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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name MARTIN, WILLIAM: FILES

Withdrawer

RBW 7/17/2009

File Folder JUNE TRIP: IRELAND, UNITED KINGDOM AND
NORMANDY (05/17/1984-05/20/1984)

FOIA

F02-071/4

Box Number 90527

COLLINS

38

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
73854 MEMO	MARTIN TO KIMMITT RE. EUROPEAN TRIP	1	5/17/1984	B1	B3
73855 SCHEDULE	RE. MTG. W/RR ON EUROPEAN TRIP [ATTACHED TO DOC. 73854]	1	ND	B1	B3
73856 TALKING PTS.	RE. RR TRIP TO EUROPE	1	ND	B1	B3
73863 CALENDAR	RE. PRESIDENT'S EUROPE TRIP [PG. 1]	1	5/18/1984	B1	B3
73865 CABLE	BONN 13266	1	5/18/1984	B1	

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THE CRISIS MACHINE

When US troops invaded Commonwealth Grenada, Margaret Thatcher may well have been locked out of the action by a computer. That computer is America's new crisis machine, a system so powerful and quick to respond that it could be set in motion without consulting even the President. Field tested for the first time in the Caribbean conflict, this computer will now orchestrate all military operations involving the US and probably NATO. As the much-vaunted safeguard of consultation with Downing Street becomes little more than a joke, *Penthouse* talks to the man behind the machine that could create global war: a convinced Mormon who converses with deceased relatives and firmly believes that the end of the world is at hand.

BY ROLAND PERRY
ILLUSTRATION BY PAUL TUPLING





The Old Executive Office Building on the corner of Pennsylvania Avenue and 17th Street in Washington DC is a colonial style antiquity with surface-to-air missiles on its roof to protect the President next door in the White House. Security in the OEB itself is tight, for many of the US's top administrators, including vice-president George Bush, have offices there. Tucked away quietly in one corner of the second floor is Room 200, a splendid suite of offices with plush carpeting and high ceilings, in which is found Dr Richard Smith Beal, whose title is Special Assistant to the President, Crisis Management and Planning. Beal, 38, is like a tranquillised young Mickey Rooney: short, chubby, outgoing and confident. Yet his benign appearance and manner mask his real, increasing power and importance. This devout Mormon and former academic is responsible for setting up a system to control and computerise international and inter-

nal conflict, the most important aspect of the Presidency in the nuclear age.

The system — based on six Digital computers — enables the US President and his aides to respond so quickly to potential danger in any world trouble spot that it begs the question of whether there would be any consultation at all, with say a British Prime Minister, in the fast build to a nuclear crisis on European soil. Beal's Crisis Management Center — in an even larger suite along the corridor from his office — had its first major test in October 1983, when US troops demonstrated that President Reagan's administration was willing and able to use force for the first time in history to impose its will on that part of the British Empire now known as the Commonwealth Caribbean. The operation had been nursed in secret at the CIA, the State Department and the Pentagon in Washington where for four and a half years officials had been seeking ways of putting an

CRISIS

CONTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE

end to the left-wing government of Grenada. One feature of Beal's new network was that it would synthesise all the data from these various departments, so that the director of the National Security Council, Robert 'Bud' McFarlane, would be able to fulfil his true role as the President's National Security Advisor. The co-ordination of vital intelligence by the network facilitated the US invasion of Grenada at a moment when other crises, such as the horrific Beirut massacre of US and French troops, may otherwise have seen it abandoned. The success of the Grenada attack, which was in effect a trial run for other possibly bigger operations, ensured that the NSC's computer network would be institutionalised. From that fateful week in October 1983, every conflict would be increasingly monitored and managed by machines. For better or for worse, this vital operation of the Presidency was now being greatly influenced and manipulated by computer.

Further evidence that the Crisis Management Center has catapulted the US into a new era of crisis decision-making — that could even preclude its allies under certain circumstances — was given by Beal in a lengthy filmed interview in October 1981,

and again in March 1983. When asked about events which could lead to World War III he made it clear that the speed and advance of technology had taken decision-making out of the hands of elected and traditional authority and placed it in the memory banks of sophisticated machines.

For instance, in the event of Soviet forces attacking West Germany, the President of the US might not be in a position to stop the introduction of nuclear weapons. Decision on their use, according to Beal, would already be in the field of battle with the NATO Commander. There would be no time for consultation, except possibly to inform Washington of a fait accompli.

'The President would have that kind of situation already defined for him by the Defence Department,' Beal said. 'He would know what the priorities and options were.'

Decisions are made in advance to save time. All possible scenarios have been considered in wargames on the computer where possible developments are 'simulated' to prepare a plan of action. If such plans were to fit what was happening in the field, the Commanders — not just in Europe, but wherever in the world an incident escalated very quickly — could, under extreme circumstances, start firing nuclear weapons. Beal reiterated the President's position when he played down the chaos which ensued after the attempted assassination of President Reagan on March 30, 1981. In that inci-

dent, US Army Colonel Jose Muratti, the person carrying the black attache case known as the 'Football', was separated from the President. The 'Football' contained the top secret 'Gold Codes' and the President's instructions to communicate with the US National Command Authority. Members of this body would have had the power to release nuclear weapons and execute American war plans if the assassination attempt had proved to be part of a Russian plot to destroy the US.

'That incident was misunderstood,' Beal said. 'The "Football" was one of four ways the President could communicate with the National Command. If he is incapacitated, he and all the others in the chain of command have successors. There are many back-ups.'

When asked what would happen if Soviet forces had attacked NATO forces in Europe at the same time as the attempted assassination, Beal said, 'Again, as in all cases, the President does not have his finger on the button. Commanders in the field have the authority to take the necessary operational decisions.'

