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**Collection:** Fortier, Donald: Files  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** FORTIER, DONALD: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 7/3/2008

**File Folder** IRAN (6/01/1984-12/31/1984)

**FOIA**

M2008-113

**Box Number** 90758

Box 6

FELIPPONE

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
54648	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO SHULTZ ET AL RE EXPORT POLICY <i>D 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	1	8/17/1984	B1 B3
54649	NOTE	MCFARLANE TO FORTIER RE IRAN <i>R 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	1	8/29/1984	B1
54650	MEMO	MURPHY TO SECRETARY OF STATE RE IRAN <i>PAR 9/16/2011 M113/1</i>	4	7/27/1984	B1
54651	MEMO	FAIRBANKS TO FORTIER RE TALKING POINTS ON IRAN <i>PAR 9/16/2011 M113/1</i>	3	8/30/1984	B1
54652	NOTE	FORTIER TO POINDEXTER RE IRAN <i>PAR 3/29/2012 M113/1</i>	1	9/19/1984	B1
54653	OUTLINE	RE INTERAGENCY GROUP <i>D 3/29/2012 M113/1</i>	6	ND	B1
54654	LETTER	SHULTZ TO MCFARLANE <i>R 5/27/2011 M113/1</i>	1	11/5/1984	B1
54655	TALKING POINTS	FOR CONVERSATION ON IRAN	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
54656	TRANSMITTAL SHEET	MESSAGE RECEIPT  <i>PAR 3/29/2012 M113/1</i>	1	12/11/1984	B1
54658	MEMO	TO POINDEXTER RE IRAN  <i>D 3/29/2012 M113/1</i>	2	ND	B1 B3

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54648 MEMO

1 8/17/1984 B1

MCFARLANE TO SHULTZ ET AL RE EXPORT  
POLICY

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 29, 1984

FOR: DON FORTIER  
FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

Attached with RCM note:

"Don Fortier,

I think the time is right to go back to Shultz in writing to lay out our case for the Pak mission but to add an Iranian message to be passed either through Turkey or Paks."

*File  
Haw*

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRI \*MD8-113  
BY RW NARA DATE 5/27/11

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right to go  
to shut the wire  
out our case for  
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may pass to by this  
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84 MAR 15 1951 26  
WITH THE COMPLIMENTS

• • OF

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

SECRETARY OF STATE



54650  
United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520 8421438

84 JUL 15 P 5: 20E

'84 JUL 27 P 6:55

Bud McF

FYI,

see esp pp 3-4

g.

"Bud McFarlane

FYI

See especially  
pages 3-4"

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S RK 7/27

~~SECRET~~

TO: The Secretary

FROM: NEA - Richard W. Murphy

SUBJECT: Signals from Iran - Less Than Meets the Eye

Several recent developments have been taken as possible signs of moderation and/or as signals that Iran seeks closer ties with the west and with the U.S.: Iranian overtures to Saudi Arabia; FRG Foreign Minister Genscher's report of his visit to Tehran; a press conference held by Majlis speaker Rafsanjani following Genscher's visit; a proposal passed through Professor Richard Falk for a global settlement at the Iran/U.S. Claims Tribunal at The Hague; and a recent article in the London "Observer" reporting high level Iranian contacts with Admiral Madani (one of the Iranian exile leaders).

We are skeptical since we believe that some of these developments represent a variation in tactics employed by Iran, but do not represent a change in Iran's basic policy with regard to the war or the U.S.; others represent a continuation of a trend begun some time ago; and the rest are misinformation.

Iran's Opening to Saudi Arabia:

-- Iran's overtures to Jidda can be explained by factors other than a basic policy change. Iran is well aware that further escalation in the Gulf will harm Iran more than any other Gulf country. Most of Iran's oil exports are lifted from Kharg Island, and virtually all Iran's export earnings come from crude exports. Although Iran has some foreign currency reserves, these reserves are not sufficient to sustain Iran through a prolonged period of no, or seriously reduced, oil exports. Should escalation threaten ports further south in the Gulf, Iran's ability to import could also be threatened. It is, therefore, in Iran's interest to assure safe passage of shipping in the Gulf.

