MERIP MIDDLE EAST REPORT
JAN/FEB 1987 Pg. 23



On this map, the size of the country corresponds to how much US aid its government receives to finance the purchase of US-made weapons.

Source: **"Security and Development Assistance"** Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 1985.

MIDDLE EAST...CONTINUED

Egypt currently assembles the British Swingfire anti-tank missile, and versions of the Soviet SA-7 and SA-2 portable surface-to-air missiles, as well as several kinds of air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles. These missiles are mostly built at the Sakr works. Egyptian factories are also turning out increasing quantities of guns and ammunition, some for export. And they are producing military electronics such as radios and telecommunications. France is Egypt's major partner in developing more sophisticated assembly and production facilities. According to one French executive, "Egypt has become a profitable relay between France and the other countries in the region."

At a time of declining foreign exchange revenues, Egypt is counting on increasing its arms exports. Since Iraq takes two-thirds of Egypt's military exports, an end to the Gulf War could affect Cairo's export plans significantly. Egypt also needs to increase arms exports to make its military industries cost-effective. Gamal al-Sayyid Ibrahim, Minister of State for Military Production, discussing which main battle tank Egypt might assemble, remarked that the choice would not only have to meet Egyptian army requirements but would also have "to satisfy the market around us." Apart from Iraq, some of Egypt's main clients have been Somalia, Oman, Sudan and North Yemen. Shipments to these countries, including Chinese jet fighters and Soviet and US tanks, have been financed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Other important customers have been the Afghan *mujahidin* and the Washington-backed forces of Hissene Habre in Chad.

Iran

Iran is a textbook case of a country whose small industrial base and determination to acquire state-of-the-art weaponry com-

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FINANCIAL TIMES
18 MARCH 87 Pg. 7

Shortage of staff in electronics 'growing'

By Terry Dodsworth

THE SHORTAGE of skilled staff in the UK electronics industry is growing worse, according to a survey which also suggests that employment in the sector is expanding.

The survey, commissioned by Cawners Exhibitions, the organisers of the electronics exhibitions Internepcon, and Electronic Production magazine, says that only 10 per cent of the 454 companies which took part feel that the recruitment situation in the industry is improving. More than a third believe it has become more difficult.

Particular difficulties exist in recruiting design and production engineers, and it is hard to find test engineers and skilled operators. Only semi-skilled staff are easy to recruit, it says.

To cope with the skills shortage, almost half of the companies surveyed have increased their in-house training. In part, they appear to be gearing up for expansion: about 45 per cent of the companies sampled said that they should be able to offer more jobs over the next year, largely because of an expected upturn in sales and orders.

● Logica, a British computer company, has been put in charge of a £500,000 contract from the European Space Agency (ESA) to work out software techniques related to a proposed manned space station.

The contract, to be shared by Logica and a group of other European companies, concerns programs required for the operation of Columbus, a £1.3bn orbiting laboratory which ESA plans for the mid 1990s.

Logica's space and defence systems division will be responsible for about £300,000 worth of work under the contract, with Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm of West Germany, CRI of Denmark and Sweden's Saab sharing in the studies.

Logica says that, with the new contract, it is responsible for about £1m worth of work related to the Columbus development. The studies concern the software needed to run computerised equipment proposed for the laboratory, together with data processing techniques needed for radio transmissions to and from Earth.

MIDDLE EAST...CONTINUED

bined to insure that it would remain overwhelmingly dependent on foreign manufacturers. With the exception of some aircraft assembly begun in the 1930s and terminated with the outbreak of World War II, Iran has imported most of its weapons from the United States.

Iranian production of small arms and explosives dates back to the 1920s. An ammunition factory at Parchin, in the north of the country, has operated continuously for more than 50 years. By the late 1970s the Royal Armaments Factories in Tehran were manufacturing a wide variety of small arms, including basic infantry rifles and machine guns. Today the production of these and other plants supply Iranian forces in the war with Iraq.

When the shah decided to expand Iran's military might, he emphasized the air force. In 1969, the parliament obliged by decreeing that a portion of the country's oil revenues be put in a fund for arms imports. In 1970 the shah established Iran Aircraft Industries (IACI) as a joint venture with Northrop. A repair facility for US-made missiles also was set up at Shiraz.

Between 1970 and 1974, the military's share in total capital expenditures in the country rose from 25 percent to 41 percent of the total, and many different industrial sectors—automotive, chemical, mechanical—had some military dimension to them. A huge military-industrial complex was begun near Isfahan, and by 1978 spare parts for tanks and helicopters were being manufactured there. The Military Industries Organization was the single largest importer of machine tools in the mid-1970s.

Iran's sizeable automobile assembly industry had a military component. Three foreign auto licensers, Jeep (US), British Leyland (UK, maker of the Land Rover) and Daimler-Benz (West Germany) manufactured military vehicles. While tank maintenance and repairs remained a completely military project, the private sector took on the production and repair of military vehicles. In small arms production, French, German and Swedish companies licensed factories owned by Iranian entrepreneurs.

The purchase agreements made by the shah's government for advanced weapons systems usually included provision of repair facilities and training programs for Iranian technicians. Most of these operations involved replacing rather than repairing defective parts. The IACI experience illustrates the limits of these measures. In 1975, the Iranian government bought out Northrop, and then contracted with Lockheed and General Electric for similar services. By 1977, IACI had a workforce of 2,600 in five Iranian cities. Three-quarters of these were Iranians, but they were concentrated in management and unskilled jobs. At the core of IACI were some 600 skilled workers from Pakistan, South Korea and the Philippines and 50 technicians from the US.

Other repair and assembly contracts were extensions of sales contracts, giving multinational arms companies easy access to the Iranian market through these local subsidiaries. The Iranian state firms producing and repairing weapons were grouped under the Military Industries Organization and, one step removed, the War Ministry. Many of the same middlemen close to the Peacock Throne who profited handsomely on contracts for importing weapons also had financial interests in these enterprises.

At the time of the revolution in 1979, several of these different arms projects were incomplete. One was the Bell Helicopter joint venture in Isfahan to train 1500 pilots and 5000 mechanics and then to assemble a military transport helicopter. This was cancelled. The Islamic Republic has continued arms production at a reduced level, but the war with Iraq has been fought largely with imported weapons and ammunition. And the regime has no doubt extended and expanded the local maintenance and repair capacity begun under the shah.

MILITARY TECHNOLOGY VOL. 9 ISSUE 2 Pg. 150

BAe orders BRAVO

An order valued at around $2 million has been placed by British Aerospace for 11 AS 202 BRAVO training aircraft with SSA AG of Altenrhein, Switzerland. The aircraft will be used for basic training at the new British Aerospace flying training school which is to be established at Prestwick in Scotland, and which will open early in 1988.

Deliveries of the 180 hp fully aerobatic *ab initio* two/three sea trainer will begin in November 1987 and continue at the rate of one a month.

Although the first batch of pilots to go through the school are destined for British Airways, it is British Aerospace's declared intention to enter the market for the training of military pilots in the foreseeable future. A British Aerospace spokesman denied any linkage or coupling of the order for the Swiss aircraft to a possible Swiss order for the HAWK, which is on competition with the ALPHA JET for a new jet trainer.

Israeli section

Israel

Israel's arms industry is the largest and most sophisticated outside the industrialized countries. It predates the state itself, with roots in the small arms and ammunition workshops that grew up in the 1930s and 1940s and eventually became Israeli Military Industries (IMI). Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) had its beginnings in the early 1950s.

Israeli arms manufacturing really took off after the 1967 war. The French arms embargo, combined with expanding political and economic clout of the Israeli military and US cooperation, helped make Israel's military-industrial establishment what it is today. There are close links between Israeli arms firms, the scientific and technical elite and the officer corps. As in the US, there is a "revolving door" through which former officers pass from staff positions in the armed forces to executive roles in the arms companies. Military expenditures currently run about $5 billion, approximately a third of Israel's gross domestic product (with approximately the same amount again going to repay foreign debts, most of them military). Over $1 billion of this each year is spent on locally produced arms, of which about 25 percent reflects the cost of imported parts and licenses.

The US allows its foreign military assistance to be used for Israeli research and development and production of advanced weapons systems, such as the Merkava main battle tank and the Lavi advanced fighter-bomber. Arms manufacturing has become an important part of Israel's industrial sector, and employs some 60,000, more than one-fifth of the industrial workforce in the country. IAI (20,000 employees), IMI (15,000) and Tadiran (10,000) are Israel's three largest industrial firms. Metal products, machinery and electronics sectors (of which military production is an important part) were the fastest growing industrial sectors in the country in the 1970s—12 percent a year as against eight percent overall. Military sales abroad of around $1 billion per year are critical to the country's balance of payments. Military produc-

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MIDDLE EAST...CONTINUED

tion includes a large value-added component and is thus highly profitable. For some firms, such as Iscar Blades, some 90 percent of their market (including civilian goods) is overseas; for many, exports account for more than half their output.

The development of Israel's military industries moved from repair and maintenance to licensed production and finally local design and manufacture. Israel's close ties with advanced arms manufacturing countries, first France and then the United States, was key. Israeli engineers, for instance, were apparently involved in the original Mirage design work in France. In any case, their familiarity with the production process enabled IAI to procure or manufacture the necessary forgings and preformed parts. Israel's first locally-produced warplane, the Kfir, had a Mirage-based airframe and the engine of an F-4 Phantom.

Maintenance and servicing is now part of Israeli military exports. IAI currently has a contract to service and upgrade US military helicopters in Europe, and many countries which import US or French weapons systems go to Israel for service contracts. Finally, Israel reconditions and re-exports surplus or outmoded IDF equipment from the US and France, and captured Soviet weapons.

Israel has developed a great ability to upgrade and retool imported weapons systems with the addition of locally-produced components. This "mix and match" capability is the most significant feature of the Israeli arms industry today. There is no question that US technology is a key feature of Israel's military might. It is difficult to imagine Israeli military industries as they are today without it. But Israel, because of its high state of military readiness and frequent use of weapons systems, has developed a relatively unique capacity to absorb available technology, build on it and produce modifications and even new systems—such as remotely-piloted vehicles (RPVs) which are not produced anywhere else.

At the head of Israeli military industries are the large government firms—IAI, IMI, Rafael, the Main Ordnance factory—which are usually the prime contractors. At a second level is an important group of joint ventures with foreign firms which provide technology and capital and in turn profit from Israel's relatively low-cost scientific and engineering workforce. General Telephone and Electronics, Control Data and Motorola are long-standing examples. Finally there are perhaps 150 small and highly-specialized Israeli firms which subcontract on weapons projects.

Pakistan

Pakistan is the one other country in the Middle East besides Israel approaching nuclear weapons capability. Yet its production of conventional arms remains limited to infantry weapons, ammunition, small ships and one type of aircraft (on license from Saab). Over the last 10 years, the country has also constructed repair and maintenance facilities for French Mirage fighters and Chinese F-6s and tanks.

The arms production facilities constructed under British rule were in the territory that became India after independence. In the 1950s, Pakistan constructed the Pakistan Ordnance Factory. Pakistani military production increased after the 1965 war with India. Today the POF includes 14 separate factories in and around the city of Wah. This is a company town of 225,000 near Islamabad. Wah's Lord Mayor is General Talat Massoud, current chairman of the POF. The Wah complex manufactures a wide range of munitions and infantry weapons—mortars, recoilless rifles and anti-tank missiles. The POF employs between 30,000 and 50,000 and has an annual production capacity of more than $400 million. It is the country's largest industrial enterprise.

The technology POF uses comes from various suppliers—West German, British, Swiss, American. Pakistan has access to Chinese technology, and through this the Soviet technology incorporated in Chinese weapons. POF-designed 100mm tank rounds are now competing on the world market for customers among the many Third World countries with Soviet and Chinese designed tanks. Some 15 percent of POF's production is for export, which earns more than $30 million in foreign exchange.

In addition, there is the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex employing some 3500 Pakistanis and a team of Chinese supervisors. Both the Ordnance Factory and the Aeronautical Complex are directly under the Ministry of Defense. The Communication and Electronic industry at Haipur assembles communications equipment for the military.

Pakistan's largest military export is not its weapons but its soldiers. The country is probably the largest exporter of military personnel in the Third World. It supplies commanders, pilots and technicians to many Arab countries, especially in the Gulf, and to other countries as well. Pakistan has also offered its Mirage repair and maintenance facilities to other countries in the region, and invited these countries to invest in joint arms ventures.

China's growing military ties with the West are influencing Pakistan's arms industry. China has been Pakistan's backer against Soviet-backed India in the competition for influence in the subcontinent. The Chinese are building a plant in Pakistan to assemble their F-7 fighter. Both governments have approached the US for technology for this project. Chinese airframes will be fitted with US-built engines, avionics and weaponry. ■

Sources: Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, eds., **Arms Production in the Third World** (London: SIPRI, 1986); Ahron Klieman, "The Lion Has Yet to Soar," **Journal of Defense and Diplomacy** (August 1986); Ken Liberstein, "Egyptian Defense Industry: Ambitious Plans," **Journal of Defense and Diplomacy** (August 1986); Yoram Peri, "The Military-Industrial Complex," **Israel Economic and Business Review** (Jerusalem, 1985); Herbert Wulf, "Arms Production Capacity and Potential for 27 Third World Countries, 1984," in **World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1985** (London: SIPRI, 1985).

ASIAN DEFENSE JOURNAL 3/87 Pg. 148

INNOVATIVE BOOST TO EXPORTS FROM DEFENCE OFFSETS

McDonnell Douglas Corporation is to provide marketing support to the Western Australia company, Underwater Systems Australia Ltd (USAL), to boost the sale of remote-controlled underwater vehicles. This is part of the offset obligation resulting from acquisition of 75 F/A-18 Hornets for the RAAF.

The initial marketing emphasis will be on the USAL designed C-Cat and Super C-Cat vehicles, which are fitted with video cameras and lights for relatively shallow water applications. Recognition by the Commonwealth of the McDonnell Douglas support would be in the form of offset credits as authorised by the Government's decision to assist defence exports and the 'Buy Australian' campaign.

For the Hornet programme, McDonnell Douglas has an obligation to place offset orders on Australian industry to the value of 30 per cent of the project cost. The bulk of the offset programme will be achieved through the production of F/A-18 components or work of similar technology. The assistance decision provides McDonnell Douglas with an opportunity to gain offset credit in programmes such as the one proposed with USAL.

Beazley said that, 'the major offsets programme arising from the Hornet purchase continues to be refined and expanded. It is currently on target to meet the company's offset obligation." Offset orders placed so far on Australian industry exceed $100 million.

INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE
JOURNAL VOL. 2, NO. 3 87 Pg. 270

Shipboard air defense 2000: The UK Royal Navy has issued a second series of RFQs to British industry covering research into aspects of VSRAD 2000, a projected very short range air defense system to supplant current shipboard close-in weapons in the next century. Among these is understood to have been Short Bros, which is known to have been promoting *Seastreak* (a derivative of the British Army *Starstreak* high velocity missile system) for naval applications.

US seeks medium-size aircraft: The Fokker F-27, the BAe 748, the *Dash* 7 and *Dash* 8, the Aeritalia G222 and the CN-235, made by CASA/IPTN are possible contenders for a large US military airlifter buy. The USAF wants about $150 million for ten C-27 short takeoff and landing aircraft and a possible eight more to ferry troops to remote airfields. The US Army needs $14 million to replace two aircraft for the Golden Knights parachute team as well as over twelve more aircraft for the Army National Guard and the Kwajalein Missile Test Center. The US DoD has ordered the USAF and Army to consider a joint buy for these requirements.

NIMROD... CONTINUED

Despite rhetoric that heads must roll, they preferred to see the deed done and forgotten rather than delayed and examined, lest skeletons should be fouind in embarrasing cupboards. Thus passed ingloriously an occasion which should have forced Parliament to grasp several nettles. That it was allowed to pass demonstrates the persistent weakness in relation to defence typical of all the UK political parties.

A letter circulated by Defence Minister George Younger to Conservative MPs before the debate confirmed the fundamental assessment uniquely given in *Defence Attaché* some months previously: "Scope for major improvements is limited by the size of the aircraft, which constrains antenna size... (*Defence Attaché* No.5/1986: "Development of a satisfactory antenna had obviously turned into a running battle. The compressed dimensions were reflected in many ways: difficulty in meeting the desired performance...").

This now-lamented constraint was inseparable from the original decision to use the Nimrod airframe for AEW. It led to the drag-reducing fore and aft radomes streamlined into the fuselage. This was not an inferior option, but an inspirational breakaway at the time from the top-mounted radome concept, and the only way of enabling Nimrod to retain adequate range to function in the AEW role. Lockheed quickly appreciated that, applied to their own Hercules, a plane of comparable size to Nimrod, it opened the AEW market to this would-be aviation workhorse also. Moreover it preserved an unobstructed downward view particularly favourable for maritime surveillance, without sacrificing view to the horizon. Undoubtedly there was and is a global need for this breed of AEW.

Much has been made of Nimrod's shortcomings. But they relate primarily to the severe military environment of NATO v the Warsaw Pact. Elsewhere the cost advantage will usually prove the most significant factor. How many countries will buy AEW at the £135 million ($202.5 million) per aircraft that Britain will pay, especially when at least two, more credibly three, are needed for the four patrol areas allocated to the United Kingdom.

Many countries will see more practical advantage in a larger number of operational aircraft than in extreme detection range and highly sophisticated electronics. £135 million would buy a fleet of 20 or more aircraft equipped with the Thorn EMI Skymaster AEW radar, whether helicopter or fixed-wing types. This is probably the lower limit of the cost scale, and there must be enormous scope at intermediate points.

In this context the size constraint of the GEC/Nimrod radar antenna becomes a virtue. But it ceased eventually to be a virtue to the MoD, even though they had conjured up the compromise in the first place.

The smaller the antenna, the higher the frequency it functions best at; the higher the frequency, the more power needed to attain equivalent range. A 250-mile (460 km) horizon is theoretically available to an AEW aircraft cruising above 30,000 feet (9150 metres), but Nimrod's power limitations meant that this was never likely to be fully exploited. A range of 190 miles (350 km) was quoted by the MoD as the ASR 400 requirement. The Ministry gave AWACS' 250 miles as its main advantage. AWACS' antenna is larger and its frequency lower.

The compact parabolic antenna puts another, qualitative constraint on Nimrod from the MoD's standpoint. As a reflector it cannot be entirely free from "sidelobes". That is to say, while it should ideally suppress transmission and reception in all directions other than that in which the radar is supposed to be looking, it cannot do so completely. Ambiguity can therefore arise. A sufficiently strong return signal coming in through a sidelobe will show up as a target in the "look" direction. Mr Younger confirmed "False targets appear while Nimrod is tracking and flying over sea".

Remediable

This problem could undoubtedly be brought under control with further development work; it would call for more sophisticated in the processing by the computer of the radar signal received. This solution would be entirely adequate for the majority of the world's potential users. Only where intense electronic countermeasures (ECM) may be encountered does it still fall short of the ideal. That, unfortunately for Nimrod, is the case in Europe. The sidelobes offer deception possibilities to a technological powerful oponent. AWACS, using a phased-aray antenna, generates its radar beam with more precision than any reflecting-type antenna, and is less vulnerable to ECM. In five to 10 years' time is may be possible to produce a phased-array antenna fitting the Nimrod dimensions, but not immediately.

This would not have been necessary however. GEC would have gone on attacking Nimrod's problems and got the radar up to specification. In recent months the company has made great progresss. But more time was needed and it could not be denied that the radar's ultimate development potential did not measure up to AWACS' potential. The MoD's case was unassailable.

Nevertheless all this was implicity at the outset in the choice of the Nimrod airframe, not much more than half as big as the Boeing's. But surely Nimrod was big enough for the job as originally conceived? So were the goal posts moved? "No," said Mr Younger. Even without the goal posts being moved, the field of play was inevitably seen in changed perspective. It was undoubtedly convenient for the MoD, the government and the RAF to escape from an assessment and a specification that had seemed right 10 years ago but got left behind by subsequent developments.

Left behind, for example, by increasing international tension as the seventies passed into the eighties. Left behind by the increasing Soviet naval threat; by the increasing importance of NATO's

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JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY 16 MAY 1987 Pg.936

Arms sales race in the Middle East

By James Bruce

THE USA IS PRESSING to revive the sale of advanced weapons, including F-16 fighters and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, to Arab countries in a bid to counter increasingly tough competition from Europe and to repair the damage caused by the Irangate scandal.

The Reagan Administration has notified Congress that it wants to sell arms worth some $2 billion to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Bahrain.

The Pentagon advised Congress late last month that it has approved a $320 million deal with the Saudis to provide technical support for modernising Riyadh's military logistics system.

Some of the proposed packages, which need Congressional approval, were rejected by Congress in 1985 and 1986 because of stiff opposition from the pro-Israel lobby which said the weapons could be used either against Israel or fall into terrorist hands.

The Administration also withdrew other packages because it felt they had little chance of winning Congressional approval. But, in the wake of the disclosures about Reagan's secret arms sales to Iran, which appalled the USA's Arab friends, and the conviction of Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard, the climate in Washington has changed.

US officials believe that the Pollard affair and the strains it imposed on relations between the USA and its main ally in the Middle East have eroded opposition in Congress.

Developments in the Iran-Iraq war may also have had an impact. Iran's deployment of Chinese-made HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship missiles in the Strait of Hormuz, gateway to the Persian Gulf through which some 20% of the non-Communist world's oil passes, and the threat to international shipping could also trim Congressional opposition to the proposed deal.

The Administration is under pressure from US arms manufacturers to resume sales because of a drop in military exports, partly due to the Congressional blocks.

Northrop, for instance, scrapped its F-20 fighter project, intended primarily for sale to developing countries as a substitute for more advanced and expensive systems like the F-16, because Arab and other countries showed little interest. The Middle East had been seen as a key market.

The British and French particularly, but also the Italians, Spaniards, West Germans and Swedes, have moved into the Middle East in a big way since Congress torpedoed major US arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other countries.

The US arms embargo on Iran also opened up the Middle East market, which accounts for 40% of the world's military purchases, to West European governments and manufacturers. While they paid lip service to the US-sponsored ban, they were quietly selling Iran and Iraq hefty amounts of hardware.

That also seriously undermined Washington's political leverage in the region while sales to Israel continued unabated.

After Congress rejected a $6 billion F-16 package in 1985, the Saudis signed a $7·8 billion deal with the UK for 72 Tornados, 30 BAe Hawk jet strike trainers, which are combat capable, and 30 Swiss-built Pilatus trainers.

Jordan said it would buy Soviet air-defence missiles after Congress scotched a $1·9 billion proposal to sell the Kingdom missile systems and armoured vehicles. Jordan has now been offered laser-guided artillery shells and equipment to convert its fixed US-made HAWK anti-aircraft missile batteries to mobile units that would enhance its air defence capability.

Jordan is also considering buying French Mirage 2000s or Tornados built by the UK, West Germany and France.

The United Arab Emirates, its hopes of buying F-16s also dashed by Congress, has bought Mirage 2000s and is considering buying BAe Hawks as well.

Kuwait, which refused Stinger anti-aircraft missiles in 1984 like Saudi Arabia, opted for the Soviet Strella weapon. The French are also supplying Saudi Arabia with F-2000 class frigates, Dauphine helicopters, Atlantique II maritime patrol aircraft and Crotale-Matra coastal defence systems under a $3·45 billion deal.

