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Collection: ROSS, DENNIS B.: Files

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File Folder: Soviet and Middle East [1 of 2]

Date: 11/13/96

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	from INR - to the Secretary re: Moscow and the Middle East - Results and Prospects (13pp) <i>P 3/28/99 NLSF94-038/2</i>	7/31/87	P1
2. Cable	081739Z JUL 87 (2pp) <i>R 3/26/99 NLSF94-038/2</i>	7/8/87	P1
3. Cable	071647Z JUL 87 (7pp) <i>R 3/26/99 NLSF94-038/2</i>	7/7/87	P1
4. Cable	062041Z JUL 87 (3pp) <i>R 3/26/99 NLSF94-038/2</i>	7/6/87	P1
5. Talking points	re: Middle East (7pp) <i>R 1/27/99 NLSF94-038/2</i>	2/17/88	P1
6. Nonpaper	re: Middle East (7pp) <i>R 12/9/05 M1468 #2</i>	n.d.	P1 P5
7. Paper	re: Middle East (3pp) <i>R " " #3</i>	n.d.	P1 P5
8. Memo	to Dr. Zbigniew Brezezinski re: Middle East (9pp)	1/16/80	P1
9. Report	(8pp)	12/7/79	P1
8a. pos	it note lg. <i>R 10/19/01 F94-038/2 #60a</i>	4/23/86	P1
8b. memo	Peter TARNOFF to ZBIGNIEW BZEEZINSKI RE US Relations w/ RADICAL ARABS 8p. <i>P 12/7/05 M1468 #4</i> PART. 10/11/01 F94-038/2 #60b	1/16/80	B1, B3
8c. memo	Brzezinski to Sec State lg <i>R 12/9/05 M1468 #5</i>	12/7/79	B1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

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Collection Name ROSS, DENNIS: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 4/4/2007

File Folder SOVIET AND MIDDLE EAST (1)

FOIA

M03-1468

Box Number

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
1	MEMO	FROM INR RE MOSCOW AND THE MIDDLE EAST RESULTS AND PROSPECTS (#1)	13 ^{mvh 3/12/08}	7/31/1987
6	NONPAPER	RE MIDDLE EAST (#2)	7 ^{mvh 3/12/08}	ND
7	PAPER	RE MIDDLE EAST (#3)	3 ^{mvh 3/12/08}	ND

FILE INDEX FOR SOVIET & MIDDLE EAST FILE FOR DENNIS ROSS

<u>NO.</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
A	Brzezinski Memo re: Relations w/Radical Arabs	Jan 16, 1980
1	Anticipating Soviet Responses on the Middle East	Undated
2	NONPAPER	Undated
3	Middle East Talking Points for Shevardnadze	Feb 17, 1988
4	Cable re: US/Soviet Regional Expert Exchanges on Iran-Iraq War	Jul 6, 1987
5	Murphy-Polyakov Exchange on Iran-Iraq War	Jul 7, 1987
6	Cable: Murphy-Polyakov Meeting:Afghanistan	Jul 8, 1987
7	State Memo re: Moscow & Middle East-Results and Prospects	Jul 31, 1987



8721939

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

~~SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON~~

July 31, 1987

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

TO: The Secretary

FROM: INR - Curtis W. Kamman, Acting *W.K.*

SUBJECT: Moscow and the Middle East - Results and Prospects

Under Gorbachev, the Soviets have made some significant gains in the Middle East. Increasingly, a Soviet role in the affairs of the region is taken as a given by the Arabs and Western Europeans. Attached is a short overview of the USSR's current approach, with annexes detailing policy toward the Arab-Israeli peace process and the Gulf. It concludes that:

- While goals and strategy have remained fairly constant, Soviet policy has been more vigorous and imaginative.
- To give credibility to their traditional calls for an international conference, the Soviets have begun a dialogue with Israel, pushed PLO unity, and shown a greater willingness to pressure Syria.
- Regional developments and changing perceptions have enabled the Soviets to improve relations with moderate Arab states like Jordan and Egypt.
- In the Gulf, the Soviets have used Arab fears of Iran to develop relations with the GCC states and maintain ties with Kuwait and Iraq, while simultaneously exploiting Iran's fears of a confrontation with the US.
- US setbacks or inactivity have contributed to Soviet successes, allowing Moscow to pose as an alternative.
- While the US is losing its monopoly over Middle East diplomacy, the USSR will be in no position to challenge US dominance any time in the next few years. A US confrontation with Iran, however, while posing risks for Moscow, could also improve the relative Soviet position.

Attachment:
As stated

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS M1448 #1By AM, NARA, Date 12/8/08~~SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON~~

Drafted: INR/SEE:WLimberg
7/30/87 x79212

MOSCOW AND THE MIDDLE EAST: RESULTS AND PROSPECTS

Recent Inroads

For years, it was commonplace to talk of the Soviet role in the Middle East as circumscribed and the USSR as being limited to dealing with radical Arab states such as Syria, South Yemen, Libya, and Iraq. Gorbachev has not entirely reversed this, but under his leadership the Soviets have advanced their claims to a role in the region. To a large extent, a psychological barrier may have already been breached. Even conservatives like the Saudis seem more willing to accept Soviet participation in regional affairs. Over the last two years, the Soviets have:

- further improved their relations with the moderate Arabs, including Kuwait, Jordan, the YAR, and Egypt;
- established diplomatic relations with the UAE and Oman and expanded contacts with Saudi Arabia, including a first-ever visit to Moscow by a Saudi cabinet minister; -
- reestablished their role as the superpower patron of the PLO, even at the cost of potential friction with Syria;
- opened a dialogue with Israel, thus addressing one of the major obstacles to their regional influence over the last 20 years; and
- won wider acceptance both in the region and in Western Europe for their role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and in the Gulf. Their prepcom idea has won both UN and EC endorsement, for example.

At the same time, the Soviets have preserved their working relationship with Syria, regained some lost ground in Iraq, and maintained contacts with Iran at a time when US-Iranian relations remain frozen. In addition, Moscow weathered a coup in South Yemen and has managed to sustain a cordial relationship with Libya even while keeping distance between itself and Qadhafi.

New Nimbleness

Overall Soviet goals and strategy have changed little. Moscow has a major interest in the region due to its proximity to the USSR and importance for the West. Increasingly, the USSR has come to see the Middle East as a testing ground of its superpower status. Ideally, the Soviets would like a group of quiescent, friendly states along its southern flank and a major reduction in western--especially US--influence. In terms of immediate objectives, this means regaining a role in the peace

process, maintaining a balance between Iran and Iraq while preventing a greater US military presence in the Gulf, and expanding ties with the moderate and conservative Arabs.

Moscow still sees Syria and the PLO as key to their Arab-Israeli policy and an international conference as the best means of assuring a Soviet role in any future negotiations. In the Gulf, they regard Iran as the great prize (but recognize there is little chance of closer ties so long as Khomeini remains on the scene).

The Soviets have exhibited greater vigor and imagination in pursuing these goals over the the last two years. The pace of Soviet policy under Gorbachev contrasts sharply with the lack of dynamism that beset Soviet policy in the late Brezhnev period. Given the USSR's superpower status and interests in the region, its low standing was, to use Gorbachev's phrase, "abnormal." Some gains were all but inevitable.

The most dramatic example of the new approach has been the opening of a dialogue with Israel. Moscow also moved to resolve the knotty debt issue that had plagued Soviet-Egyptian relations for years, and it was quick to agree to leasing tankers to Kuwait, despite the risks to the ships and crews and to relations with Iran.

Style Leads to Substance

These changes have largely been ones of style and emphasis, but they have resulted in some shifts in traditional Soviet positions and suggest a different cost/benefit analysis is at work. As their arms shipments to Iraq, recent provision of MiG-29s to Syria, and escorting of their ships in the Gulf show, the Soviets still accept the need and utility of military power in the region.

They seem, however, increasingly sensitive to the dangers of exploiting regional tensions, putting greater stress on international, especially UN, action to settle disputes. This has not been at the expense of bilateral ties or interests, however. Indeed, Moscow has tended to use UN action as a device for advancing its own relations with regional states. The Soviets were, for example, quick to support the UN resolution calling for an end to the Iran-Iraq war and have used it as a foundation for discussions with both combatants.

While the Soviets may well want an end to hostilities, even if only temporary, in order to undercut the case for a larger US presence in the region, there is no real indication they have pressured either Iran or Iraq to honor the call for a ceasefire. Publicly they have accused the US of being the first to fail to abide by the UN resolution, and they have shown no readiness to support sanctions.

Emphasis on international action in part assures the USSR a role and increases the appeal of Soviet initiatives. The pre-com idea played to French and even Chinese interests by including all the permanent members of the UN Security Council, while enabling the Soviets to claim a sincere interest in a peaceful solution; it also got around the sticky issue of Palestinian representation.

On the Palestinian issue itself, Moscow has on occasion suggested that the PLO need not be formally represented as an organization at an international conference. Yet, when pressed, the Soviets have tended to retreat to earlier positions, suggesting that they are still thinking the issues through.

New Opportunities

Still, Soviet gains in the Middle East cannot be solely explained by new leaders or new policies. Moscow has also profited from regional developments. The deepening US-Israeli relationship and questions of US reliability have made the Arabs more receptive to Soviet overtures. Syria's dire economic situation has given Moscow greater room for maneuver in the peace process and on relations with Israel and the PLO and has enabled it to press Syria to moderate its tilt toward Iran. The us-Iranian standoff has allowed Moscow to play both sides in the Gulf.

Peace Process: Continuing Contradictions

Successes notwithstanding, Soviet policy still faces many of the same obstacles and contradictions that plagued it in the past. Syrian-PLO differences are likely to persist, with Moscow often caught in the middle. A key element in recent Soviet successes has been the absence of real alternatives to Soviet initiatives on the peace process. Until US efforts were renewed this spring, the Soviets had the field largely to themselves. This gave Soviet policy a resonance that may have surprised even Moscow.

The Soviet reaction to the recent increase in interest in an international conference suggests that Moscow realizes that this situation may be changing. They now see a risk of the US subverting or co-opting the effort, and are again insisting that a conference cannot be a rubber stamp for "separate deals." While the idea of a conference, with Soviet participation, is today all but a given, the Soviets recognize that Israeli assent is a sine qua non for realistic movement toward a conference, and that only the US--possibly acting in concert with the West Europeans--is able to broker an arrangement acceptable to Tel Aviv.

The Soviets are thus unlikely to have any illusions of permanently replacing the dominant US role in the peace process. Moreover, they no doubt recognize the difficulties of "delivering" their own clients--Syria and the PLO--to the negotiating table. Indeed, this was one of the reasons behind their prepcom proposal.

The Gulf: Greater Uncertainty

Even if the war in the Gulf ends, the USSR will have difficulty balancing relations with Iran and Iraq. Indeed, an end to the war could present new problems to the extent it freed Iran to aid the mujahidin in Afghanistan and led to a rekindling of traditional Iraqi-Syrian hostilities.

Similarly, while the Soviets do not want US-Iranian relations restored and see certain benefits from continued tensions, there are risks for them as well. A US-Iranian confrontation--especially if it involved major US military action--could create new openings for Moscow in Tehran. Although the Soviets would not come to Iran's aid militarily, they would offer sympathy, political and propaganda support, and possibly economic assistance, in hopes of ingratiating themselves with the Iranians while stimulating global condemnation of the US. Eventually, they might provide some military resupply.

Military action which was insufficient to deter Tehran from its present course could lead the GCC states to reassess relations with Washington and create new opportunities for the USSR there as well. It would also, however, tend to reduce Soviet leverage on Iran and increase pressure on Moscow to choose between Iran and the Arabs.

