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*Last Updated: 11/06/2023*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: KEMP, GEOFFREY: Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Iran March 1981

Date: 8/11/99

Box 90218-90492

Wills - F97-106

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
✓ 1. Memo	Gary Sick to Richard Allen, re: Status of Iranian Students, 2 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #75</i>	3/3/81	<del>P1/F1</del>
2. Memo	Kemp, re: Internal Situation in Iran, 1 p. <i>D 4/30/01 NLSF97-106 #76</i>	3/4/81	P1/F1
3. Attachment	Current Information Memo, 3 p. <i>D 4/30/01 NLSF97-106 #77</i>	2/10/81	P1/F1
4. Memo	Allen to Secr'try of State, re: Commission on Iranian Agreements, 1 p. <i>D 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #78</i>	n.d.	P1/F1
5. Memo	Allen to Reagan, re: Commission on Iranian Agreements, 1 p. <i>D 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #79</i>	1/29/81	P1/F1
6. Memo	Alexander Haig to Reagan, re: An Independent Commission on the Iranian Agreements, 2 p.	1/28/81	P1/F1/P5
7. Memo	Mark Feldman to the Secretary, re: The Shah's Assets - Implementation of the Iran Agreements, 2 p. <i>D 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #80</i>	3/27/81	P1/F1, B3
8. Memo	Allen to Haig, re: Iran: Withdrawal of U.S. Case from International Court of Justice, 1 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #81</i>	3/31/81	<del>P1/F1</del>
9. Memo	Sick to Allen, re: Iran: Withdrawal of U.S. Case from International Court of Justice, 1 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #82</i>	3/25/81	<del>P1/F1</del>
10. Draft Memo	Copy of item #8, 1 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #83</i>	n.d.	<del>P1/F1</del>
11. Memo	Allen to Reagan, re: Iran: Withdrawal of U.S. Case from International Court of Justice, 1 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #84</i>	3/20/81	<del>P1/F1</del>
12. Memo	Haig to Reagan, re: Iran - Withdrawal of U.S. Case from International Court of Justice, 2 p. <i>D 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #85</i>	3/16/81	P1/F1
13. Memo	Robert Kimmitt to Allen, re: Iran Withdrawal..., 1 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #86</i>	3/18/81	<del>P1/F1</del>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 4/25/2007

**File Folder** IRAN, MARCH 1981

**FOIA**

F97-106/1

**Box Number** 90492

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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1	MEMO	GARY SICK TO RICHARD ALLEN, RE STATUS OF IRANIAN STUDENTS	2	3/3/1981
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mvh 3/11/08

Iran

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 2, 1981

TO: CAROLE FARRAR

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP

Gary Sick and I concur with attached.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Roger Fontaine  
Geoffrey Kemp ✓

FROM: Carole Farrar

See attached material provided by State. Janet Colson would like you to review and comment. State/ Public Affairs is planning to draw from this material in preparing response to public mail.

MA  
②  
92-756  
Comment with  
State  
Language  
① (Check with Janet  
Sick first  
(Concur -  
fs)



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

2/26

MEMORANDUM FOR CAROLE FARRAR

FROM: JANET COLSON

Appropriate NSC staff members should review and comment as necessary. Then forward to me.

Thanks.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 26, 1981

FROM: CAROLE FARRAR

TO: JANET COLSON

Janet:

You asked to clear the language State would be using to respond to sensitive issues/area subjects -- El Salvador and Iran -- among them.

State has forwarded the attached Administration's statements to date on both subjects and is intending to draw from this language as a basis for replying.

Apparently they had prepared a package to submit under a State (Bremer/Allen) memo but it was turned back to Public Affairs. They have indicated in the case of El Salvador that the situation is too fluid and that the statements being made form the Administration's policy on both issues.



STATEMENT ON HOSTAGE AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTATION

By signature  
Kemp

-- OUR POSITION UP UNTIL NOW HAS BEEN THAT THE U.S. WILL, OF COURSE, HONOR ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. BECAUSE OF THE COMPLEXITY OF THE AGREEMENTS AND THE EXTRAORDINARY CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY WERE NEGOTIATED, WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN A REVIEW TO DETERMINE PRECISELY WHAT OUR OBLIGATIONS ARE UNDER THEM.

THAT REVIEW HAS BEEN COMPLETED. HAVING CONSIDERED ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES CAREFULLY, WE HAVE DECIDED TO APPROVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS IN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENTS.

---

-- REVIEW CONSIDERED IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTING OR NOT ON:

- RIGHTS OF U.S. CLAIMANTS
- U.S. TERRORIST POLICY
- U.S. INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS, INCLUDING U.S. OBLIGATIONS TO THIRD PARTIES, PARTICULARLY ALGERIA, WHO HAD THEMSELVES MADE COMMITMENTS DURING THE COURSE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS
- LONG-TERM U.S. INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF, INCLUDING IRAN

-- DID NOT CONSIDER SEVERAL QUESTIONS, OF GREAT POTENTIAL INTEREST TO HISTORIANS AND OF POSSIBLE VALUE FOR DRAWING LESSONS WITH RESPECT TO FUTURE POLICY, BUT OF NO PRACTICAL BEARING ON THE IMMEDIATE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENTS.