This development makes a mockery of the claim by our own Government that it has the right of veto over the firing of American-

Dr Richard Smith Beal (right) explains the strategic plan to Director Jack Grossman (standing) and journalist Roland Perry.



controlled Cruise missiles from British soil. If, on specified occasions, not even the US President has to be consulted before the plans for war are executed, it is out of the question that a US commander in the field of battle would bother to contact a British Prime Minister and ask permission to fire Cruise or any other nuclear weapon. And without a dual-key system, there would be nothing to stop the weapons being used.

This is a crucial point in the nuclear argument that currently rages between our own political parties. Pointers to the fact that a British Prime Minister would have no control over the weapons that are sunk deep in British soil have been ignored, discredited and ridiculed by many involved in the debate. The offhand remarks of US generals concerning our almost complete lack of control over Cruise and Pershing have gone unpublished, and the missiles tour the roads in the Berkshire night.

But the development of the crisis machine has altered the chain of command irrevocably. No-one who knows of its existence — and one wonders quite how many Westminster politicians do — can now claim that we will know anything about the missiles leaving their silos in time to do anything about it. It's more likely that the first we'll hear about it is the enemy missiles arriving at our own population centres.

Beal's crisis computer set-up has thus further enhanced America's isolation from its allies in decision-making. Just as in the Grenada invasion, the new network's involvement in a European conflict would most likely preclude consultation for reasons of secrecy, speed and the necessity to avoid disagreement which could delay a pre-planned computer operation. Quarrels over the Falklands operation, and Grenada, demonstrated clearly that the US and the UK have major differences in their geopolitical outlook. In both those wars there was time for consultation. In the case of the Falklands conflict, arguments were heard but not resolved. Where Grenada was concerned, the British were ignored at key moments. In a nuclear war crisis, where argument would be just as likely, consultation in the quick lead up to conflict would again be unlikely. Once a superpower had its computer system set on a war path there would be little chance of human intervention.

What then is the background of Richard Smith Beal, the person who has pushed the US war machine into such an important new operational dimension? First and foremost he is an extremely religious member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints — the Mormons. His great, great grandfather was shot with Joseph Smith (hence Beal's middle name) the founder of the faith, and Beal, like other Mormons, claims to be in contact with dead ancestors. He sees and speaks with them in the middle of the night. Such visions are accepted as not unusual by many in the Mormon church. Its President, Spencer W. Kimball, claims to have revelations from God. The power of 'prophet, seer

and revelator' has been passed on from Joseph Smith to successive Mormon Presidents. He had a record 112 revelations.

Pertinent to Beal's position in the Reagan administration is the fact that he firmly believes we are in the latter days of the Latter Days. In other words, the apocalypse and the Millenium — when Christ is expected to return to Earth and rule for a thousand years — are upon us. Did Beal think that such momentous events could be precipitated by one of the many scenarios of conflict he has 'wargamed' on computer as part of the development of his crisis system?

'Oh yes,' he said with conviction, 'it could.'

This is another indication of quite how far apart the US and UK political scenes are. It's difficult to see any British senior defence civil servant openly predicting the imminent end of the world. It's also difficult for us to comprehend how someone who thinks that Armageddon — just around the corner, remember — may be brought about by

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nuclear war could be put in charge of the technology that would be responsible for starting it.

Religious fanatics in the Whitehouse, the President programmed by backstage string-pullers — this is the scenario we are used to laughing at on satirical comedy shows. In the quiet countenance, the religious fervour and the technological expertise of Richard Smith Beal, all this has become a reality. When men like Beal — committed, honest and extremely frightening — are in charge, perhaps these really are the latter days of the Latter Days.

Perhaps significantly Beal's position in charge of crisis means he is one of the few people in US Government who would be part of a secret survival plan in a nuclear war in an attempt to keep the administration functioning when the missiles start firing.

Beal is also convinced that the US Government will almost collapse (according to Church doctrine, 'the US Constitution will hang as if by a thread'), but will be saved by the Mormons. Would Beal be one of the saviours?

'If I am not,' he said with quiet certainty, 'those I teach, will.'

After studying at the main Mormon univer-

sity, Brigham Young, Beal learned the basis for the NSC system while doing his PhD at the University of Southern California. He had a burning interest in international relations — how nations related and reacted to each other, especially in times of political tension. Those who worked with him, such as fellow students Nancy Wilshausen and Frederick Rothe, found him very ambitious and 'incredibly bright'. 'He was easy to get along with and always patient and helpful,' Wilshausen said, 'but he worked so hard and put on so much weight that I worried about his health.'

Beal quickly taught himself to program computers at USC because he became aware early of the advantages of technology in his field. Computers were tailor-made for this modern clean-cut Mormon. His mind had been trained, indeed indoctrinated, to be ordered and structured. He eschewed what he saw as the common vices of society — alcohol, drugs, sex before marriage — and anything else which he felt could possibly mar his efficiency in his private or working life. To him and other Mormons of the 1980s, computers were objects of utter perfection, machines of infallible logic and discipline. If used properly, they promised to speed the march of Mormon progress in life and business, and thus expand Mormonism. Its members, for example, have built a vast computerised genealogical library in the side of a Utah mountain to enable them to trace dead ancestors whom they can baptise into the Church.

