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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Kemp, Geoffrey: Files

Near East and South Asia Affairs

File Folder: Indian Ocean 1981

Box 90217 90492

Archivist: dlb

Date: 3/20/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Gary Sick to Richard Allen, re: Indian Ocean Conference with UK, 1 p. <i>R 15/18/00 NLSF 96-109 #39</i>	2/5/81	P1
2. Memo	Sick to Allen, re: Middle East Discussions with European Visitors, 2 p.	2/5/81	P1 R5
3. Memo	Alexander Haig to Reagan, re: U.S. Policy on the Proposed Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP), 3 p. <i>R 15/18/00 NLSF 96-109 #40</i>	2/26/81	P1
4. Memo	Allen to Haig, re: U.S. Policy on the Proposed Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP), 1 p. <i>#41</i>	3/13/81	P1
5. Memo	copy of item #3, 3 p. <i>" #42</i>	2/26/81	P1
6. Memo	Raymond Tanter to James W. Nance, re: Indian Ocean Strategy -- Talking Points for Weekly Update for the President, 1 p. <i>" #43</i>	12/4/81	P1

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

→ Sick

~~read~~

~~Keep~~

re: #0310

2/9/81

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dick - meetings, meetings,  
meetings. This government  
spends half their time in  
meetings. Most don't produce  
anything but Carbon dioxide.  
I think I know where we  
can start saving some  
money.

Bid.  
I do. too.  
Let State inform  
us of the results, B.S.  
if any. 2/9/81



## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

0310

February 5, 1981

MEMO FOR RICHARD ALLEN

FROM: GARY SICK *(u)*

SUBJECT: Indian Ocean Conference with UK

The next meeting of the U.S.-UK Indian Ocean talks takes place in London on February 23-24. These talks occur twice a year, alternating between Washington and London. They have been institutionalized since the early 1970s, growing out of the U.S.-UK agreement on use of Diego Garcia, and they cover the entire spectrum of security issues growing out of the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean and our mutual interests with the British in the region.

In the past, I have attended these meetings as the NSC representative because of my close association with the development of Indian Ocean security policy and because of the very close relationship of Indian Ocean policy with our Middle East strategy--particularly in the Gulf area. One of the key issues in the forthcoming talks, for example, will be use of Masirah Island and <sup>the</sup> need for cooperation with the British in the U.S. access to Omani facilities. I believe it is important to maintain the precedent of NSC participation in these talks.

Geoffrey Kemp would be a logical candidate to represent the NSC in the forthcoming talks. However, it is not clear to me that he will be on board in time.

Do you wish to maintain NSC participation in these talks?

       Yes

☒ No

*let State brief us. he can*

If so, do you want me to raise this with Kemp?

       Yes

       No: someone else should go.

*Saw the plane fare.*

DECLASSIFIED / released  
NLS F96-109 #39  
BY *cls* NARA, DATE 5/19/00

*Indian Ocean 1981*

**RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY**

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER -2 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Indian  
Ocean

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

823

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

March 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *JK*  
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on the Proposed  
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP)

The memorandum at Tab I to the President is self-explanatory.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

Richard Pipes concurs.

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *JK*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

823

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on the Proposed Indian  
Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP)

The memorandum to you from Al Haig at Tab A is a concise summary of the issue and I concur in the recommendation that you approve Option 3.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve Option 3 in the Haig memo.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_


~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~

February 26, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Subject: U.S. Policy on the Proposed Indian  
Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP)Issue for Decision

Since the early 1970s, many non-aligned countries led by India have campaigned at the UN for a Conference on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace to focus world opprobrium on the superpower naval buildup, and especially that of the U.S., in the Indian Ocean. There is now significant pressure to hold this conference in 1981. The issue for the U.S. is to find a strategy which will best defend its interests while discrediting the non-aligned nations' naval-oriented IOZP concept. A decision as early as possible is necessary since the UN is already considering the conference question and the U.S. will have to act early and strongly if it is to carry out its strategy successfully.

Background

The mechanism which the non-aligned are using to lay the groundwork for a conference is the UN ad hoc committee on the Indian Ocean. Since 1979, this committee has been "preparing" for a 1981 conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The Soviets joined the committee in 1979 in an effort to get a quick conference which focussed on U.S. naval strength. By 1980, many U.S. allies had also joined the committee in order to moderate its activities, and it became evident that unless the U.S. intervened, a conference would be held which would be detrimental to U.S. political and security interests. In March 1980, the U.S. joined the committee in order to block preparations for a conference; stiffen Allied resolve to oppose a conference; and challenge the non-aligned IOZP concept by pointing out that Soviet land forces, whether in their Southern military districts or Afghanistan, and not "great power" naval forces, constitute the real threat to regional security.