-- THE REVIEW JUST COMPLETED DID NOT CONSIDER

- HOW COULD THE WHOLE CRISIS HAVE BEEN HANDLED  
BETTER?

- COULD A BETTER SET OF AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN  
NEGOTIATED?

- ~~WE DID NOT~~ ~~WE~~ CONSIDER WHETHER THESE AGREEMENTS  
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SIGNED?

-- WE ARE CONFRONTED WITH AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT. WE HAVE AN  
AGREEMENT SIGNED BY A PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. AND THE QUESTION  
IS WHETHER -- GIVEN THE EXISTENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT AND THE  
CONSEQUENCES (LEGAL, FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL) OF IMPLEMENTING  
IT OR NOT, WHAT SHOULD THIS COUNTRY DO.

---

~~WE~~ THE CONCLUSION OF THE AGREEMENTS WAS A LEGAL EXERCISE OF  
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY. THIS AUTHORITY WILL BE SUBJECT TO  
CHALLENGE IN OUR COURTS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH WILL OF COURSE  
ABIDE BY THE DETERMINATION OF OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM. WE DID NOT  
FIND IT NECESSARY TO REACH A CONCLUSION AS TO THE LEGALLY BINDING  
CHARACTER OF THESE AGREEMENTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW. WE ARE  
PROCEEDING BECAUSE WE BELIEVE IT IS IN THE OVERALL INTERESTS  
OF THE UNITED STATES TO CARRY OUT THE AGREEMENT.

THE DECISION REPRESENTS A PRACTICAL JUDGMENT THAT IMPLE-  
MENTATION PROVIDES THE SUREST RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE CONSISTENT  
WITH THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE GULF REGION  
AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. IRAN HAS NOT PROFITED FROM THESE  
AGREEMENTS. IT WAS ULTIMATELY FORCED TO SETTLE ON TERMS THAT

SIMPLY RESTORED THE STATUS QUO ANTE BECAUSE THE ADVENT OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION FINALLY CONFRONTED IT WITH A SERIOUS DEADLINE. THE FUNDS ALREADY RETURNED TO IRAN AND THOSE WHICH MAY BE RETURNED FOLLOWING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE AGREEMENTS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CLAIMS ARE FUNDS WHICH BELONGED TO IRAN BEFORE THE SEIZURE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.

IT SHOULD BE WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT THE DECISION TO FAITHFULLY IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENTS DOES NOT REPRESENT A PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN SIMILAR SITUATIONS. THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT HAVE NEGOTIATED WITH IRAN FOR THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES. FUTURE ACTS OF STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM AGAINST THE U.S. WILL MEET SWIFT AND SURE PUNISHMENT.

February 18. 1981

BROCK BROWN  
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SAN FRANCISCO CA 94115

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605



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4155676932 MGM TDRN SAN FRANCISCO CA 63 01-27 1038P EST

3 FEB 1981

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN  
WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON DC 20500

KIDNAPPERS ARE NEVER GIVEN RANSOM IF A KIDNAPPED PERSON IS RETURNED.  
THE KIDNAPPER IS PUNISHED. SEND IRAN NOTHING BUT HELP THE HOSTAGES  
SUE IRAN FOR THEIR SUFFERING AND COMPENSATE BUSINESSES THAT HAVE LOST  
MONEY. SEND THE IRANIANS WHAT IS LEFT THEN OF THE SHAH'S MONEY.  
CECIL BROCK BROWN

1817-B BAKER ST

SAN FRANCISCO CA 94115

22138 EST

MGMCOMP MGM



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT GARRICK

FROM:

RICHARD V. ALLEN *Dick*

SUBJECT:

Implementation of Iranian Agreements

I understand that your office is interested in the status of the implementation of the Iran Agreements. Attached for your information is a copy of a memorandum prepared by my staff concerning this subject.

Attachment

747 *Sick*  
add-on



February 25, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
FROM: GARY SICK *JS*  
SUBJECT: Iran Agreements

The implementation of the Iran agreements is beginning this week.

Mr. Stoessel, the new Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, appears today before the HFAC for testimony on the agreements and the Administration's plans on defending against future terrorist attacks. He will officially outline the nature of the implementation which is now underway.

Justice will probably go into court this week to argue for the lifting of attachments against remaining Iranian assets, in order for the assets to be transferred to escrow as required. Regulations are being prepared by Treasury concerning other technical aspects, and they will probably be published this week. Talks are underway with the Algerians about lump sum settlement of claims less than \$250,000. State is considering names for the Arbitral Commission.

In short, implementation of all aspects of the agreements is now in full swing. I strongly recommend that all queries about implementation be referred to State or to the appropriate agency, since these are technical, not policy, matters.