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NLRR MD 8-113 #54650  
BY RW NARA DATE 9/16/11



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-2-

-- Since Iraq survives on financial support coming mainly from Saudi Arabia (and from other Gulf states under probable pressure from Saudi Arabia), Iran has been seeking to drive a wedge between Saudi Arabia (and her Gulf neighbors) and Iraq by playing on their divergent interests in the Gulf (freedom of navigation vs. interdiction of Kharg bound shipping). Iranian reaction against Iraqi attacks on shipping has been targeted primarily at ships carrying Saudi or Kuwaiti crude, or those owned by Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. The shootdown of Iran's F-4's by Saudi Arabia's F-15's jolted Tehran. We believe the Iranians did not anticipate an aggressive defense on the part of the Saudis, and that the Iranians thought they would perform better militarily against the Saudis. Tehran seems to have concluded that its policy of threats and other provocative behavior will not work, and that diplomacy might be more effective.

-- Iran may have been concerned too that escalation of tension with Saudi Arabia might have led to Saudi restrictions on Iranian pilgrimage to Mecca when the annual Hajj begins next month. Iran sees participation in the Hajj as an opportunity to spread the message of its revolution among the Muslims of other lands also in attendance.

-- Iran's basic policy toward Iraq, however, remains unchanged. To quote Rafsanjani (22 July) on prospects for a mediated settlement, "If the object is peace with Saddam Hussein, then we must say there is no hope at all."

#### Closer Ties with the West:

This is not a new trend in Iranian policy. For the last two years or more Iran has sought to strengthen ties with western countries which were not viewed as "imperialists". In his welcoming statement to Genscher, Velayati stressed Germany's lack of a record of domination in Iran as an important factor in relations between the two countries. Iran looks in the same way on Italy, Japan, Spain, Austria, Australia, New Zealand and Brazil. Germany has been one of the top two or three sources of imports for Iran for at least the last ten years, and the Iranians value this. It is natural to expect that they would avoid remarks to Genscher that would mar his visit, such as criticism of the U.S. Although Rafsanjani was doubtlessly accurate in his statement that some within the regime favor closer ties with the west, we do not believe that

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-3-

statements made by Iranian officials during the course of Genscher's visit represent a shift in Iranian policy toward the west.

Where Rafsanjani himself stands is unclear. A major source of his political power is his ability to sense the direction of political winds in Iran, and to position himself with the most powerful.

[REDACTED]

Efforts to Seek a Global Settlement at The Hague:

The proponents of this settlement have yet to produce evidence that they speak for those in authority in Tehran. Rather, it appears that this is an idea proposed by those who think they can sell it to the Iranians, presumably at considerable benefit to themselves. The concept is not new and is being pushed by the same Iranian lawyer (a Dr. Nassiri) who proposed the idea two years ago, and failed to demonstrate at that time any influence inside Iran. In principle we of course have no basic problem with a global settlement, but this settlement proposal would rewrite the Algiers Accords to Iran's benefit. The carrot offered, eventual normalization, is therefore elusive.

Report from the "Observer":

Other central statements in the citation are clearly incorrect (i.e., the transfer of F-5's to Iran via Turkey), and we have no reason to believe that the mention of Madani's purported meeting with high level Iranian officials has any foundation. It is well-known in Iran that Madani received support for his presidential bid, and he has been sentenced to death in absentia. It is therefore highly unlikely that any currently sitting Majlis member would meet with him.

Countersignals to Iran?

At some point we will want to pass a private message to Iran that we are not implacably opposed to the GOI. Given the present government's attitude on the Gulf war, and its public hostility towards the U.S., any such signal now or in the near future, in the absence of some major change, would be the wrong signal at the wrong time. The Khomeini inner circle would see

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13524  
E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 (b) (4)

~~SECRET~~

-4-

such a message now as U.S. caving in to Islamic firmness. It would reinforce the Islamic leadership's feeling that the U.S. is a paper tiger, strongly reinforce Iranian intransigence on the war, and give the regime courage to persevere in policies to which we are strongly opposed.

The appropriate moment for such a message to go to the Iranians will be when some event -- leadership succession, a change of policy on the war, perhaps a direct blunt Soviet threat -- has heightened the radical leadership's receptivity to changing circumstances. We will continue to review the context of the Gulf war and Iranian politics for a suitable moment to pass a conciliatory message which will achieve the desired result and forward our recommendations to you at that time.

