN. IF FRIENDS OF THE UNITED STATES WERE ABLE TO SUGGEST PRACTICAL AND PRUDENT MEANS OF INFLUENCING EVENTS WITHIN IRAN, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MIGHT EVENTUALLY MOVE TO A MORE ACTIVE POLICY.

-- I AM ANXIOUS TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL ON HOW TO INFLUENCE THE EVOLUTION OF EVENTS IN ISRAEL AND ON HOW TO PREPARE FOR FUTURE CONTINGENCIES. I FEEL THAT ISRAELI-U.S. COOPERATION COULD BE IMPORTANT IN DEALING WITH THESE ISSUES.

-- WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY IS EQUALLY CONCERNED ABOUT IRAN, AND MIGHT BE HELPFUL WITH ENTERPRISES WE CAN IDENTIFY AS USEFUL. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR IDEAS ON HOW TURKISH COOPERATION COULD BE EFFECTIVELY USED.

-- OF COURSE, FOR THIS DIALOGUE TO BE FRUITFUL IT MUST REMAIN RESTRICTED TO AN EXTRAORDINARILY SMALL NUMBER OF PEOPLE.

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

-- WE SHOULD CONSIDER FIRST WHETHER WE CAN SET IN MOTION ANY METHODS OF INFLUENCING INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN.

-- SINCE NONE OF THE EXISTING EXILE MOVEMENTS HAVE MAJOR SUPPORT WITHIN IRAN, WE HAVE TO LOOK PRIMARILY AT OTHER INTERNAL MEANS FOR THE PRESENT.

-- IS THERE ANY WAY WE CAN DISCOURAGE SOVIET-BLOC PENETRATION OF THE IRP REGIME'S SECURITY AGENCIES? DO WE HAVE INFORMATION ON THIS QUESTION? DO WE HAVE ANY CHANNELS BY WHICH IT COULD BE SAFELY PASSED TO THOSE WHO WOULD ACT AGAINST PRO-SOVIET ELEMENTS?

-- DO WE HAVE ANY WAY OF PROVIDING USEFUL RESOURCES TO THE MODERATE CLERGY WHO ARE NOW OUT OF POLITICS?

A SECOND IMPORTANT TOPIC FOR US IS PREPARING A STRATEGY TO DEAL WITH POSSIBLE CIVIL WAR. SOME IMPORTANT QUESTIONS HERE ARE:

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E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)(6)

SECRET/SENSITIVE

-3-

-- IN A CIVIL WAR SITUATION, WHAT ARE THE CRUCIAL SKILLS AND EQUIPMENT THAT THE PRO-WESTERN ELEMENTS ARE MORE LIKELY TO LACK?



-- IF IT SHOULD EVER BE USEFUL TO UNITE THE EXILE MOVEMENT, HOW DO YOU THINK IT COULD BEST BE DONE?

-- FINALLY, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT THE WEST HAS SOME COUNTER TO SOVIET INTRODUCTION OF PARAMILITARY OR PROXY FORCES, WITHOUT NECESSARILY HAVING TO TURN TO U.S. FORCES -- SO THAT THE USSR DOES NOT HAVE AN OPTION WE CANNOT COUNTER.

-- WE ARE THUS INTERESTED IN LEARNING WHETHER ANY OF THE FRIENDS OF THE UNITED STATES (ESPECIALLY MUSLIM FRIENDS) HAVE THE CAPABILITY AND, IN A VERY GENERAL SENSE, THE WILLINGNESS TO PREPARE FOR SUCH AN EVENTUALITY.

Drafter: S/P:CHFairbanks:lm
12/14/81 ext 28613

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Poland - 1/

close INF
100 million spent at
NSC in Paris
for CCC orders -
indefinitely deferred
announcement.

is a phase of "foreign
martial law" - Sov. restraints
knows hang on Sovs
Khudskov in Warsaw

have we said anything?
we said change in for clarification.
he was told reforms would
continue.

1000 people arrested.

explicit polit. & discussion -
long discussion?

a possible & irreversible
act - for the next ten
probably irreversible

CITF thinks they are in
a phase of improvisation

for, longer - money - they're
worse -

Pols on ground would like
it in sort of parallel.

were not going to pin
suppression

final eighth day
same:

knows key thing from
being captured by
the wait and see
crowd.

quest -

① Sov responsibility
Soviet not news Sovs
logically close, but
here.

② days of action
we can sustain

③ meeting op in -
but how do you
go.

formal
real process
at the
end



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 22, 1982

MEMORANDUM

TO : Paul W.
Jim R.

SUBJECT: Moving Ahead on Iran

This morning's intelligence contained the view of [REDACTED] that the Tudeh party was growing in effectiveness. While not in itself conclusive, this information - coupled with earlier reports about decreasing influence of the regular forces and increasing KGB involvement in training IRP security units - gives cause for deep concern. Soviet success in tightening the web of influence in Iran tends to eclipse our own regional security undertakings with Oman, Pakistan and others - undertakings which aim, in particular, to prevent the kind of takeover of Iran which the Soviets hope to accomplish by stealth.