The Saudis are also believed to be close to making a final decision on bids by six Western European firms for eight diesel-powered submarines, the construction of two bases on the Red Sea and training programmes (*see p970*).

As well as the European commercial competition, the Americans are also alarmed at growing Soviet influence in the Gulf and don't want to see moderate Arab states turning to the Soviets for hardware that will only increase Moscow's leverage in the region.

The type of weapons the Americans are now proposing to sell the Arabs underlines just how seriously Washington considers the European challenge and the political stakes.

If Congress approves, Saudi Arabia will get 12 UH-60 Black Hawk assault helicopters, 14 Bell-406 scout gunships armed with TOW anti-tank missiles and 7·62 mm guns in a $400 million package.

It will get 95 sets of AN-ALQ 171 radar jamming equipment for the Saudi Air Force's US-made F-5 and F-15 fighters in a separate $325 million package.

Saudi Arabia, which has been in the market for main battle tanks and armoured vehicles for some time, will get 200 Bradley Fighting Vehicles worth $500 million.

Washington withdrew a plan to sell the Saudis the M-1 tank and Riyadh has since been considering the French Giat AMX-40, the Brazilian Osorio and the Vickers Challenger. The USA has never offered the Bradley to foreign countries before.

The Gulf Co-operation Council which groups Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, is now looking for 10-12 maritime patrol aircraft to counter increasing Iranian attacks on ships in the Gulf. Under consideration are the Lockheed P-3 Orion, France's Dassault-Breguet Atlantique and the Dutch Fokker F-27.

Pentagon officials believe that the GCC would be a less controversial customer than Saudi alone and expect minimal Congressional opposition to any deal. The Saudis, however, would be expected to underwrite that estimated $1 billion deal.

The US Defense Department also plans to supply Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain with 105 mm M833 armour-piercing anti-tank shells with uranium-hardened casings.

Bahrain, currently taking delivery of its last batch of F-15s, will get 12 F-16C and F-16D aircraft with Maverick and AIM-7 and nine missiles in a $400 million package.

This deal is significant because the USA has so far only sold the F-16s to Israel and Egypt.

Egypt, which has already taken delivery of about half the 80 F-16s it ordered in 1980 and 1982, will get another 40 with AN/APG-68 radars under a $1·3 billion deal to replace its ageing Soviet supplied MiGs.

The USA, alarmed by Egypt's bitter denunciation of the secret arms deals with Iran, has agreed to reschedule Cairo's $4·5 billion military debt.

NEW YORK TIMAES 23 MAY 1987 Pg.2

Shultz Assures Mozambique Aide U.S. Won't Withdraw Its Support

By NEIL A. LEWIS
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 22 — Secretary of State George P. Shultz told a senior Mozambican official today that President Reagan had no intention of abandoning support for Mozambique's Government in favor of an anti-Communist insurgency.

"He told him that both he and President Reagan were fully committed to the current policy," a State Department official said.

Mr. Shultz's emphatic comments to the Mozambican Transport Minister, Lieut. Gen. Armando Guebuza, underscored the widening political fight between the Administration and Republican members of the Senate over which course the United States should pursue in southern Africa.

Senate conservatives have mounted a drive to force the Administration to shift its support away from the Mozambican Government to an insurgency called the National Resistance Movement, or Renamo, which has longstanding ties to South Africa.

Fight Over 'Necklacing'

The latest effort to press the Administration on its policy in the region occurred Thursday when the Senate voted overwhelmingly to deny aid to any of the black-ruled nations there unless they explicitly renounced "necklacing." Necklacing is a practice in black South African townships in which people suspected of collaborating with the Government are executed by having gasoline-soaked tires placed around their necks and set afire.

The Senate voted, 77 to 15, to deny aid to any country of the Southern Africa Development Coordinating Council that did not renounce the practice or failed to renounce any group that condones it. The Senate had voted to provide $50 million this year to the nine countries that make up the council — Mozambique, Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Tanzania.

But an amendment, supported by conservatives including Senator Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina, and already passed, would deny any of that money to Mozambique or Angola, both of which describe themselves as Marxist Governments. Mr. Helms has said the United States should not be sending money to Communist governments.

One of the most vocal supporters of the conservative effort to shift policy has been Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, the Republican leader, who has usually supported the Administration on foreign policy issues. Administration officials have privately complained that Mr. Dole has tailored his position to help him win support from right-wing groups in his effort to obtain the Republican nomination for President.

Bush Hasn't Taken a Stand

Vice President Bush, who also is hoping to be the choice of conservative groups in his efforts to win the party's Presidential nomination, has not taken an explicit stand on the issue.

Asked this morning if Mr. Bush fully agreed with the Administration policy on Mozambique, a spokesman said he would seek an answer. But by the end of the day, the Vice President's office had not responded.

The Administration's policy on Mozambique has largely been guided by the Africa bureau of the State Department, which has adopted a strategy of improving ties with the Mozambican Government in an effort to distance it from Moscow.

Senate conservatives who object have succeeded in blocking the Administration's choice as Ambassador to Mozambique, Melissa Wells, a 55-year-old career diplomat. Mr. Helms complained that Mrs. Wells had called Renamo forces bandits and had steadfastly refused to say the United States should deal with them.

Action May Be Symbolic

The amendment passed on Thursday was sponsored by Senator Larry Pressler, Republican of South Dakota. The action may prove to be only symbolic as it involves money in a larger supplemental appropriation for the State Department that might not be approved.

Mr. Pressler said five of the nine Southern Africa Development Coordinating Council countries — Angola, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Botswana — would likely be disqualified from receiving American aid under his amendment because they support the African National Congress, the principal guerrilla group fighting apartheid in South Africa. The group's leaders have said that necklacing may be necessary to discourage collaboration.

All six New York metropolitan area Senators voted to kill the measure by sending it back to committee. But when that tactic failed and it came up for a vote, Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato, Republican of New York, switched sides and voted in favor of the Pressler amendment; the other five voted against it.

NEW YORK TIMES 24 MAY 1987 Pg.20

Bombings in U.S. Rose in '86

WASHINGTON, May 23 (AP) — Bombings by terrorist groups rose from 5 in 1985 to 15 last year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported today, while the total number of bombings nationwide was 709, killing 14 people and injuring 185.

In addition, there were 149 attempted bombings that were prevented or in which the device did not detonate or ignite, the bureau said.

It also said the number of fatalities last year was only half that of 1985, when 28 people were killed. The 14 fatalities in 1986 included 7 intended victims and 7 perpetrators.

Of the incidents reported last year, 681 involved explosive devices, down 1 percent from that of the previous year, and 177 were firebomb-like devices, up 11 percent.

Bombings last year resulted in $3.4 million in property damage, the F.B.I. reported.

Regionally, the Western states recorded 301 bombings, the Southern states 251, the Midwest 169 and the Northeast 103. Thirty-three incidents occurred in Puerto Rico and one in the United States Virgin Islands.

Personal injuries from bombings last year totaled 185, up from 144 in 1985, the bureau said.

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Lebanon is the only Middle Eastern country where terrorism had a strategically significant effect since the end of 1982. In other countries in the region, terrorism has thus far merely been a nuisance for the security forces. Nevertheless, some forms of terrorism (notably the Muslim fundamentalist brand and Jewish nationalist terrorism) may yet have a major political impact in the area.

Appendix

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON

(May 17, 1983)

The Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Lebanon:

Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening international peace based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights;

Reaffirming their faith in the aims and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognizing their right and obligation to live in peace with each other as well as with all states, within secure and recognized boundaries;

Having agreed to declare the termination of the state of war between them;

Desiring to ensure lasting security for both their States and to avoid threats and the use of force between them;

Desiring to establish their mutual relations in the manner provided for in this Agreement;

Having delegated their undersigned representative plenipotentiaries, provided with full powers, in order to sign, in the presence of the representative of the United States of America, this Agreement;

Have agreed to the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

1. The Parties agree to undertake to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of each other. They consider the existing international boundary between Israel and Lebanon inviolable.
2. The Parties confirm that the state of war between Israel and Lebanon has been terminated and no longer exists.
3. Taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, Israel undertakes to withdraw all its armed forces from Lebanon in accordance with the Annex of the present Agreement.

states also serve the practical purpose of warning them against continued economic and political support of Iraq in its war with Iran.

Iran's fear of Iraqi attacks on oil facilities is of particular importance in the present context; it may explain Shi'ite terrorist assaults on French targets in Lebanon, Kuwait, Turkey and in France itself, since France has supplied Iraq with the Super Etendard aircraft and Exocet missiles used to impair Iranian oil exports. Shi'ite attacks in the oil-producing Gulf states also appear to serve as a means of indirect pressure on Iraq, through its main financial backers, to refrain from hurting Iran's oil production. If so, these attacks have failed to achieve the objective.

Contrary to the situation in Lebanon, the use of terrorism in the Gulf has borne no clear strategic results yet. There is no indication that Shi'ite insurgency in the Gulf states has become a real threat to the existing regimes or succeeded in changing their policies in any discernible way. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that some of these states have significant Shi'ite populations, partly of Iranian origin. Thus, Shi'ites make up over 50% of Bahrain's population, 24.3% of Qatar's, 15% of the UAE's and 10.4% of Kuwait's. It is too early to preclude the possibility of more effective Shi'ite terrorism in the future. This could be precipitated by a massive Iranian success in the war or social and economic troubles in the countries under threat.

Jewish terrorism: In 1983 and early 1984, Jewish terrorism, to an extent unprecedented since the founding of Israel, was revealed. In the spring of 1984, members of four different Jewish terrorist groups were arrested and charged with various actual and planned attacks on Arab targets in the West Bank. The largest of these groups included more than twenty men. Its members were accused of the 1980 attempts on the lives of three West Bank mayors, the 1983 attack on the Islamic College in Hebron and other murders in Arab villages, as well as of planting bombs in Arab buses and planning to bomb the Dome of the Rock mosque. Members of the group lived in several settlements in the West Bank and the Golan. Some of them were army officers. They displayed remarkable planning, intelligence and technical capabilities and stocked significant amounts of explosives and weapons. Justification of this terrorist activity rested largely on the claim that the Israeli government had failed to make the West Bank secure for Jewish settlers, forcing the latter to take the law into their own hands. Nevertheless, it seems that for at least some of the accused, the use of terrorism was not merely a matter of vigilantism, but was also meant to serve political ends: undermining any prospect of a territorial compromise and stimulating Arab emigration from the West Bank.

A key question is whether this type of Jewish terrorism is a passing phenomenon. Two factors suggest that it may not be. First, the spontaneous creation of four independent terrorist groups indicates that there is a

significant pool of manpower for this kind of activity. Second, several opinion polls have shown that a substantial portion of the Israeli public (more than 20%) sympathizes with the terrorists or with their motives.

So far, Jewish nationalist terrorism has had no significant impact on Israeli politics. It is conceivable, however, that if and when the issue of territorial compromise becomes a serious option, this brand of terrorism may prove to be a real constraining factor on Israeli decisionmakers.

Jordan: A series of terrorist attacks against Jordanian targets — both inside the Hashemite Kingdom and abroad — was carried out by Abu Nidal's group, the "Fatah-Revolutionary Council" ("Black June"). This group, based in Syria in recent years, seems to act in accordance with Syria's aims.

From September 1982 to the end of 1983, Abu Nidal's group carried out at least fifteen terrorist attacks, ten of which were aimed at targets in Jordan or at Jordanian diplomats abroad. The major portion of these attacks occurred during the last three months of 1983, suggesting a concentrated effort at this particular time to influence Jordanian policy. The targets included American, French, British and Saudi diplomatic and commercial offices, as well as Jordanian security facilities. Several teams of Abu Nidal's members were arrested in Jordan.

It can be assumed that in perpetrating these attacks, Abu Nidal acted, not as a maverick, but as a proxy for Syria's strong-arm policy. The timing of the attacks and the choice of targets suggest that they were meant to deter Jordan from endorsing, jointly with Yasir Arafat, a new formula for the settlement of the Palestinian problem. Any solution of this sort would not only contradict Syria's basic conception of the geopolitical place and orientation of the Palestinian political entity; it would exclude Syria as a major factor in the shaping of this entity.

It is unlikely that terrorist attacks of this sort will have a critical effect on Jordanian policy. Jordan's cautious treatment of the Palestinian problem appears to reflect its own interests rather than the success of Syrian intimidation.

The Jordanian example illustrates the limitations of terrorism as a strategic tool. Historical evidence suggests that a terrorist campaign directed by a foreign power will have a strategic impact only when it can rely on broad support by elements of the local population in the target country, or when the targeted country does not see the issue at stake as vital. With respect to the second condition, democracies are more exposed to the effects of this mode of warfare, since public reaction to the toll of terrorism in human life — in itself usually insignificant as a national sacrifice — may suffice to induce a major change of policy. The MNF withdrawal from Lebanon is a case in point.

1. Introduction

1983 might be characterized as a year of unfulfilled expectations. Processes which had been set in motion in 1982 did not materialize, trend projections were not borne out and political aspirations perforce assumed more modest proportions. For many important actors in the Middle East, it was a year of strategic retrenchment and damage control.

This was particularly true of Israel and the United States, two powers that had seemed to be relatively well positioned in late 1982 to pursue ambitious strategic goals. Both had hoped for the reconstruction of the Lebanese central government and the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon (though they differed on the broader regional purposes that these intermediate objectives were intended to facilitate). But any opportunity that may have existed to realize these goals quickly evaporated. Lebanese factionalism proved to be more resilient than anticipated and Syria, with Soviet guarantees and massive military assistance, strengthened its armed forces and its power to obstruct any arrangements in Lebanon not to its liking. Israel did achieve a reasonably satisfactory agreement with the Lebanese government. But this proved impossible to implement — it was eventually abrogated by Lebanon — and domestic discord, fueled by continuing casualties, led Israel to carry out a unilateral partial withdrawal and to concentrate thereafter on the narrower question of alternative security arrangements in southern Lebanon. The United States persisted somewhat longer but was also obliged to reassess its policy. In early 1984, President Reagan finally ordered the "redeployment" of US forces out of Lebanon; the withdrawal, itself a serious political embarrassment, was carried out in a manner which did further damage to America's reputation in the region. In both the Israeli and American cases, murderous bombings by Shi'ite radicals had thrust the issue of terrorism into ongoing strategic assessments.

The impact of Lebanon on the strategic position of Israel and the United States was partially mitigated by the course of the Gulf war. Here, too, potential developments did not unfold in linear fashion. Iran had assumed control of events in 1982, registered some major gains on the battlefield and seemed to be poised to carry the war into Iraq. But then the two belligerents reversed the roles they had played at the outbreak of the war in 1980. Iraq, bolstered by major new arms transfers from the Soviet Union, contained all of Iran's offensives and staved off an Iranian victory that would have strengthened anti-Israeli and anti-American political forces throughout the region. The prolonged, inconclusive conflict in the Gulf also made a broader war coalition on Israel's eastern front unlikely. Iran did retain the initiative and continued to apply serious military and economic pressure throughout the year, but even this had a positive side-effect from the American point of view: security concerns forced other Arab Gulf states to

preserve relations with the United States that might otherwise have been damaged by events in Lebanon.

There were other Middle Eastern figures whose hopes for 1983 were not fulfilled. One was Yasir Arafat, titular leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization. In the fall of 1982, Arafat appeared to have salvaged a political victory from the military defeat inflicted on his forces during the summer. But Arafat's stature as an independent force was further undermined by a Syrian-inspired rebellion in his own Fatah movement and an open clash with Syria at the end of 1983. In early 1984, Arafat's energies were wholly absorbed by questions of institutional and personal rehabilitation; the substantive goals he had ostensibly been pursuing since 1965 seemed more remote than ever.

For Mu'ammar Qaddafi, 1983 was another year of thwarted ambitions in Chad. Having failed to reap the political benefits of his armed intervention in 1980 or of his voluntary withdrawal in 1981, Qaddafi sent Libyan and mercenary forces back into Chad in the summer of 1983. At first, the renewed Libyan involvement promised to tip the local balance in favor of Qaddafi's Chadian clients. But the interposition of French forces compelled Qaddafi to halt, and then retreat. Though Qaddafi retained control of northern Chad, his reputation had suffered a further setback, this time with potentially important consequences for his own political future.

During 1983, a number of actors believed that their interests would best be served by the imposition of some kind of order in one area or another of the Middle East. But the "revisionists" were invariably frustrated by others who pursued a more modest strategy of denial, a strategy which served Soviet and Syrian interests particularly well in the period under review. Developments in the region therefore demanded consideration in theoretical and historical analyses of the political utility of force. They also left unresolved the existing conflicts in the region. These would continue to dominate the strategic agenda in 1984.

2. Israel and the War in Lebanon: Phase II

At the height of the fighting in Lebanon during the summer of 1982, a vigorous debate erupted in Israel over the relative merits and demerits of initiated war. By the end of 1983, the principal architects and defenders of this particular war were no longer involved in the making of national security policy. Prime Minister Menahem Begin had resigned and virtually disappeared from public view, Defense Minister Ariel Sharon had been forced to give up his office and retained only a marginal role as Minister Without Portfolio, and Chief-of-Staff Raphael Eitan had served out the final months of his term under a cloud of judicial reproof. Their successors still justified the continued presence of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) in southern Lebanon in order to safeguard northern Galilee, but they had scaled down the scope of Israeli objectives and were clearly looking for a way out. While an explicit admission of failure to achieve more ambitious war aims was almost inconceivable, Israel's experience in Lebanon since the fall of 1982 suggested that only the most imminent and unambiguous strategic danger would produce another large-scale Israeli military initiative in the near future.

Israel's war aims in Lebanon, beyond the day-to-day security of its northern settlements, have been described as follows:

> (1) to reduce or eliminate the political and military presence of the PLO in Lebanon; (2) to remove Syrian forces from the Biqa' Valley, the Beirut region, and the Beirut- Damascus highway; and (3) to lay the groundwork for the emergence in Lebanon of a new political constellation, more compatible with Israeli interests. The issue of Syrian and PLO presence in northern Lebanon was of secondary concern. The possibility that a strong blow to the PLO would encourage moderate elements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to be more receptive toward Israeli autonomy plans was also a factor in Israeli planning.[1]

With the evacuation of the last PLO combatants from Beirut on August 31, 1982, most of these objectives appeared to have been achieved or within reach. However, the durability of Israel's achievements and the realism of its outstanding goals were quickly brought into question. The first indication that military victory might not produce the expected political rewards came the very next day. President Ronald Reagan, apparently sharing Israel's conviction that the departure of the PLO from Beirut constituted a resolution of the problem of Lebanon, declared that "in the aftermath of the settlement in Lebanon we now face an opportunity for a broader peace."

[1] *The Middle East Military Balance 1983*, ed. Mark Heller (Tel Aviv, 1983), pp. 11-12.

Reagan's vision of a broader peace, which called for eventual Palestinian self-government in association with Jordan, incorporated the transitional autonomy provisions of Camp David and excluded an independent Palestinian state, but it also reaffirmed the longstanding American preference for a freeze on Israeli settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza, the opposition to annexation or permanent control of these territories by Israel, and the insistence that the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applied to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza. These provisions contradicted the basic policy of the Israeli government, which immediately rejected the Reagan proposal, but they demonstrated that developments in Lebanon had not yet produced a more congenial international environment for the pursuit of Israel's ultimate aims in the territories. Its intermediate aims in Lebanon quickly became problematic, as well.

The enunciation of the Reagan proposals on September 1, 1982, ushered in the second phase of the war in Lebanon, characterized by rising costs and receding prospects of gaining any but the most modest of Israel's security goals. Two weeks after Reagan's speech, on September 15, the chances for a favorable political arrangement in Lebanon were seriously set back by the assassination of President-elect Bashir Jumayyil, commander of the Phalangist-dominated "Lebanese Forces" and Israel's de facto ally. The next day, Israeli forces moved into West Beirut. Phalangist militiamen, following in their wake, entered the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps and murdered hundreds of Palestinians.

The atrocity, in which Israel was indirectly implicated, precipitated a firestorm of international and domestic protest. Egypt summoned home its ambassador to Israel for "consultations" that continued into 1984. The United States, which had guaranteed the safety of Palestinian civilians during the negotiations preceding the evacuation of the PLO, was greatly embarrassed and applied strong pressure on Israel to withdraw from West Beirut. It also sent a Marine contingent back to Beirut as part of the multinational force that had only departed on September 13. This unit took over Beirut airport; the ill-defined demarcation line between its area of responsibility and forward Israeli positions produced several tense incidents that disturbed Israeli-American relations in the following months. Inside Israel, divisions within the Cabinet and growing public unrest compelled the government to appoint a commission of inquiry into Israel's role in the Sabra-Shatila massacre.

All of these developments adversely affected Israel's foreign relations or undercut the government's ability to persist in its policy regarding Lebanon. The most serious obstacle to the attainment of Israeli objectives, however, was the manifest inability of the Lebanese themselves to resolve their internal conflicts and create an authoritative central government that could

impose order and permit Israel to withdraw without jeopardizing the security that had been gained for settlements in the north.

In fact, the PLO's explusion and the temporary neutralization of Syria in the fall of 1982, by raising the possibility of a reordering of the Lebanese political system after seven years of paralysis, had the effect of exacerbating Lebanese communal conflicts. This was first evident in the Shouf Mountain and in Beirut itself. In the Shouf, Phalangist units were permitted by the IDF to retake positions they had lost during the civil war; beginning in October, Druze resistance to the armed Maronite presence produced ongoing Druze-Maronite clashes. In Beirut, the Lebanese government attempted to assert its authority by challenging the Shi'ite militia in the western sector of the city, while allowing the Lebanese Forces in East Beirut to maintain their presence. In both cases, important Lebanese communities were increasingly alienated from a Lebanese government that they suspected, in any event, of being excessively responsive to Maronite interests. Although the Druze and Shi'ites had no intrinsic reason to favor Palestinian or Syrian aspirations in Lebanon, their hostility to the government of Amin Jumayyil was eventually directed, by extension, against Israel, as well.

At the same time, the military blow inflicted on Syria soon proved to be of ephemeral strategic significance. Equipment lost during the summer was being replaced and upgraded by the Soviet Union, and the Syrians not only refused to enter into serious discussions about withdrawal of their forces from the Biqa', but actually strengthened their positions there. Furthermore, the antipathy of the Lebanese Druze and Shi'ites to the American- and Israeli-supported Jumayyil government argued in favor of cooperation with Syria, thus reviving Syria's standing in Lebanon.

Despite these inauspicious developments, Israeli efforts continued to focus on a formal agreement with the Lebanese government. Negotiations began at the end of December and continued for the next five and one-half months, alternating between Qiryat Shmona in Israel and the Lebanese town of Khaldeh. Serious differences emerged over issues of security arrangements, the projected status and role in southern Lebanon of Israel's ally, Major Sa'ad Haddad, and Lebanon's reluctance to enter into an explicit peace treaty. The slow rate of progress gave rise to vague hints of a unilateral Israeli withdrawal which, given deteriorating intra-Lebanese relations and the demonstrated impotence of the central government, would almost certainly have precipitated a new round of savage fighting in areas abandoned by the IDF.

Although the Israeli authorities did not make active preparations for such a step at this stage, the threat was given some credibility by the intensified polarization of the Israeli public caused by the release of the Commission of Inquiry report in early February. The report found several high-ranking government and military figures, including the prime minister, guilty of

indifference or faulty judgment in connection with Sabra-Shatila. Its findings provoked a cycle of demonstrations and counterdemonstrations that culminated in a violent clash between protesters and government supporters on February 10.

