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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: KEMP, GEOFFREY: Files

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Date: 8/11/99

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Wills - F97-106

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Kemp to Richard Allen, re: Iran, 1 p. <i>P 4/30/01 NLSF97-106 # 99</i>	7/9/81	P1/F1
2. Memo	Kemp to Allen, re: Iran, 2 p.	6/24/81	P1/F1/P5
3. Memo	Gary Sick to Kemp, re: Iran, 4 p.	7/10/81	P1/F1/P5
4. Report	Guidance for Use..., 1 p. <i>D 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 # 100</i>	6/5/80	P1/F1
5. Memo	to Reagan, re: Political Action Options in Iran, 4 p. <i>D 11/2/00 NLSF97-106 # 101</i>	[6/80]	P1/F1, 8 3
6. Memo	Sick to Kemp, re: Iran, 2 p. <i>A 4/30/01 NLSF97-106 # 102</i>	7/17/81	P1/F1
7. Memo	Sick to Kemp, re: Iran's Big Bomb, 4 p.	6/29/81	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

~~Kemp~~ JPCAN
#4044 file

81 JUL 7 9:14

JANET COLSON
BUD NANCE
DICK ALLEN
IRENE DERUS
JANET COLSON
BUD NANCE
KAY

gc 7/1323
X
wa 7/1/220
cgt 8/8/0806
FILE

CY TO VP	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO MEESE	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO BAKER	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO DEEVER	_____	SHOW CC	_____
CY TO BRADY	_____	SHOW CC	_____

#4044

No one knows how Staff Terry
got this or where it's been
Feb 17 — should we even
look for it??

J

(7/7/81)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RVA HAS SEEN

4044

RF

ACTION

July 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GK*

SUBJECT: Proposed Vice Presidential Response to
Dr. Karim Pakravan

At Tab I is a memo for your signature to the Vice President forwarding a proposed draft response to Dr. Pakravan who has written the Vice President concerning political asylum.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the Vice President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove ✓

*015E
RVA
7/8*

Attachment

Tab I Memo to the Vice President
A Proposed Response to Dr. Pakravan
B Incoming Letter from Dr. Pakravan

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Response to Dr. Pakravan, re Asylum

Attached is a proposed response to Dr. Karim Pakravan who has written you concerning political asylum.

Attachment

Tab A	Proposed Response to Dr. Pakravan
Tab B	Incoming Letter from Dr. Pakravan

Suggested text for letter from the Vice President
to Dr. Pakravan, re asylum.

Dear Dr. Pakravan:

This is in reply to your recent letter concerning
the status of asylum requests submitted by Iranians in
the United States.

I am happy to inform you that a decision was
recently made to resume action on Iranian asylum requests.
The Department of State is considering ways in which the
review of such cases be performed. It is likely that
the requests will be reviewed by the Department of State
in the order in which they were received from the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. Since there is an enormous
backlog of Iranian cases awaiting review, action may
necessarily be slow.

Thank you for writing.

Sincerely,

Office of the Vice President

8118581

17 February 1981

Mr. George Bush,
The Vice President of the
United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Vice-President,

Upon advice of my uncle, Mr. Manouchehr Pakravan, whom I believe you know, I am sending to you a copy of the letter I have addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near and South Asian Affairs.

In this letter, I have described the problems facing a large number of Iranians, who like myself, have requested political asylum in the United States in the past few months, and whose case has not been resolved by the Carter Administration because of the hostage crisis.

I drew his attention to the importance of normalizing the situation of this group of people who can also be counted among the victims of the Khomeini dictatorship, and requested that the problem be studied in the shortest possible time.

I respectfully reiterate my request to you and hope that you will find the problem important enough to take the steps to advise the relevant authorities on ways to resolve this difficult situation as promptly as possible.

