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*Last Updated: 11/28/2023*

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN R.: Files

Archivist: mjd

File Folder: PAKIS: Nuclear Program 1987 Box 91880 **9**

Date: 6/19/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Robert Oakley to John Negroponte re Congressional Action on Indo-Pak Nuclear Programs, 2p <i>P, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #70</i>	12/4/87	P1
2. memo	Oakley to Colin Powel re Pakistan Nuclear Matters, 2p <i>P, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #71</i>	12/24/87	P1
3. memo	Norman Wulf to Under Sec of State for Political Affairs re Pakistan- Solarz and Symington, 5p <i>P 2/27/06 F96-128/1 #72</i>	12/21/87	P1
<del>4. memo</del>	<del>Oakley to Powell re response to David Emery, 1p <i>R, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #73</i></del>	<del>12/16/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
5. memo	Powell to Emery re Strategy on Pakistan, 2p <i>P, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #74</i>	12/23/87	P1
6. memo	Kenneth Adelman to National Security Advisor re Strategy on Pakistan, 2p <i>O 2/27/06 F96-128/1 #72A</i>	11/4/87	P1 <del>P5</del>
7. memo	Adelman to the President re Certification, 1p <i>O 2/27/06 F96-128/1 #72B</i>	11/21/87	P1 <del>P5</del>
8. memo	Adelman to NSA re Proposed Language, 1p <i>P 2/27/06 F96-128/1 #72C</i>	12/4/87	P1 <del>P5</del>
9. cable	030656Z JUL 87, 3pp <i>P 2/27/06 F96-128/1 #75</i>	7/3/87	P1
10. letter	Richard Burt to Frank Carlucci re letter to PM Junejo, 2p <i>O 2/27/06 F96-128/1 #76</i>	9/9/87	P1
<del>11. cable</del>	<del>171245Z JUN 87, 1p <i>R 2/27/06 F96-128/1 #77</i></del>	<del>7/17/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
12. memo	Shirin Tahir-Kheli to Oakley re Pakistan's Nuclear Program, 5p <i>D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #78</i>	7/23/87	P1

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN R.: Files

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**File Folder:** PAKIS: Nuclear Program 1987 Box 91880

**Date:** 6/19/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
13. memo	Oakley to Carlucci re Pakistan's Nuclear Program [annotated], 8p <i>D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #79</i>	n.d.	P1
<del>14. memo</del>	<del>Oakley to Carlucci re calls to Senators, 1p <i>R, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #80</i></del>	<del>4/22/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>15. draft cable</del>	<del>re Pakistan Nuclear Issue, 1p <i>" " " #81</i></del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>
16. draft cable	re Pakistan Nuclear Issue [annotated], 5p <i>P 2/27/06 F96-128/1 #82</i>	4/15/86	P1
17. cable	200516Z MAR 87, 9p <i>P 2/27/06 F96-128/1 #83</i>	3/20/87	P1
18. cable	200516Z MAR 87 [annotated], 5p <i>P 2/27/06 F96-128/1 #84</i>	3/20/87	P1
19. paper	re Pakistan's Nuclear Program [annotated], 4p <i>D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #85</i>	n.d.	P1

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 5/21/2007

**File Folder** PAKIS: NUCLEAR PROGRAM 1987

**FOIA**

F96-128/1

**Box Number** 91880

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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<del>3</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>NORMAN WULF TO UNDER SEC OF</del> <sup>mvh 3/5/08</sup> <del>5</del>	<del>12/21/1987</del>
		<del>STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS RE</del>	
		<del>PAKISTAN SOLARZ AND SYMINGTON</del>	
<del>9</del>	<del>CABLE</del>	<del>030656Z JUL 87</del> <sup>mvh 3/5/08</sup> <del>3</del>	<del>7/3/1987</del>
<del>16</del>	<del>DRAFT CABLE</del>	<del>RE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ISSUE</del> <sup>mvh 3/5/08</sup> <del>5</del>	<del>4/15/1986</del>
		<del>(ANNOTATED)</del>	



~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

File : 8968  
SPK  
Sally

December 4, 1987

INFORMATION

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor  
has seen

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN NEGROPONTE

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY

SUBJECT: Congressional Action on Indo-Pak Nuclear Programs

The Inouye-Kasten language approved by the Senate Appropriates Committee yesterday is attached at TAB I. The justification for the language is at TAB II, basically shifting to a regional approach since pressure upon Pakistan alone has not worked. Briefly, the key points are:

- Presidential certification every six months.
- Provision of a six-year waiver for Pakistan.
- Cuts in ESF and FMS to Pakistan to indicate some displeasure with the direction of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program (in enrichment above five percent (5%) and in illegal procurement in the U.S.).
- Equating the Indian and Pakistani programs by designating their competition to be the root cause of the nuclear problem.
- Placing the fabrication or possession of unsafeguarded, nuclear-weapons-grade enriched uranium or plutonium as the major problem -- rather than fabrication possession or use of nuclear weapons.
- Provision of waiver authority for Pakistan/India by the President based on continued unsafeguard production of fissile material by the other.
- Mandatory sanctions against borrowing in multilateral institutions in case production is not under safeguards, unless waived. (This is aimed at India.)
- Sanctions against technology trade with India absent safeguards on fissile material production, unless waived by the President. (This is aimed at India.)

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

CLASSIFIED IN PART

96-128/1 # 70

dlb Date 4/15/00

HOUSE REPORT LANGUAGE ON PAKISTAN  
IN THE REPORT TO ACCOMPANY  
THE FY 1988 FOREIGN AID APPROPRIATIONS BILL

**ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN**

The issue of United States assistance to Pakistan has been at the forefront of Congressional debates on foreign assistance programs this year, and a series of events have made it essential for the Committee to address the entire issue of assistance to Pakistan in detail. The Symington Amendment waiver authority for Pakistan expired on September 30, 1987, and, in order for assistance to Pakistan to continue, the authority for the waiver must be extended in some form. The House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees each adopted provisions granting authority for two-year waivers of the Symington Amendment in April. These provisions took a regional approach to the non-proliferation issue in South Asia, and did not include any major new restrictions on assistance. Soon thereafter, however, a Pakistani-born Canadian citizen was arrested for trying to export to Pakistan a specialty steel used in uranium-enriching centrifuges, raising the concern that a more comprehensive solution to the non-proliferation issue in South Asia was needed.

At the same time, events this year have also made clear both Pakistan's strategic importance to the United States and the need to continue the U.S-Pakistan relationship. The war in Afghanistan is going particularly well for the Afghan mujahideen, and Pakistan's assistance has been an essential element to that success. In the Persian Gulf, Pakistan's quiet assistance to the United States has been vital to our efforts in the recent crisis. Pakistan remains our sole military partner in the region working to restrain Soviet expansionism.