In these circumstances, the possibility of an Israeli withdrawal had to be taken seriously by both the Lebanese and the Americans, who by now had much invested politically in the appearance of movement toward some solution of Lebanon's problems. Secretary of State George Shultz therefore became personally involved in the negotiations in early May. On May 17, an agreement confirming that "the state of war between Israel and Lebanon has been terminated" was signed by representatives of the two states and witnessed by a representative of the United States government (see Appendix).

The agreement included an undertaking by Israel to withdraw its armed forces from Lebanon, consistent with the objective "that all external forces withdraw from Lebanon." It also provided for the creation of a security region in southern Lebanon; in the zone of this region extending fifteen kilometers north of the Israeli border, responsibility for maintaining order would devolve on a Lebanese "territorial brigade," meaning the Israeli-supported forces of Major Haddad. In addition to various other security arrangements, the agreement stipulated the creation of a Joint Liaison Committee, one of whose functions was "to conclude agreements on the movement of goods, products and persons and their implementation on a non-discriminatory basis." In other words, Lebanon committed itself to normal relations with Israel. Israel had secured an "agreement" rather than a "treaty;" it could not exchange embassies with Lebanon, only "liaison offices." But in other respects, the document satisfied Israel's most ambitious hopes. It also met Lebanon's need for Israeli withdrawal and provided for the peace that many Lebanese aspired to. The only flaw — but ultimately a fatal one — was that Lebanon was not an autonomous international actor free to undertake whatever commitments it deemed to be in its interest. Indeed, the government could not even speak on behalf of the country. And unless this flaw were removed, the agreement was doomed to remain a diplomatic dead letter.

The obstacle to implementation of the agreement was Syria, which had adopted a consistently uncooperative position in the Syrian-American discussions that accompanied the negotiations over the agreement. Syrian objections included the ritualistic refusal to have its own invasion of Lebanon in 1976, which was sanctioned ex post facto by the Arab League, equated with Israel's invasion of 1982. In fact, Syria had been explicitly univited by Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis on June 21, 1982, and its Arab League mandate, which expired on July 27, 1982, had never been renewed. But Syrian policy had never been determined solely by legalistic considerations.

A more substantial reason for Syria's indignation was the Lebanese government's symbolic assertion of independence, which no government in Damascus had ever formally recognized, in contracting the agreement. In the Syrian view, Lebanon was properly part of "Greater Syria," certainly within the Syrian sphere of influence, and rather than surrendering part of its sovereignty to appease Israeli security concerns, it was expected to subordinate its foreign policy to Syrian preferences. This had been demanded on other regional issues — Lebanon under Sarkis, for example, had joined in the Syrian boycott of the November 1980 Arab Summit conference in Amman — and it was particularly necessary on the sensitive question of relations with Israel. Assad, after all, had felt isolated and threatened by the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and he was not about to acquiesce in a second such agreement, not by Jordan and definitely not by Lebanon.

Syria, of course, did not object to Israeli withdrawal. But it saw no need to permit Lebanese concessions or to make Syrian concessions in order to bring this about. Since it was strongly entrenched in the Biqa', untroubled by domestic opposition, able to influence developments in Lebanon through its local allies and relieved of the threat of renewed Israeli military action, Syria could afford to do nothing. The provision that made Israeli withdrawal contingent on Syrian withdrawal had inadvertently conferred on Syria a veto over the agreement. By doing nothing, Syria could at least prevent the agreement from coming into force. And if Assad waited long enough, Israel might eventually just lose patience and pull out unconditionally.

Events over the summer of 1983 seemed to be tending in this direction. Constantly rising casualties and growing despair at the prospect of ever seeing the agreement implemented led Israel to prepare a withdrawal to the Awali River, just north of Sidon. Although Israel would no longer control the Beirut-Damascus highway, it was hoped that a pullout from the Shouf to shorter, more defensible lines would allow Israel to end its uncomfortable involvement in the Maronite-Druze conflict and reduce its casualties. Ironically, Lebanon and the United States objected to a partial Israeli withdrawal — because it would almost surely precipitate large-scale fighting in the Shouf (the Lebanese army was still incapable of assuming responsibility for the whole area) that might ultimately permit pro-Syrian forces to apply military pressure on the city of Beirut, and also because a less costly occupation for Israel might produce a permanent de facto partition of Lebanon. The United States, moreover, opposed any action that would encourage Syria to persist in its uncompromising attitude.

In response to American requests, Israel delayed its withdrawal several times, but on the night of September 3-4, Israeli forces were redeployed along the Awali line. One of the Lebanese and American expectations was borne out: major clashes erupted immediately between Phalange and

Druze forces. In most cases, the Druze quickly got the upper hand. On the Beirut-Damascus highway, they took the key town of Bhamdun and linked up with their stronghold in Aley, thereby establishing a secure line of communication back to their sources of supply in the Syrian-held Biqa'. They also pushed south and west through the Shouf and took control of most of the mountain up to the ridge overlooking the coastal road. Large numbers of Christian refugees fled to the town of Deir al-Qamar, which was surrounded on September 17 but which Druze forces refrained from storming. Suq al-Gharb was the only major Christian position to hold, this because of a major effort by the Lebanese army and supporting fire from US naval units. Simultaneous battles broke out in Beirut itself involving Shi'ite militias and the Lebanese army. By the time a ceasefire was declared on September 26, the Druze had consolidated their hold over all the area evacuated by Israel except for a narrow strip of territory along the coast. Within a few days, artillery and mortar exchanges broke out again and continued sporadically throughout the rest of the year.

But the second expected consequence of Israeli redeployment — a lightened burden of occupation — did not materialize. In fact, Israeli relations with all the relevant Lebanese factors became even worse. Caught in the middle of intensifying Maronite-Druze hostility, Israel was inevitably accused by each side of favoring the other. Continuing ties with the Jumayyil government and the Phalange movement meant that Israel was perceived to be anti-Druze; this had worrisome domestic repercussions, since large numbers of Israeli Druze were alienated from Israeli policy, and some Druze officers demonstratively resigned from the IDF. At the same time, Israel was reluctant to permit the Phalangists a prominent security role in the area south of the Awali lest this anger the other communities; the decision in July to close a Phalangist base at Falus, west of Sidon, resulted in an anti-Israel demonstration by local Maronites. Israel also attempted to build some kind of working relationship with Druze leader Walid Jumblatt in order to encourage him to prevent Palestinians from infiltrating back into the Shouf. Israeli-Druze cooperation, which reportedly involved the transfer of equipment along with periodic IDF patrols north of the Awali, did seem to produce the intended outcome, but at the cost of angering the Lebanese government and also the United States, which had become increasingly identified with Jumayyil.

The most dramatic effect of the redeployment, however, was to poison relations between Israel and the Lebanese Shi'ites, by far the largest community in the area under Israeli control. The Shi'ites, by virtue of sectarian affinity, were more susceptible than any other Lebanese community to the anti-Israel incitement of Iranian revolutionary guards posted in the Biqa'; they were also most involved in the inevitable friction between the local population and security forces. Israeli efforts to prevent the infiltration of terrorists and sabotage materiel involved stringent inspection arrangements at the Awali bridges. These disrupted the flow of traffic between Beirut and the south and greatly inconvenienced the residents of southern Lebanon. Anti-Israel sentiment was further inflamed by normal searches and roadblocks and by occasionally inept Israeli conduct in the area. One particularly damaging incident was the interruption by a motorized patrol of a Shi'ite Ashura procession in Nabatiyya at the end of October. In the ensuing altercation, some Shi'ites were killed. This, in turn, provoked a community-wide protest strike and continuing anti-Israel pronouncements by Shi'ite religious leaders.

As Shi'ite antipathy to Israel intensified, so, too, did Shi'ite involvement in attacks on Israeli forces and installations. The most dramatic incident was the truck bombing of Israeli military headquarters in Tyre on November 4, which killed 29 Israeli security personnel and 32 Lebanese and Palestinians being held there for interrogation. But the steady rhythm of sniping attacks, vehicle ambushes and mine or roadside explosions took a larger toll on Israeli troops, and showed no sign of letting up after the redeployment.

By the end of 1983, Israel therefore found itself mired in Lebanon with little prospect of implementing the May 17 agreement. Syria could not be forced or persuaded to carry out the role assigned to it. And the emergence of a strong central government in Beirut appeared more remote than ever. It is true that a National Reconciliation Committee of Lebanese factional leaders had convened in Geneva at the end of October, but in five days of meetings its only accomplishment was a decision to "freeze" the Israeli-Lebanese accord. The efforts of a Saudi-supported mediator, Rafiq al-Hariri, to negotiate a relatively modest security plan involving movement of the Lebanese army into parts of the country not under Israeli or Syrian control also foundered on the rocks of Lebanese factional suspicions, although his activities continued into 1984.

Political deadlock and the continuing casualties — over 200 killed between September 1982 and December 1983 and about 40 since the redeployment — forced Israel to consider alternatives to the agreement with Lebanon. A number of statements indicated that Israel had already abandoned the linkage between Israeli and Syrian withdrawal. Instead, growing emphasis was placed on security arrangements in the south that would permit Israel to withdraw the bulk of its forces without endangering the settlements in the Galilee. While these arrangements were not precisely defined, the general sense was that local forces, perhaps armed and coordinated by Israel, would assume the responsibility for ensuring that Palestinian infiltrators did not move back in the wake of the departing Israeli army. The reliability of such arrangements would presumably rest on the self-interest of the local population in avoiding both the harassment of a renewed Palestinian presence and the effects of Israeli retaliation in the event of Palestinian attacks on Israel (as was the case before June 1982). But if effective security arrangements also required some measure of local

goodwill, a prolonged Israeli presence — pending the completion of such arrangements — was counterproductive, since unavoidable friction would continue to erode whatever store of goodwill remained from the initial Israeli entry in the summer of 1982. Meanwhile, Israeli hopes for reliable security arrangements were further undermined by the murders of several Israeli-sponsored "home guard" leaders and also by the death (by natural causes) of Israel's most proven ally, Major Sa'ad Haddad.

By early 1984, most of Israel's war aims in Lebanon had been exposed as unrealistic. A strong, pro-Israel regime in Beirut was clearly unattainable; the prospects for any kind of political reconstruction were uncertain, at best, but in the maneuvering aimed at the establishment of some kind of central authority, Syria's position appeared to be superior to that of Israel. The internal cohesion of the PLO had been severely disrupted and Yasir Arafat's ability to function effectively as an autonomous political actor had been further circumscribed. But these changes had not yet impelled Arafat to revise his basic policy. Nor had they eliminated his power to veto negotiations that bypassed the PLO, or improved Israel's ability to promote its preferred outcomes for the Palestinian issue and the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The only enduring achievement was the physical distancing of the PLO from Israel's northern settlements, and the major challenge was to determine whether this gain could be preserved by some method other than a perpetuation of the military deployment of early 1984. None of the possible alternatives — complete withdrawal, partial withdrawal, graduated withdrawal, reliance on local and/or international security forces — promised to be as effective in keeping terrorists away from Israel's northern border. Furthermore, any pullback in the eastern sector had to take account of possible encroachments by the formidable Syrian forces in the Biqa'.

Nevertheless, a continuing presence on the same scale entailed very high costs in terms of IDF casualties, morale, normal training routines, economic costs and domestic unity. The last consideration might ultimately be the most critical of all, because until a domestic consensus on security was restored, it would be difficult for Israel to project an image of decisiveness on other issues in other areas and thus maintain the credible deterrent that lies at the very core of its national security. For this reason, Israel could be expected, within a reasonable period of time, to act unilaterally to extricate itself from Lebanon.

3. The Fatah Rebellion and the Future of the PLO

If Israel's recent experience in Lebanon has been unhappy, the PLO's would appear to be altogether disastrous. Two events that roughly demarcate the period under review — Yasir Arafat's enforced departure from Beirut at the end of August 1982 and his enforced departure from Tripoli at the end of December 1983 — also symbolize the impact of the Lebanese war on the fortunes of the PLO. These events were linked by a chain of circumstances that included a rebellion inside Fatah, a violent split in the PLO and a direct confrontation with Syria that called into question the future character of the PLO and the overall place of the Palestinian issue in the Arab-Israel conflict.

There are two dimensions to the crisis that wracked the PLO: intra-Palestinian disputes and Palestinian-Syrian enmity. Both problems had existed for a long time; either one was potentially explosive. It was Israel's expulsion of the PLO from its last autonomous base of operations in southern Lebanon and Beirut that fused these problems together into the political equivalent of critical mass.

Despite the triumphal face that Arafat put on his withdrawal from Beirut, the dispersal of PLO forces constituted a serious political setback. Southern Lebanon had provided the only military front with Israel and the only access to a large Palestinian population that was not mediated by some Arab government. The loss of these assets undermined the PLO's ability to maintain a credible independent struggle against Israel and was recognized as a defeat by others, even if not by Arafat himself. Arafat's leadership and judgment were further tarnished by the massacre in Sabra and Shatila, which exposed the inadequacy of the security arrangements to which Arafat had agreed during the pre-evacuation negotiations. And without the quasi-state apparatus that he had previously used to impose organizational discipline, Arafat was far less able to suppress challenges to his authority.

In this general atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty, specific measures taken by Arafat to retrieve the situation came under increasing criticism. One immediate problem-area was rehabilitation of the organization. The appointment to senior military commands of Haj Ahmad Ismail and Ghazi Atallah (Abu Hajm) — two Arafat loyalists whose performance during the fighting was felt to have been less than honorable — provoked widespread hostility and brought into the open the simmering resentment of corruption in the use of PLO funds and offices. Arafat's opponents denounced his control of finances and personnel and began to issue strident demands for "internal democracy" and a truly collective leadership.

The second major source of conflict was the future strategy of the

organization as a whole. The PLO had always been an umbrella organization containing elements and factions that favored uncompromising struggle for maximal objectives, as well as those that accepted the necessity of tactical moderation and political flexibility in accordance with changing conditions. One reason for Arafat's continuing leadership of the PLO had been his ability to maneuver among these various forces. In the aftermath of Beirut, however, he apparently concluded that greater receptiveness to proposals for a political settlement of the Palestinian problem was necessary, lest he and the PLO be completely overtaken by events. Given the weakened condition of Syria and the PLO, Arafat could not rely on other Arab states to torpedo the Reagan Plan, especially since Israel's immediate rejection meant that Arab acceptance might produce a rift between Israel and the United States. In fact, the Arab Summit Conference in Fez resolved on September 9 to initiate contacts with the United States in order "to be informed" about the American position. Nor could Arafat afford to oppose the Conference's endorsement of the Fahd peace plan, Article 7 of which called for "peace for all the states of the region" and was widely interpreted to imply recognition of Israel.

These developments forced Arafat to embark on a mission of diplomatic "damage control," primarily aimed at ensuring that any Jordanian response to American initiatives would somehow preserve both a central role for the PLO, which was ignored in the Reagan Plan, and the eventual possibility of a Palestinian state, specifically excluded in the president's proposal. But whereas Arafat's ambiguous pronouncements had previously mollified his PLO and Arab critics, this time they only intensified suspicions. The mere intention to hold discussions with King Hussein was viewed as tantamount to concessions on fundamental Palestinian demands; a statement of willingness at the beginning of January 1983 to enter peace negotiations without preconditions was considered treasonous.

Conflicts over principle and power were hardly unprecedented in the PLO. Every effort to "moderate" Palestinian policy had resulted in verbal attacks, and worse, by factions committed to ideological purity or the interests of rejectionist Arab regimes. Saiqa and Ahmad Jibril's PFLP — General Command, though formally represented in the PLO Executive Committee, had long since been subordinated to Syrian control; the Abu Nidal faction of the Palestine Liberation Front had been expelled from the PLO for using terror against other Palestinians and Abu Nidal himself had repeatedly threatened to kill Arafat. What distinguished the resistance to Arafat this time was that it emerged from the ranks of Fatah itself, Arafat's own faction and the largest and most important of the PLO's constituent groups.

The incipient unrest in Fatah first surfaced at a meeting of the Fatah Revolutionary Council in Aden in January 1983. At that session, the Deputy Chief of Operations, Muhammad Sa'id Musa (Abu Musa) spoke

for several high-ranking Fatah officials when he demanded that Arafat rectify the deviations attributed to him.

Those who engineered the rebellion in Fatah may have acted for their own reasons — some had fought against the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976 — but it is unlikely that they could have successfully challenged Arafat's authority without active Syrian support. Syria's determination to bring Arafat to heel, or else bring him down, was partly explained by personal enmity betweeen the PLO leader and Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad that dated back at least to 1966, when Assad, then minister of defense, had Arafat arrested for unwarranted interference in Ba'th Party affairs. There was also strong evidence that Arafat had provided weapons and funds to the fundamentalist Islamic Sunni forces in Syria that had attempted to overthrow Assad's regime in the early 1980s; according to some reports circulating at the time, Assad decided then to terminate Arafat's leadership of the PLO, and perhaps his life, as well. Many Muslim Brethren fleeing Assad's brutal repression of their revolt found refuge in Tripoli, where they joined forces with Arafat and continued to conspire against Assad. The first large-scale Syrian-PLO battle took place in Tripoli in December 1982, and during Arafat's final stand in Tripoli a year later, the Islamic Unity Organization of Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban allied itself with Arafat against the Syrian-supported rebels.

Assad's major concern, however, was Arafat's persistent tendency to act independently of, and sometimes contrary to Syrian strategic interests. He may have blamed Arafat for dragging him into a war in Lebanon that Assad did not yet want. In any event, Syria gave the PLO no active help during the fighting, agreed to a ceasefire with Israel at the first opportunity and reportedly even intercepted Soviet arms shipments to the Palestinians in Lebanon. Assad's approach to the negotiations over PLO withdrawal from Beirut was not sympathetic — he delayed several times before permitting the evacuation of some PLO units to Syria. And when these units did reach Syria, Assad made it abundantly clear that they were not going to recreate in his country the political-military infrastructure they had lost in Lebanon. PLO fighters were immediately disarmed and kept under close scrutiny.

Arafat apparently grasped the situation and preferred to establish his new headquarters in Tunis. Beyond Assad's reach, he reasserted the Palestinian "independence of decision" and embarked on the diplomatic campaign seemingly demanded in the post-Reagan Plan, post-Fez environment. But the prospect of Arafat-Hussein negotiations not only antagonized elements in Fatah, it also revived traditional Syrian fears of another separate Arab peace with Israel. Although Syrian suspicions of Arafat's moderation might appear to be even less warranted than Israeli skepticism, similarly flimsy evidence of Jordanian intention to negotiate with Israel had led Assad to apply crude military pressure in the past. Now, the prospect of a

Jordanian-PLO "conspiracy" necessitated measures to dissuade both parties.

In early 1983, Jordan was warned against negotiations and subjected to threats of Syrian force concentrations. Later in the year, several Jordanian diplomats were murdered. Arafat, deprived of his Lebanese sanctuary by Israel, was even more vulnerable to Syrian intimidation because the only remaining operational PLO units were now in Syria or Syrian-occupied areas of Lebanon and at the mercy of Syrian goodwill. Reports began to circulate as early as October 1982 that Assad was encouraging a revolt among these units. In the middle of that month, the Syrian Information Minister declared that Arafat had no authority to represent the PLO in any talks with Jordan, and other, unnamed Syrian officials explicitly demanded the ouster of Arafat and the reorganization of the PLO Executive Committee.

Arafat, as usual, tried to placate all parties without foreclosing any options. The 16th session of the Palestine National Council, meeting in Algiers in February 1983, reaffirmed the PLO's adherence to the armed struggle and its demands for self-determination and an independent state. It also confirmed the importance of the strategic relationship with Syria and rejected the Reagan Plan as a just basis for a solution of the conflict. In a gesture to Syria and PLO hardliners, Arafat even forbade Issam Sartawi, his political adviser and a known advocate of peaceful coexistence with Israel, to address the Council. On the other hand, the emphasis on "independent Palestinian decisionmaking" implied criticism of Syrian behavior, as did the statement that the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front "was not at the level of the tasks requested of it during the Zionist invasion of Lebanon." Most importantly, the PNC affirmed the need for action to develop "the special and distinctive relations" with Jordan. Even though future relations were to be based on a confederation between two independent states, the Council decisions clearly did not rule out negotiations with Jordan over joint tactics and policy vis-à-vis Israel and the United States.

In spite of Syrian opposition and threats, talks between Arafat and Hussein were begun on April 4. According to most reports, the two men actually agreed on a plan sufficiently compatible with the Reagan proposals to permit further discussions with the Americans. Arafat then flew to Kuwait to consult with the Fatah Executive Committee and other PLO colleagues, promising to return within two days. He could not, however, secure their endorsement of the agreement and did not return to Amman. On April 19, Hussein's patience was exhausted and he broke off the talks. The same day, Issam Sartawi was assassinated at a Socialist International conference in Lisbon, apparently by a member of the Abu Nidal group.

Syria and the Fatah radicals could draw little solace from the fact the Arafat-Hussein negotiations had failed. After all, they had come uncomfortably close to success. Furthermore, Arafat could obviously not be trusted not to revive them at a later time. So though Arafat sought a reconciliation with Assad in a meeting at the beginning of May, it was clear that only a fundamental restructuring of the PLO would ensure that the Palestinian cause would be promoted in a manner compatible with Syrian interests.

The revolt broke out in the Yarmuq Brigade on May 9, when rebels led by Abu Musa took eight loyalist positions in the Biqa'. In the days that followed, other positions were overrun and PLO installations inside Syria were also attacked. The Syrian government announced that the rebellion was a purely internal Palestinian affair. Syrian circumspection was called for in view of widespread Arab support for Arafat. Nevertheless, the heavy hand of Syrian intervention was unmistakable. Without Assad's concurrence, armed men would not have dared to attack PLO offices and depots in Damascus; nor could the supply lines to loyalist positions in the Biqa' have been cut. The most telling indication was the fact that an open rebellion only took place in Syria and Syrian-occupied Lebanon; everywhere else, Arafat's preeminence was unchallenged, however much sympathy may have been felt for some of the rebels' demands.

By the middle of June, the situation in the Biqa' had deteriorated to the point where Arafat felt compelled to return to Lebanon and set up a command post in Tripoli. He then traveled covertly to Damascus and called an emergency session of the Fatah Revolutionary Council. But the real problem now was Assad. Far from agreeing to meet Arafat, the Syrian leader directed his artillery to shell Tripoli and then had his military police deliver an ultimatum to Arafat to leave Damascus within six hours or be arrested. Arafat chose the first option and returned to Tunis. From there, he appealed alternatively to Assad and Arab public opinion to stop the battles. But the former was implacable; the latter, impotent. Assad kept up controlled military pressure and occasionally added a measure of psychological pressure — as in the revival on July 10 of the claim that Palestine was really southern Syria.

Arafat's situation steadily worsened throughout the summer because of military setbacks and continuing defections, including that of his own spokesman, Mahmoud Labadi. In the middle of September, Arafat returned to Tripoli to assume direct command of the loyalist forces, but by the end of the month, his position in the Biqa' was no longer tenable. The last 1,000 fighters were escorted by Syrian troops to the northern town of Hermel and then permitted to slip out and join other forces in the Tripoli area, Arafat's only remaining foothold in Lebanon. In the following three months, the drama of Beirut and the Biqa' was played out once again, with the same results.

