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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: KEMP, GEOFFREY :Files

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File Folder: PLO 1981 (1 of 3)

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Date: 8/10/99

Wills - F97-106

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Richard Allen to Geoffrey Kemp, re: Talking Points from George Shultz, 1 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #16	3/5/81	P1/F1
2. Draft Memo	re: PLO Contact, Governor Conally, George Shultz, 2 p. P 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #17	n.d.	P1/F1 ^{P1/F1} _{BC}
3. Talking Pts.	re: PLO, 1 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #18	n.d.	P1/F1
4. Director's Staff Memo	re: Increased Threat of Anti-US Terrorism by Palestinians, 1 p. D 4/4/06 F97-106 #19	8/21/81	P1/F1 ₃₃
5. Memo	Douglas Feith to Norman Bailey, re: U.S. Policy Toward the PLO, 9 p. P 4/30/02 NLSF97-106 #20	2/18/81 6/5/03	P1/F1
6. Memo	re: PLO, 2 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #21	n.d.	P1/F1
7. Memo	Kemp, Feith to Allen, re: Visas for Additional PLO UN Observers, 1 p. A 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #22	9/15/81	P1/F1
8. Memo	Allen to Alexander Haig, re: Additional PLO UN Observers, 1 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #23	n.d.	P1/F1
9. Memo	Paul Bremer to Richard Allen, re: Expansion of the PLO Observer Mission to the UN, 2 p. R 11/8/01 NLSF97-106 #24	9/10/81	P1/F1
10. Memo	Bailey, Kemp to Allen, re U.S. Policy Towards the PLO, 1 p. R 4/30/01 NLSF97-106 #25	9/17/81	P1/F1
11. Paper	A Summary of Doug Feith's Paper on the PLO, 3 p. P 4/30/01 NLSF97-106 #26	n.d. 6/5/03	P1/F1
12. Memo	Copy of Item #5, 9 p. P 4/30/01 NLSF97-106 #27	2/18/81 6/5/03	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 4/25/2007

File Folder PLO 1981 (1)

FOIA

F97-106/1

Box Number 90220

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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7	MEMO	KEMP, FEITH TO ALLEN, RE VISAS FOR	1	9/15/1981
		ADDITIONAL PLO UN OBSERVERS		
8	MEMO	ALLEN TO ALEXANDER HAIG, RE	1	ND
		ADDITIONAL PLO UN OBSERVERS		

MEMORANDUM

(Outside the System)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET / SENSITIVE~~

March 5, 1981

ATTACHMENTINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GEOFFREY KEMP

FROM:

RICHARD V. ALLEN *dur*

SUBJECT:

Talking Points from George Shultz

Please handle this with great delicacy. I'm not sure what it all means, but neither am I surprised.

~~SECRET / SENSITIVE~~ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #16

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~SECRET / SENSITIVE~~

FOIA(b) (1)

FOIA(b) (6)

D R A F T

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT: PLO Contact; Governor Connally; George Shultz

On March 2nd former Secretary of the Treasury George Shultz called on me to discuss what he considered a sensitive matter.

A gentleman whom he knows, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] handed him a paper with certain talking points pertaining to the PLO. [REDACTED] mentioned that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] met with John Connally four weeks before the Inauguration concerning discussions with Arafat. He gave John Connally a copy of this paper.

Shultz said that Connally remarked that he would see the President and would get back to "them," by "them" I understand [REDACTED] and those whom he represents. Governor Connally indicated that he had met with the President, with Haig and with Ed Meese before the Inauguration, at which time the President said, "This is a turn of events." The President was said to have indicated to Connally that he would discuss in meetings that he'd plan to have with Prince Fahd in May. He also remarked that he would be seeing Sadat first.

~~SECRET / SENSITIVE~~

Review on March 5, 2001

Extended by reason of NSC 1.13 (f)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-10C #17

By smf, NARA, Date 11/8/01

The President was then said to have called John Connally to tell him he had not forgotten the matter. John Connally then met with Ed Meese, and told the Vice President and the Secretary of State that he would be going to Saudi Arabia soon, and the Saudis were anxious to receive the "plan."

Under the terms of this plan, the PLO would be prepared to recognize Israel and a Palestinian state which would include all of the West Bank and Jerusalem would be created and henceforth dedicated to peaceful purposes.

George Shultz did not elaborate, but I am appending the talking points paper which he was given by his contact,



Apparently the message in all of this is that we are receiving a communication from the PLO. My recommendation is that we discuss this matter again (You may remember that the matter came up in a meeting with the President and John Connally.) and inform the Secretary of State and Haig (?).

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- During his electoral campaign Mr. Reagan made very unfavourable statements about the Palestinians. He has also made such statements since his election.
- In spite of this we are assuming that he is still suffering from "election fever."
- We are very anxious to open a dialogue with the new administration.
- We have always wanted to have a dialogue with Washington but it is Washington who has not been eager for such a dialogue.
- Only a Palestinian State will solve the political and psychological needs of the Palestinians.
- Such a state would be willing to live in coexistence with Israel.
- We would accept any guarantees for our state and for Israel.
- We are not leftists or Marxists but nationalists.
- A Palestinian state would not be in alliance with the Soviet Union or give bases to it or anybody else.

Any advice that you may have would be appreciated.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #18

BY emf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

PLO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Geoffrey, you may want to use the attached
ltr fm Allen to the Natl Assoc of Arabs as a
guide and prepare a similar response to the
ltr that you have fm the Palestine Congress,
Log N^Umber 2201.
"

Thanks

S.

→ Kemp:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


April 27, 1981

Dear Mr. Sams:

Thank you for your letter of April 16th.

Enclosed is the complete transcript of my remarks for the ABC show. It is obvious that only a few words, not necessarily in context, were used for the telecast. After reading my full remarks, you will see that some of the points you raise were in fact addressed.

Yours truly,



Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Encl.

Mr. James F. Sams
President
National Association of Arab
Americans
1825 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 211
Washington, D.C. 20009



Transcript of Complete Interview

Given by Richard V. Allen on March 20, 1981

to "20/20 The ABC News Magazine" for Broadcast April 2, 1981.

Q

Is the spread of International terrorism a threat to the United States?

RICHARD ALLEN

Oh, certainly it is. It's an indirect threat at present because terrorism, as some people know it, is not good for our country. But, yes, it is. It's a threat to us and certainly to our foreign policy objectives, if you concede that our main and overriding foreign policy objectives is the preservation of peace. That which disturbs the peace, no matter what its source, is injurious, not only to our interest, but to the interest of the people on whom it's being visited.

Q

How important is the Soviet involvement in the spread of international terrorism in the disruption of peace in the Western world?

RICHARD ALLEN

I think substantially. (the) Secretary of State has made quite a good case, I think, demonstrating Soviet involvement. But we have to be careful to define that involvement. What does it mean? Does it mean direct participation? Does it mean the support, whether it be ideological, hortatory, tangible? And in the case of the supply of weapons, which are ultimately used to inflict terrorism, there has been, I think, ample evidence accumulated.

RICHARD ALLEN (CONTINUED)

I need only mention the work of Claire Sterling in this regard. I think it is a significant landmark work on the subject of terrorism, and something about which we have to be better informed.

We've had some studies in this country, such as that done by Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent. We're way behind the power curve, and we've been very fortunate so far that all violent forms of terrorism have not been inflicted upon our people here.

Q

What about the Soviet role in the Middle East? How would you define their relationship with the PLO?

RICHARD ALLEN

It's difficult to assess the relationship with the PLO because there are various component parts of the PLO. But, overall, I think it's fair to say that the Soviet Union is supporting the main aims of the PLO.

Again, that fine line between the support of a tangible nature and support of an ideological nature is difficult to measure. But, it's there. Any student of the Soviet system, anyone who is even reasonably serious in an evaluation of the Soviet system, from its inception, who is even in the most cursory way familiar with the writing of Lenin or Stalin, and after that it's more or less disappeared. The use of terror has been an important weapon, an important instrument in achieving revolutionary goals.

After all, you have to understand that the Soviets do have a very tightly closed ideological system or framework in which terrorism is one important component part.

Q

But, specifically in terms of the PLO, what is the Soviets' role? Is it the providing of arms? Is that it basically? Is it the condoning of criminal acts? Is it all of those things?

RICHARD ALLEN

I think so, I think it is probably all of those things. I think it's financial, although others have perhaps taken up some of the slack that may have developed from the shortfall of Soviet funding. The PLO is said to get funds from other countries in the world. Libya. And I don't know what the budget process of the PLO is. And it may be that the case may be made for a minimal Soviet involvement in PLO organization itself.

But, nonetheless, that identify of purpose, that agreement as to the justness of revolution and terror as an instrument of revolution, is an inherent part of Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Q

Is it fair to call the PLO a terrorist organization?

RICHARD ALLEN

Let me put it this way; we have said, the President of the United States has said repeatedly, that there are two main conditions that are obstacles to discussing anything with the PLO.

One is its practice of terrorism and its condoning of international terrorism. And second, of course, is the refusal to recognize the right of Israel to exist.

Absent those two conditions, we'd be dealing with a fundamentally different situation, so the President has said. I think, yes, on balance. There's no question that we must identify the PLO as a terrorist organization, until it provides convincing evidence to the contrary.

Q

Of course, they have moderated their statements within the last year or so.

RICHARD ALLEN

Again, you say they. They are factions of the PLO and one hears a spokesman on the one side. I've heard descriptions that identified Arafat as a moderate. But we're certainly wanting in hard proof that this is the case.

One man's moderate is another man's terrorist.

Q

If the PLO as presently constituted does become the government of an independent Palestinian state, what would the relevance be then of the Soviet connection?

RICHARD ALLEN

Well, there are two premises there which I, of course, am not going to share, but you then pose a totally hypothetical situation.

The relevance of the Soviet Union in such a hypothetical circumstance would be rather substantial. Of course, that would be a function of how close the Soviet Union were to such a hypothetical state with a hypothetical government.

If you are going to ask that question another way, would such a state be a puppet, an appendage of the Soviet Union, or a satellite state, I really don't know. But I think the influence would be heavy because the historical influence has been heavy, and the evidence is there to show it.

Q

What troubles some journalists now, particularly since Claire Sterling's book has been published, is the many people talking about the Soviet connection with the PLO and the Soviet connection

Q (continued)

with international terrorism in general. But, the (lack) of substantial evidence to corroborate the fact that the Soviet Union is in some way funding, manipulating, supplying these various groups.

RICHARD ALLEN

Mr. Rivera, I can -- unfortunately I'm not at liberty to go into great detail with you on this show, which I'm sure will be a fine one, about the level of involvement.

I can tell you only that I am perfectly satisfied and I am prepared to defend that level of satisfaction in public forum, that the Soviet involvement is organic. And I don't want to just isolate it with respect to the PLO. We need to talk . . . you need to amplify the context here to talk about training African terrorists, Latin American terrorists, and, of course, not even the Soviets are the only ones involved. We have evidence that North Korea trains terrorists.