Thanking you in advance, I remain

Yours truly,

K. Pakravan

Dr. Karim Pakravan,
Visiting Scholar,
The Hoover Institution,
Stanford, Ca. 94305

The Assistant Secretary Of State,
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
The United States Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520

27 January 1981

Dear Mr. Assistant Secretary,

I am an Iranian citizen currently living in California and working as a Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. I left my country in the Fall of 1979 under very difficult circumstances a few months after my father, a retired army officer, had been murdered by order of the so-called courts of Islamic justice. My wife and child accompanied me. We requested political asylum in the United States in March of 1980 and were informed by the INS on April 4, 1980 that our case had been sent to the State Department for further action. Because of the hostage crisis, the Carter administration decided not to act on such applications by Iranians until all of the US diplomats held captive by terrorists in Iran were released. For whatever reasons such a policy was pursued, it has created serious delays in normalizing the situation of people like myself, who have chosen to exile themselves rather than to submit to the savage dictatorship of the Ayatollah Khomeini, and whose freedom and even lives would be in danger if they were forced to return to their country under the present circumstances. Furthermore, it has seriously impeded our freedom of movement, as asylum applicants are not allowed to leave the United States and reenter it at a later date while their case is pending. This situation has had serious consequences for us, as we have not only been unable to see even our closest relatives who live in France for over a year, but I have had to turn down invitations to attend scientific conferences abroad, which has affected me professionally.

The Carter administration policy has also meant that there is now a backlog of almost 9000 similar cases from Iranians that are pending. A speedy resolution of their cases would not only be a great step forward in the normalization of the situation of my fellow countrymen, but would also make clear to the dictators ruling Iran that the United States will not bow to terrorist pressures and will continue its long tradition as the refuge for the oppressed and freedom loving people of the world.

This is why I respectfully request from the United States Department of State to consider my application at the earliest possible date, thus allowing my immigration status to be normalized.

Hoping to hear from you soon, I remain

Yours truly

Dr. Karim Pakravan,

15 JAN 30 1981

P.S. Enclosed is a copy of the file presented to the INS.

My address is: 49 Showers Dr., #J-226, Mountain View, Ca. 94040

Tel. (415) 949-1029 (Home) (415) 497-4122 (Office)

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

8118581

REFERRAL

To: Director, Secretariat Staff
(S/S-S)
Department of State, Room 7241
Washington, D.C. 20520

Date: June 16, 1981

ACTION REQUESTED

- ☒ Draft reply for:
☐ Vice President's signature.
☒ Undersigned's signature.
☐ Memorandum for use as enclosure to reply.
☐ Direct reply.
☐ Furnish information copy.
☐ Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling.
☐ Furnish copy of reply, if any.
☐ For your information.
☐ For comment.

NOTE

Prompt action is essential.

If more than 48 hours' delay is encountered, please telephone the undersigned immediately.

Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum, or comment is requested.

REMARKS:

Description:

1 Letter: _____ Telegram: _____ Other: _____
 To: The Vice President
 From: Dr. Karim Pakravan
 Date: February 17, 1981
 Subject: Political asylum for Iranians

By direction of the Vice President

W. C. Atzert
 W. C. ATZERT
 Staff Assistant

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

REFERRAL

To: Immigration and Naturalization Service Date: May 6, 1981
 Department of Justice
 425 I Street, NW
 Washington, D.C. 20520

ACTION REQUESTED

- ☒ Draft reply for:
 _____ Vice President's signature.
☒ ~~Undersigned~~ signature.
 _____ Staff
 _____ Memorandum for use as enclosure to reply.
 _____ Direct reply.
 _____ Furnish information copy.
 _____ Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling.
 _____ Furnish copy of reply, if any.
 _____ For your information.
 _____ For comment.

NOTE

Prompt action is essential.

If more than 48 hours' delay is encountered, please telephone the undersigned immediately.

Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum, or comment is requested.