If, on the other hand, such action by the US succeeded in forcing Tehran to halt its attacks on Gulf shipping and move toward a ceasefire with Iraq, US credibility among the GCC states would be bolstered and the end result would likely be a strengthening of the US position and presence in the Gulf. The probable lack of meaningful Soviet assistance to Iran would mean that any near-term improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations would be marginal at best.

Staying the Course

From long and painful experience, the Soviets are well aware of the transitory nature of successes and failures in the Middle East. Increasingly, they have come to reject the notion that US-Soviet rivalry in the region is a zero-sum game. They probably are reasonably satisfied with their progress over the last two years under Gorbachev and--for the first time in

nearly a decade--even guardedly optimistic that, while they may still be confined to playing the margins, those margins are growing larger.

Annex I: Moscow and the Peace Process

Annex II: Moscow and the Gulf

ANNEX I

MOSCOW AND THE PEACE PROCESS

The Soviets have long enjoyed near exclusive rights to the idea of an international conference on the Middle East. They probably saw the breakdown of the Arafat-Hussein dialogue in 1986 and the lack of any promising US initiative as breathing new life into their approach.

Until recently, Moscow probably had few expectations of actually seeing a conference convened but felt it was making some headway in developing regional support. The prepcom idea received wide approval, including UN and EC endorsement, and even Israel and the US did not entirely reject the idea of Soviet participation in the peace effort.

The Peres-Hussein initiative calling for an international conference, however, may have caught the Soviets off balance. Although it failed due to Peres' inability to win domestic support, the Soviets still seem concerned that they may be maneuvered into rubber-stamping direct negotiations. As a result, their position has stiffened:

--In late April, MFA spokesman Gerasimov insisted that the USSR would not accept any condition imposed by Israel in order to participate in a peace conference.

--TASS on May 23 asserted that an international conference must not be used as a "cover for separate deals...of the Camp David kind."

--IMEMO head Primakov in June told a US academic that the USSR could envisage a conference which served as an umbrella for one-on-one negotiating sessions but insisted that each member of the conference's plenary must be able to veto agreements reached in these sessions.

--Earlier the Soviets had suggested privately that Palestinian interests could be represented by individual Palestinians--possibly as part of another, presumably Jordanian, delegation--and not the PLO. They have now, at least publicly, returned to insisting that the PLO is the sole, legitimate voice of the Palestinian people.

The Soviets undoubtedly intend to regain the initiative and may push for convening the prepcom as early as January 1988.

To add credibility to their efforts and ensure themselves access to the peace process, the Soviets will continue to put a premium on gaining the cooperation of Syria and the PLO.

- The collapse of the Hussein-Arafat discussions together with Assad's preoccupation with other problems enabled the Soviets to repair relations with Arafat and the mainline PLO.
- Moscow sided with the PLO during the camp war in Lebanon last year and worked behind the scenes to see that the PNC this spring was a success.
- The Soviets are now in a better position to influence PLO policy. For the first time, the Palestinian Communist party has a representative on the PLO executive committee and DFLP and PFLP influence has grown, limiting Arafat's freedom of maneuver.
- Moscow recognized that support for the PLO would antagonize Syria and met the problem head on. During Assad's visit to Moscow in April, Gorbachev pressed him to support, or at least not hinder, PLO reunification.
- He also urged Syria to reduce its support for Iran, repair ties with Iraq, and be more forthcoming in its support for an international conference, lines Gorbachev repeated in his July 3 letter to Assad.
- While far from satisfied with Syrian compliance, Moscow recognizes it must balance pressure with incentives. After nearly a year's delay, Syria received its first delivery of MiG-29 fighters this month, and Moscow has also begun delivery of \$300 million worth of spare parts promised during Assad's trip to Moscow in April.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have also been working on the third and newest leg of their peace diplomacy, Israel.

- The Soviet-Israeli dialogue has continued and reportedly deepened. [REDACTED]

- A Soviet consular delegation is currently in Jerusalem. While insisting that its mandate is limited to normal consular concerns, it may well suggest discussions of the peace process and bilateral relations before ending its two- or three-month stay.

- The Soviets have begun to prepare the Arabs: while Assad was in Moscow in April, Gorbachev publicly referred to the lack of relations with Israel as "abnormal."

- Still, the Soviets are proceeding cautiously. They have blurred the issue of just when they would reestablish

ties with Israel. Over the last year or so, they have implied that ties could be normalized in the course of an international conference. Recent comments suggest that they are returning to their traditional position--that relations could be restored once a settlement had been achieved.

ANNEX II

MOSCOW AND THE GULF

While concerned that the situation in the Gulf could result in an increased US military presence in the region, Moscow has not hesitated to exploit available opportunities to improve its standing in the region at US expense.

- The Soviets responded quickly and positively to Kuwait's request last November to lease tankers, going ahead with the deal even after it became clear that the US would be playing an even larger role.
- Soviet naval units in the Gulf began escorting Soviet merchantmen carrying arms for Iraq after the Iranian attack on one such ship last September. The Soviets increased their naval presence--adding two additional minesweepers--in April.
- A May 6 Iranian attack on a Soviet ship, followed by the Stark incident, probably only confirmed Moscow's decision to continue a military role. It has kept its naval presence small, however--in part because of limited capabilities, but also in order to play on regional fears of superpower involvement and overreaction.

The attack on the Stark fueled Soviet concern over escalation of the Gulf war and greater US involvement; Moscow seemed especially worried that the US would use the incident to justify a larger military presence.

- Following the Stark incident, the pace of Soviet diplomacy on the Gulf quickened. Even before the incident, the Soviets had hinted at the need for some kind of international shipping regime; in late May, they began to talk more openly of international guarantees of Gulf shipping under the umbrella of an Indian Ocean zone of peace.
- In the UN, the Soviets indicated their support early on for a US-authored resolution calling for an end to the Iran-Iraq war. Moscow had introduced a similar resolution in January following the Iranian offensive against al Faw.

Moscow also moved to take advantage of Iran's fear of a confrontation with the US and to polish its image as "honest broker."

- In mid-June, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov traveled to Tehran, ostensibly to reciprocate Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati's February visit to Moscow. Vorontsov apparently repeated public Soviet warnings

against further attacks on Soviet shipping in the Gulf and may also have tested Tehran's reaction to the UN resolution.

- Within two days of his Iranian visit, Vorontsov was off to Baghdad to brief the Iraqis.
- The last two weeks of June saw the Soviets focusing on the Gulf: Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan's visit to Moscow was followed by a Vorontsov meeting with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani in Geneva. On the heels of these meetings came the late June De Cuellar and Walters visits to Moscow.
- Moscow indicated its support for the UN resolution in all these sessions, apparently emphasizing different passages depending on the audience. It continued to temporize on the question of sanctions, however, leading the Iranians to believe that the Soviet approach was in keeping with their own. This view may have been shared by the Arabs; there were signs of displeasure with Moscow's handling of the issue.
- In the meantime, Moscow pursued its own approach: on July 3 an official government statement called for a removal of all non-regional warships from the Gulf, blamed the US for increased tensions, and endorsed UN action--without, however, mentioning anything about means of enforcing a UN resolution.
- Moscow also put off answering the President's letter on the Gulf until July 19. Then, while indicating that they might be open to an experts' meeting at the UN, the Soviets made it fairly clear that Shevardnadze would not be attending.
- Through July, the Soviets were careful not to appear to be obstructing a solution to the war or following the US lead. While recognizing its July 3 call for "radical measures" to improve the Gulf situation had little chance of being accepted, Moscow kept reiterating it. Once the UN resolution was passed, the Soviets accused the US of continuing to exploit the situation in the Gulf.
- Since the passage of the UN resolution, the Soviets have been relatively silent on the issue of sanctions, arguing that the UNSYG should have time to work out a solution. They would be extremely reluctant to support a sanctions resolution and probably calculate, given French and Chinese resistance to the idea, that they will not be forced to take a position.

--The Soviets may be willing to move ahead on the economic front with Iran; there are reports--mostly from the Iranians, who have a vested interest in portraying relations in the best light--of a deal to use the Soviet-Iranian gas line to transport Iranian oil.

--Still, the Soviets are careful to protect their Arab flank and continue to supply Iraq with the majority of its military needs.

Vorontsov's current round of diplomacy (he arrived in Baghdad July 29 and is scheduled to visit Iran shortly) seems primarily aimed at reinforcing Moscow's peacemaker image and underscoring its ability--unlike the US--to talk to both sides. The UN resolution appears to be the main topic of conversation, and Moscow is probably attempting to convince both sides that it serves their needs.

Nonetheless, there is no sign that Moscow is pressuring either Iran or Iraq to honor the cease-fire. Indeed, its claims that the US is already failing to abide by the resolution lead in the opposite direction.



8721939

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

~~SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON~~

July 31, 1987

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/SBLP
7/31

P.C.W.

W.K.

M.V.C.

ARP

NGA

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TO: The Secretary

FROM: INR - Curtis W. Kamman, Acting *W.K.*

SUBJECT: Moscow and the Middle East - Results and Prospects

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Attachment:
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS E94-02812 #55

By *W*, NARA, Date 3/26/99~~SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON~~

DECL: OADR

Drafted: INR/SEE:WLimberg
7/30/87 x79212

MOSCOW AND THE MIDDLE EAST: RESULTS AND PROSPECTS

Recent Inroads

For years, it was commonplace to talk of the Soviet role in the Middle East as circumscribed and the USSR as being limited to dealing with radical Arab states such as Syria, South Yemen, Libya, and Iraq. Gorbachev has not entirely reversed this, but under his leadership the Soviets have advanced their claims to a role in the region. To a large extent, a psychological barrier may have already been breached. Even conservatives like the Saudis seem more willing to accept Soviet participation in regional affairs. Over the last two years, the Soviets have:

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Still, Soviet gains in the Middle East cannot be solely explained by new leaders or new policies. Moscow has also profited from regional developments. The deepening US-Israeli relationship and questions of US reliability have made the Arabs more receptive to Soviet overtures. Syria's dire economic situation has given Moscow greater room for maneuver in the peace process and on relations with Israel and the PLO and has enabled it to press Syria to moderate its tilt toward Iran. The us-Iranian standoff has allowed Moscow to play both sides in the Gulf.

Peace Process: Continuing Contradictions

Successes notwithstanding, Soviet policy still faces many of the same obstacles and contradictions that plagued it in the past. Syrian-PLO differences are likely to persist, with Moscow often caught in the middle. A key element in recent Soviet successes has been the absence of real alternatives to Soviet initiatives on the peace process. Until US efforts were renewed this spring, the Soviets had the field largely to themselves. This gave Soviet policy a resonance that may have surprised even Moscow.

The Soviet reaction to the recent increase in interest in an international conference suggests that Moscow realizes that this situation may be changing. They now see a risk of the US subverting or co-opting the effort, and are again insisting that a conference cannot be a rubber stamp for "separate deals." While the idea of a conference, with Soviet participation, is today all but a given, the Soviets recognize that Israeli assent is a sine qua non for realistic movement toward a conference, and that only the US--possibly acting in concert with the West Europeans--is able to broker an arrangement acceptable to Tel Aviv.

The Soviets are thus unlikely to have any illusions of permanently replacing the dominant US role in the peace process. Moreover, they no doubt recognize the difficulties of "delivering" their own clients--Syria and the PLO--to the negotiating table. Indeed, this was one of the reasons behind their prepcom proposal.

The Gulf: Greater Uncertainty

Even if the war in the Gulf ends, the USSR will have difficulty balancing relations with Iran and Iraq. Indeed, an end to the war could present new problems to the extent it freed Iran to aid the mujahidin in Afghanistan and led to a rekindling of traditional Iraqi-Syrian hostilities.

