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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: FORTIER, DONALD: FILES

Archivist: gcc/bcb

File Folder: Iran (1 of 2)

RAL Box 6  
Box 90751

FOIA ID: F97-105

Date: 08/17/99

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Donald Fortier to John Poindexter re: Iran, 4p. <i>PART 3/31/06 F97-105/1#112</i>	4/18/85	P1
2. memo	re: US Policy Toward Iran, 2p. <i>PART " " #113</i>	n.d.	P1
3. memo	re: Iran, 9p. <i>PART " " #114</i>	4/7/87	P1
4. memo	re: Iran, 1p. <i>PART " " #115</i>	4/26/85	<del>P1</del> B2
5. memo	re: Iran-USSR, 1p. <i>PART " " #116</i>	4/11/85	P1, B2, B3
6. memo	re: Iran, 8p. <i>PART " " #117</i>	4/7/87	P1
7. paper	re: Iran, 11p. <i>PART " " #118</i>	4/9/85	<del>P1</del> B6
8. memo	re: Iran, 2p. <i>D 10/17/00 NLSF97-105 #119, D 8/19/02 P01-023 #119</i>	4/7/87	<del>P1</del> , F1, F3
9. note	Vince to Don, 1p. <i>PART 3/31/06 F97-105/1#120</i>	n.d.	P1
10. memo	re: Iran, 4p.	n.d.	P1
11. memo	re: Iran, 15p. <i>D 3/31/06 F97-105/1#122</i>	n.d.	P1, B3
12. note	Paul Metger to Steven Rosen re: attached memo, 1p. <i>D 10/2/00 NLSF97-105 #123 D 11/01/01 P2001-023 #123</i>	3/28/85	P1, B3
13. memo	re: Iran: Prospects for Near-Term Instability, 7p. <i>D 10/2/00 NLSF97-105 #124 D " " #124</i>	3/28/85	P1, B3
14. transmittal	Washfax Message, 1p. <i>P 10/2/2000 NLSF97-105 #125</i>	4/3/85	P1
15. memo	re: Iran, 4p. <i>D 10/2/2000 NLSF97-105 #126 D 11/01/01 P2001-023 #126</i>	n.d.	<del>P1</del> , B3

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].  
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].  
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].  
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].  
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].  
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].  
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].  
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].  
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].  
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].  
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** FORTIER, DONALD: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 4/24/2007

**File Folder** IRAN (1)

**FOIA**

F97-105/1

**Box Number** 90751

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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<del>1</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>FORTIER TO JOHN POINDEXTER RE</del>	<del>4</del>	<del>4/18/1985</del>
		<del>IRAN</del>		
<del>2</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>US POLICY TOWARD IRAN</del>	<del>2</del>	<del>ND</del>

RETAINED for  
SPECIAL COUNSEL  
IRAN / CONTRA  
INVESTIGATION

folder Title:

IRAN

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FORTIER

Page 1, Box 1/56

PULLED FOR TOWER GROUP

By J.R. SCHARFEN

2/14/87

Returned to file  
from 2/24/87

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ACTION

April 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: DONALD R. FORTIER

SUBJECT: Iran

Introduction

I've read Howard's paper at Tab A, which provides a good summary of U.S. interests in Iran, the political environment there, and the strengths and weaknesses of the current regime. This latest paper reflects the thinking of Howard's earlier NSSD.

I think it will also help us clarify our thinking if we focus on three basic policy choices:

- Do we want to influence Iranian internal politics?
- Do we want to prevent the Soviets from influencing Iranian internal politics?
- Do we want to do more to influence Iranian external politics?

I. Influencing Iranian Internal Politics

If we could influence Iranian domestic politics, we might set some ambitious goals for ourselves: a government more friendly to the U.S. However, as far as we can see, we have little knowledge of Iran's internal politics today and less ability to influence it.