So, in some other places -- in Libya -- where we understand that recently terrorism has been elevated to the Ministry -- the level of Ministry. This is very important. Many students are being taken out of Latin America and given scholarships in Eastern Europe -- Germany, Czechoslovakia. These countries are all hosts to facilities which turn out terrorists and there's no doubt in my mind, and, as I say, I'm perfectly prepared to argue that case in a public forum and I welcome this opportunity to at least present my point of view on it.

Q

No doubt whatsoever that the Soviet Union is organically involved?

RICHARD ALLEN

There's no doubt in my mind, no sir. But, on the other hand, as I say, it's very difficult for me at this stage to provide you with overwhelmingly convincing evidence.

Q

One of the problems with the current struggle with the Mid-East is that there seems to be some moral ambiguities now; it isn't just one side using weapons that hurt innocent people it seems. Do you agree with that, or do you think that terror or innocent people being hurt is strictly a one-way street in the Mid-East?

RICHARD ALLEN

Well, I think that the use of terror, under any circumstance, globally, whether it comes from the right or left, is something that the United States condemns vigorously. That could be true in Central America, as true as it is in a place in the Middle East. In the Middle East, one takes Lebanon as an example. There's so much going on in Lebanon that it's very, very difficult to sort it out from time to time.

The public impression is very confused and hazy I find, at least in my discussion with public people. We've become so confused and, I think in some ways, so demoralized by this avalanche of information about terrorism. I mean, atrocities become a way of life on a day-to-day basis that we sooner or later tune it out. It's not unlike trying to describe to people what the extermination of six million Jews means. Six million is a huge figure. We can't conceive of this; our children can't conceive of what the

elimination of six million people is. If thirty people are killed in a bus accident, that's staggering already. Thirty individual lives are lost.

As far as I'm concerned, whenever terrorism results in that loss of life is to be condemned. Now, I'm not here to confuse terrorism with the legitimate right of self-defense. We could go back and appeal to Thomas Of Aquinas if we wished, or earlier in the origins of law, for justification of self-defense. But, the inflicting of terrorism is something quite special. We haven't had it, so we can't know it.

The Italians have known it; it's been practiced on the streets of Italy. You have to combat this. We have to get the nations, the civilized nations of the world together, and combat it.

What the Iranians did in holding our hostages was terrorism. And the holding of the airliner, the hijacking of the Pakistani airliner and holding it in Kabul was an extension of terrorism. We found there that terrorists got off the plane with better weapons than they had gone on the plane with. We know from our own methods of interpreting intelligence what the Soviet role was in that.

This must stop. The people of the civilized world must be awakened to this. The terrorism that the Soviet troops are practicing on the people of Afghanistan today is something we believe must stop as well. And the Afghan people, the Freedom Fighters of Afghanistan, are resisting that kind of terrorism

It doesn't necessarily just mean putting a bomb in a bus or in a building. You can have organized terrorism. Hitler's hordes are a case of organized terrorism against the world.

RICHARD ALLEN (CONTINUED)

So, we do have to find ways, means to do something about it, to organize ourselves, to combat it, and it's very, very difficult.

Q

Hasn't terrorism worked for a group like the PLO though? Haven't they managed to pull themselves up by their bootstraps into some kind of very legitimate world place right now? Arafat got into the United Nations. Over one hundred nations recognizing them as the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people. Hasn't terrorism worked for the PLO?

RICHARD ALLEN

Accepting the premise then that the PLO is a terrorist organization, under these circumstances, I would say perhaps it has. And that's to my chagrin.

Q

You say accepting the premise?

RICHARD ALLEN

Well, I say, you said hasn't terrorism worked? Hasn't the PLO pulled itself up by its bootstraps? My response is obviously the premise behind that is the question that the PLO is a terrorist organization.

Q

You're not clear that the . . .

RICHARD ALLEN

I'm quite clear. I'm now reinforcing your own clarity, because you asked the question in a slightly different way just a few moments ago.

Q

I didn't mean to be semantical.

RICHARD ALLEN

Of course, the one advantage you have, you've got the scissors.

Q

I'll definitely cut that out.

RICHARD ALLEN

Of course. I'll have a press conference the next day.

Q

In your definition of terrorism, bearing in mind that terrorism can be an organized thing, and you also say that a state has a legitimate right of self-defense, and, of course, it does. But within the context of that statement of fact, are the Israeli air raids into South Lebanon acts of terrorism or are they acts of legitimate self-defense?

RICHARD ALLEN

I don't want to get into a specific policy discussion here, and what I'm saying does not represent the, I emphasize, the official policy of the United States Government, but to the extent that one reaches to the source of terrorism then, of course, there is ample justification for taking actions.

However, I'm not going to judge in a blanket way those particular actions to which you are saying now. I'm just saying that reaching to the source is generally recognized as hot pursuit of a sort and, therefore, justified. At least it's
At least there's a question there.

There is no question in some of the acts; there is no question in many of the acts perpetrated by the other side against Israel.

RICHARD ALLEN

It is my understanding that Israel exists with defined boundaries. Some of those boundaries are obviously subject to dispute. But, in Israel proper, there have been repeated acts of, if you will, forcible entry into Israeli space, violating Israeli sovereignty. Hostages taken and murders committed. Now, I don't think reasonable people have much difficulty in understanding that someone who comes from outside, invades for the purpose of terrorizing and murdering, is anything less than a terrorist. I think there is a broad understanding in the world.

The Israeli people, you are focusing here on the Middle East, have been the victims, the people of Israel. Especially those who came from Central Europe. They have been the victims of organized terrorism. They are highly sensitized to this phenomenon, and until they have some means of assurance in knowing that they're not going to be subject to that form of terrorism for a long period of time, they're going to be very leery.

Again, I want to emphasize this is not a statement of public policy on the part of the United States. You are addressing me in an individual capacity, and I'm giving you my personal reactions.

But, I don't apologize for the practice of terrorism anywhere, anytime. You've been to the Middle East. You've seen it practiced. You've seen the results of terrorism. I've seen it. I've seen it not only in the Middle East; I've seen it in Africa; I've seen the results inflicted on people in places like Vietnam. It's got to

RICHARD ALLEN (CONTINUED)

stop. Civilized peoples are particularly vulnerable. Those living in urban areas, to the demands of terrorists.

Disruption of our way of life is quite easily done or performed by terrorists, a small band of terrorists. A whole city can be held hostage. Not three blocks from where we sit, there was a terrorist incident several years ago and perpetrated by the so-called Hanafi Moslems right here in Washington, D.C., in City Hall. Life was lost.

I speak personally, and I speak with a substantial amount of emotion about this. I've never had the misfortune, and probably never will, to have terrorism directed against my people in this country or fellow citizens. But, I recognize that the opportunities for practicing terrorism by enhanced means of communication and the like, easy access to weapons, techniques that are widely known, increase that possibility. And I'm going to oppose it with all that I have at my disposal.

Q

Given the fact that the Soviet Union is organically involved in the international terror network, is the concept of detente a fraud?

RICHARD ALLEN

Well, I don't agree under any circumstance that the concept of detente is a fraud. If you meant as a specific policy, I don't consider detente to be a policy. I consider it to be a means to an end. It means relaxation of tensions in whatever language you're using. Detente, entspannung, in German, just means relaxation of tension.

RICHARD ALLEN (CONTINUED)

Some of the delusions of detente have been demonstrated to be, not a fraud, just wrong. Some of our own assumptions that building bridges to the Soviet Union, which in itself is not a bad idea, would bring about a better understanding and, therefore, perhaps a lessening of the Soviet momentum in the arms build-up, or for whatever the purpose of Soviet behavior we might want to alter. It's been demonstrated to be wrong.

We now are confronted with a tremendous arms build-up that continues. The most important arms build-up in the history of mankind is what we are now experiencing in the world. And we have to ask ourselves the question, is this the representation of terror in itself?

We speak of the balance of terror. We've sought to avoid that balance of terror by negotiating arms control agreements at the super-power level. And it seems to be no reduction. We've stood still; we haven't increased our arsenals; we haven't increased our defenses; we've allowed, in fact, our defenses to decay, to erode. And the other side continues to pump out that material. For what?

The Soviet Union has accumulated weapons far exceeding it's defensive requirements, and now confronted us with this massive military build-up. So, we have to be very careful; we have to be able to respond.

The purpose of our accumulation of armaments is to deter a war and to fight successfully any war that we're not able to deter.

Q

Is the PLO the major organization, the major vehicle, for spreading terrorism being used by the Soviet Union now?

RICHARD ALLEN

Probably not. My own estimate is that there are many, many instrumentalities, ^(that spread) the spread of Soviet techniques of terrorism.

I even think that sub-contracting stations have been set up elsewhere in the world, that the techniques have been successful, and that it being, that is terrorism, a component part of policy, that practices against the West. That other countries have been trained in the techniques, in fact, encouraged to set up sub-contracted schools.

Q

Is Israel fighting the fight of the Western democracies against terrorism?

RICHARD ALLEN

When Israel fights against terrorism, yes. Any nation that combats terrorism. The Germans, the Israelis at Entebbe, the New York police when they fight against terrorism in that city, and anywhere in the world. I think, yes.

Q

Good. Thanks.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM:

PHYLLIS KAMINSKY *PK*

SUBJECT:

20/20 and National Association of
Arab Americans

Attached at Tab A is a letter to Mr. James Sams, President,
National Association of Arab Americans, in response to his
letter of April 16th, which is attached at Tab B.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to Mr. Sams at Tab A.

RVA 4/27/81

SIGNED
4/27/81



NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ARAB AMERICANS

1825 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 211, Washington, D.C. 20009 202-797-7757

Accept
Regret

April 16, 1981

Mr. Richard Allen
National Security Affairs Adviser
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Allen:

~~As you may know, the NAAA has requested a meeting with you in order to discuss the Middle East situation generally and your filmed comments ("20/20", April 2nd) about Israel and the PLO in particular. We hope very much to be given an opportunity to meet directly with you~~ and look forward to establishing a mutually convenient meeting time. We were, however, sufficiently concerned about the substance of your remarks to make several points in this letter that we can discuss in detail at our meeting.

With regard to Lebanon, you stated that there is "ample justification" for Israeli raids into Lebanon based on the doctrine of "hot pursuit" in "reaching to the source (of terrorism)". This assertion is contradictory to fundamental principles of international law which our government has supported in the past. The NAAA holds no brief for Palestinian commando raids in Israel. We have deplored violence perpetrated on innocent civilians from all sources, and take exception to your apparent support of Israel's "retaliatory" policy which results in the indiscriminate killing and dislocation of innocent Lebanese and Palestinian non-combatants. The American practice in Vietnam of counting all dead bodies as "VC" has been duplicated by the Israeli view that whoever stops an Israeli shell or bullet is ipso facto a "terrorist". Despite your statement on film that your views were not to be taken as the "official policy" of the Administration on the subject, they have no doubt been interpreted by the Israelis as a signal from Washington that it will turn a blind eye to the continued destruction of South Lebanon by Israeli forces.

