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Wills - F97-106

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Kemp to Janet Colson, re: Response to Abbas Amirie, 1 p.	4/20/81	P6/F6 <i>B6</i>
2. Memo	James Nance to Michael Deaver, re: State's Request for Meeting between the President....., 2 p. <i>D 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #106</i>	n.d.	P1/E1 <i>B1</i>
3. Memo	Paul Bremer to Nance, re: Proposes Call on President Reagan....., 1 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #107</i>	12/29/81	P1/E1
4. Memo	Copy of Item #2, 2 p. <i>D 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #108</i>	12/30/81	P1/E1 <i>B1</i>
5. Memo	Copy of Item #3, 1 p. <i>R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #109</i>	12/29/81	P1/E1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

(4)

Some Further Thoughts Concerning Iran*

Psychologists are fond of referring to a well-publicized experiment in order to illustrate the significance of perceptual phenomena in human psychology. The typical experimental setting is a room in which two strands of a discorded rope hang from the ceiling in such a way that the two ends cannot be tied together by stretching either one. The problem, of course, is to tie the two ends of the rope together. In the meantime, a pair of pliers is placed in one corner of the room. If the subject can perceive a relationship between the pair of pliers and his objective, then a gestalt, or configuration is established among, seemingly unrelated elements. Among many other uses the pair of pliers may have, the subject must perceive a use relevant to his problem. If successful, he would tie it to the end of one rope, swing it high enough to catch it while he has the end of the other rope in his hand, and tie the two ends together.

The experiment just cited illustrates how some apparently disparate elements could be brought together to form a configuration useful for the purposes of the moment. It also

* a sequel to the earlier report entitled "How to Recapture Iran"

illustrates the superimposition of the perceptual qualities of human species on elements which, in themselves, are neutral. Further, it is an illustration of the use of certain relevant qualities and features of elements as required by the exigencies of the circumstances. Different circumstances may require different configuration of the same elements. In other words, under different conditions, different qualities of the same elements may be utilized.

This experiment illustrates, further, the use of a quality, exclusive to human species, generally referred to as intelligence. Along a continuum, intelligence, or ability to adapt to and make desired changes in the environment to suit one's ends, varies from concrete processes to highly reflective and abstract thinking. The higher the ability to perceive relationships, and above all, to create new relationships, the higher the intelligence.

Great theoretical scientists, artists, world statesmen, innovators, great strategists, etc. have all the characteristics of innovation in common, and therefore, are among the rare breed of humans who possess the special gift to explore - and manipulate - the unlimited possibilities afforded man.

The foreign policy of any nation (or for that matter, any policy) is no exception. A bold, innovative policy and an outward-looking orientation, infact, is indicative of the ability of its advocates to perceive the unlimited resources of the individual, as well as a nation.

To place the various components of this argument in proper perspective (and by extension to form a gestalt) one must only be able to notice (or perceive) the various, and apparently disparate, elements currently existing in the world social order, in order to pick out the instruments of a new configuration and a novel world order.

To illustrate, it was previously argued that the basic elements of a creative foreign policy and its successful implementation does exist in the Middle East today. Assuming that the immediate goal of the American foreign policy is to block the advancement of the Soviets in various parts of the world, and of particular, in areas with strategic significance. Then the formation of a grand alliance among the many nations of the Middle East, extending from Pakistan into Iran, and covering Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, Persian Gulf States, Israel, and further to the west, Egypt, the Sudan, and Morocco, forms the cornerstone of that strategy.

Obviuosly, there is always a "technological gap" between a theoretical framework and its successful implementation. Among the many factors in this endeavor, are the national, cultural, and historical characteristics of each "link-nation" in the general implementation of a new world order.

What is crucial at this juncture in history is the capacity to perceive the elements of opportunity, and at once to recognize its ephemeral nature. The technological ability of the U.S., and the resurgence of a new assertiveness on the part of America, combined with the visible vulnerabilities of the U.S.S.R. and its allies, present completely novel opportunities and pave the way for the pursuit of an "unconventional" foreign policy.

The larger elemental world policy and the recognition of opportunities - and perils - to form (and create) desirable gestalts is of course outside the scope of this paper. Rather, this writing intends to focus on Iran, as one of the key elements in the larger chain of figure-ground relationships.

In the latest paper, the decline of Khomeini regime and its eventual demise was predicted. This prediction was made at a time when many political pundits and Iran "experts" in the West could not foresee such a quick disintegration of a regime

which once, appeared to be formidable, and even invincible. The reason for this failure (on the part of the "experts") was a lack of perspective, as well as a lack of familiarity with the nuances and subtlties of Iranian culture.

At any rate, Iranian politics, at the time of this writing, is in a state of perpetual flux - and constant chaos. To make some order out of it, and thus, distinguish among the relevant and irrelevant elements (for the final purpose of making a meaningful configuration), the following observations are made:

(1) The current regime, headed by Khomeini is doomed. The imminent downfall of Khomeini, and his loss of all legitimacy signifies lack of any viability or practicality of any government wishing to rule on religious or ideological grounds. This is particularly so in the case of Islam. The rigid rules of Islamic laws, its cruel and inhumane methods, and its anachronistic nature make it (Islam) an ineffective tool to combat "progressive-looking" Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

Islam becomes an effective tool only when it is pushed to the back benches and only when it acts as an spiritual factor.

Bani-Sadr's claims to the contrary would not change anything, because of the "devine" nature of the Islamic laws and the unchangeable nature of the doctrine.

Reports reaching out of Iran indicate a growing aversion for religion, especially on the part of the educated younger generation (fully 50% of Iranian population is under 20). Islam, which up to the advent of Khomeini, played the vital psychological role of providing the individuals the much needed anchor in life, and acted as a deterrent against the invasion of atheistic ideologies, is now losing ground to radical anti-religion doctrines. The general consensus among knowledgeable Iranian experts is that any insistence on reviving religion as an instrument of power would boomerang and would have highly destructive backlashes. This is true in Iran as well as in other "Islamic" countries. Religion which, so far, has acted as a "natural" system of immunity against the inroad of communism, is now in danger of being vanquished. Devoid of their immunity systems, countries in the "Islamic" world could become highly vulnerable.

These same experts consider it unwise to insist on religious revivalism. Rather, the ultimate and durable "cure" would have to be found in moral secularism, coupled with

general enlightenment and economic and technological advancements. Good and dependable allies of the west are economically secure, technologically advanced, and intellectually enlightened allies.

(2) In previous writings, it was successfully predicted that any hopes the west may have on possible "ascendancy" of the so-called "moderate" elements amidst Khomeini regime are in vain. The defeat and subsequent flight of Bani-Sadr, underscored his basic ineffectuality and his lack of political skills. Further, it was widely thought in the west (judging from newspaper editorial and scholarly publications) that the likes of Bani-Sadr were able, and willing, to establish a government in compliance with the rules of reason. Such thoughts, conjectures, and hopes must also be put to rest. Bani-Sadr's repeated statements indicate his determination to re-establish the "true" Islam in Iran. Based on an outmoded, inflexible, anachronistic, and impractical Shi's ideology, in which he deeply believes, Bani-Sadr and his new allies are sure to further destabilize the country and continue to create tensions in the region.

The Mujahedeen-e-Khalgh guerrilla organization, now in ascendance in Iranian political scene, is a tightly-built

terrorist organization, whose tactics are copied after any other terrorist group, and whose ideology are molded by Marxist thinking. As it stands now, Bani-Sadr's newest allies have tens of thousands of guerrillas under arms. But its hard-core strength consists of about 7000 fighters. The organization is run with an iron-fist by a leadership who keeps a tight and strong hold on the lives of the rank-and-file, and whose major financial support comes from countries having close relationships with the Soviet Union.