There was a small story on the agreements in the Wall Street Journal today, and there will no doubt be other stories in the next few days as implementation gets underway and as Stoessel's testimony gets reported.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Feb. 25, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: JANET COLSON ✓  
SUBJECT: Implementation of Iranian  
Agreements

Bob Garrick's office is interested in the status of the implementation of the Iran Agreements, hence Gary's memo. Shall I prepare a forwarding memo for you to send to Garrick?

Yes ☒ No, I'll pen him a note \_\_\_\_\_

I have provided a copy for Brady's read file.



ACTION

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 3, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GARY SICK *JS*

SUBJECT: Status of Iranian Students

The State Department is engaged in implementing the President's decision on normalizing visa regulations for Iranians so they will be comparable to those which now apply for Libyans, Soviets, or nationals of other nations where security interests are paramount. One exception to this rule will be treatment of minorities. Over the past year or two, we have maintained special regulations which favor entry by Jews, Bahais, and members of other minority faiths. Although there is at present little evidence of large-scale persecution of minorities in Iran (and in fact some Jews are beginning to return to look after their affairs), State proposes to retain these special provisions for the time being. I believe that is sensible.

There is, however, one problem which is more difficult. The President's decision did not address the special INS regulations concerning the status of Iranian students and other Iranian nationals who are in this country on legal visas of one sort or another. Because of the large numbers of Iranian students--60,000--in this country and the many cases of pro-Khomeini demonstrations and violence, the INS adopted regulations which prohibit Iranians from adjusting the status of their visas while in this country. Simply stated, this means that any Iranian in this country for a specific purpose (e.g. a prescribed course of study) or for a specifically prescribed period of time (e.g. two years) must leave when that purpose/time has been completed. The only recourse for those who wish to remain is to seek political asylum.

Last year at this time, we were contacted by some of the most prestigious universities in the country to complain that students with an arbitrary time limit on their visas were being forced to leave in the middle of their studies--in many cases even a month before final exams. This was rectified by an INS regulation which stipulated that students enrolled in bona fide courses or accepted to advanced programs (e.g. medical school or PhD programs) could continue their studies, if acceptance had been received prior to April 7, 1980. State and INS correctly assume that similar hardship cases will arise this year--for example, a student of a pro-Shah family who has finished a B.A. will have to leave the country even if accepted to graduate school, unless political asylum is chosen. Many resist asylum since it may affect their careers in Iran at a later date if the situation calms down.

Students from all other countries are routinely permitted to adjust their status according to their academic career. The problem with the Iranians, of course, is the very large numbers and the public perception that they are all pro-Khomeini. In fact, most of them are either anti-Khomeini or apolitical, but the activists get all the publicity. The large clash yesterday in Los Angeles between pro- and anti-Khomeini factions only underscores the problem for U.S. policy.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-106 #75

*Bill Mearls  
PAS for 6/15/81  
6-22-1911  
(notified 7/2/81)  
7 PA visas  
- 3 - 3/6*



The following options are available:

1. Lift restrictions on Iranians in the U.S. (including students). They would be treated the same as their counterparts from other nations.
2. Lift restrictions on the small number of non-student Iranians, who are relatively few in number and not very visible. The students would continue to be subject to limitations on change of status, i.e., when a given course of study is complete, they would have to leave or choose asylum.
3. Lift restrictions on non-students and change the regulations for students to permit them to remain if accepted into an approved course of studies. Thus, if a student is accepted into graduate school after completion of a B.A., he or she would be permitted to remain, even if the visa was written only for a B.A. or a given period of time which has expired.
4. Retain restrictions on all Iranians pending completion of our overall policy review toward Iran. (Date very uncertain)

Since there is no legal way to distinguish between "good" Iranians and "bad," restrictions always hurt those who are friendly to the U.S. as well as those who are not. The problem is to find a balance which is fair to those who will be our friends someday without appearing to be soft on the unpopular pro-Khomeini activists.

Option 4 is the easiest. However, if last year's experience is any guide, we will soon begin to have letters and calls from educators and Iranian friends of the Administration who will complain that we are unnecessarily making enemies of an entire generation of prospective Iranian leaders. NEA supports this option to avoid appearing weak.

I personally prefer Option 3, which would alleviate the worst of the inequities. Nevertheless, it provides an open door for any Iranian student who wishes to remain in the U.S. There is no shortage of schools and training programs which will accept almost anyone who can pay the tuition.

Option 2 would have minimal public visibility and would take care of the small numbers of Iranians who have not been a problem. However, it leaves the "good" students in the same position as Option 4.

Option 1, in my view, is premature at this time and would be perceived as being soft on the student militants.

State has asked for our informal views on this issue, since it will inevitably have political implications. Do you have a preference?