With regard to the PLO, you said, "...there's no question that we must identify the PLO as a terrorist organization". As I think you must know, the PLO is a broad-based coalition of various Palestinian organizations with all the attributes of a government, including a legislative assembly and an executive. The PLO also operates a far-flung system of hospitals, orphanages, rehabilitation centers, women's groups, schools, professional associations, business enterprises, and labor unions. Are these functions appropriate to what you call "a terrorist organization"? The importance with which these activities are regarded by all Palestinians and most of the other nations in the world challenges your narrow definition.

Officers

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President
- *Robert W. Thabit
Executive Vice President
- *Alexander A. Simon, Jr.
Vice President
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- M. Therese Sabbah, California
- James F. Sams, Washington, DC
- Cherif Sedky, Washington, DC
- Raymond Shaheen, New York
- Thelma Shain, Michigan
- Anis Nick Shamiyeh, California
- Hisham Sharabi, Washington, DC
- Alexander A. Simon, Jr., Florida
- *Peter Tanous, Maryland
- Ibrahim Tawasha, California
- Robert W. Thabit, New York
- James Zogby, Pennsylvania
- *Executive Committee Members

Mr. Richard Allen

(There may be "terrorists" in the United States, for example, but are we a nation of "terrorists"?) We are aware of the efforts being made by some officials in the Administration to establish in the public mind an image of Palestinians as Soviet-controlled terrorists, but the "evidence" offered is scanty indeed.

We do not deny that the issue is complex, nor do we deny that there are strong domestic reasons for keeping the Palestinian situation "on hold". But we feel that the American national interests requires a broader and more sensitive approach to Middle East policy matters. We hope to have an opportunity to meet with you to discuss this matter in greater detail.

Very truly yours,

James F. Sams

James F. Sams
President

Dear Mr Sams:

*Thank you for your letter of
April 16th.*

*Enclosed is the complete transcript
of my remarks for the ABC Show.
It is obvious that only a ~~few~~
few words, not necessarily in context,
were used for the telecast. After
reading my full remarks, you will see
that some of the points you raised
were in fact addressed.*

*Yours truly
Mr*



Association of
Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.

PRESS RELEASE

For more information:
PENNY JOHNSON
484-5483

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 3, 1981

AAUG CALLS FOR IMMEDIATE RESIGNATION OF NSC ADVISOR RICHARD ALLEN

"The 'off-the-cuff' remarks of National Security Council Advisor Richard V. Allen, made on ABC-TV's 20-20 program April 2, 1981, displayed a dangerous and irresponsible attitude towards the Middle East crisis, flew in the face of established U.S. policy, and seriously endangered the possibilities of peace in the Middle East," declared AAUG President Khalil Nakhleh, "For these reasons, the Association of Arab-American University Graduates calls for the immediate resignation of Allen from his position of responsibility with the Reagan Administration." Nakhleh and nine other Arab-American community leaders have sent a letter demanding Allen's resignation to the White House.

Allen, a long-time pro-Israeli hawk, characterized the Palestine Liberation Organization as a "terrorist organization" and said there was "ample justification" for Israeli's internationally-condemned policy of pre-emptive strikes into South Lebanon, on the grounds, Allen said, of "hot pursuit."

The AAUG notes that the Reagan Administration has to date refrained from characterizing the PLO, stating, as State Department spokesman William Dyess said on January 27 that: "The precise legal characterization of the PLO is, like most legal issues, a complex one that neither Secretary Haig nor President Reagan has yet time to review." It is certainly not the responsibility of Allen, then, to speak out on this issue which has grave ramifications for Arab-American relations.

More important, for a top U.S. official to term as "terrorist" the PLO, which is the sole, legitimate representative of 4 million Palestinians is a large step backward in the search for peace in the Middle East. Negotiation with, and recognition of, the PLO and Palestinian rights, are absolutely essential for any peaceful solution in the region.

Allen's remarks on Israeli raids into Lebanon, which callously brushed aside the suffering of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, who have been displaced, wounded or killed (2000 killed since 1978) since Israel began its raids in 1970, also ignore international and U.S. official outrage at Israel's persistent violations of international law in Lebanon (often using U.S.-supplied weapons). His resignation is imperative if the Reagan Administration proposes to pursue a just and rational policy in the Middle East.



Association of
Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.

PRESS RELEASE

FOR MORE INFORMATION:
Penny Johnson
484-5483

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

April 3, 1981

ARAB-AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS INVOKE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE OVER ABC TERRORISM SPECIAL

Calling an April 2, 1981 special on "terrorism and the Middle East" produced by ABC-TV's 20-20 program, "perhaps the most biased program on the Middle East ever shown on American television and certainly one of the most destructive to a human understanding of the conflict and the possibilities of a genuine peace in the Middle East," AAUG President Khalil Nakhleh announced today that the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) would join with other Arab-American and human rights organizations, including the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and the Palestine Congress of North America, in demanding equal time under the FCC's Fairness Doctrine to respond to the distortions, misinformation and biased perspective of the ABC special.

The AAUG is especially concerned with the lack of a Palestinian, Arab, or indeed, international consensus perspective on the roots and effects of violence in the Middle East, a lack which included such obvious imbalances, among many others, as:

1. Interviewing no Palestinian or Lebanese victims of Israel's "pre-emptive" strikes in South Lebanon, while featuring an Israeli victim of the Nahariya raid.
2. Continual reference to Palestinian fighters as "terrorists" (in the AAUG's count, a total of 58 references), while Israeli commandos are portrayed as fulfilling their responsibilities to their nation.
3. The interjection of unsubstantiated opinion by Geraldo Rivera into the narrative, such as Rivera's assertion that "without question" a Palestinian state would have a "large debt to the Soviet Union" and thus would be a "revolutionary government" and a threat to the region.
4. A large amount of incorrect information given as facts. For example, the death of Phalangist leader Pierre Gemayel's daughter is attributed to Palestinians, when all press accounts, and the Phalangists themselves, agree it was the result of inter-Christian rivalry.

"More than fair programming is at stake here," Nakhleh declared. "ABC-TV has done a grave disservice to the American people, the peoples of the Middle East and the cause of peace in airing such a vicious and undocumented attack on the Palestinian people."

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3199

June 1, 1981

~~GK~~
~~RT~~
~~DF~~ ^{SEP 1/21}
~~BS~~
FILE
PLO

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: GEOFFREY KEMP *JK*

FROM: DOUGLAS J. FEITH

SUBJECT: Israel & The Palestine Liberation Organization

The Vice President received a letter from Mr. Repass in Texas urging the USG to view the Palestine Liberation Organization as something other than a terrorist organization. The State Department and the NSC staff have prepared a draft reply which is at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to the Vice President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I - Memo to the Vice President
A - Draft reply
B - Incoming letter

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN

SUBJECT: Israel & The Palestine Liberation Organization

You received a letter from Mr. Repass in Texas urging the USG to view the Palestine Liberation Organization as something other than a terrorist organization.

Attached is a draft reply prepared by the State Department and the NSC.

Mr. Rex Repass
2222 Western Trails
Austin, Texas 78745

Dear Mr. Repass:

Thank you for your letter regarding U.S. policy toward the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). I foresee no change in our policy towards the PLO, unless PLO policy and behavior change. In the context of the search for peace in the Middle East, we have nothing to negotiate with the PLO, unless it accepts the right of Israel to exist in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. Acceptance of Israel would, of course, be inconsistent with terrorist activities.

At the time of the Sinai II Agreement in September of 1975, the U.S. Government entered into an undertaking with the government of Israel regarding the PLO. The U.S. Government promised that it "will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." This Administration shall abide by this promise, which was part of an agreement freely entered into by the United States. We accord the highest importance to our nation's adherence to such obligations.

How the United States might bring about the desired changes in PLO behavior and policy is a matter the Administration has under review. In consultations with our allies, we have made clear that the United States remains committed to promoting peace in the Middle East and supports the Camp David framework

therefor. We have also made clear our position on the PLO. Our allies, in turn, assure us that they seek the same objectives as we and that their efforts are meant to be complementary to ours.

The Administration has declared its intention to fight terrorism. We are reviewing the most effective ways to put an end to terrorism. In particular, we are working to ensure that those who engage in (or support) terrorism do not profit from it.

Sincerely,

REX L. REPASS, M. D., ASSOCIATED
2222 WESTERN TRAILS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78745
TELEPHONE 512: 447-4151

8110168

February 24, 1981

Vice-President Bush
Executive Offices
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Austin, Tx 20500

Dear Vice-President Bush:


This letter comes to request that you reconsider your public statements regarding the Palestinian Liberation Organization as a terrorist organization. That remark is on par with President Ford's remark during the 1976 debate that the Russians do not have troops in Eastern Europe. If the PLO is considered a terrorist organization because its members throw bombs instead of strafing entire villages with F-4 fighters, then you have a curious understanding of fair play. If the United States supplied the PLO with the same weapons and support we provide to Israel, then the use of small bombs and hand grenades by the PLO would cease forthwith.

Palestinians are outraged that their land has been confiscated by the Jews. If we continue to take a one-sided view of this very sensitive issue, it could easily be the running sore which eventually gets us into a Third World War, just as the rivalries of the small Balkan countries led to the outbreak of World War I.

I hope you will examine this issue very carefully and try to arrive at a more balanced understanding of the Palestinians, Jews, ourselves and all the people of this world who fear a Third World War.

Thank you.

Cordially,



Rex Repass

kk

PLO

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4299

ACTION

July 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DOUGLAS J. FEITH *DFS*
SUBJECT: Letter to you from Congressman Findley
re PLO and New Palestinian State

Findley sent you two newspaper items -- a New York Times op-ed piece by Arthur Hertzberg favoring creation of a new Arab state on the West Bank and a letter by a "prominent Jewish businessman from Columbus (Ohio)" condemning Israel's raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Findley's cover letter favors creation of a new Palestinian state and disfavors the "exclusion" of the PLO from the peace process.

The draft reply attached at Tab I (1) thanks Findley for his letter and the items he enclosed, (2) assures him his views will be taken into account as we review our Middle East policy, and (3) reiterates our policy of no negotiation with the PLO.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Proposed reply to Findley
Tab II Incoming from Findley, dtd July 10

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Findley:

Thank you for sending me the items by Arthur Hertzberg and Arthur J. Kobacker. I very much appreciate your sharing your thoughts on the PLO and the desirability of a new Palestinian state. As you know, the Administration is now reviewing its Middle East policy in anticipation of President Sadat's visit to Washington next week and Prime Minister Begin's visit in September. I can assure you that your views will be taken into account.