The basic ideology of the Islamic-Marxists calls for an abolition of all private ownership (a principle hotly disputed by the orthodox Shi'a as contrary to Koranic edicts). It also calls for the establishment of a "monotheistic" classless society, total distribution of wealth, dismantling of the regular army, and its replacement by "people's army." Judging from the past action and terroristic tactics of Mujahedeen, their publications, injunctions, and statements, a bloodbath, not unlike that of Cambodia, can be expected.

The Islamic-Marxists seem to be intent on introducing radical transformation by force of arms.

(3) Again, in previous papers, it was predicted that upon the demise of Khomeini, barring unforeseen events, a major civil war, with the active participation of major contending factions should be expected. This phenomenon was referred to as Lebanonization. At the present time, a mini-civil war is shaping in Iran, to be transformed into a full-scale conflict upon the death of Khomeini.

Among the important factions to participate in the war are the Pasdaran-e-Enghelab-e-Islami (The Islamic revolutionary guards, Khomeini's mainstay of power), the Islamic-Marxist Mujahedeen, the various ethnic groups, such as Kurds, Baluchis, Azaris, religious minorities, such as orthodox Sunnis, tribes, such as Ghashghais, pure Marxists, such as Fedaiyan-e-Khalgh, etc. Depending on the dexterity, political skill, ideological affinity, and momentary interests, these factions could be grouped in larger segments to oppose other contestants with more strength.

From the outset, it appears that the strategy of the Soviet Union has been:

(1) To infiltrate the leadership of the major Politico-military functions (regardless of ideology, creed, etc.), by means of blackmailing, entrapment, bribery, etc., for the

purpose of steering them in directions towards the interests that the Soviet Union may dictate.

(2) The grand strategy of the Soviet Union seems to be the consolidation of its position in Iran, amidst the present chaos, by deeper penetration, through its agents, into various state organs, factional organizations, recruitment efforts, buying friends, distributing arms, establishing clandestine cells, and otherwise, expansion of its influence and grabbing various leverages. Upon the arrival of a full-scale civil war, the nearest possibility for the Soviet Union would be to encourage the disintegration of Iran into several smaller autonomous "people's" republics. Of these, the easiest choices should be the Baluchistan Republic which would give the Soviets easy access to the Gulf of Oman, and eventual control of the Persian Gulf.

What Is To Be Done

Let it be said at the outset that at this juncture in Iranian history and in the rush of events, any passivity on the part of the world may have disastrous consequences. The situation in Iran is tense, tight, complicated, requiring great care, but also quick and ingenious intervention.

Had the free world started complete and unwaivering support of forces friendly to the West from the outset, those forces would have come now to the fore in Iranian consciousness, and would have successfully replaced the Islamic-Marxist. Rather, the Islamic-Marxists, thanks to the foot dragging non-policy of the West, have now been able to gain ascendancy by capturing the imagination of the Iranian public. They have been able to generate a great deal of support, as much by Western default as by their own activistic tactics.

Although the defection of Islamic-Marxists and Bani-Sadr faction complicates the situation, but it has its own blessings.

The Mujahedeen, being one of the most hardened, radical, and ruthless of the "revolutionary" forces in Iran have now committed the biggest political-military mistake of grappling with Khomeini regime now, rather than waiting for his death. Although the Islamic-Marxists have been able to increase their popularity, but they have also exposed themselves to mass arrests, and relentless execution of their ranks by Khomeini's Islamic guards. But, the phenomenon also has great potentials. As suggested earlier, and as part of an over-all strategy, formentation of the present conflict between the two sides, to lead to full-scale war, does have the beneficial effect of

eliminating the "revolutionary" forces in their own hands and by their own methods. Emphasis on this tactic, could pave the way for an eventual recapture of Iran by nationalistic, pro-west secular forces.

The bombing of the headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party, and the general show of support it received from the general public, demonstrated, at once, the vulnerability and defenselessness of the Khomeini regime, and the deep hatred people harbor for it. It also, in a highly dramatic fashion, illustrated the way it should be toppled, once preparations are completed and the time becomes ripe.

The Relevant Elements:

That the desire, if not the policy, of the U.S. is to find Iran, once again, a stable, prosperous, secure, and strong country, with close ties to the West, can hardly be disputed. The important point is (1) to recognize the limited nature of opportunity now available, (2) the exclusive nature of forces potentially amenable to the West, (3) the futility of pinning any hopes on the clerical regimes or its offshoots (such as Mujahedeen), and the sensitivity of the current situation.

The fact is that the U.S. does possess a vast array of resources not available to many other nations, including the Soviet Union. If a fraction of these resources could be devoted to Iran problems, before the opportunity slips away, there is a good chance, indeed a strong possibility, that the desired results may follow.

The Gestalt

As it was stated before, the Iran situation, now in a state of fluidity, is replete with dangers and opportunities. To exploit it, recognition of certain elemental variables are necessary:

(A) Bringing about the desirable change (i.e., return to power by pro-West, secular, nationalists) requires resort to a step-by-step grand strategy. The strategy contains three distinct phases: (1) keeping the Khomeini regime off-balance; (2) weakening the regime by (a) isolation, (b) undeclared embargo in food supplies, (c) by world-wide denunciation, (3) by exposing the flagrant violation of human rights and rampant corruption.

(B) The second phase (whose beginnings are now being witnessed) involves a skillful tormenting of armed conflict between and among the "revolutionary" elements.

(C) The onslaught involving commando and military operations for a final take-over of Iran.

One important consideration in the operation is the recognition of the factor of "maturity." In other words, economic woes (which must be deliberately worsen) together with world-wide propaganda operations could hasten the "maturity" period of the total or near-total discreditation of the mullah regime. Psychological preparation and ground work would make the war-weary and peace-starring people ready to accept a "savior."

Clearly, the skill with which the pro-West groups are brought to the center of the Iranian - and world - consciousness is largely dependent on the time factor. The encouragement of the radical elements (such as Bani-Sadr - Mujahedeen faction) to burn themselves out is crucial.

Crucial also is the training, shaping and vigorous preparation of pro-Shah forces. A most crippling handicap in the operation of pro-Shah forces has been lack of funds. A good supply of funds - lent to the forces and payable upon resumption of power - by wealthy and friendly states, would reinvigorate, revitalize, and sharply boost the scope, depth and the extent of the operations.

Evidently, funding an operation of the type described, is beyond the ability of any private individual or group of individuals. But it is easily within the financial ability of such friendly states as Saudi Arabia and Kuwaif.

To sum up, the present report does not notice any change in Iran equation to justify any transformation of the strategy, posture and the operation that the United States should undertake. On the contrary, the occurrence of many bloody events reinforce the basic soundness of the recommendations put forward, and reiterate the position advocated.

Of all forces now operating in and out of Iran, the only group, possessing the potential to liberate Iran, and join forces with the West, is the army. Despite repeated purges, the Iran-Iraq war revitalized it and gave it a new prestige, an organization, and a force to reckon with. In short:

(1) As predicted earlier, the chances that the current regime will remain in power, but accompanied by increasing chaos, daily assassinations, mass executions, worsening economy and a deepening discontent, is strong. But upon Khomeini's demise, a full-scale civil war is also predicted.

(2) Unless the West takes initiatives in its own hands (and do it speedily), there is a great likelihood that Iran would be dismembered (after a protracted, bloody civil war) with the choicest parts eventually falling to the Soviet Union.