REMARKS:

Description:

1 Letter: _____ Telegram: _____ Other: _____
 To: The Vice President
 From: Dr. Karim Pakravan
 Date: February 17, 1981
 Subject: political asylum for Iranians

RECEIVED

1981 MAY -8 PM 4: 2

CONFIDENTIAL

By direction of the Vice President

W. C. Atzert
 W. C. ATZERT
 Staff Assistant

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

RVA HAS SEEN

ACTION

July 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP

SUBJECT: Iran

You gave me permission (see Tab I) to meet with [REDACTED] to talk about setting up a small group to discuss things we might want to do in the event of a further deterioration of the Iranian crisis. [REDACTED] and I met for lunch and discussed this matter. He then relayed the discussion to Mr. Casey.

[REDACTED] called today to say Casey thinks this is a good idea.

~~REDACTED~~ yes~~CTED~~~~CTED~~~~REDACTED~~~~REDACTED~~

I think it is most important that the NSPG give Casey authority [REDACTED] and the sooner we get a small meeting together the better. I therefore recommend that I be authorized to call a meeting which would make recommendations to you and the NSPG. The participants would be [REDACTED] West, Pustay, Veliotis, McFarlane, and Kemp. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That Kemp be given permission to call a small, off-the-record meeting in the Situation Room at 4:30 p.m. on Friday, July 17, with representatives from State, Defense, and CIA to make a recommendation for you to take to the NSPG.

APPROVE *[Signature]*

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment

Tab I - Kemp memorandum to RVA dated June 24, 1981

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Review July 9, 1987

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-106 #99

By *[Signature]* NARA Date 4/30/01



Iran July 1981

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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1 ran July 1981

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~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 17, 1981

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MEMORANDUM FOR GEOFFREY KEMP

NLS F97-106 #102

FROM: GARY SICK *js*

BY smf, NARA, DATE 4/30/8

SUBJECT: Iran

There are two recent developments in Iran you should be aware of:

-- The Commander of the Iranian Navy made a well-publicized speech in the last week which hinted very strongly that a resolution of the war with Iraq was necessary and desirable. This has been coupled with extensive propaganda about recent Iranian military "victories" in the south, suggesting that the way is perhaps being prepared for negotiations. This is compatible with recent intelligence reports suggesting that Olof Palme believes, on the basis of his latest mediatory visit to the region, that there is a very good prospect for an early diplomatic settlement and negotiations.

-- The National Voice of Iran (Soviet clandestine radio) on July 14 strongly criticized the decision of the Council of Guardians that "only those who have the religious qualifications required by the officials can become presidential candidates." (Only four of the 71 potential candidates were found competent to run.) Although this may be nothing more than an expression of discontent that pro-Tudeh candidates were excluded from the presidential race, the text of the broadcast went further than I have seen in some time in criticizing the direction of the revolution. Among other things, the NVOI said "The Iranian revolution was not staged so that a Constitution without a shah would replace a constitution with a shah." It stressed that political qualifications should be determined not only "on the basis of religious beliefs but on the basis of their class attachments."

Both of these are simply straws in the wind at the moment, but they suggest that the clerical leadership may be running scared. The clerics have always maintained that there would be no accommodation with Iraq until Saddam Hussein was overthrown. Is the apparent shift in this position simply the result of the fact that Bani-Sadr is now gone and the clerics now have the responsibility of dealing with the war (just as they shifted position on the hostage issue after consolidating their political control)? Or is it the result of their recognition that the regime is in deep trouble and needs to focus all its attention on the internal situation? Or could it be that the military, which is quite aware of its own inadequacy, has begun to make itself heard with the clerical rulers on political issues?

My guess is that the clerics are truly frightened of the military at a time when internal order is breaking down, and this is an effort to keep the military in line through political concessions.

The NVOI commentary is not unique. NVOI has criticized the regime in the past for its Kurdish policy and for attacks on Tudeh party headquarters and its newspaper. Nevertheless, this commentary comes very

~~SECRET~~

close to equating the clerical dictatorship to the shah's rule. If nothing else, it suggests that the Tudeh (and the Soviets) perceive that the concept of theocratic dominance is a point of vulnerability for the regime.