There are no obvious answers, and our own influence is admittedly slight. Still, Charles Fairbanks and others have already compiled an excellent list of options to consider:

- ° Urgent high level study of IRP security network; search for Islamic security help (from Paks? Turks? others) so as to prevent further KGB inroads.
- ° facilitate arms transfers by others to maintain stalemate; provide contact with armed services; provide continuing alternative to Soviet bloc.

- [REDACTED]
- ° work with Europeans and other trading with Iran to try to influence government's position on foreign trade nationalization - a move that would limit existing ties to merchant class.

The point is we will never find an answer if we don't begin to seriously look.

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NLRR M08-113#54630


RV RW NARA DATE 5/27/11

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)(e)

An S/P priority for the coming month should be to try to get the Iranian work firmly back on track. The following possibilities - not all mutually exclusive - seem worth consideration:

- ° Private note to Haig that reviews situation on the ground; remind him of earlier decision to commence work and also of the departure of the person assigned to preside over that work; i.e. Bud. (I think it might be worth making a bid to take-over that work yourself.)
- ° Similar note to LSE, trying to stimulate his own interest in the subject (do we know his views? do we know who his Middle East person will be?) and offering to support in any way possible.
- ° Work with Burt or new EUR Assistant Secretary to build upon Turkish-Iranian connection, using Turkish feedback as a wedge to advance policy within the building. Alternatively, suggest that Haig name Walters to carry out Turkish dialogue with S/P backing.
- ° Bring someone in from outside with special charter to do this work.
- ° Try through McFarlane channel to get NSC to pick up ball on Iranian work.



Don Fortier



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

54631

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~~SECRET~~

March 23, 1982

MEMORANDUM

TO: P - Lawrence Eagleburger

FROM: S/P - James G. Roche, Acting *GR*

SUBJECT: A More Active Policy Toward Iran

Despite the urgent attention Central America is receiving, the Persian Gulf situation could explode on short notice into one of the greatest threats to Western security and unity. Various *[REDACTED]* reports suggest that the threat has recently become more acute owing to increasing Soviet and proxy penetration of Iran and Iranian moves against the Gulf states. In the past 48 hours, there have been reports of a successful Iranian offensive which could lead to a rapid unraveling of the Iraqi position. And Nick Veliotes has recently cabled that he found in all GCC states he had visited "acute concern that Soviet influence in Iran would increase" and "a more realistic appreciation of security threats to the region."

To date, we have been passively neutral in the Iran-Iraq War, and have sought to assist Gulf states essentially through arms transfers alone. Such passivity is itself a major strategic choice, but one that is unlikely to achieve any of our goals for the region, including Turkey and the Gulf States, and that sends a dangerous signal to the Soviets.

Our sense is that prior to the recent Iranian counter-assault the JCS and some elements in State were altering that policy to tilt toward Iraq in response to the Gulf states' anxiety over a resurgent Iran. There is a danger that this tilt will neither save Iraq from a defeat we would be blamed for nor make its policies less hostile in the long run either to our friends or our interests; a tilt to Iraq is also unlikely to offer the Gulf states either increased U.S. protection or effective security. At the same time it practically cuts off any possibility of increasing Western influence in Iran, which by its size and location, by both its resources and its vulnerabilities, deserves the strategic priority accorded it by Soviet policy.

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NLRR M08-113#54631

BY RW NADA 4/11/..

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E.O. 13526
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

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-2-

The U.S. drift in this direction can be explained in part by the general sense that we have few opportunities for influence in Iran anyway and little in the way of reliable information to act on. Nevertheless, before drifting any further down this path, we should question the conventional wisdom and consider a more activist policy that recognizes the strategic priority of Iran. Because of the political difficulty of an overt tilt to either party, we must try to think of ways to gain leverage in both. To that end, an urgent but thorough review should go beyond looking at the Iran-Iraq War in isolation and consider the whole range of associated Persian Gulf security problems in a global perspective including the Soviet dimension. We should try to create and exploit opportunities for a more activist and strategically sound policy. Such a review should explore at least the following such opportunities:

1) The Iranian threat offers an opportunity to demonstrate U.S. ability and commitment to secure the Gulf states against either Iranian or future Iraqi hegemony, through e.g., a temporary deployment of F 15s to Oman or a demonstration of U.S. carrier airpower over the Persian Gulf. The Bahrainis are speaking more favorably than in many years about a U.S. presence. We could work with countries like Oman willing to cooperate with us and we should expect the Saudis at least to offer tacit support. Vigorous action in these respects could send the Soviets a useful signal, show the Gulf states that we are able and willing to be the security balancer in the Gulf, and thereby increase our freedom of maneuver toward both Iran and Iraq.

2) A more active and forthcoming public and diplomatic stance toward Iran could keep open the possibility of dealing with this or the next government, increase Western influence in Iran, enable Iranian forces to distance themselves from the Soviets, and maximize our ability to influence the termination of the war. Such a stance could include:

a) a more active form of neutrality favoring return to the status quo ante and emphasizing our concern for the independence and territorial integrity of Iran.

b) a more forthcoming policy toward third party arms transfers to both Iran and Iraq, offering alternatives to Soviet bloc supplies without enabling either side to overwhelm its neighbors.