(3) Despite the ability of Khomeini to still pour hundreds of thousands of its supporters into the streets, a very large segment of Iranian society remains alienated from his regime, and undecided about the future of Iran. Furthermore, to despite increasing popularity of the Mujahedeen, their influence on the silent majority falls short of adequate.

(4) In the final analysis, the army, and the silent majority (both impressionable), properly mobilized, and taken advantage of, could be transformed into powerful instruments of future power and two main pillars of support for Western-oriented forces.

(5) The interesting point is that secular forces and the army (including the many high-ranking officers in exile) do possess considerable talent, expertise and ability. Collectively, this could be turned into an awesome force. Many highly trained officers, technicians, scientists, scholars, tacticians, and strategists, could pool their talent, experience, and their

burning desire to serve their country if favorable conditions could be created.

(6) Rightly or wrongly, many in and out of Iran (in common with the people of the Third World) attribute magical powers to the United States. The prevalent belief is that no faction, no matter how strong or popular, could come to power without U.S. blessing. This perception has immense potential and political implication for the West. Put to proper use, great benefits could be reaped.

(7) Iran, notwithstanding Khomeini and his deranged ideals, still will have to build its future on the dual pillars of nationalism and spiritual religion. The two, however, are now greatly weakened.

(8) Among the major contending forces, the only potential whose interests, ideals, beliefs, perspectives and orientation coincide with those of the West are the army, and the forces now operating for the restoration of a constitutional monarch in Iran headed by Reza Shah II. While the Soviet Union is feverishly supporting forces, directly or indirectly, which may have the potential for its future use, the U.S.'s support, in general, has been less than determined for its own

sake, and for the sake of a free, independent, and indivisible Iran, a determined, full-hearted, and vigorous operation, in support of the U.S. allies should be mounted.

The U.S. has resources in its concession which are still unique in the world. What the pro-West Iranians need is U.S. blessings. As soon as it is given, it is expected that the effect would snowball and would be felt almost immediately. The secularists inside and outside could be likened to an out-of-focus camera. That gentle touch by the U.S. could put it back into focus and make things fall into place- once again.

(9) The role the U.S. is to assume should be a catalyst. The blessing that the U.S. may give would galvanize the opposition, reinvigorate their ranks, open the coffers of the friendly neighboring states, and help provide training grounds, sanctuary, and staging areas by our neighbors.

Naturally, the U.S., publicly assuming a posture of "benign" neglect toward Iran, should play an indirect and covert role in the operation. The clandestine operations would give the U.S. the advantage of dissociating itself easily, if the need be, and, at the same time, keep the movement free from any accusations of collusion with the West. But, naturally

enough, the U.S. assistance in many areas, including intelligence coverage is of vital importance.

That the movement headed by the young Shah of Iran must be turned into a viable, credible force as the alternative for Iran rule, is reinforced by two groups of political realities. One such reality is that the only force (with the potential of turning into a formidable power) to return Iran to the stability of the good old days is the constitutionalists, according to extensive reports, is attributable to U.S. lack of full support. The potential participants in the consitutionalist coalition are large segments of the armed forces, many tribes, ethnic minorities, and the middle class. Joining forces could by many respected religious leaders in and out of Iran. But the secret of success is to put to use the dual functions of the vast public relations potential of the U.S. toward the dual functions of exposing the real nature of Khomeini regime, and its former allies (including the Islamic-Marxists and other leftists), and the advantages of returning the country to sanity.

The second reality is that the thought of any political solution (i.e., a peaceful solution) to the problem of Iran is far-fetched. The ultimate solution, if any, would be determined in the battlefields, in street fighting, and by resort to

force of arms. Any group which gains the upper hand, and demonstrates the ability to restore law and order, on the one hand, and subdue other contending forces, on the other, would be the future rulers of Iran. The process may take years, indeed. But the potential for Soviet intervention and exploitation in the absence of a careful pro-West politico-military strategy can never be ruled out.

The Reagan administration is, therefore, left with no choice but to embark on a comprehensive, well-thought strategy in consultation with the young Shah of Iran and his supporters. While no one would be willing to underestimate the risks involved, yet, a bold, well-rounded, all out effort has the best chance of success.

It is expected that once the "green light" is flashed, vast resources of the "opposition" would start rolling. There are thousands of young Patriotic Iranians whose potentials and abilities could be used. There are also thousands of army officers, whose mobilization, shaping, and retraining would immediately create a credible force.

The elements of formation of a gestalt are already present in Iran. The important point is to recognize them and

put them to immediate use before Iran is irretrievably lost.

As pointed out earlier, the outbreak of conflict between the radical, "revolutionary" forces is a blessing in disguise. Fully exploited, it could rid Iran of the radical elements and pave the way for an eventual take-over by pro-West, secular forces.

Naturally, details of a grand, comprehensive strategy requires a meeting of minds. To hammer out a workable plan necessitates close consultations. Centralized planning, and the recognition of the young Shah, as the seat of authority, and the symbol of unity, is of immense importance.

The young Shah is planning to form a national resistance council, consisting of some of the best technical, scientific, military, and political planners, advisers, and strategists whose past record is completely unblemished and whose integrity is beyond question. He is also planning to establish a strong organization in the U.S. It is high time that the ground-work for a close co-operation and a durable alliance and partnership be built- now.

A secret of success in Iran is the recognition of a time-honored psychological twist in their collective uncon-

scious. Iranians, throughout centuries, have come to develop an instinct which has sensitized them to changes of power and political shifts. Sensing a change, and recognizing the possible new center of power, mass support becomes almost certain.

In the final analysis, however, fighting the symptoms of world malaise, and regaining lost grounds is only the preliminary (but also necessary) stage of a world strategy. To form a final gestalt, the United States of America, as the only bastion of freedom and human hope, should start attacking the root causes of turmoil in the world. Eliminating, or at least reducing, the economic and social causes of human misery, restoring social, political and economic balance and equality, are not only morally noble causes, but also economically sensible.

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
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November 14, 1981

Dr. Geoffrey Kemp
Senior Staff Member
Near East and South Asian Affairs
National Security Council
The Old Executive Office of the President
Room 351
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Dr. Kemp:

Thinking that you would be interested in this short paper on Iran, I am enclosing a copy for you. In the meantime, I wonder whether the Administration has developed any policy posture in regard to Iran. I would be most grateful if you would enlighten me on this.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely yours,

Abbas Amirie
Abbas Amirie
Visiting Professor

He
1/11/82



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A Short Analysis of Political Developments in Iran

by

Abbas Amirie

The central issue which divides Iran's population is the question of the clergy's domination of the country's political life. During the past two and a half years the inept, inexperienced and revenge-seeking clergy have inflicted so much damage on the country and its people that it will take many years, perhaps decades, to repair their ravages. Since they have failed miserably to rebuild the country's post-revolutionary economy and to solve its immense political and social problems, they have increasingly turned to terrorizing the population by killing every opponent they could find in order to maintain power. Amnesty International reports that the officially announced executions in Iran during the past year have been almost five times the number executed in all other countries of the world! It is highly unlikely that the regime will be able to continue to govern in this manner for too long.

Internationally, Khomeini's regime has served as a destabilizing force in the Persian Gulf region. Due to a common hostility toward the West, especially the U.S., there is convincing evidence that Khomeini's Islamic Republic, together with the Soviet government and Qaddafi's regime, is working to undermine the pro-Western governments in the area. The recent Libyan alliance with the Marxist regimes of South Yemen and Ethiopia, the assassination of President Sadat, and the disturbances caused by the Iranian pilgrims to the holy city of Mecca should be viewed from this angle. Iran's new President has publicly stated that he intends to form an alliance with the anti-Western governments of the Middle East.