Similarly, while the Soviets do not want US-Iranian relations restored and see certain benefits from continued tensions, there are risks for them as well. A US-Iranian confrontation--especially if it involved major US military action--could create new openings for Moscow in Tehran. Although the Soviets would not come to Iran's aid militarily, they would offer sympathy, political and propaganda support, and possibly economic assistance, in hopes of ingratiating themselves with the Iranians while stimulating global condemnation of the US. Eventually, they might provide some military resupply.

Military action which was insufficient to deter Tehran from its present course could lead the GCC states to reassess relations with Washington and create new opportunities for the USSR there as well. It would also, however, tend to reduce Soviet leverage on Iran and increase pressure on Moscow to choose between Iran and the Arabs.

If, on the other hand, such action by the US succeeded in forcing Tehran to halt its attacks on Gulf shipping and move toward a ceasefire with Iraq, US credibility among the GCC states would be bolstered and the end result would likely be a strengthening of the US position and presence in the Gulf. The probable lack of meaningful Soviet assistance to Iran would mean that any near-term improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations would be marginal at best.

Staying the Course

From long and painful experience, the Soviets are well aware of the transitory nature of successes and failures in the Middle East. Increasingly, they have come to reject the notion that US-Soviet rivalry in the region is a zero-sum game. They probably are reasonably satisfied with their progress over the last two years under Gorbachev and--for the first time in

nearly a decade--even guardedly optimistic that, while they may still be confined to playing the margins, those margins are growing larger.

Annex I: Moscow and the Peace Process

Annex II: Moscow and the Gulf

ANNEX I

MOSCOW AND THE PEACE PROCESS

The Soviets have long enjoyed near exclusive rights to the idea of an international conference on the Middle East. They probably saw the breakdown of the Arafat-Hussein dialogue in 1986 and the lack of any promising US initiative as breathing new life into their approach.

Until recently, Moscow probably had few expectations of actually seeing a conference convened but felt it was making some headway in developing regional support. The prepcom idea received wide approval, including UN and EC endorsement, and even Israel and the US did not entirely reject the idea of Soviet participation in the peace effort.

The Peres-Hussein initiative calling for an international conference, however, may have caught the Soviets off balance. Although it failed due to Peres' inability to win domestic support, the Soviets still seem concerned that they may be maneuvered into rubber-stamping direct negotiations. As a result, their position has stiffened:

--In late April, MFA spokesman Gerasimov insisted that the USSR would not accept any condition imposed by Israel in order to participate in a peace conference.

--TASS on May 23 asserted that an international conference must not be used as a "cover for separate deals...of the Camp David kind."

--Earlier the Soviets had suggested privately that Palestinian interests could be represented by individual Palestinians--possibly as part of another, presumably Jordanian, delegation--and not the PLO. They have now, at least publicly, returned to insisting that the PLO is the sole, legitimate voice of the Palestinian people.

The Soviets undoubtedly intend to regain the initiative and may push for convening the prepcom as early as January 1988.

To add credibility to their efforts and ensure themselves access to the peace process, the Soviets will continue to put a premium on gaining the cooperation of Syria and the PLO.

- The collapse of the Hussein-Arafat discussions together with Assad's preoccupation with other problems enabled the Soviets to repair relations with Arafat and the mainline PLO.
- Moscow sided with the PLO during the camp war in Lebanon last year and worked behind the scenes to see that the PNC this spring was a success.
- The Soviets are now in a better position to influence PLO policy. For the first time, the Palestinian Communist party has a representative on the PLO executive committee and DFLP and PFLP influence has grown, limiting Arafat's freedom of maneuver.

[REDACTED]

Meanwhile, the Soviets have also been working on the third and newest leg of their peace diplomacy, Israel.

[REDACTED]

- A Soviet consular delegation is currently in Jerusalem. While insisting that its mandate is limited to normal consular concerns, it may well suggest discussions of the peace process and bilateral relations before ending its two- or three-month stay.
- The Soviets have begun to prepare the Arabs: while Assad was in Moscow in April, Gorbachev publicly referred to the lack of relations with Israel as "abnormal."
- Still, the Soviets are proceeding cautiously. They have blurred the issue of just when they would reestablish

ties with Israel. Over the last year or so, they have implied that ties could be normalized in the course of an international conference. Recent comments suggest that they are returning to their traditional position--that relations could be restored once a settlement had been achieved.

ANNEX II

MOSCOW AND THE GULF

While concerned that the situation in the Gulf could result in an increased US military presence in the region, Moscow has not hesitated to exploit available opportunities to improve its standing in the region at US expense.

--The Soviets responded quickly and positively to Kuwait's request last November to lease tankers, going ahead with the deal even after it became clear that the US would be playing an even larger role.

--Soviet naval units in the Gulf began escorting Soviet merchantmen carrying arms for Iraq after the Iranian attack on one such ship last September. The Soviets increased their naval presence--adding two additional minesweepers--in April.

--A May 6 Iranian attack on a Soviet ship, followed by the Stark incident, probably only confirmed Moscow's decision to continue a military role. It has kept its naval presence small, however--in part because of limited capabilities, but also in order to play on regional fears of superpower involvement and overreaction.

The attack on the Stark fueled Soviet concern over escalation of the Gulf war and greater US involvement; Moscow seemed especially worried that the US would use the incident to justify a larger military presence.

--Following the Stark incident, the pace of Soviet diplomacy on the Gulf quickened. Even before the incident, the Soviets had hinted at the need for some kind of international shipping regime; in late May, they began to talk more openly of international guarantees of Gulf shipping under the umbrella of an Indian Ocean zone of peace.

--In the UN, the Soviets indicated their support early on for a US-authored resolution calling for an end to the Iran-Iraq war. Moscow had introduced a similar resolution in January following the Iranian offensive against al Faw.

Moscow also moved to take advantage of Iran's fear of a confrontation with the US and to polish its image as "honest broker."

--In mid-June, First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov traveled to Tehran, ostensibly to reciprocate Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati's February visit to Moscow. Vorontsov apparently repeated public Soviet warnings

against further attacks on Soviet shipping in the Gulf and may also have tested Tehran's reaction to the UN resolution.

--Within two days of his Iranian visit, Vorontsov was off to Baghdad to brief the Iraqis.

--The last two weeks of June saw the Soviets focusing on the Gulf: Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan's visit to Moscow was followed by a Vorontsov meeting with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani in Geneva. On the heels of these meetings came the late June De Cuellar and Walters visits to Moscow.

--Moscow indicated its support for the UN resolution in all these sessions, apparently emphasizing different passages depending on the audience. It continued to temporize on the question of sanctions, however, leading the Iranians to believe that the Soviet approach was in keeping with their own. This view may have been shared by the Arabs; there were signs of displeasure with Moscow's handling of the issue.

--In the meantime, Moscow pursued its own approach: on July 3 an official government statement called for a removal of all non-regional warships from the Gulf, blamed the US for increased tensions, and endorsed UN action--without, however, mentioning anything about means of enforcing a UN resolution.

--Moscow also put off answering the President's letter on the Gulf until July 19. Then, while indicating that they might be open to an experts' meeting at the UN, the Soviets made it fairly clear that Shevardnadze would not be attending.

--Through July, the Soviets were careful not to appear to be obstructing a solution to the war or following the US lead. While recognizing its July 3 call for "radical measures" to improve the Gulf situation had little chance of being accepted, Moscow kept reiterating it. Once the UN resolution was passed, the Soviets accused the US of continuing to exploit the situation in the Gulf.

--Since the passage of the UN resolution, the Soviets have been relatively silent on the issue of sanctions, arguing that the UNSYG should have time to work out a solution. They would be extremely reluctant to support a sanctions resolution and probably calculate, given French and Chinese resistance to the idea, that they will not be forced to take a position.

--The Soviets may be willing to move ahead on the economic front with Iran; there are reports--mostly from the Iranians, who have a vested interest in portraying relations in the best light--of a deal to use the Soviet-Iranian gas line to transport Iranian oil.

--Still, the Soviets are careful to protect their Arab flank and continue to supply Iraq with the majority of its military needs.

Verontsov's current round of diplomacy (he arrived in Baghdad July 29 and is scheduled to visit Iran shortly) seems primarily aimed at reinforcing Moscow's peacemaker image and underscoring its ability--unlike the US--to talk to both sides. The UN resolution appears to be the main topic of conversation, and Moscow is probably attempting to convince both sides that it serves their needs.

Nonetheless, there is no sign that Moscow is pressuring either Iran or Iraq to honor the cease-fire. Indeed, its claims that the US is already failing to abide by the resolution lead in the opposite direction.

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By smf NARA, Date 12/9/05



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520

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January 16, 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
THE WHITE HOUSE

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Subject: US Relations with the Radical Arabs

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(d)

We find the [redacted] memorandum on US Relations with the Radical Arabs to be an excellent assessment of the limits and opportunities for improved relations within the context of our present policies. Because the CIA analysis predated the recent Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, its basic conclusions may be more pessimistic than warranted by the new configuration of attitudes and events that have followed in its wake within the Arab and Islamic world. While it would be too optimistic to believe that the radical Arabs will want warmer relations with the US as a consequence of Soviet behavior in Afghanistan, new opportunities may present themselves as suspicions of Soviet intentions increase among some of the Arab countries in question. The basic tendency among the radical Arab states, however, will remain unfavorable to any conspicuously closer relationship to the United States -- largely because of our identification with Israel and what these states consider to be an anti-revolutionary bias in the United States. — *a desire to initiate US interests, presence and influence in the area*

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(d)

As the [redacted] study points out, our relations with the Arab radicals are in large measure a function of our attitude toward the Palestinians and their most widely recognized representative, the PLO. As long as we maintain our present position on the PLO and as long as the Palestinians do not see an independent state in their future, progress on those other fronts is likely to be limited. The Sovietization of Afghanistan, if it continues, could in time become an accepted part of the political landscape of the region, and the Palestinian issue will reappear as the touchstone of the quality of our relations with the radical Arabs.

As Amended

The [redacted] analysis suggests a number of policy options that could improve our relations with the radical Arabs during the next year. Other steps, some of which are already being implemented, are listed below. Highlighted

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Things
improving
as the area
and visa
for the future
of the region
is a comparison
with ours.

But how
far do we
want to
go in
improving
these relations?

What are the
payoffs for us?
The impact on our
friends?

Even if
we fail
to have a
state with
a revolution
as its
capital, in
the long run
it's a
major step
in the
process.

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- 2 -

for the President's attention are those measures which will require basic, high-level policy decisions before they can be implemented.

The following policies are designed to fulfill the objective of broadening our relations with the radicals in such a way as to avoid hurting the good relations that we now enjoy with our friends in the area. They will have to be calibrated carefully in order to achieve this dual objective.

(1) Influencing attitudes, opening lines of communication:

-- We already have in process a sustained publicity campaign tailored to the radicals highlighting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and pointing up: (a) the dangers and liabilities of close relations with the USSR and the Bloc countries and (b) the anti-Muslim nature of atheistic Communism. We are also continuing our efforts, begun last fall, to keep the close relationship between Cuba and the USSR before the non-aligned countries, including the radical Arabs. While the radicals' response may ultimately be "a pox on both your houses", more distance between them and the Soviets is in itself to the advantage of the US. This idea presents no risk for our relations with the moderates, unless it is seen as exaggerated or meddling.

-- We have begun, and will continue, to give greater public recognition to the values, contributions and heritage of the Islamic faith, which is a galvanizing force in the radical states as much as in the conservative and moderate states. ICA and private organizations are already organizing efforts in this direction. We will recommend specific themes for inclusion by the President in his speeches and other public statements (along the lines of his November 28, 1979, press conference) and in a declaration honoring the 14th Centennial of Islam.

-- We are encouraging the initiation of contacts through private and religious groups in the US with the many Islamic organizations, such as the Islamic Conference and the World Muslim Conference, which are composed of moderates and radicals alike. There are many potential areas of mutual interest, as has been demonstrated over the years by

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meetings of Catholic, Protestant and Jewish organizations in the US and abroad.