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II. Blocking Soviet interference in Iranian Internal Politics

Even if we can do nothing positive to bring about a regime more to our liking, we could try and prevent the worse case outcome by preventing or defeating Soviet attempts to influence Iranian politics in favor of the Soviets. The Soviets appear to have two ways of doing this. They could:

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NLS F97-105/1 #112  
By LOJ, NARA, Date 3/31/06



What can the U.S. do to induce Iran to abandon terrorism, negotiate an end to the war, remain neutral, and sell oil? We could position ourselves better to play a role in ending the war once Khomeini is out of the picture. U.S. statements condemning Iraqi chemical warfare have been noticed in Iran, and further statements along these lines would be consistent with basic U.S. policy and could increase our credibility in Iran as a mediator. We could search for alternative mediators, perhaps non-Arab Islamic states. Limited packages of assistance for Iran need to be thought through.

FOIA(b) (1)

Those are possible carrots.

[illegible]

#### IV. Conclusion

[illegible]

[illegible]

## V. Recommendation

That you discuss in the PCG the issues we have outlined above, and circulate the draft NSDD attached at Tab B.

Approve

Disapprove

## Attachments

Tab A      Paper on Iran

Tab B      Draft NSDD

Our minimum policy objective in Iran is to block any Soviet action to increase its influence in Iran after the death of Khomeini. The Soviets are likely to utilize clandestine contacts and programs in Iran to try and increase their influence, and it is necessary to develop ways of countering this. [REDACTED]

The first step toward reaching both our minimum and maximum objectives is to improve our knowledge of and contacts with a broad range of political actors in Iran. In order to do this the following program objectives are established.

[illegible]

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NLS F97-105/1#113  
By LBJ, NARA, Date 3/31/06

next 60 days. This short-term effort will rely primarily on existing assets and whatever expedient measures are available.

Second, planning should begin now on the assumption that Khomeini does not die within the next 60 days in order to develop programs that use the extra available time to satisfy the requirements listed above more fully. This planning should be complete and ready for presentation to the PCG within 30 days.

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U.S. Policy Toward Iran

The war between Iraq and Iran, growing Iranian internal dissent, and the growing likelihood of Ayatollah Khomeini's death in the near future, combine to create potential opportunities for the United States to try to restore a position of influence in Iran. The independent emergence of an Iran more compatible with American interests is likely to take place only gradually, if at all. Soviet efforts to reinforce Iran's anti-Americanism and further penetrate Iranian society, (possibly reflecting their own analysis that "the ripe fruit is ready to be plucked") seem to be increasing, thus reducing the likelihood of independent Iranian socio-political development. In this environment, it is essential for the U.S. Government to undertake a broad review of (1) its interests in Iran, and (2) the evolving situation in and around Iran. This analysis should serve as the basis for the development of a strategy to promote and protect American interests.

Western Interests

Within the U.S. policy community, interagency consensus has been reached on U.S. and Western interests in Iran.

Broad U.S. interests are:

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By hdt, NARA, Date 3/31/06

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- (1) Prevention of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over Iran while containing Soviet influence in an oil-rich, strategically located major country;
- (2) Iran's resumption of a moderate and constructive role as a member respectively of the non-communist political community, of its region, and of the world petroleum economy;
- (3) maintenance of Iran's internal cohesion and territorial integrity.

Specific major U.S. and Western interests include:

- (4) Iran's emergence, as steadily and as soon as possible, from the extremism of its fundamentalist revolution and from its attachment to state-sponsored terrorism as a tool of policy;
- (5) open access to Iranian and Persian Gulf oil, including unimpeded transit of the Strait of Hormuz;
- (6) continued Iranian resistance to the expansion of Soviet power in general, and to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in particular;
- (7) an early end to the Iran-Iraq war which does not fundamentally alter the balance of power in the region;

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- (8) an end to the Iranian government's sponsorship of terrorism, and its attempts to destabilize governments of other regional states;
- (9) elimination of Iran's flagrant abuses of human rights;
- (10) a balanced and less hostile post-war relationship between Iran and the Arab states of the Gulf, as well as between Iran and Iraq;
- (11) movement toward eventual normalization of U.S.-Iranian diplomatic consular and cultural relations, and bilateral trade/commercial activities;
- (12) resolution of American legal and financial claims through the Hague Tribunal; and
- (13) Iranian moderation on OPEC pricing policy.