Syrian artillery began shelling the town. Rebel forces continued their pressure, both here and in Damascus, where clashes between rival Fatah

factions in October led to the ousting of Arafat loyalists from the organization's offices. Despite the backing of Sunni forces in Tripoli and continued political support elsewhere — anti-Assad demonstrations were held in the West Bank at the beginning of November — Arafat could do little more than fight a holding action. Rebel/Syrian control of Mount Turbul, overlooking the Tripoli enclave, was a major tactical advantage, as was the presence of a pro-Syrian Alawite militia inside the city.

Arafat's major assets now were the sympathy of most Arab states and the benevolent neutrality of the most important PLO factions after Fatah itself — the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine of George Habash and the Democratic Front of Na'if Hawatmeh. These factors forced Assad to obscure the extent of Syrian involvement but they did not weaken his determination to see Arafat removed from Lebanon. After a month of artillery exchanges and infantry skirmishes, temporarily halted by a ceasefire on November 10, the rebels attacked the two Palestinian refugee camps still held by Arafat. Nahr al-Bared fell on November 14 (one of the most prominent defenders killed here was Abu Ali Mustapha, secretary-general of the PFLP); Baddawi, the site of Arafat's military command, was overrun two days later.

Pushed back into Tripoli itself, Arafat was now confronted with the choice of fleeing in disgrace or attempting to defend the city against superior rebel and Syrian firepower, probably bringing about its physical destruction along with his own. Lack of enthusiasm among his local allies for the second option was one factor that convinced Arafat to agree to evacuate his forces. Characteristically, however, he tried to prolong the negotiations over withdrawal arrangements as long as possible, hoping that some deus ex machina would rescue him from his dilemma. In fact, the illness of Assad and uncertainty about political stability in Syria did provide a temporary reprieve. The spectacularly lopsided prisoner exchange with Israel in late November – six Israeli POWs in return for the release of 4,700 Palestinians held in Israeli jails or in the Ansar detention camp in southern Lebanon — also boosted Arafat's prestige.

In the end, however, it was the unchanging balance of forces on the ground that dictated the outcome. After additional delays caused by Israeli shelling around Tripoli port and vague threats to prevent Arafat's departure, the evacuation actually began on December 20. In two days, about 4,000 of his supporters were ferried out on Greek ships under French naval escort and dispersed, once again, to reception areas in Arab countries far from the front line of the Palestinian cause.

As in September 1982, so now did Arafat strive to convert a military defeat into a political victory. His first priorities were to find a useful counterweight to Syrian hostility and to reestablish his control of the Palestinian movement. In both respects, the results of his efforts were mixed.

Traveling through the Suez Canal en route to Yemen, Arafat stopped at Ismailia and then proceeded to Cairo, where he was received by President Mubarak in the first official meeting between Egyptian and PLO leaders since Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977. The decision to meet Mubarak before Egypt had complied with consistent Palestinian demands that it abandon the principles of Camp David was obviously a retreat stemming from weakness. It was interpreted as such by Arafat's enemies in the PLO and by some Rejection Front countries as well as by Egypt, Jordan and the United States. The former criticized this concession on Palestinian principles; the latter welcomed it as presaging a possible reduction of the PLO's ability to constrain their own freedom of maneuver on the Palestinian question, perhaps even leading to Arafat's agreement to further exploration of the Reagan Plan. If there were now two PLOs, rather than one, then Arafat's claim to be the sole legitimate spokesman of the Palestinian people was devalued, and Hussein's own credentials would be enhanced. It was apparently with this idea in mind that Hussein reconvened the Jordanian Chamber of Deputies in January 1984 and arranged to have new representatives appointed for West Bank seats that had fallen vacant since the suspension of Parliament in 1977.

All this notwithstanding, the very fact that Arafat's visit to Cairo aroused such strong reactions indicated that his position as the primary international symbol of the Palestinian cause had been preserved. The visit was valuable to Mubarak precisely because Arafat, even in his weakened condition, was still able to withhold or confer a measure of pan-Arab legitimacy on Egypt and thus influence the nature of Egypt's relations with the rest of the Arab world. Several other Arab states, for reasons having little to do with the Arab-Israeli conflict, were interested in a formal rapprochement with Egypt, but only in the aftermath of Arafat's visit did they feel free to move decisively on this issue. Jordan, for example, signed an economic cooperation agreement with Egypt only three days after Arafat had left Cairo. In January 1984, Mubarak was invited to make official visits to Jordan and Iraq and did go to Morocco. In the same month, the Islamic Conference Organization, of which Arafat was vice-president, met in Rabat and formally invited Egypt to rejoin without posing any preconditions.

Furthermore, Arafat did retain control of Fatah and PLO institutions. In Lebanon, the Fatah rebels appeared to be unsure of what to do next and Ahmad Jibril, whose credentials as an independent Palestinian force were even less impressive, displaced them as the movement's leading spokesman. A session of the Fatah Central Committee in Tunis on January 5 expressed "surprise" at Arafat's "personal initiative," meaning the meeting with Mubarak, but it also denounced the Syrian-Libyan "conspiracy" against the Palestinian cause and expelled five prominent rebels, including Abu Musa, on grounds of treason. It appeared that the most important

Palestinian financial resource — the Saudi subsidy — was still paid over to Arafat personally.

The greatest degree of ambiguity attached to the most critical question of all — the implications of the split in the PLO for the future course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The expulsion of Arafat from Lebanon meant that one of Israel's war aims had effectively been achieved, though by Syria and in a manner probably not anticipated. But this did not necessarily improve Israel's position, tactically or strategically.

In Lebanon, Palestinian attacks from whatever quarter had long since been replaced by Shi'ite and other Lebanese violence as the primary day-to-day threat to Israeli forces. But the PLO rebels, at least as inclined as Arafat's supporters to strike at Israeli targets, were potentially freer to do so now that the intra-Palestinian fighting had come to an end. At the same time, they were even more subject to Syrian control (except for those released from Ansar — rebels and loyalists — who remained in southern Lebanon). In the West Bank and Gaza, and in Israel iself, PLO disunity had not eliminated Palestinian unrest and attacks on Israelis. Several Israelis were killed in the territories during 1983 and a bus in Jerusalem was bombed at the beginning of December, even before the fate of Tripoli had been decided. Indeed, there were signs in early 1984 that Palestinian organizations — loyalists as well as rebels — were reverting to the small-unit terrorist attacks on civilian targets that had been the only form of PLO "military" activity before the acquisition of the Lebanese base in the 1970s had made possible an ambitious conventional buildup.

On the broader political-strategic question, the picture was even more confused. If Arafat remained strong enough to deter others from acting on behalf of the Palestinians, then there would almost certainly be no movement toward an autonomy agreement as favored by Israel, and the most likely outcome would be continuation of the status quo. A desire to reunify the PLO would also argue in favor of political immobilism. But it was also possible that Arafat, having already paid the price — a split in the PLO and an open clash with Syria — for a "crime" he did not commit, might now decide that he had little more to lose by committing himself unequivocally to a peaceful political settlement This he could conceivably do either on a bilateral basis with Israel or by dropping his objection to Jordanian-Israeli negotiations in exchange for a minimally satisfactory role for himself and the Palestinians in any settlement.

Another possibility was that Arafat would ultimately emerge so weakened by recent events that he no longer had a veto. That might conceivably facilitate an agreement on autonomy, but the more likely consequence was that Jordan, with the support of the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Palestinians in Jordan and the territories, would feel both capable of and justified in approving negotiations on the basis of the Reagan proposals. If that happened, the government of Israel would come under heavy international and domestic pressure to respond positively.

The difficulty in predicting the implications of the split in the PLO explained Israel's ambivalent attitude toward Arafat's expulsion from Tripoli: expressions of satisfaction at his humiliation and defeat coupled with veiled threats that he would not be permitted to depart peacefully. A clearer picture would not emerge before the Hussein-Arafat dialogue was renewed and another Arab Summit conference was convened, and perhaps not even then. But an unqualified PLO declaration in favor of peace or Jordanian acceptance of the Reagan Plan (with or without Arafat's endorsement) would be equally problematic for the Israeli government. Ironically, then, the least unfavorable outcome from its point of view was that Arafat remain both as authoritative and as noncommittal as he had been before his defeats in Tripoli, the Biqa' and Beirut.

4. Superpower Involvement in the Area

The first phase of the war in Lebanon was widely interpreted as an American victory in the superpower competition for power and prestige in the Middle East. American allies and weapons had prevailed over Soviet allies and weapons and the United States appeared to have gained a commanding role in the diplomacy of the region. But during the next eighteen months, events illustrated, once again, the volatility of the political balance and the difficulties that superpowers encounter in controlling, or even understanding, the forces that determine their relative standing.

Like every other administration before it, the Reagan administration has been frequently accused of not having a comprehensive, consistent strategy for the Middle East. Whatever the validity of this criticism, the United States did pursue three fairly clear objectives during 1982-83: a restoration of stability in Lebanon (based on the withdrawal of all foreign forces and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and national unity), movement toward a comprehensive settlement of the Israel-Arab conflict, and the promotion of strategic cooperation with local powers, especially in the Gulf. The first of these was intrinsically least important and was initially perceived as an obstacle in the pursuit of the broader peace settlement and, to a lesser extent, of strategic consensus in the area. But with the passage of time, Lebanon so entangled and monopolized the thoughts and actions of American policymakers that it threatened to paralyze progress on other issues.

The complexities of the Lebanese problem were not fully appreciated in September 1982. In fact, President Reagan's peace plan of September 1, which called for Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza "in association with Jordan," proceeded from the assumption that a Lebanese settlement had, for all intents and purposes, already been achieved. This assumption did not then seem totally unfounded. After all, the PLO had been broken and expelled from Beirut, Syria was weakened and would, it appeared, eventually have to agree to withdraw its remaining forces in the Biqa' and northern Lebanon, considerable progress toward the reunification of Lebanon under a new central government had already been made, and Israel was expected to pull back its forces in the very near future.

Israel's categorical rejection of the Reagan Plan was certainly a disappointment but there would be time to deal with this problem once the loose ends in Lebanon had been tidied up. In this connection, the recall on schedule of the American, French and Italian contingents of the multinational force sent to supervise the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut was an encouraging sign. Even the assassination of Bashir Jumayyil and the subsequent mass murders in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps did not appear to pose insurmountable barriers to national reconciliation in

Lebanon. It is true that the multinational force was sent back to ensure order until the Lebanese government could assert its authority, but the expeditious election of Amin Jumayyil to succeed his younger brother promised a reasonably smooth political transition. By October, American military advisers were already reporting "impressive progress" in rebuilding and strengthening the Lebanese army. There was also reason to believe that Lebanon and Israel would soon reach agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the institution of mutually beneficial relations between the two countries.

No single event derailed American plans for Lebanon. Instead, it was an exaggerated sense of American influence, coupled with a fundamental misreading of the aspirations and capabilities of other relevant factors, that made these plans appear progressively less feasible. Absent a credible Israeli or American threat to force Syria out of Lebanon, Hafiz al-Assad could not be compelled or convinced to sanction arrangements that would translate Israeli military successes during 1982 into political currency or entrench an independent (i.e., pro-western, pro-Israeli) government in Beirut. Israel was unwilling to abandon its war aims in Lebanon. And the contradictory interests of the most coherent Lebanese factions — Maronites, Druze and Shi'ites — continued to rule out a peaceful redistribution of power and reunification of the country.

Although the United States was ostensibly involved in a peacekeeping operation in support of confessionally-neutral Lebanese government institutions, that government was inextricably linked in the eyes of its enemies with Maronite power. Supporters of the government were therefore identified, by extension, with the Maronites (and their Israeli allies), and the increasingly active hostility of the government's domestic and foreign opponents was inevitably directed against the United States, as well. Five Marines were wounded in a grenade attack in March but the first major blow at the American presence in Lebanon was the car-bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983. Among the 63 casualties were 17 Americans, several of whom were working in the CIA station in Beirut. The perpetrators were assumed to be Iranian-inspired Shi'ite terrorists, assisted by Syrian intelligence agencies.

Despite this attack and continuing Syrian opposition, the President and Secretary of State George Shultz continued to pursue a Lebanese-Israeli agreement. But other American officials were losing confidence that such an agreement was attainable or that it would, even if possible, suffice to produce a Syrian withdrawal; references to the problem of the Golan Heights were made in terms designed to elicit a more cooperative attitude on the part of Syria and perhaps even to bring about a Syrian-American rapprochement.

In Lebanon itself, however, progress on national reconciliation was virtually nonexistent. The Lebanese Parliament's approval of the May 17

agreement with Israel did little to reduce intercommunal tensions. On the contrary, these increased in anticipation of a struggle for control of any territory that Israel might evacuate. The formation of an anti-government National Salvation Front by pro-Syrian Druze, Maronite and Sunni leaders on July 24 portended growing violence over the summer, which eventually touched American forces.

At first, the main danger to the Marine contingent in the Beirut airport area was accidental exposure to fire by Druze or Shi'ite militiamen attempting to close the airport or hit nearby Lebanese army positions. This danger intensified at the end of August when the Maronite and Druze militias prepared to battle for control of the Shouf and the Lebanese army mounted a major push against Shi'ite strongholds in West Beirut. On August 29, a Druze mortar shell killed two Marines in the airport and American forces were authorized to return fire for the first time. The incident led to a reinforcement of US naval power off the coast of Lebanon, but it also revived the debate in Washington about the wisdom of leaving the Marines in Beirut. That debate intensified the following week when vicious fighting broke out in the Shouf and Druze shelling killed two more Marines.

Casualties in a "peacekeeping operation" were controversial enough, but when US naval firepower was employed in support of the Lebanese army in Suq al-Gharb, the character of American involvement changed and Congress threatened to cut off funding for operations in Lebanon unless the president invoked the War Powers Resolution, which would require him to withdraw US forces from Lebanon within sixty days unless Congress authorized them to stay longer. Reagan eventually secured a compromise whereby Congress itself declared the War Powers Resolution to be in effect but approved the Marine presence until April 1985.

This decision temporarily removed Lebanon from the domestic political agenda. The American show of force helped bring about a ceasefire at the end of September, which provided additional relief for the president. But on October 23, terrorists drove a truck-bomb into Marine headquarters at Beirut airport and inflicted the bloodiest blow at US military forces since Vietnam. The explosion collapsed the building, killed 241 Americans and cast a heavy shadow over the US presence in Lebanon. Evidence of Iranian and Syrian complicity fueled Reagan's anger at "state-supported terrorism" and was viewed as an intolerably vicious aspect of the campaign by "the Soviet-Syrian axis" to sabotage his policy in Lebanon. Unlike France, whose contingent headquarters in Beirut was bombed the same day, the US did not retaliate against suspected terrorist bases in Syrian-controlled territory, but it did issue strong threats against Syria, backed up by a major concentration of force in the eastern Mediterranean, by aggressive aerial reconnaissance over Syrian positions and, in November, by discussions on strategic cooperation with Israel that produced ominous references in the press to "joint planning" against Syria.

At the same time, the attack led to renewed questioning of the price the United States was being forced to pay for objectives that were both ill-understood at home and not readily attainable by military means. Despite the president's argument that the survival of the Lebanese government and the general credibility of American guarantees both required a continuing Marine presence, support for his policies was further threatened at the beginning of December when the first application of American air power led to the downing of two planes by Syrian ground fire, as a result of which one pilot was killed and another taken prisoner. On the same day, a mortar attack on Beirut airport killed eight more Marines. Another unwelcome development at the end of December was the report of the Pentagon committee study of the Marine headquarters bombing. The committee, headed by retired Admiral Robert Long, focused on security lapses and defects in the military chain of command, but it also suggested new diplomatic efforts, thereby implicitly criticizing the appropriateness of the Marines' mission.

Lebanon was also temporarily injected into electoral politics by the publicity surrounding the fate of the captured Navy pilot, Lt. Robert Goodman. Goodman's release was secured at the beginning of January 1984 after the personal intervention of Jesse Jackson, a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination. Jackson's success — described in some quarters as a victory in "the Syria primary" — did not assure him the nomination but it did raise unflattering comparisons with the president's inability to achieve this outcome and recalled the impact of American hostages on the reelection hopes of a previous incumbent president. It also improved Assad's image in the United States, stimulated a demand by all other Democratic candidates (except for John Glenn) and many congressional leaders for the quick recall of US troops, and forced Reagan to defend his policies more vigorously than ever. This was made doubly difficult by the weakening resolve of other participants in the multinational force in Beirut. Although none had yet decided to withdraw its entire contingent, the Italians did recall almost one-third of their 2,200-man force by the end of January, and the French returned one-quarter of their 2,100 troops to UNIFIL duty in southern Lebanon.

American policy in Lebanon was burdened by a number of contradictions. One was the tendency to justify the use of force by the need to protect American troops stationed there, thus creating the impression that the means to other objectives had become ends in themselves. While this approach had some resonance in congressional and public opinion, it did not resolve growing doubts about the substance of the Marines' mission. A second problem was the attribution of global significance to American persistence in Lebanon. If a continuing military presence was made a test of US will and credibility everywhere in the world, then America's ability to induce President Jumayyil to make compromises necessary for an internal

settlement — by implicitly linking US military support to Jumayyil's behavior — was diminished.

These contradictions were not the only factors in the Lebanon equation — Syria's central role and intransigent policy remained the critical variables — but they certainly contributed to America's inability to secure its objectives there. The central government of Amin Jumayyil, which had never been able to extend its authority much beyond the confines of Beirut, lost control of the western part of the city to the Shi'ite and Druze militias during a fresh outbreak of fighting in early February 1984, at which point even President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz recognized that a continuing military presence in Lebanon was no longer warranted. On February 7, a "phased redeployment" of the Marines was announced; the evacuation of the Marines, together with several thousand foreign civilians, was completed by February 26. The withdrawal was accompanied by heavy naval and air bombardment of anti-government positions but this was universally interpreted as a parting shot, intended only to compensate for the indignity of the American retreat, and it did little to check Syria and its local allies or to still the doubts voiced elsewhere in the region about the reliability of American commitments.

As discouraging as the futility of America's direct involvement in Lebanon was the fact that the unresolved conflict there made it difficult for the United States to direct its resources and attention to the promotion of the broader regional peace plan announced by President Reagan in September 1982.[1] The effect of the stalemate in Lebanon on strategic cooperation with local powers was much less weighty. In the Gulf, US rhetoric betrayed a growing concern about the possible implications of an Iranian victory and diplomatic contacts with Iraq became more frequent, although there was no suggestion that military ties were even under consideration. But strategic relations with the other Arab Gulf states remained an important element of US policy. Although no major breakthroughs took place, the growing fear of horizontal escalation in the Iran-Iraq war did lead some Gulf Cooperation Council members to adopt a more positive attitude to the idea of discussions with the United States on security planning. Even Kuwait, which had always most strongly opposed any visible association with the US military posture in the area, received the commander of the US naval task force based in Bahrain and agreed to discuss contingencies with a joint State-Defense Department delegation.

Joint exercises to rehearse desert combat — one with Egypt and one with Sudan — were held as scheduled in the summer of 1983. During the course of these exercises, the Rapid Deployment Force, recently integrated into the newly-formed Central Command, assembled the largest American force concentration in Africa since World War II. Maneuvers were held with Oman and Somalia, as well.

[1] For more on the fate of the Reagan proposals, see Chapters 1 and 2.

At the end of November, the issue of Israeli-American strategic cooperation was discussed during a visit by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to Washington. Although the suspended Memorandum of Understanding of November 1981 was not officially revived, the strategic relationship between the two countries was given new impetus and it was decided that political-military working committees would meet periodically to treat specific topics. By early 1984, an agreement on medical supplies and facilities had been reached and it was announced that a joint US-Israeli naval exercise, to be held at some unspecified future date, was under consideration. Continuing cooperation in the fields of intelligence, contingency planning and military research and development is implicit in the relationship between the two countries.

The most controversial aspect of American efforts in the field of strategic cooperation was the funding of a Jordanian rapid intervention force. During 1983, administration attempts to provide secret funding for the equipment and training of two Jordanian airborne brigades came to light. The mission of these brigades — timely intervention in support of threatened regimes in the Arabian peninsula — was not inherently objectionable to Congress. Indeed, a Jordanian RDF would complement US interests in the Gulf and fill an obvious lacuna in US force projection capabilities. But Congress did take strong exception to the administration's secretive methods and both Congress and Israel expressed reservations about the relevance of some of the weaponry (e.g., bridging equipment, shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles) included by the Pentagon in the plan. Congress therefore turned down a formal request in October to appropriate $220 million for this purpose. However, the administration indicated that it still supported the idea and Israel was obliged to tone down its opposition. Although the same proposal might not be resubmitted in the near future, parallel concerns about developments in the Gulf suggested that if agreement could be reached on an acceptable weapons-mix for the force and on assurances that it would not be turned against Israel, practical US assistance to augment Jordan's intervention capability could well be forthcoming.

American efforts through 1982-83 can be generally characterized as an attempt to exploit politically the apparently advantageous position brought about by Israel's military victory in Lebanon. The Soviets, by contrast, faced the challenge of salvaging something from the defeat of their major Middle Eastern allies in Lebanon. But their primary task, as seen through the prism of superpower competition, was to deny the Americans the political harvest they were seeking: an exclusive role in future Middle Eastern diplomacy, perhaps culminating in a fundamental restructuring of Syria's foreign alignments. And since denial was essentially a less complicated undertaking, the Soviets were able to achieve a greater measure of success.

It is fortunate for the Soviets that the problem they confronted was both

familiar and relatively simple. Throughout the period under review, they were preoccupied with a permanent political succession crisis because of the impending death of Leonid Brezhnev and, after a brief burst of activity, the incapacitating illness of Yuri Andropov. This crisis consumed the attention of Soviet leaders and made major new initiatives problematic. Furthermore, whatever energy was left over for foreign policy was devoted to a much more important problem — the stationing of new American intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

The Soviets therefore responded to the setback in Lebanon with tried and true methods — a strong declaration of political support for PLO positions and the rapid, massive resupply of the Syrian armed forces. The first of these steps was particularly simple. In mid-September 1982, the Soviets answered the Reagan Plan with a set of peace proposals, issued in Brezhnev's name, that included Palestinian self-determination, the "right to return," and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO. In affirming traditional PLO demands, the Soviets obviously hoped to reestablish their own political credentials and undermine any inclination among Palestinians and other Arabs to respond positively to the Reagan Plan.

The rearming of Syria was an even more urgent priority because the Syrians had expressed disappointment with the quality of Soviet weapons, and their actions in the summer and early fall of 1982 could be interpreted as foreshadowing a major reorientation of Syrian foreign policy. Syria was the last important Soviet foothold in the region. Syria's "defection" to the pro-American camp would be an extremely serious blow to Soviet aspirations in the Middle East, and the Soviets therefore spared no effort to provide every reassurance demanded by the Syrians. This meant, not only replacing what had been lost, but upgrading and modernizing Syrian capabilities, especially in the field of air power and air defense. Extra-long range (185 km) SA-5 surface-to-air missiles were provided — the first time these were sent outside the Warsaw Pact — along with new radars, Soviet advisers and crews, and a command, control and communications network that linked the entire system to Soviet air defense headquarters in Moscow.