-- We are engaging in a more concerted effort to communicate with the radicals through moderates in the area. Pakistan, which maintains good relations with several radical states including Libya, could become useful in this respect. We have quietly encouraged Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco in their efforts to convene a conference of Islamic states on Afghanistan to which they hope to attract at least some of the Islamic radicals. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco, all members for the present of the Baghdad rejectionist front, could be encouraged to do more in counseling moderation by the radicals in instances in which encouragement of "Islamic solidarity" can be expected to overcome antipathy toward what the radicals perceive to be royalist, "reactionary" regimes. In addition, Turkey has been showing more interest in involving itself in regional questions and could serve as a natural bridge between the Muslim world and the West. More indirect, but also useful, are the channels we use between our European friends and radical states on a number of important questions.

-- In the longer term, we plan to broaden our contacts and dealings with the Tunis-based Arab League. The rump League, currently led by a moderate and friendly Tunisian, could serve as another channel of communication to a large part of the Islamic world, including radical states. Its representatives already enjoy diplomatic status in several European countries. We will, of course, be careful not to undermine Egypt and the Camp David Accords in the process of such contacts, and will tailor our actions accordingly.

(2) Offering specific forms of economic and political assistance:

-- We are increasing humanitarian aid through relief organizations to present victims of conflicts and natural disasters. A separate paper is being prepared on the Afghan refugees in Pakistan for the January 17 SCC meeting. We have recently increased our Title II aid for refugees in Somalia and consideration could be given to

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- 4 -

increasing aid to refugees in and from southern Lebanon as a gesture of political support that would coincide with Arab concerns. This is an area where a small amount of money goes a long way and where we are morally shielded from any criticism of a shift in policy from our friends. We will provide the NSC with a paper detailing this proposal.

-- As opportunities arise we will keep under close review the possibilities for dampening flash points involving Arab states, including radical Arab states, especially in situations where such conflicts might rebound to our disadvantage. Examples are the Western Sahara, the Yemens, Egypt/Libya, and Iraq/Iran. Our approach could include supporting initiatives by the UN Secretary General, Arab third countries, international organizations (OAU, Arab League, Red Cross), and prominent international figures. It could also take the form of increased humanitarian aid and technical, logistical, and financial assistance in appropriate cases, e.g. West Bank, Lebanon, and the Sahara.

(3) Addressing the underlying substantive political concerns that motivate the radical Arabs:

-- We can continue to take advantage of opportunities to give public recognition, at a high level, to the achievements of genuine, popular revolutions. This was done at the 25th anniversary commemoration of the Algerian revolution. Another occasion will be the official visit to the US of Algerian President Bendjedid, if he accepts. A second revolutionary Arab (or successor to a revolutionary Arab heritage) could be invited at a later date, depending on the results of the Bendjedid trip and other circumstances at the time.

✓ -- We will continue to attach a high priority to taking a forthcoming stance in the North-South dialogue. For their own reasons, Algeria and Iraq are actively pursuing a leadership role in the dialogue and are particularly striving to overcome the differences between oil producers and other LDCs which have become more apparent during the past year. We should avoid giving any appearance of trying to divide the two groups. This dialogue will develop in any case; it is to our advantage to be involved when the terms are still somewhat favorable to us and not risk being isolated at a later date. We will provide the NSC with a paper detailing the costs and benefits of possible approaches in this area.

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- 5 -

-- We can seek some accommodation on energy with the radical oil producers Iraq, Algeria, and Libya, either singly or together with the moderate oil producing states in the region, to reduce the risk of future confrontations over energy prices and supplies. All three want to maximize their revenues through both higher prices and higher production levels. Iraq is particularly important because it is the only Persian Gulf State with sufficiently large known oil reserves to support a substantial increase in production. The Iraqi Oil Minister has recently said that his country would like to see a more orderly oil market with stable prices and balanced supply and demand.

Any formal arrangement would entail a significant change in US oil policy, e.g., modification of a free market oriented policy and a less anti-OPEC stance. We will provide the NSC with a paper detailing possible approaches.

* -- We are reviewing how to deal with the Palestinian debate in the UN with our objective centered on making progress on difficult problems rather than on rhetorical exchanges. There may be a way for us to recognize Palestinian rights (and perhaps even the concept of self-determination), as defined in votes in the UNGA and Israel. However, any movement in this direction will be fiercely resisted by Israel (and perhaps Egypt because of timing considerations); we must also weigh the costs in terms of our objectives of making progress in the autonomy negotiations. We will prepare a paper on this subject for potential consideration at a PRC meeting.

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- 6 -

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(d)

Country Review

The discussions in the second half of the [redacted] study regarding our bilateral relations with radical Arabs is a well-balanced summary. It again points up the limits more than the opportunities for improving those relations in the short-term. We would make the following additional comments.

Algeria

We are already carrying on a fairly constructive dialogue with Algeria on a wide range of issues. We agree that efforts to resolve existing military, diplomatic, and energy issues may lead to only marginally stronger bilateral ties. Nevertheless, opportunities for progress in US-Algerian relations may present themselves in view of the private efforts that the Algerians have undertaken in support of our attempts to secure the release of our hostages in Iran as well as in their also private expressions of consternation about the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan.

In specific areas of our bilateral relationship: (1) while C-130 aircraft sales and military training for Algeria will pose problems (e.g., Algeria is not eligible for FMS), we have recently approved an Algerian request to establish a Military Attache in Washington; (2) we are trying to get a response from Algeria indicating interest in a visit by President Bendjedid in July of this year; (3) regarding the Western Sahara, Algeria has reacted much less strongly than expected to our proposed new military sales to Morocco. At some point, we may want to broaden our contact with the Polisario, a move which Algeria would heartily endorse and, over the longer term, we are exploring reimbursable technical assistance in agriculture, science and technology.

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(d)

Libya

The [redacted] assessment on Libya, in our opinion, paints too bleak a picture. Though certainly possible, it is not "virtually certain" that relations with Libya will deteriorate over the coming months. Indeed, quite the opposite could be true, depending on the outcome of our current high-level dialogue with Col. Qadhafi. Meaningful cooperation, as the study says, is not likely, but a modus vivendi is still possible. Also, parallel action against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan is possible, especially if a wider Islamic

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provision
once again
we understand
over Assad's
energy issues
with Libya
assured
in mind
I wonder
who's
conducting
it & how
head of it
except for
Qadhafi says
he has Carter's promise
of a basic change in
policy next year

*Libyan
refused
to go*

effort to oppose the Soviets is organized by Pakistan and other Islamic states. The thrust of our current policy has been and remains to accentuate the areas of positive relationship through cooperation in such fields as culture, technology and education.

Iraq

Since Afghanistan, Iraq has betrayed increased nervousness about Soviet intentions and is considering amending its treaty of friendship and cooperation with the USSR. This situation could present us with openings for increased communications. Informal arrangements for sharing information with Iraq on matters of mutual concern are currently being explored and, if implemented, could have a beneficial impact on our bilateral relationship.

Syria

As the [redacted] study states, our relations with Syria under Assad's leadership will remain strained; however, we have been able to continue a productive dialogue on Lebanon, and the Syrians are not ungrateful for our efforts to bring about Israeli restraint. *(Not as ungrateful)*

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(a)

South Yemen

We agree that the PDRY's leadership is not presently amenable to improved relations with the US. Moreover, the current PDRY drive to win over the North Yemeni government to unity on a pro-Soviet tilt is alarming Saudi Arabia. We are reviewing carefully what options we have in that context -- whether to continue cooperation with the YARG at the risk of displeasing the Saudis, whether such cooperation would hold out the promise of a successful reversal of North Yemen's apparent pro-Soviet bent, or whether to encourage Saudi efforts to change the current leadership in North Yemen. As you know, Thursday's SCC meeting on this subject will consider ways to deal with this problem.

for RGH
Peter Tarnoff
Executive Secretary

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Drafted: S/P:EMorton^{em}/NEA:PJRizik^{PR}:he
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S/P

December 17, 1979

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MEMORANDUM FOR

S/S-S (SL)

RF

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President would like your assessment of the attached paper on U.S. relations with the radical Arabs. (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment

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NLS M/448#5

BY SNF, NARA, DATE 12/9/02

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Review December 17, 1985

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SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV MEETING: AFGHANISTAN
EXDIS

*** START OF TEXT ***

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, XF, AF

SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV MEETING: AFGHANISTAN

EXDIS

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD MURPHY MET IN GENEVA JULY 6-7 WITH VLADIMIR POLYAKOV, CHIEF OF THE SOVIET MFA NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA DIVISION. THE MEETING WAS PART OF THE REGULAR CYCLE OF SENIOR REGIONAL EXPERTS EXCHANGES. DURING AN INFORMAL MOMENT IN THE COURSE OF THE JULY 7 SESSION, A/S MURPHY RAISED AFGHANISTAN. SINCE POLYAKOV'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY DOES NOT/NOT INCLUDE AFGHANISTAN, WE MADE THE DEMARCHE NOT EXPECTING A RESPONSE. POLYAKOV'S DEPUTY TOOK FULL NOTES.

3. MURPHY SAID THAT SECRETARY SHULTZ WOULD WANT TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN WHEN HE MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE. MURPHY URGED POLYAKOV TO PASS ON TO SHEVARDNADZE THE FOLLOWING POINTS, WHICH REFLECTED THE

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F94-03812 #56

BY

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NARA, DATE

3/26/99

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SECRETARY'S OWN VIEWS:

- THE AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT WAS A HIGH PRIORITY ISSUE FOR THE USG AND FOR THIS ADMINISTRATION. RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE WOULD IMPROVE DRAMATICALLY THE U.S. ABILITY TO

MOVE FORWARD ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE EAST-WEST AGENDA.

- THE U.S. WAS SURPRISED THAT KABUL HAD REFUSED FOR A SECOND TIME TO RECEIVE UN NEGOTIATOR CORDOVEZ. MOREOVER, THE USSR WAS AVOIDING DIRECT BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOP.

- THE U.S. CONSIDERED THIS CONTRADICTORY TO SOVIET PUBLIC EXPRESSIONS OF A DESIRE TO REACH AN AFGHANISTAN SETTLEMENT.

- NAJIB'S CLAIMS ASIDE, HE HAS FAILED TO PROMOTE GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

- THE U.S. ASKS THAT THE SOVIETS REVIEW THE REALITIES ON THE GROUND AND ADOPT POLITICS THAT COULD LEAD TO A VIABLE SETTLEMENT. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FURTHER DISSIPATION OF MATERIAL, MORAL, AND POLITICAL RESOURCES IN AN INCONCLUSIVE STRUGGLE.

- THE U.S. WAS READY TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT WHEN AND IF MOSCOW WAS READY TO MAKE THE CRITICAL DECISIONS TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS ON THE BASIS OF A REALISTIC TIMETABLE AND TO PERMIT GENUINE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

4. AS EXPECTED, POLYAKOV MADE NO RESPONSE.

5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

PETRONE

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SECTION: 01 OF 01

** END OF TEXT **

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 OF 07

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1489

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, JULY 6
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 GENEVA 07372

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TOKYO, USUN NEW YORK

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IZ, IR, UNSC

SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, JULY 6

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING REPORTS JULY 6 EXCHANGE BETWEEN ASSISTANT
SECRETARY MURPHY AND AMBASSADOR POLYAKOV ON THE
IRAN-IRAQ WAR.

3. A/S MURPHY MADE THE FOLLOWING PRESENTATION:

-- DESPITE THE RELATIVE LULL IN THE GROUND WAR, THE WAR
IN THE GULF HAS BECOME MUCH MORE ACTIVE AND SERIOUS
SINCE SEPTEMBER 1986.