In this context, the Committee has developed a new proposal on assistance to Pakistan which melds together the elements of current proposals on Pakistan in the Congress. It provides a six-year waiver of the Symington Amendment; a prohibition on assistance to India or Pakistan if either is producing weapons grade nuclear materials; and a requirement for a Presidential report on the Pervez case. Under the Committee's proposal, assistance could be continued under a Presidential waiver, if both parties are found to be producing weapons grade nuclear materials.

Throughout the debate on assistance to Pakistan this year, two elements to the debate have been constant. Unfortunately, these have been treated parallel to one another. They are: 1) finding a way to prevent further enrichment of weapons grade nuclear materials; and, 2) finding a way to make a regional approach to the issue a central element of the nuclear debate. The Arshad Pervez case intensified the debate in the Congress on nuclear proliferation in South Asia. Nonetheless, it did not

-- Sanctions against bilateral assistance, unless waived (aimed at Pakistan).

Because of the impact the above would have on: (a) U.S. relations with India; (b) on achieving nonproliferation goals in South Asia; and, (c) increased tension between India and Pakistan Mike Armacost and I have met with Congressman Wilson and Mike Armacost talked to Senator Kasten on desired changes to be made on the House floor or in conference. We hope to get the following if possible:

~~REDACTED~~

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~~REDACTED~~

~~CTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

We will keep you posted on this fast moving situation.

Attachments:

TAB I Inouye-Kasten Language on Pakistan  
approved by the Senate Appropriates Committee

TAB II Justification - Bill

alter the central issues of the debate; it remained a matter of resolving enrichment questions in a regional context. Indeed, the main thrust of S. Res. 266, introduced in the Senate in the aftermath of the Pervez incident, and approved on a voice vote on July 31, was its expression of the need for a solution to the enrichment issue and the importance of the regional solution to the problem.

In the opinion of the Committee, none of the proposals set forth so far this year have satisfactorily engaged both of the issues in the debate. The Committee recommendation brings them together in a comprehensive manner.

At the same time, the Committee bill seeks to find a solution to the issue which will adequately address the nuclear question over the long term and yet not irreparably damage the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The Committee is concerned that some of the proposals under discussion would result in a cutoff of U.S. assistance to Pakistan, particularly in the military area. It is the considered judgment of the Committee that such a cutoff is not in the national interests of the United States.

The Committee shares the conviction that the nuclear non-proliferation issue in South Asia can only be resolved through a regional approach. The Senate must face the fact that the root cause of the nuclear problem in South Asia is competition between India and Pakistan. It is precisely this competition which negates ongoing efforts on the part of the United States to resolve the nuclear issue. While the United States may not be able to get both countries to work together to resolve this issue, the United States must work with each and must work to ensure that our policy regarding nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia encompasses the factors which are at the base of proliferation.

In one sense, this is a departure from previous Congressional and U.S. policy on nuclear non-proliferation, but in another, more fundamental sense, it is a necessary extension of that policy. Previously, U.S. policy with regard to nuclear non-proliferation has occurred on a purely bilateral basis, between the United States and the country in question. That approach has worked with well over one hundred countries, and must continue to be the central focus of U.S. non-proliferation policy. At the same time, however, it has become clear that in certain cases -- Brazil and Argentina in one instance, India and Pakistan in another -- the issue of non-proliferation must be dealt with in a different way and on a regional basis. In those cases, it is clear that the United States must not only abide by the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, it must also try to develop a solution which matches the regional nature of the causative factors of proliferation. This is what the Committee bill does.

### The South Asia Provision

The following is a detailed discussion of the Committee's recommended provision. The Committee urges all members to read and carefully study this provision. It is detailed; it is complex. We know of no way of addressing the substance of this extremely complicated issue other than to provide the Senate an opportunity to review the provision in detail.

The Committee provision states that, beginning six months from the date of enactment, no country in South Asia which the President determines is producing weapons grade enriched uranium or separated plutonium in facilities which are not subject to international safeguards may receive any U.S. assistance or obtain an export license for the purchase of sophisticated U.S. equipment or technology which has potential military application. If the President subsequently certifies to the Congress that the country has ceased producing such materials or has placed the facilities at which the materials are produced under international safeguards, then assistance may be resumed and export licenses may be issued.

The Committee provision further requires that, at any time during a period that United States bilateral assistance to any country in South Asia has been terminated pursuant to that requirement, the U.S. shall oppose all multilateral development bank loans to that country.

It is the Committee's understanding that under current circumstances aid to Pakistan -- and to India -- would be terminated under this provision because each presently produces weapons grade nuclear material in unsafeguarded facilities. It is the Committee's strong belief that such a termination would not result in either country ceasing the production of such materials.

Therefore, the Committee adds a provision allowing the President, in strictly limited circumstances, to waive these restrictions for any country in South Asia. In order to do so, the President must certify that a second country in South Asia is producing weapons grade enriched uranium or separated plutonium in unsafeguarded facilities and that the failure of that country to agree to cease production of such materials has resulted in the continued production of such materials by the first country.

The Committee provision further limits the waiver authority by requiring the President to submit certifications and reports under this section to the Congress every six months and, if in any such certification and report the President determines that the situation in South Asia has changed then the President shall so certify and shall take whatever action is appropriate. That

is, every six months the President must review the determination to continue or terminate assistance to either party.

In addition, the Committee proposal does the following:

- It extends the current Symington Amendment waiver for Pakistan for six years, subject to the restrictions above. Many have convincingly argued that a six-year waiver is the only way to make Pakistan confident enough in the U.S. commitment to take serious steps on non-proliferation.
- It requires the President to submit a report to the Congress on the Arshad Pervez case prior to issuing any waiver of the Symington Amendment for Pakistan. Such a report is essential to clarify once and for all whether Pakistan violated Section 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

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Calendar No.

100TH CONGRESS  
1ST Session

S.

[Report No. 100- ]

Making appropriations for foreign assistance, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

~~DECEMBER~~ ~~OCTOBER~~ (legislative day, ~~OCTOBER~~ ), 1987

Mr. LROUZE, from the Committee on Appropriations, reported the following bill; which was read twice and placed on the calendar

A BILL

Making appropriations for foreign assistance, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, and for other purposes.

- 1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
- 2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*



1 organizations for the purpose of investigating  
2 human rights abuses; and

3 (F) improving the human rights situation.

4 (b) None of the funds appropriated in this Act shall be  
5 obligated or expended for Liberia except as provided through  
6 the regular notification procedures of the Committees on  
7 Appropriations.

8 (c) The requirements of this section are in addition to  
9 any other statutory requirements applicable to assistance for  
10 Liberia.

11 **RECIPROCAL LEASING**

12 **SEC. 554.** Section 61(a) of the Arms Export Control  
13 Act is amended by striking out "1987" and inserting in lieu  
14 thereof "1988".