Both Khomeini and Qaddafi consider their versions of Islamic fundamentalism to be the "wave of the future." A careful reading of their works indicates that their philosophies are extremely hostile toward the West. No amount of good will or acquiescence can change this historically-based fundamental hostility.

Having engaged the Iranian Armed Forces in a protracted war with Iraq and together with their Communist allies of the Tudeh Party having effectively infiltrated their ranks, the clergy has been able to neutralize the military as a major threat to their rule. Since the

Mujahedeen's only preoccupation has been terrorism, and their leadership one hundred percent Communist with strong ties to the Soviet Union, the only alternative to Khomeini's rule is a nationalist leader. One must remember that the Mujahedeen were responsible for the murder of several American military advisers during the last years of the Shah's rule.

As the opponents of the Shah found it necessary to use religion as an ideology in order to mobilize the masses against his regime, the opponents of the Islamic Republic must gather around a general indigenous ideology capable of winning the support of the Iranian people. Iranian nationalism, with its deep roots in history and literature, can serve this purpose, particularly since the clergy have directed their major attack on the nationalist leaders, poets, writers, symbols, and monuments.

Among the nationalist leaders Shahpour Bakhtiar enjoys a unique position. Advocating the establishment of a democratic system of government, during the past 30 years he has continuously fought against dictatorship. As Prime Minister, Bakhtiar understood the true nature and philosophies of Khomeini and his fundamentalist colleagues sooner than anyone else in the country. He then warned the nation of the disastrous consequences of their rule and stood firm against them at the height of their power. And when the nation failed to respond to his call of resisting the fanatic clergy, Bakhtiar's government collapsed, forcing him to flee the country. Upon arriving in Paris, he resumed his relentless crusade against Khomeini and his dictatorial regime. Most of those who now appear on the opposition scene helped bring in the Islamic Republic to power and only after they were put aside did they turn against it. In one way or another these individuals have been partners to most of the atrocities committed by the regime.

Today no other nationalist leader has the credentials, the legitimacy, the organization and the team which Shahpour Bakhtiar commands. He has the most effective underground organization in the country and enjoys considerable support among the middle class Iranians, the military, the civil servants, the moderate clergy, the bazaar merchants and the tribal leaders. For these reasons, Khomeini and his regime consider Bakhtiar their number one enemy. Consequently, they sent a team of assassins to Paris last year to murder him. Bakhtiar's recent uniting with the popular General Bahram Aryana has strengthened his team even more.

Neither the people of Iran nor their Western friends have a better candidate than Shahpour Bakhtiar for uniting the nationalist forces against the Khomeini regime. A popularly based nationalist government under Bakhtiar will give Iran a long-term stability needed for rebuilding the country and maintaining the security of that vital part of the globe. I believe that the West will have no problem maintaining and pursuing its legitimate interests in the area with a Bakhtiar government in place.

Bakhtiar and his colleagues have prepared a comprehensive program for rebuilding the country's shattered economy and socio-political structures. They are putting together a list of 600 highly educated and skilled Iranians to implement this program once they take over the government. They are quite mindful of the difficulty of establishing law and order in the country and checking the Marxist's penetration in the country. To these ends, they have worked out detailed contingency plans. I believe that it is in the interest of the United States to support Bakhtiar and his team. A veiled expression of support to the regional leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and the Emirates of the Persian Gulf can help pave the way for their ascent to power without U.S. material support. Khomeini's regime blames the U.S. for any adverse political or military happenings in Iran in any case.

In connection with my analysis of political development in Iran, if Dr. Bakhtiar's team assumes power in Iran, in the following areas of interest to the United States, the country's policies will be: (1) To raise the oil production to four million barrels per day. The new government will need the revenues to reconstruct the shattered economy, industry, etc.; (2) to help maintain the security of the Persian Gulf; (3) to combat both terrorism and the spread of Communism in the country and the region; (4) to purchase needed military equipment from the United States; (5) to purchase industrial needs from the United States providing that the American industries are willing to transfer technology to Iran.

If I can be of more help in elaborating on any of these or related issues, please do not hesitate to contact me.

~~Nov. 14/81~~
Dear Ray,

The enclosed is a copy of
the paper you suggested I
send to Mr. Allen, which I did
and I told him about our
meeting.

Sincerely yours,

Abbas

Are you sure you
want to respond
to this now?

I would imagine RVA
would eventually
respond (and send
you a copy of his
letter).

Why don't you wait
until you see what
he says to him. (Who
knows, he may offer
him his (RVA's) job!)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 11/1/81
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

A Short Analysis of Political Developments in Iran

by

Abbas Amirie

The central issue which divides Iran's population is the question of the clergy's domination of the country's political life. During the past two and a half years the inept, inexperienced and revenge-seeking clergy have inflicted so much damage on the country and its people that it will take many years, perhaps decades, to repair their ravages. Since they have failed miserably to rebuild the country's post-revolutionary economy and to solve its immense political and social problems, they have increasingly turned to terrorizing the population by killing every opponent they could find in order to maintain power. Amnesty International reports that the officially announced executions in Iran during the past year have been almost five times the number executed in all other countries of the world! It is highly unlikely that the regime will be able to continue to govern in this manner for too long.

Internationally, Khomeini's regime has served as a destabilizing force in the Persian Gulf region. Due to a common hostility toward the West, especially the U.S., there is convincing evidence that Khomeini's Islamic Republic, together with the Soviet government and Qaddafi's regime, is working to undermine the pro-Western governments in the area. The recent Libyan alliance with the Marxist regimes of South Yemen and Ethiopia, the assassination of President Sadat, and the disturbances caused by the Iranian pilgrims to the holy city of Mecca should be viewed from this angle. Iran's new President has publicly stated that he intends to form an alliance with the anti-Western governments of the Middle East.

Both Khomeini and Qaddafi consider their versions of Islamic fundamentalism to be the "wave of the future." A careful reading of their works indicates that their philosophies are extremely hostile toward the West. No amount of good will or acquiescence can change this historically-based fundamental hostility.

Having engaged the Iranian Armed Forces in a protracted war with Iraq and together with their Communist allies of the Tudeh Party having effectively infiltrated their ranks, the clergy has been able to neutralize the military as a major threat to their rule. Since the

Mujahedeen's only preoccupation has been terrorism, and their leadership one hundred percent Communist with strong ties to the Soviet Union, the only alternative to Khomeini's rule is a nationalist leader. One must remember that the Mujahedeen were responsible for the murder of several American military advisers during the last years of the Shah's rule.

As the opponents of the Shah found it necessary to use religion as an ideology in order to mobilize the masses against his regime, the opponents of the Islamic Republic must gather around a general indigenous ideology capable of winning the support of the Iranian people. Iranian nationalism, with its deep roots in history and literature, can serve this purpose, particularly since the clergy have directed their major attack on the nationalist leaders, poets, writers, symbols, and monuments.

Among the nationalist leaders Shahpour Bakhtiar enjoys a unique position. Advocating the establishment of a democratic system of government, during the past 30 years he has continuously fought against dictatorship. As Prime Minister, Bakhtiar understood the true nature and philosophies of Khomeini and his fundamentalist colleagues sooner than anyone else in the country. He then warned the nation of the disastrous consequences of their rule and stood firm against them at the height of their power. And when the nation failed to respond to his call of resisting the fanatic clergy, Bakhtiar's government collapsed, forcing him to flee the country. Upon arriving in Paris, he resumed his relentless crusade against Khomeini and his dictatorial regime. Most of those who now appear on the opposition scene helped bring in the Islamic Republic to power and only after they were put aside did they turn against it. In one way or another these individuals have been partners to most of the atrocities committed by the regime.