In order to relieve continuing Syrian anxieties, Soviet spokesmen also declared that any Israeli aggression against Syrian territory would be met by direct Soviet intervention. However, the prospect of a massive Soviet military presence was not an unmitigated blessing in Syrian eyes, and some other remedy for Syria's sense of vulnerability to Israeli power was necessary. This appeared in October 1983, in the form of the SS-21, a new tactical ground-to-ground missile with a range of 120 km and much greater accuracy than anything in the Syrian arsenal. The SS-21, stationed in southern Syria, could hit airfields and other facilities in northern Israel vital to any Israeli military operations against Syria. It also provided a counterweight to Israel's long-range bombing capability by posing a

potential threat to important economic installations (e.g., the oil refineries near Haifa) against which Israel's own air defenses could not provide an effective response. Because of their potential impact on the air balance, the SA-5 and SS-21 were a significant contribution to Syria's goal of "strategic parity" with Israel.

Between the end of the Syrian-Israeli battles in Lebanon in June 1982 and the beginning of 1984, the Soviets were said to have dispatched to Syria over 4,000 military advisers (in addition to the 3-4,000 previously there) and some $2.8 billion worth of weapons. This assistance was an important factor in Syria's ability to pursue an uncompromising policy in Lebanon, thereby frustrating American aspirations and, in the logic of the superpower rivalry, promoting Soviet objectives in this part of the Middle East.

In the Gulf, the Soviets resumed their sales of major weapons to Iraq in mid-1982 and the tone of Soviet-Iraqi relations improved after a period of strain during which Saddam had been moved to complain that the 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation had not worked. The pre-war intimacy was not revived and Iraq continued to cultivate better ties with the West, but the Soviet Union remained Iraq's most important military supplier. On the other hand, Soviet-Iranian relations cooled in early 1983 when Iran arrested Tudeh (communist) Party leaders and then outlawed the entire party after charging it with subversion and espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Some Soviet diplomats were also accused of interfering in Iran's internal affairs and expelled from the country. Nevertheless, it had long been clear that the Soviets were unlikely to achieve any meaningful influence or presence in Iran under Khomeini and these developments therefore represented only a marginal deterioration in the Soviet position. Iran was careful not to break ties completely and the fact that the Soviets maintained diplomatic and military relations (however tenuous) with both sides still left them with a relative advantage over the United States.

One new problem did emerge in late 1982 and 1983 to trouble Soviet decisionmakers — the conflict between Syria and the PLO. Both were desirable Soviet allies and the clash between them, like those between other Soviet regional allies in the past, was a source of considerable embarrassment. Unlike the dilemmas posed by Iraqi-Iranian or Somali-Ethiopian hostility, however, Soviet posture in this case did not involve a really difficult choice. The Soviets obviously preferred an independent PLO to a Syrian-controlled organization, but in the final analysis, Syria was an infinitely more important strategic asset. The Soviets did make some pro forma efforts to save Arafat's position in Lebanon — under the guise of defending the unity of the PLO — but when they raised the issue with Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam during his visit to Moscow in mid-November 1983, Khaddam took a very strong, uncompromising position and the Soviets quickly backed down. Propaganda support for

Arafat in the Soviet media stopped immediately and the fate of Tripoli was resolved without further Soviet interference.

In view of the regional and domestic handicaps facing the Soviets in September 1982, their position in early 1984 appeared quite impressive. This accomplishment was secured by indirect means — Syria was provided with the tools that enabled it to pursue its interests effectively and these tended to coincide with the Soviets' own limited objectives, at least for the moment. Since indirect competition is generally the most prudent and economical way for the superpowers to carry out their struggle in the "gray areas" of the world, the Soviets could be justifiably satisfied with developments in this area during 1982-83. There was, of course, no guarantee that Soviet and Syrian interests would continue to coincide; the Tripoli affair as well as Syrian support for Iran in the Gulf war clearly demonstrated that if Assad's preferences diverged from those of the Soviet leadership, Moscow could not impose its own views. And there was nothing in the longer term that precluded yet another reversal of superpower positions in this part of the Middle East. But for the time being, the continuing frustration of American ambitions was a benefit of no mean value.

5. The War in the Gulf

As the Iran-Iraq war entered its third year in the fall of 1982, an Iranian victory was no longer implausible. Iraq, which had started the war with such confidence and apparent military superiority, had been unable to follow through after its initial gains. The opening Iraqi offensive bogged down in November 1980 and was followed by eighteen months of inconclusive positional warfare. But the tide of battle had turned in the spring of 1982, when two spectacularly successful Iranian offensives in Khuzestan cleared the Iraqis out of most of the territory they had overrun at the beginning of the war, including the major port city of Khorramshahr. Iran's attempt to follow up in July with a massive drive toward Basra — "Operation Ramadan" — was thwarted by Iraqi defenders who displayed unexpected determination and, with the help of superior firepower, inflicted extremely heavy casualties on the Iranian army and revolutionary guard (pasdaran).

Nevertheless, the initiative had definitely passed to Iran. Iranian morale was high, there was an evident willingness to carry the fighting into Iraq despite the casualties inherent in such operations, and the accumulating pressures on the government of Saddam Hussein suggested that Iran might eventually be able to achieve its war aims. One of these was the replacement of the secular, nationalist regime in Baghdad with one guided by the Islamic fundamentalism of the Iranian revolution. If that were to happen, the domestic threat to vulnerable traditional regimes in nearby states would intensify and the establishment of Iranian hegemony in the Gulf would be virtually assured, with profoundly destabilizing consequences for regional and international alignments in the rest of the Middle East, as well.

Fears of an Iranian victory, though never completely allayed, were not borne out in the period under review. Instead, Iraq demonstrated a growing ability to frustrate every Iranian offensive.

The first of these was an effort in the central sector, in the area of Somar-Mandali, that began on September 30, 1982 and produced only a minor advance before petering out within a week. This was followed at the beginning of November by a much larger enterprise — "Operation Muharram" — that involved army regulars, pasdaran and a new category of barely-trained militias known as baseej ("mobilization troops"). Muharram enabled Iran to open the road between Dehloran and Ein-i Khosh and to recover some more territory in northern Khuzestan, including Musian and the Bayat oilfields. The Iranians even took the Iraqi border-village of Teib but they were unable to advance further toward Amarah or interrupt traffic on the Tigris Highway from Baghdad to Basra. The effort to drive into Misan province was resumed in early February 1983 when "Operation Dawn" was launched against Fakeh village. But Iran's human wave tactics were of little use against the entrenched Iraqi defenders in what had become one of the most strongly-fortified sectors of the entire front, and this assault

was effectively blocked, as was a subsequent thrust in early April in the same area.

By the summer, Iran had shifted its attention to other sectors. Two small penetrations were made in July, the first on July 23 around Haj Omran, in the Kardaman mountains of northern Kurdistan, the second on July 30 in the center, between Mehran and the Iraqi border town of Zurbatiya. The final Iranian probe of 1983, in mid-October, was directed against the Iraqi resort town of Panjwin, due east of Sulaymaniya. Like the previous attacks, this was contained after very minor gains.

Because of its numerical advantage in manpower and its greater willingness to incur casualties, Iran was able to maintain continuous pressure along the front and to compel Iraq to use all the means at its disposal, including chemical weapons, to foil Iranian offensives. Nevertheless, a decisive military breakthrough remained beyond Iran's reach. After the failure of Operation Ramadan in July 1982, it had become increasingly clear that Iran lacked the resources — armor, airpower and mobile air defenses — to sustain a war-winning offensive. The Iranian attacks since then punctuated the positional warfare that had set in but they were only one aspect of a broader strategy of attrition that aspired, not to destroy the enemy's armed forces, but rather to wear them down and to exacerbate the economic and political strains in the Iraqi camp, ultimately bringing about the collapse of the Saddam regime.

Iraq, meanwhile, continued to acquire major weapon systems from a wide variety of sources (including the Soviet Union, which resumed large-scale transfers in mid-1982 after recognizing that attempts to cultivate influence in Iran had been futile) and increased its advantage in most dimensions of conventional military strength. But despite the superior firepower and mobility of his ground and air forces, Saddam, perhaps lacking confidence in the ability of the high command to manage a major offensive and fearing the inevitable casualties among the (mostly-Shi'ite) lower ranks, also adhered to a strategy of attrition.

The war of attrition has meant substantial civilian casualties on both sides — in Iraqi border settlements within range of Iranian artillery, and, on a much larger scale, in Iranian cities (especially Dezful and Andimeshk) which were subjected to Iraqi bombing and missile attacks. But many of the developments affecting the outcome of the war took place away from the battlefield. The most important of these was the progressive debilitation of the Iraqi economy.

The destruction of the Fao terminal at the head of the Gulf in the first days of the war severely limited Iraq's oil export capacity. Falling world prices cut revenues from remaining exports, which were further reduced in April 1982 when Syria, Iran's foremost ally in the Arab world, shut down the Iraqi Petroleum Company terminal in the Syrian port of Banias. Since then, Iraq's only oil export route has been the pipeline through Turkey, with

a daily capacity of some 600,000 barrels (reported to have been upgraded to 900,000 in December 1983). The result is that exports, which stood at more than $21 billion before the outbreak of the war, fell to a projected level of $7.5 billion in 1983. Despite very substantial financial assistance from the Arab Gulf states, Iraq was forced to draw down its foreign exchange reserves in order to finance both the war and the continuing development programs. But when reserves dropped to an estimated level of $2-3 billion by mid-1983 (as compared with approximately $31 billion in mid-1980), the government could no longer avoid a program of austerity. Economic projects were stretched out, suspended or cancelled and foreign creditors faced delayed payments, demands for cheap credit and debt rescheduling and threats of default. Shortages of some basic commodities were reported and the public was encouraged by various means to contribute cash, gold and family heirlooms to the war effort.

Although Saddam Hussein remained in power throughout 1983, there were some indications that the burden of the war was beginning to take a political toll. Persistent rumors of unrest and personnel changes in the army command, the security services and the civilian leadership (extending even to Saddam's own relatives) were accompanied by an upsurge of anti-regime terrorist activities. These were attributed mostly to Shi'ite groups like al-Da'wa and the Iraqi Mujahideen, which were inspired and supported, if not directly controlled, by the authorities in Tehran. The most dramatic actions were the murder of eleven foreign industrial experts in August and the bombing of intelligence headquarters in November. The need to divert all military assets to the front also created opportunities for the reassertion of Kurdish demands in the north; by June, Kurdish military activity had become so troublesome that Saddam Hussein agreed to the temporary entry of Turkish troops into border areas to pursue Kurdish fighters. But this was hardly sufficient to restore central government authority. In January 1984, Saddam was forced to recognize that the results of the brutal campaign against the Kurds in the mid-1970s had been undone and to concede to Jalal Talabani, leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, a much greater degree of Kurdish autonomy.

While Iraq did not appear to be in danger of imminent collapse, these events tended to reinforce the impression that Iran was better positioned to prevail in a prolonged war of attrition. Its advantages in population and territory were self-evident. Iranian morale and political will also appeared to be superior. But Iran's greatest advantage was economic. Relative freedom of movement in the Gulf permitted Iran to step up its oil exports to a level of 2.5-2.7 million barrels per day (mbd) by early 1983, enough to finance the procurement of weapons and spare parts from various suppliers, along with a growing civilian trade with Japan, West Germany, Britain and even the United States.

This did not mean that Iran was totally immune to the domestic problems

confronting Iraq. Iran also had to contend with Kurdish resistance to central rule; military operations in the north were often directed against Kurdish secessionists as well as Iraqi forces. The remnants of the leftist opposition, especially the Mujahideen al-Khalq, continued to carry out car bombings and assassinations through the fall of 1982, when shortages of food, fuel and other consumer goods were still felt. But since then, both domestic security and the economy have shown sustained improvement.

The importance of the economic balance led both sides to devote considerable attention to this dimension in the period under review. In late 1983, Iran temporarily shifted its main military effort to the northern sector, apparently with the hope of reaching the oil fields between Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya, or at least bringing the pipeline to Turkey – Iraq's last functioning export route — within artillery range. Sizable penetrations might also permit Iran to strike at several large dams in the vicinity, damaging Iraq's hydroelectric power supply and perhaps even causing major floods.

Iraq attempted to enlist outside actors both to enhance its own economic situation and to undermine Iran's. In fact, Iraq required economic assistance almost from the outset of the war. During the first two years, the bulk of this came from the Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which provided some $25-30 billion in loans and grants. According to Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tareq Aziz, direct aid stopped in 1982; these states instead produced part of Iraq's OPEC quota of 1.2 mbd on its behalf, transferring the proceeds to Baghdad. But since total income still fell short of current needs, Iraq became increasingly dependent on other benefactors. The most prominent of these was France, which had secured some $5.6 billion in military contracts – 40% of French arms exports – and another $4.7 billion in civilian contracts since the outbreak of the war. Iraqi insolvency or the overthrow of Saddam's government would jeopardize the chances of recovering the $5 billion in Iraqi debts to France and additional credit was one way of preventing, or delaying, either eventuality. French banks were therefore encouraged to float a $500 million loan in March 1983 and a further loan of $1.6 billion in August was guaranteed by the French state export-credit agency. In the same month, Japan also supplied a loan of some $1.5 billion. In September, a German company was contracted to truck some 90,000 barrels per day of refined oil products across the desert to Aqaba, thus providing at least minor relief from the Syrian blockade. Work also began on an emergency linkup with the Saudi transpeninsular pipeline to Yanbu which, when completed, perhaps by early 1985, will enable Iraq to export an additional 300,000-500,000 barrels per day. Longer-range plans were also made for an entirely separate pipeline from Iraq's southern oilfields to Yanbu, with a throughput of 1.6 mbd, and for another line from Kirkuk to Aqaba, to be built with American financing.

All these measures bought time for Saddam but only the last promised a really fundamental improvement in Iraq's economic situation, and even that required that the capacity of Iraq's producing fields not be damaged by Iranian military action. Meanwhile, the imbalance resulting from Iran's ability to export almost as much oil as it wanted to would continue. Iraq's own economic programs were therefore supplemented by persistent efforts to damage Iran's economic infrastructure. These included naval and air strikes on Iranian ports, industrial facilities (such as the petrochemical complex at Bandar Khomeini), tankers and other ships sailing to or from Iran (a Greek freighter carrying zinc and steel from Japan was sunk at the beginning of December 1983), and the offshore oil wells in the Nowruz field (an attack at the beginning of March 1983 caused a major leak that was not capped until October). The primary target, however, was the oil export terminal at Kharg Island. If operations at Kharg could be shut down or significantly interrupted, Iran would quickly run out of revenues needed to purchase ammunition, vehicles and spare parts. But despite repeated Iraqi claims of successful attacks against Kharg, the facility continued to operate throughout 1982 and 1983.

Still, the evident centrality of Kharg and its seemingly greater vulnerability to Iraqi attack in late 1983 prompted a sudden upsurge of international concern over the course of the war. The new elements that shook the composure of outside observers were the declared intention of France to deliver to Iraq five Super-Etendard strike aircraft, and Iran's threat to prevent all oil exports from the Gulf if its own export capability were impaired.

Iraq always had aircraft with sufficient range to attack Kharg with conventional gravity bombs, the most appropriate ordnance for a large, stationary target of this sort. But the extremely dense air-defenses around Kharg had apparently deterred Iraqi pilots from pressing home their attacks to good effect. The Super-Etendards could be armed with air-to-surface versions of the Exocet missile already acquired for Iraq's helicopter fleet, i.e., with a standoff weapon that might enable Iraq to achieve better results against the tankers operating to and from Kharg, if not against the terminal itself.

Iran's threat, which was widely interpreted to imply a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, produced an initial flurry of anxiety, pressure on France to delay transfer of the aircraft, and western counterthreats (backed up by a show of naval force) to keep the Strait open. More sober reflection indicated that the dangers were exaggerated. For one thing, the importance of Gulf oil had declined significantly since the outbreak of the war. A complete cessation of shipping in the Gulf would certainly produce a shortfall, but a good part of it could soon be covered by increased liftings in other producing countries and maximum use of the Saudi transpeninsular Petroline. Nor was it clear that Iran was technically able to mine or blockade

the wide, deep shipping channels in the Strait, actions which would anyway be self-defeating so long as Iran retained any oil export capacity of its own.

Whatever the danger to the Strait, Iran could achieve the same result if it instead attacked Arab oil facilities directly across the Gulf, with conventional air or naval force or by means of sabotage operations that were less likely to provoke armed intervention by western powers. Simultaneous terrorist bombings in December 1983 of Kuwait airport and the Shuaiba oil refinery, along with the American and French legations in Kuwait — by Iranian-supported Shi'ites from Iraq and Lebanon — were a pointed reminder that Iranian threats to retaliate could not be lightly dismissed.

Iraq took delivery of the Super-Etendards in October; there were no subsequent reports of their being used against the Kharg terminal itself, although attacks on shipping continued. Iraqi restraint could be explained by the technical inadequacy of the aircraft, by the pressure of Iraq's Arab allies and awareness of the economic consequences for Iraq itself if allied oil exports were interrupted, or by the desire to preserve the threat to Kharg as a deterrent against Iranian attacks on the Iraqi terminal in the Gulf that was scheduled to resume operations in 1984. But whatever the explanation, there was a growing awareness by late 1983 that unless some radical development restored the overall Iraqi-Iranian strategic balance, Iraq would eventually face the prospect of defeat.

A temporary disruption of oil shipments from the Gulf would undoubtedly discomfit the rest of the world; an Iranian victory would be a far more serious problem. Iraq could well be partitioned between Iran, Syria and Turkey. And even if the country were preserved intact under a regime sympathetic to the Islamic revolutionary movement in Tehran, the only serious barrier to Iranian expansion would have been removed.

The other Arab Gulf states would be hard put to defend themselves against direct military assault. And if a triumphant Iran were deterred by the threat of American intervention from sending its armed forces into the peninsula, it would still be able to intensify its campaign of political subversion and sabotage. Antiregime forces in these states, and especially the Shi'ites in Bahrain, Kuwait and the oil-producing Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, would be further emboldened by Iranian victory; convulsions in those countries would create the conditions for an Iranian imperium thoughout the Gulf, either through the incorporation of the principalities or the emergence of regimes prepared to dedicate their foreign and resource policies to an Iranian-led, anti-western political cause. An Iraqi defeat would also further radicalize Shi'ites in Lebanon and produce serious external pressures on the Hashemite regime in Jordan. Even Syria, Iran's major ally, would be threatened by the encouragement of Islamic, albeit Sunni, opposition to the Ba'thist regime in Damascus. If the present rulers in Jordan and Syria were replaced by fundamentalist regimes driven by a cost-benefit calculus less responsive to Israel's deterrent power, the result

could be an extremely dangerous war coalition on Israel's eastern front, involving not only those two states, but Iraq and Iran as well.

As Baghdad's general position appeared to worsen during 1983, the relative indifference of outside actors to a prolonged, inconclusive war was replaced by fear of an impending Iraqi collapse. This fear, in addition to financial considerations, undoubtedly entered into French policy vis-à-vis the war. It almost certainly explained the increasingly palpable pro-Iraqi "tilt" on the part of the United States, symbolized by the December 1983 visit to Baghdad of US special Middle East envoy Donald Rumsfeld — the most senior American official to visit Iraq in almost seven years.

The calculus of interests also changed for Israel, whose initial attitude to the war had been largely molded by the long history of implacable Iraqi hostility and concern about the potential Iraqi contribution to an Arab war coalition. The seemingly endless war with Iran meant that Iraq would not be able to send a significant expeditionary force against Israel under any foreseeable circumstances; even if the Iranian threat were eliminated — a very remote prospect — war-weariness in Iraq would almost surely produce a dramatic demobilization. Instead, it was an Iranian victory that now represented the greatest danger, since the spread of the Islamic revolution could energize a far more menacing anti-Israel coalition. Some Iraqi actions — endorsement of the May 17 Israel-Lebanon agreement and support for the withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces from Lebanon — could even be construed as a softening of Iraq's attitude toward Israel (if only to secure American goodwill). Israel did not respond overtly to these faint signals — the Israeli government claim to have suspended sales of spare parts to Iran had an independent logic — but only the presumption that Israel would not interfere with the construction or operation of the Kirkuk-Aqaba pipeline justified proceeding with the project.

But while such developments were undoubtedly welcome in Iraq, they did not reduce the very immediate dangers facing the regime in Baghdad. Even the direct assistance of Jordan and Egypt (the latter continued to sell Iraq weapons, spare parts and ammunition for its Soviet-made arsenal) did not alter the basic reality of an Iranian regime more able than Iraq to persist in a war of attrition and unwilling to accept a compromise settlement. If Iraq's position continued to deteriorate, Saddam would need to take desperate action — meaning an unrestrained effort against Iran's oil industry and the international shipping that brings the oil to foreign purchasers — in order to deny Iran the capacity to pursue total victory. And Iran would surely retaliate in kind against both Iraq and its Arab supporters in the Gulf. In fact, an exchange of precisely this sort did take place in the spring of 1984, but since it subsided before producing any fundamental change in the underlying balance of power between Iran and Iraq, it probably represented a mere foreshadowing of developments in the future. The potential for more serious escalation remained. And if this potential did materialize, it would fall upon the western powers to contain the damage.

6. Qaddafi in Chad: The Islamic Empire Strikes Back

Events in Chad during 1983 bore eloquent testimony to the fact that even problems that appear to have been resolved have a disturbing tendency to reemerge after brief periods of relative tranquility. In June 1982, the capture of N'Djaména by Hissène Habré promised to end the seventeen-year civil war in Chad. But fighting resumed the following summer and active Libyan involvement on the side of Habré's archrival, former President Goukouni Oueddei, threatened to turn an otherwise unremarkable African conflict into a major source of international tension.

Goukouni's leadership of the Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT) had been preserved only by an earlier Libyan intervention in November 1980. However, a combination of local and regional considerations had convinced Mu'ammar Qaddafi to withdraw his forces from most of Chad a year later, thus paving the way for Habré's victory.[1]

The fall of Goukouni was not necessarily unwelcome to Qaddafi. The Chadian leader had shown himself to be a rather obstreperous ally, having resisted Libyan demands for unification and submitted requests for French economic and military assistance even while Libyan troops were securing his rule in N'Djaména. In fact, the abrupt Libyan departure in November 1981 was carried out in such a way as to favor Habré in the ongoing civil war; weapons and equipment were withdrawn from the capital but substantial stockpiles were left behind in the northern and eastern prefectures already under Habré's control.

On the other hand, subsequent developments did not redound to Qaddafi's advantage. Habré's triumph was more complete than anyone could have anticipated given the prior political history of Chad. Goukouni immediately fled to Cameroon and then on to Algeria. Ahmat Acyl, the most pro-Libyan of Chad's warlords and one of Habré's most dangerous opponents still in the country, died in July 1982. French and American aid was quickly made available and by September, all fourteen prefectures had come under central government authority, for the first time since 1965. Thus, Qaddafi's ability to maneuver in Chad's domestic affairs had been constrained by the onset of stability that was quite impressive, at least by Chadian standards.

Furthermore, a major diplomatic prize for Qaddafi's display of moderation in November 1981 had eluded his grasp. Because of the split between "moderates" and "progressives" over issues such as Chad, the Western Sahara and Qaddafi himself, only 29 states sent delegations to the

[1] For more on the background to these events, see *The Middle East Military Balance 1983*, ed. Mark Heller, Part I, Chapter 7.

Organization for African Unity Summit meeting in Tripoli in August of 1982. This was five short of the legal quorum, and Qaddafi could therefore not expect to gain the chairmanship of the OAU, customarily conferred on the host of the official Summit.