With specific reference to the PLO, U.S. policy for years, as you undoubtedly know, has precluded official U.S. negotiations with PLO representatives so long as the PLO rejects Israel's right to exist and refuses to endorse United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. Therefore, until there is a change in the PLO's position, U.S. policy will not change.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Paul Findley
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

4299

July 10, 1981

Mr. Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
National Security Council
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506


Dear Mr. Allen:

The enclosed piece by Arthur Hertzberg, immediate past president of the American Jewish Congress, is a convincing case for a separate Palestinian state. Rabbi Hertzberg's analysis is that such a solution is not only best for the United States, but that Israel cannot survive if it does not give the Palestinians their own state with appropriate safeguards.

An increasing number of American Jews, I feel, are beginning to question openly policies that exclude the Palestine Liberation Organization from the peace process. Perhaps you saw the Lou Harris in-depth survey of a year ago which concluded, among other things, that "a 66-13 percent majority of the public and a 53-54 percent majority of Jews feel that 'if the PLO would recognize the right of Israel to exist instead of pledging to destroy Israel, then they should be able to join the peace talks about the future of the West Bank.'"

I am convinced that a trend is underway and that responsible citizens are beginning to speak out in favor of policies that deal honestly and realistically with our own long-range interests in the Middle East, as well as those of all the other parties. The letter to the editor from Arthur J. Kobacker, a prominent Jewish businessman from Columbus, is but one example. I'll keep pressing the issue.

Sincerely,



Paul Findley
Representative in Congress

Enclosures

ENGLEWOOD, N.J. — Both major parties in Israel, Likud and Labor, agree that Palestinian independence on the West Bank, even with demilitarization and other security safeguards, is too disastrous to contemplate. Today, Israel's election day, is a good time to question that consensus.

Laying aside the arguments for Palestinian nationalism as Palestinians might advance them, we find that a strong, perhaps even incontrovertible, case can be made for two propositions: First, indefinite occupation of the West Bank, even if it continued another 14 years, will destroy Israel as a Jewish state; second, the two-state solution — the insistence that there is room in the region only for Israel and Jordan, with the boundary between them yet to be defined — is far more dangerous to Israel than the three-state model, which includes a Palestinian state on the West Bank.

The most striking fact is that the Arab population of the "undivided Israel" — that is, Israel and the West Bank combined — is now estimated as

at least 1.75 million and is perhaps even as high as 2 million out of a total population of some 5 million.

To be sure, the Arabs inside Israel's pre-1967 borders are Israeli citizens and few are openly involved in the cause of Palestinian nationalism, while the one million or more on the West Bank remain citizens of Jordan, and will, if Prime Minister Menachem Begin wins, be possessed of "personal autonomy" and live on territory integrated into Israel.

Sooner rather than later, the high Arab birth rate would produce an Arab majority in the "undivided Israel"; this majority would inevitably coalesce into one political force. As early as 1967, this was clear to such moderates as Levi Eshkol, who was Prime Minister, and his Finance Minister, Pinhas Sapir. Yasir Arafat's rhetorical objective in the 1970's — a democratic state of Israel based on the principle of one man, one vote — would thus be realized de facto, not by those who are "soft" on the Palestinians but by the tough-minded who refuse to

The West Bank's Future

By Arthur Hertzberg

withdraw from Judea and Samaria.

Within the Jewish world itself, both in Israel and in the diaspora, opinion is more divided over the continuing occupation of the West Bank than over any other issue since the state was created, in 1948.

Even in the United States, where rhetoric of support for Israel is the norm, the disagreement is not even thinly veiled.

In Israel itself, for the first time in its history, a handful of soldiers — the same kind of young people who as pilots are patrolling the Lebanon skies and who followed without question an order to bomb an atomic reactor in Iraq — have refused to serve on the West Bank. Some have even gone to jail for this disobedience.

The most serious questions go to the

heart of the security argument. Is Israel likely to be more secure if it keeps a sullen and ever-more-mutinous Arab near-majority under its control? Even if Labor's solution — the return of most of the West Bank to Jordan — is eventually implemented, will Israel be more secure?

King Hussein of Jordan has shown absolutely no enthusiasm for Labor's suggestion, and not merely because he wants all of the West Bank returned rather than the roughly three-quarters that Labor would offer him. One of the worst kept secrets in the political world is the probability that in a two-state solution, the Palestinians would soon take over Jordan in its new boundaries and would open the door wide to the Palestinians in the camps in Lebanon. At such a point, the "Jor-

danian option" would have produced a state that consists of substantial territory, that would be unrestrained by treaty arrangements, and would probably be a base for subversion of Israeli and United States interests in the region.

The Palestinian diaspora is perhaps the ultimate reason why it is in Israel's interest to create a Palestinian state.

The population of this diaspora is estimated at a million or more. Clearly, not all of these Palestinians could return to the West Bank. In negotiating toward the solution that much of the Arab world now says it wants, a Palestinian state, Israel would be able to insist that the large majority that ought not, and does not want to return to the West Bank be absorbed by its Arab partners in the talks.

If such a state were to be created by the logic of events, against Israel's will, Israel would have missed an opportunity to influence the size and nature of its population and perhaps even to exercise, by treaty and other safeguards, indispensable control over its

military capacity.

The Camp David agreements, in 1978, specified that the Palestinian question was to be faced at the end of five years. That date will fall during the term of the government that will start forming itself tomorrow. Whoever the next Prime Minister may be, neither President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt nor President Reagan will let him forget that timetable, and they will perhaps want to hasten it.

Tomorrow morning, the prime minister-designate, if logic is to be properly served, should begin preparing the nation to accept separation of the West Bank from Israel and the creation of a new political entity. For the sake of both Israel's security and its Jewish character, the government being voted in today can no longer postpone this task.

Arthur Hertzberg, rabbi of Temple Emanu-El, in Englewood, N.J., and author of "The Zionist Idea," is immediate past president of the American Jewish Congress.

BRIARCLIFF MANOR, N.Y. — The United States has become a soft target for industrial espionage that is costing the nation its technological superiority. The prime weakness is an absence of consistent Government policies to protect trade secrets and stop the flow of technology out of the country.

The Freedom of Information Act is contributing to the problem. There was a time when information that corporations gave the Government was kept confidential. Since passage of the act, however, the Government has served as a "clearinghouse," providing sensitive information to anyone who asks, even noncitizens. This free information, of course, imperils more than just high technology closely allied with military hardware. There is the

potential of damage to domestic manufacturers who must face foreign competitors that are able to produce similar goods at lower cost and then export them to this country.

On a reassuring note, Attorney General William French Smith recently announced a policy change in the guidelines by which Federal agencies respond to public requests for Government information and files. The change rescinds a requirement, established in 1877 by Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, under which agencies wanting to withhold information had to show that disclosure would be "demonstrably harmful" to the Government. Also, the Reagan Administration has begun formal review of the Freedom of Information Act itself.

The Industrial-Spy Peril

By Herchell Britton

Clearly, the Government must be more specific in spelling out guarantees of secrecy under the act — or the net results will be free donation of research and technology to foreign powers, with the risk of having it turned against us militarily or economically.

The United States is in an unprecedented context to protect its technological lead from the Soviet bloc, China, and even some of its more competitive trading partners, such as Japan, France, and West Germany. Few Americans are aware that there are special industrial-espionage schools where one can learn state-of-the-art skills in this highly lucrative and criminal profession. Japan and Switzerland are each said to have a major secret school. It is quite apparent from the number of Soviet agents scattered all over the world that the K.G.B. has a training school and that most European Communist countries, notably East Germany, have sophisticated training institutions.

With industrial espionage a booming industry, should American corporations also use industrial intelligence?

Increasing competitive pressure seems not only to justify this practice but appears to be an essential element of survival. However, an ethical balance exists between legal and illegal intelligence. A growing number of corporations are setting up information-gathering departments, clearly required in today's business climate. Through them, competitors' operations, plans, philosophies, policies, and expectations can be pieced together. To protect trade secrets and high technology, corporations must constantly test security systems and spot check managers and technical employees.

Above all, the Administration and Congress must devise consistent policies and enact strong legislation that will prevent the outflow of vital industrial information.

The Freedom of Information Act urgently demands revision. In the current overall review of the act, Congress should give serious consideration to the following recommendations:

- Guidelines must be clearer on what does and does not constitute classified national-security and national-

defense information. In case of doubt, a three-member committee should rule on classification, and it should consist of the business firm, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Library of Congress, which is a repository of patents and copyrights.

- A total embargo should be placed on information relating to research, technology, manufacturing, and marketing of all American products, military and consumer. No entity, American or foreign, should be able to secure know-how without paying a royalty fee and obtaining consent of the American business firm.

- No information of a quasi-classified or highly classified type should be provided to any person, even a United States citizen, until a complete check

had been made on the individual's credentials and purpose in seeking the information.

- All commercial financial information should be exempted from disclosure.

Industrial espionage is a multimillion-dollar business between friends and foes of the United States. The ultimate objective of American business is to be at the leading edge of technology in areas of military and economic survival. America's objective should be to ensure that its overall superiority continues to provide the free world with unparalleled leadership.

Herchell Britton is executive vice president of Burns International Security Services Inc.

IN THE NATION

Trouble for START

By Tom Wicker

The way things are going, it will be a surprise if the Townes Commission reports to Secretary of Defense Weinberger this week that the Reagan Administration should proceed with plans to deploy 200 new MX missiles in 4,000 shelters in Utah and Nevada.

But that's only not much of a relief for those who doubt the conventional wisdom that the Soviet Union has gained nuclear superiority,

Company is pushing a "small ICBM" plan that "is being discussed with interest at the highest government levels." Since Boeing not only manufactured the Minuteman missile, but also is prime contractor for the huge transporters that would shuttle MX missiles among the 4,000 shelters, its proposal obviously carries weight.

Mr. Pincus said the Townes Commission had been "thoroughly

NEW YORK

A Dangerous Tax Revolt

By Sydney H. Schanberg

A tax revolt based on bogus mail-order ministries has found its way from California, the land of moonbeams and cults, to the New York area and has quietly taken root here on a grand scale. An investigation by the Manhattan district office of the Internal Revenue Service, which is nowhere near complete, has so far turned up more than 7,000 persons using this clerical dodge to evade income taxes

minister and his immediate family as a separate church. He then declares, usually by establishing a bank account in the church's name and putting his salary in it, that the family's income is really church income and therefore exempt, or largely exempt, from taxes. Meanwhile, he spends his money as he always has, to pay his normal expenses: rent, food, clothing, auto insurance, and so forth.



The Dispatch

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER FOUNDED JULY 1, 1871—EVENING AND SUNDAY

Opinion

B-2

F

TUES., JUNE 30, 1981

Freedom of speech? A key Khomeini aide had his mouth blown off when a baby trapped tape recorder exploded on the podium he was using during an address Saturday.

Freedom from fear? Seventy-two government officials — including Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, the second most powerful man in Iran and Khomeini's likely successor — were murdered Sunday.

country. Instead it precipitated chaos.

And what of Khomeini, the ayatollah, "the reflection of God"? He remains closeted somewhere in Iran dispensing his venom to an ever-shrinking circle of confidants.