Today no other nationalist leader has the credentials, the legitimacy, the organization and the team which Shahpour Bakhtiar commands. He has the most effective underground organization in the country and enjoys considerable support among the middle class Iranians, the military, the civil servants, the moderate clergy, the bazaar merchants and the tribal leaders. For these reasons, Khomeini and his regime consider Bakhtiar their number one enemy. Consequently, they sent a team of assassins to Paris last year to murder him. Bakhtiar's recent uniting with the popular General Bahram Aryana has strengthened his team even more.

Neither the people of Iran nor their Western friends have a better candidate than Shahpour Bakhtiar for uniting the nationalist forces against the Khomeini regime. A popularly based nationalist government under Bakhtiar will give Iran a long-term stability needed for rebuilding the country and maintaining the security of that vital part of the globe. I believe that the West will have no problem maintaining and pursuing its legitimate interests in the area with a Bakhtiar government in place.

Bakhtiar and his colleagues have prepared a comprehensive program for rebuilding the country's shattered economy and socio-political structures. They are putting together a list of 600 highly educated and skilled Iranians to implement this program once they take over the government. They are quite mindful of the difficulty of establishing law and order in the country and checking the Marxist's penetration in the country. To these ends, they have worked out detailed contingency plans. I believe that it is in the interest of the United States to support Bakhtiar and his team. A veiled expression of support to the regional leaders of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel and the Emirates of the Persian Gulf can help pave the way for their ascent to power without U.S. material support. Khomeini's regime blames the U.S. for any adverse political or military happenings in Iran in any case.

In connection with my analysis of political development in Iran, if Dr. Bakhtiar's team assumes power in Iran, in the following areas of interest to the United States, the country's policies will be: (1) To raise the oil production to four million barrels per day. The new government will need the revenues to reconstruct the shattered economy, industry, etc.; (2) to help maintain the security of the Persian Gulf; (3) to combat both terrorism and the spread of Communism in the country and the region; (4) to purchase needed military equipment from the United States; (5) to purchase industrial needs from the United States providing that the American industries are willing to transfer technology to Iran.

If I can be of more help in elaborating on any of these or related issues, please do not hesitate to contact me.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 21, 1981

TO: GEOFF

FROM: GARY

Amirie left this paper
with me to pass to you.

file 1 amw

SP-4 COLTON CORLETT

Amir

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

A Summary Analysis of
The Post-Revolutionary Power Struggle in Iran

by

Abbas Amirie

The central issue which divides Iran's population is the question of the clergy's involvement in the country's politics. During the past two years the inept, inexperienced and revenge-seeking clergy have inflicted so much damage on the country and its people that it will take many years, perhaps decades, to repair their ravages.

Upon the clergy's assent to power in February 1979, Iran had full employment for its citizens (in addition to over a million foreign technicians and workers), 11 billion dollars of foreign currency reserves, and a tolerable inflation rate of 23% a year. Since then, the incompetent clergymen have so mismanaged the country's economy that according to their President's "State of the Nation Address" of March 21, 1981, unemployment has reached 42% of the work force, inflation over 100% a year, industrial production is at less than 60% of its capacity and the foreign currency reserve is down to 1.3 billion dollars. In fact, if it had not been for the release of Iranian assets from U. S. banks during the hostage settlement, the country would have been bankrupt by now. It has been predicted that if the regime does not receive an additional infusion of money from its assets abroad, bankruptcy by mid-July is a certainty.

Today, the question is not whether the fanatic clerics should continue to rule, but rather how they should be forced out of the government. There are basically three groups which are competing to replace them: (1) President Bani-Sadr and his colleagues, (2) the various Marxist groups, e.g., the Tudeh Party (Iranian Communist Party), the Fadayeen-e Khalgh, the Mujahedeen-e Khalgh, and (3) the exiled nationalist leaders, e.g., Shahpour Bakhtiar, the young Shah and others.

1. President Bani-Sadr has begun to confront the clergy. But his basic problems are: (a) he himself is a creature of Khomeini who engineered his elevation to the presidency and who can remove him if he goes too far in challenging the clergy, and (b) he has not been able to build a solid base of power for himself among the people. He received the great majority of the votes in the presidential elections largely because the population feared having another clergyman occupying an important political position. He has taken advantage of the rapidly growing public resentment toward the clerics' policies and their interference in the war with Iraq in order to win the support of both the people and the Armed Forces. The military has been divided and effectively penetrated and watched by the clergy and their

Communist allies of the Tudeh Party.* Those disaffected Iranians who reject Marxism and do not have a leader in the country to rally around have gathered around Bani-Sadr because it is relatively safe to express their opposition to the clergy in this way.

2. The three Marxist groups which have gained considerable support among the masses are the popular Mujahadeen-e Khalgh, the Fadayeen-e Khalgh and the Tudeh Party. These Marxist groups, especially the members of Tudeh, have effectively infiltrated various Komitehs (Committees) set up by the Islamic Republic, the government institutions, the labor force, the mass media, etc. Recently, even the officials of the regime have become alarmed at the extent of their infiltration. For example, a few months ago Mohammad Ali Tavassoli resigned as the Mayor of Tehran charging that "Marxists, Communists and members of the Tudeh Party have infiltrated important government organizations, including the news media."** And Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the heir-apparent to Khomeini, in an interview in a West German magazine, Die Welt, also charged that "the Tudeh Party is the greatest threat to the Islamic Revolution."

Reports from Iran indicate that the Tudeh Party is gradually pushing the country into the Soviet camp. A leading clergyman, Ayatollah Yahya Nouri, told a Tehran newspaper interviewer a few weeks ago, "Some visible and invisible hands are directing Iran toward the eastern superpower." One should not overlook the fact that the regime's words and actions against the Soviet Union have been extremely mild, mostly to provide a smoke screen.

Khomeini's supporters refer to him as the bulldozer of the revolution. This is an appropriate reference simply because as the bulldozer, he levels the ground, in this case for the communists to take over the country. The regime's policies, misrule, corruption and atrocities have so damaged the once-strong bond between the Iranian masses and their religion that to a great many people the Marxists now look respectable, attractive and a serious alternative to the fanatic clergymen. Recent "illegal" demonstrations by the Mujahadeen-e Khalgh drew an estimated 100,000 participants in Tehran.

Furthermore, due to a common hostility toward the West and especially toward the United States, for different reasons to be sure, there is convincing evidence that the Soviet government and the Khomeini regime are working hand-in-hand, causing disturbances and turmoil for the pro-Western governments in the Persian Gulf region. Their ultimate aim is to topple them one-by-one. Needless to say, the consequences of such a development would be incalculable for the West and the entire world balance of power.

3. Among the exiled nationalist opponents of the regime, Shahpour Bakhtiar is the most prominent. Many Iranian opposition personalities, whom I

*It is unlikely that the military will be able to make an independent move against the Islamic Republic without the cooperation of one of the political leaders, be it Bani-Sadr, Bakhtiar or someone else.