15 **ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN**

16 **SEC. 555.** (a) Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act  
17 of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the  
18 following:

19 "(c)(1) Beginning six months from the date of enactment  
20 of this subsection, no country in South Asia which the Presi-  
21 dent determines is producing weapons grade enriched urani-  
22 um or separated plutonium in unsafeguarded facilities may  
23 receive any United States assistance or obtain an export li-  
24 cense for the purchase of sophisticated United States equip-  
25 ment or technology with possible military application, until  
26 such time as the President has certified to the Congress that

1 the country has ceased producing such materials or has  
2 placed the facilities at which the materials are produced  
3 under international safeguards.

4       “(2) At any time during a period that United States  
5 bilateral assistance to any country in South Asia has been  
6 terminated pursuant to subsection (c)(1), the Secretary of the  
7 Treasury shall instruct the United States executive directors  
8 of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-  
9 ment, the International Development Association, the Inter-  
10 national Finance Corporation, the International Monetary  
11 Fund, and the Asian Development Bank to use the voice and  
12 vote of the United States to oppose any assistance by these  
13 institutions using funds appropriated or made available by the  
14 United States.

15       “(3) The President may waive the prohibitions of para-  
16 graphs (1) and (2) of this subsection for any country in South  
17 Asia if the President certifies to the Congress that a second  
18 country in South Asia is producing weapons grade enriched  
19 uranium or separated plutonium in unsafeguarded facilities  
20 and that the failure of that country to agree to cease produc-  
21 tion of such materials has resulted in the continued produc-  
22 tion of weapons grade enriched uranium or separated plutoni-  
23 um in unsafeguarded facilities by the first country, and if the  
24 President determines that it is in the national interest to  
25 waive those prohibitions.

1       “(4) Beginning concurrently with the initial certification  
2 or waiver issued pursuant to subsections (c)(1) or (c)(3) of this  
3 section, and for as long as any waiver of the requirements of  
4 subsections (a) and (b) of this section is in effect for any coun-  
5 try in South Asia, the President shall submit any waiver or  
6 certification required pursuant to subsection (c)(1) or (c)(3) of  
7 this section to the Congress on March 31 and on  
8 September 30 of each year. The President shall submit any  
9 such waiver or certification to the committees specified in  
10 section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.  
11 If in any such waiver or certification the President deter-  
12 mines that the situation in South Asia has changed and the  
13 certification previously made under subsection (c)(1) or (c)(3)  
14 of this section cannot again be made, then the President shall  
15 so certify and shall take whatever action is appropriate under  
16 this subsection with regard to the assistance programs of and  
17 export licensing for the country or countries in question, and  
18 with regard to United States voice and vote in the institu-  
19 tions described in paragraph (2) of this subsection.

20       “(d) Beginning at the time the initial waiver or certifica-  
21 tion under subsection (c)(1) or (c)(3) of this section is submit-  
22 ted, and each March 31 or September 30 thereafter for as  
23 long as a waiver of the provisions of section 669 (a) and (b) is  
24 in effect for any country in South Asia, the President shall  
25 submit to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate

1 and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the  
2 House of Representatives an Intelligence Community report  
3 containing a factual description of the isotopic content and  
4 quantity of separated plutonium and uranium that have been  
5 produced or imported during the preceding six-month period  
6 (or, in the case of the first required report, during the period  
7 since the date of enactment of this subsection) by any country  
8 in South Asia which has produced or imported such materi-  
9 als. The President shall notify the committees specified in  
10 section 602(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978  
11 that such report has been transmitted to the intelligence com-  
12 mittees of the Congress."

13 (b) Section 620E(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of  
14 1961 is amended to read as follows:

15 "(d) The President may waive the prohibitions of section  
16 669 (a) and (b) of this Act at any time during the period ✓  
17 beginning on the date of enactment of this subsection and  
18 ending on September 30, 1993, to provide assistance to Paki-  
19 stan during that period if he determines that to do so is in the  
20 interest of the United States."

21 (c) Prior to issuing a waiver for Pakistan pursuant to  
22 section 620E, the President shall submit to Congress a  
23 report detailing—

1 (1) the degree to which the Government of Paki-  
2 stan has cooperated in the investigation of the Arshad  
3 Pervez case;

4 (2) what legal action Pakistan has taken against  
5 any Pakistanis who are shown to have been involved  
6 in this case;

7 (3) what actions Pakistan has taken, and what  
8 laws, regulations, or other measures Pakistan has im-  
9 plemented to ensure that no such incident, whether or  
10 not undertaken with the support or active assistance of  
11 Pakistani Government officials, shall occur again; and

12 (4) the nature of any assurances which the Gov-  
13 ernment of Pakistan has provided against any future  
14 procurement which would contribute significantly to  
15 the ability of Pakistan to manufacture a nuclear explo-  
16 sive device.

17 LIMITATION ON DEFENSE EQUIPMENT DRAWDOWN

18 SEC. 556. Defense articles, services and training drawn  
19 down under the authority of section 506(a) of the Foreign  
20 Assistance Act of 1961, shall not be furnished to a recipient  
21 unless such articles are delivered to, and such services and  
22 training initiated for, the recipient country or international  
23 organization not more than one-hundred and twenty days  
24 from the date on which Congress received notification of the  
25 intention to exercise the authority of that section: *Provided,*  
26 That if defense articles have not been delivered or services

ST-15  
Suly

December 24, 1987

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *ROO*

SUBJECT: Update on Pakistan Nuclear Matters and  
Security Assistance

The President certified last week under Section 620 E (e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear device and that U.S. assistance reduces Pakistani incentives to acquire a nuclear device. Congress finally approved the Pakistan package this week. A thirty-month waiver (until April 1, 1990) has been granted. Pakistan's funding for FY '88 was reduced only marginally (about five percent) FMS came out at \$260 million instead of the \$290 million requested. However, the reduction was offset by writing off \$30 million as a grant. ESF was reduced to \$220 million from the \$250 million requested. PL 480, Development Assistance, IMET, and Narcotics Control funds, adding up to an additional \$145 million, were left changed.

Regarding the Pakistan nuclear weapons program, it is worth noting that there does not seem to be even a Presidential reporting requirement, much less a waiver, required on uranium enrichment. (OMB has not yet done an exhaustive review of the authorization bill, but tells us that no mention has surfaced so far.)

We do have two issues that are pending which must be dealt before FY '88 money can be spent. First, the Symington Amendment waiver (on enrichment equipment) by the President on national security grounds. This is fairly simple and State believes documentation can be provided to the NSC for the President on short notice. Second, the Determination to ascertain whether the Solarz Amendment (based on illegal procurement by Pakistan in the U.S.) has been triggered by the Pervez case. Pervez has been convicted

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~~(WITH SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
~~ATTACHMENT)~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

F96-12811 # 71

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~~ATTACHMENT)~~

-2-

in Philadelphia on several counts. State is just beginning to get access to the complete documentation on the case. Judge Sofaer will be addressing the Determination issue shortly. However, since the Pervez case is precedent-setting and the documents numerous, some in State L believe we may need a good deal of time.