Once master of the modern metal beasts, Beal went on to make a science of international relations. Tantalised by being able to predict world crises, Beal applied computers to WEIS (World Event/Interaction Survey). Its aim was to gather information and turn it into a graph on a computer terminal screen. The idea was that the graph's peaks and troughs represented heights and depths of activity between nations. Too much talking between diplomats or even too little could mean, for example, that a war was brewing somewhere in the world. In short, Beal aimed to be a soothsayer of war. While others on the campus were getting their kicks from grass, he was getting high on the possibility of seeing coming conflict in his computerised crystal ball. At first the information or 'intelligence' for his experimental system was restricted to collecting clippings from the *Times* and the *New York Times*, and filing them under different headings. These showed whether nations were talking, fighting or cooperating. While on face value the basic data seemed flimsy, the two newspapers, particularly the *London Times*, had a great tradition of covering events sometimes with greater depth and accuracy than government intelligence agencies, for reporters could often go where MI6 and the CIA could not. The scores of categories were collected from these papers and then programmed into the computer where they could be seen as trends on a graph. By linking all the categories such as 'force', 'request', 'deny',

'demand', 'warn', 'threaten', which showed the relationship between certain nations over several years, it was possible to learn something from the peaks and troughs. When the bumps on the graph were spotted, the theory went, potential areas of trouble could be isolated. This was about as far as it could go in the university computer room. However, some useful indications emerged from those basic patterns. For example, Beal was excited by the fact that if the US Government had been using such a system, it may well have been able to predict the surprise attack on Israel by Egypt in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. He saw the possibility of taking the WEIS concept to a highly sophisticated level so that coming wars could be accurately predicted and acted on. This became Beal's academic speciality, and he spent much of the 1970s developing his ideas about predicting and 'managing' crisis, especially as a Professor at Brigham Young.

Then a major break came in 1980 when Dr Richard Wirthlin asked him to join a select squad of Mormons who were secretly programming Ronald Reagan's bid for the Presidency. Wirthlin, a close friend of the former actor and Governor of California, was in charge of the Republican campaign's planning and strategy from February until November. As such he was the person most responsible for Reagan becoming President. The pay-off for this success was the appointment of many campaign supporters to important jobs in the White House. Wirthlin himself remained happily outside government with a more than one million dollar a year contract to advise the President and the Republican Party, and it was he who asked that Beal be given a special place inside the White House. Reagan agreed, and a totally new office — Planning and Evaluation — was set up. It put the young academic very close to the seat of power as a special adviser to the President. This began well for Beal and he took part in some of the major planning by the White House including the US's confrontation with Libya in the Bay of Sitre in August, 1981, in which two Libyan jets were shot down.

After a year, however, Beal's over-zealous activity and inexperience in government saw him in conflict with others around Reagan such as White House Chief of Staff, James Baker. Beal's problems were, in part, attributable to his faith: he took his role in government very seriously and adhered strictly to the Mormon Church's Doctrine of the Covenants, which dictated that 'All men should uphold their governments... governments were instituted of God for the benefit of men.' Inextricably bound to this was his total, almost blind dedication to Reagan, who happened to be well disposed to the Church's views in all

main issues. Beal's dedication caused him to become precipitately involved in trying to see that some of Reagan's more extreme aims were achieved, and this brought him into conflict with some of the more moderate staff in the White House.

At the depth of his trouble, Beal seriously considered returning to teach at Brigham Young, but in October 1982, William Clark, then Reagan's security advisor, asked him to join the National Security Council (NSC). Clark knew of Beal's expertise in crisis management, and he encouraged him to create a computer system which could be relied on to give Reagan answers and options in times of international, and even internal strife.

Clark was what the White House described as a 'passive' administrator, which was a euphemism used to hide his ignorance of international politics. At the time of his appointment to the Reagan administration, Clark candidly admitted: 'I

It's difficult for us to comprehend how someone who thinks that Armageddon may be brought about by nuclear war could be put in charge of the technology for starting it.

don't know any more about the subject (of foreign affairs) than any casual reader of *Time* and *Newsweek*.' Emphasis should be placed on 'casual', to understand the sudden elevation of Beal to a position of prominence in foreign policy concerning crisis.

By May 1983 the system, using the six computers, scores of terminals, General Electric scanners and processors, was in place within a short walk from Beal's office. The scanners could 'read' and electronically edit intelligence coming, in standard form, from all US Government sources worldwide. The CIA, the NSA, the military and State Department would be sending input to the system. WEIS had come a long way since the primitive days of newspaper cuttings, although reliable information from journalists would still be used in the new advanced system. When the huge amount of data arrived daily the processors and scanners would strip away excess words to the bare essentials and store the information on computer. A message would appear on TV terminal screens telling the users that filing had taken place. The detail could be flashed up instantly if requested.

Beal aimed to link and synthesise information so he could monitor trouble spots

anywhere in the world, whether they be the China-Vietnam border, the Iran-Iraq war, Beirut or Belfast. The strategist hoped that by the second half of 1983 the President would not just be relying on data coming individually from the military, the CIA, or the NSA. The National Security Council would have the capability to integrate and sift all the data coming into the White House — in keeping with the NSC's true role — so that the Commander-in-Chief (Reagan) could press a button and see the options at his disposal in a crisis. Beal in fact did not want the system to produce just summaries. He was determined to introduce computerised maps of the trouble spots which would allow the President to make an instant decision on, for instance, where an invasion force might be landed. This visual data would be supplemented by satellite photos and other data which could make or break a mission. Beal was particularly concerned with the failure of the US military to free the hostages in Iran. In his opinion, if some of the top level decision-makers had had a better understanding of the distances, the soil topography and conditions in general, the rescue mission might have been successful. Yet the strategist's ambitious project was not merely aimed at presenting military options to the President. He wanted the Commander-in-Chief to push one button and see the problem, and then be able to push another and see all the economic, cultural and political conditions connected with the troublespot.