The bombing of the IRP headquarters, and the subsequent widespread attacks on mullahs and Revolutionary Guards throughout the country, has not only wounded the clerics very seriously but, perhaps more important, has demonstrated that the clerics are vulnerable. If important elements in the bazaar, the tribes and the moderate clergy begin to sense that the clerics are losing control, there could be a massive shift of loyalty and a widespread inclination to hedge political bets while waiting to see the outcome. This "shift in the wind" could mark the beginning of the end for the theocrats, just as it did for the shah's regime.

The clerical regime is facing its most critical test since the departure of the shah. It is on a knife edge, and one false move or show of weakness could reverse its fortunes. The presidential elections, scheduled for July 24, will be a fundamental test of strength. The clerics are going all out for a massive show of public confidence. Approximately 16 million people voted in the January 1980 presidential election. They cannot afford a substantial drop in public participation in this election, and they will do everything in their power to insure that they get the requisite vote of confidence. It will be interesting to see how they fare.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 29, 1981

MEMO FOR GEOFFREY KEMP

FROM: GARY SICK *N*

SUBJECT: Iran's Big Bomb

I have been reviewing the sequence of events over the past month or so in Iran prior to the explosion at the IRP Headquarters which killed Khomeini and others yesterday. I am not sure that the regular reporting has sufficiently stressed the extent to which the situation in Iran had deteriorated almost to the extent of outright warfare. You might be interested in this compilation of some of the clashes of the past month:

- 30 May Wheat fields set afire near Qom
- 2 Jun Aide to Bani-Sadr arrested, charged with assisting "counter-revolutionaries"
- 30 May Another Bani-Sadr aide roughed up in B-S's home town of Hamadan
- 5 June Anniversary of 1963 clerical uprising. Mass marches and speeches call for clerical rule
- 7 June Ibrahim Yazdi, supporter of B-S, badly injured when thugs broke up a meeting in Shiraz
- 7 June B-S's paper (and Tudeh paper, among others) banned
- 8 June B-S inaugurates "bureau for cooperation of the people with the president" in Hamadan; it is immediately attacked by Hezbollahi thugs
- 9 June Mojahidin declares its support for B-S
- 8 June B-S supporters attacked during rally outside the Tehran bazaar; security forces fire in the air
- 8 June Khomeini: "The day I feel danger is threatening the Islamic Republic...that day I shall no longer confine myself to giving advice....I shall cut off everyone's hands."
- 8 June B-S: "The specter of dictatorship and repression is again trying to impose itself (on Iran)"
- 12 June Earthquake in Kermanshah kills many
- 10 June Khomeini dismisses B-S as CINC of armed forces
- 11 June Ali Nobari (B-S supporter) resigned as head of Central Bank under pressure from Majlis
- 10 June Amir Entazam (B-S supporter) sentenced to life imprisonment as a spy (for U.S.)