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-3-

- c) expedited settlement of claims with Iran.
- d) exploration of possible U.S. and other Western economic cooperation with Iran, including their proposal for a natural gas pipeline through Turkey to Western Europe, and moves to discourage foreign trade nationalization (with an eye both to Western influence and the position of the merchant class).
- e) more active discussion on Iran with third parties to encourage more effective involvement there, including assistance on internal security and intelligence from e.g., [REDACTED] to obviate reliance on KGB or proxy help.
- 3) [REDACTED] contingency planning focused on Soviet moves (along the spectrum from present penetration to overt military invasion in a range of possible Iranian circumstances) would increase our ability to respond rapidly and prudently to future threats and opportunities in Iran. The Soviets obviously have a strategy to gain power and influence in Iran. What is it? Could we counter it? How?
- 4) Security measures in eastern Turkey could help to deter possible Soviet military moves and support possible Western moves in Iran.

5) Our willingness to counter threats to the Gulf from the north could be confirmed by acting to counter threats from the south. A reassessment of our Yemen policy could explore a more active stance in support of YARG against PDRY possibly in collaboration with the Saudis who expressed interest earlier. As an effort to reassure our friends and counter Soviet presence, this could complement and connect a more active policy toward Iran and a more active policy in the Horn.

Opportunities in this area have so far been allowed to slip away. S/P has made several attempts over the past year to start high level planning on a more active policy toward Iran, including a SIG, an NSC-convened special study group, and a State special group (the tasker for which I attach; we have other papers on the subject). None of them got off the

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-4-

ground and Bud MacFarlane who presided over them has departed. If you think that a serious review is warranted, we could work with others on it on an inter-bureau or interagency basis. We don't have the assets to take this over by ourselves, and the track record suggests that there is not a lot of enthusiasm elsewhere to devote a lot of effort to such a project. We are not sure how to proceed now other than letting you know... we believe that time is not on our side on this issue.

Attachment:

as stated

Draft: S/P:NTarcov:lm
3-23-82 ext. 22576

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S

W.C.

5432

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

September 1, 1981

TO : The Secretary

FROM : C - Robert C. McFarlane
S/P - Paul D. Wolfowitz

SUBJECT : Attached Memo on Iran

The attached memo on "Dealing with Growing Anarchy in Iran" was sent to you on July 3. It apparently never reached you and your office does not know where it is. In view of the weekend's events in Iran, however, it is even more timely than before.

As you will see, the memo mainly describes a long list of issues that need to be addressed (although there are some immediate interim actions suggested, e.g., the initiation of discussions with other concerned countries on the situation in Iran). This format reflects partly our need for better information on many of these issues and partly our concern not to commit you to policy recommendations in this memo which has not been staffed with any other bureaus.

What we do recommend is that you give Bud a charter to develop policy on these issues, both within the Department and interagency, on an urgent basis. It would also be useful to get your reaction to the issues we propose to address. Are there some options we have failed to include? Alternatively, are there some which are too sensitive or seem unlikely to produce results? Attached at TAB 2 is a tasker for you to sign that assigns Bud responsibility for an urgent study of these questions.

Instead of creating an institutional mechanism right now, we could prepare for your consideration a set of action recommendations. However, unless the bureaucracy has a clear sense that you are interested in getting answers to these issues, there will be a great deal of foot dragging and reluctance to address them.

Recommendation

That you sign the tasker attached at TAB 2.

Attachments:

1. Copy of July 3 memo
2. Tasker for signature

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NLRR M08-113#54632

BY RW- NARA DATE 5/27/11

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: C - Robert C. McFarlane
NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis
EUR - Lawrence S. Eagleburger
PM - Richard R. Burt
S/P - Paul D. Wolfowitz
INR - Ronald I. Spiers

From : Alexander M. Haig
Subject : Policy for Iran

In light of the growing chaos in Iran and the potential effect on US interests that could arise from developments there, we must as a matter of urgency explore what options are available to us to influence the course of events there in a favorable direction or to deal with a serious crisis that might be thrust upon us with little warning.

Accordingly, I am asking Bud McFarlane to convene a small group within the Department consisting of representatives from NEA, EUR, INR, PM and S/P to develop policy recommendations on the following issues (and on any others that may seem appropriate) and I am asking Bud to convene a restricted interagency group to review these same issues on an urgent and continuing basis:

-- Do we have any possible ways of influencing the evolution of the political struggle within Iran?

-- How can we influence Soviet conduct in Iran?

-- What should be our strategy in the event of civil war in Iran?

-- Do we have the intelligence necessary to form adequate policy in the first three areas?