#### Present Iranian Political Environment

Ayatollah Khomeini's regime remains in power with no effective opposition. The regime, however, exhibits several weaknesses, including ideological splits within the clerical establishment, deep-seated economic problems, a too-rapidly growing urban population and an increasingly costly war.

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Because the clerical regime's strengths nonetheless outweigh its weaknesses, a relatively smooth transition after Khomeini's death is likely. The clerics will retain their hold on power and install a successor from their ranks. Yet there is a good chance that such a regime will be essentially transitional and collective in nature, giving way eventually, perhaps after a period of chaos and factional struggle, to a single strong leader -- a figure most likely to come from the Revolutionary Guard or, less likely, from the regular military.

#### The Regime's Strengths

- Legitimacy. Although much of the Revolution's legitimacy resides within the person of Ayatollah Khomeini, some of it has been transferred to the clerical regime. While much of this aura will dissipate in the months following the Ayatollah's death, the regime will be able to capitalize on its power in the immediate post-Khomeini period.
- A monopoly of control on various instruments of power. These instruments include the media, oil revenues, the Revolutionary Guard (discussed below), and of course the religious establishment which reaches down to the grass-roots level. Cash resources can be channeled to key political groups and leaders, while control of the media permits the regime to restrict and shape much (but not all) of the information reaching the masses.

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- The Revolutionary Guard. The numerical strength of the Guard is roughly equal to that of the army. The Guard has assumed a pivotal political/military position and will have a decisive role in the immediate post-Khomeini period. Key political leaders in the regime probably can count on the Guard to maintain order and control on its behalf in the days following Khomeini's death.
  
- Opposition disarray. Neither the Shah's son nor any other Iranian exile leader or group now possesses the necessary domestic assets to make a successful bid for control immediately after Khomeini's death. The regular military continues to be purged of officers suspected of anti-regime sentiments and most regular army units are at the war front. Iranian minorities desire only autonomy from Tehran and do not aspire to political control. Leftist parties, such as the Tudeh and Mujahidin, have been suppressed, but not eliminated, and could resume activity quickly after Khomeini's death.
  
- Flexibility. Several leaders within the inner ruling clique -- most notably Majlis speaker Rafsanjani -- have the ability to flow with the political current, yet maintain the appearance of ideological and revolutionary purity.

Weaknesses of the Regime

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Generally speaking, the regime's weaknesses are structural and do not automatically constitute acute and immediate threats.

However, they have the potential for becoming so, particularly after Khomeini dies, as Iran moves further from the Ayatollah's residual influence. Among the principal weaknesses, we discern:

- Divisions within the clerical establishment. There is no sign that any meaningful compromises have been reached on the deep philosophical/theological cleavages within the clerical leadership, particularly over the role of the clergy in politics and the role of the government in the economy. Moreover, clerical maneuvering over the future of the war is expanding the divisions among the clerical leadership. Further military failures could prompt open dissent against Khomeini by several leading Ayatollahs.
- The economy. The Iranian economy continues to falter, beset by unemployment, high inflation, inefficiency and waste. Long-term development of both industry and agriculture is languishing, hostage to factional disagreements and the high cost of the war. Meanwhile, oil revenues are down, a consequence of the tanker war in the Gulf, the slack world oil market, and Iran's need to discount prices to sustain weakened demand.
- Population migration. The population of Tehran is now reportedly eight to ten million people, nearly 150 percent

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of its size when urban mobs were in part responsible for the Shah's downfall. The Islamic Republic could be riding the same population tiger if it fails to satisfy the urban poor, who represent the largest base of support for the regime.

- The war with Iraq. Although the war has long had a dual effect, recently it has become a net political liability internally since the onus is on Iran to agree to negotiate. War weariness is reflected in declining civilian morale. War expenditures may consume as much as 40 percent of the government budget, intensifying an already difficult economic situation.
  