Suppose the President was thinking of invading a country near the US border because he believed it posed a threat to America's national interest. The computer system would be able to present the President with instant details of actions which could put economic pressures on the country rather than invading it. He could also see the political ramifications of a decision to invade, such as the effect diplomatically on allies and enemies. Beal's aim was to avoid the President being backed into a corner and left thinking he had just one military option open to him in the event of a crisis requiring immediate decisions. The strategist's idea was to provide quick diplomatic and trade options which could possibly avoid confrontation and military risks.

The same principles were to apply to internal US crisis, and Beal has been asked to monitor the potential troublespot of the 1984 Olympics. In 1983, those in charge of security were preparing for it as if they were certain of a terrorist attack. The Olympic Law Enforcement Coordinating Council began cooperating with Beal and the President. 27 subcommittees in charge of everything from intelligence to communications were set up. If the worst happens, as it did in Munich in 1972 when Israeli athletes were taken hostage, Reagan will be better prepared than any previous leader of a nation hosting an Olympics.

When Prime Minister Maurice Bishop was murdered in Grenada last year, the Crisis Management Center had been running for

just a few months. It had been monitoring developments on the tiny Caribbean island ever since becoming operational, and the system was ready for its first big test. Beal was summoned back to the OEB on the night of October 19 by NSC boss McFarlane as the US considered plans for invasion. No one in the computer crisis team except Beal knew action was likely and he kept it to himself, for secrecy was vital for a successful attack on the island. Through the night and well into Thursday 20, data started building up in the crisis system from terminals linked to other areas of government such as the CIA, State and Defence Departments, which in turn gathered data from satellite links to military, diplomatic and CIA sources, particularly in the Caribbean. The crisis computers distilled pertinent details about Grenada, including information concerning its armed forces, constitution, economic and trade conditions, culture and — most important to the President — the number and location of American citizens. Late in the day Reagan asked Vice President Bush to convene a Special Situation Group which was to meet in the OEB. Based on the intelligence at hand, the decision was made to prepare for invasion and it was agreed that the US should let the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) know that it was willing to use force to restore order and protect American citizens. All these states were concerned that the new extreme-leftist regime that had taken over in Grenada posed a threat to them. It was not difficult therefore to get them to 'ask' the US to invade Grenada, and also to supply a token force to accompany the Americans on their mission. The invitation from OECS came in the early hours of Saturday 22 October and was received by Secretary of State George Shultz at Augusta National Golf Club in Georgia. Reagan was informed and pictures of the Commander-in-Chief in his pyjamas being briefed by Shultz were taken to authenticate the well-staged moment. They had ostensibly been at the Golf Club for a relaxing weekend.

Beal was awakened at 4am by a call from Bush's office and was asked to report in person immediately. He found the OEB a hive of activity as pressure built for action in the Caribbean. The vice president and McFarlane wanted a wide range of intelligence regularly supplied to them. McFarlane had been in the top NSC job only a week after Reagan had posted Clark to the Department of the Interior, and the 45-year-old former marine Colonel was concerned to cover all contingencies, and not let the focus on Grenada neglect potential problems elsewhere. He was well aware that an inadequate performance now could finish his promising career.

The first test came when a gunman took hostages at the Gold Club's pro shop, a half mile from where the President was playing a game with Shultz. Reagan was informed that the man wanted to speak with him. McFarlane quickly ascertained

that this 'drunken gunman' was not, according to the crisis system, part of a wider plot or disturbance. The President still had a green light for Grenada if he wanted to make the final decision to invade. Everyone at the clubhouse breathed a sigh of relief.

'As if we didn't have enough on our hands,' Reagan said to McFarlane.

Early the next morning a far more serious event occurred when a Mercedes pick-up truck packed with explosives was driven into the US Marine HQ building, in Beirut. The collision at the front entrance killed 250 marines. Within minutes the horror story was flashed to the Crisis Center. Beal, who like the President was having little or no sleep, was again on his way into the OEB in the middle of the night. The next few hours were spent in urgent telephone conversations with Beirut, Paris, London and Washington. Reagan now had second thoughts about the Grenada invasion. 'Could we be in danger of

Could we be in danger
of having too much
blood on our hands?

having too much blood on our hands?' an aide asked him.

McFarlane could see no logical reason for not going ahead with Grenada unless the Crisis Center found some new piece of intelligence which would deter action. By 9am on Sunday 23 October, when Reagan, Shultz and McFarlane were back in Washington for a special meeting of the NSC — this time in the Situation (or War) Room in the White House basement — the intelligence from Beal indicated that world conditions had been stable since the Beirut Massacre. The military was prepared for the Caribbean assault. All through the night, the computer system had read, rejected, sifted and synthesised intelligence from innumerable sources worldwide, and McFarlane was confidently able to tell Reagan that events were 'under control and manageable.'

At midday during the height of the tension, Beal was in the Cordell Hull Conference Room next door to the computer suite when he suddenly announced to two of the crisis group: 'I've got to be away for three hours, and no-one will be able to contact me.' When asked where he was going, Beal replied, 'Church with my family.' Being Sunday, only one thing came above his commitment to his

President and his country, that was worship to his God at the gleaming white Mormon Washington Temple. Beal intended to pray hard for the good judgment of himself and his President, and the smooth operation of the computer system.

As more timely data filtered through from the Crisis Center during Sunday, Reagan firmed on a final decision. At six pm he signed an order which put the invasion plan into action. Operation 'Urgent Fury' was underway. Once the American forces were on the island early on Tuesday 25 October, the computer again played an important role as intelligence from Grenada and all over the world flowed into the system, and succinct summaries were passed to the President.

The speed and precision of the system and the breadth of data, which included reaction from allies and enemies, allowed Reagan to stay on top of events which ranged from military to diplomatic and public relations decisions. Just two days after the invasion, the President was able to go on TV in prime time to the nation and the world and do his familiar and effective 'selling' of the operation. Reagan kept it simple. 'Grenada,' he said, 'was a Soviet Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy.' Then he added theatrically, 'We got there just in time.'

