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Meeting on Iran 07/26/1982

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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**Withdrawer**

LOJ 4/19/2007

**File Folder** SIG (SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP) MEETING  
07/26/1982

**FOIA**

F07-039

**Box Number** 91146

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
35347	CHECKLIST	OF ACTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN INITIATED OR COULD BE CONSIDERED WITHIN CURRENT US POLICY GUIDELINES <b>R 7/15/2008 F07-039</b>	6	7/23/1981	B1
35348	LIST	NEEDS <b>R 7/15/2008 F07-039</b>	1	ND	B1
35349	MEMO	RE SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP NO. 2 SIG MEETING ON IRAN JULY 26, 1982 <b>R 7/15/2008 F07-039</b>	2	7/28/1982	B1
35350	LIST	OF PARTICIPANTS FOR 7/26/82 MEETING (PARTIAL) <b>R 7/14/2008 F07-039</b>	1	ND	B3

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MESSAGE NO. 00306 CLASSIFICATION Secret/NO DIS No. Pages 8  
FROM: Tain Tompkins S/S-S 632-5804 7241, Main State  
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Appendix A: Checklist of Actions Initiated or Could  
be Considered within current U.S. Policy Guidelines + Appendix 3

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>OVP</u>	<u>Mrs. Nancy Beang Dyke</u>	<u>395-4213</u>	<u>298, OEOB</u>
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Mr. Michael Wheeler</u>	<u>395-3044</u>	<u>372, OEOB</u>
<u>CIA</u>	<u>Mr. Thomas B. Cormack</u>	<u>351-4301</u>	<u>7E12, HQ</u>
<u>Defence</u>	<u>COL John Stanford</u>	<u>697-8388</u>	<u>3E880, Pentagon</u>
<u>JCS</u>	<u>MAJ Dennis Stanley</u>	<u>695-4824</u>	<u>2E983, Pentagon</u>

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☒ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: Please treat as sensitive. Today's  
meeting is confirmed at 4:00 pm.

S/S Officer: Tain Tompkins

Nancy H. Cady

URGENT



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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Senior Interagency Group No. 2

TO : OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke  
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler  
CIA - Mr. Thomas B. Cormack  
Defense - COL John Stanford  
JCS - MAJ Dennis Stanley

SUBJECT: Discussion Paper for SIG Meeting: Addendum

Attached are the appendixes to the discussion paper circulated July 24. We ask that these papers be given the minimum possible distribution.

*L. Paul Bremer, III*  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary *for CEM*

Attachment:

As stated

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GDS 7/26/88

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Department of State, July 21, 1987  
By 101 Date 4/19/01

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APPENDIX A: CHECKLIST OF ACTIONS THAT  
HAVE BEEN INITIATED OR COULD  
BE CONSIDERED WITHIN CURRENT  
U.S. POLICY GUIDELINES

STEPS ALREADY TAKEN

UN Action.

We voted for the July 12 UNSC resolution calling for a ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq fighting and settlement of differences through negotiation. This resolution was supported by Arab moderates, including Saudi Arabia, which specifically asked that we vote for it. Iran has so far ignored the resolution.

AWACS Support For Saudi Arabian Air Defenses.

Four USAP AWACS aircraft have been deployed to Saudi Arabia since October 1980 to provide the Saudi Arabian air defense system with an early warning capability against hostile air attack. Recently, at Saudi request, we agreed to eliminate filters that had screened out of the data supplied the Saudis certain tracking information and to permit AWACS flights on a more extended orbit toward the Gulf (while still remaining over the Saudi land mass). These steps now give the Saudis the full air picture over southern Iraq and Iran, thereby permitting earlier and more complete detection and tracking of possible intruders/hostile aircraft; our agreement to take these steps was also intended as a positive gesture of U.S. concern for the security of Saudi Arabia. Restrictions on passing any AWACS data by the Saudis to third parties, especially Iraq, without our consent, still apply.

U.S.-Saudi Coordinating Planning Group.

The Saudis have now agreed to our offer to provide technical and other required advice to SAG for use in national and regional planning to meet their defense needs against regional threats. As requested by SAG, the initial emphasis will be on air defense planning. A seven-man U.S. air defense team went to Saudi Arabia this week as what is expected to be the first element of a larger coordinating planning group.