Shortly thereafter, Qaddafi began to reassert an active interest in Chadian developments. In October, Goukouni was installed as head of the Provisional Government of National Salvation in the oasis town of Bardai, just south of the Libyan-occupied Aouzou Strip. Libyan arms supplies to Goukouni were supplemented by subversive efforts elsewhere in the country. In the following months there were also reports of Libyan troops having joined Goukouni in Bardai. By early June of 1983, Goukouni's forces were again operating in the Tibesti mountains in northern Chad and evidence of Libyan support for him prompted the US State Department to issue a formal warning against Libyan involvement.

This warning had no apparent effect. Libyan air support enabled Goukouni to capture the major northern town of Faya Largeau on June 24 and to continue an offensive to the southeast that produced fighting in Abeché by the middle of July. Habré, however, received new military supplies from Egypt and France and was able to rally his forces. He blocked Goukouni in Abeché, retook Oum Chalouba on July 13 and pushed north to Faya Largeau, which was recaptured on July 30.

At this point, Qaddafi intervened in earnest. The Libyan air force unleashed massive attacks on Faya Largeau. Su-22 fighter aircraft and Tu-22 bombers, operating out of Sabha and from a forward base in the Chadian town of Aouzou, also bombed Koro Toro, on the road to N'Djaména, and Oum Chalouba. Qaddafi's "Islamic Legion," consisting of Libyan regulars and Muslim recruits from other countries (many of these recruits were reported to be workers in Libya who were pressganged into service), joined the fighting on the ground. Although half of Habré's army invested Faya Largeau, it was soon outnumbered two-to-one by the combined force of Islamic Legion and Goukouni-led rebels. More critically, Habré had no really effective defense against the very heavy Libyan air strikes. Chadian ground forces did shoot down one Su-22 and take its Libyan pilot prisoner, but the emergency supply by France of SA-7 missiles and 23mm anti-aircraft guns (reportedly taken from PLO stocks discovered by the French contingent in Beirut) did not suffice to neutralize Libyan airpower. Increasingly desperate calls for counter-intervention against Libya went unanswered and on August 10, Habré was compelled to evacuate the town.

Habré withdrew in comparatively good order to the Salal-Biltine line and left a garrison in Oum Chalouba. But the fall of Faya and reports of two Libyan armored columns moving further south (Koro Toro was also captured) finally provoked decisive western counteraction. The United States played only a supporting role in this development. Following the large-scale Libyan involvement at the end of July, the US decided on a

number of measures intended to signal American opposition to Qaddafi's action. These included sending the aircraft carrier Eisenhower to patrol the central Mediterranean near the Gulf of Sidra, posting two AWACS aircraft (with eight F-15 fighter escorts) to Sudan, where they could monitor Libyan air activity in Chad and help coordinate air cover for Habré if the French air force intervened, and transferring to Chad about $10 million worth of military vehicles and equipment, including 30 Redeye surface-to-air missiles, accompanied by three US Army instructors.

But though President Reagan had once labeled Qaddafi "the most dangerous man in the world," there was to be no active American intervention. This was not because of lack of capacity. During the Chad crisis, the United States had over 7,000 troops in eastern Africa, mostly in connection with joint exercises with Egypt (Bright Star) and Sudan (Natural Bond), and one unnamed American official claimed, "We could have Qaddafi picking steel fragments out of his couscous for the rest of time without much trouble." However, the administration was already involved in controversial military operations in Central America and in delicate Middle Eastern negotiations backed by a military presence in Lebanon, and there was very little inclination to assume a combat role in Chad as well. Instead, the US concentrated on urging others to become involved.

The most willing partner was Zaire. After consulting with Reagan in Washington, President Mobutu sent more than 2,000 troops and several Mirage aircraft to N'Djaména. The Zairian contingent might have helped if a danger to the capital had materialized, but it did not approach the actual combat zone.

It was France that ultimately took the decisive step to stop Qaddafi. This was not inappropriate given that Chad, as President Reagan had argued, was much more a French sphere of influence. Despite the granting of independence in 1960, French troops remained in the northern prefecture until 1965. After that, they returned several times in an effort to maintain order, most recently in 1978. But President Giscard D'Estaing had approved the OAU-sponsored settlement of 1979 that installed Goukouni as head of the GUNT, and the French military presence was finally eliminated in May 1980. Giscard was unwilling to become militarily involved again after the first Libyan invasion in November 1980, although he did order an embargo on arms deliveries and the suspension of an oil exploration agreement with Libya.

President François Mitterrand was initially even more reluctant to oppose by force Qaddafi's second invasion in the summer of 1983. After all, before the elections in March 1981, Mitterrand had campaigned against Giscard's "interventionist" foreign policy; his own was predicated on a "new internationalism" that rejected "neo-colonialist" overtones, including military involvement, in France's relations with its former colonies in the third world. In fact, Mitterrand had supported the GUNT under Goukouni

by sending it 25 tons of weapons and munitions in October 1981. He also adopted a more conciliatory approach to Qaddafi, cancelling the sanctions imposed by Giscard. At the time, these measures were interpreted as having contributed to the Libyan decision to withdraw from Chad.

At first, Mitterrand therefore resisted Habré's appeals for air cover. Military equipment was shipped to Chad immediately after Goukouni overran Faya in late June. But even after the much more brutal Libyan intervention following Habré's recapture of the town at the end of July, Mitterrand continued to insist that the 1976 security assistance agreement with Chad only provided for military advisers, not combat personnel. Mitterrand also disregarded similar appeals by Mobutu and Reagan. But when Faya Largeau was lost again on August 10 and the danger of a Libyan advance into southern Chad became real, French policy was quickly reversed and a major intervention took place.

Mitterrand's decision appeared to have been taken without enthusiasm and in response to the fears expressed by moderate Francophone states in Africa that France's unwillingness to check Qaddafi would endanger them and leave them with no alternative but to turn directly to the United States for protection. As a result, Mitterrand dispatched several hundred paratroops to N'Djaména and instructed Jaguar squadrons in Gabon and the Central African Republic to stand by, although active air support was still withheld. In the following days, the full dimensions of "Operation Manta" were revealed. On August 14, paratroop detachments were sent to Salal and Abeché. Five days later, eight aircraft (four Jaguar and four Mirage) were ordered into Chad. By the end of the month, there were over 3,000 troops in the country, with artillery, light armor, helicopters and air support — the largest French military presence in Africa since the termination of the Algerian war. Their "perimeter of security," which ran along the 15th parallel, was anchored at Salal in the west and Arada in the east. Their orders were not to seek out contact but to fight if attacked. In other words, the French had drawn a line in the desert and told Gaddafi not to cross it.

By and large, the French action achieved its limited objective. Hissène Habré maintained one major outpost north of the French defense line, at Oum Chalouba, and this was subjected to three unsuccessful attacks in September, one from the air and two on the ground. Otherwise, the fighting subsided almost completely and only some sporadic and inconsequential raiding threatened the de facto ceasefire that continued through the end of 1983.

The 1983 chapter in Libya-Chad relations had important implications for two long-standing problems. The first was the future of Chad. French intervention stopped the Libyan advance but it did not undo the practical partition of the country and Qaddafi remained in control of much of the north. In fact, the partition line coincided roughly with the distinction the

French themselves had made, as colonial rulers, between the settled, agrarian south ("le Tchad utile") and the nomadic, desert north ("le Tchad inutile"). Political developments since the outbreak of the civil war in the mid-1960s emphasized the ethnic, religious and ecological differences between the two parts of the country and indicated that it was extremely difficult for the same authority to prevail in both areas.

The preservation of post-colonial boundaries had become almost a sacred principle to other countries vulnerable to similar strains. This is one reason why the Organization of African Unity was interested in resolving, or at least containing, the conflict in Chad. Thus, an OAU-sponsored reconciliation conference for all eleven factions originally involved in the civil war was convened in Addis Ababa in January 1984. But the enmity between Habré and Goukouni was so intense — although both belonged to the same Toubou tribe from the north, each had previously declared that the other deserved nothing but the end of a rope — that a dispute over protocol (President Mengistu of Ethiopia tendered Goukouni an official welcome) led to the suspension of the conference before its first working session was held. And even if the conference were eventually to resume, there would be little basis for optimism. For with the passage of time, partition appeared more and more to be the only durable solution.

The second problem was Qaddafi's continued capacity and inclination to promote instability in order to further his own visions in Africa and the Arab world. The Libyan leader's previous record suggested that a temporary setback would not convince him to refrain from soon striking out again, if not in Chad then in some other direction. Indeed, only twelve days after the collapse of the Addis Ababa meeting, a rebel column did advance on the government outpost at Zigey, south of the French security perimeter; the column was ultimately driven back by French air power, but not before a Jaguar jet was shot down and the pilot killed. French forces responded by moving their defense line 100 kilometers further north, an action which Qaddafi chose not to contest. This incident, like the original French intervention, demonstrated once again that Qaddafi was still sensitive to cost-benefit calculations and that he generally recoiled when confronted with resolute counterforce. Nevertheless, it was clear that any effort to end Qaddafi's mischief-making would have a long-term impact only if it were made, not in Chad, Tunisia, Sudan or some other neighboring country, but rather inside Libya itself.

In other words, the Qaddafi problem could only be resolved by Libyans. And reports of growing opposition among the Libyan armed forces, attributed in part to resentment of garrison duty in Chad, suggested that a determined attempt to remove Qaddafi from the scene might eventually be made. A successful operation would be the most significant consequence, by far, of Libya's involvement in Chad.

7. Terrorist Activity in the Middle East

by Ariel Merari[1]

Although no Middle Eastern country has been absolutely free of terrorism in recent years, most terrorist activity has continued to be associated with the main foci of tension in the region: the Arab-Israeli conflict, the civil war in Lebanon and the war in the Gulf.

Palestinian terrorist activity in Israel and the administered territories: Whereas 203 Palestinian terrorist incidents were recorded in 1982, the number dropped to 173 in 1983.[2] This decline is presumably explained by the disruption in Palestinian ranks caused by the 1982 war in Lebanon, the rift in Fatah and the expulsion of Arafat loyalists from Tripoli in December 1983. It is reasonable to assume that the slowdown in terrorist activity is temporary.

Since early 1984, Fatah has made an effort to revive operations from Jordan; Khalil al-Wazir ("Abu Jihad"), head of the "Western Sector Apparatus" (the Fatah organ charged with terrorist activity in Israel and the administered areas), has spent much time in Amman to this end. Furthermore, several other Palestinian groups have attempted to carry out spectacular terrorist operations in Israel, mostly by teams sent from neighboring countries. In the last year before the Lebanon war, most groups drastically limited this type of activity, mainly because of their fear of a massive Israeli ground action against PLO strongholds in Lebanon. Having lost these strongholds in the war, various groups again tried to carry out mass killings and barricade-hostage operations in Israel. Two such instances were the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine attempt on April 2 to take hostages in Jerusalem and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacking of a bus on the Tel-Aviv — Ashqelon highway on April 12. The team of Fatah rebels killed on Mount Hebron on May 12 and the Palestine Liberation Front team captured in the southern Golan on June 5 apparently had similar missions.

For special operations of this type, the Palestinian terrorist organizations try to infiltrate specially chosen teams recruited and trained outside Israel's borders; the team which hijacked the bus was the first exception to this pattern. Before the 1982 war, most of these penetration attempts were made through the Lebanese border. But because of the Israeli presence in southern Lebanon since the war, the Palestinian groups have made most of

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[2] IDF Spokesman's statistics.

their forays from bases in Syria. The latter does not yet permit direct incursions from its territory into Israel but it does encourage Syrian-based terrorists to cross into Jordan first and then penetrate into Israel. Jordan appears to be making a considerable effort to foil these attempts.

Lebanon: Palestinians are also active in guerrilla type activity against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon. Most such activity, however, has been carried out by non-Palestinians, especially local Shi'ites. Despite the Israeli withdrawal to the Awali River, the number of attacks in the second half of 1983 grew by about 25% as compared to the corresponding period in 1982. Most incidents involved roadside charges, grenade attacks and ambushes of Israeli vehicles carried out by small teams of a few men. During the first months of 1984, some progress was made in combatting these guerrillas, as a result of more aggressive search tactics by the IDF as well as the successful participation of the local South Lebanese Army under the command of Gen. Antoine Lahad. Nevertheless, the high rate of guerrilla attacks and the resulting Israeli casualties continued to affect the public debate about Israel's presence in Lebanon. Although it is too early to assess their impact on future arrangements in Lebanon, it can be said with certainty that these attacks have already eroded Israel's willingness to cling to its original war aims.

The most salient and influential terrorist actions in Lebanon, however, were the attacks against the Multi-National Force (MNF), highlighted by several spectacular multi-casualty truck-bombs activated by suicide drivers. These greatly augmented public and political pressures within the targeted countries to speed up the evacuation of their forces from Lebanon. At the same time, awareness of these pressures seemed to have strengthened the Syrian refusal to reach a modus vivendi over the Lebanese problem. The evacuation of the MNF may have far-reaching consequences. Not only has it put Lebanon under unquestionable Syrian influence and simultaneously weakened Israel's ability to influence future developments there; its long-term effects may transcend Lebanon. The failure of the Western powers' military commitment in Lebanon, particularly that of the United States, will necessarily affect the willingness of other countries in the region and throughout the world to rely on Western support in the face of external pressures. The Lebanese example has thus exposed the political constraints of the democratic system, its vulnerability to low-level warfare, and the limited ability of democratic nations to sustain an intervention where the interests served by such intervention are not perceived by sizable sections of the public to be vital. At the same time, the Lebanese trauma is also likely to sensitize the Western governments involved — Israel included — against similar endeavors in the future.

There is no doubt about the Syrian and Iranian sponsorship of the wave of terrorist attacks against Western targets in Lebanon. There is a wealth of

evidence which indicates that the terrorist operations against the MNF were planned and prepared in Syrian-held territory. The attacks were carried out by members of militant Shi'ite groups, mainly al-Amal al-Islami and Hizb Allah. The headquarters and training bases of these groups were located around Baal-Bek, with the full consent and support of the Syrian army. These groups were trained by Iranian officers, were guided spiritually and politically by Iran, and maintained close ties with the hundreds of Iranian "Revolutionary Guards" sent to Lebanon during the 1982 war to fight alongside the Syrians.

Having served their purpose in harassing the MNF and precipitating its evacuation, however, the pro-Iranian Shi'ite fundamentalist groups became a disruptive factor from the Syrian point of view. Not only did their uncompromising extremism threaten any Syrian-sponsored compromise in Lebanon; their fundamentalist influence was presumably seen as a danger to the secular Syrian Ba'th regime, constantly aware of its own "Muslim Brothers" problem. In the spring of 1984, most Iranian Revolutionary Guards were apparently forced by the Syrians to return to Iran. Local Shi'ite fundamentalist groups, however, have continued to carry out terrorist attacks, mainly against American diplomats and citizens in Beirut.

Iranian-sponsored terrorism in the Gulf: Another major focus of state-directed terrorism with potentially strategic implications has been the Iranian attempt to export the Islamic Revolution to other countries. The main thrust of this effort has been aimed at the Gulf states, but peripheral countries such as Turkey have been targets as well. It is not always easy to differentiate between terrorist operations planned and prepared in Teheran and the activities of local Shi'ite extremists inspired, though not directly organized, by Iran. Nevertheless, there are sufficient indications of a central effort in this direction. Iran was apparently involved in the December 1981 coup attempt in Bahrain, in the abortive attempt to blow up the convention hall in Qatar where a summit meeting of the Gulf states was supposed to take place in September 1983, and in a series of 11 car bombings in Kuwait in December 1983, most of them directed against local targets. Another incident inspired by Shi'ite fundamentalism, although not necessarily planned by Iran, was the bizarre attempt of Iranian pilgrims to take over the Grand Mosque in Mecca in September 1982, in which more than 100 Iranians (according to Radio Teheran) were arrested by Saudi police.

The Iranian motivation for sponsoring terrorism in the Gulf is undoubtedly twofold: religious-ideological and instrumental. On the ideological side, the Iranian regime is interested in spreading its fundamentalist brand of Islam in a missionary fashion to all Muslim countries, especially to those having a sizable Shi'ite population. Violent subversion is seen by Iran as a permissible way of struggle against regimes that betray the principles of the "true Islam." The Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks on the Arab Gulf

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The Middle East and the Gulf

SEARCHING FOR PEACE *

At the outset, 1985 looked to be the year in which real progress would be made in settling the Arab–Israeli conflict. King Hussein of Jordan had taken advantage of the weakness of the PLO after its defeat in Lebanon and its split with Syria to forge an alliance designed to give him legitimacy to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel, sensing that his nation was moving towards a moment of truth in the shaping of its future and seeking to ensure his own survival as Prime Minister, sought to engage Jordan and the Palestinians in negotiations. And President Reagan of the United States, fresh from his stunning re-election victory, was now looking to leave a legacy that might include his own Camp David.

Yet 1985 ended with Hussein travelling to Damascus, rather than Jerusalem, Peres bogged down over a minuscule border dispute with Egypt, and Reagan focusing his attention on balancing the budget. As Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy said, a year of intense diplomatic activity had only succeeded in 'revealing the critical obstacles blocking our path'.

This failure to achieve progress was a reflection not of a lack of desire on the part of the peace-makers but of their fundamental weakness in the face of those who opposed peace. What 1985 revealed was a shift in the balance of power in the Middle East that had begun with the Iranian revolution, had been reinforced by the assassination of Sadat, and was capped by the Syrian victory in Lebanon. Until that imbalance was redressed the obstacles to peace-making would remain.

Jordan and the PLO

The signs of weakness were there from the beginning. On 11 February Hussein and Arafat announced agreement on a programme for joint action on the peace process. This Jordan–PLO Accord spoke of exchanging territory for peace via an international framework for negotiations that would include the permanent members of the UN Security Council and all the parties to the conflict, including the PLO, within a joint Jordanian/Palestinian delegation. It also called for Palestinian self-determination in the context of a confederation with Jordan.

The Accord, however, made no mention of direct negotiations with Israel or of UN Resolution 242 (which was the only agreed basis for

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negotiations between Israel and Jordan). It revealed instead that Hussein had no intention of proceeding alone into negotiations with Israel. He would try to move the Arab consensus towards peace with Israel by co-opting Arafat, but he would not step beyond that consensus.

Just how little Arab support Hussein in fact enjoyed became immediately clear. Syria had already manifested its opposition to the Jordan–PLO alliance in November 1984 by withdrawing recognition of Arafat's PLO as the representative of the Palestinians and establishing the rival Palestine National Salvation Front. For its part, Saudi Arabia, the bell-wether of Arab consensus, offered no visible support for the Accord, which happened to be unveiled during King Fahd's visit to Washington. While urging the US to solve the Palestinian problem, Fahd made no mention of the Accord and instead, out of deference to Syria, pressed his 1982 Fez Plan (which was acceptable to Syria but provided no role for Jordan). Moreover, despite the Accord, Arafat's supporters in the PLO remained deeply suspicious of the King who had expelled them from Jordan in 1970 and who remained at heart a competitor for control of the West Bank. Thus on 19 February the PLO Executive Committee issued a clarification of the Jordan–PLO Accord which unequivocally rejected Resolution 242 (as well as the 1982 Reagan Plan and the Camp David Accords), insisted on an independent Palestinian state and refused any sharing of its role as 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians'.

Only Egypt was prepared to offer Hussein support, but its backing was conditioned by weakness as well. Precisely because of its peace treaty with Israel, Egypt had been isolated in the Arab world and was therefore incapable of assembling Arab backing. And President Mubarak was in some senses a competitor with Hussein both for the attention of Washington and for the mantle of Arab legitimacy that came from promoting the Palestinians. Thus, on the eve of his March visit to Washington, Mubarak suggested that the US and Israel should sit down with a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation that did not include known members of the PLO. When this was rejected by both Hussein and Arafat, Mubarak proposed, in his meeting with Reagan, that Israel should be cut out of the first stage and that the US alone should meet the Egyptian and Jordanian foreign ministers to decide on a subsequent meeting with a Jordanian/PLO delegation. This effort to assume control of the process by promoting Egyptian initiatives would be repeated throughout the year, undermining Hussein rather than assisting him.

To clarify what had quickly become a confusing Arab approach to the peace process, Hussein's foreign minister, Taher al-Masri, followed on Mubarak's heels to Washington and proposed that the US should take two steps to reassure the Palestinians: it should support self-determination in the context of a confederation with Jordan; and it should meet a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation whose Palestinian members would be selected by the PLO. The outline of Jordan's strategy thus emerged. Hussein was too weak to proceed without Arab 'cover',

but if he could drag Arafat with him into the negotiations, then he would at least have acquired Palestinian legitimacy. To succeed in this, however, he would have to make it worthwhile for Arafat while simultaneously ensuring that he retained control over the PLO. Hussein's hands would be on the steering wheel but Arafat would be sitting next to him. In Hussein's script, the US role was to pay Arafat by granting the PLO limited recognition for Palestinian self-determination in a Jordanian context, and limited participation in the negotiations through a meeting between a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation and the US.

The American Response

The Reagan Administration was also burdened by its own form of weakness. The defeat of its Lebanon policy by Syria, the demise of the 17 May 1983 Israel–Lebanon Accord, and the collapse of the effort to launch Arab–Israeli negotiations on the basis of the Reagan Plan had damaged the credibility of US commitments. These failures of the President's first term had generated disillusionment in the White House and a sense of caution in Secretary of State George Shultz. They had also reinforced Congressional scepticism about the willingness of key Arab countries to make peace with Israel and the wisdom of supplying sophisticated weapons to them in the absence of such a commitment.

In these circumstances, the Reagan Administration approached the Middle East with wariness at the start of its second term. Neither Reagan nor Shultz were prepared to risk their credibility and US prestige further unless the parties to the conflict themselves were ready to move to the negotiating table. The US would play a supporting role, but it was up to the parties to take the initiative. Accordingly, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy would be responsible for conducting US diplomacy, with Shultz and the President restricting their visible involvement until such time as the opportunity for a real breakthrough presented itself. The objective remained the same as originally envisaged in the 1982 Reagan Plan: 'direct negotiations' between Israel and Jordan, with Palestinians involved in every stage of the process. Operationally, this meant that the US looked to Jordan to take the lead on the Arab side, rather than Egypt or Saudi Arabia. And it meant close co-ordination with Prime Minister Peres in Israel.

All this was made very clear to King Fahd and President Mubarak on their visits to Washington. On both occasions Reagan declared that the security of Israel and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians 'can and should be addressed in direct negotiations'. He also rejected Mubarak's proposal that the US should meet a Jordan/PLO delegation. The US did, however, welcome Hussein's 11 February Accord with Arafat as a 'milestone', and after Jordanian Foreign Minister Masri's visit Reagan announced that the US would be prepared to meet a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation 'if it will lead to direct negotiations'.

That seemingly insignificant announcement meant in practice that the first round of diplomacy would – as Hussein insisted – centre on the

question of Palestinian representation in the peace process. However, US strategy on this point was not entirely congruent with Hussein's. Whereas the King wanted a meeting between the US and a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation, the US wanted direct negotiations between this delegation and Israel. And while the King wanted the PLO as a partner, albeit a junior one, the US wanted it as an observer – a back-seat driver with a plastic steering wheel, its only role to select the non-PLO Palestinians to participate in the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation.