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
RDS-3 9/1/01

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NLRR M08-113#54633
BY RW. NARA DATE 5/27/01

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54634 MEMO

7

7/3/1981

B1

WOLFOWITZ THRU MCFARLANE TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE RE IRAN

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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new
file:
Iran-Iraq
Review

54635

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

[Handwritten signature]

SECRET

April 1, 1982

MEMORANDUM

TO : S/P - Mr. Paul Wolfowitz
NEA - Ambassador Veliotis

FROM : Lawrence S. Eagleburger *[Handwritten signature]*

SUBJECT: Iran-Iraq

S/P's memo on "A More Active Policy Toward Iran" contains a number of interesting ideas. I have serious doubts about nearly all of them, largely because of their effects on our relations with the Arabs. But my current views are irrelevant because I have not really addressed these questions systematically. What we need now, with NEA taking the lead, is a paper which looks at our policy choices regarding the war and its aftermath in the broadest possible -- without becoming unmanageable -- context. I want to be sure the Secretary sees the tradeoffs and options on the main policy questions, even if there is consensus on what to do. I have asked David Gompert and Robin Raphael to work with you and to let S/S know what I think is needed.

SECRET

GDS 4/1/88

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NLRR M08-113#54635

BY RW NARA DATE 5/27/11



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

54636

~~SECRET~~

March 23, 1982

MEMORANDUM

TO: P - Lawrence Eagleburger
FROM: S/P - James G. Roche, Acting *gm*
SUBJECT: A More Active Policy Toward Iran

Despite the urgent attention Central America is receiving, the Persian Gulf situation could explode on short notice into one of the greatest threats to Western security and unity. Various *[redacted]* reports suggest that the threat has recently become more acute owing to increasing Soviet and proxy penetration of Iran and Iranian moves against the Gulf states. In the past 48 hours, there have been reports of a successful Iranian offensive which could lead to a rapid unraveling of the Iraqi position. And Nick Veliotis has recently cabled that he found in all GCC states he had visited "acute concern that Soviet influence in Iran would increase" and "a more realistic appreciation of security threats to the region."

To date, we have been passively neutral in the Iran-Iraq War, and have sought to assist Gulf states essentially through arms transfers alone. Such passivity is itself a major strategic choice, but one that is unlikely to achieve any of our goals for the region, including Turkey and the Gulf States, and that sends a dangerous signal to the Soviets.

Our sense is that prior to the recent Iranian counter-assault the JCS and some elements in State were altering that policy to tilt toward Iraq in response to the Gulf states' anxiety over a resurgent Iran. There is a danger that this tilt will neither save Iraq from a defeat we would be blamed for nor make its policies less hostile in the long run either to our friends or our interests; a tilt to Iraq is also unlikely to offer the Gulf states either increased U.S. protection or effective security. At the same time it practically cuts off any possibility of increasing Western influence in Iran, which by its size and location, by both its resources and its vulnerabilities, deserves the strategic priority accorded it by Soviet policy.

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NLRR MD8-113 #54636

E.O. 13526
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

25

SECRET

-2-

The U.S. drift in this direction can be explained in part by the general sense that we have few opportunities for influence in Iran anyway and little in the way of reliable information to act on. Nevertheless, before drifting any further down this path, we should question the conventional wisdom and consider a more activist policy that recognizes the strategic priority of Iran. Because of the political difficulty of an overt tilt to either party, we must try to think of ways to gain leverage in both. To that end, an urgent but thorough review should go beyond looking at the Iran-Iraq War in isolation and consider the whole range of associated Persian Gulf security problems in a global perspective including the Soviet dimension. We should try to create and exploit opportunities for a more activist and strategically sound policy. Such a review should explore at least the following such opportunities: ✓

1) The Iranian threat offers an opportunity to demonstrate U.S. ability and commitment to secure the Gulf states against either Iranian or future Iraqi hegemony, through e.g., a temporary deployment of F 15s to Oman or a demonstration of U.S. carrier airpower over the Persian Gulf. The Bahrainis are speaking more favorably than in many years about a U.S. presence. We could work with countries like Oman willing to cooperate with us and we should expect the Saudis at least to offer tacit support. Vigorous action in these respects could send the Soviets a useful signal, show the Gulf states that we are able and willing to be the security balancer in the Gulf, and thereby increase our freedom of maneuver toward both Iran and Iraq.

2) A more active and forthcoming public and diplomatic stance toward Iran could keep open the possibility of dealing with this or the next government, increase Western influence in Iran, enable Iranian forces to distance themselves from the Soviets, and maximize our ability to influence the termination of the war. Such a stance could include: /?

a) a more active form of neutrality favoring return to the status quo ante and emphasizing our concern for the independence and territorial integrity of Iran.

b) a more forthcoming policy toward third party arms transfers to both Iran and Iraq, offering alternatives to Soviet bloc supplies without enabling either side to overwhelm its neighbors. /?

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-3-

- c) expedited settlement of claims with Iran.
- d) exploration of possible U.S. and other Western economic cooperation with Iran, including their proposal for a natural gas pipeline through Turkey to Western Europe, and moves to discourage foreign trade nationalization (with an eye both to Western influence and the position of the merchant class).
- e) more active discussion on Iran with third parties to encourage more effective involvement there, including assistance on internal security and intelligence from e.g., [REDACTED] to obviate reliance on KGB or proxy help.
- 3) [REDACTED] contin-
gency planning focused on Soviet moves (along the spectrum from present penetration to overt military invasion in a range of possible Iranian circumstances) would increase our ability to respond rapidly and prudently to future threats and opportunities in Iran. The Soviets obviously have a strategy to gain power and influence in Iran. What is it? Could we counter it? How?
- 4) Security measures in eastern Turkey could help to deter possible Soviet military moves and support possible Western moves in Iran.
- 5) Our willingness to counter threats to the Gulf from the north could be confirmed by acting to counter threats from the south. A reassessment of our Yemen policy could explore a more active stance in support of YARG against PDRY possibly in collaboration with the Saudis who expressed interest earlier. As an effort to reassure our friends and counter Soviet presence, this could complement and connect a more active policy toward Iran and a more active policy in the Horn.