~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED  
F96-109 #40

NARA DATE

2/19/00



~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

During 1980, the U.S. largely succeeded in achieving its objectives. Momentum toward a conference was slowed, and the Soviets suffered severe propaganda damage over Afghanistan. Moreover, many participants joined the U.S. in questioning the IOZP concept, doubting the wisdom of an early conference, and condemning the Soviets. Some of the nations on the Indian Ocean littoral genuinely wish to reduce the risk of superpower confrontation there; they support the IOZP for this reason and generally are not acting from anti-US motives. They have become more receptive to our argument that Soviet military presence on land must also be considered. The principle of decision by consensus was also established (in practice this means that the U.S. has a virtual veto over holding a conference).

#### Options

Option 1: Withdraw now from the Committee, with as many allies as possible. On the surface, this option appears attractive, since without Western participation any IOZP Conference will be meaningless. However, it would allow the Soviets to recoup some of the propaganda damage they sustained last year and shape the conference to their own ends. This could lend to a harsher political climate for the U.S. in the Indian Ocean region, and increased unwillingness on the part of moderate states to cooperate militarily. While the U.S. can withdraw from the Committee at any time, it would be better tactically to do so using a defensible reason for withdrawal such as the Committee's non-adherence to the consensus rule.

Option 2: Agree to a conference. This would prevent radicalization of the conference by the Soviets and somewhat improve in the short term U.S. relations with the non-aligned. However, it would give the world the wrong signal since U.S. attendance at a conference would be taken as an endorsement of arms control discussions on the Indian Ocean. As presently envisaged, these could, among other things, compromise our high seas navigation rights under international law and our access to critical local facilities. It would also open the door to the non-aligned idea that there should be additional conferences with ever more specific and binding results.

Option 3: Continue participation while opposing a conference. This allows us to take the lead to ensure that no conference is scheduled and to identify the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as the threat to regional security. It keeps

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

our options open and permits us to withdraw, should we judge this desirable, and to do so in a way that puts the onus for breaking consensus on the Soviets. We would accept no situation which could imply US participation in any eventual IOZP conference.

RECOMMENDATION

The entire interagency community recommends approval of Option 3.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Alternatively: Approve Option 1 \_\_\_\_\_

Approve Option 2 \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

→ Kemp

~~SECRET~~

March 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on the Proposed Indian  
Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP)

The President has reviewed your memorandum on "U.S. Policy on the Proposed Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP)" dated February 26, 1981, and has approved your recommendation of Option 3. (S)

*Richard V. Allen*

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

Review March 12, 1987

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F96 109 4-41  
BY *allo* NARA, DATE 5/19/00

~~SECRET~~URGENT ACTION

March 12, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *ls (for)*  
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on the Proposed Indian  
Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP)

Per your instructions (Tab B), the memorandum for your signature to the Secretary of State at Tab A forwards the President's approval of Option 3.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the Secretary of State at Tab A.

APPROVE ✓

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

*RVA Sign  
3/13/81***SIGNED**  
*3/13/81*

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By dib NARA, Date 2/19/98~~SECRET~~

Review March 12, 1987



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

823

March 5, 1981

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*  
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on the Proposed Indian  
Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP)

The memorandum to you from Al Haig at Tab A is a concise summary of the issue and I concur in the recommendation that you approve Option 3.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve Option 3 in the Haig memo.

APPROVE ☒ DISAPPROVE           

Approve Option 1           

Approve Option 2           


cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
James Baker

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON**SECRET**

February 26, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

Subject: U.S. Policy on the Proposed Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP)

Issue for Decision

Since the early 1970s, many non-aligned countries led by India have campaigned at the UN for a Conference on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace to focus world opprobrium on the superpower naval buildup, and especially that of the U.S., in the Indian Ocean. There is now significant pressure to hold this conference in 1981. The issue for the U.S. is to find a strategy which will best defend its interests while discrediting the non-aligned nations' naval-oriented IOZP concept. A decision as early as possible is necessary since the UN is already considering the conference question and the U.S. will have to act early and strongly if it is to carry out its strategy successfully.

Background

The mechanism which the non-aligned are using to lay the groundwork for a conference is the UN ad hoc committee on the Indian Ocean. Since 1979, this committee has been "preparing" for a 1981 conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The Soviets joined the committee in 1979 in an effort to get a quick conference which focussed on U.S. naval strength. By 1980, many U.S. allies had also joined the committee in order to moderate its activities, and it became evident that unless the U.S. intervened, a conference would be held which would be detrimental to U.S. political and security interests. In March 1980, the U.S. joined the committee in order to block preparations for a conference; stiffen Allied resolve to oppose a conference; and challenge the non-aligned IOZP concept by pointing out that Soviet land forces, whether in their Southern military districts or Afghanistan, and not "great power" naval forces, constitute the real threat to regional security.