-- SINCE THAT TIME, IRAN HAS TRIED TO PUT SPECIAL
PRESSURE ON KUWAIT TO PULL BACK IN ITS COMMITMENTS TO --
AND SUPPORT FOR -- IRAQ.

-- TEHRAN APPARENTLY MISCALCULATED KUWAIT'S LIKELY
RESPONSES. RATHER THAN ACCOMMODATING WITH IRAN, KUWAIT
HAS PURSUED A VIGOROUS LINE -- UNDERSCORING ITS SUPPORT
FOR IRAQ AND ASKING FOR OUTSIDE SUPPORT AND PROTECTION.
-- THE U.S. WAS IN THE FINAL STAGES OF REREGISTERING
ELEVEN KUWAITI TANKERS WHICH WILL THEN HAVE THE
PROTECTION OF THE U.S. NAVY.

-- WE ARE DOING THIS TO SUPPORT A FRIENDLY STATE --
KUWAIT -- AGAINST IRANIAN INTIMIDATION. SUCCESSFUL
INTIMIDATION OR COERCION BY IRAN WILL BUILD IRANIAN
WEIGHT IN THE REGION AND THE APPEAL OF THE ISLAMIC
REVOLUTION MORE GENERALLY.

-- WE ARE EXPANDING OUR MILITARY UNITS IN THE REGION TO
PROTECT OUR SHIPS AND THE REREGISTERED TANKERS. BUT OUR
AIM IS TO DETER, NOT TO PROVOKE, IRAN. THE U.S. HAD
TRIED, BOTH IN TERMS OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND PRIVATELY
THROUGH THE U.S. PROTECTIVE POWER IN IRAN, TO GET THAT
MESSAGE UNDERSTOOD IN TEHRAN.

-- WHILE WE WILL BE READY TO PROTECT OURSELVES SHOULD
IRAN SEEK A CONFRONTATION, WE THINK IRAN SHARES OUR
DESIRE TO AVOID A CONFRONTATION. WE BELIEVE THE IRANIAN
LEADERSHIP HAS NOT ONLY HEARD BUT UNDERSTANDS OUR
MESSAGE THAT WE SHARE AN INTEREST IN PRUDENT ACTIONS AND
AVOIDING AND PREVENTING HOSTILITIES.

-- HOWEVER, SHOULD THERE BE A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
U.S. AND IRAN, WE ASSUME AND TRUST THAT THE USSR WOULD
DO NOTHING TO COMPLICATE THE MATTER.

-- WE KNOW OF YOUR CHARTER ARRANGEMENTS WITH KUWAIT AS
WELL AS YOUR INCREASED NAVAL PRESENCE WITHIN THE GULF.
WE ARE AWARE OF YOUR STATEMENT THAT THE USSR WOULD TAKE

STRONG STEPS IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER IRANIAN ATTACKS ON
SOVIET MERCHANT VESSELS.

-- MEANWHILE, WE ARE VERY PLEASED AT THE DIRECTION OF
THE U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS TOGETHER IN THE SECURITY
COUNCIL.

-- WE BELIEVE THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE COUNCIL TO TAKE
A FIRM STAND ON THE WAR. THIS WAS OF COURSE THE BURDEN
OF AMBASSADOR WALTERS' DISCUSSION IN MOSCOW. THE USSR
KNEW OF THE U.S. VIEW THAT THERE MUST BE VIGOROUS
ENFORCEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION, AND WE TAKE SUPPORT OF
THIS RESOLUTION AS A MEASURE OF THE PRACTICAL -- A5

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OPPOSED TO RHETORICAL -- INTEREST THAT ANY COUNTRY HAS
IN ENDING THE WAR.

--AMBASSADOR WALTERS OUTLINED HIS VIEW OF THE NUMBERS OF
UNSC STATES LIKELY TO SUPPORT THE FIRST RESOLUTION AND
HIS STRATEGY FOR FURTHER STEPS SHOULD THE PRC ABSTAIN
FROM THE FIRST RESOLUTION. THE U. S. AND USSR BOTH HAD
GROUNDS TO ASSUME THE PRC WOULD HAVE MORE DIFFICULTY
WITH THE 2ND RESOLUTION BUT THE FIRST WOULD CARRY
WITHOUT DIFFICULT, EVEN IF THE PRC ABSTAINED.

--THE U. S. AND USSR FREQUENTLY NOTED TO EACH OTHER THAT
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR IS ONE REGIONAL ISSUE ON WHICH WE HAVE
PARALLEL INTERESTS. I HOPE WE CAN BUILD ON OUR
COOPERATION TO DATE AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 06 GENEVA 07372

NODIS

DEPT PASS MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, LONDON, PARIS, BEIJING,
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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IZ, IR, UNSC

SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, JULY 6

--SINCE THE 2ND RESOLUTION WILL BE THE EFFECTIVE ONE,
ASSUMING THE FIRST RESOLUTION IS NOT ACCEPTED BY IRAN, I
WOULD LIKE TO REVISIT A THEME WE DISCUSSED LAST YEAR.

--AS NOTED LAST YEAR, THAT ISSUE IS THE CONTINUING FLOW
OF ARMS AND MATERIEL FROM SOURCES IN EASTERN EUROPEAN TO
IRAN. WE THINK THIS IS A MOST UNHELPFUL EFFORT. WE
HOPE AND ASKED AGAIN THAT MOSCOW HELP END THIS SUPPLY
LINK.

--IT WOULD BE ALSO USEFUL IF THE USSR COULD USE
INFLUENCE ON NORTH KOREA TO RESTRICT ARMS SALES TO
IRAN. LAST YEAR, THE USSR SIMPLY NOTED THAT IRAQ HAD
MADE APPEALS TO NORTH KOREA. THESE EFFORTS BY BAGHDAD
WOULD BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED AND MADE MORE EFFECTIVE BY
SOVIET EFFORTS WITH NORTH KOREA.

--U. S. EFFORTS -- THROUGH OPERATION STAUNCH -- ARE
VIGOROUS. IF ANYTHING, THEY HAVE BECOME MORE VIGOROUS
SINCE BEFORE THE ILL-FATED IRAN INITIATIVE. THE
PRESIDENT HAS STATED THAT THIS POLICY WAS AN ABERRATION
FROM U. S. POLICY AND THAT IT WAS A MISTAKE. WE WILL NOT
PROVIDE THE IRANIANS ARMS AND WE ARE ENERGETICALLY
TRYING TO STAUNCH THE FLOW OF ARMS TO THEM FROM OUR
FRIENDS AND ALLIES. THE U. S. WAS CONVINCED THAT THAT
EFFORT CERTAINLY COMPLICATED AND MADE MORE EXPENSIVE
IRAN'S PROCUREMENT EFFORTS.

--WE ARE AWARE THAT THERE ARE ARMS SUPPLIES FROM WESTERN
SOURCES TO IRAN. WHEN WE FIND OUT ABOUT THEM WE
ACTIVELY TRY TO STOP THEM. YOU SHOULD DO THE SAME WITH
YOUR FRIENDS.

--CONSIDERING THE LANGUAGE WHICH HAS BEEN AGREED UPON

FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WE THINK SUCH A
CONTINUING FLOW OF ARMS FROM EAST OR WEST WAS
UNACCEPTABLE.

--WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IRAN WILL STOP ITS WAR EFFORT
ANY TIME SOON. BUT, THAT SAID, THE INTERNATIONAL

COMMUNITY HAS NEVER BEEN MORE GALVANIZED AS IT NOW IS
-- AND WE ALL MUST ACT TO SUPPORT THAT MOOD. PRESSURE
MUST CONTINUE -- UNTIL THE TIME IRAN RECOGNIZES THAT IT
IS NOT GOING TO WIN THE WAR AND THAT ITS OWN INTERESTS
REQUIRE THAT THE WAR END. OBVIOUSLY. ONCE THE WAR IS
OVER, U. S. MILITARY NEEDS AND REQUIREMENTS WILL BE
REDUCED.

--THE REALIZATION THAT IT CANNOT WIN WILL ONLY COME
SLOWLY IN IRAN, BUT GIVEN THE STAKES INVOLVED FOR US
BOTH IN THE REGION, IT IS AN EFFORT WE HAVE TO SUSTAIN.

--I REITERATE OUR VIEW -- WHICH I THINK YOU SHARE --
THAT THE WAR IS BAD FOR BOTH OF OUR INTERESTS. IT IS
THIS BASIC FACT WHICH ENABLES US TO COOPERATE AS WE
HAVE TO DATE.

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--WITH RESPECT TO THE MILITARY SITUATION, THE U. S. SAW THE GROUND WAR AS CURRENTLY IN A LULL AND WAS PICKING UP NO INDICATIONS OF A MAJOR IRANIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
--THE IRANIAN OFFENSIVE AGAINST BASRA IN JANUARY AND FEBRUARY WAS BOTH VERY COSTLY TO IRAN AND ULTIMATELY UNSUCCESSFUL.
--SINCE THE SIEGE OF BASRA, THE IRAQIS HAVE APPEARED MORE CONFIDENT OF THEIR ABILITY TO WITHSTAND FUTURE IRANIAN PROBES AND IRANIAN OFFENSIVES -- AND THEY HAVE DONE SO THIS SPRING IN THE CENTRAL AND NORTHERN SECTORS.
--THE U. S. HAS SOMETIMES WORRIED IN THE PAST OVER IRAQI OVER-CONFIDENCE, BUT SAW NO EVIDENCE OF THAT AT PRESENT.
--THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE IN IRAQ APPEARED STABLE. WE ARE UNAWARE OF PRESSURE INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT OR BAAATH PARTY NOW SUCH AS EXISTED A YEAR AGO.
--INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN REMAIN SOMETHING OF A MYSTERY TO US. KHOMEINI WAS REPORTEDLY VERY ILL BUT APPEARED TO BE IN FIRM CONTROL OF AT LEAST THE BROAD POLITICAL PROCESSES -- AND CERTAINLY IS ABLE TO MEDIATE BETWEEN FACTIONS.

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 GENEVA 07372

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IZ, IR, UNSC

SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, JULY 6

--U.S. RELATIONS WITH IRAN ARE MARGINAL -- AND FULL OF FRICTION -- COMPLICATED BY MANY IRANIAN POLICIES AND ACTIONS AGAINST AMERICAN INTERESTS.

--THESE INCLUDE THE WAR WITH IRAQ. CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR AND ORCHESTRATION OF TERRORIST ACTS AND HOSTAGE-HOLDING AS WELL AS SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE AGAINST THE GULF STATES.

--AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL, THE IRANIAN LEADERSHIP REMAINS FIRMLY DETERMINED TO PURSUE THE WAR UNTIL VICTORY ON IRANIAN TERMS. THOSE TERMS APPEAR TO INCLUDE THE REPLACEMENT OF THE CURRENT POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF IRAQ.

--WE WERE STRUCK BY KHOMEINI'S PUBLIC CRITICISM LAST MAY OF THE "PEACE PARTY." WE DON'T KNOW WHAT IRANIAN

GROUP OR GROUPS HE WAS REFERRING TO.

--WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SOVIET VIEWS ON THE ABOVE POINTS.

ALEKSANDR ZOTOV INTERJECTED TO NOTE THAT THE U. S. IRANIAN INITIATIVE WAS PREDICATED ON THE EXISTENCE OF MODERATES THAT THE U. S. HOPED TO ENCOURAGE, INCLUDING AN IRANIAN PEACE PARTY AND ANTI-KHOMEINI FORCES. THE U. S. NOW WAS SAYING THAT IT KNEW NOTHING OF ANY IRANIAN PEACE PARTY. HOW COULD THESE TWO CONTRADICTORY POINTS BE RECONCILED? AMBASSADOR MURPHY REJOINED THAT LT. COL. NORTH'S CREDENTIALS AS AN IRANIAN EXPERT WERE IN CONSIDERABLE DISREPUTE. ZOTOV ASKED WHETHER NORTH HAD, IN THE IRAN INITIATIVE, MISCALCULATED. MURPHY ANSWERED THAT THIS WOULD BE A VERY POLITE TERM FOR IT.