- 9 June Shiraz Islamic Court warns that the penalty for burning crops will be death
- 8 June Clergyman in Baluchistan killed by dissidents. The ensuing battle results in 33 police killed. Six attackers killed, 123 arrested.
- 14 June Khomeini to military commanders: "I command army commanders to stop discussing political issues..."
- 15 June Khomeini: The National Front (supporters of Mossadeq), Liberation Front (Bazargan's org.) and those supporting Bani-Sadr should "repent." "They have openly risen against Islam." "What they have done is blasphemy."
- 15 June Mass demonstrations supporting Khomeini's speech and calling for death to those opposing clerical rule, "Death to nationalism."
- 15 June Bani-Sadr's representative resigns from special "mediation committee"
- 15 June Revolutionary Guards attack house in Tehran where B-S supporters were gathered
- 16 June Leading clergymen say that opposition to the "retribution bill" (prescribing Islamic penalties e.g. cutting off hands of thieves) is "apostasy" and "infidelity"
- 14 June Town in southern Iran announces it can not accept any more war refugees. Clashes reported in Tabriz, Shiraz, Mashhad and Isfahan
- 16 June The "Central Islamic Revolution Komiteh" announced that several oppositionists were turned over to them for investigation. B-S supporters arrested after a march in a provincial town.
- 17 June Public Prosecutor's Office announces that "following the disgraceful defeat of their counterrevolutionary uprising on 15 June, with the excuse of supporting Bani-Sadr" with the intent of retoring U.S. imperialism, the people are called upon to exert "their direct and active presence in the streets and to foil the plots of the U.S. agents."
- 16 June Bani-Sadr supporters who failed to show up in the Majlis (thus preventing a quorum) are named in the media as "absent without permission." One of them is dismissed from his duties. One of B-S's offices closed in Shiraz.
- 17 June Majlis votes against B-S, Council of Guardians concurs
- 18 June Khomeini: "I...will stand against the counterrevolution which has decided to make a pretext of certain individuals..."
- 21 June A commune of 40 Mujahidin girls broken up and arrested in Shiraz

- 23 June Security forces in the south ordered to be alert in checking departing vessels and watch for "suspicious movements."
- 22 June Citizens in south notified of individuals posing as revolutionary guards; ordered to check ID's.
- 23 June Clashes between clerical and anti-clerical factions reported on 21 and 23 June in Shiraz and in Ahwaz on the 23rd. At least one person killed.
- 23 June Revolutionary Guards on alert and reservists mobilized. Abadan requests blood donations.
- 22 June Mojahidin meeting house broken into and searched near Shiraz. Weapons found. Members arrested.
- 23 June Mustapha Chamran, former Minister of Defense, killed, reportedly in action against Iraqis during guerrilla operations. (He was close to Bazargan, Yazdi, and Bani-Sadr.)
- 22 June Khomeini dismisses Bani-Sadr as President.
- 22 June Four Mujahidin members and five other political activists (including a colonel) executed at Evin Prison. A journalist executed.
- 22 June Khomeini speech attacking Bani-Sadr as "not able to understand what Islam meant," lacking in political understanding, and failure to listen to Khomeini's warnings.
- 23 June A Majlis member disqualified for criticism of the Constitution and Council of Experts (clerics) and for allegations of gunrunning and corrupt practices.
- 23 June Five persons executed: one Mujahidin member, four supporters of Zionism and Israel.
- 23 June The "Political-Ideological Department" of the Police issues a warning that it will deal severely with anyone violating "the holy integrity" of the country. Reiterates support for valayat-i faqih.
- 24 June Tripartite Presidential Council formed (Behesti, Rafsanjani. Rajai); Rajai announces he will run for president.
- 25 June Rafsanjani speech about dangers threatening Iran. Singles out: Mojahidin, Bani-Sadr's "cooperation bureaus," monarchists, National Front. "There are some difficulties. Our country is engaged in war; it has suffered an earthquake; it is under an economic embargo; it has internal enemies; it had other difficulties which for one year caused a lot of trouble and destroyed and wasted our forces" (hostages).
- 14 June 14 pro-Bani-Sadr deputies write open letter complaining of loss of freedom of speech and political attacks on them.