\_\_\_\_\_ Option 1

\_\_\_\_\_ Option 2

\_\_\_\_\_ Option 3

\_\_\_\_\_ Option 4



*I ran March 1981*

**RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY**

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER *2-3* LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

FRENCH C. GOODWYN

RESIDENCE:

4852 Indian Lane, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20016  
(202) 362-5435

BUSINESS ADDRESS:

1700 N. Moore Street  
Suite 2220  
Arlington, VA 22209  
(703) 524-8957

EXPERIENCE:

Corporate Travel Services, Inc. (CTS)

Ten years experience in the travel services profession encompassing the administration of Fulbright scholarships and management of executive accounts. After initially working for several travel corporations, acquired a travel service business which required the restructuring of a former well-known firm from a carriage trade image to nationwide management of travel budgets and planning for large corporations, law firms, associations, etc. CTS successfully managed the Reagan-Bush Campaign travel requirements and participated in Transition travel as well (see attached letter).

Corporate Consulting International, Inc. (CCI)

Formed an international consulting firm with innovative ideas in foreign direct investment combined with a genuine interest and concern for the U.S. image abroad. Built up efficient international network, through contacts, reports and documentation, for gathering pertinent information regarding "inside" political and economic trends. Dissemination of verifiable and accurate information to proper channels and clients.

Participation, for the past 4 years, at the Inter-American Development Bank and IMF-World Bank annual meetings. Additional exposure to international banking circles has provided entree facilitating direct contact to various European, Mid-East and South American economic and business sources resulting in clients.

Areas of Political, Economic Knowledge

South America - Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Columbia (in order of depth of knowledge, as well as substantial business contacts)

Mid-East - principally Iran

Europe - England, France, Switzerland, Norway, Spain

EDUCATION:

1962-66	4 years, Chateau Brilliantmont, Lausanne, Switzerland
1966	1 year, Ecole des Interpretes, Geneva, Switzerland
1967	Georgetown University - degree from Institute of Languages & Linguistics - Bilingual French
1969	Continued studies at SAIS in experimental International Studies Program

LANGUAGES:

French	read, speak, write fluently
Spanish	read, speak, write well
Italian	slight command, understand
German	conversational

PERSONAL:

Born Baltimore, Maryland 1947....Married to Wilfred Goodwyn III, Investment Manager. One son, Wilfred Scott Madison Goodwyn.

REFERENCES:

John Firestone, Arthur Houghton, Eliska Coolidge, William Colby, Dan Kingsley, Henry Catto, Mary Oakes Smith.

INTERESTS:

Travel frequently. Sailing, riding, tennis, art and painting.

VOLUNTEER ACTIVITIES:

Washington - Childrens Hospital Board Member  
Stratford Hall - Women's Board  
Ford Campaign  
Nixon Campaign - fund raising



SUMMARY ON LATIN AMERICAN POLICY

U.S. Foreign Policy towards Latin America must be reworked to insure peace, stability and a continually growing friendship. These countries have been neglected too long. Looking ahead and envisioning where the true danger signals for the United States exist, one need only view Latin America and the changes taking place at this moment. South American sources indicate that the design and spread of Communism is well planned and is being implemented there. This is not simply a paranoia, it is true and coming faster than the U.S. may be prepared to handle.

A more open, i.e., "free incentive", trade policy must be developed along with a reduction of much of the red tape imposed by our current policies. Many U.S. corporate CEO's want to build plants in these countries. If we truly want to "aid" these areas, our own firms will be allowed to produce in Latin America. The benefits are obvious: Foreign investment should work in reciprocal ways - U.S. → L.A. → U.S. in imports-exports, and perhaps even more importantly, in goodwill and trust. By building a more solid "trade in trust - trust in trade" philosophy, the response from many countries would be enormous. These programs would be reinforced by U.S. corporations and encouraged by the U.S. Government. A specific example where this did not occur was in Argentina. To create a healthier atmosphere we should have continued maintaining contacts by holding small group sessions for each trade area every 4-6 months. A definite lack of continued interest and communication created unnecessary tensions under the previous Administration.

So much of what our great nation is, was developed by trade. We should now recognize, with enthusiasm, what each country has to offer and carefully assist them towards developing their own potential. Hemispherically speaking, if we, the U.S., will maintain a close relationship with Latin American countries, as difficult as it might seem now, the long-term aggression by the Soviet Union might be stopped.

Our military positions must remain strong and supportive of non-terrorist governments. It follows that if the U.S. relinquishes our "linkage", as the previous Administration did, it will indeed be too late to salvage our former friends and allies.

As an overview, we have many friends in South America, from every strata. These friends believe in us and have been stunned by the behavior of the past Administration. They were neglected by both President Ford and Dr. Kissinger and insulted by President Carter. We must work diligently to restore the dignity between the nations and it is therefore imperative to have knowledgeable individuals participate in this restoration of commitment and friendship. President Reagan has clearly demonstrated his interest in renewing our ties in Latin America.



SPECIFIC AREAS OF INTEREST IN THIS ADMINISTRATION:

I would like to work with projects directly involved with my strong interest in Argentina, both economic and political planning.