Israel and the PLO

Like all the other parties, Israel approached the peace process from a position of weakness. This was partly a result of preoccupation with its parlous economic situation and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, which had become a dangerous and costly exercise. But, more importantly, it was also a product of the unusual National Unity Government (NUG), formed in October 1984, which brought together the opposing Labour and *Likud* party blocs – neither being able to muster a majority in the *Knesset* in its own right. Labour and *Likud* agreed on what to do about the economy and Lebanon, but they disagreed strongly about the peace process. Both sought negotiations with Jordan, but Labour wanted to negotiate a territorial compromise based on UN Resolution 242, whereas *Likud* favoured negotiating autonomy for the Palestinians based on the Camp David Accords, while ensuring Israel retained control over the land occupied in 1967.

If there were to be negotiations based on the 'territory for peace' formula, as envisaged by the US and Jordan, the NUG would collapse. Peres, who assumed the post of Prime Minister for the first two/years of the government's supposed four-year term, might welcome such a collapse. But he could only do so if he felt confident either that he could form a narrow coalition with the support of some religious parties and Liberal elements of *Likud*, or that he could win new elections fought on the question of whether Israel should enter peace negotiations with Jordan and the Palestinians.

In this regard, Peres needed to establish two conditions to accompany any Jordanian willingness to enter negotiations. First, the PLO could not be part of the negotiations. Second, Israel's peace treaty with Egypt would have to be revitalized if Israelis were to have their faith restored in the value of further territorial compromise. Peres was thus dependent upon Hussein to come to the table without the PLO, and on Mubarak to warm up his country's relationship with Israel. Moreover, his delicate pirouette could easily be disrupted by PLO or Syrian-sponsored terrorism, which would force Israel to take retaliatory measures, thus complicating its relations with Jordan and Egypt. Nevertheless, Peres was determined to be as flexible as possible in an effort to meet Hussein's requirements for negotiations. In his first speech to the *Knesset* he signalled to Hussein his peaceful intent and his willingness to consider any Jordanian proposal.

When Secretary of State Shultz arrived in Israel in May he discovered further flexibility. On the issue of a US meeting with the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation, Peres explained that, while he preferred direct negotiations, Israel's position would be determined by context and timing. If the meeting took place in the context of direct negotiations, and if the subsequent step was to be direct negotiations, then Israel would not raise strong objections. On the issue of Palestinian representation, Peres would accept those who were not members of the PLO and did not advocate the destruction of Israel. This at least narrowed the gap between the US and Israel on the definition of acceptable Palestinians. The US was ready to meet a delegation that included non-PLO members of the Palestine National Council (PNC), and, though Foreign Minister Shamir rejected this formula, the Israeli cabinet left open the possibility that some members of the PNC might be acceptable. On the question of the sale of sophisticated American weapons to Jordan, Peres reiterated his opposition to such sales to countries still in a state of war with Israel but suggested to Shultz that, if Hussein made a declaration of non-belligerence, he would regard that as a step involving an added element of risk for the King, and Israel would re-evaluate its position.

When Shultz conferred with Hussein in Aqaba a few days later, he found him fairly open to all three ideas. He was prepared to commit Jordan to direct negotiations, he would seek from Arafat a list of Palestinians for the meeting with the US, and he would consider issuing a statement of non-belligerence. Not surprisingly, Shultz left the region optimistic about the 'genuine sense of movement' he had observed. This optimism, however, was based on one crucial assumption: that Arafat would be prepared to name nondescript Palestinians to join the delegation that would meet the US. But during Shultz's visit senior PLO officials made clear in public statements that only declared PLO members would be permitted to join the delegation. The PLO was not about to give up its claim to be the 'sole, legitimate representative' of the Palestinians.

Hussein and Reagan

At the end of May, King Hussein arrived in Washington bearing three messages for Reagan. He stated publicly that Jordan was prepared to move towards direct negotiations with Israel, under international auspices, by the end of the year; that the PLO was now ready to accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338; and that Jordan considered itself to be acting in 'a non-belligerent environment'.

Each of these messages appeared more promising than it actually turned out to be. According to the King's timetable, direct negotiations with Israel would only take place as the last step in a five-stage plan. That plan would first involve a US meeting with a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation, during which the US would be expected to endorse self-determination for the Palestinians; this would be followed by the PLO's public acceptance of Resolution 242, then by a US dialogue with the

PLO, and finally by an international conference. Hussein's second claim, that the PLO was ready to accept Resolution 242 was almost immediately contradicted by Arafat, who insisted that the United States would first have to endorse the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Moreover, Hussein's announcement that Jordan would proceed in a non-belligerent environment was, as Shimon Peres would observe, more 'an observation about the weather' than a statement of non-belligerence.

Nevertheless, President Reagan was suitably impressed – so much so that he went against the advice of Shultz and National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane and promised the King that he would immediately receive a package of sophisticated weapons, including *Improved HAWK* anti-aircraft missiles and F-16 or F-20 advanced fighter aircraft. Because of Hussein's willingness to commit Jordan to direct negotiations 'within the year', Shultz agreed that the US would now go ahead with the preliminary meeting with the Jordanian/Palestinian delegation, whose Palestinian members would be selected by the PLO.

The government of Israel, however, was not impressed. Peres's requirements had not been met on the preliminary meeting nor on the arms sale. And Hussein's effort to insert the PLO into the process raised the spectre that, instead of direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel, there would be direct negotiations between the US and the PLO. Accordingly, Israel responded to Shultz's report of Hussein's visit by expressing opposition to the preliminary meeting and the arms sale. On 10 June Peres offered his own five-point peace plan as a way of accentuating the positive. This called for direct negotiations between Israel, Jordan, Egypt, the US and non-PLO Palestinians. Instead of the US dialogue with a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation, it proposed that Israel be included with this delegation in a working group that would prepare the agenda for the negotiations; and in response to Hussein's desire for 'international auspices', it suggested that the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council should give their blessing to the negotiations through some form of opening ceremony. As for the Palestinian representatives, it was suggested that they be drawn from residents of the West Bank and Gaza. Finally, Peres responded to Hussein's timetable by suggesting that negotiations begin in three months.

By June, then, the desire of both Israel and Jordan for a peace process was clearly established, but so too were the constraints within which Peres and Hussein would have to manoeuvre. Hussein sought PLO involvement, via a dialogue with the US; Arab and Soviet support, via an international conference; and a demonstrated US commitment to him, via an arms sale. Peres on the other hand, could not live with a US–PLO dialogue, or an international conference, or the sale of sophisticated weapons to a neighbour still at war.

If these had been the only factors the US had to contend with, it might just have been able to finesse the differences. However, other players now intervened. In June 72 US Senators, more sceptical than their President of the King's readiness to enter direct negotiations, sponsored

a resolution opposing a major new arms sale. In these circumstances, the Reagan Administration decided to delay notification of the sale and offered the King $250 million in economic assistance instead. In mid-July Arafat provided his list of Palestinians for the preliminary meeting with the US: five of the seven were closely affiliated with the PLO leadership, the other two being from the West Bank and Gaza. When Peres announced Israel's willingness to deal with the latter, Arafat quickly demoted them to 'consultants', eventually agreeing that they could be part of the delegation, provided two others from the list were included. Then, in early August, Hussein tested his Arab support via an emergency Arab summit at Casablanca, and found it severely wanting. Not only was the Syrian boycott of the summit joined by Algeria, Lebanon, South Yemen and Libya, but King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq also decided to stay away. Instead of endorsing the Jordan–PLO Accord as the way to proceed, the Arab League reaffirmed the Fez Plan. Meanwhile – as if to drive the point home – Kuwait, under Syrian pressure, had already ended its financial subsidies to Jordan on 17 July.

The Murphy Meeting

In these circumstances the task of US diplomacy became immensely more difficult. Hussein's first step could only now be taken if the US were prepared to meet clearly identified members of the PLO without previous PLO acceptance of any of the long-standing US conditions. Such a meeting ran the very real risk of giving the PLO a significant political victory while weakening Peres domestically and causing a rift in US-Israeli relations. In Shultz's judgment it was a risk only worth taking if the US could be assured that direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan would ensue. Thus Murphy was dispatched to Amman in August with strict instructions to meet the joint delegation only if the King were prepared to make a clear commitment to enter direct negotiations with Israel after the meeting. However, after the Casablanca summit Hussein was unwilling to make such a commitment. He clung instead to his five-stage plan, and his Prime Minister, Zaid al-Rifai, rejected publicly any linkage between the preliminary meeting and negotiations with Israel. In an effort to overcome the impasse, Murphy now proposed to Shultz that the US should drop the linkage to direct negotiations and use the meeting instead to test the PLO's intentions. If, following the meeting, Arafat still failed to endorse Resolution 242, then the onus would be on Hussein to find another way. Shultz chose a different approach – Britain would put the PLO to the test by meeting a Jordanian/PLO delegation in mid-October.

In the meantime, the PLO demonstrated its real intentions with a series of spectacular terrorist incidents. The first two operations, in late August, were frustrated by Israel. But on 25 September, two days before King Hussein was due to arrive in the US on another visit, the PLO's Force 17 (Yasser Arafat's bodyguards) murdered three Israelis on a yacht in Larnaca, Cyprus. Israel retaliated by bombing the PLO headquarters in

Tunis. Two weeks later a branch of the Palestine Liberation Front loyal to Arafat hijacked the Italian cruise liner *Achille Lauro* and killed a crippled American.

In the wake of these events two members of the PLO Executive Committee arrived in London for the planned meeting with British Foreign Secretary Howe. But the meeting never took place because, under orders from Arafat, they refused to endorse a statement that would have been issued afterwards committing them personally to acceptance of Resolution 242 and Israel's right to exist. These events effectively ended the effort to resolve the problem of Palestinian representation by providing a role for the PLO via a US meeting with a Jordanian/Palestinian delegation. As Shultz noted: 'those who perpetrate violence deal themselves out of the peace process'.

Stage Two: International Auspices

Hussein had already begun to shift the emphasis of his strategy after the Casablanca summit and the failure of Murphy's August visit. It was now clear, on the one hand, that Syria had denied him Arab support and, on the other, that the PLO was not serious about making peace. Repeated demonstrations of the PLO's commitment to 'armed struggle', combined with its failure to live up to its commitment to Jordan to accept Resolution 242, were more than a severe embarrassment to the King. They also seemed designed to drag Jordan back into conflict with Israel, for the actions against Israel were generating heavy pressure on Peres to retaliate by bombing PLO offices in Jordan. If the PLO was dragging him back into war at the same time as he was straining his relations with Syria and Saudi Arabia, then King Hussein felt he was running high risks for little benefit.

Accordingly, when Hussein returned to the United States in late September, he no longer sought a US–Jordanian/Palestinian dialogue. As he declared in a speech to the UN General Assembly, his stress now was on prompt and direct negotiations with Israel, under appropriate auspices (which he defined as an international conference, hosted by the UN Secretary General, and including the five Permanent Members of the Security Council as well as all parties to the conflict).

This shift in strategy was accompanied by purposeful reconciliation with Syria. The process began in mid-September with a Saudi-sponsored meeting between the Syrian and Jordanian Prime Ministers. A second meeting, one month later, resulted in a three-point agreement which rejected direct negotiations with Israel as well as partial and unilateral settlements. In this way, Hussein achieved two purposes: he reduced tensions with Syria while laying the groundwork for involving Damascus in an international conference; and he applied pressure to Arafat to adhere more piously to the 11 February Accord or be left out of the process. But this did little to improve his ability to enter negotiations with Israel. As the agreement with Damascus demonstrated, Syria would only be drawn into the process on its own terms, which amounted to a veto over any

Jordanian move. And, as Hussein's subsequent meeting with Arafat on 27–8 October showed, the PLO was well able to resist his pressure.

Moreover, Hussein also paid a high price. His rapprochement with Damascus robbed the Reagan Administration of the Syrian threat to Jordan as the major justification for its $1.9-billion arms sale. And his acceptance of Syria's demand that he reject direct negotiations robbed his commitment before the UN General Assembly of any credibility. In these circumstances, the US Congress was overwhelmingly opposed to the arms sale, and on 23 October the Administration decided to avoid an embarrassing defeat by delaying the sale until 1 March 1986. Hussein's weakness was therefore portrayed in stark relief. He had been unable to control Arafat by allying himself with the PLO, but he could not now ally himself with Syria without coming under Assad's control. In these circumstances, he could not enter negotiations with Israel, which meant that he could not gain access to America's arsenal.

Shimon Peres had a different problem. He was due to hand over the Prime Ministership to Yitzhak Shamir in twelve months' time. Yet he was riding high in the opinion polls and facing increasing pressure from his own party to precipitate new elections before summer 1986. If he could bring Hussein to the table, he would have the issue he needed for breaking his agreement with Shamir. Aware of Hussein's disillusionment with the PLO, Peres tried to accommodate his desire for international auspices in the hope that Hussein could reciprocate by meeting Israel's need to exclude the PLO. Accordingly, in his speech to the UN General Assembly in October, Peres suggested that the direct negotiations could be initiated by an international forum. Subsequently, he indicated that the USSR could be included in this forum if it renewed diplomatic relations with Israel or allowed significant numbers of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel.

Co-operation and co-ordination now began to take place on a number of levels. Peres and Hussein apparently held a secret meeting in Paris in October, and other meetings between Jordanian and Israeli officials may also have taken place. Jordan urged the Soviet Union to renew diplomatic relations with Israel. Murphy paid a secret visit to Amman, after which he reported that Jordan, Israel and the US were in agreement on three points: that the UN Secretary General would issue invitations to an international conference which would accompany direct negotiations; that only states would be represented at the table (meaning the Palestinians would be part of the Jordanian delegation); and that the topic of negotiation would be transitional or functional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza.

The Reluctant Super-powers

If there were to be an international forum for the negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union would have to be there. In mid-November, Reagan and Gorbachev were scheduled to hold their first summit. Peres and Hussein therefore urged Murphy to get Reagan to

discuss the peace process with Gorbachev and seek Soviet involvement in the international forum they both now sought. It was ironical indeed that the lesser powers, normally the most fearful of super-power agreements being made at their expense, were now seeking super-power involvement. But this time neither super-power proved in a hurry to accept the invitation.

Shultz regarded the notion of reintroducing the Soviet Union into the American-sponsored peace process with great scepticism. Moreover, he did not want the Middle East to interfere with the other items on the agenda – arms control and US–Soviet bilateral relations – to which he attached a higher priority. For its part, the USSR also showed little interest in making the Middle East a summit issue. Under Gorbachev's leadership, Moscow had begun to adopt a more flexible approach to the Middle East, focused on cultivating relations with the conservative Arab regimes, and it had also sent several signals to Israel that it was interested in improving relations. In late October, however, when Peres met Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze at the UN and explained Israel's terms for Soviet involvement in the peace process, he was told to wait until after the super-power summit.

In fact Moscow was in no hurry to repeat the humiliations of the 1973 Geneva conference on the Middle East or the 1977 US–Soviet joint communiqué. In the first case, the USSR was left co-chairing a phoney conference while Kissinger conducted the negotiations between Israel and Egypt and Syria. In the second case, it reached an agreement with the US on reconvening the Geneva conference, only to see Sadat negotiate directly with Israel. Now, in the Soviet view, Israel and the US were attempting to orchestrate another phoney conference which, as Peres emphasized in subsequent clarifications to his UN speech, would have no control over the bilateral negotiations and would only be a 'short premiere'. Moreover, at a mid-year meeting of Soviet and American officials to discuss the Middle East, the US had made it clear that the USSR would have to demonstrate constructive behaviour by revising its regional policies before it could be involved in the peace process.

Neither of these conditions was attractive to Moscow. It was only interested in a real international conference in which it would play a substantive role. The fact that both Jordan and Israel now sought its participation it saw as a positive step, but it wanted to ensure that the American-sponsored peace process failed, rather than help its success by agreeing to an international facade. Accordingly, the USSR had from the outset opposed the Jordan–PLO Accord and had pressed Arafat not to make concessions to Jordan or the US. It feared that, if he did so, US-sponsored direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel would take place, putting an end to any hope of rebuilding Soviet influence in the Middle East heartland. Thus, for very different reasons, Moscow showed as little interest as Washington in putting the Middle East high on the Reagan–Gorbachev summit agenda. Discussion of the Middle East at the summit was perfunctory, with both sides restating their long-held

positions and agreeing only to continue the regional consultations that had started in 1984.

Losing Momentum

Without super-power backing, the efforts of Peres and Hussein would now prove inadequate to surmount the growing regional opposition to direct negotiations. Syria was determined to ensure that Jordan would not proceed and took advantage of the reconciliation talks with Jordan to make this very clear. The joint communiqué issued after Jordan's Prime Minister had met Assad in Damascus in mid-November again emphasized their common rejection of direct negotiations and partial or separate solutions. When the King finally held his summit with Assad in Damascus, in December, no communiqué was issued. If Hussein had planned to gain Syrian acquiescence to an international conference, he had apparently made no headway.

The one advantage of this rapprochement might have been the pressure it put on the PLO to meet Hussein's terms for direct negotiations for fear of being sacrificed on the altar of improved Syrian–Jordanian relations. But when the PLO Executive Committee met in Baghdad in late November it proved to be quite resilient to this pressure and (although Hussein only learned of its decision in February 1986) apparently decided to reject his call for unequivocal PLO acceptance of UN Resolution 242. Indeed, Hussein's leverage on the PLO was so weak that Arafat could spend the next two months simply avoiding the rendezvous in Amman at which he would have to deliver this rebuff.

Egypt at least could have been expected to provide support for Peres and Hussein, but Mubarak had his own agenda. First, in an effort to prove Egypt's fidelity to the Palestinian cause, he managed to ease the pressure Hussein was applying to Arafat. During his September visit to Washington, he had again insisted that the PLO be involved in the process via a US–PLO dialogue, even though Hussein had by this time given up the idea. In November Mubarak welcomed Arafat to Cairo and with much fanfare arranged the issuing of Arafat's 'Cairo Declaration', in which he condemned terrorism while reaffirming the legitimacy of 'armed struggle' against Israel. While Egyptian officials interpreted this as meaning that the PLO would restrict its activities to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, Arafat subsequently explained that armed struggle would continue in the whole of occupied Palestine. And then in mid-November, after meeting Hussein, Mubarak declared that the PLO would have to be actively and directly involved in the negotiations.

These activities complicated Peres's diplomacy as much as they did Hussein's. Not only was Peres trying to exclude the PLO from the negotiations, he had also been counting on Mubarak to warm up relations with Israel. Instead, negotiations with Egypt on the Taba border dispute had now become bogged down in an internal disagreement over whether conciliation should precede arbitration. Peres' *Likud* coalition partners were insisting that conciliation come first; Peres himself was insisting

that, if Israel agreed to arbitration, Egypt would have to revitalize its normalization agreements with Israel and return its ambassador.

Mubarak's insistence on PLO involvement in the peace process, together with his reluctance to make any gesture towards Israel that might be criticized by the opposition at home or in the Arab world, posed problems enough for Peres. But matters were only made worse by the Egyptian handling of the killing of seven Israeli tourists in Sinai in October, when Mubarak dismissed the incident as a 'small matter' and delayed a response to Israel's request for an official report. Nevertheless, in January Peres did succeed in persuading his Cabinet to agree to a compromise on the Taba dispute, whereby the issue would be submitted to arbitration but the first step in the process would be an effort at conciliation. Negotiations with Egypt began again in earnest, but they dragged on for months, over the terms of the compromise and the linkage to normalization of relations, without any satisfactory conclusion being reached.

Denouement

In these circumstances, the peace process began to languish. Nevertheless, the United States decided to make one more attempt to get negotiations started. In January 1986 Murphy was dispatched to London to meet Hussein and, subsequently, Peres. He carried with him a commitment from the President that the US would adopt a higher profile by sending Shultz to the region if Hussein were now prepared to enter direct negotiations with Israel within an international context. Hussein insisted, however, that the PLO would have to be present in the Jordanian delegation at the international conference. Thus, in the final act, the problems of Palestinian representation and the forum for negotiations would be combined, if anything lessening the chances that a breakthrough would be achieved.

In an effort to meet Hussein's requirements, however, the US decided that it would accept the issuing of an invitation to the PLO to attend the international conference provided that the PLO accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and renounced terror. It also agreed that each party to the negotiations would have the right to submit any disagreements between them to the conference. If the PLO accepted its conditions, the US would begin discussions with the USSR and the other Permanent Members of the Security Council to seek their participation in the conference. Peres apparently acquiesced in this offer on the basis that the conference would have no power over the bilateral negotiations, where the PLO would not be present, and on the understanding that Israel retained its right to refuse to negotiate with the PLO.

Hussein put this offer to Arafat when he finally turned up in Amman in late January 1986. Arafat insisted, however, that before the PLO accepted UN Resolution 242 the US would have to state its support for Palestinian self-determination and that the international conference would have to have arbitral powers over the bilateral talks. Their nego-

tiations dragged on for two weeks, with the US trying to come up with creative formulations which would meet Arafat's demands without endorsing self-determination, but on 7 February Arafat left Amman, still insisting that the US must approve Palestinian self-determination. Then, on 19 February, King Hussein delivered a three-hour speech announcing the breakdown of the peace process, blaming the PLO, and ending co-operation with the PLO leadership 'until such time as their word becomes their bond'.

Although in subsequent days Hussein called for an alternative Palestinian leadership, he took no action to move towards negotiations without the PLO. The PLO's offices in Amman remained open, and Hussein's supporters in the territories waited in vain for some signal that he would move ahead on his own. In this vacuum the murder of the mayor of Nablus, Zafir al-Masri, a pro-Jordanian who had been appointed by Israel in November, put an end to any prospect that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza might break with the PLO and join Hussein in negotiating with Israel. In the end none of the parties to the process considered the benefits of beginning the negotiations worth the risks involved in taking the next step. The PLO would not accept Resolution 242 and renounce terror; Jordan would not proceed without the PLO and an international conference; Israel would not negotiate with the PLO; and the United States would not commit itself to supporting the creation of an independent Palestinian state. None of them was in a strong enough position to change these parameters. It was left to the State Department spokesman to announce that the peace process had now entered a 'period of reflection'.

It had always been an illusion to think that the diplomacy of Israel, Jordan and the US on its own could have overcome the obstruction of the radical forces in the Middle East which had combined to prevent progress in the peace negotiations. And it was a mistake to believe that, merely by addressing the Palestinian problem, the grievances of the Palestinians could be requited or their objectives thwarted. Only when the balance of power shifts back in favour of the parties who have a stake in peace, will it be possible to start the process again.