- 24 June Khomeini speech attacks Bani-Sadr and supporters, including dissident members of clergy: "they were hatching plots. They had no sympathy for Islam.... They wanted to hold a referendum and through it make the Constitution unlawful..."
- 25 June Bani-Sadr's judicial advisor arrested at the airport as he was about to leave for Frankfurt.
- 25 June A clerical funeral in Mahabad attacked by armed dissident Kurds. Six killed. Governor of Province wounded in the leg. Eight persons later executed.
- 21 June Mojahidin "politico-military communique 25" published in Keyhan: Denounces raid on member's home June 16 and "unlawful detention of members of the president's coordination bureau" and "widespread plans to arrest all progressive leaders." The Mojahidin "hereby asks permission of the heroic people...to use the most decisive measures...to protect the lives of its members, especially the organization's central cadre, which may be considered a focal point for the people and the revolution.... Responsibility for any occurrence during our revolutionary resistance will lie with the monopolist reactionaries and thier club-wielding hooligans who have attempted...to destroy the Mujahidin.... Whoever they are and in whatever guise they appear, they will receive the severest punishment and revolutionary penalties."

* * * * *

This sampling provides some indication of how life was going in Iran during the last month before the big bomb. The last item above is particularly significant. It indicates a virtual declaration of war by the Mujahidin on the clerical forces just one week before the blast. The revolutionary guards were put on alert and reserves mobilized two days later (out of sequence). It is too soon to say with any certainty who planted the bomb, but the Mujahidin is one organization with the resources and experience to carry out such an operation. (The other is the shadowy Forqan organization which has been systematically killing ayatollahs since early 1979.)

All of the evidence to date suggests that the bombing was carried out by anti-clerical forces with good access to the plans of the ruling elite. The pro-Soviet forces (Tudeh and Fedayan) had little incentive to undertake such a risky operation at this stage, since they have been making extreme efforts to sustain their relationship with Behesti and co., but they will undoubtedly attempt to exploit the loss of IRP leadership to increase their own influence.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~Jimmy~~
What next? Should
he tell RVA about.
the latest info on Walker/Phid
Arabian? we should
of.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EVA HAS SEEN

~~ADMINISTRATIVELY~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

July 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*

SUBJECT: Ardalan Case: A Further Complication

Gary Sick told me yesterday that State has misinformed us. It now looks as though the Ardalan file will not come up for consideration for at least two months, rather than the two weeks originally promised. What happened is that the consular people working this are now under very strict instructions from "on high" not to take files out of order. According to Gary, they have resisted requests on this type of issue from other high-ranking officials, including Ed Meese. *?*

However, Gary says that if Ardalan wishes to travel outside the United States during this waiting period we can arrange to have papers prepared for him to permit him to do so. If he doesn't want to travel, then his case will, as I say, take about two months. *||*

There are two decisions then to be taken:

1. We can inform Ardalan that his case is taking longer than we thought, but that we can get the necessary papers for him to travel. This can be done by a telephone call from Gary to Ardalan.

APPROVE ✓ DISAPPROVE _____

2. You can make a phone call to Bill Clark or Walt Stoessel and make a personal intervention. At this point any further interference by Gary or myself would probably be counterproductive.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE ✓

Thank
wa

~~ADMINISTRATIVELY~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.3(a)

By NARA

dlb

Date

8/11/99

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EVA HAS SEEN

~~ADMINISTRATIVELY~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

July 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP

SUBJECT: Ardalan Case

The attached memo at Tab A from Gary Sick says that the Ardalan case will be processed within two weeks. State is aware of White House interest. If there are any further complications, I will let you know.

Attachment

Tab A - Memorandum to Kemp from Sick

Great
many thanks
Duj
7/13

~~ADMINISTRATIVELY~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.3(a)

By NARA

dlb

Date

8/11/99

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 7, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR GEOFFREY KEMP

FROM: GARY SICK *JS*

SUBJECT: Ardalan Case

Since my memo to you of June 25, I have been in contact with the head of the Bureau of Consular Affairs at State who assured me that the Ardalan case would be processed within two weeks. From my discussions with the Ardalan, I believe that is satisfactory from their point of view.

State is well aware of interest in this case from the White House side. I am reluctant to insert myself into the process any further at this point, since I believe it is unnecessary and likely to raise the profile of White House involvement higher than is desirable.

I will check with State in the next week to determine whether the case has been processed. I will keep you informed.