- National Security Council  
Staff Member - Latin America
- Department of State  
Inter-American Affairs  
Policy Planning Staff - South America
- Department of Commerce  
International Trade Commission - Latin America  
Assistant Secretary for Trade Development

GS

## SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

DATE: March 5, 1981

FROM: Richard V. Allen *Allen*

VIA: Michael Deaver

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

MEETING: Former Canadian Ambassador to Iran  
Kenneth Taylor (currently Canadian  
Consul-General in New York) (U)

DATE: March 10-11 in the context of your visit  
to Ottawa (U)

PURPOSE: To present to Ambassador Taylor the specially-  
struck gold medal authorized by Congress in  
recognition of the haven and help he and his  
Embassy staff provided our hostages in Tehran (

FORMAT: -- During a brief visit to our Embassy  
in Ottawa;

-- The Secretary of State, Dick Allen, members  
of the Embassy staff and their families; (U)

-- 15 minutes (U)

CABINET PARTICIPATION: -- Secretary Haig (U)

SPEECH MATERIAL: -- Informal remarks will be provided by State  
and the NSC (U)

PRESS COVERAGE: -- Pool coverage (U)

STAFF: -- Dick Allen (U)

RECOMMENDED: -- State (but prefers presentation occur  
outside framework of visit; see attached  
memo) *et*

NOT RECOMMENDED: -- None (U)

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: -- None (U)

BACKGROUND: The medal has been ready for presentation for  
several weeks; it was not practical to include  
the presentation in the welcome-home ceremonies  
for the 52 returned Americans. Coupling such  
a presentation with your brief stop at the  
Embassy in Ottawa during the March 10-11 State  
Visit could provide an appropriate occasion  
for stressing both our gratitude to Canada  
for its help in Iran and our toughened stance  
on dealing with terrorism. *et*

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_ DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

CONFIDENTIAL

Review March 2, 1987

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By *dlb* NARA, Date *8/11/99*



B



8103983

0534

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~  
dlb

February 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Award of Gold Medal to Canadian Ambassador Taylor

In recognition of the courage of Ambassador Taylor and his staff in providing haven and ensuring the return last January of six members of the American Embassy in Tehran, Congress passed and President Carter signed into law PL 96-201, to award a specially-struck gold medal to Ambassador Taylor.

The medal has been ready for presentation for several weeks. However, the Department and the White House decided it would be unwise to present the medal during the delicate final negotiations with Iran. It was not practical to include the presentation of this medal in the welcome home ceremonies for the 52 former hostages at the White House.

We recommend that the president make the presentation at the White House. If that is not possible, the Department suggests the medal be presented by Vice President Bush. To make the award at a lower level could suggest to Canadians that Americans are ungrateful, or have forgotten the protection of the six Embassy employees by Ambassador Taylor.

The Department recommends that the presentation be made as soon as possible, before the President's visit to Ottawa which may take place in early March. We have discussed informally with Canadian officials the inclusion of the presentation in the schedule for the visit, but the Canadians would prefer that the medal be awarded at some other time.

*L. Paul Bremer, III*  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

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dlb  
8/11/95



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 2, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CHT*FROM: JAMES RENTSCHLER *JR*SUBJECT: Presentation of Medal to Canadian Ambassador Taylor  
For His Help in Tehran (U)*Immediately by  
to the  
Sy/ten  
for  
MLO*

State's memorandum at Tab B proposes a presentation ceremony for former Canadian Ambassador to Iran Ken Taylor involving either the President or the Vice President, during which Taylor would receive the specially-struck gold medal authorized by Congress for his help to our hostages in Tehran. (U)

There has been some thought that this presentation might be worth folding into the President's Ottawa program, particularly in connection with his brief visit to our Embassy (it could be used to dramatize both our gratitude to Canada for its help in Iran and the President's toughened policy on terrorism). The only problem with this idea is, as State notes in its memo, possible Canadian unhappiness. (My own strong surmise is that such "unhappiness", to the extent that it would exist, is of the sour-grapes variety and would come from some Canadian Embassy people here who feel their colleague has gotten too much of the spotlight). (C)

I tend to favor a Presidential presentation in Ottawa; it will generate good coverage and further underscore U.S.-Canadian ties already symbolized by the President's visit. (A Schedule Proposal to that effect is at Tab A). (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the schedule Proposal at Tab A

Approve *great idea*SIGNED  
3/5/81

Prefer Presidential presentation on some other occasion \_\_\_\_\_

Vice President should do \_\_\_\_\_

cc: Phyllis Kaminsky

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on March 2, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987  
By dlb NARA, Date 8/11/99

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

184

*Kemp: 241*

SECRET

SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

ACTION

March 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP  
SUBJECT: Commission on Iranian Agreements

The memorandum from Al Haig at Tab B appears to be an ancient piece of business which may have already been taken care of. If not, I have included a memorandum for Haig at Tab A informing him of the President's decision.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A, unless this decision has already been relayed to the Secretary of State.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

DISAPPROVE \_\_\_\_\_

*3/16*

*Action already  
completed.*

*Jellson*

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 8/11/96

SECRET

SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

Review March 13, 1987



Iran March 1981

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0187

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1981

MR. PRESIDENT:

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

Jim Baker instructed me to note that he strongly agrees with the attached recommendation by Al Haig: i.e., he is "against establishing an independent Commission on the Iranian agreements." (He is also anxious to have the internal review completed quickly.)

