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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: FORTIER, DONALD: FILES

Archivist: gcc/bcb

File Folder: Iran (1 of 2)

RA Box 6
Box 90751

FOIA ID: F97-105

Date: 08/17/99

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Donald Fortier to John Poindexter re: Iran, 4p. <i>PART 3/31/06 F97-105/1#112</i>	4/18/85	P1
2. memo	re: US Policy Toward Iran, 2p. <i>PART " " #113</i>	n.d.	P1
3. memo	re: Iran, 9p. <i>PART " " #114</i>	4/7/87	P1
4. memo	re: Iran, 1p. <i>PART " " #115</i>	4/26/85	P1 BZ
5. memo	re: Iran-USSR, 1p. <i>PART " " #116</i>	4/11/85	P1, BZ, B3
6. memo	re: Iran, 8p. <i>PART " " #117</i>	4/7/87	P1
7. paper	re: Iran, 11p. <i>PART " " #118</i>	4/9/85	P1 B6
8. memo	re: Iran, 2p. <i>D 10/17/00 NLSF97-105 #119, D 8/19/02 P2001-023 #119</i>	4/7/87	P1 F1, F3
9. note	Vince to Don, 1p. <i>PART. 3/31/06 F97-105/1#120</i>	n.d.	P1
10. memo	re: Iran, 4p.	n.d.	P1
11. memo	re: Iran, 15p. <i>D 3/31/06 F97-105/1#122</i>	n.d.	P1, B3
12. note	Paul Metger to Steven Rosen re: attached memo, 1p. <i>D 10/2/00 NLSF97-105 #123 D 11/01/01 P2001-023 #123</i>	3/28/85	P1, B3
13. memo	re: Iran: Prospects for Near-Term Instability, 7p. <i>D 10/2/00 NLSF97-105 #124 D " " #124</i>	3/28/85	P1, B3
14. transmittal	Washfax Message, 1p. <i>P 10/2/2000 NLSF97-105 #125</i>	4/3/85	P1
15. memo	re: Iran, 4p. <i>D 10/2/2000 NLSF97-105 #126 D 11/01/01 P2001-023 #126</i>	n.d.	P1, B3

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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Collection: FORTIER, DONALD: FILES

Archivist: gcc/bcb

File Folder: Iran (2 of ³~~2~~)

RAL 6
Box 90751

FOIA ID: F97-105
Date: 08/17/99

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. notes	re: Iran, 1p. D 10/17/00 NLSF97-105 #127, D 8/19/02 P2001-023 #127	n.d.	PL F1, F3
2. memo	re: Iran, 1p. R 3/31/06 F97-105/1 #128	n.d.	PI
3. paper	re: Impact of War and Revolution, 48p. D 10/2/00 NLSF97-105 #129 D 11/01/01 P2001-023 #129	Feb 85	P1, B3
4. memo	re: Iran, 15p. D 3/31/06 F97-105/1 #130	n.d.	P1, B3

RESTRICTIONS

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P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
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2. IRAN: COPING WITH INTERNAL PRESSURES

Economic malaise is growing in Iran and could lead to occasional public disturbances in the coming months. However, the regime appears capable of containing and neutralizing such outbursts; moreover, there is no coherently organized internal or external opposition that can seriously challenge Ayatollah Khomeini's rule.

* * *

There is no doubt about the regime's political and economic problems. Inflation; shortages of jobs, goods, and municipal services; general incompetence; and a continuation of the war have reduced living standards and made the regime increasingly unpopular among all segments of the population. The economic malaise is severely aggravated by declining oil revenues.

Moreover, the ruling establishment is not united. There are important differences among key political and religious players and institutions on ideological, economic, and political issues, including the war. Jockeying for position against the day Khomeini dies accentuates these differences.

Specific examples of economic discontent and political maneuvering have surfaced on occasion:

- In November 1984, there were labor strikes in some Iranian cities. There have been no demonstrations since then, however, and there is no evidence suggesting the strikes were coordinated, despite claims to the contrary in the exile press.
- Within the Revolutionary Guard, there have been personnel disputes and a struggle may have developed for control of the guard's intelligence apparatus.
- Recent reporting indicates that several grand ayatollahs are opposed to continuing the war--a conviction that even some elements of the Revolutionary Guard may share.
- Finally, President Khamenei may face several challengers in his upcoming bid for reelection to the presidency.