Peace will not come to Iran as long as Khomeini's troubled, twisted soul guides the nation. His new era is a catastrophe. We can only hope that it ends soon.

Ohio's Deficient Bridges

IF OTHER STATES have the same mounting bridge maintenance problems as Ohio, then the nation's bridges are in rather poor condition.

It is true the Ohio General Assembly has enacted legislation increasing the motor vehicle fuel tax, commencing Wednesday, but these revenues will not fund all the state's needed bridge replacements and maintenance. So federal aid for this crisis would be appreciated.

For one thing, the state gasoline and diesel fuel tax revenue also will be needed for highway repairs and construction, and part of the total revenue will be shared with local governments.

Due to a lack of funds, state bridges and those the responsibility of local governments have been given only a modicum of repairs—and virtually no replacements—because the priority of much of the Transportation Department budget is earmarked for highways.

So a delegation of Ohio lawmakers recently traveled to Capitol Hill to support legislation for bridge repair money.

They lobbied for a bill sponsored by a Pennsylvania congressman who seeks a change from an 80-20 ratio for financing bridge repairs to 90 percent federal and only 10 percent state money.

Ohio legislators told congressmen that 4,918 bridges in this state are in bad condition, emphasizing that 2,081 of them are structurally deficient, meaning they cannot handle maximum vehicle weights and traffic volume for roads they connect.

A recent study outlined a 15-year program to repair the 4,918 bridges in need of repair at a cost of \$4.4 billion. This would require federal funds to augment state money.

One thing is certain. A high priority is essential for the bridge program for the safety of Ohio motorists.

OUR OWNERS: THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH COMPANY, 100 N. HIGHWAY 100, COLUMBUS, OHIO 43260

SIR O'NEILL?
...TIP?

URPP...

The Dispatch Mail Bag

Some Jewish Americans Deplore Attack Of Israel On Iraq Reactor Plant, Nation's Hard-Line Policies

To the Editor:

Every Jewish American desires the continued existence of the state of Israel. Most hope to see a peaceful Israel surrounded by friendly neighbors. Some Jewish Americans, myself included, deplore the Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor. So does Prime Minister Menachem Begin's parliamentary opponent, Shimon Peres, who stated that it was timed for domestic political reasons.

Even more Jewish Americans object to the Israeli West Bank settlement policy, believing that Begin's hard-line policy makes peace more difficult. So do hundreds of thousands of Israeli Jews, who have joined the "peace now" movement.

SOME JEWISH Americans, again myself included, believe there is much right in the stated position of Israel, but also agree that there is much right in the position of Israel's Arab neighbors, and in the position of the Palestinians. They also believe there is much wrong with both the Israeli and Arab positions, statements and actions.

Many Jewish Americans agree with the policy of our last four presidents, who have tried to create a more even-handed policy directed toward both Israel and the Arab states. Some recognize that the Israeli use of long range offensive aircraft, provided by the United States as military aid, in an attack on

an Iraqi reactor endangers the American peace effort and threatens the continued friendship of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan toward the United States. They, therefore, agree with *The Dispatch* that Begin could be a dangerous force in the Mideast — dangerous to Israel's continued quasi peace, and even more dangerous to American interest in good relations with the entire area.

SOME JEWISH Americans regret Israel has refused to sign the nuclear non proliferation treaty and that she has refused to allow even American authorities to examine her nuclear facilities. Most believe that Israel has already manufactured between three and 18 nuclear bombs or weapons from the 50 pounds of uranium "lost" in Pennsylvania and Europe.

Inasmuch as 30 nations can produce, or will soon be able to produce, atomic weapons, they feel that a method other than an air attack is needed to stop nuclear proliferation. They wonder why if Israel can attack Iraq, why can't India attack Pakistan, or Argentina attack Chile, or ??? attack Israel, itself.

Many Jewish Americans believe Israel's neighbors, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Palestinians, and Egypt now recognize that Israel is "there to stay" and are now willing to engage in a peace process out of which will come a Palestinian West Bank

demilitarized state, a treaty of peace, eventual diplomatic and trade relations, and the formal recognition of Israel's right to exist.

They know that Israel's security is best served by meaningful peace. They believe that Begin serves neither the real interest of Israel nor the interest of the United States. He will never beat his swords into plowshares, or his spears into pruning hooks.

SOME JEWISH Americans feel insulted at the suggestion that an American sale of AWACS is an anti-Semitic act, or even an anti-Jewish act (the Arabs being the purest Semites in the world). They feel that it is an insult to them to suggest that newspapers, or a representative, or a senator dare not criticize a man like Begin, or an Israeli action, or dare not suggest an American military aid policy re-evaluation without being labeled anti-Jewish, or anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic. An American politician or newspaperman who succumb to such fear, or a Christian friend who fails to tell a Jewish friend that he disagrees with a particular Israeli action — that person or newspaper is the real anti-Semite.

Newspapers, like *The Dispatch* are to be complimented when they write what they feel. By so doing, they serve not only our country and all Americans, but probably the real interest of Israel as well.

Arthur J. Kobackor

Columbus

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4738

PLO.
July

ACTION

August 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: DOUGLAS J. FEITH *DF*

SUBJECT: Response to ZOA

The President of the Zionist Organization of America has sent to you and other members of the White House Staff the text of a message he sent to the President expressing his regret that the shipments of F-16s to Israel were suspended and asking that the President make a public statement condemning the PLO covenant and submit a formal resolution in the U.N. to that effect.

The response at Tab I explains the Administration's decision to suspend deliveries of the aircraft and reiterates our intention to carry out a campaign to combat international terrorism.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

RT
Ray Tanter concurs.

Attachments

Tab I Ltr to Mr. Novick
II Incoming

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Novick:

Thank you for your message of July 21, addressing our administration's suspension of F-16 aircraft deliveries to Israel and our policy toward the PLO.

Regarding the F-16 suspension, I would emphasize that it is a temporary measure. It was taken in connection with our investigation to determine whether Israel, in using US-supplied equipment to raid the Iraqi nuclear reactor, violated the 1952 U.S.-Israel Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. The recent violence in Lebanon has necessitated our deferring the lifting of that suspension. The suspension does not in any way signify a finding that Israel violated the 1952 agreement. Furthermore, as the President made clear in his press conference following the raid, we attach importance to Israel's contentions that (1) Iraq manifested an intention to produce nuclear weapons for use against Israel and (2) a state of war exists between Iraq and Israel.

There has been no change in our relationship with Israel, nor are we going to allow the military balance in the Middle East to change with regard to Israel's ability to protect herself. We have a moral commitment to the State of Israel as well as a strategic interest which we will never abandon.

As for the PLO, your message made a number of trenchant points and thought-provoking suggestions. Be assured that this Administration will earnestly carry out its campaign to combat international terrorism. The battle is not merely Israel's but ours as well. Indeed, it should be the fight of all civilized nations. As we devise our policy, the well-stated comments you sent us will be taken fully into account.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Ivan J. Novick
President
Zionist Organization of America
4 East 34th Street
New York, New York 10016

THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMER
4 EAST 34 ST
NEW YORK NY 10016



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RICHARD V ALLEN
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG 17 ST AND
PENNSYLVANIA AVE NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON DC 20506

I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU A MESSAGE I SENT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN TODAY:

ON MY PERSONAL BEHALF AND THAT OF MY TOTAL ORGANIZATION, I MUST EXPRESS DEEP DISAPPOINTMENT AND PROFOUND REGRET AT YOUR DECISION TO SUSPEND THE SHIPMENTS OF AIRCRAFT PROMISED TO ISRAEL ON A CONTRACTUAL BASIS. ~~THIS DECISION IMPROPERLY PUNISHES A RELIABLE FRIEND TO THE ADVANTAGE OF ITS ENEMIES AND TO THE DETRIMENT OF AMERICA'S OWN BEST INTEREST. THE DECISION TO WITHHOLD THE SHIPMENT OF PLANES TO ISRAEL WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE "MODERATION" WHICH REPORTEDLY IS THE RATIONALE FOR THIS ACTION, AND "TO RETURN TO THE SITUATION BEFORE THE FIGHTING BEGAN" IS AN UNACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE BECAUSE THAT SITUATION WAS INTOLERABLE TO START WITH.~~

MR PRESIDENT, THE TIME HAS COME WHEN THE BASE PROBLEM THAT PLAGUES THE PEACE OF THE MIDDLE EAST MUST BE ADDRESSED. THE OBSTACLE TO PEACE IS THE COVENANT OF THE TERRORIST PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION WHICH CALLS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE JEWISH STATE. ISRAEL DOES NOT ADVOCATE THE DEMISE OF ANY ARAB NATION, ISRAEL HAS NO QUARREL WITH THE PEOPLE OF LEBANON, BUT ISRAEL CANNOT IGNORE THE THREATS AND ACTIONS OF VIOLENCE DIRECTED AT IT BY THE PLO AND THE PLO CANNOT CLAIM IMMUNITY FOR ITS ACTIONS.

MR PRESIDENT, WE HAVE ADMIRERD AND APPRECIATED THE WORDS OF DISAPPROVAL YOU AND SECRETARY OF STATE, ALEXANDER M HAIG, JR. HAVE VOICED AGAINST TERRORISM AND THE PLO IN THE PAST. THE TIME HAS NOW COME FOR CONCRETE ACTION.


1. THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON CANNOT TURN ITS BACK ON ITS OWN RESPONSIBILITY. AS A SOVEREIGN NATION, IT HAS AN OBLIGATION TO ITSELF, ITS NEIGHBORS AND TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE TO TAKE SUCH ACTION THAT WILL ELIMINATE BLOODSHED AND VIOLENCE. THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON MUST NO LONGER TOLERATE THE PRESENCE OF PLO TERRORISTS IN ITS MIDST. MR PRESIDENT, I URGE THAT YOU VOICE PUBLIC SUPPORT TO THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON BY ENCOURAGING IT TO ACT IMMEDIATELY TO REMOVE THE PLO AS A REALISTIC AND IMPERATIVE STEP TO AVOID FURTHER CONFLICT.
2. THE PLO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE VIOLENCE AND DESTRUCTION IN LEBANON, IN ISRAEL AND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. ITS MOST EFFECTIVE

SUPPORTER IS SAUDI ARABIA. IT IS SAUDI ARABIA WHO HAS ALREADY VOLUNTEERED TO REBUILD IRAG NUCLEAR FACILITIES. IT IS SAUDI ARABIA WHO HAS ALREADY ANNOUNCED THAT IT WILL PROVIDE 20 MILLION DOLLARS TO COMPENSATE THE PLO FOR THE LOSS OF ITS FACILITIES IN LEBANON. THIS IS THE "MODERATE" FRIEND OF THE UNITED STATES, WHO DEMANDS THAT WE PROVIDE IT WITH OUR MOST SOPHISTICATED AND SECRET ARMAMENTS. MR PRESIDENT, UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SAUDI ARABIA DISSOCIATES ITSELF FROM THE PLO, CEASES ITS FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND OTHER TYPES OF MORAL AND MATERIAL ASSISTANCE, THE UNITED STATES MUST REFUSE TO PROVIDE IT WITH F-15 ENHANCEMENTS AND AWACS. THIS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP TO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT INTEND TO REWARD AND ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO ARE INSTRUMENTAL IN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS. THIS WOULD BE A MORAL DECISION OF THE HIGHEST SIGNIFICANCE, AND I URGE YOU TO TAKE THIS ACTION.