Good!

OK - fine.

RECEIVED

81 JUN 29 P 5: 32

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

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SHOW CC

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

RVA HAS BEEN

~~ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL~~INFORMATION

June 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*

SUBJECT: The Ardalan Case

I passed your memo of June 22nd concerning Manoutchehr Ardalan to Gary Sick. He has handled these cases before. Gary has made inquiries for the Ardalans. He had to talk to them in order to get their case numbers. He has passed the information to the State Department. No mention of any names. There is no assurance that the INS will expedite the cases, but Gary thinks they will since it is of no importance to them in what order the cases are raised. If there are any serious problems, either State or the Ardalans will give Gary a call (see his attached memo). I think this is the best we can do at this time, given the guidelines laid down in your memo.

As you will see from Gary's memo to me, the Ardalans are very grateful for what you are doing for them.

Attachments

John
I would really
like to help them.
And would appreciate
a monitoring of
this.

*Thanks to
Gary and to
you -
Don
7/6*

~~ADMINISTRATIVELY
CONFIDENTIAL~~

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.3(a)

By NARA

dlb

Date

8/11/99

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR GEOFFREY KEMP

FROM: RICHARD ALLEN *hr*
SUBJECT: Manoutchehr Ardalan

I have received this further communication from M. Ardalan. I would appreciate your looking into it.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1981


Dear Mr. Ardalan:

Thank you for your letter of June 25.

We will see what can be done as outlined in my previous letter, and will be back in touch with you.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Rich Allen", written over the word "Sincerely,".

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Manoutchehr Ardalan
2127 California Street, N. W.
Apartment 205
Washington, D. C. 20008

Thursday

JUN 26 1981

June 25th, 1981

C. Dub

Dear Mr. Allen,

Many thanks for your kind words and thoughtful message of June 22nd. It's indeed a rare quality in public personalities to take into mind all their erstwhile associates and acquaintances when issues of individual concern are brought to their attention. The genuineness of your interest in our personal well-being as conveyed in your letter therefore is especially heartwarming.

May I take this opportunity to express to you my sincere gratitude and through you to Mr. Gary Sic for his kind assistance in seeing that my request is pursued to a speedy resolution.

With appreciation and eagerness, I look forward to receiving news regarding our status in the not too distant a future. Wishing you happiness and success, I remain with high esteem
Sincerely
Manvickesh Chandra

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 25, 1981

MEMO FOR GEOFFREY KEMP .

FROM: GARY SICK *JS*

SUBJECT: Ardalan Case

I have talked by phone to Mr. and Mrs. Ardalan. In order to make any progress, I had to have additional information, including their case numbers with INS. They are well aware that an effort is being made to move consideration of their cases up near the top of the stack. They hoped for--and expected--nothing more, and they are quite grateful. Both of them asked me to relay their gratitude to Dick Allen for his interest and support. He needs to do nothing more in the way of letters, etc.

I have passed the necessary information to the appropriate officials at the State Department. I have dealt with several of these cases in the past, and it was not necessary to mention any names. There is, of course, no absolute assurance that INS will expedite these cases, but I think they probably will since it is of no importance to them what order the cases are raised. I doubt we will hear anything more about this case. If there is any serious problem, either State or the Ardalan will give me a call.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.3(a)

~~ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL~~

By NARA

dlb

Date

8/11/99

June 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR GEOFF KEMP

FROM:

RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*

SUBJECT:

Manoutchehr Ardalan

Please read the letter I have received from Manoutchehr Ardalan, formerly of the Iranian Diplomatic Corps stationed in Washington. He is well known and highly thought of.

As I indicate in my letter I would like to learn why his case is being delayed. Therefore, I ask that you very gently inquire around State as to why the final determination in his case has not been made. Also, very skillfully you may wish to hint that there is a White House interest without bringing my name to bear. I'll be willing to do that later, but would prefer to solve this with a minimum of influence at the present time.