~~REDACTED~~

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Our current understanding with State is that we will get the appropriate paperwork in place on Symington and Solarz waivers by January 7, recognizing that the paperwork on the Solarz part of the package could cause the date to slip. The deadline for a Presidential letter to Congress on both amendments should be no later than January 11, when the next round of U.S.-Pakistan military consultations will be held in Islamabad. -This would enable the Paks to resume procurement.

Attachment:

TAB I Wulf (ACDA)/Under Secretary of State Memo  
December 21, 1988

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Pakistan -- Solarz and  
Symington

Prepared by:  
Shirin Tahir-Kheli

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~~(WITH SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

December 21, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Pakistan -- Solarz and Symington (U)

With the conviction of Pervez and enactment of an unconditional authority to waive Symington, a strategy is needed that addresses timing--when to invoke Solarz, when to waive Solarz, when to waive Symington--and the conditions, if any, that would be attached to the Solarz and Symington waivers. This memo seeks to provide initial thoughts on such a strategy. (S)

Recent Congressional action could be construed as a Congressional determination that our Afghan interests take precedence over our non-proliferation interests. Carrying this interpretation too far, however, would be both imprudent and bad policy. Imprudent because the two and one-half year waiver authority carries with it funds only for this Fiscal Year. Appropriations will be needed for Fiscal Years 1989 and 1990.

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By an, NARA, Date 2/27/06

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DECL: OADR

Solarz

The first Administration response to the Pervez conviction should not be waiver of Symington. Rather, the response should be a rapid invocation of Solarz. Lengthy legal analysis is not germane. The issue is fundamentally political not legal. The lawyers should be able to advise us now on how to draft the finding so that it will not create a sweeping precedent for the future. Invoking Solarz now will send the right message to potential proliferants and to Zia. (S)

Before invoking Solarz, however, the Administration must decide the conditions under which it will waive Solarz.

[illegible]

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Symington

When this Administration resumed aid to Pakistan in 1982, it established conditions designed to keep the Pakistan nuclear program some distance from an actual nuclear-weapon capability. These conditions, the so-called red lines, originally consisted of the following four:

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Not to reiterate these red lines at the start of the next aid package would be a gross error. Possible misinterpretation by Zia of this action could lead Pakistan into going further than Congress would be able to tolerate,

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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December 16, 1987

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MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RB*

SUBJECT: Responding to David Emery on Pakistan

We have sent under separate cover a package for the President on certification for Pakistan. We continue to work the legislative strategy in which Mike Armacost is taking the lead. A pivotal issue at this point is a six-year versus a two-year (house language) waiver of the Symington Amendment.

Ken Adelman has disagreed with the tactics of certification and Congressional action. However, he has not challenged the intelligence on which the certification is based. Although Adelman is no longer at ACDA, we believe a response for the record is needed.

Doug *dg* Jenkins concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Emery at TAB I.

Approve *dg*

Disapprove

*UPDATE IN  
LIGHT OF  
CONGRESSIONAL  
ACTION.*

Attachments:

TAB I Your Memorandum to Adelman

TAB II - Adelman/APNSA Memo of November 4, 1987 (# 8133)  
Subj: A Strategy on Pakistan

- Adelman/The President's Memo of November 21, 1987  
Subj: Certification on Pakistan

- Adelman/APNSA Memo of December 4, 1987 (# 8996)  
Subj: Proposed Language on Pakistan

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BY *dlh*

NARA, DATE

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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OAKLEY

December 23, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE DAVID EMERY

Acting Director

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: A Strategy on Pakistan (U)

We have been working on an overall strategy for Pakistan which will enhance the chances for nonproliferation in South Asia and protect our Afghanistan strategy in the crucial period ahead. Ken Adelman's memos of November 4, 1987, November 21, 1987 and December 4, 1987, have raised some tactical questions about certain aspects of our policy. (S)

The suspension of security assistance to Pakistan from October 1, 1987 to January 15, 1988, is a clear signal to the Government of Pakistan that it is no longer a case of "business-as-usual." The President has before him the full layout of our strategy on Pakistan. He has written to key Congressmen that the Administration is in the process of determining whether to invoke the Solarz Amendment. (S)

Prime Minister Gandhi's visit to the White House in October enabled the President to make some headway with India on the need for a regional nonproliferation regime in South Asia, as well as to reinforce the importance of Indian-Pak bilateral nuclear dialogue and getting Pakistan to maintain its present restrictions (e.g., nonproduction, nontesting, etc.). We are actively exploring avenues for progress along these lines with the Governments of India, Pakistan, the UK, the PRC, and the Soviets. Continued security assistance to Pakistan is a key ingredient in the success of any plan for nonproliferation in South Asia. (S)

Pakistan is indeed aware that the Administration's willingness to waive the Symington and the Solarz Amendments requires nuclear restraint including an end to illegal procurement activities in the United States. Reduction of the Symington Amendment waiver from six to two-and-half years by Congress reflects ongoing concern with some aspects of Pakistan's nuclear program -- a point not lost on Islamabad. Nor is the near-success of sanction proposals by Senator Glenn and Congressman Solarz aimed at stopping uranium enrichment above five-percent (5%). (S)

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
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Colin L. Powell

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY  
WASHINGTON

8996

DIRECTOR

December 4, 1987


MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Proposed Language on Pakistan

This week the Senate Appropriations Committee adopted language that, in effect, says Pakistan's nuclear bomb program is justified since India has one and vice versa. It, thus, removes any pressure on either India or Pakistan to restrain their programs. (U) FOIA(b)(1)

Redacted

I am sending a similar memorandum to the Secretary of State.  
(U)

  
Kenneth L. Adelman

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By smf, NARA, Date 2/27/06

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PAGE 01 OF 03

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<SUBJ>SUBJECT: NUCLEAR  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: MNUC, PK  
SUBJECT: NUCLEAR

1. ENTIRE TEXT
2. SINCE ARRIVING IN PAKISTAN 10 DAYS AGO, I HAVE DISCUSSED THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH ZIA, JUNEJO, THE FOREIGN SECRETARY AND OTHERS. THERE IS SOME GOOD NEWS AND STILL A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF BAD NEWS. BOTH THE GOOD AND THE BAD, AND SOME THOUGHTS ON WHERE WE GO FROM HERE, FOLLOW.
3. SOME GOOD NEWS - BEFORE WE CAN BEGIN A SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE ON AN ISSUE OF THIS IMPORTANCE, BOTH SIDES MUST LEVEL WITH EACH OTHER. AS DEANE

WE HAVE  
SEEN GREATER HONESTY FROM THE PAKISTANI SIDE. THIS

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5. WE HAVE, I BELIEVE, ACHIEVED A FAIRLY CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE THE GOP IS NOW. SPECIFICALLY, ALTHOUGH NO PAKISTANI HAS SO STATED ALL THE FOLLOWING TO US, PAKISTAN WILL MOST LIKELY:  
---STAND BY THE ORIGINAL FOUR RED LINES

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PAKISTAN PROBABLY BELIEVES THAT THESE STEPS ARE

SUFFICIENT TO MEET PRESIDENT ZIA'S PROMISE NOT TO EMBARRASS THE PRESIDENT AND ALSO TO ALLOW THE PRESIDENT TO CERTIFY THAT PAKISTAN DOES NOT POSSESS A NUCLEAR DEVICE.