3. MR PRESIDENT, THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION STANDS GUILTY BEFORE THE WORLD BY ITS INHUMAN USE OF CIVILIANS IN LEBANON WHO SERVE AS A SHIELD TO PROTECT ITS MILITARY AND TERRORIST ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL. THE PLACEMENT OF PLO ARMED FORCES AND PLO BASE OF OPERATIONS IN THE MIDST OF HEAVILY POPULATED AREAS MUST BE CONDEMNED. IT IS THE PLO THAT MUST BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCES OF LOSS OF HUMAN LIVES. MR PRESIDENT, I URGE THAT YOU STATE THIS PERSONALLY AND PUBLICLY AND THAT YOU INSTRUCT OUR AMBASSADOR TO SUBMIT A FORMAL RESOLUTION OF CONDEMNATION TO BE ACTED UPON BY THE UNITED NATIONS.

4. MR PRESIDENT, THE PLO COVENANT IS A WRITTEN DOCUMENT WHICH CALLS FOR THE PHYSICAL ELIMINATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL, AND A MEMBER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY. THE PLO DOCUMENT IS A MANIFESTO OF ANTI-SEMITISM AND ANTI-AMERICANISM. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY IT CAN BE INTERPRETED. IT HAS STOOD WITHOUT CHALLENGE BY THE CIVILIZED COMMUNITY AS DID HITLER'S MEIN KAMPF THAT WAS DISREGARDED AS BEING FRIVOLOUS. THE JEWISH PEOPLE DO NOT VIEW THE PLO COVENANT AS A TRIVIALITY. IT IS A CALL FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE JEWISH HOMELAND AND PEOPLE. WHY IS IT SO EASY TO RAISE VOICES OF PROTEST WHEN ISRAEL DESTROYS PLO TERRORIST BASES AND YET SO DIFFICULT TO CONDEMN THE DOCUMENT THAT IS AN AFFRONT TO THE TOTAL HUMAN RACE? MR PRESIDENT, WE URGE THAT THIS OVERSIGHT BE CORRECTED NOW BY YOUR PERSONAL AND PUBLIC STATEMENT AND BY INSTRUCTIONS TO OUR AMBASSADOR TO SUBMIT A FORMAL RESOLUTION OF CONDEMNATION OF THE PLO COVENANT TO BE ACTED UPON BY THE UNITED NATIONS.

5. MR PRESIDENT, THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPERLY ASSUMED THE POLICY OF POSITION WHEREIN IT REFUSED TO "RECOGNIZE" THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. BUT REFUSAL TO "RECOGNIZE" IS NO LONGER A SUFFICIENT ANSWER. BECAUSE THE PLO IS A VEHICLE OF ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND IN THE WORLD, AMERICA MUST NOT ONLY REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE, BUT MUST NOW PUBLICLY REJECT, INDEED CONDEMN, THE PLO AS THE PRIMARY INSTRUMENT OF WORLDWIDE ANTI-SEMITISM. THE UNITED NATIONS CAN BE HELD GUILTY FOR THE VIOLENCE IN LEBANON BY ITS CATERING TO THE PLO. THE UNITED STATES MUST ACT IN A WAY THAT THE WORLD WILL UNDERSTAND, AS AMERICANS, WE CHERISH THE FREEDOM WE ARE BLESSED WITH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO GUARD IT ZEALOUSLY, BUT THE



Mailgram



PROTECTION OF OUR CONSTITUTION WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE OFFERED TO THOSE WHO ADVOCATE INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE ELIMINATION OF A NATION AND PEOPLE. WE CANNOT CONTINUE TO ACCEPT, AS AMERICANS AND AS JEWS THE SPECTACLE OF TERRORIST PLO REPRESENTATIVES OPERATING FREELY IN THEIR OFFICES LOCATED IN THE CAPITOL OF THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER PLACE IN OUR LAND. MR PRESIDENT, WE RESENT, AND WE REJECT THE CONTINUANCE OF THE PLO OFFICES IN THE UNITED STATES. WE RESPECTFULLY URGE THAT YOU TAKE ACTION TO ELIMINATE THIS BLIGHT ON THE HONOR OF OUR NATION.

MR PRESIDENT, WE APPRECIATE THAT THESE ARE TROUBLESOME DAYS. THE CHALLENGE TO THE WORLD IS WHETHER IT CAN FREE ITSELF FROM THE TENTACLES OF HATRED WHICH APPEAR TO BE GROWING. THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICA IS TO ASSUME LEADERSHIP. WE URGE THAT YOU DO NOT FALTER; WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT OUR NATION MUST ACT IN A WAY TO APPEASE THE ENEMIES OF OUR FRIEND, NOR DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO FEEL EMBARRASSED BY CHARGES THAT THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HAS A SPECIAL KINSHIP AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE JEWISH STATE. ON THE CONTRARY, MR PRESIDENT, WITH PRIDE YOU SHOULD LET THE WORLD KNOW THAT NEITHER YOU NOR OUR NATION WILL CAPITULATE TO PRESSURES OR THREATS. IF THERE IS TO BE NEW "HARD LINE" POLICY, I SUGGEST THAT IT BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE SPECIAL ACTIONS I HAVE RECOMMENDED FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION. IN THIS WAY, OUR NATION WILL CONTINUE TO STAND PROUD AS A DEFENDER OF PEACE AND AN ADVOCATE OF DEMOCRACY, DETERMINED THAT OUR SENSE OF MORAL VALUES WILL NOT BE SACRIFICED.

IVAN J NCVICK PRESIDENT ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA

17:06 EST

MGMCOMP

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

August 6, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *JK*

SUBJECT: Guidance on PLO

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President suggesting guidance for answering questions on President Sadat's statements about the PLO. It is based on the guidance Secretary Haig will use this afternoon when he briefs on the Sadat visit.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

*This was useful -
did not end on
to State / WH
Guidance captured
this, and we worked
at WH to make
sure it was obtained
I think we
succeeded!*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT: Guidance on Our Policy Toward the PLO

In view of the fact that senior Administration officials will probably be inundated with questions arising out of Sadat's call that we talk to the PLO, I am suggesting that until we have decided upon a more formal policy statement, we use the following language, drafted by the State Department:

In the course of his meetings with President Reagan, President Sadat discussed the Palestinian problem and the Camp David commitment for resolving it in all its aspects.

President Sadat is aware of our commitment to Israel not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO until it recognizes Israel's right to exist and accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

cc: The Vice President
Edwin Meese
James Baker
Michael Deaver
David Gergin

#4700

81 AUG 6 P 11:42

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

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August 14, 1981

To: Geoffrey Kemp

From: Landrum Bolling

Subj: Continuing Strains Among the Palestinians

In a memorandum put into your office files some years ago, I once wrote that the Palestinian Liberation Organization is a "holding company of irreconcilable revolutionary movements." From a recent series of conversations with Palestinians of various political viewpoints in the West Bank, in other parts of the Arab world, and in Western Europe, cross checked with well-informed European and American Palestinian-watchers, I am reconfirmed in that judgment.

There are still deep divisions within the PLO and growing frustration and criticism are being expressed by Palestinians, both those close to the Beirut leadership and those removed from it. This is particularly true of Palestinians under Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza.

Summary of criticism heard in the West Bank:

1. There is still no coherent, unified Palestinian strategy for ending the Israeli occupation and bringing peace. "Fourteen years is a long enough time to be under Israeli military control," is a sentiment frequently expressed in criticism of the PLO as well as of Israel.
2. The Beirut leadership of the PLO is seen as too pre-occupied with internal factional quarrels. The extremist factions are allowed too much influence, giving them in effect a kind of veto power over the moderate peace-seeking policies the vast majority of Palestinians favor.
3. Acts of terrorism along the Lebanese-Israeli border and isolated incidents here and there in Israel are viewed as serving no useful purpose for the Palestinian cause, but only providing excuses for hard-line, repressive policies for the occupation authorities, strengthening the hand of the Israeli Hawks in general.
4. Suspicion is expressed from time to time that the PLO leadership is so locked into their roles as managers of a revolutionary movement in exile that they are incapable of moving toward a responsible political entity that should be aspiring to governmental authority, beginning with a government in exile.
5. Occasional contemptuous remarks are spoken about the lush living enjoyed by a considerable number of PLO leaders who have access to all the money supplied by the oil rich Gulf states, with no real accountability for how they spend it.

Despite the widespread criticism of PLO leadership, the West Bankers are remarkably united in a commitment to stand behind the PLO as the only legitimate spokesman for the Palestinians. With some, no doubt, there is fear of reprisal if they should come out in open opposition to the PLO. They simply aren't going to take chances. But there are other factors of considerable importance, as defined by Palestinians in the occupied territories:

1. The PLO has achieved widespread international acceptance, at the UN and around the world, and has even established direct communications with a number of Western European leaders.
2. The PLO, despite questionable and offensive tactics, has forced the world to give attention to the Palestinian question -- even the Israelis and the Americans. "We are now on the world agenda, and can't be ignored."
3. The basic objectives of the PLO reflect the basic hopes of the Palestinian people: an end to the occupation, self-determination for the Palestinians, eventually a Palestinian State.
4. The Arab cultural and political traditions that stress the importance of submission to central authority, plus the human tendency to close ranks when confronted by superior hostile forces -- "What can any loyal Palestinian possibly do but back the PLO?" is the question used to answer all questions on this subject.

In more than twenty years of repeated visits to the area -- once to four times a year since 1968 -- I have watched the shifting moods of the Arab Palestinians toward their Israeli neighbor/conquerors.

Here are my current conclusions:

1. The major positive change is this: Palestinians accept Israel as a permanent fact in the Middle East. They know that Israel is here to stay, and they are prepared to live with it. Almost no Palestinian thinks or talks any more about the abolition of the State of Israel.
2. The idea of a "unified, secular, democratic State of Palestine", once the rallying cry of the PLO, has almost no support. Most of them seem to be totally in agreement with former Foreign Minister Abba Eban who has repeatedly said in political debate inside Israel: "There is no point in arguing over whether Palestine should be divided; it is divided -- by race, religion, political ideas, social attitudes. The only question is where to draw the dividing line, somewhere west of the Jordan River." Palestinians are not likely to agree easily with any Israelis as to where that dividing line should be drawn, but they basically agree that a unitary Jewish/Arab state would be an impossibility.
3. Some kind of co-federal arrangement with Israel is seen by many Palestinians, including certain PLO leaders, as a genuine, long-term possibility. The conservative, pro-Western West Bank lawyer, Aziz Shehadi, spoke to me in May about the need to work toward some kind of United States of the Middle East in which Israel would be closely linked with the Palestinian and other Arab states. He is hardly typical of West Bank opinion, but his ideas are not wholly out of line with the groping thoughts of many other educated Palestinians, including some PLO leaders.