Polling surveys quickly indicated that Reagan had great support for his action and on Friday 28 October, McFarlane visited the Crisis Center to thank Beal on behalf of the President for the 'timely and vital data' that had come to him at the most critical times in the week of high pressure. Shaking hands with Beal, the National Security Advisor said, 'That's the first time in American history that a crisis has been truly managed.' Traditionally all the heads of departments such as the CIA, Defence and State had jealously guarded their intelligence and data from one another. Now for the first time all information had been channelled to the National Security Advisor, allowing him to monitor — via the system — the whole spectrum of events on the President's behalf. This significantly increased the control and speed of the invasion and its aftermath.

Although unaware of the secret technology behind the decision, sections of the stunned and surprised world press were unconvinced when they came to review the speedily executed affair. Some saw it as too hasty, others saw it as unnecessary. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 (when the Soviet Union tried to place their nuclear warheads on Cuba aimed at the US) was cited warily as a conflict where decisions made too fast could have led to a deadly confrontation with the Soviet Union.


Commenting on that crisis, the then Secretary of State, George Ball, wrote: 'Had we fixed on a response during the first 48 hours we almost certainly would have made the wrong decision.' Crisis planners, he said, must '... carefully examine all the consequences and look far beyond the initial action.' At first, the planners in 1962 assumed

CONTINUED ON PAGE 146

CRISIS

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 49

the US would have to take direct military action. In the early moments of that 13 day affair, President Kennedy described an air strike on the missiles already on Cuba as something 'we're certainly going to do.' But as time, diplomacy and discussion took their course, other options emerged which placed military action down the list.

Yet despite this justified and inevitable press skepticism, the crisis computer system, which in this case significantly helped facilitate the operation from invasion to diplomacy afterwards, is here to stay. The success of the Grenada exercise in the eyes of the key White House planners has ushered in a new era in world international politics. 

Copyright © Roland Perry, 1984.

(Roland Perry's book, *The Programming of the President*, was published in May, by Aurum press. It chronicles the dramatic rise to prominence of America's new power brokers, focussing on the titanic struggle between the key strategist behind Ronald Reagan — Dr Richard Wirthlin — and the mastermind behind the rise from obscurity of Jimmy Carter and Gary Hart — Patrick Caddell.)



Doctor Beal and Roland Perry go into detail



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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

4033

May 18, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

SUBJECT: Presidential Welcome to BallyPoreen

Brendan Grace, a well-known musician in Ireland, has written and sings a folk song in honor of the President welcoming him to BallyPoreen.

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum for the President forwarding the cassette for his listening pleasure and also a typewritten copy of the lyrics.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Tab I Memo for President
 w/Cassette & Typed Lyrics

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Presidential Welcome to BallyPoreen

Brendan Grace, a well-known musician in Ireland, has written and sings a folk song in your honor on your return to BallyPoreen to the tune of a traditional Irish air.

Attached is the cassette for your listening pleasure. Also attached is a typewritten copy of the lyrics.

Attachments: Cassette & Copy of Lyrics

TITLE: BACK TO THE HOMELAND
(FAILTE ABHAILE)

MUSIC: COME BACK PADDY REILLY TO BALLYJAMESDUFF
A Traditional Irish Air by Percy French

LYRICS: By Brendan Grace

Oh the gardens of Ireland are bloomin today
with the scent of the fresh mornin dew.
Tipperary's in blossom like the flowers in May
for to welcome our son good and true.
The Star Spangled Banner will fly everywhere
and the people will sing oer the land.
Oh come back Ronald Reagan to BallyPoreen
You're so welcome to Old Ireland.

Oh the day we all heard of the President's plan
for to visit the Emerald Isle,
Our hearts filled with joy every woman and man
for to welcome him home with a smile.
A cead mile failte is waiting for you
and your First Lady sure twil be grand.
So come back Ronald Reagan to BallyPoreen
You're so welcome to Old Ireland.

From here in the land of the green, white and gold
to the far off American shore,
*And from Hollywood's glory to the White House so bold
and back to the homeland once more.
Tipperary's a long way from Washington, D.C.
but today they'll be joined hand and hand.
Welcome home Mr. President to BallyPoreen.
You're so welcome to Old Ireland.

**Our world is much better with a leader like you,
and behind you we Irish will stand.
Welcome home Ronald Reagan to BallyPoreen
We love you in Old Ireland.

*Option #1
Then from California to the White House so bold

**Option #2
The shamrock of Ireland will blossom so green
on the day that you visit our land.
So come back Ronald Reagan to BallyPoreen
We're waiting in Old Ireland.

WINDMILL LANE

Windmill Lane Recording Studios Limited

4 WINDMILL LANE, DUBLIN 2, IRELAND TELEPHONE 01713444, 01713103 TELEX NO. 30643

ARTIST **BRENDAN GRACE** DATE **MAY '84**

TITLE A B

1 **COME BACK RONALD REAGAN**

2

3

4

5

DOLBY **NO**

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Collection Name

MARTIN, WILLIAM: FILES

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
73863	CALENDAR	1	5/18/1984	B1
	RE. PRESIDENT'S EUROPE TRIP [PG. 1]			B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRESIDENT'S EUROPE TRIP