- A single-leader political culture. Historically, the key prerequisite for the achievement of political stability in Iran is the emergence of a single, recognized political leader. The Revolution has not reversed this apparent political imperative. There is as yet, however, no such identifiable individual-capable of assuming Khomeini's mantle.

#### U.S. Policy

In this highly charged and fluid environment, the U.S. policy should be designed:

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- to restore a normal working relationship between Washington and Tehran;
- to counter growing Soviet influence and complicate Moscow's policy calculus in Iran;
- to devise means to establish links with key clerical, Army and Bazaar leaders;
- to support the evolution of elements opposed to Khomeini and his clique; and
- to the maximum extent possible, restore U.S. influence on the ground in Iran.

Analytical Support

In order to safeguard the interests of the U.S. in Southwest Asia should the death of the Ayatollah Khomeini create the possibility of shifts in the internal politics or foreign policies of Iran, the following [REDACTED] should be satisfied:

-- [REDACTED]

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- Information on Soviet activities to encourage, support or

FOIA(b) (1)

These requirements should be addressed in two phases. First, an effort to satisfy them promptly must be made in order to prepare ourselves as best we can in the event that Khomeini dies in the next 60 days. [REDACTED]

Second, planning should begin now on the assumption that Khomeini does not die within the next 60 days in order to develop programs that use the extra available time to satisfy the requirements listed above more fully. This planning should be complete and ready for presentation to the PCG within 30 days.

IRAN: Need for Unity. (U)

(U) Political leaders remain committed to the war effort but are apparently concerned antiwar sentiments and factionalization within the armed forces are reducing prospects for success on the battlefield.

(U) On 24 April, Ayatollah Khomeini spoke on war-related issues during the Revolutionary Guards Day celebration in Tehran. He stressed unity and selfless devotion to duty, but he noted that if the regular ground forces, Revolutionary Guards, and mobilization units went their separate ways, they would be destroyed. Each of these units was urged to maintain brotherhood and friendship.

(U) At the same time, President Khamenei was speaking to members of the armed forces in the capital. He said Iran would not be forced into a hasty military offensive before fully organizing and supplying its units. He also noted the armed forces should not lose an opportunity to attack, but they must also use the time to organize themselves. Meanwhile, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani addressed a group of Revolutionary Guards, declaring the people were well prepared to tolerate the future of the war.

COMMENT: (U) These speeches indicate a coordination problem among the fighting forces. Khomeini's and Khamenei's heavy emphasis on unity and organization comes at a time when assets needed to launch an offensive are present along the southern border, but no attack has been staged. The delay in the anticipated offensive could be due in large part to the animosity between the army and Revolutionary Guard forces that has prevented the necessary joint cooperation to mount a successful offensive. Relations between these two groups are probably still suffering as a result of the army's willingness to let the Revolutionary Guards absorb the brunt of the casualties incurred during the last disastrous offensive.

(U) Adding to this problem are antiwar sentiments among the general public that could easily influence the already factionalized and undisciplined Revolutionary Guard forces and mobilization units. Rafsanjani's remarks were intended to lend an air of general public support for additional sacrifices by these units. Although major Iranian political leaders appear intent on pursuing the ground war to achieve their political goals, motivating increasingly factionalized units into a cohesive fighting force may hamper realization of those goals. (DECL OADR)

DIADIN 115-14A as of 2148 EST 25 Apr 85

26 Apr 85

Defense Intelligence Summary

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TCS 652065/85

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By LDI, NARA, Date 3/31/06

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FOIA(b) (2)

IRAN-USSR: Possible Arms Deal. (U)

FOIA(b) (1)  
FOIA(b) (3)



DIADIN 100-4B as of 1942 EST 10 Apr 85



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NLS F97-105/1#116

By L.J., NARA, Date 3/31/06

11 Apr 85

Defense Intelligence Summary

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TCS 652041/85

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Steve  
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HT

U.S. Policy Toward Iran

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NLS F97-105/1 #117  
By HT, NARA, Date 3/31/06

FCRM 1-5, RB 4-7-87

- (1) Prevention of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union over Iran while containing Soviet influence in an oil-rich, strategically located major country;
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of its size when urban mobs were in part responsible for the Shah's downfall. The Islamic Republic could be riding the same population tiger if it fails to satisfy the urban poor, who represent the largest base of support for the regime.