**For details, see the Iran Times, January 2, 1981.

recently interviewed in Paris in connection with this paper, confirmed this assessment. Bakhtiar considers himself the opposition leader who stood firm against Khomeini and his supporters at the height of their popularity prior to the collapse of his government and has relentlessly continued his struggle against them since. Most of those who now appear on the opposition scene first cooperated with the Islamic Republic and only when they were put aside did they turn against it. He also maintains that he is the only opposition leader capable of putting an end to Khomeini's regime and, consequently, he has been the only one targeted by the regime for assassination. My research indicates that he has considerable support among the military, civil servants, moderate clergy, merchants, minorities and the middle class. Among the exiled opposition leaders, Bakhtiar has the most effective underground organization in the country. It is my sincere belief that once Bakhtiar's supporters "liberate" a part of Iran and make it possible for him and his team to physically move into the country, all the people, including the military who now find it convenient to express their opposition by using Bani-Sadr as a rallying point will swarm to Bakhtiar, particularly when they learn of the young Shah's support. A great many Iranians, for historical reasons, are ardent members of what we call in Iran "the Wind Party." As soon as the political wind shifts, so do they. If they sense that a person or group has a good chance to come to power, they change their allegiance very quickly. In any political calculation, this important factor must be taken into account.

Up until recently, a considerable amount of energy and resources of the exiled opposition "leaders" were spent fighting one another and neutralizing each other's plans. In recent weeks, however, Bakhtiar has made genuine efforts, with some good results, to unify these individuals under one umbrella, the National Resistance Movement. He has already reached a basic agreement with the young Shah to form a new government on the basis of the 1906 Constitution. The young Shah has realized that had his father lived up to the original document's guidelines and reigned rather than ruled, he would be on the Peacock Throne today. He has thus agreed that once power is wrested from the fanatic clergymen and a national referendum approves the constitutional monarchy, he will serve only as the ceremonial head of state. He has also reportedly agreed that because of the unfavorable reputation of his aunts and uncles and some other members of his family, only he and his immediate family (mother, brother and sisters) will return to Iran once it is "liberated."

During the revolution the people's wrath was directed against his father and the people around him, not necessarily against the institution of the monarchy. He and his mother are still popular among a large number of Iranians. In addition, the Shah symbolizes Iranian nationalism, serves the nation's psychological needs for pageantry and acts as the most important unifying force in a country with a diverse population. The monarchy has deep roots in Iranian history, tradition and literature and provides an alternative to the Islamic Republic and an obstacle against Communist penetration of the country and region. The regional powers, e.g., Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, will be more inclined to help a team against the fanatic Khomeini regime if that team intends to reestablish a monarchy in Iran. Furthermore, since most Iranians lack political education and training, the election of the president every four years will result in a great

deal of instability and confusion. And, if the Islamic Republic survives, as mentioned before, several of the traditional pro-Western regimes in the area will be in danger of being undermined one-by-one.

Although Bakhtiar was treated harshly by the late Shah's regime, he sincerely believes that due to geopolitical considerations at this stage of Iranian history, the monarchy can play a very useful role in keeping the country together and maintaining its territorial integrity. For obvious reasons of politics, he does not want to publicize this view and the agreement with the young Shah.

I believe that Bakhtiar and the young Shah together may be the only force which can wrest the power from the fanatic clergymen and restore peace and stability in the country and the region. I believe that it is in the interests of the United States to support this team. A veiled expression of support to the regional leaders, e.g., Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Kuwait and the people of Iran can help pave the way for their ascent to power without U. S. material support. The Islamic Republic blames the U. S. for any adverse political or military happenings in the country anyway.

As for the Soviets' reaction, as long as the U. S. leadership is firm, strong, and decisive, one should not worry. They have enough in Afghanistan and Poland to be worried about. The Iranian Marxists, however, will probably put up some resistance, but since they cannot count on popular support, their resistance can be overcome if plans are properly prepared and executed.

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 28, 1981

Dear Dr. Amirie:


Richard Allen and Janet Colson have passed to me your correspondence to them on political developments in Iran and the Persian Gulf, which I have read with great interest. I am now the Senior Staff Member for Near East and South Asian Affairs in the National Security Council.

I think we met once in Tehran when I was visiting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sharam Chubin arranged a luncheon for me at your Institute.

I hope all is well with you in your new career in California.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,



Geoffrey Kemp

Dr. Abbas Amirie
8305 Manifesto Circle
Huntington Beach, CA 92646

1998
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Geoff Kemp:

Help. I've never heard of the guy. Letters sent during the transition were precarious, at best. I highly doubt if RVA wants to meet with the guy.

Could you/Gary Sick draft me some kind of a response which will let him know we've read the letters but not be overly encouraging about a continued dialogue.

Thanks.


Janet

1998
APR 13 1981
via airtel na

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SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

April 8, 1981

Mrs. Janet Colson, Staff Member to:
Mr. Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President
on National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mrs. Colson:


I hope that all of you have recovered by now from the shock of the contemptible assault on the President's life. I pray for his quick and complete recovery.

You may wonder why I am writing to you. Upon President Reagan's personal suggestion during our July, 1979, meeting at Mr. Peter Hannaford's office in Los Angeles, I have prepared and sent several analyses of the political developments in Iran and the Persian Gulf region to Mr. Allen since then. Mr. Allen used to respond to every one of these reports. Since January 5, 1981, however, I have sent him three letters concerning the Iranian situation and have received no response whatsoever. I know that he is extremely busy, but it seems to me that a simple acknowledgment should not have been too difficult. In my letter of January 5, 1981, I suggested that if he is too busy to respond to my correspondence, he should recommend that I send these reports to the staff member handling the Persian Gulf region. He may want to do this now. I am enclosing for you copies of the three letters plus a copy of one of his earlier letters to me. After extending my warm personal regards to Mr. Allen, please bring the contents of these letters to his attention and let me know his views. I have postponed my trip to Egypt with the hope of seeing Mr. Allen before my departure.

7/0 Knowing that the President wants me to continue giving the Administration my views on regional and international issues, I want to bring the following to Mr. Allen's attention. In my letter of October 10, 1980, I pointed out that the Soviet Union and Khomeini's Islamic Republic are in league to topple the pro-Western governments in the Persian Gulf regions. (Please see that report). My sources in Tehran now report that the Ayatollah's regime is gradually moving into the Soviet camp. Even a leading cleric, Ayatollah Yahya Nuri, told the Tehran newspaper reporters last week: "Some visible and invisible hands are directing Iran towards the eastern superpower." He cited the unusually close relations between Iran and North Korea and Cuba as an indication. I think this development should be watched closely.

I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely yours,


Abbas Amirie

8305 Manifesto Circle

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SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

February 24, 1981

Mr. Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Allen:

Firstly, I wonder whether you have received the two confidential reports I sent you on January 5 and 14, 1981. If you have received them, I would appreciate an acknowledgement. If not, please let me know so that I can send photocopies of them to you.

Secondly, since my contract with UCLA has been terminated, I have been seeking an academic or an administrative position elsewhere, but without success so far. Therefore, I have decided to enclose my resume and supporting documents, hoping that you will be kind enough to help me find new employment.

Thirdly, a group of military officers of the former Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, who claim to represent several hundred of their fellow officers here in the United States has sent a letter to President Reagan. Fearing that the President might not receive the letter, they have asked me to transmit the enclosed confirmation copy to the President through your good offices.

Finally, I have been asked to go to Cairo, Egypt, in order to consult with the young Shah. Before going there, however, I would very much like to see you. Therefore, I will be grateful to you if you give me an appointment during the next three weeks.

I look forward to hearing from you soon and send you my warm personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Abbas Amirie".

Abbas Amirie
8305 Manifesto Circle
Huntington Beach, CA. 92646
(714) 842-2534

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SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

January 14, 1981

Mr. Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President-elect
on National Security Affairs
The Office of the President-elect
1726 "M" Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20270

DETERMINED TO BE AN
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, Sec. 1.3(a)

By NARA

dlb

Date

8/11/99

Dear Mr. Allen:

As I promised, I am sending you this short analysis of the post-revolutionary power struggle in Iran. I regret that because of the complexity of the subject, it is going to be more than the two pages you have specified.