Despite these positive attitudes among the Palestinians, it must also be reported that bitterness among them toward the Israeli government has never been greater since the Israeli occupation of the West Bank began. That anger and resentment is based upon these perceptions:

1. "The drive to establish Jewish settlements throughout the West Bank and Gaza is intended to lay the ground-work for taking over all the Arab lands in time, inundating us with Jewish settlers, and forcing us to leave. Mayor Sha'qa of Nablus told me that there are now two rings of settlements being developed around that largest city on the West Bank. "They want to create here eventually a major metropolitan center of Jewish population and power."
2. They claim that the daily harassment of Palestinians in their towns and villages, and particularly the identity checks on the roads and streets, are part of a calculated policy of humiliation.
3. They charge that the West Bank settlers practice constant intimidation, swagger about with their guns which they shoot off at all hours of day and night without provocation.
4. They complain that continuing expropriation of Arab held private lands and the "closure" of so-called "Public Lands" which the Israeli government asserts its right to take over, interferes with the traditional patterns of Arab pasturage for their flocks that go back over centuries and at times block their access to water supplies.

Random comments from a member of the PLO Central Committee:

The most pro-American, Western-educated PLO leader I have met talked with me at length about his 1981 views:

1. He said that, of course, the PLO accepts a "two-state solution" whereby a Palestinian state and the State of Israel would live peacefully side by side "if and when the Israelis will accept our right to exist."
2. He was delighted to have Begin continue as the Prime Minister of Israel. "Begin is the best thing that has happened for the PLO."
3. He hopes the U.S. Congress will turn down the AWACS deal. His argument: "every President since Truman has started out strongly pro-Israel, and has to learn for himself of the injustices done the Palestinians and of the arrogance of the Israeli leaders. Every President also has to learn through direct humiliation the power of the Israeli lobby to dominate the Congress and, at times, to block any administration's Middle East policies. If the lobby humiliates Reagan, too, that can only be to our eventual advantage. Maybe Reagan has the self-assurance to act independently on the Middle East realities as he learns them."

PLD 1981 (1)

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 1, 1981

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with ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NB*

SUBJECT: Policy Towards the PLO

As a result of various recent events and public pronouncements involving the PLO, I have asked Doug Feith to research the background of U.S. policy towards the PLO and more particularly the policy of the present Administration as demonstrated by the words of some of its principal figures.

I found the attached memo to be interesting, and I pass it on to you should you find the time to look at it.

cc: ✓ Geoffrey Kemp
Ray Tanter
Carnes Lord
Don Gregg
Jim Lilley
Robert Schweitzer
Chris Shoemaker
Richard Pipes
Paula Dobriansky

Attachment

Feith Memo of August 28 entitled "U.S. Policy Toward PLO"

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL


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August 28, 1981


MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN A. BAILEY

FROM: DOUGLAS J. FEITH *DF*
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward PLO (U)

In light of (1) the current halt in hostilities across the Lebanese border, (2) Sadat's recent call for direct USG-PLO negotiations, (3) press reports of a "softening" of our Administration's line on the PLO, and (4) Begin's imminent visit to Washington, you requested me to review how we arrived at our official position on the PLO, why we retain it, and where we should go from here. (U)



Were the Reagan Administration to undertake the diplomatic campaign outlined on page 9 below, it would demonstrate the coherence of three of our chief foreign policy promises and themes: (1) to combat international terrorism; (2) to counter the Soviet Union's use of subversive proxies; and (3) to bolster our friends and stand down our enemies.


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Review Aug 28, 2001

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These factors help explain the USG's willingness, in 1975, to sign an agreement with Israel (in connection with the second Egyptian-Israeli "disengagement" accord) containing the following commitment:

The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Memorandum of Agreement of September 1, 1975 between the Governments of Israel and the United States.



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On September 3, 1980, President (then-candidate) Ronald Reagan stated:

President Carter refuses to brand the PLO as a terrorist organization. I have no hesitation in doing so.

We live in a world which any band of thugs clever enough to get the word "liberation" into its name can thereupon murder school children and have its deeds considered glamorous and glorious. Terrorists are not guerrillas or commandos, or freedom-fighters or anything else. They are terrorists and they should be identified as such. If others wish to deal with them, establish diplomatic relations with them, let it be on their heads. And let them be willing to pay the price of appeasement.

Address to the B'nai B'rith Forum, Washington, D.C.

President Reagan reiterated on November 6, 1980 (in his first press conference following the election), that "the PLO has proven that it is a terrorist organization."

Secretary of State Alexander Haig, when questioned about the PLO, has made two points: First, the PLO is not a unitary organization

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and second, the largest and most "moderate" section of the PLO, Fatah, is a terrorist group:

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
If you're talking about the PLO, I think that encompasses a number of forces, influences, and attitudes. If you're talking about the Fatah wing of the PLO, for example, then you're talking about a pretty tough hardcore group of terrorists.

Confirmation hearings before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 1981.

Likewise has Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard Allen characterized the PLO as an organization "dealing in terror and supporting terror." (The Washington Post, January 3, 1981, p. A-14.) In an interview with ABC-News aired March 20, 1981, Mr. Allen was asked: "Is it fair to call the PLO a terrorist organization?" He responded:

We have said, the President of the United States has said repeatedly, that there are two main conditions that are obstacles to discussing anything with the PLO. One is its practice of terrorism and its condoning of international terrorism. And the second, of course, is the refusal to recognize the right of Israel to exist. Absent those two conditions and we'd be dealing with a fundamentally different situation, so the President has said.

I think yes, on balance. There's no question that we must identify the PLO as a terrorist organization.



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interview Farouk Kadoumi, the head of the PLO's Political Department, gave the West German newsmagazine Stern on July 30, 1981. Kadoumi works closely with Arafat within Fatah and generally is characterized as a relative "moderate" in Fatah.

Kadoumi: One cannot expect the Palestinians to talk with their enemy. Israel has occupied our country for 32 years [note: "occupied territories" refers not just to areas lost to Israel in 1967, but to areas Israel has controlled since 1949], and the primary precondition is that it retreat from the occupied territories.

Stern: When you say "occupied territories," what do you mean?

Kadoumi: For the present, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip.

* * * *

Stern: ... Provided you were now to get this state on the West Bank and Gaza - and there are not a few who would wish you to have it with all their heart - what would then happen to the remainder, to Israel in the 1948 boundaries?

Kadoumi: I shall make it perfectly clear to you. We shall never recognize Israel, never accept the usurper, the colonialist, the imperialist.

Stern: Your attitude means the destruction of the State of Israel.

Kadoumi: Yes, I want to destroy the enemy who keeps my homeland occupied, who has murdered my parents, my brothers and sisters

* * * *

Stern: Your Arab friends in the region are somewhat more reserved towards the Soviet Union.

Kadoumi: That might apply to Saudi Arabia. But King Hussein of Jordan has quite recently visited Moscow, and, to conclude from the joint communique, understanding between him and his hosts has been excellent. You see that there has been some change.

Stern: But it does not seem likely at present that, in an emergency, he would side with the Soviet Union.

Kadoumi: In case all-out war actually broke out, we would be the allies of the Soviet Union -- for we prefer to be the friends of Communists, rather than to be the victims of the Zionist and imperialist occupation forces.

Stern: As we know, Communists, too, can be occupation forces.

Kadoumi: In the Arab world they are not.

(Emphasis added.)

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SUBJECT: PLO

Given that there is no real prospect of any West Bank or Gaza leader advancing the peace process so long as the PLO can successfully pursue its policy of violent intimidation, the USG could lay the groundwork for diplomatic progress by launching a multifaceted campaign against the PLO.

I. Diplomacy

- A. Persistent condemnation of the PLO as a terrorist group. Emphasis on PLO's Soviet connection.
- B. Declaration that USG is convinced that no "progress" toward "resolution of the Palestinian problem" can occur until a non-terrorist (i.e. non-PLO) Palestinian Arab leadership emerges.
- C. Closure of PLO information office in Washington.
- D. Campaign among U.S. allies to ostracize the PLO.
(This should go hand-in-hand with education of allies regarding the "oil weapon.")
- E. Campaign to convince Arab states supporting PLO that the USG will not ease up its opposition to the PLO no matter how much they protest. (We can tell the Saudis that, while we realize they cannot very well endorse our attacks on the PLO, it will ultimately serve Saudi interests if the PLO is undermined.)

II. Force

- A. "Green light" to Israel to destroy the PLO's military capabilities

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NLS F97-106 #21

BY Smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

B. Arrangements for better international cooperation
to combat terrorism.

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PLO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ACTION

September 15, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP
DOUGLAS J. FEITH

SUBJECT: Visas for Additional PLO UN Observers (C)

At Tab A is the memo by which State notifies you that it has approved issuance of visas for two additional PLO UN observers. This will double the size of the PLO's UN mission. (C)

State tried at first to keep the increase to one, but the PLO hung tough and threatened to appeal State's refusal to issue both requested visas. Believing that the appeal would likely be resolved in the PLO's favor, State decided to yield. (C)

State's Assistant Secretary for International Organizations, Elliott Abrams, favored sticking to the one-visa position. He fears newspaper headlines that will declare: "Reagan Administration Agrees to Double Size of PLO UN Mission." He believes it would be better to fight, lose before the appeals tribunal, and then submit, rather than to submit without a fight. Then, at least, no one could accuse the Administration of being soft on the PLO. Abrams said that an indication from the White House that it favored a hard line on this matter would likely cause State to reassess its decision to issue the visas. (C)

This matter must be handled with reference to our plan of action for Lebanon. We can hardly look for PLO cooperation in Lebanon while we kick the PLO in the shins at the UN. Should the PLO deny US cooperation in Lebanon, however, we might be looking for ways to demonstrate our disapproval. Abrams says that we might be able to get State to defer action on the visas through a memo from you to Secretary Haig. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memo to Secretary Haig at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Haig
II Memo from Bremer

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #22

BY snf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01~~SECRET~~

Review Sept 15, 1987

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5322

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Additional PLO UN Observers ~~(C)~~

Paul Bremer has notified me that State has approved issuance of visas to two additional PLO UN observers. I understand that State tried to keep the increase to one, but has concluded that the PLO would likely prevail on appeal if we refused to grant both requested visas. ~~(C)~~

Lest the Administration's position on the PLO be misconstrued, it might be better to fight on this issue, lose, and then submit, rather than to submit without a fight. ~~(C)~~

It occurs to me also that it may be worthwhile to defer action on those visa applications until we see whether the PLO cooperates with our plan of action for Lebanon. ~~(S)~~

Richard V. Allen
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

Review Sept 16, 1987

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F97-106 #23

BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

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S/S 8126355

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Expansion of the PLO Observer Mission to the UN

The Department has approved issuance of visas to two PLO Observers to permit them to join the PLO Observer Mission to the UN. As a result the permanent PLO Observer mission staff will expand from two to four officers. We had hoped that the PLO would reduce its request to one additional position rather than two, but they refused to do so.