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- to the maximum extent possible, restore U.S. influence on the ground in Iran.

Analytical Support.

1. Political activity in "tribal" areas

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

- How "tribes" affect struggle for power among groups in Tehran

2. If Peshdaran leaders are likely to play a large role in struggle for power

- who are key players at first & second level,
- who are their allies among clergy, clerics

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~~SENSITIVE: NO DISTRIBUTION~~

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS: IRAN

April 9, 1985

Author: [REDACTED]  
Contact: [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (6)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLS F97-105/1#118  
By LOI, NARA, Date 3/31/06

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STRATEGIC REPORT: IRAN

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1. Current Situation:

Almost six years and three months of Ayatollah Khomeini's rule have led Iran to a pivotal, unstable position. Domestic control is based on widespread repression, political execution, systematic torture, and ill-treatment of prisoners and populace. There is no voice, no vote, and no choice for the terrorised Iranian people. For four years and six months, war with Iraq has continued. Almost 270,000 Iranians have been killed and 650,000 wounded or missing in action in the war. The treasury and blood of the country has been exhausted in this war; the economy has been destroyed, food shortages have created widespread problems. There are 5,000,000 unemployed. Six Iranian states have been devastated by the war. The population of Iran has reached 42,000,000, half under 16 years of age, and two-thirds under 30 years of age. There are 2,500,000 small arms in the hands of the people, apart from those held by the Armed Forces. The people are keeping distant from the mosques and Khomeini. The Armed Forces, police, Gendarmerie, and even some of the Revolutionary Guards and the majority of the moderate clergy, are unhappy with the present regime.

2. Non-Ruling Power Blocs Inside Iran

(a) Moderate forces, such as former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, have been paralyzed.

(b) The Mujahedin-e-Khalq forces inside of Iran have been destroyed, and some of its members are working with Kurdish leader Abdur al-Rahman Ghassemlou, a pro-Soviet communist.

(c) The Marxist Fedayeen-e-Khalq are underground and are presumed still under Soviet control.

(d) The Tudeh Party has been outlawed but it retains underground cells, all still under direct Soviet control.

(e) The Iranian Armed Forces remain outside the political power structure, but remain potentially the major element in deciding the future outcome of any power struggle.

3. Opposition Groups Outside Iran

Most external opposition groups and leaders are based in Europe, the US and elsewhere. They include:

(i) Dr Ali Amini, former Prime Minister under the late Shah; currently in Paris. He is coordinator of much opposition activity and is an experienced politician. He has not yet succeeded in having a viable organization to send his message to the Iranian

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population inside the country.

(ii) Dr Shahpour Bakhtiar, very briefly the last Prime Minister under the late Shah. He lacks real organization, although he has sufficient money. He is politically naive, without perception of geopolitics. His identification with Iraq has created great problems for him, and has jeopardized any role he could play in the future.

(iii) Mohssen Pezeshkpour, leader of Pan-Iranist Party. Anti-communist; has followers inside of Iran, especially in the Khuzestan area. Lacks international perception and contacts.

(iv) Admiral Ahmad Madani and Mr Nazih and other National Front leaders: while they were in Iran they had an organization. Now that they are outside, they have been unable to establish any organization or command and control structure.

(v) Shah Reza Pahlavi, pretender to the throne, has gained some experience in the past six years, but still lacks political, strategic and economic knowledge. He has been surrounded by former SAVAK and Bahai officials. He has come to the scene prematurely.

(vi) The Azadegan movement, organized by former Imperial Iranian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Gen. Bahram Aryana and former Iranian Minister to Washington Dr Assad Homayoun. This is the organization which executed the seizure of the Iranian patrol boat "Tabarzin" in 1981. General Aryana has handed over the leadership of Azadegan to Dr Homayoun. The organization is headquartered in Paris, but maintains an underground force with links into Iran.