The central issue which has divided Iran's population is the question of the clergy's involvement in the country's politics. During the past two years the inept, inexperienced and revenge-seeking clergy have inflicted enough damage on the country and its people that it will probably take many years and perhaps decades to repair their ravages. Today, the question is not whether they should continue to rule, but rather how they should be forced out of the government. There are basically three groups which compete to replace the clergy: (1) President Bani-Sadr and his colleagues, (2) the various Marxist groups, e.g., The Tudeh Party, the Fadayeen-e Khalgh, the Mujahedeen-e Khalgh, and (3) the exiled nationalist leaders, e.g., Shahpour Bakhtiar, the young Shah and others.

1. President Bani-Sadr has started to confront the clergy. But, his basic problems are: (a) he himself is a creature of Khomeini who engineered his elevation to the presidency and who can remove him if he goes too far in challenging the clergy, and (b) he does not have a solid power base of his own among the population. He was elected president by Khomeini's silent support and the fear of the population of having another clergyman occupying an important political position. He has taken advantage of the rapidly growing public resentment toward the clerics and the war with Iraq in order to win the support of both the people and the military. But, the military has been effectively penetrated, watched and divided by the clergy.* Those disaffected Iranians

*It is unlikely that the military will make an independent move against the Islamic Republic without the cooperation of one of the political leaders, be it Bani-Sadr, Bakhtiar or someone else.

who reject Marxists and do not have a leader in the country to rally around have gathered around Bani-Sadr because it is relatively safe to express their opposition to the clergy in this way. But, it is my sincere belief that once the supporters of Shahpour Bakhtiar "liberate" a part of Iran and make it possible for him and his team to physically move into the country, all the people, including the military who now find it convenient to express their opposition by using Bani-Sadr as a rallying point will swarm to Bakhtiar, particularly if they learn that the young Shah is with him. Only if Bani-Sadr succeeds in leading Iran to victory against Iraq will he have a chance of pushing the clerics out of the government, providing that Khomeini is gone.

2. The two Marxist groups which have gained considerable support among the masses are the pro-Moscow Tudeh Party and the Fadayeen-e Khalgh. They have effectively infiltrated various Komitehs (Committees) set up by the Islamic Republic, the government institutions, the labor force, etc. Recently even the officials of the regime have become alarmed at the extent of the Marxist infiltration. For example, a couple of weeks ago Mohammad Ali Tavassoli resigned as the Mayor of Tehran charging that "Marxists, Communists and members of the Tudeh Party have infiltrated important government organizations, including the news media."* And, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the heir-apparent to Khomeini, in an interview in a West German magazine, Die Welt, also charged that "the Tudeh Party is the greatest threat to the Islamic Revolution."

Khomeini's supporters refer to him as the bulldozer of the revolution. This is an appropriate reference simply because as the bulldozer he levels the ground, in this case for the Communists to take over the country. The regime's policies, misrule, corruption and atrocities have so damaged the once-strong bond between the Iranian masses and their religion that to a great many of them the Marxists now look respectable, attractive and a serious alternative to the fanatic clergymen. The chances of the Marxists/Communists takeover of the government, however, are still slim in the short run but are rapidly growing.

3. Among the exiled nationalist opponents of the regime, Shahpour Bakhtiar is the most prominent. Many Iranian opposition personalities whom I recently interviewed in Paris confirmed this assessment. In my judgment he rightfully considers himself the opposition leader who stood firm against Khomeini and his supporters at the height of their popularity prior to the collapse of his government and has relentlessly continued his struggle against them since. Most of those who now appear on the opposition scene first cooperated with the Islamic Republic and only when they were put aside did they turn against it.

*For details, see the Iran Times, January 2, 1981.

For the previously mentioned reasons, Bakhtiar maintains that he is the only opposition leader capable of putting an end to Khomeini's regime and, consequently, he has been the only one targeted by the regime for assassination. My research indicates that he has considerable support among the military, civil servants, moderate clergy, merchants, minorities and the middle class. In addition, a great many Iranians, for historical reasons, are ardent members of what we call in Iran "the Wind Party." As soon as the political wind shifts, so do they. If they sense that a person or group has a chance to come to power, they change their allegiance very quickly. In any political calculation, this important factor must be taken into account.

As you know, in the past a considerable amount of energies and resources of the exiled opposition "leaders" were spent fighting one another and neutralizing each other's plans. In recent weeks, however, Bakhtiar has made genuine efforts, with some good results, to unify these individuals under one umbrella. He has already reached a basic agreement with the young Shah to form a new government on the basis of the 1906 Constitution. The young Shah has realized that had his father lived up to the original document's guidelines and reigned rather than ruled, he would be on the Peacock Throne today. He has thus agreed that once the power is wrested from the fanatic clergymen and a national referendum approves the constitutional monarchy, he will serve only as the ceremonial head of state. He has also reportedly agreed that because of the unfavorable reputation of his aunts and uncles and some other members of his family, only he and his immediate family (mother, brother and sisters) will return to Iran once it is "liberated."

During the revolution the people's wrath was directed against his father, not necessarily against the institution of the monarchy. He and his mother are still popular among a large number of Iranians. In addition, the Shah symbolizes Iranian nationalism, serves the nation's psychological needs for pageantry and play as the most important unifying force in a country with a diverse population. The monarchy has deep roots in Iranian history, tradition and literature and provides an alternative to the Islamic Republic and an obstacle against communist penetration of the country and the region. The regional powers, e.g., Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, will be more inclined to help a team against the Islamic Republic if that team intends to reestablish a monarchy in Iran. Furthermore, since most Iranians lack political education and training, the election of the president every four years will result in a great deal of instability and confusion. And, if the Islamic Republic survives, several of the traditional pro-Western regimes in the area will be in danger of being undermined one by one. Consequently, as in Iran, the Soviet Union will be the net winner.

Although Bakhtiar was treated harshly by the late Shah's regime, he sincerely believes that due to geopolitical considerations at this stage of Iranian history, the monarchy can play a very useful role in keeping the country together and maintaining its

territorial integrity. For obvious reasons of politics, he does not want to publicize this view and the agreement with the young Shah.

I believe that Bakhtiar and the young Shah together may be the only force which can wrest the power from the fanatic clergymen and restore peace and stability in the country and the region. Needless to say that most of the nationalist and military "leaders," e.g., General Ovaissi, would work within such a united front. I sincerely believe that it is in the interests of the United States to support this team.


Whatever the fate of the hostages, the U.S. should not allow the regime to go scot free. My private sources in Tehran indicate that the so-called "students" who held the hostages were instructed by people very close to Khomeini and that at all times the "students" were under the complete control of Khomeini's agents. A move by the supporters of Bakhtiar and the young Shah within the country can create an environment conducive to their take-over and freeing of the hostages; if they are not freed soon. I think the Reagan Administration should give this team a chance to carry out its plans before it undertakes any retaliatory action against the regime. (Had his military coup succeeded, Bakhtiar had intended to free the hostages at once.)

Since the overwhelming majority of Iranian people as well as the people in the region believe that U.S. support of any individual or group would ensure his or its success, a veiled expression of support of Bakhtiar and the young Shah by the U.S. government for the regional leaders, e.g., Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Kuwait and the people of Iran can easily pave the way for their ascent to power without U.S. material support. The Islamic Republic blames the U.S. for any adverse political or military happening in the country anyway.