RETURNING TO HIS PREPARED POINTS, AMBASSADOR MURPHY STATED:

--THE U. S. WAS NOT AWARE OF HIGH-LEVEL QUESTIONING OF THE WAR POLICY. WAS THE USSR?

--FINALLY, BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ HAVE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, BUT THEY BOTH SEEM TO HAVE WEATHERED THE GREAT STRESSES OF 1986. BOTH HAVE INCREASED OIL PRODUCTION NOW. INCOME IN 1987 SHOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER THAN IN 1986.

4. IN RESPONSE TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY'S PRESENTATION, POLYAKOV ASSERTED A COMMONALITY OF US AND SOVIET INTERESTS AND VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF THE GULF

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WAR. THE CONTINUATION OF THE WAR WAS AS MUCH A PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIET UNION AS FOR THE US; THEY TOO APPRECIATE THE DANGER OF THE WAR SPREADING TO INVOLVE OTHER STATES IN THE REGION; AND THEY AGREE WITH US THAT CONTINUATION OF THE WAR CONTRIBUTES DIRECTLY TO OTHER TENSIONS IN THE REGION. THE SOVIET SIDE, HE SAID, WANTED TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE US IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION, AS WELL AS EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO ENFORCE IT. THEY BELIEVE THAT A CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION IS NOW ACHIEVABLE AND THAT RECENT COOPERATION AMONG THE FIVE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES INDICATES THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER COOPERATIVE EFFORTS IN THE NEXT STAGE. FOLLOWING THE 1ST RESOLUTION, THE QUESTION OF THE 2ND RESOLUTION OF "PRACTICAL MEASURES" WILL ARISE. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT, HE NOTED, HAS NOT OBJECTION TO THE PARTICIPATION OF SOVIET EXPERTS WHEN WORK BEGINS ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION, AND IS WILLING TO WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY ON FURTHER MEASURES.

5. POLYAKOV THEN TOOK ISSUE WITH STATEMENTS BY US OFFICIALS SUGGESTING THAT THE SOVIET UNION SOUGHT TO USE THE GULF WAR TO INCREASE ITS PRESENCE IN THE AREA. THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING IN SOVIET BEHAVIOR TO SUPPORT THIS CHARGE, HE ARGUED. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN WORKING IN EARNEST TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND HAS A STRONG NATIONAL INTEREST IN BRINGING THE WAR TO AN EARLY END. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AGREED TO THE KUWAITI REQUEST TO USE SOVIET TANKERS, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WOULD HELP KUWAIT RESIST IRANIAN PRESSURE TO DROP ITS SUPPORT FOR IRAQ. CONTRARY TO US ALLEGATIONS, THE AGREEMENT WITH KUWAIT DID NOT LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE AREA. THERE WERE THREE NAVAL SHIPS

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IZ, IR, UNSC

SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR. JULY 6
THERE BEFORE AND THERE ARE THREE SHIPS THERE NOW. THE SHIPS ARE NOT ESCORTING THE SOVIET TANKERS, BUT REMAIN IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS.

6. THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT VARIOUS ARAB COUNTRIES FROM TIME TO TIME REQUEST SOVIET COOPERATION. THE US, SAID POLYAKOV, SEEMS TO CONCLUDE THAT ANY POSITIVE SOVIET RESPONSE TO SUCH REQUESTS IS AUTOMATICALLY A THREAT TO US INTERESTS. HE RECALLED A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR CHARGING THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF EGYPT'S LONG-STANDING DEBT PROBLEM WITH THE SOVIET UNION WAS A THREAT TO US INTERESTS (SIC). THE SOVIET SIDE, HE CONCLUDED, RECOGNIZES US INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF AND CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE US SIDE CANNOT SEE THAT THE SOVIET UNION ALSO HAS INTERESTS THERE.

7. POLYAKOV THEN EXPLAINED THE INTENTION OF THE RECENT SOVIET GOVERNMENT STATEMENT ON THE GULF WAR (PUBLISHED JULY 4), PROPOSING AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT ALL NATIONS NOT BELONGING TO THE REGION REMOVE THEIR MILITARY VESSELS FROM THE GULF. THE SOVIET SIDE, HE SAID, WAS FULLY PREPARED TO REMOVE ALL THE SOVIET SHIPS CURRENTLY IN THE GULF. THIS PROPOSAL, HE CLAIMED, WAS DESIGNED TO COMPLEMENT, AND NOT DETRACT FROM, THE GENERAL EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE. THE MAIN THRUST OF THE STATEMENT WAS ITS RECOGNITION THAT THE SITUATION CONTINUES TO BE VERY TENSE AND WE MUST PURSUE EVERY EFFORT TO SEEK SOLUTIONS BY PRACTICAL, CONCRETE MEANS.

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AS PART OF THIS PRACTICAL EFFORT, SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN MEETING FREQUENTLY WITH IRANIAN AND IRAQI REPRESENTATIVES AT VARIOUS LEVELS. INSISTING ON EVERY OCCASION THAT THE WAR BE BROUGHT TO A SPEEDY END. UNFORTUNATELY, HE SAID, IRAN HAS AT ALL LEVELS CONSISTENTLY REITERATED ITS INTENTION TO PURSUE THE WAR TO VICTORY. KHOMEINI'S PUBLIC REFERENCE TO A "PEACE PARTY" INDICATES THAT THERE MUST BE A GROUP OF SOME SORT THAT ADVOCATES AN EARLY END TO THE WAR, BUT THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS THAT MIGHT BE INVOLVED. POLYAKOV SPECULATED THAT THE SO-CALLED "PEACE PARTY" MIGHT NOT BE A FORMAL ORGANIZATION, BUT RATHER A TERM FOR AN OPINION TREND IN IRAN.

8. SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A CEASE-FIRE, POLYAKOV CONTINUED, PROCEED FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT AN IRANIAN VICTORY WOULD CREATE A SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT SITUATION IN THE ENTIRE REGION AND BEYOND. THERE WOULD BE A RAPID SPREAD OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, WITH UNPREDICTABLE RESULTS. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO SEEKING AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO STEM THE FLOW OF ARMS TO IRAN, HE CLAIMED, AND HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THEY HAVE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT SUCCEED, FOR EXAMPLE WITH LIBYA. HOWEVER, IRAN SEEMS TO RELY ON THE BLACK MARKET FOR THE BULK OF ITS ARMS SUPPLIES AND THE SOVIETS THUS

CALCULATE THAT IRAN IS NOT SERIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A SECOND RESOLUTION IN THE UNSC CALLING FOR AN ARMS EMBARGO BECAUSE THIS WILL NOT TOUCH THEIR BLACK MARKET SOURCES. EVEN ISRAEL SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SUPPLYING IRAN. BY CONTRAST, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT APPEARED COMMITTED TO PURSUING A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE WAR. MEANWHILE IRAQ STILL POSSESSED MILITARY CAPABILITIES; THE DEGREE TO WHICH IRAQ WOULD USE THEM DEPENDED ON THE CAPABILITIES OF THE IRAQI LEADERSHIP.

9. IN SUM, POLYAKOV CONCLUDED, THE SOVIET UNION STANDS READY TO PURSUE ANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE US OR OTHERS AIMED AT ELIMINATING TENSIONS IN THIS REGION. ALTHOUGH HOSTILITIES HAVE ABATED RECENTLY IN THE GULF, LARGE-SCALE FIGHTING CAN RESUME AT ANY TIME. THE SOVIETS FURTHER BELIEVE THAT THE GULF WAR CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM THE QUESTION OF AN OVERALL MIDEAST SETTLEMENT OR EVEN FROM THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. (HE NOTED IN HIS CONNECTION RECENT PRESS REPORTS THAT THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ("DUSHMANI") HAD BEGUN TO RETRANSFER STINGERS TO IRAN.)

10. IN A GIVE-AND-TAKE FOLLOWING THE FORMAL PRESENTATIONS, THE SOVIET DELEGATION MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- (TURDEYEV) ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IS AN IDEOLOGICAL
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 06 GENEVA 07372

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IZ, IR, UNSC

SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, JULY 6
PLATFORM THAT PROJECTS SUCCESS ON A LONG-TERM BASIS, AND IS NOT DEPENDENT ON THE PREDOMINANCE OF ONE GROUP OR ANOTHER IN IRANIAN SOCIETY. IN ORDER TO RESTRICT THE SPREAD OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM, WE MUST CREATE THE PROPER ATMOSPHERE AROUND ITS SOURCE. WITHOUT A RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT THERE CAN BE NO EFFECTIVE RESTRICTION OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM.

-- IF, AS THE US CLAIMS, 15 TO 20 PERCENT OF IRANIAN ARMS SUPPLIES ARE COMING FROM EASTERN EUROPE, THIS MUST BE THROUGH THE BLACK MARKET, BECAUSE THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS MADE KNOWN TO BOTH EASTERN EUROPE AND THE DPRK THAT IT DISAPPROVES OF ANY SOVIET ARMS OR

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SOVIET ARMS PRODUCED UNDER LICENSE BEING TRANSSHIPPED TO IRAN.

-- IF KHOMEINI DESIGNATES HIS SUCCESSOR, THE TRANSITION WILL BE SMOOTH, AT LEAST IN ITS INITIAL PHASES. IF THE SUCCESSOR IS NOT NAMED BY KHOMEINI, THERE WILL BE TURMOIL. THE SOVIET SIDE KNOWS OF VARIOUS GROUPINGS AND FACTIONS WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE A SUCCESSOR TO KHOMEINI, BUT HAS NO IDEA WHO MIGHT PREVAIL.

-- THE FIRST RESOLUTION ON THE GULF WAR IN THE UNSC WILL BE ADOPTED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY AND IT IS THEREFORE DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT THE POINT WOULD BE IN SENDING FOREIGN MINISTERS TO THE DELIBERATIONS AT THIS POINT. IT WOULD SEEM MORE APPROPRIATE TO USE THEIR WEIGHT DURING THE DELIBERATIONS ON A SECOND RESOLUTION. THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS IS A VERY RARE OCCURRENCE AND CARRIES HEAVY POLITICAL WEIGHT. IF THE FIRST RESOLUTION DID

NOT PRODUCE RESULTS, IT MIGHT PROVE TO BE A COSTLY EXPENDITURE OF POLITICAL CAPITAL FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO HAVE ALREADY BEEN DEPLOYED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WOULD THE US PROPOSE SENDING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL A SECOND TIME FOR THE SECOND RESOLUTION?

11. IN RESPONSE, THE US DELEGATION MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE GULF WAR CAN AND SHOULD BE SEPARATED, BOTH ANALYTICALLY AND PRACTICALLY, FROM THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT.

-- SOVIET SPOKESMEN HAVE ALLEGED THAT THE US IS TRYING TO EMBARGO BOTH IRAN AND IRAQ. THIS IS NOT TRUE. THE US WILL PLACE THE BURDEN ON THE PARTY THAT REFUSES TO ACCEPT A COMPREHENSIVE CEASE-FIRE AND IS FULLY CONFIDENT THAT IRAQ WILL ACCEPT IT.

-- THE WAR SEEMS TO BE IMPOSING HEAVY DOMESTIC COSTS IN IRAN AND THERE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY SOME IN IRAN WHO SHARE THE VIEW THAT THE WAR SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO AN END. TO THE EXTENT THAT THAT SENTIMENT CAN BE EXPANDED, WE CAN COMPLICATE MATTERS FOR THE KHOMEINI REGIME, NOT ONLY IN ITS CONDUCT OF THE WAR BUT IN ITS DOMESTIC SUPPORT. FOR THIS REASON, THE US SEES A CONNECTION BETWEEN AN ARMS EMBARGO AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE IN IRAN.