(vii) Former Armed Forces Officers, diplomats and technocrats in the US and Europe are, by and large, ready to follow any opposition leader who can take a strong initiative and who may have the support of the United States.

All these groups have, for the past six years, been preoccupied with infighting rather than in combating the Khomeini regime. They proved unable to work together or to face the realities of the situation. No unified message could be sent to the Iranian public demonstrating an alternative to Khomeini. Group work has been alien to the nature, reflecting traditional Persian culture. Some, like Dr Amini, are to some extent realists, but lack leadership capabilities and viable organizational backup, including contact inside Iran.

For the past six years, the United States has waited for these groups to become united. The groups, on the other hand, have been waiting for US support. Throughout Iranian history, such groups have been unable to work without a catalyst and singular leadership. Unless such a catalyst or leadership is ready from within these groups they will face a vacuum after the demise of Khomeini. Such a power vacuum may arise before the death of Kho-

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meini, due to the pressures of the wrecked economy and the impact of the war with Iraq.

#### 4. Probable Contingencies

(a) Immediate Contingencies: In the event of the short-term death of Khomeini, a series of events may take place. There are six factors which could influence the future course of development in Iran, and which will have an impact in the future. Those include political power groups inside of Iran, political groups outside of Iran (opposition), the United States, the USSR and Iraq, friendly regional and unfriendly regional powers. These are shown on the enclosed table [Appendix A]. But of critical importance is the action of the US after the death of Khomeini.

It is likely that, after the demise of Khomeini, there would be chaos and a struggle for power, and disintegration of state structures. It is important for the US to support democratic moves to prevent communist forces gaining control at this stage, or to prevent the cooperation of the clergy with the communists.

Since outside opposition groups are not likely to get united, it is important for the United States to pick a single Iranian leader and to support him. The US should signal to other opposition groups to this effect. If the US gives such support to a competent leader, all groups will follow. Unity will come after the leadership is chosen, not before. Such a leader and his group should be competent to make contact with police, Gendarmerie, Armed Forces, tribal groups, moderate clergy (including Ayatollahs Shariatmadari and Golpiyegani, Ghomi and Ruhanni and others), etc., inside Iran, and to build networks of support there.

A message to the Armed Forces assuring that any new leadership would continue to respect the territorial integrity of Iran, and that any peace would be honorable would help to eliminate the prospect of a radical clergy assumption of power. Failure to have a US-backed moderate leadership, able to work with the Army, could allow the vacuum in Iran to be filled by a radical nationalist leadership such as that in Libya, or for it to become (either de facto or openly) a pro-Soviet satellite.

After the demise of Khomeini the loyalty of the Armed Forces becomes a critical factor in the success of any movement. In the past few weeks, President Khamenei indicated that the position of commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces would go to him. But Speaker Rafsanjani has mentioned several times that it will be transferred to Khomeini's successor or to a council of successors.

(b) Non-Immediate Contingencies (Between six and 18 months). It can be assumed that Ayatollah Khomeini will not be able to retain control of Iran for the long term (ie: beyond a year to 18 months). This gives the US a brief breathing space to prepare its position and to directly force the unity of leadership and action

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of the opposition movements so that they can have a viable structure ready for the death or demise of Khomeini.

If work begins immediately, the one group with military and political assets inside Iran (Azadegan) can undertake the following preparatory steps:

Contact with former intelligence officials inside Iran to assist in information gathering and cell building;

Contact with current Iranian intelligence officials to assist in information gathering and counter-intelligence;

Contact with current and former Armed Forces officers, moderate clergy and security officials and tribal leaders on both sides of the Iranian borders;

Contact with Bazaar leaders and internal groups, including where possible some Pasdaran units.

The objectives could include the gathering of intelligence, which would help identify where (for example) Soviet and pro-Soviet groups have penetrated Iran. It would also include the creation of action groups to undertake psycho-political, or propaganda, operations, and to create catalytic units in all vital areas of the country to be used when necessary.