A. G. D.

Richard G. Darman  
White House Staff Secretary



Iran March 1981

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 27, 1981

TO: RUD POATS  
FROM: GEOFF KEMP

I sympathize with you regarding the closing paragraph, but I accept the attached reasoning. (see Gary's memo to me).

GEOFF -

Bob Kimmitt--who is the resident expert on OMB and Congressional Relations--assures me that it is probably futile to fiddle with this hoary phrase.

-- First, it is jealously guarded by OMB as evidence that the reply has been properly coordinated within the administration. This is the Management part of their charter, rather than the Budget. This was instituted back in the fifties, and they will not take it off (or presumably change it significantly) without a struggle.

-- Second, since this phrase appears on virtually every piece of correspondence going to the Hill, it is both expected and almost invisible. In correspondence with the Hill, this phrase is the functional equivalent of "Sincerely yours."

My advice is just to leave it alone, unless you want to lift a very large, very old rock and see what comes crawling out....

gary



Gary

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ID 8101319

RECEIVED 18 MAR 81 12

DOCDATE 17 MAR 81

March 20, 1981

TO: GEOFF KEMP

FROM: RUTHERFORD POATS

I concur on the attached, State Department letter to Zablocki re Iran, but I do not believe such foreign policy statements should include the conventional closing paragraph re OMB.

*Natasha*  
*Concur. (Find out)*  
*why OMB has closing*  
*paragraph? Does. Gary know?*  
*Is this an issue!*

TARY RELATIONS BTW IRAN & US

81 STATUS S FILES

FOR INFO  
SCHWEITZER

REF#

LOG


NSC IF ID

( H / )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

March 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: TRACEY COLE LAWLER

FROM: ALLEN J. LENZ 

SUBJECT: HJR-37: Implementation of Interparliamentary  
Relations Between Iran and the United States

The NSC concurs with the Department of State and strongly opposes passage of H.J. Resolution 37, or any move to establish inter-parliamentary relations between the Congress and the Iranian legislature (Tab A).



Re 1319

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3/18/81

TO: ALLEN J. LENZ

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP

Attached for your signature  
to OMB is NSC's comments  
re HJR-37.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

March 17, 1981

1319

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer-  
National Security Council



SUBJECT: State proposed report on H.J.Res. 37, "To establish a select committee for the implementation of interparliamentary relations between the legislatures of the Government of Iran and the Government of the United States."

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than Tuesday, April 7, 1981.

Questions should be referred to Tracey Cole Lawler (395-4710), the legislative analyst in this office, or to ( ).

*Ronald K. Peterson*  
RONALD K. PETERSON FOR  
Assistant Director for  
Legislative Reference

Enclosures  
Dave Spevacek





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on H. J. Res. 37, "to establish a select committee for the implementation of interparliamentary relations between the legislatures of the Government of Iran and the Government of the United States."

We note that this resolution was introduced prior to the release of the 52 Americans who had been held hostage in Iran. The release of the hostages may have overtaken the purpose of the proposed legislation. In any event, the Executive branch strongly opposes the enactment of H. J. Res. 37.

The willingness of the present Iranian regime to respect the fundamental principles of international law and custom is by no means clear. We believe that the actions envisaged in this resolution, by appearing to move this country toward more normal relations with Iran under these circumstances, would tend to undermine our efforts to gain international support for effective sanctions against states that violate the principles of international law relating to the inviolability of diplomats and diplomatic premises. Such actions could also damage the credibility of our efforts to make absolutely clear that the United States will not tolerate, and will respond in the strongest terms to, any similar violations in the future. Moreover, we would view with particular concern actions by the Congress designed to establish interparliamentary relations with the government of a country with which we have severed diplomatic relations.

The Honorable  
Clement Zablocki,  
Chairman,  
House Foreign Relations Committee,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.

For these reasons, we strongly oppose passage of H. J. Res. 37, or any move to establish interparliamentary relations between the Congress and the Iranian legislature. We take this position fully cognizant of the vital interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf and the serious threat posed by the Soviet Union to that area.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of these views.

Sincerely,

Alvin Paul Drischler  
Acting Assistant Secretary  
for Congressional Relations



97TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# H. J. RES. 37

To establish a select committee for the implementation of interparliamentary relations between the legislatures of the Government of Iran and the Government of the United States.

---

## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 5, 1981

Mr. HANSEN of Idaho introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred jointly to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Rules

---

## JOINT RESOLUTION

To establish a select committee for the implementation of interparliamentary relations between the legislatures of the Government of Iran and the Government of the United States.

1       *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*  
2       *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*  
3       That there is hereby established a select committee on the  
4       relationship between Iran and the United States.