-- ACCORDING TO US INFORMATION EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SUPPLY IRAN WITH 15-20 PERCENT OF IRAN'S ARMS NEEDS. THESE MAY BE ARRANGED THROUGH SECRET CONTRACTS BUT SUCH SECRET DEALS DO NOT IN OUR TERMINOLOGY QUALIFY AS BLACK MARKET, AS THE SOVIET SIDE SEEMS TO IMPLY.

-- THE USG BELIEVES THAT THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS ON THE FIRST RESOLUTION WOULD GIVE A VITAL BOOST TO MOMENTUM FOR THE SECOND RESOLUTION. IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE OUR SERIOUSNESS TO BRING THE WAR TO AN END. OUR THINKING AT THIS POINT EXTENDS ONLY THROUGH THE FIRST RESOLUTION. WHETHER THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE SUMMONED TO SUPPORT THE SECOND RESOLUTION WOULD BE DETERMINED BY WHAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE IN HIS CONSULTATIONS AFTER THE FIRST RESOLUTION. THE FIRST RESOLUTION WILL BE AN HISTORIC EVENT IN THE UN SINCE IT WILL BE THE SC'S FIRST DEMAND FOR A CEASE-FIRE TO BE ISSUED WITHOUT PRIOR CERTAINTY OF ITS ACCEPTANCE BY THE PARTIES. ALTHOUGH WE TAKE THE SOVIET POINT ABOUT NOT SQUANDERING POLITICAL ASSETS, WE BELIEVE THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE

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SUBJECT: MURPHY-POLYAKOV EXCHANGE ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, JULY 6
APPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT. PETRONE

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NLS F94-03812 A58

BY W, NARA, DATE 3/26/89

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SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET REGIONAL EXPERT EXCHANGES ON THE
- IRAN-IRAQ WAR

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DEPT SUGGEST PASS: MOSCOW, USUN NEW YORK, ROME, BONN,
BAGHDAD, LONDON, PARIS, TOKYO AND BEIJING

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IA, IZ, UNSC

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET REGIONAL EXPERT EXCHANGES ON THE
- IRAN-IRAQ WAR

1. (~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. IN THE INITIAL MEETING WITH THE POLYAKOV DELEGATION
JULY 6, WE DISCUSSED BOTH THE GULF WAR AND THE ARAB-
ISRAELI PEACE-SEEKING PROCESS. ON BOTH, THE SOVIETS
SEEMED EAGER FOR GIVE-AND-TAKE SESSIONS. THEIR
PRESENTATIONS WERE LESS STYLIZED AND MEMBERS OF THE

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SOVIET DELEGATION FELT FREE TO LEAP INTO THE DISCUSSIONS, A NOTABLE DEPARTURE FROM OUR PREVIOUS MEETINGS. POLYAKOV AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION ALSO WERE CLEARLY MORE INTERESTED IN TALKING ABOUT THE PEACE

PROCESS THAN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. TO ENSURE WE COVERED THE GULF WAR, WE DEALT WITH THAT FIRST. (REPORT ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS DISCUSSION WILL BE SENT BY SEPTTEL.)

3. I OUTLINED OUR BASIC APPROACH TO THE WAR; THE REASONS FOR REFLAGGING, PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF RESPONDING TO A FRIENDLY STATE'S REQUEST AND THE NEED TO RESIST IRANIAN INTIMIDATION; THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF SUCCESSFUL IRANIAN COERCION NOT ONLY IN THE GULF BUT THE REGION AS A WHOLE; OUR DESIRE TO DETER, NOT PROVOKE THE IRANIANS; AND OUR CONVICTION THAT IT IS TIME FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE A FIRM STAND ON THE WAR AND BE WILLING TO ADOPT ENFORCEMENT MEASURES. I REFERRED TO DICK WALTERS' MISSION AND HIS TALKS IN MOSCOW AND EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE INTERESTED IN PRACTICAL, NOT SIMPLY RHETORICAL STEPS.

4. IN LIGHT OF THAT AND IN LIGHT OF OUR EFFORT TO GET AGREEMENT ON ENFORCEMENT MEASURES, I RAISED THE ISSUE OF SOVIET-ORIGIN ARMS GOING TO IRAN. I PRESSED FOR AN END TO THE EAST EUROPEAN LINK AND URGED THE SOVIETS TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE NORTH KOREANS TO CUT OFF SUPPLIES.

5. I SAID THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD NEVER BEEN SO GALVANIZED AND THAT NOW WAS THE TIME TO PRESS THE IRANIANS TO GIVE UP THEIR WAR EFFORT. WHILE NOT HAVING ILLUSIONS ABOUT AN EARLY END TO THE WAR, WE FELT IT IMPERATIVE TO MAKE IT AS DIFFICULT AS POSSIBLE FOR THE IRANIANS TO PROSECUTE THE WAR. I CONCLUDED WITH SOME THOUGHTS ON THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN IRAN AND IRAQ AND ASKED FOR SOVIET ASSESSMENTS.

6. POLYAKOV RAISED SEVERAL POINTS IN RESPONSE:

--THE SOVIETS ARE WORKING HARD TO END THE WAR, BUT, REGRETTABLY, CANNOT PREDICT WHEN IT WILL END.

--THEY ARE COORDINATING WITH US ON THE UN RESOLUTION, AND HAVE NO OBJECTION TO OUR EXPERTS GETTING TOGETHER TO FORGE AGREEMENT ON ENFORCEMENT MEASURES.

--THE SOVIETS DO NOT SEEK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CONFLICT TO BUILD THEIR POSITION IN THE AREA, AND RECOGNIZE OUR INTERESTS. WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THEIRS.

--THEY FAVOR PULLING ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF THE GULF, INCLUDING THEIR OWN, AND BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION. (POLYAKOV CALLED ATTENTION TO THE SOVIET STATEMENT RELEASED BY TASS, BUT CERTAINLY DID NOT SUGGEST THAT IT WAS THE RESULT OF ANY PARTICULAR ANXIETY ABOUT RISING TENSIONS, AS U.S. MEDIA HAS INTERPRETED IT.

7. BEYOND THIS, POLYAKOV EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOVIETS IN THEIR CONTACTS WITH THE IRANIANS AND IRAQIS HAVE PUSHED FOR THE END OF WAR. IN ALL THEIR MEETINGS WITH

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THE IRANIANS, HOWEVER, THEY HEAR ONLY THAT THE IRANIANS WILL PURSUE THE WAR UNTIL VICTORY; "THEY HAVE NO OTHER RECIPE." POLYAKOV ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS HAVEN'T IDENTIFIED A PEACE PARTY IN IRAN, BUT BELIEVE THAT THE "CHAMPIONS OF PEACE" (UNNAMED) ARE GROWING. HE ALSO NOTED THAT HE THOUGHT SUCCESSION TO KHOMEINI WOULD BE MESSY IN IRAN. FINALLY, HE SAID THAT THEY WERE DOING ALL THEY COULD TO STOP THE ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE IRANIANS.

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, IA, IZ, UNSC

SUBJECT: U.S.-SOVIET REGIONAL EXPERT EXCHANGES ON THE THEY HAD HAD SUCCESS IN STOPPING ARMS GOING FROM LIBYA, AND FELT THE IRANIANS WERE GETTING MOST OF THEIR ARMS FROM THE BLACK MARKET. WE CHALLENGED THIS POINT SAYING THAT WE BELIEVED THE EAST EUROPEANS AND NORTH KOREANS MIGHT BE SELLING ARMS SECRETLY AND, IF SO, THIS SHOULD NOT BE CHARACTERIZED AS "BLACK MARKET" DEALS.

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8. COMMENT: OUR READING OF THE SOVIET REMARKS IN THIS SESSION IS THAT THEY ADDED ONLY marginally TO AMBASSADOR WALTERS' CONVERSATIONS IN MOSCOW LAST WEEK. THEY GAVE THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION OF RELUCTANCE TO COMMIT SHEVARDNADZE TO SECURITY COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS ON THE FIRST RESOLUTION, BUT THEY WERE POSITIVE ON THE IDEA OF SENDING EXPERTS TO AUGMENT THE SOVIET DELEGATION DURING DEBATE ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION AND INDICATED THE POSSIBILITY OF SHEVARDNADZE'S PARTICIPATION, AS WELL, DURING THIS PHASE. THEIR OPTIMISM ON THE PROSPECTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL VOTE ON THE FIRST RESOLUTION WAS UNQUALIFIED. ONE OTHER POINT WORTH NOTING IS THAT POLYAKOV ET AL DID NOT EXPLICITLY RAISE THE SOVIET IOZP PROPOSAL OR CALL FOR ANY PARTIAL CEASE-FIRE IN THE GULF. RATHER, IN PASSING, HE REFERRED TO THE VALUE OF GETTING ALL FOREIGN FORCES OUT OF THE GULF AND THE IMPORTANCE OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.

9. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PETRONE

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MIDDLE EAST TALKING POINTS FOR SHEVARDNADZE

- Let me say something about the new effort we have launched on the Middle East. We see new forces at work in the region and in the conflict. There are new realities, and they have created a new sense of urgency. Everyone feels threatened. The dangers of drift are clear and all seem to understand that the status quo is unacceptable.
- In light of that, we are seeing a new willingness to explore different possibilities. Old formulas and stances haven't magically disappeared, but some of the old rigidities have softened.
- There is a convergence of interest on the need to revitalize the peace process and create hope and the possibility of movement. We can't be certain that this new psychology and sense of urgency can be translated into political reality. But we believe it is essential to try.
- That means pushing for near-term progress. That won't come from posturing; seeking to use the Security Council to push endless discussions or to attribute blame; or, from making proposals that only deal in vague generalities.
- It's time to get away from generalities and focus on real issues. We've tended to focus too much attention on the format of negotiations, and not their content. But it is

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the content that matters. Content will determine if real progress is possible. That is why we think it is time to work on the structure of negotiations, not the structure of a conference.

- If there is enough understanding on the substance of negotiations--what they are about and how they will unfold--then the format in which negotiations take place should be manageable. We have had our concerns about a conference, but those concerns would be minimized if there is enough agreement on the agenda and sequence of negotiations to tell us where the negotiations are headed and to give us a reason to believe they can be successful.
- That's what we are working on right now. Frankly, continued discussions on the format or modalities of a conference at this point represent a diversion from trying to get productive, meaningful negotiations underway.
- In focussing on the substance, we recognize that we cannot satisfy everyone completely; we're trying to meet the minimal needs of all sides while also offering near-term, tangible benefits to the Palestinians.

- We recognize also that if we try to resolve the more difficult questions like territory and sovereignty first that we will drive all parties to their most extreme positions. That is a prescription for paralysis, not progress.
- We don't need that; we need real movement. To create that, we've developed a blend of old ideas and new. Negotiations need to have a certain sequence, starting with talks on transitional arrangements and concluding with negotiations on final status.
- What do I mean by transitional arrangements? We envision negotiations on transitional arrangements to be about the powers that a transitional Palestinian authority would have. We would see that authority being responsible for nearly all areas of self-government except that of foreign policy. Responsibility for internal security would devolve to the Transitional Authority.
- Final status negotiations will deal with the questions of territory, sovereignty, the terms of peace, and its guarantees. The two sets of negotiations must be interlocked. Transitional arrangements talks begin first, but final status negotiations must begin before the end of the first year. That will guard against the suspicion that transitional arrangements will become permanent.

- We envision an accelerated timetable to achieve early agreement on the powers of the transitional authority to ensure the Palestinians are offered something tangible, to develop momentum, to change the environment and to condition everyone to a new reality that should also make the issues of final status more manageable.