### Conclusions

It is unlikely that any of the initiatives reviewed above represents a significant change in Iranian policy. Nonetheless, any development that reduces Iran's isolation and advances prospects for negotiation merits support. We will also continue to support purely commercial relations between Iran and the West (and Japan), so long as these dealings exclude militarily useful items, and to support dialogue with the Iranians (by the Saudis and others). In the case of the Falk initiative, we will continue to reply with questions designed to draw out the Iranians on what they really mean, how firmly the leadership is behind the initiative, and what sort of specific steps they foresee; and at the same time, firmly, but without hostility, set forth what behavioral signs we would expect as evidence of their sincerity and governmental support. Thus far, such probes have produced either lack of official backing for alleged Iranian signals, or an Iranian version of a potential deal with a clear one-way street dimension. As we proceed to assess Iran's evolving policies, we will of course keep in mind that modifications in the regime's posture does not necessarily equate to a softening of their stance vis-a-vis the United States.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 30, 1984

*file  
Iran*

*2451*

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

TO: NSC - Don Fortier

FROM: State/HA - Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr. *CHF*

SUBJECT: Talking Points on Iran

The Present Situation

The future of Iran is vitally important to us, but we have almost no ability to influence the evolution of events there. The stalemate in the war and Khomeini's declining health are likely to lead to changes of policy on the part of the Iranian Government, and may lead to internal instabilities. Iran, facing a situation of almost complete isolation, has sought to open up channels of communication to both the United States and the Soviet Union. Iran clearly signalled, during the visit of their Prime Minister to Japan, a desire to use Japan as a channel of communication with us. In the absence of an opening to the United States, Iran has pursued contacts with the Soviet Union vigorously. While relatively high level visits have not led to an overall warming of relations, they have had effects such as cooperation between the Soviet and Iranian intelligence services in Azerbaidzhan.

Our policy has centered on the Iran-Iraq War. Our actions on arms transfers by friendly countries to Iraq and Iran are probably perceived by Iran as a "tilt toward Iraq." In 1981 the Iran SIG decided not to oppose transfers of non-U.S. origin weapons by friends to Iran. We have since reversed this policy, and given increasing emphasis to stopping arms sales by a wide range of friendly countries to Iran. On the other hand, we have not opposed friendly countries' sales to Iraq, except of chemical warfare materials. We ourselves have recently licensed heavy trucks, a dual-use item to Iraq.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE  
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NLRR M08-113#54651  
BY *RW* NARA DATE 9/16/11

*FBI  
ADA  
DFOK-3  
4/7/81*

Possible Items for Work Program

- We should consider whether there is now a need for a signal to the Iranian Government that the United States would not be hostile to Iran under all circumstances. To avoid the problems that occurred before the hostage crisis, the approach should probably not consist of direct conversations. We should make it clear that we have not forgotten the hostage crisis, will never deal with officials directly involved in it, and that we are seriously concerned about terrorism.
- The most promising approaches are thru Turkey and Japan. The former approach has the advantage of increasing Turkey's role in the region, which we want to see.
- A concrete American signal, going beyond a message, can only consist of a change in something we are doing or not doing towards Iran. Our attempt to block arms sales is the major action we have taken towards Iran recently.
- This policy now needs to be reviewed in the light of the decreased likelihood of an Iranian victory in the Iran-Iraq War-- the concern that originally provoked the policy. The kinds of arms transfers we have sought to prevent are in most cases (not in the case of mines) small items that would not have greatly or quickly increased Iranian military capability against Iraq, but the policy does cut off potential channels of communication to groups within the Iranian Armed Forces, and increases the relative power of the Pasdaran as compared with the Army (where our contacts used to exist) by putting a premium on religious enthusiasm rather than technology and expertise.
- If we do decide to modify our arms transfer policy, we should consider whether our friends could be encouraged to use these arms transfers to develop communication channels, as well as for commercial purposes.
- We need at this point to inventory our knowledge about the internal situation within Iran, what the Soviet Union is doing, and our own contingency plans.
- We need to review our military plans, especially to see whether they cover the full spectrum of contingency and commitment of U.S. troops.

-- [REDACTED]

13524  
E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

- Do we have a strategy for dealing with a future civil war situation within Iran? If not, a special working group should be convened to devise such a strategy.
- Do we have an information strategy toward Iran? That is, are we transmitting the right kind of public messages through official statements and VOA?