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GDS 7/23/82

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#### U.S.-Bahrain Contingency Discussions.

We have agreed in principle to a request made by the Bahraini Foreign Minister to discuss what facilities and prepositioned assets the U.S. might require in Bahrain if called upon to deploy forces for the defense of the Gulf states. The Bahrainis have suggested these discussions take place in Bahrain sometime early this fall.

#### Intelligence Sharing.

We have taken steps to provide our posts in the Gulf states with updated intelligence on the Iraq-Iran conflict suitable to be shared with host governments. In addition to established intelligence sharing arrangements with the Saudis, Bahrain has now indicated it would be interested in receiving intelligence provided through COMIDEASTFOR channels.

#### Consultations With Gulf Governments.

Messages have gone from the President to King Fahd and from the Acting Secretary to his counterparts in the other Gulf states reaffirming our wish to help support the security of those countries and inviting them to offer their suggestions as to how we might most effectively work together. Initial responses from the host governments have been positive. We have indicated our willingness to conduct joint military exercises with Saudi Arabia and Oman.

#### Consultations With Allies.

Messages have gone to all NATO Foreign Ministers and to Tokyo from the Acting Secretary asking that their governments continue to urge, directly or through appropriate third parties like the Algerians, restraint on the Iranians and compliance with the UN resolutions calling for a ceasefire. It was also proposed that we consider together what additional measures might be undertaken to demonstrate our mutual support for the security of the other Gulf states. USNATO made a similar presentation to NATO Permanent Representatives.

#### Consultations With Key Regional States.

In addition to Turkey, The Acting Secretary sent similar messages to the Foreign Ministers of Egypt, Jordan, and Pakistan. Regional states with possible influence in Tehran

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(Pakistan, Turkey, Algeria, and Syria) have been asked to urge restraint on Iran.

#### Naval Coordination.

We have made approaches to the French, British, Australians, and New Zealanders about resuming informal Navy-to-Navy discussions (last held in 1980) about our respective naval presences and cooperation in the Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf region. U.S., UK, Australian and New Zealand naval officials meet in London on August 28. The French have agreed to Navy to Navy talks. We assume they will propose that CTF-70 and the French area commander meet in the Indian Ocean as they did in 1980.

#### ADDITIONAL STEPS THAT COULD BE TAKEN WITHIN PRESENT POLICY

##### Increased Naval Presence in the Arabian Sea.

We can consider whether to increase our naval presence in the Arabian Sea. An immediate--and minimum--step we could take would be to redeploy in the Arabian Sea a cruiser now with the Surface Strike Force in the southern Indian Ocean. A more significant step would be to deploy a second CVBG to the Arabian Sea. These steps could be cited to friendly Gulf state governments as further evidence of our concern for their security. Augmentation of our naval strength in the Arabian Sea would become quickly known to the Iranians who regularly surveil U.S. naval movements there. The increase in our carrier presence in the Arabian Sea is unlikely to be provocative to the Iranians, but by the same token, it is not likely to have much deterrent effect on their actions in the northern Gulf region.

##### Augmentation of MIDEASTFOR.

A more significant signal both to our Gulf friends and to the Iranians might be augmentation of the Middle East Force presence inside the Persian Gulf, presently consisting of the COMIDEASTFOR flagship and four destroyers/frigates. Increasing the MIDEASTFOR presence would probably not in itself be considered provocative by the Iranians so long as the ships continue to follow existing patterns of movement. However, the size of the augmentation would be a matter of concern to Iran.

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Another destroyer would probably not be a problem, but several additional ships might alarm the Iranians and possibly provoke some counter action on their part. It might also prompt a Soviet response, such as an increase in their Indian Ocean naval presence.