JUNE 1984

As of May 18, 1984

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
					1 9:00 AF1 departs Andrews AFB 8:20 AF1 arrives Shannon, Ireland, Arrival Ceremony with Brief Remarks 9:15 Arrive Ashford Castle	2 2:15 Arrive Galway 2:50 University College Ceremony, Remarks 4:15 Arrive Ashford Castle 5:06 Radio Address
3 1:10 Arrive Ballyporeen. Visit Church, Pub, and Town Center 3:00 Depart Ballyporeen for Dublin 4:40 Private Mtg. with Pres. Hillery 7:55 Dublin Castle for State Dinner, Toasts	4 11:20 Mtg./FitzGerald at Leinster House 12:00 Add. Joint Session of Parliament 1:35 Luncheon f/Hillery at Deerfield, Toasts 3:10 Depart Dublin, Cere. and Remarks 4:30 AF1 Arrives London 5:45 Welcoming Cere. & Tea w/Thatcher at Kensington Palace	5 1:00 Private Lunch w/Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip Aft: (T) School Event 6:00 Thatcher Bilateral at Downing Street 7:30 Working Dinner with Thatcher	6 12:00 Depart f/Normandy 2:40 Remarks at Point du Hoc 4:10 Omaha Beach Cere. w/Mitterrand, Remarks 5:00 Utah Beach Heads Cere., Brief Remarks 6:10 Depart Normandy 6:30 Arrive Winfield House, London	7 11:50 Nakasone Bilateral (30 min.) 12:30 Summit Lnh Brfg. (60 min) 4:14 Craxi Bilaterals (30 min) 4:14 Kohl Bilaterals (30 min) 6:00 Mitterrand Bilateral (30 min) 7:30 St. James Recpt. f/ Summit Leaders 8:00 Leaders Working Dinner at Downing Street	8 10:00 Meet with Leaders at Lancaster House 1:00 Working Luncheon 2:30 Plenary Session 8:00 Working Dinner at National Portrait Gallery	9 9:30 Mtg. with Heads at Lancaster House 1:00 Working Luncheon 3:40 Reception at Guild Hall, Joint Press Statement 5:06 Radio Address 8:00 State Dinner at Buckingham Palace
10 10:00 Remarks to Embassy Personnel 10:30 Depart London 1:40 (EDT) AF1 Arrive Andrews AFB	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30

Martin

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

May 18, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

SUBJECT: Presidential Press Conference

Bob Sims asked me to prepare an opening statement on the current oil situation for possible use by the President at a press conference tentatively scheduled for Tuesday. Attached for your approval is a draft Presidential statement (Tab A), a fact sheet covering current market conditions (Tab B) and a few possible Q's & A's (Tab C).

Don Fortier and Roger Robinson concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached statement and Q's and A's forwarding the memo at Tab I to Bob Sims.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I	McFarlane memo to Sims
Tab A	Draft Presidential Statement
B	Fact Sheet
C	Q's and A's

TAB I

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT S. SIMS

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Draft Presidential Statement

Attached, per your request, is a draft Presidential statement on the current oil situation, a fact sheet outlining current market conditions and a few questions and answers which might be useful for the President's press conference.

Attachments

Tab A	Draft Presidential statement
B	Fact Sheet
C	Q's and A's

A.

TAB A

Draft Presidential Statement
Iran-Iraq Threat to Oil Flows

The situation in the Persian Gulf continues to concern us. As I have repeatedly stated, we support UN Security Council resolution 540 which calls for freedom of navigation and an end to hostilities in the Gulf. Furthermore, as I have stressed in the past, we and our allies will not stand by and permit an interruption in the oil flows necessary for maintaining the world's economic well being.

I am pleased to report, however, that in terms of our energy security, the U.S. has reason for confidence. Due to this Administration's early efforts to decontrol oil prices, we have spurred domestic production and cut our imports. At the 1977 peak we imported 8.6 million barrels per day. Today our imports are only 5 million barrels per day and oil from the Persian Gulf accounts for only 3 percent of our consumption.

While we believe that price decontrol is fundamental to our energy security, we realize that as long as we are dependent on any imported oil, we need to have sufficient reserves for use in times of disruption. I am happy to report that our Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) has been increased to 400 million barrels, nearly 4 times the amount on hand when I took office in January 1981. This represents the equivalent of 80 days of our net oil imports and is in addition to commercial stocks which can also be used to cushion the effects of a disruption. As Secretary Hodel has stated, we are willing and intend to use the SPR to optimum advantage early in a major supply disruption. In addition to our oil inventories, surplus capacity available to offset a disruption is greater than ever before, totaling about 9 million barrels per day worldwide.

Nevertheless, because the oil market is international, we could not isolate ourselves from the effects of a temporary

interruption of Persian Gulf oil flows. Our allies remain very dependent on Persian Gulf oil and would more severely feel the effects of a disruption than would the United States. Europe depends on imports to meet nearly two-thirds of its consumption needs, while Japan imports nearly all of its oil. That is why, at my initiative, we have been engaged over the past few months in an extensive new round of consultations with our allies on ways to prevent or deal with a disruption. We intend to continue our close cooperation to ensure that everyone works together to achieve our paramount goal -- continued economic recovery to provide a better life for all the world's people.

B.

TAB B

FACT SHEET
Current Oil Situation

1. Current Production

Free World crude oil production will total about 43 million barrels per day in second quarter 1984. Persian Gulf countries account for about 11 million barrels per day or 25 percent of the total.

2. U.S. Dependence on Imported Oil

Imports currently supply about one-third of the oil consumed in the United States, down from nearly one-half of our supply in 1977. In terms of our total energy consumption, oil imports account for less than 15 percent of our requirements.

3. Dependence on Persian Gulf Oil

The United States depends on Persian Gulf oil for only about 3 percent of our oil consumption. In contrast, the Persian Gulf accounts for about one-fifth of Western Europe's consumption and 60 percent of Japanese consumption requirements.

4. Current Excess Productive Capacity

Excess capacity available to help offset a disruption totals about 9-10 million barrels per day worldwide. Only about one-third of the total is outside the Persian Gulf.