Despite this expansion to four officers the PLO Observer Mission will remain one of the smallest observer missions to the UN. In making the decision to issue the visas, we considered both the strong legal arguments in favor of issuance and the adverse public reaction.

Section 11 of the 1947 Headquarters Agreement between the United States and the United Nations (61 stat. 3416) provides that the U.S. "shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the Headquarters District of. . . persons invited to the Headquarters District by the United Nations. . . on official business". In 1974 the UN General Assembly, over our objections, invited the PLO "to participate in the capacity of observer to all sessions and work of the General Assembly and to observe all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations".

A refusal to issue the visas would have led to consideration in the UN's Host Country Committee. Ultimately, the issue could have gone to binding arbitration, and possibly an International Court of Justice advisory opinion proceeding, either of which we would probably have lost. Such debate and legal process could have also called into question our practice, which is tacitly accepted by the UN, of excluding Soviet and other diplomats whose past activities show them to be a threat to our security.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLS F97-106 #24


GDS - 9/9/87

BY inf, NARA, DATE 11/8/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

We plan to reply to any public criticism by noting the legal situation as outlined above and by emphasizing our intention to expel any PLO mission members who engage in activities inconsistent with their UN duties. We continue to restrict movement of all PLO mission members to a 25 mile radius of Columbus Circle. They must request permission from the Department for any travel outside this area.

for 
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESS BRIEFING PAPER

SUBJECT: PLO OBSERVER MISSION STAFF INCREASE

Q. Is it true that the State Department has issued additional visas to the PLO in order to double the size of the PLO Observer Mission to the UN?

A. We have authorized the issuance of two additional visas, bringing their total personnel number to four.

Q. Why would the State Department permit such an expansion of a terrorist organization?

A. The Headquarters Agreement between the US and the UN, ratified by the Senate on August 8, 1945, provides under Section 11, that "the federal, state or local authorities of the United States shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the Headquarters district of persons invited to the headquarters district by the United Nations" on official business". On October 16, 1974 the UN, over our objections, passed UNGA Resolution 3237 (XXIX) which gave "Observer Status" to the PLO. This resolution invited the PLO "to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer to all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations".

Q. Is four the "magic number" or does the State Department intend to issue visas to the PLO Observer Mission in the future?

A. I am not going to consider hypothetical questions or to engage in a debate over numbers. Even with the two additional members, the PLO Observer Mission is still one of the smallest. We will closely monitor the activities of members of the PLO Mission to ensure that their activities remain consistent with their UN duties. We will expel any member who does not.

- Q. Will the PLO Observer Mission continue to be placed under certain restrictions?
- A. Yes, they will continue to be issued B-1 visas and limited, as is customary, to travel within a 25 mile radius of Columbus Circle. They must request permission from the Department for any travel outside this area.

Drafted: IO/UNP:Frank R. Provyn:bfj *FRP*

Clearances: IO/UNP:Phil Wilcox *PW*
IO/UNP:R. Grant Smith *RGS*
NEA/ARN:Jim Collins *Jim Collins*
L/UNA:David Small *David Small*

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FILE: PLO

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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September 17, 1981

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY ^{MB}
GEOFFREY KEMP ^{gk}
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Towards the PLO (U)

Doug Feith's original paper on this subject was lengthy because Bailey asked him to prepare a memo that was reasonably comprehensive, not manageably short. You should have been provided with a summary, which we hereby do. Sorry. (U)

It is past time for the USG to consider its policy towards the PLO in the light of recent events and circumstances. We propose to hold an in-house meeting on this topic soon and then we would like you to authorize us to convene a small "off the record" interagency working group to consider options. We would like to keep the numbers small and would keep the deliberation on a "close-hold" basis. We would limit participation to the following: State, 2 (SP & NEA); CIA, 2; OSD, 1; NSC, 3. ⁴⁸

^{RT} Ray Tanter and Doug Feith concur. (U)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize us to convene a small interagency working group to consider the options when we have completed our in-house review.

Approve _____ Disapprove ☒ Other _____
✓ Please see me about this - RT

Attachment

Summary Paper on U.S. Policy Toward the PLO

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NLS F97-106 #25

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 4/30/01

~~SECRET~~

Review September 17, 1987

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*discussion internally
a necessary first
step. No further
action may be taken
Eve
9/19/81*

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-106 #24
By OS, NARA, Date 6/5/03

A Summary of Doug Feith's Paper on the PLO

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PLO

In light of our plan of action for Lebanon and our role in the upcoming Egyptian-Israeli autonomy talks, it is timely to review our thinking about the PLO. (S)

Such a policy would demonstrate the coherence of three of our chief foreign policy promises and themes: (1) to combat international terrorism; (2) to counter the Soviet Union's use of subversive proxies; and (3) to bolster our friends and stand down our enemies.

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 1, 1981

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with ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT *dlb 8/10/89*

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NB*
SUBJECT: Policy Towards the PLO

As a result of various recent events and public pronouncements involving the PLO, I have asked Doug Feith to research the background of U.S. policy towards the PLO and more particularly the policy of the present Administration as demonstrated by the words of some of its principal figures.

I found the attached memo to be interesting, and I pass it on to you should you find the time to look at it.

cc: Geoffrey Kemp
Ray Tanter
Carnes Lord
Don Gregg
Jim Lilley
Robert Schweitzer
Chris Shoemaker
Richard Pipes
Paula Dobriansky

Attachment

Feith Memo of August 28 entitled "U.S. Policy Toward PLO"

UNCLASSIFIED
with ~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*Can we get Doug's
memos to a
manageable size?
Interesting memo
none the less!
09/09/81*


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August 28, 1981


MEMORANDUM FOR NORMAN A. BAILEY

FROM: DOUGLAS J. FEITH *DF*SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward PLO *(U)*

In light of (1) the current halt in hostilities across the Lebanese border, (2) Sadat's recent call for direct USG-PLO negotiations, (3) press reports of a "softening" of our Administration's line on the PLO, and (4) Begin's imminent visit to Washington, you requested me to review how we arrived at our official position on the PLO, why we retain it, and where we should go from here. *(U)*



Were the Reagan Administration to undertake the diplomatic campaign outlined on page 9 below, it would demonstrate the coherence of three of our chief foreign policy promises and themes: (1) to combat international terrorism; (2) to counter the Soviet Union's use of subversive proxies; and (3) to bolster our friends and stand down our enemies.

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
Review Aug 28, 2001

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NLS *F97-106* *727*
By *CS*, NARA, Date *6/5/03*

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These factors help explain the USG's willingness, in 1975, to sign an agreement with Israel (in connection with the second Egyptian-Israeli "disengagement" accord) containing the following commitment:

The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Memorandum of Agreement of September 1, 1975 between the Governments of Israel and the United States.



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On September 3, 1980, President (then-candidate) Ronald Reagan stated:

President Carter refuses to brand the PLO as a terrorist organization. I have no hesitation in doing so.

We live in a world which any band of thugs clever enough to get the word "liberation" into its name can thereupon murder school children and have its deeds considered glamorous and glorious. Terrorists are not guerrillas or commandos, or freedom-fighters or anything else. They are terrorists and they should be identified as such. If others wish to deal with them, establish diplomatic relations with them, let it be on their heads. And let them be willing to pay the price of appeasement.

Address to the B'nai B'rith Forum, Washington, D.C.

President Reagan reiterated on November 6, 1980 (in his first press conference following the election), that "the PLO has proven that it is a terrorist organization."

Secretary of State Alexander Haig, when questioned about the PLO, has made two points: First, the PLO is not a unitary organization

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and second, the largest and most "moderate" section of the PLO, Fatah, is a terrorist group:

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
If you're talking about the PLO, I think that encompasses a number of forces, influences, and attitudes. If you're talking about the Fatah wing of the PLO, for example, then you're talking about a pretty tough hardcore group of terrorists.

Confirmation hearings before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 1981.

Likewise has Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Richard Allen characterized the PLO as an organization "dealing in terror and supporting terror." (The Washington Post, January 3, 1981, p. A-14.) In an interview with ABC-News aired March 20, 1981, Mr. Allen was asked: "Is it fair to call the PLO a terrorist organization?" He responded:

We have said, the President of the United States has said repeatedly, that there are two main conditions that are obstacles to discussing anything with the PLO. One is its practice of terrorism and its condoning of international terrorism. And the second, of course, is the refusal to recognize the right of Israel to exist. Absent those two conditions and we'd be dealing with a fundamentally different situation, so the President has said.

I think yes, on balance. There's no question that we must identify the PLO as a terrorist organization.



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interview Farouk Kadoumi, the head of the PLO's Political Department, gave the West German newsmagazine Stern on July 30, 1981. Kadoumi works closely with Arafat within Fatah and generally is characterized as a relative "moderate" in Fatah.

Kadoumi: One cannot expect the Palestinians to talk with their enemy. Israel has occupied our country for 32 years [note: "occupied territories" refers not just to areas lost to Israel in 1967, but to areas Israel has controlled since 1949], and the primary precondition is that it retreat from the occupied territories.

Stern: When you say "occupied territories," what do you mean?

Kadoumi: For the present, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip.

* * * *

Stern: ... Provided you were now to get this state on the West Bank and Gaza - and there are not a few who would wish you to have it with all their heart - what would then happen to the remainder, to Israel in the 1948 boundaries?

Kadoumi: I shall make it perfectly clear to you. We shall never recognize Israel, never accept the usurper, the colonialist, the imperialist.

Stern: Your attitude means the destruction of the State of Israel.

Kadoumi: Yes, I want to destroy the enemy who keeps my homeland occupied, who has murdered my parents, my brothers and sisters

* * * *

Stern: Your Arab friends in the region are somewhat more reserved towards the Soviet Union.

Kadoumi: That might apply to Saudi Arabia. But King Hussein of Jordan has quite recently visited Moscow, and, to conclude from the joint communique, understanding between him and his hosts has been excellent. You see that there has been some change.

Stern: But it does not seem likely at present that, in an emergency, he would side with the Soviet Union.

Kadoumi: In case all-out war actually broke out, we would be the allies of the Soviet Union -- for we prefer to be the friends of Communists, rather than to be the victims of the Zionist and imperialist occupation forces.

Stern: As we know, Communists, too, can be occupation forces.

Kadoumi: In the Arab world they are not.

(Emphasis added.)

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Comments: "Please see me about this. RVA.

discussion internally a necessary first step.

No further action may be taken."