#### Greater MIDEASTFOR Visibility.

In addition to, or possibly as an alternative to, augmenting MIDEASTFOR we could make the MIDEASTFOR presence more visible to the Gulf states through an increased number of port calls, PASSEX's, etc. To do this, however, we would need to have the cooperation of the Gulf states, several which are presently unwilling to receive U.S. naval visits because of growing anti-U.S. feelings in the area over Lebanon. Even were host governments willing to accept a closer degree of identification with MIDEASTFOR, care needs to be taken that such visits not provide the Iranians with excuses for stimulating anti-American incidents in port cities. Naval visits to northern Gulf ports like Kuwait should continue to be avoided.

#### Joint Military Exercises With the Saudis.

The Saudis have deferred for the time being discussion of our offer to conduct joint training exercises including temporary deployment to Saudi Arabia of USAF F-15 aircraft and air defense units. We will wish to consider whether to pursue this issue within the joint coordinating planning group.

#### Joint Military Exercises With the Omanis.

A joint U.S.-Omani military exercise (JADE TIGER) is scheduled for October 8-18. If the Omanis agree, consideration could be given to accelerating or expanding this exercise or scheduling another exercise at an earlier date.

#### Expediting Arms Deliveries.

Completion of the Saudi assurances regarding the air defense enhancement package makes it possible to consider expediting delivery of a limited number (perhaps 60) AIM-9L air-to-air missiles to the Kingdom. An accelerated delivery in an emergency would have to take into account our promises to the Congress that we would have completed security arrangements for handling AIM-9Ls prior to delivery. Minimum time frame for

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delivery would be two weeks. Expedited delivery of these missiles, which the Saudis have requested, would demonstrate the seriousness with which we view the situation and our willingness to be of assistance within the limitations the Saudis themselves are placing on U.S.-Saudi security cooperation. As an interim step, we might consider "loaning" these missiles to the Saudis pending completion of the assurances and security arrangements; in this case the U.S. would officially retain custody of the missiles within the Kingdom except when they are actually loaded in the Saudi F-15's.

Consideration could be given also to expediting delivery to Kuwait of TOW launchers and missiles recently purchased. We recently clarified a potential misunderstanding by informing Kuwait that their TOWs do, in fact, work; but offered additional deliveries if required. These arms can be readily absorbed by the Kuwaiti armed forces and would strengthen the country's ability to deter or delay a hostile armor attack from the north. A major problem to be dealt with is that to expedite TOW deliveries to Kuwait would require a draw down on our own services' inventories. To date the Kuwaitis have not pressed us for expedited TOW deliveries.

#### Support Jordanian or Egyptian Troop Movements to Gulf States.

We could be asked to support, by providing logistic aid or permission to deploy U.S.-origin equipment, the stationing of Jordanian or Egyptian troops in the Gulf states to help protect them. We can probably insist that the Gulf states themselves fund the costs of such deployments, but would need to consider seriously what could most effectively be done to replace military equipment withdrawn from Jordanian or Egyptian inventories for that purpose. By operating "behind the scenes" we can probably minimize U.S. direct identification with such deployments, but the Iranians will likely assume our role in these movements. The Egyptians have told us they would respond to a Gulf request for deployment of Egyptian forces, but they would not want any direct U.S. support role and would probably want a commitment in advance from the U.S. to replace equipment used in the operation. (They would want our permission to deploy U.S.-origin equipment before we agreed to a Jordanian request for logistic support in deployments to the Gulf.) We would need to consider coordinating with the Saudis -- who might prefer to provide such support themselves.

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Allied Support for the Gulf States

We could encourage some of our Western allies to take tangible steps to bolster Gulf state security. The UK, for example, may be better able to provide visible security assurances to certain Gulf states (e.g., Kuwait, UAE, Oman) than the U.S. Such measures as UK air defense exercises/ deployments in the Gulf area would probably be more politically acceptable to host nations and viewed as less provocative by Iran than similar U.S. actions.

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APPENDIX B

## IRAQI MILITARY NEEDS

In terms of military equipment the Iraqis mainly need antipersonnel weapons, artillery, and ammunition.

## (a) Antipersonnel

- They need flechette rounds. For 106 recoilless rifles and 105mm and 155mm artillery.
- Claymore mines and any other antipersonnel mines.
- Cluster bombs (they reportedly are receiving these from the French.)
- Napalm bombs compatible with Soviet aircraft or the Mirage F-1.
- Tear gas shells for the 81mm mortar or other artillery.