As for the Soviets' reaction, as long as the U.S. leadership is firm, strong and decisive, I would not worry. They have enough in Afghanistan and Poland to be worried about. The Iranian Marxists, however, will probably put up some resistance, but since they cannot count on the popular support, their resistance can be overcome if plans are properly prepared and executed.

I know I may have raised more questions than provided answers for on this complex subject. I will be happy to reply to whatever specific questions you may have. Please give my warm personal regards to President-elect Reagan. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely yours,


Abbas Amirie
Visiting Professor

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024

January 5, 1981

Mr. Richard V. Allen, Assistant to the President-elect
National Security Affairs
The Office of the President-elect
1726 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20270

Dear Mr. Allen:

First, please accept my sincere wishes for a happy, rewarding and successful New Year.

You may have been wondering why I was determined to see you between December 4th and 8th, probably during your most difficult and busy time. As I briefly explained to your secretary, Miss Irene Derus, I learned that former Iranian Prime Minister, Shapour Bakhtiar, and a group of his advisers had concluded that during the transitional period of American Government, they should take advantage of the confusion in the U.S. and make their second attempt to topple the Khomeini regime. The reasons they had felt that this time was appropriate to make their move I understood to be:

- a) the American Government would be least prepared to stop or to neutralize their action; and
- b) they were convinced that they could present themselves to the Iranian people as the only nationalist group which could negotiate the Iraqi withdrawal from the Iranian territories before further damage was inflicted upon Iran.

Mr. Bakhtiar and the company believe that the Carter Administration has friends in the regime and thus tipped off President Bani-Sadr in advance of their unsuccessful military coup some six months ago.

In connection with a paper I am writing on the post-revolutionary power struggle in Iran,* I went to Europe last September to interview several key officials of the late Shah's government. It was then that I met Bakhtiar for the first time. Upon learning that I had taught, among other subjects, American National Government at Kent State University for several years, he began quizzing me on American domestic politics and the electoral process. He was curious to know how a person of Jimmy Carter's calibre could become the President of the United States. I spent three hours explaining the complexity of the American electoral process to him. He seemed to know a great deal about Governor Reagan and Mr. Bush and had high regards for both. He told me that he had prayed for their success in the elections. I told Mr. Bakhtiar that I know Governor Reagan and you and confirmed his views of the Reagan team.


*In a few days I will send you an initial summary of this paper.

On November 28, 1980, Mr. Bakhtiar called me and asked me whether I would be interested in participating in what he termed "a very important strategy meeting." He told me that he intended to make a move against the Ayatollah between that time and January 20, 1981. Subsequently, when I met with them in Paris they told me that they are quite concerned about the rapid political gains the Marxists are making in the country and want to make a move before it is too late.

My reasons for wanting to see you were: a) to inform you of this, and b) to seek your help in advising him. Fortunately, I was able to convince him and his advisers that their planned action was premature and that they should wait at least until next spring. I further told them that since Governor Reagan and his team had nothing to do with the ascent of Mr. Khomeini to power, the Reagan Administration will look at the whole Iranian issue from a different perspective. After this meeting, Bakhtiar asked me to deliver a personal letter to you, which I did.

Finally, knowing that from now on you will be extremely busy, I wonder whether I should continue to send my reports directly to you or to one of your assistants, e.g., Ambassador Neumann. Please advise me on this matter. I look forward to hearing from you soon and I extend my warmest personal regards to you.

Sincerely yours,



Abbas Amirie

P.S. I would prefer that you send all correspondence to my home address.

RICHARD V. ALLEN

905 SIXTEENTH STREET, N.W. • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

April 7, 1980

Dr. Abbas Amirie
Visiting Professor
Department of Political Science
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, California 90024

Dear Dr. Amirie:

Thank you for your good letter of March 4th, which arrived during my absence from Washington. Only now, while taking a few days to catch up on my correspondence, am I able to answer it and also thank you for sending the four memoranda.

It is clear that we will benefit from your continuing assistance, and I hope you will not hesitate to send along policy memoranda and related items as you see fit.

We would be especially interested in receiving your analysis of two short-term problems and one longer-range one. As one who is intimately familiar with Iran's prevailing circumstances, you are well qualified to address these issues:

- a) Barring some sort of negotiated outcome on the hostage situation, what concrete steps should the United States take to deal with Iran, giving particular consideration to the exploitation of major weaknesses?
- b) What is the likelihood of destabilization in Iran, to the extent of the prospect of civil war developing? Under such circumstances, which forces would seek Soviet help? What, in your opinion, would the Soviets do -- specifically?
- c) In the long term, assuming the hostage situation is resolved one way or the other, how should the United States deal with Iran? Will persuasion and incentives work, or do Iranians likely to hold power have more respect for a tough, resolute but sometimes demanding United States?

While these questions cannot be answered succinctly, it would be important for us to have your responses in as economical a manner as possible, perhaps within just a few pages. The task


Dr. Abbas Amirie
April 7, 1980
Page Two

of informing Governor Reagan on such complex matters is also, as I'm sure you'll understand, a function of available time.

Incidentally, the other day while we were in Illinois, Governor Reagan told me that he had received a letter from Samuel Harrod, who indicated you had contacted him. I have since written to Mr. Harrod at the Governor's request.

With my best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Richard A. Green". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

RVA:ccf

Iran Committee For Democratic Action and Human Rights

P.O. Box 503 • Flossmoor, Illinois 60422

December 23, 1981

Mr. Raymond T~~an~~ter
Old Executive Office Building
National Security Council
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Mr. T~~an~~ter:


This is to inform you that my associate S. Kaveh Mirani, a Ph.D. candidate in economics at the University of Chicago, will visit Washington, D.C. during the last week of the current year. He would like to discuss with you the activities of our Committee and our plans for a convention on "Human Rights and Civil Liberties in Iran," to be held in New York City next February or March.

NW:
yes

Mr. Mirani will call you while in Washington, and I would be grateful if you could give him an appointment at your convenience.

I take the opportunity to wish you a very happy New Year and remain,

Sincerely yours,




Marvin Zonis

MZ:vml

Dear Professor T~~an~~ter:

I hope it will be possible for you to see Mirani. Thanks,



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

ACTION

December 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*

SUBJECT: State's Request for Meeting Between
the President and Empress Farah
of Iran (Tab A)

Further to Chuck Tyson's memo to you on this subject, this is what I have learned and recommend that you sign Tab I to Mike Deaver and wire it to California soonest.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to Mike Deaver at Tab I and wire to California soonest.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments:

Tab I Memorandum to Deaver
A State memorandum dated 12/29/81 (S/S 8137517)

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *dlb* NARA, Date *8/11/99*

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

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Staff
URGENTLY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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SENSITIVE

December 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES W. NANCE
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Call on the President by Empress Farah

Iranian Empress Farah has asked to meet with the President while he is in California. She is currently in the U.S. on a private visit.

We recommend that the President agree to meet with her and that the meeting be given minimal publicity and be described as a social call.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #107BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01~~SECRET~~

RDS-1 12/29/01

Ivan

7412

81 DEC 30 P2:15 ~~Keep~~ ~~File~~

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

Comments:

1) Transmit to Deaver for tomorrow delivery.

2) DACOM to ~~the~~ Fuller with a note it has been transmitted to Deaver.

3) Copy to Deaver

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

4) Jeanne for files.

done 1/8/81
f

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTACTION

December 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

THROUGH: CHARLES P. TYSON *CMT*
FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *GN*
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of Iran (Tab A)

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 8/11/99

SECRET/SENSITIVE ATTACHMENT

Staff
URGENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~SENSITIVE

December 29, 1981

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L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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NLS F97-106 #109BY 2mf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01~~SECRET~~

RDS-1 12/29/01