Despite these problems, the regime is not about to break up. Nor do we believe Iran will face political instability in the coming months because of the emergence of open splits within the ruling entourage. To the contrary, observers in Tehran report that there is widespread political apathy despite increased dislike of the regime. The ruling clerics, for their part, know that as they approach the post-Khomeini era, they must hang together, or they will hang separately. DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-105/1#128

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BY 101 NARA DATE 3/31/06

Admiral Ahmad Madani: a biographical sketch

Admiral Ahmad Madani is a major Iranian opposition leader who enjoys a broad base of support among Iranians inside and outside of Iran. His appeal is specially strong inside the country and particularly among the powerful moderate and conservative politicians and religious groups who are becoming increasingly ascendant in their power struggle with the Muslim fundamentalists and who will most likely determine Iran's destiny after Khomeini's death.

Admiral Madani has held influential positions in Iran both before and after the Revolution. During the Shah's reign, he studied for several years, in the 1950's and the 60's, in the naval academies of England and the United States. After returning to Iran he earned a doctor's degree in political science and economics from Tehran University.

For many years, Admiral Madani served as commander of the naval forces in the Persian Gulf. In 1970, he was forced into retirement because of his consistent opposition to the former regime's corruption and dictatorial practices. After his retirement, he taught political science and economics in various Iranian universities and published several books on a wide range of subjects, including naval strategy, geopolitics and economics. In addition, he became a member of the executive council of the National Front, a mass party started by the late Iranian Premier Dr Mohammad Mossadegh, and a founder of the Iranian Committee for the Protection of Human Rights, a movement which included former prime minister Mehdi Bazargan.

Because of his impeccable record as a reformer and defender of freedom and his reputation for moral integrity and promotion of national reconciliation, Admiral Madani was invited by the Bazargan Government after the Revolution to join the cabinet. Consequently, he served as minister of defense, commander-in-chief of the Navy and governor-general of the Khuzistan province. In the latter position, he successfully quelled the widespread unrest in the oil-rich province and put an end to the secessionist movement which threatened Iran's territorial integrity.

Admiral Madani became a candidate during the first presidential election and received nearly three million votes, the highest votes received by any candidate after Bani-Sadr, Khomeini's hand-picked candidate. Most informed observers believe that Admiral Madani would have won the election if he had not been such an outspoken opponent of the fundamentalist elements' excesses.

In spite of the fundamentalists' concerted campaign against

him, Admiral Madani enjoyed such popularity among the people that he easily won a parliamentary seat from his home town of Kerman. However, the fundamentalists succeeded in denying him entry to the Parliament and openly moved to eliminate him.

In a public declaration, Admiral Madani denounced the regime's police state tactics and its gross violations of human rights and called for an immediate end to these practices. Orders were subsequently issued for his arrest. With his life thus in imminent danger, Admiral Madani went briefly into hiding. Then, with the help of his friends and supporters, he secretly left Iran, living for a while in West Germany, then moving to France where he still resides. From his small, modest apartment just outside of Paris, Admiral Madani, now 55, patiently and carefully, with the aid of his friends and contacts inside and outside of Iran, builds his organizational network.

Admiral Madani carries such a strong weight within Iran that several months ago a number of leading officials of the Islamic Republic secretly requested him to return to Iran as prime minister to help bring an end to the Iran-Iraq war, to establish law and order in the country and to put into practice an effective social reconstruction program. Admiral Madani made this offer public. He also made public the letters he wrote to Khomeini and the Speaker of Parliament Rafsanjani in which he again called for an end to the regime's inhumane practices and for the enforcement of democratic principles.

Admiral Madani has high hopes for Iran's future. Although a republican, he believes that the future form of government in the country must be decided by the people themselves in free elections. His priorities include the termination of the Iraqi-imposed war within the context of Iran's national interest and the establishment of justice and the rule of law in a spirit of national reconciliation.