6. THIS SYNOPSIS, BASED ON DEANE'S AND MY CONVERSATIONS HERE, TRACKS CLOSELY WITH WHAT WE HAVE ALWAYS ASSUMED TO BE PAKISTAN'S INTENTIONS. THEY WANT TO HAVE A CAPABILITY IN PLACE TO MOVE TO AN ACTIVE ASSEMBLY AND TESTING PROGRAM ON VERY SHORT NOTICE IN CASE THEY CANNOT COUNT ON OUTSIDE SUPPORT

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By AM, NARA, Date 2/27/06

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 03

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IN A FUTURE CRISIS. THEY WILL NOT GO ALL THE WAY TO ASSEMBLY AND TESTING, HOWEVER, SINCE THAT WOULD ENSURE THE CUT-OFF OF OUR SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

7. THE PAKISTANIS ALSO UNDOUBTEDLY FEEL THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A CERTAIN RISK, THESE GROUNDRULES HAVE WORKED FOR THEM IN THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US. IN SPITE OF DIRE PREDICTIONS THAT WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO HELP FULLY UNLESS CERTAIN NUCLEAR RESTRAINT STEPS ARE TAKEN, THE US HAS ALWAYS COME THROUGH TO HELP PAKISTAN MEET ITS PRESSING SECURITY NEEDS. THIS WAS LAST PROVEN WITH OUR SUCCESS IN THE SENATE AND HOUSE COMMITTEES ON PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE. BASICALLY, S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 14310

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MNUC, PK

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR

1. ~~ENTIRE TEXT~~

PAKISTANI POLICY IS BUILT ON THE ASSESSMENT, ~~REDACTED~~ THAT AS LONG AS SOVIET TROOPS ARE IN AFGHANISTAN, US STRATEGIC COMPULSIONS ARE LIKELY TO PREVAIL OVER ITS PROLIFERATION CONCERNS.

8. ...AND THE BAD NEWS. THERE IS STILL ENOUGH BAD NEWS TO KEEP US DEPRESSED. ~~REDACTED~~

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9. THIRD, I SEE NO CHANCE OF SIGNIFICANT UNILATERAL STEPS BY PAKISTAN WHICH COULD BE PUBLICLY CHARACTERIZED AS DISCRIMINATORY. THIS MEANS, SPECIFICALLY, THAT ALTHOUGH SOME MOVEMENT IS POSSIBLE ON ISSUES ABOUT WHICH WE HAVE GOP COMMITMENTS, SUCH AS ENRICHMENT AND PROCUREMENT, PAKISTAN WILL NOT REVERSE PUBLICLY STATED POLICIES SUCH AS NO NPT SIGNATURE UNLESS INDIA DOES SO AS WELL. FOURTH, ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PUSH, THERE IS NOW ONLY A SLIGHT CHANCE OF SIGNIFICANT REGIONAL STEPS AS LONG AS INDIA HAS ITS CHINA CONCERNS REINFORCED BY RAJIV'S POLITICAL TRIALS.

10. FINALLY, I AM EVEN MORE CONVINCED THAT PRESSURES AND/OR LINKAGES TYING OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO GOP MOVEMENT ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WILL NOT WORK. EVEN

AFTER ONLY TEN DAYS BACK IN PAKISTAN, IT IS EVIDENT THAT THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM STILL ENJOYS WIDE AND DEEP PUBLIC SUPPORT. ZIA AND JUNEJO COULD RENOUNCE THE NUCLEAR OPTION ONLY AT CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL COST. THE ONLY CAUSE WHICH I CAN FIND WHICH IS MORE POPULAR IN PAKISTAN IS INDIA-BASHING.

11. WHERE FROM HERE? - THERE ARE NO QUICK FIXES AND WE ARE ALL SHORT OF INNOVATIVE IDEAS. WE MUST FIND WAYS TO CONVINCE THE GOP THAT IF WE ARE TO ENSURE A SOLID RELATIONSHIP POST-AFGHANISAN, WE MUST BUILD THE FOUNDATION NOW. WE THEREFORE MUST FIND A WAY TO PUT THE NUCLEAR ISSUE BEHIND US.

12. WE SHOULD PURSUE THREE SEPARATE TRACKS. FIRST, WE MUST CONTINUE TO NOTE THAT OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE IS GOP ADHERENCE TO THE NPT AND FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS, REALIZING THAT OBJECTIVE IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO ATTAIN IN THE SHORT TERM.

13. SECOND, WE MUST CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE GOP TO

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15. IT CAN BE CORRECTLY CLAIMED THAT THE ABOVE IS BASICALLY MORE OF THE SAME WITH NO IMAGINATIVE FAST AND EASY ANSWERS. BUT I DON'T BELIEVE THERE ARE ANY. I WILL CONTINUE THE NUCLEAR DIALOGUE WITH SATTAR AND, MORE IMPORTANTLY, CONTINUE TO PUSH ZIA AND JUNEJO. VISITORS, SUCH AS MIKE ARMACOST DURING HIS COMING TRIP, CAN HIT THE THEMES NOTED ABOVE. IF WE CAN TAKE WHAT THE PAKISTANIS HAVE ALREADY GIVEN US, AND THEN GET THEIR RESTRAINT ON THE FOUR DISCRETE ISSUES MENTIONED ABOVE, IT WILL BE A CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS, EVEN ABSENT A PAKISTANI SIGNATURE ON THE NPT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. RAPHEL

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TO

CARLUCCI

FROM BURT, R

DOCDATE 09 SEP 87

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KEYWORDS: GERMANY F R

PAKISTAN

NON PROLIFERATION

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SUBJECT: LTR TO CARLUCCI FM AMB BURT RE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES

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ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CARLUCCI DUE: 05 OCT 87 STATUS S FILES WH  
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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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PAGE 01

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<SUBJ>SUBJ: REPORTED PAKISTANI NUCLEAR TEST BAN PROPOSAL  
~~SECRET~~ NEW DELHI 14958  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PARM, IN, PK

SUBJ: REPORTED PAKISTANI NUCLEAR TEST BAN PROPOSAL

REF: ISLAMABAD 12062

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. POLCOUNS WAS INFORMED JUNE 15 BY HIS PAKISTANI COUNTERPART IN NEW DELHI AND VISITING MEA OFFICER FROM ISLAMABAD ABOUT THE JUNEJO-GANDHI LETTER ON NUCLEAR ISSUES REPORTED IN REFTEL. ACCORDING TO THESE PAKISTANI INTERLOCUTORS, A NUCLEAR TEST BAN WOULD BE A FIRST STEP TOWARD A NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME IN THE REGION IN THE ABSENCE OF AN AGREEMENT NOT TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SINCE ALL THE SAARC COUNTRIES EXCEPT PAKISTAN AND INDIA HAVE SIGNED THE NPT, THEY EXPLAINED, A REGIONAL TEST BAN SHOULD BE EASY TO OBTAIN ONCE THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR PROGRAMS ACCEDE TO IT. THE GOP ALLEGEDLY OFFERED ALSO A BILATERAL TEST BAN IF INDIA PREFERRED THAT TO A REGIONAL AGREEMENT. SO FAR, THE PAKISTANIS SAID, THE GOI HAS NOT RESPONDED TO THE OFFER AND THE GOP HAS NOT DISCLOSED IT PUBLICLY.