5. Stocks

Commercial oil stocks total about 2.8 billion barrels. In addition to commercial stocks, government owned strategic stocks total about 580 million barrels. The US SPR contains about 400 million barrels of this total or about 80 days of our total imports. In December 1980 the SPR held only 108 million barrels.

TAB C

C.

Iran-Iraq Oil Situation

May 18, 1984 2p.m.

Q: Under what circumstances would you authorize the release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve?

A: I oppose any enumeration of specific triggers, detailed criteria, or specific scenarios for SPR use. We believe it is not possible to predict accurately all the variables surrounding a potential energy emergency. These variables include, among other things: the perception at the time of disruption concerning not only the magnitude, but the likely length, of the oil supply shortfall; availability of excess oil production capacity; potential military requirements; the level of oil stocks in the United States and worldwide and whether such stocks are or will be drawn down. Therefore, detailed plans designed to meet specific potential disruption scenarios are inappropriate because ultimately they are apt to be inadequate and will tend to create rigidities which is the last thing the Nation could afford in such a complex situation.

Q: Will SPR oil be exported to other countries?

A: While there are no plans to export SPR oil, under certain circumstances limited volumes of SPR oil might have to be shipped out of the country in order to meet our obligations within the International Energy Agency (IEA). We remain committed to the IEA. Moreover, export of SPR oil to Caribbean refineries could be necessary to accommodate the petroleum requirements of geographic areas, such as New England, which typically rely upon such refineries.

Q: If we are in such good shape to survive a disruption compared to our allies, why should we help them?

A: As I stated earlier, the oil market is international and we could not isolate ourselves from the economic effects

of a disruption. All of our allies need to work in cooperation with us to reduce or eliminate the burden of a supply interruption. It is for this reason that I initiated consultations with our allies, to ensure that we will have the necessary cooperation to deal with any potential problem.

Q: Who are we consulting with and what is the exact nature of these consultations?

A: Since these talks are still underway I would rather not comment on their substance. Let me just say that they are being conducted at a bilateral and multilateral level and that we have made excellent progress.

Q: If we are guaranteeing the safety of oil flows from the Persian Gulf, why have we not yet taken any action? I believe at least 7 tankers have been attacked since May 8.

A: So far, there has been no real interruption in the flow of oil necessary to the world's economies. We have also not yet received any request for aid from the countries in the region.

Q: Would you consider imposing oil price and allocation controls in the event of a disruption?

A: No. Central to the Administration's energy supply policy, both in periods of surplus and in supply emergencies, is a firm commitment to the principles of the free market, supplemented by the release of oil from the SPR. Past experience demonstrates that government intervention in energy markets does not work, primarily because the government in its regulatory attempts to control the market lacks the flexibility to deal adequately with all the complexities of our energy supply and demand system. Government intervention, at any level, creates rigidities that prevent or discourage market forces from adjusting to change and uncertainty. Thus, it is especially important during major supply disruptions to permit

prompt and efficient market responses to adjust to a changing energy supply situation. We can assist market adjustment through the use of our Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

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73865	CABLE BONN 13266	1	5/18/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DUBLIN 01796

WHITEHOUSE FOR BAKALY, NSC FOR RENTSCHLER
USIA FOR EU: ZAVIS
E.O. 12354: N/A
SUBJECT: DESCRIPTION OF VISIT SITES.

1. DUBLIN

DUBLIN, ONE OF THE OLDEST CITIES IN THE WORLD FOUNDED AROUND 970 A.D. BY THE VIKINGS. HAS A POPULATION OF ABOUT A MILLION PEOPLE. THE NAME ORIGINATES FROM THE IRISH "DUBH LINN" WHICH MEANS BLACK POOL.

DUBLIN CASTLE

THIS WAS THE CENTRE OF BRITISH RULE IN IRELAND AND IT DATES FROM THE 13TH CENTURY. THE STATE APARTMENTS, WHICH WERE THE HOME OF THE VICEROY, ARE WORTH A VISIT. THE CASTLE HAS LATELY BEEN VENUE FOR THE SESSIONS OF THE NEW IRELAND FORUM.

LEINSTER HOUSE

THE SEAT OF HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS (PARLIAMENT), THE DAIL (LOWER HOUSE) AND THE SEANAD (UPPER HOUSE), HAS BEEN LEINSTER HOUSE SINCE 1922. THE ORIGINAL BUILDING IS OF THREE STOREYS AND IS RECTANGULAR IN SHAPE, ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY FEET LONG BY SEVENTY FEET DEEP, WITH A CIRCULAR BOW PROJECTING ON THE NORTH SIDE. THE DESIGN IS TYPICAL OF THE PERIOD IN IRELAND. IT HAS BEEN CLAIMED THAT IT FORMED A MODEL FOR THE DESIGN OF THE WHITE HOUSE. THE ARCHITECT OF THE WHITE HOUSE, JAMES HOBAN, HAD STUDIED ARCHITECTURE IN DUBLIN IN THE 1780S. THE DESIGNER OF LEINSTER HOUSE WAS THE ARCHITECT RICHARD CASSELS, WHO CAME TO IRELAND FROM GERMANY ABOUT 1727.

DEERFIELD

DEERFIELD, THE RESIDENCE OF THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, DATES FROM 1776. IT IS SURROUNDED BY 70 ACRES OF PRIVATE GROUNDS, IN THE MIDST OF EUROPE'S LARGEST PARK, THE PHOENIX PARK. IT HAS BEEN CALLED DEERFIELD SINCE MARCH 1981.