5       SEC. 2. Each House of Congress shall appoint from  
6       among its Members seven Members which shall constitute  
7       the select committee. The chairman of the committee shall be  
8       the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

1 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the select com-  
2 mittee created in section 2 shall have the powers set forth in  
3 subsections (a) through (c) of this section.

4 (a) The committee shall investigate and report to the  
5 Congress all matters concerning the relations of the Govern-  
6 ment of Iran with the Government of the United States  
7 which in its judgment caused or influenced the deterioration  
8 of those relations and/or are necessary to the formulation of  
9 laws for the correction of existing or past inequities in those  
10 relations.

11 (b) The committee shall be the congressional agency for  
12 the implementation of interparliamentary relations between  
13 the legislatures of the Government of Iran and the Govern-  
14 ment of the United States.

15 (c) The committee shall formulate and offer any bill  
16 which in its judgment is necessary and desirable for the ame-  
17 lioration of relations between the two governments.

18 (d) To enable the select committee to carry out the pur-  
19 pose of this Act, such committee is authorized to utilize the  
20 services of staffs of other standing committees of the Con-  
21 gress, and to employ investigators, attorneys, consultants, or  
22 organizations thereof, and clerical, stenographic, and other  
23 assistants.

24 (e) The select committee is authorized and directed to  
25 transmit findings and reports to the Congress on any matters



1 which have been referred to it and on which it has acted as  
2 soon as practicable.

3 (f) Any bill and accompanying report of the select com-  
4 mittee shall be subject to the rules of the Congress in the  
5 same manner as though such bill and report had been re-  
6 ported from a standing committee of the Congress.

7 (g) The select committee shall expire upon the last day  
8 of the Ninety-seventh Congress.

○



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SITE

**B**

S/S #

RECEIVED

MAR 28 4:55

TO BOB  
HSE

KIMMITT  
3/30

SITUATION ROOM

LDX MESSAGE NO. 000711

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

No. Page 2

FROM: Mark B. Feldman

L

22001

(Officer name)

(Office symbol)

(Extension)

6423

(Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Memo to Secy. re: The Shah's Assets - Implementation of the Iran Agreements

LDX TO: (Agency)

DELIVER TO:

Extension

Room No.

WHITE HOUSE

Frank Hodsoll

456-2174

WEST WING

Hodsoll Cousin

KEMP

3491

REMARKS:

FOR:

CLEARANCE ~~XXX~~

INFORMATION

☐

PER REQUEST

COMMENT

S/S Officer:

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 8/11/99



Jan - March 1968  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 18, 1981

MEMO FOR ROBERT KIMMITT

FROM: GARY SICK *JS*

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of U.S. Case from  
the ICJ

I concur with Secretary Haig's recommendation that the U.S. case be withdrawn from the ICJ as called for in the Algiers agreement. Pursuing the case in the ICJ will achieve nothing, while risking the abrogation of other aspects of the agreement which are in our interest to preserve.

The letter from Feldman to the Registrar correctly preserves our right to reintroduce our claims if Iran does not fulfill its obligations under the agreements and under international law.

The issue is well presented in the Haig memo. I recommend a brief concurring memo from Allen to the President recommending approval.

Geoff Kemp concurs *gk*



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*AK* 1263

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 18, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*  
SUBJECT: Iran: Withdrawal of U.S. Case from  
International Court of Justice ~~(C)~~

Secretary Haig proposes withdrawing the U.S. case against Iran in the International Court of Justice (Tab A). For reasons stated in the proposed covering note at Tab I, I recommend that you concur with the Haig proposal. ~~(C)~~

Fred Fielding has been given a copy of the Haig letter and your proposed covering note. I will advise you of any comments received from him.\* (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I. (U)

✓  
Geoff Kemp and Gary *[initials]* Sick concur.

SIGNED

\* After forwarding, Fred called to say that he fully concurred. He asked that his concurrence be noted on your covering note, which I have done.

cc: Henry Nau

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review March 18, 1984

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #86

BY *snf*, NARA, DATE 11/8/01





To Secretary-General Waldheim:

I have reference to the message delivered to you from President Carter on January 19, 1981, regarding the agreement of that date on the release of the 52 American nationals held hostage in Iran.

That message includes a sentence stating that "with the release of our hostages, the United States considers that Iran has complied fully with Security Council Resolutions 457 of December 4, 1979, and 461 of December 31, 1979, and with the Judgment of the International Court of Justice of May 24, 1980." I should like to clarify that this sentence referred only to the requirement of release contained in these instruments. It will be understood, therefore, that the United States does not consider that Iran had responded fully to the letter or spirit of other requirements of the foregoing Security Council Resolutions or of the Judgment of the International Court of Justice. For example, the Government of Iran has not returned to the United States the premises, property, archives and documents of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and of its Consulates in Iran, as ordered by the Court in its Judgment.

Mr. Secretary-General, I should like to extend once again my Government's deepest gratitude to all those who sought to gain the release of our diplomats and other American citizens and to restore the rule of law to its rightful place in the protection of diplomats.