Opportunities in this area have so far been allowed to slip away. S/P has made several attempts over the past year to start high level planning on a more active policy toward Iran, including a SIG, an NSC-convened special study group, and a State special group (the tasker for which I attach; we have other papers on the subject). None of them got off the

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ground and Bud MacFarlane who presided over them has departed. If you think that a serious review is warranted, we could work with others on it on an inter-bureau or interagency basis. We don't have the assets to take this over by ourselves, and the track record suggests that there is not a lot of enthusiasm elsewhere to devote a lot of effort to such a project. We are not sure how to proceed now other than letting you know we believe that time is not on our side on this issue.

Attachment:

as stated

Draft: S/P:NTarcov:lm
3-23-82 ext. 22576

~~SECRET~~

54637
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Current Policy Implications of Iran-Iraq Conflict

U.S./National Interests

- Security of the Gulf region and survival of regimes friendly to western interests;
- Continued access to petroleum supplies in adequate quantities and at reasonable prices;
- Prevent Soviet expansion, counter Soviet influence and prevent the USSR from exploiting regional developments to undermine security.

Derived Objectives

- Do we still agree that an early end to the war is essential?
- If so, is it to our advantage that neither combatant emerge with the military capability to dominate the Gulf?
- What are the steps we could take to promote more actively a negotiated settlement?
 - At the UN Security Council?
 - With the Western allies?
 - With the Islamic Group?
 - With the USSR (Is an end sufficiently compelling as to make cooperation with the Soviets desirable?)
- Should we consider changes in our policy so long as the war continues?

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NLRR M08-113#54637

BY RW NARA DATE 5/27/11

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- 2 -

- Are there advantages in a U.S. "tilt"?
 - toward Iran?
 - toward Iraq?
- Should we sell arms to one or both? Should we encourage third parties to do so?
- Is there any prospect of a successful blockade of arms resupply?
- What are the implications and opportunities for the Soviets
 - from a continuation of the conflict?
 - from a negotiated settlement:
 - by the Islamic states?
 - by the UN?
 - by the NAM?
 - from a victory by Iran?
 - from Iraq?
- What are Soviet vulnerabilities and how can they be exploited to deny the Soviets benefits and opportunities"
 - on the diplomatic front?
 - on the economic/military assistance front?
 - by seizing the initiative?
 - through clandestine means?

Implications and choices: Iranian military success

- Is resolution by Iranian "victory" in our interests?
- Can we affect this development?
- What dangers do we face if Iraq becomes desperate?

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 3 -

- Intensified strikes on oil facilities?
- Threats to navigation in the Gulf?
- Pressures on friendly Arab states for manpower of staging facilities?
- Chemical warfare?
- What influences can we bring to bear directly or indirectly on Iran to press for negotiations?
 - politically?
 - economically?
 - in terms of post-war arms relationships?
 - by heightening concerns re Soviet intentions?
- Implications for our regional posture and interests
 - Arab perceptions of Iranian military and subversion potential?
 - Islamic subversion potential? fundamentalism mythology?
 - Enhanced Syrian capabilities to play a spoiling role? Arab-Israeli peace process? Lebanon?
 - Our ability to satisfy requests of friendly Arab ~~regimes~~
 - Arab regimes for security assistance and assurances?
 - U.S. credibility?



*unfiled
Iran-Iraq
Review*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

54-38
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April 6, 1982

Larry,

Thanks for your note regarding S/P's memo on Iran. Your call for a broad review of policy is indeed a welcome one. I perhaps should have made clearer from the outset that we recognize the immense danger Iran poses to our Arab friends in the Gulf, and the need to contain it. We are by no means recommending a "tilt" towards Iran at this moment. Indeed many of the measures listed in our paper - e.g. economic cooperation - can only be implemented over time.

At the same time, we believe that in light of Iran's enormous strategic importance, it is essential to develop - much more intensively than we have to date - a long-term policy that would minimize Soviet influence in Iran. Likewise, we need to prepare steps now that will put us in a better position to influence events when Khomeni passes from the scene. Our own reading of Nick's cables from the region suggests that this is something that the Arab states would very much favor themselves.

Finally, I would only reemphasize the importance of using the current crisis to provide a reassuring demonstration of military support to the threatened Gulf states. As we noted in our memo, Bahrain is now speaking very positively of US presence, and the UAE has even asked us to arrange a ship visit for a naval combatant with modern anti-air missile equipment. This is a remarkable turn of events. At a minimum, our reply should be forthcoming and go beyond the standard bureaucratic response. At best, we should look for ways of exhibiting initiative ourselves. A failure in this regard will result in more than a missed opportunity for the US. Without concrete manifestations of US protection, our Arab friends will be placed in an even more exposed and compromised position vis-a-vis Iran. In this position, they will no doubt be tempted to explore ways of placating the threat that will in turn be very damaging to our own long range interests.