- We believe Palestinians must be involved in every step of this process. Here again, we are seeking to be practical and come up with a formula that is realistic and makes negotiations possible.

- The absence of negotiations and a process have hurt Palestinians more than anyone. We believe the process we're describing is possible and can provide Palestinians a pathway to gaining political control over their own future.

- To this point, we have been told by Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Israel to proceed with our concept. The Syrians have been far more reserved. They have not closed the door completely, but they have been arguing for precisely the kind of approach that can't go anywhere--an approach that requires settling all and/or the most difficult issues at the same time.

- Such an approach cannot work. It would lock us into stalemate. And it raises basic questions about the intentions of those who argue for such approaches.
- We are determined to press on. We believe there is an opportunity to make real progress. The parties seem to understand that, and at this point no one wants to say no to us or to this process.
- We obviously still have questions to resolve and details to sort out, but I wanted to use this meeting to outline our thinking, to answer your questions and to raise a number of questions with you.
- We are not interested in excluding you. But we are interested and determined to take practical, not merely rhetorical, steps. And we are looking for signs that you are committed to such steps. After what we've seen as your efforts to protect Iran from the spirit and meaning of UNSC 598, your calls to use the UNSC as the forum for resolving Arab-Israeli questions are very hard to take seriously. They confirm the view of some that you are not serious. I hope that's wrong. I hope you see the importance of supporting real steps that produce real movement.

-- Some may say that an election year is not the time to try to move on the question of peace in the Middle East. For conventional politicians that might be true, but President Reagan is not a conventional politician. Moreover, the regional environment doesn't give us the luxury of passivity and indifference.

-- If we don't move ahead now in meaningful and concrete ways, the situation will get worse. Fundamentalists who preach struggle, not reconciliation, will gain greater weight and we will see that the ability to make peace recedes. Stability in the region will become far more problematic.

-- That isn't in our interest and shouldn't be in yours. Are you prepared to work with us in practical ways? Are you prepared to accept an approach that focuses on manageable problems first and lays the basis for dealing with the more difficult problems later? Are you prepared to work with your friends like the Syrians and the PLO to ensure they don't block this opportunity to make real progress?

-- I want to discuss these questions with you and hear your reactions. I don't expect to resolve all questions today, but I think it is important to see whether we're on the same wavelength, particularly before I head off to the Middle East.

- Time is of the essence. If we are going to seize the moment, we have to move quickly and not get bogged down in dilatory discussions as all sides raise traditional objections and their defense mechanisms. We are working to avoid that, and we are pressing all parties to give up sterile approaches and ideas that can't work.

- It's not unlike what you confront internally in your efforts at Perestroika. It is time not merely to talk of "new thinking", but to apply it.

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The United States is presently involved in active efforts to revitalize the Middle East peace process. Our decision to move forward more actively at this time is based on a number of considerations:

- Our contacts with the parties indicate that they understand the urgency of moving ahead in the peace process.
- It has become clear that the status quo is unacceptable and that drift will mean a further deterioration.
- In particular, talks with regional leaders suggest that there is greater willingness to think afresh about what might be done. This gives us something to work with -- a new opportunity.

Our goal is a comprehensive peace that takes into account Israel's security concerns and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Our approach is to take what is best from traditional peace-making ideas and procedures and create a "new blend" to use in this initiative.

Over the past year peace process discussions have been dominated by arguments about procedure:

- The United States believed, and continues to believe, that the best prospects for peace agreements lay in direct bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbors.

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- Others contended that an international conference, would be the best way to proceed.

- It is clear that some good work was done and some real progress achieved in coming to terms with these procedural issues. These discussions, moreover, contributed to a climate in which it may now be easier for the parties to find their way to the negotiating table.

The time has now come to look at the structure of negotiations, and not just the structure of a conference. In other words, it's time to address substance and the specific issues involved in the negotiating process.

For example, peace-making requires time for the parties to adjust to one another and to build mutual confidence. It also requires some idea of the shape of a final settlement, so the parties can see and have confidence in the direction the process is heading.

Several elements are clear to us: The parties need to see the entire picture, including both what to expect early in the process, and what to expect after a final settlement is reached. A final settlement would have to be within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 242. Also, and in line with what we've heard from the parties, we need to move on a faster timetable than previously envisaged.

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We are looking at ideas that would enable the residents of the West Bank and Gaza to gain greater political control over their own lives. The specific details of all these ideas are still under discussion with the parties most immediately concerned, but they involve looking at transitional arrangements and final status in an interlinked way. The process is in a state of evolution.

In the days ahead, we will continue our close contacts with the parties with a view toward refining our thoughts and finding additional common ground.

Though we are still in a very formative stage, we are conveying these ideas to the Soviet Union now. We're prepared for a serious discussion of them, and interested to see whether the Soviet Union is ready to play a constructive role.

Frankly, we have been deeply disappointed that notwithstanding the avowed "new thinking" and the more positive rhetoric, there has been too little evidence of a Soviet desire for cooperation with us to solve regional problems and too much evidence of traditional Soviet behavior aimed at enhancing its image and influence at our expense. Perhaps, we have misperceived Soviet behavior and perhaps, also, we have been both victims of mirror-images. But at this point we are looking for signs that the Soviets mean what they say about solving regional conflicts and not viewing them in zero-sum terms.

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The situations in the Middle East and the Gulf, should give rise to non-zero-sum or cooperative approaches. It had been our hope and expectation that the cooperation of the five permanent members of UNSC in unanimous adoption of SC Resolution 598 might create a turning point toward serious, sustained common efforts for an equitable, peaceful end to Iran-Iraq war. This positive hope was enhanced by the discussions Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz had in Washington and NYC last September, and by the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the five permanent members of the UNSC. Success in dealing with the Iran-Iraq war would have argued for a prominent and serious role for the UNSC on conflict resolution on a broad regional basis. It would also have provided a stronger basis on which to develop U.S.-Soviet cooperation.

Unfortunately, subsequent Soviet behavior has appeared to be directed primarily at helping Iran avoid implementation of UNSC 598 and enforcement action by the Security Council. In effect, the Soviet Union has permitted Iran to frustrate the "will" of five permanent members and helped divert attention away from Iranian aggression and its continuing efforts to build toward another major offensive.

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Given the Soviet efforts to help Iran avoid the spirit of 598, what conclusion should be drawn about the value of such cooperation? If the Soviet approach to the UNSC on the Iran-Iraq war is any indication, why should anyone take seriously current Soviet efforts to involve the UNSC in Arab-Israeli peace-making? We see current Soviet efforts to use the UNSC as being disruptive, and having no practical effect.

Unfortunately, Soviet behavior toward the Middle East peace process continues to be disappointing. The USG made a major effort over the past year with Jordan, Egypt, Syria and Israel to reach detailed agreement on procedures for international conference, and important progress was made. We consulted USSR repeatedly and in detail during this process. We did not receive explicit or definitive answers on such important questions as the power and role of the plenary or on the question of Palestinian representation. As in the case of the Gulf, we also saw that the Soviets were giving different answers to different parties on the different questions. While there was much talk of the need for serious preparation, there was little to accompany Soviet rhetoric in this regard and no evidence of the kind of preparation that would be needed if a conference was to provide a vehicle for real progress and not mere posturing.

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We are still looking for signs that the USSR will cooperate. We are forging pragmatic solutions to problems. We are prepared to join with the USSR and others to promote practical, not merely rhetorical, progress toward peace. Is the Soviet Union prepared for such action?

The U.S. is serious about this because we are presently engaged in a new, intensive initiative with key governments and government officials of Israel and its neighbors to try and produce such negotiations very soon and see them move rapidly to agreement. We are discussing practical concepts designed to get negotiations under way, offer the Palestinians something tangible, and ensure a certain pathway to the resolution of final status issues. Our aim is a comprehensive peace, but we recognize that this cannot be achieved all at once. We also recognize that if we try to resolve the most difficult issues like territory, sovereignty and the terms of peace first, we will not make progress.

Talking a good game, but failing to propose practical, workable ideas suggests a commitment to process, not peace. We're finding that as we present new ideas on substance as well as format to Israel, Egypt and Jordan that they are all determined to move

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toward peace. They are not interested in an empty process, one that can't succeed and could actually discredit negotiations as the vehicle for resolving the conflict. At a time when fundamentalists are gaining strength -- and calling for struggle, not reconciliation -- neither we, moderates in the region, nor the Soviets should have an interest in that.

As we continue our consultations with the regional parties (Assistant Secretary Murphy is presently travelling to Syria and Saudi Arabia) and develop our ideas, we will be talking to the Soviet Union about them. But we will be looking for signs of a serious commitment to making practical progress, and not just to having a part of a process.

Secretary Shultz is prepared for a meaningful discussion with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow, a discussion that reveals a Soviet sense of urgency about making real progress.

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Anticipating Soviet Responses on the Middle East

- Main interest is not to be cut-out. That's a traditional Soviet objective. It takes on special meaning for Gorbachev because he wants to show (a) that perestroika and "new thinking" on the outside will not sacrifice the Soviet position globally, and (b) new Soviet diplomatic dynamism ensures Soviet centrality.
- o Our new efforts worry them, but may, as a result, increase their sense of urgency. The Soviets had felt comfortable with the situation because they saw us losing credibility and the Arab world embracing their concept of an international conference. Our initiative and the initial responsiveness to it reminds them that if the Arab world wants a credible peace process they look to us, not them, to produce it. Because of that--and because of the Soviet interest in creating a climate of broader cooperation--they will show interest in (and possibly even support for) our renewed efforts.
- o At the same time, Shevardnadze will talk of their view of the need for movement and how to get it. He'll emphasize the consensus that exists in the Arab world in favor of an international conference. He'll also note Arab suspicion that Shamir will only go along with partial agreements, agreements which cannot work.

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- o He'll agree that thorough preparation will be needed to make progress, and make clear their readiness and flexibility to be helpful, perhaps noting their efforts now with their friends.
 - o He'll prefer to remain general in his responses, while probing where we stand on the conference, how we propose to handle the Palestinian representation question, what their role might be, and what the Secretary hopes to accomplish in his trip. (He and his experts are likely to be especially interested in what we expect in Israel.)
 - o Shevardnadze is likely to propose a very early meeting of our experts, probably soon after the Secretary's trip to the area. He may even suggest our taking parallel approaches, particularly as this gives them a role.
- While wanting a role, we shouldn't expect the Soviets to be willing to pay a price with some of their friends (Syria, PLO) unless they see a process taking off and excluding them otherwise. Still, the Soviets could be helpful in effecting Assad's interest in causing trouble and in weighing in with Arafat not to try to block the current developments. They may be prepared to do this, but will probably want to know more of what we are planning to do, especially with the Israelis.

- o We shouldn't be reluctant to press for clear-cut demonstrations of Soviet intent, perhaps in side discussions. They should know we still haven't seen anything that suggests a serious Soviet commitment to making peace. We're looking for practical suggestions. The proposal on the UNSC is not practical. Are the Soviets prepared to be practical? Will they be practical on the Palestinian representation question and be helpful? If so, how? Do they accept the sequenced approach, focusing on practical, manageable steps first? Are they prepared to be helpful in trying to defuse tensions? (The Voice of al-Quds is run in Syria by Jibril, two Soviet friends. It's not the cause of the problem in the territories, but it contributes to violence--affecting the message carried by the Voice of al-Quds is one way of signalling the Soviet desire to be helpful. Israeli reciprocation on some of the Sinoria-Rahme 14 points might be possible if there were some indication of restraint. This may be one way to shape the environment and make it more amenable to serious negotiations.)

4/23/86

Mr. Ross:

Ambassador Wolfowitz
asked that this be
forwarded to your
attention.

Arline Hetland
Secretary
Indonesia Desk
Department of State

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