I should be most appreciative if you would transmit this message to the members of the United Nations Security Council and the representatives of member states of the United Nations. We will be communicating directly with the President of the International Court of Justice.

Signed: Alexander Haig

Dated: March 3, 1981





With regard to the communication from the Secretary-General of the United Nations referred to in your letter, I should like to call your attention to the enclosed letter sent by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the Secretary-General on 3 March 1981. Secretary Haig's letter corrects a mistake in the prior correspondence and makes clear the United States view that Iran has not complied fully with the Judgment of the Court of 24 May 1980.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark B. Feldman, Acting

Enclosures

THE LEGAL ADVISER  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Mr. Santiago Torres Bernardez  
Registrar  
International Court of Justice  
The Hague, The Netherlands

Sir:

I have received your letter of 23 February 1981 referring to the proceeding instituted by the Government of the United States of America on 29 November 1979 in the International Court of Justice against the Government of Iran in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran. On 24 May 1980 the Court rendered judgment in the case for the United States, deciding that Iran had violated international law and was under an obligation to make reparation for the injuries caused, while reserving for subsequent procedure the form and amount of such reparation.

Effective 19 January 1981 the United States and Iran entered into certain mutual commitments in order to resolve the crisis arising out of the detention of the fifty-two United States nationals, and for the settlement of claims between the United States and Iran, as reflected in two Declarations issued on that date by the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, certified copies of which are enclosed. Paragraph 11 of the first Declaration provides that upon the certification by the Government of Algeria that the fifty-two U.S. nationals had safely departed from Iran, "the United States will promptly withdraw all claims now pending against Iran before the International Court of Justice...."

Accordingly, and in accordance with rule 88(1), I request, on behalf of the United States of America, that all pending proceedings relating to United States claims against Iran for reparation be discontinued. The United States reserves the right, however, to reinstitute such proceedings if the Government of Iran fails to live up to its commitments under the foregoing Declarations. Independently of the foregoing, the United States reserves the right to seek redress in the Court if Iran fails to return promptly the premises, property, archives and documents of the United States Embassy in Tehran and of its Consulates in Iran.





Iran March 198

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MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

1263

WASHINGTON

ACTION

March 20, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

RICHARD V. ALLEN *RA*

SUBJECT:

Iran: Withdrawal of U.S. Case from  
International Court of Justice (C)

Al Haig recommends that the U.S. case against Iran be withdrawn from the International Court of Justice, as called for in the Algiers agreement (Tab A). (C)

I also believe that you should authorize withdrawal of the case. Pursuing it further in the ICJ will achieve little, if anything, while risking the abrogation by Iran of other aspects of the agreements that are in our interest to preserve. (C)

Further, as the letter at Tab 1 indicates, we are preserving the right to reintroduce our claims if Iran does not fulfill its obligations under the agreements and international law. Also, Al's letter to Secretary General Waldheim (Tab 2) makes clear our position that Iran has not responded fully to either the relevant UN Security Council resolutions or the judgment of the ICJ, a point that was confused somewhat by a Carter message on January 19, 1981. (C)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve withdrawal of the U.S. case against Iran from the ICJ, subject to the understandings described above. (C)

Fred Fielding concurs.

Attachments

cc: Vice President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F92-106 #84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review March 18, 1984

BY *smf*, NARA, DATE *11/8/01*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



Sick:

Iran

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3/23

Is Hoff Kemp

any sick

Needs memo to  
appropriate individuals  
advising them of  
President's decision.

my

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Iran: Withdrawal of U.S. Case from  
International Court of Justice ~~(C)~~

The President has reviewed your memorandum of the same title dated March 16, 1981, and has approved your recommendation. You are authorized to withdraw the U.S. case from the International Court of Justice as required by the Algiers Agreement of January 19. ~~ter~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #83

BY snf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on March 18, 1984



MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Iran*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1263

March 25, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GARY SICK *JS*  
SUBJECT: Iran: Withdrawal of U.S. Case from  
International Court of Justice ~~(c)~~

The President has approved Secretary Haig's recommendation that the U.S. case against Iran be withdrawn from the International Court of Justice, as called for in the Algiers agreement. The attached memorandum (Tab I) to Secretary Haig authorizes this action to be taken. ~~(c)~~

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to Secretary Haig at Tab I.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #82

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rvw. on 3/18/84

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
March 31, 1981

*Sick*  
1263  
*1/10/81*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Iran: Withdrawal of U.S. Case from  
International Court of Justice (C)

The President has reviewed your memorandum of the same title dated March 16, 1981, and has approved your recommendation. You are authorized to withdraw the U.S. case from the International Court of Justice as required by the Algiers Agreement of January 19. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

*Richard V. Allen*

Richard V. Allen  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

cc: The Vice-President  
Ed Meese  
Jim Baker  
Jim Brady  
*3/31/81 sent / JCB*

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #81

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on March 18, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~