We are happy and eager to work with you and Nick on this in any way we can.

Paul Wolfowitz

P - Ambassador Eagleburger

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NLRR M08-113 #54638

BY RW NARA DATE 5/27/



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: C. - Robert McFarlane

FROM: S/P - James G. Roche

SUBJECT: Iran Conversations--Analysis to Accompany
Talking Points

The characteristic tendency of our bureaucratic process is not to devise policy for the problems that are most likely to arise, or those that would be most dangerous to us, but rather to prepare for the events we can deal with most easily. Thus we prepared elaborately for a Soviet invasion of Poland, rather than a Polish suppression of Solidarity. In the same way, we have not faced the problem of Iran. Yet:

-- In no other area of the world could there take place a shift of power as decisive as the shift produced by Soviet control over Iran.

-- In virtually no country of the world do we now have as little ability to avert bad consequences for us.

-- While it is uncertain what the future may bring in Iran, it is almost certain that the present situation will not endure. The regime depends very heavily on the popularity of one man, Khomeini, who will not be able to turn over his role to a successor of comparable prestige. Since the overthrow of the Shah, the IRP clerical group has progressively excluded the other viewpoints from political life, forcing almost all future opposition to express itself through violence. Aside from the ability to apply savage terror, the IRP regime is not well equipped to cope with an opposition using violence. It will have to meet future violence with a disorganized state apparatus and improvised security agencies. The bombings of the summer showed that both were, at least at that time, thoroughly penetrated by disloyal elements. As time goes on, the IRP regime will increasingly face other problems

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BY RW NARA DATE 5/27/11

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latent in the nature of Persian society--the waning of revolutionary enthusiasm and the fact that it cannot appeal to the secularist tendency which is strong among the population of Iran. Finally, the core of the IRP's legitimacy suffers from a kind of built-in obsolescence. The moral stature of the Shi'i clergy under the Shah came from the fact that the clergy, which had never before ruled in Iranian history, has thus avoided being implicated in the illegitimacy of the previous dynasties, which were viewed as illegitimate because of their despotic rule and their lack of religious credentials. Now that the clergy is ruling, for the first time, in its own name, it is increasingly noticed that it rules by the same methods as the earlier dynasties, that it is involved like them in various sordid compromises, and that it did not fulfill the messianic expectations that brought the clergy to power. The moral stature of the clergy always depended on their distance from everyday politics; when in power, they will gradually lose the sanctity that brought them to power.

The Current Situation

For us, the important events of the last six months are:

-- The Mujahedin assassination campaign against the IRP, and its abandonment after partial success.

-- The IRP's attempt to rebuild its security agencies in response to this threat, and the Soviet attempt to use this rebuilding to purge unfriendly elements (and perhaps to insert their own friends).

-- After the abandonment of the Mujahedin campaign, the open emergence of much greater factionalism within the IRP. The Parliament's rejection of President Khamenei's candidate for Prim Minister was unprecedented.

-- Greater IRP success in the war with Iraq.

We now see a situation in which strong opposition to the IRP obviously exists, but no particular opposition group is strong enough to contend with the IRP for rule. None of the exile groups, as now constituted, seem to have major support within Iran.

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Conversations with Israel

-- In addition to their obvious uses, such conversations can serve the function of presenting U.S. policy-makers with concrete possibilities that might move policy here.

-- It might be counterproductive for it to become clear how little we have done so far.

-- Exile groups should not be neglected. Their present lack of support within Iran might not prevent them from playing a constructive role later, under altered circumstances.

-- There is a temptation for exile groups to become the primary topic in such conversations, simply because they operate outside of Iran and we can work with them more easily. If this takes place we may lose sight of the more effective and subtle actions we could take within Iran.

-- Eventually, such conversations could embrace a wide range of connected topics forming a coherent strategy toward Iran. But limitations on your time suggest that it is possible to raise only a few topics initially, and that these be rather specific so that the conversations can have an operational outcome. Suggestions along these lines are made in the Talking Points.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

SECRET ATTACHMENT

September 22, 1982

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DAM

Ken:

The attached is another example of what we will be missing when Don Fortier leaves us.

I am sending it to you not for that reason but because I think the paper is if anything more timely now than when it was written.

Paul

Paul Wolfowitz

SECRET ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

snf 7/3/08

All

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. IKLE

SUBJECT: Report from Tehran

I lunched yesterday with [REDACTED] who just completed a two year tour in Tehran.