## (b) Heavy equipment

- Primary Iraqi need is for additional artillery and ammunition.
- 105mm and 155mm artillery from South Korea.
- 175mm artillery and extended range ammunition (Iranians can stand off and shell Iraqis with 175mm and Iraqis can't reach them.)
- Iraq does not need additional armor, APCs, fighter aircraft or helicopters. It probably could use some help on the maintenance of these items but this is not a priority.

## (c) Anti tank weapons (Iranians, however, rely mostly on infantry.

- TOW missiles for launchers captured from Iran.
- Additional TOW launchers and maintenance for same, perhaps in Jordan.

## (d) Miscellaneous

- Iraqis could use drone for reconnaissance. Trying to buy some from Italy.
- Radios at brigade level and lower levels. Iraqis have complained about unreliability of Soviet radios in the intense heat.
- Night vision devices, Iranians always attack at night.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

July 28, 1982

UNCLASSIFIED

(With ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ Attachment)

Senior Interagency Group No. 2

TO : OVP - Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke  
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler  
CIA - Mr. Thomas B. Cormack  
Defense - COL John Stanford  
JCS - MAJ Dennis Stanley

SUBJECT: SIG Meeting Summary of Conclusions

Attached is the Summary of Conclusions for the SIG Meeting on Iran held on July 26, 1982.

*L. Paul Bremer, III*  
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Summary of Conclusions
2. List of Participants

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(With ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ Attachment) 105 11/19/87

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 28, 1982

Senior Interagency Group No. 2

PARTICIPANTS: See List Attached

DATE AND TIME: July 26, 1982, 4:00 p.m.

PLACE: D Conference Room 7219, State Department

SUBJECT: SIG Meeting on Iran, July 26

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The restricted SIG convened to discuss policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. CIA briefed on the military situation and on the potential of the war to affect oil supplies from the Gulf states.

It was concluded that while an Iranian victory over Iraq was not in the U.S. interest, there was little that any outsider could do to offset the training and leadership weaknesses of the Iraqi forces, who were well-equipped with materiel. The established U.S. posture of neutrality towards the conflict should be maintained.

With regard to Saudi Arabia, it was noted that the U.S.-Saudi dialogue had become more searching on both sides as a result of the Iran-Iraq conflict. The present stage of discussions concerning the U.S. position in the event of threats to the Kingdom was delicate. The SIG discussed the proper means of presenting the elements of a decision on U.S. policy to the President and of communicating information relevant to a decision to the Saudi royal family, should it be deemed in the U.S. interest to do so explicitly.

The SIG concluded that the question of Gulf contingencies required further study.

ACTION ASSIGNMENTS

The sense of the SIG was that U.S. material assistance to either side of the Iran-Iraq conflict was not in the U.S. national interest. All agencies agreed to monitor the conflict actively.

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The SIG asked State to provide a memorandum to the President recommending a policy toward heightened Saudi Arabian security concerns and the proper manner of communicating with the Saudis.

A small group led by State's political/military bureau (PM) undertook to study the likely consequences for the Gulf and for U.S. policy if Iran should break through the Basra front.

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SIG Meeting on Iran

July 26, 1982, 4:00 p.m.

D Conference Room 7219, State Department

PARTICIPANTS

<u>State</u>	Deputy Secretary Stoessel, Chairman Adm. Jonathan Howe, PM Amb. Nicholas Veliotis, .NEA Mr. Tain Tompkins, S/S-S (Notetaker)
<u>OVP</u>	Mrs. Nancy Bearg Dyke
<u>NSC</u>	Mr. Geoffrey Kemp Mr. Howard Teicher
<u>CIA</u>	Mr. Charles Waterman Mr. Robert Gates
<u>Defense</u>	Mr. Bing West MGen Richard Secord
<u>JCS</u>	Vice Adm. Thomas Bigley LTC Ronald Hatchett

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BY LOI NARA DATE 7/14/08



Drafted by: S/S-S:TTompkins  
7/28/82 x25804

Clearances: D:WStoessel (draft)  
PM:JHowe (draft)