3. SO FAR THE STORY OF THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROPOSALS HAS NOT LEAKED IN INDIA. WE WOULD EXPECT THE GOI TO HOLD THIS ISSUE VERY CLOSE, AS IT APPEARS TO PLACE THEM IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. IT WOULD APPEAR TO US THAT THE GOI WILL HAVE THE SAME POLICY OBJECTIONS TO THIS AS IT HAS TO ADHERING TO THE NPT. I.E. THAT IT ADDRESSES NUCLEAR POLICY ONLY IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT WITHOUT REGARD TO THE NUCLEAR SUPERPOWERS, THAT IT DOES NOT INCLUDE CHINA IN THE REGIONAL NUCLEAR CONTEXT, AND THAT IT SUPPORTS THE PAKISTANI CLAIM TO NUCLEAR EQUIVALENCE WITH INDIA. THE GOI WILL SEE THIS PROPOSAL AS HAVING THE EFFECT INTERNATIONALLY OF SERVING TO EASE PRESSURE UPON THE GOP TO SIGN THE NPT AND TO RESTRAIN ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. HOWEVER, WE WOULD EXPECT THE GOI TO FIRST OF ALL DELAY RESPONSE AND, IF THE GOP MAKES THE PROPOSAL PUBLIC, TO REJECT IT IN TERMS WHICH STRESS THE CONTINUITY OF INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY AND TO DEPICT THE PROPOSAL AS INTENDED TO GAIN LEGITIMACY FOR WHAT THE GOI SEES AS AN ONGOING PAKISTANI EFFORT TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY.

4. WE ARE A BIT PUZZLED REGARDING THE MOTIVATION BEHIND THE PAKISTANI EMBASSY HERE MENTIONING THE LETTER TO US, ESPECIALLY SINCE REFTEL INDICATED THE

PAKS WANT TO KEEP THIS STRICTLY IN BILATERAL CHANNELS ON THE FRINGES OF SAARC.  
DEAN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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May 4, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM TO FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RB*

SUBJECT: Your Reply to Congressman Solarz on Pakistan

Attached at TAB I is a proposed reply for your signature to Congressman Solarz in response to his letter of April 2 to you (TAB II) on Pakistan.

*AM* Alison Fortier, Steve *ARK* Wanzdsky and Lou *LP* Proliaresi concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the attached letter to Steve Solarz at TAB I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

TAB I Your letter to Solarz

TAB II Solarz/Carlucci letter of April 2, 1987



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I read your op-ed in the Washington Post on security assistance to Pakistan with great interest. Your assessment of the complexities of the issues involved was clear, cogent and insightful. As the debate in Congress over the last few weeks indicated, approval of security assistance for Pakistan is important given increased Soviet pressure via Afghanistan. Keeping up the pressure on nuclear issues is also important.

As the President recently wrote to Senator Glenn, he does not intend to trade off non-proliferation concerns for our support to Pakistan on Afghanistan. Our help to Pakistan in its hour of need is a prudent step in protecting against a nuclear weapons race in South Asia. We have no disagreement on that score, and also agree that India as well as Pakistan be persuaded to eschew such a policy. If differences exist, it is on tactics. In this connection, we would have preferred a six-year waiver of the Symington Amendment for the new program for Pakistan. However, the Administration is cognizant of the concerns of Congress and accepted the two-year waiver which you sponsored and, which was also supported by members of both parties in the crucial vote of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

With best wishes.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Stephen J. Solarz  
Chairman,  
Subcommittee on Asian and  
Pacific Affairs  
United States House of Representatives  
Washington, D. C. 20515

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STEPHEN J. SOLARZ  
13TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEES:

FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN  
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

EDUCATION AND LABOR

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April 2, 1987

Honorable Frank Carlucci  
National Security Council  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500


Dear Frank:

As you undoubtedly know, the Administration has asked the Congress to authorize almost \$671 million of assistance to Pakistan for each of the next two years. Few questions before the Congress this year present us with a more complex set of issues.

The enclosed essay, which I wrote for the Washington Post, sums up my views on how we might address this vexing issue in a way that is sensitive to both our nonproliferation and our Afghan concerns.

I would, as always, be most interested in your reaction to my article.

Sincerely,



STEPHEN J. SOLARZ  
Member of Congress

SJS/rh  
Enclosure

# OUTLOOK

Commentary and Opinion

Stephen J. Solarz

APR 1987

## A Two-Year Waiver for Pakistan

### Taking Exception

*"A cutoff of American aid to Pakistan . . . is more likely to lead to a regional nuclear arms race than to prevent one."*

The Post recently published an editorial calling upon the Reagan administration to "hang tough" in its efforts to slow Pakistan's inexorable march toward a nuclear weapons capability ["Pakistan and Nuclear Weapons," March 10]. Toward that end The Post endorsed Sen. John Glenn's recent suggestion that American military aid to Pakistan be suspended pending a policy review and the receipt of adequate assurances from the Pakistani government regarding its nuclear program.

The indignation expressed in Glenn's proposal and The Post editorial is entirely understandable. Americans are justifiably frustrated by Pakistan's apparent determination to achieve a nuclear weapons capability. It would clearly be in our interest to terminate our aid to Pakistan if, by doing so, we could actually induce Islamabad to accept international safeguards on its nuclear facilities.

Unfortunately, no one knowledgeable about Pakistan thinks there is the slightest chance that Islamabad, if forced to choose between U.S. aid and moving ahead on its nuclear program, would accept safeguards in order to retain American assistance.

So long as India, which has already exploded a nuclear device, refuses to accept safeguards, there is no real prospect of Pakistan's doing so by itself. Former prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's stark declaration that Pakistanis would eat grass if need be in order to achieve a nuclear capability remains a vivid expression of Pakistan's determination to stay abreast of India in the nuclear field.

Instead of advancing U.S. nonproliferation objectives, cutting off American aid to Pakistan would almost certainly set them back. Up to now the Pakistanis have avoided exploding a nuclear device—partly because they do not believe testing is essential to the success of their program, but also because they realize that American law requires an immediate termination of assistance in such an event.