Please made the inquiries at your earliest convenience.

Many thanks.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 22, 1981

Dear Mr. Ardalan:

Indeed, I do remember your quite well, and I'm aware that you have attempted to contact me in recent months. I must apologize for being unavailable, but my schedule has been quite full since January 20th.

Your case is a curious one, and I shall inquire into the reasons for delay. When I have a response, I'll be back in touch. I should like to have very much your status clarified, and I recognize that you may indeed be caused hardship in the absence of a satisfactory resolution.

Please do not hesitate to contact me again if I may be of assistance. My response will be forthcoming. With every best wish,

Sincerely,

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Manoutchehr Ardalan
2127 California Street, N.W.
Apartment 205
Washington, D.C. 20008

387-7092

Masoumeh

Mr. A 722 35468

Ms. A 226 42255

Thursday *Hand Delivered*
6/18/81
June 18th, 1981

Dear Mr. Allen,

Just

When I first called you before the Presidential inauguration, which you were kind enough to reciprocate personally, my intention was not to impose on your time nor to add to the burdens of your new responsibilities. In view of the delicate circumstances associated with your high office, however, I can well appreciate that it would be very difficult to continue responding to the entire gamut of new demands made on yourself.

I recall when I had the pleasure of meeting you at the Embassy to prepare for your visit to my country, I was much impressed by your courteous & positive sense of understanding. It is gratifying to realize that your selection

To this high office will contribute to a more realistic vision of world problems and further distinguish the paths of your predecessors.

Much has transpired in the course of the past two & half years. After my assignment in Washington, I was posted as Consul General in San Francisco.

My wife & I were on our way back in February 1979, when we were forewarned that the political atmosphere would not be conducive to our return. The chaotic events since and the current volcanic situation in Iran has validated our decision to remain in the U.S. until their destructive phase in Iran's long history is once again overcome.

When we resettled in Washington with the assistance of many of our friends, my wife learned that her father had fallen gravely ill in Geneva, mainly as a result of the heart-breaking events inside Iran. She arrived at his bedside only to discover that he had fallen into a coma, from which he never recovered.

Since my wife's mother & brother could not leave
Iran, I joined my wife to make the necessary
arrangements for his internment. Soon thereafter,
we came back to the U.S. We thereupon learned
to our chagrin & dismay that the immigration
had decided to forfeit our right to remain
in the U.S. according to Chapter XIII applicable
to all diplomatic representatives in view of our
exit & re-entry. They told us that permission to
stay and seek gainful employment would be
contingent on applying for asylum. Having no
other option, we chose the only recourse left
open to us.

Since these turn of events at the end of 1979,
my wife & I have both been engaged in new pursuits.
My wife has been with the public relations department
of Garfinckel's & I have been on contract as a
consultant in the private sector.

Though my work entails traveling, my clients have thus far shown much understanding hoping that our status here would be favorably resolved.

Nearly a year and a half has passed and so far as I can deduce, little movement has taken place in dealing with my application.

Therefore, I have sought to see you to let you know that any further postponement of a ruling on my application which is basically routine in nature considering my previous diplomatic background and the exceptional circumstances surrounding my case, would jeopardize my position and lead to severe hardships for my family.

Since I know of several precedents where the kind intercession of a high public official has led to an expeditious treatment of such pending applications, I would be indebted if you could, in spite of the taxing burdens of your high office, have someone facilitate a review of

my application at the State Department. Having
been in government for eighteen years myself,
I know that at times the web of government
bureaucracy can only be unraveled if a direct interest
is brought to bear.

My wife & I would therefore be most grateful
if you could find it in yourself to use your
good office to assist us and thus enable me
to have the freedom of mobility that is essential
for us to re-establish our lives on a new &
constructive footing.

Thanking you once again in advance for your
consideration & with every good wish & high esteem,
I remain,

Sincerely
Mansoutchehr Ardalan