6. ISRAEL

BASIC DATA

Official Name of State: State of Israel
Head of State: President Haim Herzog
Prime Minister: Shimon Peres
Minister of Defense: Yitzhak Rabin
Chief of the General Staff: Lieutenant General Moshe Levi
Air Force Commander: Major General Amos Lapidot
Ground Forces HQ Commander: Major General Amir Drori
Navy Commander: Rear Admiral Avraham Ben-Shoshan
Area: 20,325 sq. km. including East Jerusalem and vicinity annexed in 1967 (not including Golan Heights, 1,100 sq. km. to which Israeli law was applied in December 1981)
Population: 4,170,000

ethnic subdivision:		
Jews	3,461,000	83.0%
Arabs & Druze	588,000	14.1%
Others (Armenian, Circassian, European)	121,000	2.9%
religious subdivision:		
Jews	3,461,000	83.0%
Muslims	542,000	13.0%
Christians	96,000	2.3%
Druze and others	71,000	1.7%

GDP:
1982 — $23.0 billion
1983 — $25.2 billion
Balance of Payments (goods, services & unilateral transfer payments):

year	income	expenditure	balance
1982	$12.73 billion	$14.94 billion	–$2.21 billion
1983	$12.81 billion	$15.06 billion	–$2.25 billion

Defense Expenditure:
1983 — $4.6 billion
1984 — $4.3 billion
1985 — $4.0 billion
Foreign Military Aid Received:
financial aid from:
USA — $1.4 billion grant (1985)

military training:
trainees abroad in — USA, Britain, France
arms transfers from:
USA (tanks, SP artillery, SSMs, combat aircraft, attack helicopters); Britain (spare parts); Italy (helicopters, naval guns)

Foreign Military Aid Extended:
financial aid to:
South Lebanon militia — $100 million
military training:
advisors/instructors/technicians in — Liberia, South Lebanon (SLA militia), USA, Zaire
foreign trainees from — Lebanon (various militias), Liberia, Papua New Guinea, Zaire
arms transfers to:
militias in Lebanon (small arms, tanks, artillery pieces); Argentina (sub-components of combat aircraft); Belgium (naval tactical training center); Canada (ammunition); Chile (AAMs, MFPBs); Colombia (transport aircraft); Ecuador (AAMs, combat aircraft); El Salvador (transport aircraft); Finland (artillery); FRG (ammunition, aircraft); Guatemala (rifles); Honduras (transport aircraft); Iran* (spare parts, ammunition, recoilless rifles); Ireland (ballistic helmets); Italy (tank ammunition); Kenya (SSMs); Liberia (transport aircraft); Mexico (transport aircraft); Papua New Guinea (patrol boat, transport aircraft); Paraguay (transport aircraft); Singapore* (SSMs, AAMs, naval tactical training center); South Africa* (MFPBs, SSMs); Sri Lanka* (patrol boats, unconfirmed); Taiwan* (SSMs, naval tactical training center); Thailand (transport aircraft); USA (parts, mini-RPVs, light AT rockets, combat aircraft on lease); Venezuela (MRLs); Zaire (small arms)
forces deployed abroad in:
Lebanon — observation units on a small scale in the security zone in South Lebanon

Cooperation in Arms Production/Assembly with:
Finland (artillery); USA (aircraft, electronics, naval vessels, tank guns)

Joint Maneuvers with:
USA

* according to foreign and Israeli publications

INFRASTRUCTURE

Road Network:

length (paved): 4,760 km

main routes:

Tel Aviv — Jerusalem
Tel Aviv — Hadera — Haifa
Tel Aviv — Ashdod — Beer Sheva
Hadera — Afula — Tiberias/ Afula — Amiad — Rosh-Pina
Haifa — Tiberias
Haifa — Nahariya — Naqura (Lebanon)
Acre — Safed — Rosh Pina/Acre — Amiad
Tiberias — Metula — Marj Ayoun (Lebanon)
Beer Sheva — Eilat
Rafah (Rafiah) — Nitsana — Eilat
Eilat — Sharm al-Shaykh (Egypt)
Beer Sheva — Nitzana — Isma'iliya (Egypt)
Tel Aviv — Gaza — Kantara (Egypt)
Jerusalem — Hebron — Arad/Beer Sheva
Jerusalem — Nablus — Afula
Jerusalem — Allenby Bridge — Amman (Jordan)
Jerusalem — Jericho — Beit Shean/Jericho — Eilat

Railway Network:

length (standard gauge): 767 km

main routes:

Tel Aviv — Haifa
Haifa — Nahariya
Tel Aviv — Jerusalem
Tel Aviv — Beer Sheba — Oron
Kiryat-Gat — Ashkelon — Ashdod
Tel Aviv — Lod — Ashdod
Tel Aviv — Lod — Gaza (serviceable as far as Rafah)
Lod — Haifa

Airfields: 57

airfields by runway type:

permanent surface fields 30
unpaved fields and usable airstrips 27

airfields by runway length:

2440 — 3659 meters 8
1220 — 2439 12
under 1220 37

international airports: Ben Gurion (Tel Aviv), Eilat

major domestic airfields: Beer Sheva, Haifa, Jerusalem, Rosh Pina, Tel Aviv, Masada

Airlines:

companies: El Al (international), CAL (cargo), Arkia/Kanaf-Arkia (domestic and charter), Sun d'Or (charter), Shahaf (domestic)

aircraft:

Boeing 747-200B/100F/200/200C/200F	8
Boeing 767/767ER	4
Boeing 707-420/320B/320C	8
Boeing 727	1
Boeing 737-200	4
Britten-Norman BN-2 Islander	4
Cessna 337	2
DHC-7 (Dash 7)	2
Grand Aero Commander	1
Piper Navajo/Chieftain	6

Maritime Facilities:

harbors — Ashdod, Eilat, Haifa
anchorages — Tel Aviv-Yaffo
oil terminals — Ashkelon, Eilat, Haifa
coal terminal — Hadera

Merchant Marine:

vessel type	number	GRT
general cargo, including container	63	654,000
bulk carrier	22	580,000
other	17	885,000
TOTAL	102	2,119,000

Defense Production:

army equipment:

artillery pieces; assault rifles; ATRLs; electronic equipment; heavy, medium and light mortars; MRLs; mortar and small arms ammunition; mines; mine-clearing rollers; MRLs, SMGs; tanks; tank guns

aircraft and air ammunition:

AAMs; combat aircraft; light transport aircraft; naval patrol aircraft; mini RPVs; operational flight trainer systems; radars

ships and naval ammunition:

LCTs; MFPBs; patrol boats; SSMs

ARMED FORCES

Personnel:

military forces —

	regular	reserves	total
army	130,000	310,000	440,000
air force	30,000	50,000	80,000
navy	10,000	10,000	20,000
TOTAL	170,000	370,000	540,000

para-military forces —

Nahal — 5,000

border police — 4,500

Army:

major units (including reserves):

unit type	divisions	independent brigades
armored	12	
infantry/territorial		15
airborne		5
TOTAL	12	20

small arms:

personal weapons —

9mm Uzi SMG

7.62mm AK-47 (Kalashnikov)

7.62mm FAL/FN SAR

7.62mm Galil sniper rifle

7.62mm M-14 SAR

machine guns —

12.7mm (0.5") Browning M-2 HMG

7.62mm (0.3") Browning M-1919 A1 MMG

7.62mm MAG (FN) LMG

light and medium mortars —

81mm Soltam

60mm

52mm IMI

light ATRLs —

M-72 LAW

RPG-7

tanks:

model	number
high quality	
Merkava	400

check make

M-60 A3		200
T-62		150
	(sub-total	750)
medium quality		
Centurion		1100
M-60/M-60 A1		1100
M-48 A5		600
T-55 (improved)		250
	(sub-total	3050)
TOTAL		3800
on order: Merkava		
APCs/ARVs:		
model		number
high quality		
M-113 (various marks)		
RBY		
others		
M-2 & M-3 halftrack		
BTR-50		
OT-62		
BRDM-2		
TOTAL		8000
artillery:		
guns and heavy mortars —		
high quality		
203mm M-110 SP howitzer		
175mm M-107 SP gun		
155mm M-109 A1 & A2 SP howitzer		
155mm L-33 SP howitzer (SOLTAM)		
155mm M-50 SP howitzer		
155mm M-71 howitzer		
130mm M-46 gun		
122mm D-30 howitzer		
160mm SP mortar		
	(sub-total	900)
others		
120mm mortar		
	(sub-total	100)
TOTAL		1000
MRLs —		
290mm (MAR 290)		

240mm	
140mm	
122mm BM-21	
engineering equipment:	
Gilois motorized bridges	
M-123 Viper minefield crossing system	
M-69 A1 bridging tanks	
mine-clearing rollers	
mine layers	
MTU-55 bridging tanks	
tank-towed bridges	
AFV transporters:	
anti-tank weapons:	
missiles —	
AT-3 (Sagger)	
BGM-71A TOW and Improved TOW	
FGM-77A Dragon	
surface-to-surface missiles and rockets:	
model	launchers
MGM-52C (Lance)	12
Jericho SSM (according to foreign publications)	
anti-aircraft defenses:	
short-range missiles —	
MIM-72A Chaparral	18
MIM-43A Redeye	
SA-7 (Grail)	
short-range guns —	number
40mm Bofors L-70	
37mm	
ZU 23x2	
20mm M-163 A1 Vulcan SP	
20mm TCM-20 Hispano Suiza SP	
20mm Hispano Suiza	
TOTAL	900
CW capabilities:	
personal protection	
unit decontamination equipment	
Air Force:	
aircraft — general:	number
combat aircraft	645
transport aircraft	90

helicopters		190
combat aircraft:		
interceptors —		
high quality		
F-15 Eagle		50
F-16A/B (multi-role, employed as interceptor)		75
Total		125
strike and multi-role aircraft —		
high quality		
F-4E/RF Phantom		160
Kfir		180
	(sub-total	340)
others		
A-4 Skyhawk		180
Total		520
on order: 75 F-16		
transport aircraft:		
Arava		10
Beechcraft Queen Air		12
Boeing 707		8
C-130H Hercules		22
DC-3 Dakota (C-47)		20
Dornier Do-28		11
KC-130 (refuelling)		2
KC-707 (refuelling)		2
Westwind 1124		3
TOTAL		90
training and liaison aircraft:		
Cessna U-206 (Stationair-6)		41
CM-170 Fouga Magister/Tzukit		94
Piper Cub		35
TOTAL		170
helicopters:		
attack —		
AH-1G/1S Cobra		20
500MD Defender		35
	(sub-total	55)
naval attack/search & rescue —		
HH-65A Dolphin		2
heavy transport —		
CH-53		35

SA-321 Super Frelon		8
	(sub-total	43)
medium transport —		
AB-212		60
light transport —		
AB-206 JetRanger		30
TOTAL		190
on order: 500MD helicopters; UH-60A Black Hawk (unconfirmed); HH-65A Dolphin		
maritime surveillance aircraft:		
Seascan (Westwind 1124N)		4
miscellaneous aircraft:		
E-2C Hawkeye AEW		4
OV-1E Mohawk AEW		2-4
Beech AQM-37A target drone		
Beech MQM-107B target drone		
Mastiff (Tadiran) Mini-RPV		
MQM-74C Chukar II RPV		
Scout (IAI) Mini-RPV		
Teledyne Ryan Model 1241 RPV		
advanced armament:		
air-to-air missiles —		
AIM-9 Sidewinder; AIM-9L		
AIM-7 Sparrow		
Python 3		
R-530 Matra		
Shafrir		
air-to-ground missiles —		
AGM-65 Maverick		
AGM-62A Walleye		
AGM-45 A/B Shrike		
bombs —		
CBU		
runway-penetrating bombs		
on order: AIM–9M AAM		
anti-aircraft defenses:		
radars —		
Elta		
FPS-100		
Westinghouse AN/TPS-43 three-dimensional radar		
long-range missiles —		

model	
HAWK	
MIM-23B Improved HAWK	
aircraft shelters —	
in all operational airfields, for combat aircraft	
military airfields:	11
Haifa, Hatzerim, Hatzor, Lod, Nevatim, Palmachim, Ramat David, Ramon, Tel Aviv, Tel Nof, Uvda	
aircraft maintenance and repair capability:	
maintenance on all models in service, partly in airfields, partly at Israel Aircraft Industries facilities	
Navy:	
combat vessels:	number
submarines —	
IKL/Vickers Type 206	3
MFPBs —	
Sa'ar 2 and 3 class	12
Sa'ar 4 class (Reshef)	8
Sa'ar 4.5 class (Aliyah)	4
Total	24
missile-armed hydrofoils —	
Flagstaff	2
patrol craft —	
Dabur class	37
Kedma class	4
PBR — Yatush	6
Total	47
on order: Dvora class MFPBs	
landing craft:	
Ash class LCT	6
Bat-Sheva class LST	1
LSM 1 class	3
Sealand Mk III hovercraft	2
US type LCM	3
TOTAL	15
auxiliary vessels:	
support ships	2
training craft, 109 ton (full load)	1
swimmer delivery vehicles	
advanced armament:	
Barak anti-missile missile	

Gabriel 1, 2, & 3 SSM
RGM-84A Harpoon SSM
20mm Vulcan-Phalanx radar-controlled anti-missile gun

naval bases: 3
Ashdod, Eilat, Haifa

ship maintenance and repair capability:
repair and maintenance of all naval vessels in Haifa, in part in conjunction with Israel Wharves

6A. The Israel Defense Forces

Two developments left their mark on the IDF during the period under review: the withdrawal from Lebanon and the cuts in the defense budget. Both had an impact on the IDF's force structure and operational capability.

Force Structure

IDF force structure was affected by the ongoing reorganization of the ground forces and by overall growth in the three service arms, combined with certain cutbacks in the size and equipment of the regular army.

There are now 12 armored divisions in the IDF. The infantry order-of-battle, which was felt to be too small, was expanded through the reconstruction of the Givati and Nahal brigades. The number of tanks increased to some 3800, with high-quality Merkavas accounting for almost all the growth. The air force acquired additional F-15 interceptors and the navy added a small number of missile boats. This buildup stemmed not from the creation of new frameworks, but largely from a reorganization of the existing order-of-battle and the absorption of weapons systems ordered under previous plans.

In addition to these qualitative improvements, the IDF was also forced by budgetary constraints to make substantial cuts, especially in the regular forces. Virtually no sector was left untouched by the cutbacks. Thousands of career military personnel and civilian employees in the IDF and the defense establishment were or will be dismissed. Regular army formations were also adversely affected. Regarding weaponry, the cutbacks were concentrated in low-priority areas. In the air force, for example, low-quality aircraft such as Skyhawks were grounded. The cutbacks also entailed a reduction in ground forces' ammunition stocks — which appear to be below the levels designated as optimal following the Yom Kippur War — and slowdowns in a number of weapons development or upgrading projects, such as the plan to carry out additional upgrading of tank weapons systems. Various headquarters and rear-area units were also affected.

The budgetary cuts, coupled with the debilitating effects of inflation, have necessitated major revisions in the IDF's multi-year force construction program that began in 1982 (and was made up of two five-year plans). The new multi-annual plan (extending until 1995), which is currently being drawn up, will undoubtedly reflect the economic constraints felt by the IDF in 1985.

It seems likely, then, that the new multi-annual plan will be marked by an emphasis on quality at the expense of quantity; and since quality also costs money, it will take the form of improvements to existing weapons systems and the addition of high-quality equipment which will provide more precise and effective firepower. Noteworthy in this connection is an air force Phantom upgrade project involving the installation of new electronic and combat systems and possibly also new engines; As a result, the Phantoms' operational life will be extended until the end of this century.

1985 was the second year of operation for the Field Forces Command (FFC), which was established to meet a long-felt need to reorganize and improve the ground forces. The lessons of the Lebanon War, and notably the air force's dazzling success in that campaign, only underscored this need, while providing a model for emulation. The objective of the FFC was to be achieved through the assimilation and integration of the combined-arms, inter-service battle, the invigoration of the ground forces' doctrine of integrated warfare, and the initiation of projects to develop high-quality ground weaponry. The FFC is not intended to serve as a supreme command for all the ground forces; unlike the air force and navy commands, the FFC does not function as a service arm HQ. Although the FFC was fully operational in 1985, it has proved incapable of reducing the HQs of its constituent professional corps or of taking over certain functions of GHQ Training Branch — thereby leaving in place a duplication of effort which is particularly blatant at a time of budgetary cuts.

On the other hand, the IDF's reorganization efforts have led to the subordination of both the Ordnance and Supply Corps' HQs to the Quartermaster-General (previously they had only been coordinated through him). It seems likely that some of the corps which are coordinated by the chief of the Manpower (A) Branch will also be subordinated to him. Here, too, the object is to streamline the various systems by eliminating duplication.

Two other issues — Israel's security burden and its national

resources — are also relevant to the force structure of the IDF.

In 1985, the defense budget stood at $4 billion, excluding expenditures on the withdrawal from Lebanon but including $1.4 billion in US military aid (all of it a grant). The net burden on national resources (excluding indirect costs, most of which are difficult to estimate) is $2.6 billion. As a proportion of GNP (about $23 billion in 1984), defense represents about 17 percent while local defense outlays are slightly more than 11 percent of the GNP. (These percentages increase when the cost of the withdrawal from Lebanon is added.) All this constitutes a heavy drain on the already troubled Israeli economy. This is so despite the fact that the defense budget, in real terms, has been declining in recent years (with the exception of 1982, the year of Operation Peace for Galilee) because of inflationary erosion and annual cutbacks. In the coming years, these budgetary constraints will have a sharper impact on the IDF's force structure and general development.

An additional problem is the allocation of large sums for the development of the Lavi combat aircraft, as well as for naval vessels — submarines and Sa'ar MFPBs. A large part of American military aid — $400 million — is currently earmarked for the Lavi's development. It is true that $250 million of this is convertible into local currency, thereby making a major contribution not only to the development of the plane and its accompanying technologies, but to the economy as a whole (net capital import, employment opportunities, and so forth). But when the production stage gets underway in a few years' time, Israel will have to set aside over $500 million per annum for an entire decade (unless US aid for the project is extended or a production partner is found). In other words, a very large part of the defense budget will be mortgaged for many years to a weapon that is important, but not decisive, and for which substitutes are certainly available. Furthermore, the budgetary drain will inevitably affect the air force's overall procurement program and, even worse, will leave few funds for the growth and enhancement of the ground forces and the weapons they so badly need.

To sum up, the IDF's force construction and development in 1985 were marked, on the one hand, by the completion of the gradual buildup planned in previous years and based largely on high-quality weapons systems and, on the other hand, by tangible cuts, mainly affecting the regular forces, and the need to factor budgetary constraints into long-range planning.

Operational Capability

The withdrawal from Lebanon should have enabled the IDF to resume a more intensive training program. But because the bulk of the IDF's budget is taken up by tank and aircraft running costs, it is precisely in the area of training that the cutbacks are most pronounced. There is therefore a real danger that reduced training will reduce professional skills.

Despite the introduction of less expensive alternatives, such as simulators, these cannot fully substitute for training under the most realistic conditions. For example, any significant decrease in the number of flying hours for regular air force pilots — whose flying time was in the past greater, on the average, than in western air forces — is liable to result in reduced flying standards. This will be compounded by the major reduction in flying time of dozens of reserve pilots and the grounding of many others.

Ironically, the training cutbacks are being imposed just when the buildup in the order-of-battle and the absorption of new weaponry demand the opposite. Moreover, the cutbacks in both training and equipment will make it impossible to apply some of the lessons of the Lebanon War.

Another constraint on operational capability is the existing shortage of technical manpower. This has an impact on unit readiness and fitness, the ability to develop weapons systems and equipment, general levels of maintenance, etc. Personnel cuts in the maintenance sector are adversely affecting the IDF's ability to refurbish various combat systems, just when overall defense budget cutbacks are forcing the IDF to take on projects which were previously farmed out to private industry. The even heavier burden placed on technical personnel may well have a negative impact on morale and influence decisions about career service in the regular army; although the economic slowdown has somewhat limited alternative opportunities, highly skilled technical manpower is still in demand in the private sector.

Another manpower-related problem in recent years has been the declining willingness of young officers, especially field officers, to volunteer for lengthy periods (over a year) of service in the regular army. As a result, the field forces are finding it difficult to fill mid-level ranks (captain and major), even though some improvement has recently been felt.

Despite all the adverse effects of the budget constraints, the

cutbacks may also have some positive impact. The regular army, for example, may become smaller but also more cohesive and effective. The standard of officers, which declined somewhat during the rapid buildup in the order-of-battle after the Yom Kippur War, may be raised. And despite the budget cuts, fairly large-scale training and exercises in the three services are continuing, as are weapons development and upgrading and the constant reassessment of combat doctrine.

Furthermore, quantitative reductions are offset by equipment modernization. The acquisition of additional F-15 interceptors has already been noted; more F-16s (part of the order of 75 such aircraft) are due to arrive next year as outdated Skyhawks are taken out of service. By the same token, the ongoing supply of large numbers of "advanced" Merkava tanks will improve the ground forces, even if outmoded tanks have to be removed from the order-of-battle. In sum, Israel's qualitative edge can be maintained even in the midst of quantitative cutbacks — although there is naturally a point beyond which cutbacks cannot be compensated for by quality.

Finally, several operational-strategic aspects of the Lebanon War and the withdrawal from Lebanon have had an impact on the IDF's capability. Although Operation Peace for Galilee effectively terminated in September 1982 with the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, the IDF remained in Lebanon until the summer of 1985. This prolonged presence affected the IDF's ability to carry out routine training and prepare for a future war, which would be waged against a strong, regular army. Resources needed to ensure the security of the troops stationed in Lebanon were diverted from other investments, which could have made greater contributions to force construction. For reasons grounded in Israel's political structure and value system, the IDF found it difficult to cope successfully with the problems of a hostile population and terrorist and guerrilla warfare in southern Lebanon. As a result, the IDF's initiative and offensive ethos were curbed and the army was torn between the overriding desire to protect its soldiers, and a basic principle of war which had always characterized IDF operations — adhering to the mission. All of these factors could not but affect the morale of both officers and men.

At the same time, the war and the IDF's protracted presence in Lebanon also produced certain positive results. Considerable operational experience was acquired, the constant dangers to

which soldiers were exposed helped raise professional standards, and weapons systems and equipment were combat-tested. In addition, the need to come up with responses to terrorist and guerrilla warfare and the problem of a hostile population helped sharpen thinking and the ability to cope with changing circumstances.

Above all, the IDF's stay in Lebanon, and particularly its combat missions there, enabled it to detect incipient flaws in its operational capability. For example, the IDF found that the logistic echelons had been enlarged disproportionately; the current reduction is not only consistent with budgetary constraints but is also making the IDF a more agile, less clumsy army. Deficiencies in inter-service coordination and in air support for the ground forces that were revealed during the war are also being corrected.

The IDF has attempted to benefit, not only from defects revealed in Lebanon, but also from successes. The deployment of remotely piloted vehicles and other intelligence systems will make it possible to provide visual intelligence to the ground forces and thereby upgrade their field intelligence. The air force revealed some of its secrets in its impressive battle against the Syrian surface-to-air missile system in Lebanon. The navy, which for the first time successfully landed a task force in the enemy's rear, is now working to integrate this type of operation into future IDF planning. Similarly, lessons are being drawn from the experience of the improvised supra-divisional headquarters set up during the war. Although the creation of such improvised HQs during a pre-planned operation may seem strange, it also reflects the dynamic character of the IDF.

In any event, the overall impact of the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon is clearly positive. Training programs, which were actually resumed at the beginning of the year, could be carried out normally at all levels. Regular and reserve forces undertook several exercises, including one at the GHQ level. These were intended to polish the army's command-and-control and draw other lessons concerning the effective utilization of forces. In early December 1985, the IDF conducted a large-scale exercise in which a number of regular and reserve divisions took part. The aim of this exercise was two-fold: to examine command-and-control capabilities, and to test certain combat scenarios that might materialize.

Secondly, the withdrawal from Lebanon and the concomitant

shortening of lines also enabled the IDF to deploy more effectively against possible future threats from both the Golan Heights and Lebanon. Forces on the Golan have been strengthened; deployment in this zone is always reinforced by several reserve brigades which conduct their exercises here and which are as capable and combat-ready as the regular formations.

Thirdly, the withdrawal from Lebanon has raised troop morale and motivation. Evidence of this may be found in the consistently high volunteer rate for the IDF's elite units.

To sum up, despite the cutbacks in various elements related to the IDF's capability and readiness, and despite the problems associated with the protracted stay in, and withdrawal from Lebanon, the IDF's overall combat effectiveness has not been substantially impaired.