MEMORANDUM

NON SYSTEM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

54652

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

13526  
E. O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3(b)(4)

*File*  
*True*

September 19, 1984

NOTE FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

Attached is the document I described to you yesterday. Many of the specific work tasks remain valid and, at the very least, provide a feel for the specificity that a more serious approach would require.



I can stop by a few minutes before the 3:00 meeting if you like.

*Don Fortier*

Don Fortier

Attachment

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE  
Declassify OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR M113 #54652  
BY KPL NARA DATE 3/29/12

FBI  
RAB  
4/1/87  
DF Box 64-2

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54653	OUTLINE  RE INTERAGENCY GROUP	6	ND	B1

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFICATION ENCLOSURE(S)  
FROM SHULTZ, G *inf 1/3/08*

RECEIVED 05 NOV 84 18

TO • MCFARLANE

DOC DATE 05 NOV 84

KEYWORDS: IRAN

RAFSANJANI, HASHEMI

SUBJECT: SEARCH FOR A BASIS FOR DIALOGUE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF# 8429687

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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ack  
4/7/87  
DF Box 64-1*

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II  
91138

November 5, 1984

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Dear Bud:

I have considered what response we might give Les Gelb to Hashemi Rafsanjani's apparent interest in finding a basis for dialogue. This is one of several similar propositions that have come to us from Iran with increasing frequency, all holding out promise of an improved future relationship against immediate help with military supplies.

We see no benefit in providing arms to Iran, particularly F-14 spare parts that would bring sidelined aircraft back into action while the war with Iraq continues. At the same time, I believe we should use the opportunity provided by the first part of Rafsanjani's message to reiterate to top Iranian Islamic leadership that we would be open to contacts and discussions without prior conditions or a quid pro quo, and to a more normal relationship after an end of the war with Iraq, and after Iran's abandonment of terrorism and a return to a more acceptable international role. Attached are the points we have used to respond to similar messages in the past.

I also believe it would be useful, at the right time, to inform appropriate individuals in the Government of Iran that we are not implacably opposed to Iran's interests and, in the correct circumstances, would be open to a renewed dialogue. A reasonable time to send that message could be when we resume diplomatic relations with Iraq, and a good intermediary would be Algeria. We will be back to you with further thoughts in the next several weeks.

Sincerely yours,



George P. Shultz

Enclosure: As stated.

The Honorable  
Robert C. MacFarlane,  
National Security Advisor,  
The White House.

SECRET/SENSITIVE  
DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M08-113#54654  
BY RU NARA DATE 5/27/11

5

Suggested Talking Points for  
Conversation on Iran

--The United states cannot make exceptions to the ban on export to Iran of military equipment or spare parts as long as the war between Iran and Iraq continues. Moreover, the United States continues to object most strongly to the Iranian government's involvement in acts of international terrorism and violence.

--The United States wants the Iranian leadership to understand that the United States is not irrevocably opposed to the Iranian revolution but only to the prolongation of the war and the aspects of its policy and behavior which are hostile to us.

--The United States also does not bear enmity to the Iranian people or nation.

--We want responsible elements of the Iranian leadership to know that we are prepared to engage in a dialogue without preconditions or quid pro quo when it is desired by the Iranian side.

--In the longer run, and after the war and support for terrorism are no longer obstacles, the United States is ready to work with Iran in good faith to improve progressively our relations.

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NLRR MD8-113#54655  
BY RW NARA DATE 5/27/

54656

TABLE 1-255015710

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FROM: (Type, Office, Extension)

Clair E. George, CIA, DDO

MESSAGE

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Ground Floor  
West Wing  
White House

RADM John Poindexter

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KOMMIT

RECEIPT ASAP Thanks

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NLRR M113 #54656

BY KML NARA DATE 3/29/12

13526

E. O. 12958

As Amended

Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

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National Security Council  
The White House

*File*  
*Tram*

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

84 DEC 12 P 7: 36

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	1	<i>K</i>	_____
John Poindexter	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	I
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	3	<i>K</i>	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<i>FOR ITIR</i>	4	_____	_____

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

Do you want to share this with others?

*Don,*

*This is one of the most unimaginative pieces I have seen. Let's talk about it. There has to be a better way. J*