ARAS AN UACHTARAIN

THIS IS THE HOME OF THE IRISH PRESIDENT. LIKE THE RESIDENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES, IT IS LOCATED IN THE PHOENIX PARK. THIS WAS ORIGINALLY A RANGER'S HOUSE WHICH DATED FROM THE MID-EIGHTEENTH CENTURY WHICH THE FAMOUS ARCHITECT JOHNSTON REFURBISHED AS THE VICEREGAL LODGE. THE HOUSE HAS BEEN THE PRESIDENT'S RESIDENCE SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE.

2. BALLYPOREEN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 USIS DUBLIN 1796

DTG: 181609Z MAY 84 PSN: 049521

BALLYPOREEN, CO. TIPPERARY IS A VILLAGE AT THE FOOT OF THE KNOCKMEALDOWN-KILWORTH MOUNTAINS IN THE HEART OF IRELAND'S DAIRYLAND. THE VILLAGE, AND ITS ENVIRONS, ARE STEEPED IN HISTORY. IT IS, OF COURSE, THE AREA FROM WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S ANCESTORS HAILED. IT IS ALSO FAMOUS FOR THE CELEBRATED "MITCHELSTOWN CAVES". OF THESE DESMOND'S CAVE IS FAMOUS BECAUSE THE EARL OF DESMOND SOUGHT REFUGE THERE ONLY TO BE BETRAYED IN 1601. THE EASTERN CHAMBER IS THE LARGEST CAVE IN IRELAND.

3. ASHFORD CASTLE

BUILT OVER A PERIOD OF THIRTY YEARS BY LORD ARDILAUN IN THE 19TH CENTURY, ASHFORD CASTLE. CONG. CO. MAYO INCORPORATES IN ITS CASTELLATED FACADE THE REMAINS OF A 13TH CENTURY DE BURGO CASTLE AND THE ORIGINAL ASHFORD HOUSE, BUILT IN THE STYLE OF A FRENCH CHATEAU. IN MORE RECENT YEARS, ASHFORD HAS BEEN RENOVATED AND LUXURIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CREATE ONE OF EUROPE'S PREMIER CASTLE HOTELS. IT HAS A FAIRY-TALE SETTING ON THE SHORES OF BEAUTIFUL LOUGH CORRIB, THE SECOND LARGEST LAKE IN IRELAND. WITH ITS HUNDREDS OF ISLANDS, BAYS AND COVES.

4. GALWAY

GALWAY IS THE PRINCIPAL TOWN T THE PROVINCE OF CONNACHT. IT IS A MARKET AND INDUSTRIAL TOWN AS WELL AS A RENOUNED EDUCATIONAL CENTER. IT CELEBRATES ITS QUINCENTENNIAL AS A MAYORAL CITY THIS YEAR.

BT

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 DUBLIN 01796

WHITEHOUSE FOR BAKALY, NSC FOR RENTSCHLER
USIA FOR EU: ZAVIS
E.O. 12354: N/A

SUBJECT: DESCRIPTION OF VISIT SITES.
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, GALWAY

ON DECEMBER 30, 1845, LETTERS PATENT WERE ISSUED
INCORPORATING IT UNDER THE NAME OF 'QUEEN'S COLLEGE,
GALWAY.' THE COLLEGE WAS OPENED FOR STUDENTS IN 1894.
BY THE IRISH UNIVERSITIES ACT (1908) THE COLLEGE BECAME
A CONSTITUENT OF THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF IRELAND
(NUI). THE COLLEGE EXPANDED RAPIDLY DURING THE
SIXTIES, AND A NEW BUILDING PROGRAM WAS
UNDERTAKEN. DENNIS
BT

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MEMORANDUM
101 MAY 19 11 2: 14

~~SECRET~~

The President has seen Martin

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 18, 1984

3986

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*
SUBJECT: European Visit Briefing Books

Issue

Your briefing books for your visit to Europe.

Facts

Attached at Tab A are briefing books for your visit to Europe. Two volumes are included: one which covers the visits to Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Normandy -- and one which focuses primarily on the London Economic Summit. The books will be updated in light of discussions at the preparatory meetings scheduled for the next two weeks.

The speechwriters are presently working on all of your public statements, which will be forwarded to you for editing.

Recommendation

OK
BR

No

That you review the attached briefing books.

Tab A Briefing Book for European Visit
 Briefing Book for Summit

Prepared by:
William F. Martin
Douglas McMinn
Peter R. Sommer
Tyrus Cobb

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

cc Vice President

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *pw* NARA, Date *7/17/09*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

3986

SECRET

May 17, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*
DOUGLAS McMINN *DM*
PETER R. SOMMER *PS*
TYRUS COBB *TC* **SIGNED**

SUBJECT: President's Briefing Books for Europe

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum for the President forwarding briefing books for his European trip and the London Economic Summit.

You should note and sign the covering memorandum in each book. Any changes you would like will be incorporated.

Draft public statements are with the speechwriters and will be ready for Presidential editing next week. Dick Darman will handle this.

As has been our practice, the books will be revised just prior to departure and at that time 3x5 cards will be included.

We would like to acknowledge the excellent coordination throughout the whole preparatory process provided by Cathy Torgerson.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I, and forward the briefing books to the President for his weekend reading.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo for the President
Tab A Briefing Books

SECRET

Declassify: OADR

W/ *RV*

7/17/09

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01
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SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH MITTERRAND
- ON JUNE 7
REF. MARESCA GELBARD TELECON MAY 18

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CONFIRMING REF TELECON, MITTERRAND'S STAFF
HAS AGREED TO PROPOSED TIME OF 6:00-6:30 ON
JUNE 7 FOR THE PRESIDENT'S BILATERAL MEETING
WITH MITTERRAND IN LONDON. GALBRAITH
BT

*- make sure French know
at Wulfd Hse.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By RW NARA, Date 7/17/09