**SECRET**

GDS 27/17/87

F96-109 #42

dlb

NARA DATE 5/19/00

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

During 1980, the U.S. largely succeeded in achieving its objectives. Momentum toward a conference was slowed, and the Soviets suffered severe propaganda damage over Afghanistan. Moreover, many participants joined the U.S. in questioning the IOZP concept, doubting the wisdom of an early conference, and condemning the Soviets. Some of the nations on the Indian Ocean littoral genuinely wish to reduce the risk of superpower confrontation there; they support the IOZP for this reason and generally are not acting from anti-US motives. They have become more receptive to our argument that Soviet military presence on land must also be considered. The principle of decision by consensus was also established (in practice this means that the U.S. has a virtual veto over holding a conference).

#### Options

Option 1: Withdraw now from the Committee, with as many allies as possible. On the surface, this option appears attractive, since without Western participation any IOZP Conference will be meaningless. However, it would allow the Soviets to recoup some of the propaganda damage they sustained last year and shape the conference to their own ends. This could lend to a harsher political climate for the U.S. in the Indian Ocean region, and increased unwillingness on the part of moderate states to cooperate militarily. While the U.S. can withdraw from the Committee at any time, it would be better tactically to do so using a defensible reason for withdrawal such as the Committee's non-adherence to the consensus rule.

Option 2: Agree to a conference. This would prevent radicalization of the conference by the Soviets and somewhat improve in the short term U.S. relations with the non-aligned. However, it would give the world the wrong signal since U.S. attendance at a conference would be taken as an endorsement of arms control discussions on the Indian Ocean. As presently envisaged, these could, among other things, compromise our high seas navigation rights under international law and our access to critical local facilities. It would also open the door to the non-aligned idea that there should be additional conferences with ever more specific and binding results.

Option 3: Continue participation while opposing a conference. This allows us to take the lead to ensure that no conference is scheduled and to identify the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as the threat to regional security. It keeps

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

our options open and permits us to withdraw, should we judge this desirable, and to do so in a way that puts the onus for breaking consensus on the Soviets. We would accept no situation which could imply US participation in any eventual IOZP conference.

### RECOMMENDATION

The entire interagency community recommends approval of Option 3.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Alternatively: Approve Option 1 \_\_\_\_\_

Approve Option 2 \_\_\_\_\_

Rand Rayner

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

823

297

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

ACTION

March 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*  
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on the Proposed  
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP)

The memorandum at Tab I to the President is self-explanatory.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

*RVA Signed 3/5/81*  
Richard Pipes concurs.

SIGNED  
3/5/81

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
*gk*

2/27/81  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 8100823

RECEIVED 27 FEB 81 11

DOCDATE 16 FEB 81

HAIG, A

Concur with recommendation  
of SecState in favor of

Option 3.

NAM

USSR

Concur with recommendation  
of SecState in favor of  
Option 3.

ZONE OF PEACE (IOZP)

RPipes

DUE: 02 MAR 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

KEMP

PIPES

FONTAINE

ALLEN +

NAU

COMMENTS

REF# 8105181

LOG

NSCIFID

( L / )

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Qth -  
 The paper is an accurate  
 presentation of the background  
 on this issue. I recommend you  
 simply forward the memo to  
 the Dir of Allen's concurrence  
 on Option 3 -

Noting

Memo to RIA from J.  
~~1st~~ ~~this is~~  
 The attached memo from Hing to the Dir  
 is self explanatory  
 Resonable  
 The Dir of ST TAB A  
 Support for  
 Contingency  
 TAB A RUA  
 5/5

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3/12/81

When Shuff  
like Mrs comes  
back, prepare as  
implementing memo  
from me to Sec State.  
Do it now, today,  
Pls.

(RVA)



## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*SUBJECT: Indian Ocean Strategy -- Talking Points for  
Weekly Update for the PresidentStatus in the NSC System

There was an IG in Spring 1981, there has not been a SIG. There appears to be no interagency consensus thus far to reconvene the IG. Based upon information available to the NSC staff, there is no agreed upon paper making its way through the interagency process. State could oppose creating an Indian Ocean SIG since State may argue that IGs, SIGs and ad hoc groups already in existence are adequate to the task.

Divisive Issue

Since the Indian Ocean cuts across geographical regions and its problems are of a political military nature, it may be difficult to obtain consensus.

The Core of the Issue

The key issue to be discussed in an NSC meeting is whether a comprehensive strategic overview needs to be developed for the Indian Ocean and littoral countries in relation to the growing Soviet threat.

Fred Wettering concurs.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
Review Dec. 4, 1987DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F96-109 #43  
BY *dlb* NARA DATE 5/19/00