[REDACTED] made the following points:

- o All indications are that the Iranians will try a feint to the north and run two simultaneous major offensives, armor in the center region (they have some 800 tanks intact) and infantry in the marshy south.
- o The North Koreans seem to be Iran's biggest suppliers. But the South Korean school in Tehran has 200 children, implying a community of at least 1,000. The South Koreans are providing spare parts for US equipment used by Iran.
- o The Israelis may yet be supplying Iran. [REDACTED] is convinced that they are, and Jewish middlemen are definitely involved even if the GOI is not.
- o Iran's economy is improving. The Iranians are awash with money--trade with [REDACTED] increased dramatically last year.
- o The Iranian middle class is settling down; middle class businessmen are moving back to Iran, as the need for technocrats remains strong. The middle class is unhappy with Khomeini's conservatism, but is not restive.
- o Jewish merchants are still active in the bazaars. The Jewish community seems less pressured, though the Bahai's are being persecuted.
- o There is a strong pro-Western conservative faction within the Mullah circles. Formerly called the Anti-Bahai League, it is anti-Soviet, pro-US. Foreign Ministry officials are dropping heavier and heavier hints of a desire to patch up relations with the US. The military will work with anybody who will help them (this confirms the gist of the attached cable from Strausz Hupe, which I saw after my conversation with [REDACTED]).

- o The Iranians have created a buffer zone in Baluchistan, to prevent incidents with the Russians (such as those that took place) over Afghan refugee camps.
- o The Iranians are also, it seems, trying to resuscitate their effort to build a port at Chah Bahar. The South Koreans could be particularly helpful in that regard.

Quinn
Plutson

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - AUGUST 12, 1983

1. USSR/IRAN: STRAINED RELATIONS PERSIST

Sharpening Soviet media criticism of Iran indicates that Moscow has concluded that public restraint has not softened Tehran's anti-Soviet stance on issues of concern to the USSR (for example, a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq conflict and harsh treatment of the Tudeh Party). Nonetheless, the topics the media most recently singled out for attention--economic relations and Iranian support to Afghan insurgents--may be areas where Moscow believes it can apply some leverage.

file
Iran

5461

* * *

Pravda on August 5 refuted at length criticism by Iranian clerics of Soviet-Iranian economic cooperation. Among other points, the Pravda piece underlined Moscow's agreement to facilitate and increase the transshipment of goods across Soviet territory to and from Iran.

The latter issue has become particularly thorny since January when enormous pile-ups of railroad cars--up to a reported 8,000 in mid-February--began to cause congestion and lengthy delays. Since January, the USSR has been placing intermittent restrictions on the acceptance of freight bound for Iran at border points with a number of other countries such as Poland and Japan. Instructions issued in July to rail and maritime transport lines to postpone the booking of Iranian-bound cargoes have now been extended to September 15 because of the continued congestion. Meanwhile, the Iranian customs post at Dzhulfa, on Iran's northwest border with Azerbaijan, ceased operations on July 25 and was still closed a week later. Reports of this interruption generated rumors that Iran had closed its border with the Soviet Union.

While delays are endemic to the Soviet rail system (one of Andropov's first moves as General Secretary was to fire the Minister of Railroads), the long lasting problem at the Iranian frontier probably reflects the difficult relations between Moscow and Tehran as much as technical problems. Joint efforts to resolve the transport tie-ups apparently have not been resumed since May, following Tehran's expulsion of Soviet diplomats and the banning of the Tudeh Party. Should Iran signal any eventual softening toward Moscow, the Soviets might turn greater attention to correcting the railroad congestion.

An August 3 Izvestiya article detailing Iranian assistance to Afghan insurgents focused on Iran's efforts to export its Islamic revolution. Moscow's concerns on this score, if perhaps exaggerated, are not without some basis. In mid-July, a Mujahadin delegation visiting Tehran obtained permission for the transit of weapons from Baluchistan to Herat. Moscow probably has little expectation of influencing Tehran to refrain from such activities, but may hope to play on the aversion of Afghanistan's urban and politicized population groups to an Iranian-style Islamic revolution.

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IRAN

BY KML NARA DATE 3/29/12

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before leaving Tehran and presented him with a written message from Kim Il-song.

During this meeting, at which the deputy foreign minister, the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the DPRK, and the DPRK ambassador in Tehran were also present, the DPRK Foreign Ministry political under secretary referred to his visit to Iran and tour of the battlefronts, saying: These victories and successes are of great importance. They have been achieved as a result of a struggle and campaign against imperialist conspiracies. Everyone knows that the Islamic Republic of Iran as a nonaligned country with a policy of neither East nor West is active on the world scene.

In reply, Khamene'i stressed the friendship and ties with the countries which have understood the magnitude of the struggle against world arrogance, saying: Today one must not underestimate the big world powers' expansionist move — a move that can easily be detected in their political, economic, military, and propaganda efforts. In all those spheres, we have prepared ourselves for a decisive encounter with America and we can give those countries which have had encounters with America this assurance: that we have been able to deal crushing blows to America in all spheres. This campaign will result in retreat by the devilish forces, but only if it is pursued continuously and indefatigably.

Concluding his remarks, Khamene'i said: We and you and all those countries which are the subject of America's policy of conspiracy must believe that as long as we have not forced the enemy into a complete retreat we will have no peace, and that we will have complete success in pursuing our programs and aims only after conquering the dominating aggressor. So the Government and nation of the Islamic Republic of Iran are determined to continue their struggle and campaign against the world dominating powers, against the great satan, America, until the final victory of the justice-seeking forces of the oppressed.

According to this report, toward the end of this meeting, the DPRK Foreign Ministry political under secretary conveyed to Khamene'i Kim Il-song's official invitation to visit the DPRK.