Azadegan has the manpower and potential to undertake these tasks while at the same time being able to provide political leadership to all major opposition groups. The cooperation of such leaders as Dr Amini, Mr Pezeshkpour, Admiral Madani, General Aryana and others can be guaranteed by Azadegan provided it is given the support of the United States. Azadegan already maintains links with most opposition leaders, especially Dr Amini and Mr Pezeshkpour.

The failure of the United States to take up the options available to it will lead to the certainty that the Soviet Union will use its extensive influence inside Iran to shape events to its own purpose.

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APPENDIX (i)  
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Internal Iranian Events  
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1. Struggle for succession and the emergence of a leader.
2. The military responds favorably/unfavorably.
3. ~~The non-communist opposition rises.~~
4. The communist opposition rises.
5. Coalition emerges of the clergy and military/Revolution Guard.
6. Prosecution of the war against Iraq maintained by the successor government (most likely under radical/fundamentalist regime).
7. Successor democratic government requests US political, military and economic assistance, and recognition.

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External Democratic Opposition Group Events  
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1. Struggle for dominance within the various opposition groups and the emergence of dominant group(s), or individual leader with strategy and organization.
2. Overt move to challenge post-Khomeini power by establishing links with democratic/moderate factions within Iran.
3. Proclamation of new Government with support of military and democratic/moderate factions.
4. Request for US/Western governments for military/economic assistance to rebuild the country.
5. Begin peace negotiations with Iraq.

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Events in the United States

1. Alert US military forces in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean (CENTCOM).
2. Covert support of democratic forces inside Iran.
3. Covert/overt support of democratic opposition forces, or single leader outside of Iran.
4. De facto recognition of post-Khomeini democratic leadership.
5. US offer to mediate peaceful settlement of Iran-Iraq war (under friendly government).
6. US offer to assist in Iranian post-war reconstruction.

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USSR/Iraqi Events

1. Iraq/USSR recognize new Iranian Government, especially if it is communist or pro-communist/pro-Soviet.
2. USSR covert/overt support of communist and front elements inside Iran.
3. USSR support of clergy/left coalition.
4. USSR/Iraq launch combined political, military and insurgent attacks on the new government if it is neutral or pro-West.
5. USSR/Iraq promote underground resistance and guerilla operations on a sustained scale against any moderate elements in a new Iranian government, or in the Armed Forces, or against the entire government if pro-West.
6. USSR support for revolt and separation movements in Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Baluchistan in the case of civil war.
7. Military intervention in the northern half of Iran in case of the disintegration, or an Armed Forces move against communist/clergy coalition, especially if US engaged elsewhere (Korea, Central America, etc.) 1921 Treaty between Iran and USSR gives the USSR an excuse to interfere; the Khomeini abrogation of the Treaty is not recognized by the USSR).
8. USSR likely to promote diversion activities elsewhere in the world (Korea, Central America) to maintain US concentration away from Iran during buildup of Soviet forces inside Iran. [Such diversions were successfully used by the USSR prior to the Afghan invasion.]

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Events Among Friendly Regional Powers

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1. Recognition of moderate, pro-Western government, should one emerge in Iran.
2. Shipment of arms and other technology to reconstruct Iran's military and economic base.
3. Offer to mediate peace with Iraq (especially by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Jordan).
4. Formulation of Persian Gulf "security system" considering military and economic issues.

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Events in Unfriendly Regional Powers

1. Instigate and support opposition to the formation of democratic, pro-Western government, and support of radical fundamentalist factions.
- 2. Increased pressure on Iraq to continue war against a democratic government by offering arms, financial support and political-military assistance.
3. Organize radical Shiite groups outside Iran to form "government in exile" and conduct terrorist campaign against Iranian interest in other countries (especially with Libyan and Syrian support).

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FOIA(b)(1)

Don,

Attached is a brief analysis I did based  
on my own research, input from DIA and CIA,



*VC*  
Vince

cc. Steve Rosen

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