6 August Departure

LD071047 Tehran IRNA in English 1015 GMT 7 Aug 83

[Text] Tehran, Aug. 7 IRNA — Kim Hyong-u, the political deputy of the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), concluded his 5-day tour of Iran and left Tehran Sunday morning.

He was seen [off] at Mehrabad airport by his Iranian counterpart Hussein Sheykh ol-Eslam.

Prior to his departure Kim talking to IRNA said his visit to Iran was very fruitful. Referring to his meeting with President 'Ali Khamene'i, he said that Iranian president expressed desire for further expansion of Irano-DPRK ties in political, economic and cultural fields. He said he would convey friendly and fraternal message of Iranian nation to Korean nation.

Sheykh ol-Eslam also speaking to IRNA said that Kim's visit to Iran was very successful, adding that these visits played important role in strengthening two countries' relations. He said that Irano-DPRK ties enjoyed a significant aspect because of their struggles against imperialism and that both countries are members of the Non-aligned Movement.

NVOL Says Revolution Guards Corps Enlisting Afghans
TA102005 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian
1730 GMT 10 Aug 83

Baku

[Unattributed commentary: "Counterrevolutionary Afghans Instead of Revolutionary Guards"]

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots: For some time now, the wave of resignation and retirement from the Guards Corps has been expanding and intensifying among members of the Corps, so much so that a while ago leaders of the Islamic Government declared the resignation of guards from the Corps to be an antigovernment act and bordering on a plot. They called those who were resigning offenders and threatened to bring them to trial and to punish them.

Some time ago, officials of the Islamic Republic embarked on granting special identity cards to Afghans residing in Iran and announced that only those who have this kind of identity card will be recognized as an Islamic mojahed or as a political refugee.

Apparently there is no connection between these two developments, but subsequent events have shown that these two developments are links of a single chain. According to a decision by the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Afghans who hold such identity cards do not have the right to work in Iran but they can either become members of so-called Afghan mojahedin groups and go to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to engage in subversion and in killing their compatriots or be employed in the service of the Islamic Government and participate in crushing Iran's revolutionary forces.

The main reason for this is that revolutionary and patriotic youths in the Guards Corps gradually are realizing that the rightists ruling over the Islamic Republic of Iran are following the path of treachery contrary to the popular and anti-imperialist goals of the revolution and that by killing the true revolutionary forces — whether Tudeh, mojahed, Feda'i, or religious — they are striving to revive the sinister and overthrown system of Mohammad Reza in the disguise of religion.

The majority of the revolution guards are from the toiling strata and are pure, noble, and self-sacrificing human beings. It is particularly among this group that dissatisfaction with the treacherous and insidious policy of the Islamic Government's pseudoclergy and rightists is increasing daily. Many of them are no longer ready to blindly become an instrument in the hands of the elements of their class foes and of the godless pseudoclergy and engage in persecuting, torturing, and killing their brothers in the name of satanic Islam.

Soys shift
Mujahidin-i-Khalq
Fidayin

Note drastic
shift of attitude
toward Iranian regime
in the last few
months

-VHL 11 Aug 83

17

44
IRAN

The agents of imperialism and the rightists and pseudoclergy in the Islamic Government have resorted to threats in the face of protests by the realistic revolution guards and so far have executed scores of the best and most faithful guards. Now, since they are observing that discontent among the guards is increasing daily, they are thinking of setting up strike groups from among counterrevolutionary Afghans residing in Iran to crush progressive and revolutionary parties and organizations and to kill and murder true patriots and genuine revolutionaries. At present, the formation of these groups has begun in Khorasan, Sistan va Baluchestan, and other areas.

The formation of strike groups from among counterrevolutionary Afghans demonstrates to what extent the Islamic Government's rightists and the capitulated pseudojurisconsults have lost the support of Iran's toiling masses. Of course, those who have betrayed the revolution and the oppressed can, with the aid of Afghan counterrevolutionaries, kill and eliminate a number of genuine revolutionaries and patriots and even guards who believe in the revolution's popular and anti-imperialist goals, but by these criminal acts they arouse the million-strong toiling masses even further against them and bring closer their own certain death and destruction.

Free Voice of Iran Cites Opposition Communique on War
GF091956 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian
1500 GMT 9 Aug 83

[Text] The National Resistance Council issued a communique saying that although conditions are favorable for establishing a respectable peace between Iran and Iraq, the Iranian regime continues the war.

In the communique, it is said, that despite the severe opposition of the people of Iran, the regime continues its war-mongering policy. The National Resistance Council considers Ayatollah Khomeyni's request on Monday to the youths to go to the fronts an indication of the fact that Ayatollah Khomeyni has reached a complete impasse vis-a-vis the war and his helplessness in mobilizing for the war.

In this communique, the people of Iran, in general, and the youths, in particular, are requested to render the regime's program to mobilize the youths for the frontlines impotent by resisting the enforced dispatching to the fronts. The resistance council also urged the Armed Forces to foil the militaristic policy of Ayatollah Khomeyni.

excuse
for Sov.
intervention

Don Fortin,

Please work
with Phil to pull
together a quick
reply to this.

John

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.