An aid cutoff, however, would remove one of the principal incentives Pakistan now has to forgo testing. Moreover, without the benefits of the American connection, Pakistanis would probably feel that their security required a dramatic demonstration of their nuclear potential as a way of discouraging any possible Indian designs against them.

Were Pakistan to test a bomb, India could be expected to follow suit within a matter of weeks. The stage would thus be set for a nuclear arms race on the Indian subcontinent, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the region and the world.

Furthermore, insofar as the viability of

advised to extend the waiver for only two years. This would make possible a continuation of U.S. assistance but place Pakistan on notice that we will be continuously reviewing its nuclear program.

Pakistan has repeatedly stated it would agree to any system of safeguards India accepts. Since it is unrealistic to expect Pakistan to embrace safeguards unilaterally, we should also try to induce India to agree to international inspections. This might be accomplished by coupling Pakistan's two-year Symington waiver with a provision that voids the waiver if India agrees to safeguards for its nuclear facilities.


Stripped of its waiver, Pakistan could not meet the Symington amendment standard, and thus would no longer qualify for U.S. assistance—unless it also accepted comparable safeguards. And with the nuclear facilities of both countries adequately safeguarded, each would find its security improved, while the subcontinent would be spared a nuclear arms race.

Even if India did not agree to safeguards, such an approach would at least have the virtue of making it clear that New Delhi as well as Islamabad bears responsibility for the escalating nuclear tensions in the region.

This is a time to avoid the temptations of self-righteousness. Reconciling our conflicting interests on the subcontinent requires that we act prudently rather than precipitously. A cutoff of American aid to Pakistan in the name of nonproliferation is more likely to lead to a regional nuclear arms race than to prevent one, while simultaneously jeopardizing our important interests in sustaining the Afghan resistance. It is, in short, an altogether bad idea.

*The writer, a Democratic representative from New York, is a senior member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.*

BY MATRO





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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 22, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: Additional Calls to Senators on Pakistan Package

Alison Fortier and I have been in touch with State on SFRC proposals for the Pak follow-on program. The current language has restrictive clauses which are unacceptable to the Administration (on uranium enrichment and sophistication of weapons systems supplied to Pakistan). Additionally, the present draft publicly confronts Pakistan on the nuclear issue in such a way that it will be harder for the GOP to do what we are quietly pushing it to do. A Republican alternative has been developed by Lugar, Boschwitz and Helms.

The SFRC may get to the Pakistan markup late this afternoon, and is sure to get there tomorrow. We particularly need to reinforce the importance of the assistance package for Pakistan with three key Republicans: Senators Pressler, Kassebaum and Evans. No one at State has been able to talk to them about this issue.

State believes that Senators Dodd and Kerry are supportive of the Administration's efforts on the Pak package.

Alison Fortier concurs.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the attached talking points at TAB I and call Senators Pressler, Kassenbaum and Evans before the Pak markup this afternoon.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment:  
TAB I Talking Points

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BY dlb, NARA, DATE 6/15/00





TALKING POINTS

for

USE WITH SFRC MEMBERS

- The Administration can't live with the Committee draft on Pakistan. We understand that Senators Lugar and Boschwitz have good alternative ideas.
- The Administration is working hard on Pakistan. We have the same nuclear objectives as the Committee, namely a halt to nuclear enrichment (HEU) and restraint in other areas. We also want Pakistan to continue its support for a free-Afghanistan in the face of increased Soviet pressures.
- The present draft will make it much harder for the Pak Government to work quietly with us on the nuclear issue, could undermine our basic relationship, and cause Pakistan to waiver on Afghanistan.
- Given blatant Soviet attacks on Pakistan in recent weeks, we need to be very careful what signals we send on Afghanistan.
- This is an issue of great importance to the Administration. I hope you will work with other Republicans and like-minded Democrats so that an acceptable draft will emerge.

CABLE -

SUBJECT: PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

(Page 3 - para. 8.)

Replace (2nd sentence)

.....President Zia's interview with Time magazine was a good step forward in recognizing Pakistani capabilities. The dialogue now needs to be built on the baseline projected in the Zia interview and Ambassador Hinton's speech in Islamabad.....

(Para 9.)

(INSERT - after 1st sentence)

As part of the same action, we have already initiated a number of steps which focus on the regional aspects of the nuclear problem. Specifically: the President wrote to Senator Glenn on April 10, 1987, that it is important that India be engaged if the threat of a nuclear arms race, and its underlying causes, are to be permanently removed from the region. (FYI. He had made this point directly in a letter to Prime Minister Gandhi on March 13th.) We continue to urge the GOI -- as will be reflected in the Indian's Foreign Minister's visit to Washington next week -- to respond to GOP proposals on mutual nuclear restraint or make alternative proposals; Congressional recognition of this interrelationship between India and Pakistan during recent weeks, which the Administration has fostered is a new and positive development despite GOI unhappiness.

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BY dlb NARA, DATE 6/15/00

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S/NP:GSAMORE  
NEA:SAOKI  
S/S:JLAKE  
NSC:SHIRIN TAHER-KHELI

IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

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DECL: OADR

PREL, MNUC, MASS, PK

PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

REF: ISLAMABAD 7318

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS ON HOW TO PROCEED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH PAKISTAN ON RESOLVING THE SOUTH ASIA NUCLEAR ISSUE. WE ARE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT ON THE NEED BOTH TO SEEK PAKISTANI RESTRAINT TO ADDRESS THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS RAISED BY CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATIONS AND TO SEARCH FOR A SOLID UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE THAT CAN SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP.

3. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN CONSIDERING ELEMENTS OF AN ACTION PLAN, PART OF WHICH WILL DRAW ON YOUR CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH THE PAKISTANI LEADERSHIP. THE SECRETARY HAS APPROVED THIS ACTION PLAN, WHICH WILL BE CONVEYED TO YOU SEPARATELY. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE YOU HAVE BEGUN WITH SATTAR, INCLUDING A DISCUSSION OF PAKISTANI INTENTIONS, PAKISTANI PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, WAYS TO PURSUE

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By AM NARA, Date 2/27/06

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A REGIONAL APPROACH, AND [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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4. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] WE WANT  
TO FORGE A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WHICH WILL REFLECT  
DURABLE MUTUAL INTERESTS AND CONCERNS. BUT WITHOUT A  
CLEAR COMMITMENT TO A RESOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR  
PROBLEM, THIS FUTURE WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE.

5. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT NUCLEAR RESTRAINT IS IN  
PAKISTAN'S OWN BEST INTERESTS, NOT JUST A TACTICAL  
DEVICE TO SLIP PAST THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE.  
NONETHELESS, THE CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION GIVES A NOTE  
OF URGENCY SINCE PAKISTANI ACTIONS AT THIS TIME CAN  
HELP TO LAY A BIPARTISAN FOUNDATION FOR AN ENDURING  
RELATIONSHIP. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1)

6. OUR OBJECTIVE REMAINS NOT ADHERENCE BY PAKISTAN AND  
INDIA, OR SOME DURABLE REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION  
REGIME, BOLSTERED BY BINDING AND PUBLIC COMMITMENTS BY  
INDIA AND PAKISTAN. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WILL NOT BE  
EASY TO ACHIEVE BUT WE MUST CONTINUE TO PRESS IN THIS  
DIRECTION. AT PRESENT, WE NEED TO CONVINCE PAKISTAN  
AND INDIA TO REFRAIN FROM FURTHER ELABORATION OF THEIR  
NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, (I.E., NO ASSEMBLY, NO TESTING,  
AND NO FURTHER ACCUMULATION OF UNSAFEGUARDED WEAPONS  
GRADE MATERIAL). THIS "FREEZE" COULD BUY TIME FOR  
NEGOTIATIONS OF ADDITIONAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND  
VERIFICATION MEASURES AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS WHICH  
COULD SERVE OUR GOAL OF CREATING A MORE PERMANENT AND  
SECURE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, BUT WE MUST KEEP OUR  
FOCUS AND THEIRS ON THE ULTIMATE GOAL IF WE ARE TO HAVE  
ANY HOPE OF CREDIBILITY AND SUCCESS IN ESTABLISHING THE  
KIND OF LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WE SEEK. YOU ARE  
AUTHORIZED TO EXPLORE ANY IDEAS OF THIS SORT WHICH COME

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UP IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PAKISTANIS.

7. ALTHOUGH HFAC MARK-UP DID NOT RESULT IN NEW NON-PROLIFERATION CONDITIONS IN THE HOUSE BILL, WE STILL FACE STRONG CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN ABOUT PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE SENATE HAS RECESSED WITHOUT AN SFRC MARK-UP ON THE PAKISTANI AID AUTHORIZATION, BUT THE CURRENT STAFF DRAFT WOULD REQUIRE CERTIFICATION THAT PAKISTAN HAS CEASED PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS USABLE NUCLEAR MATERIAL, WITH DOLS 100 MILLION OF FMS AND ALL SALES OF SOPHISTICATED MILITARY ITEMS CONDITIONED ON THE CERTIFICATION. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT SIMILAR LANGUAGE WILL BE INTRODUCED ON THE HOUSE FLOOR.

8. TO FEND OFF THESE AND OTHER NON-PROLIFERATION CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON OUR AID PACKAGE, WE WILL NEED IMMEDIATE PAKISTANI ACTION TO DEMONSTRATE COMMITMENT AND RESTRAINT.

FOIA(b)(1) [REDACTED] VERIFICATION IS AN ABSOLUTE MUST IF PAKISTANI CREDIBILITY IS TO BE RESTORED. IAEA SAFEGUARDS WOULD BE POLITICALLY PREFERABLE TO BILATERAL US-PAKISTAN ARRANGEMENTS, BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER VERIFICATION OPTIONS IF NECESSARY INVOLVING THE US OR OTHER PARTIES.

FOIA(b)(1) [REDACTED] WHICH MIGHT BE AN OPENING STEP ON THE WAY TO AN INCREASINGLY BROAD INDO-PAK NUCLEAR AGREEMENT.

9. THIS APPROACH TO THE GOP WOULD, IN OUR THINKING, BE THE FIRST STEP IN A SERIES OF ACTIONS WE PLAN TO TAKE ON THE SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM. \* OUR INITIAL GOAL IS TO OBTAIN SOME TANGIBLE (AND MEANINGFUL) PAKISTANI ACTION THAT WE CAN USE WITH THE CONGRESS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GOP WILL RESPECT A SET OF NUCLEAR FIREBREAKS, PARTICULARLY ON ASSEMBLY AND TESTING OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE AND ON ENRICHMENT LEVELS. AS YOU WILL NOTE FROM SEPTTEL DESCRIBING OUR STRATEGY, WE ALSO WANT TO PURSUE MORE COMPREHENSIVE MEASURES, AND EXPECT TO BE DESIGNATING AN EMISSARY WHO WILL BE ABLE TO PURSUE BOTH ADDITIONAL UNILATERAL STEPS PAKISTAN CAN TAKE, AND A

\* As part of the same action, we have already instructed a number of steps which focus on the regional aspects of the nuclear problem. Specifically:

~~SECRET~~

*President has indicated with time was a good idea. Stop. Forward to me in Houston. Pakistani capabilities to dialogue needs to be built on the basis of projected in the and his interview with Ambassador in Islamabad. India*

*Gene letter*

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4

# REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION DIALOGUE INVOLVING INDIA.

10. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR IN YOUR DIALOGUE THAT WE HAVE BEEN, AND WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS ON THE REGIONAL APPROACH TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. WE HAVE BEEN URGING OTHERS TO BRING WHATEVER INFLUENCE THEY HAVE TO BEAR ON INDIA -- MOST RECENTLY IN SECRETARY SHULTZ'S TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE -- AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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AS TIME GOES ON WE WILL SEEK OTHER AVENUES TO PUSH THE REGIONAL EFFORT AS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED. BUT WE NEED PAKISTAN'S HELP OUT FRONT. ALONG THIS LINE YOU SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO GET ACROSS THE POINT THAT A DRAMATIC MOVE BY PAKISTAN

[REDACTED]

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AS WELL, IT WOULD CLEARLY BE A SIGNAL ACHIEVEMENT VIS-A-VIS OUR EFFORTS ON THE HILL. WE WOULD FOLLOW UP SUCH A STEP WITH A MAJOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN TO BRING FURTHER PRESSURE ON INDIA TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD AND WOULD URGE OTHERS TO DO LIKEWISE INCLUDING IN THE UN.

11. AS TO THE PEACEFUL USES COOPERATION AGREEMENT, YOU ARE QUITE RIGHT THAT OUR ABILITY TO MOVE HINGES UPON PAKISTANI AGREEMENT TO THE NPT. WE HAVE MADE THIS POINT REGULARLY WITH PROMISES OF HELP IF THEY ARE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE THE NPT. YOU SHOULD ASSERT THAT IF PAKISTAN TAKES THAT STEP, NOT ONLY WILL THEY BENEFIT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE (WHICH WE WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO FOSTER) BUT WILL BENEFIT ECONOMICALLY FROM OUR ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN A PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROGRAM WHICH IS DEMONSTRABLY PEACEFUL. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT AND SEEK, WITH EVERY REASONABLE ASSUMPTION OF SUCCESS, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR THE PROGRAM. WE WOULD ALSO URGE THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHERS (RATHER THAN CONTINUING OUR VIGOROUS AND LARGELY SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS AT DISSUADING THEM).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
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13. FROM THE FOREGOING IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT WE AGREE WITH THE ASSUMPTIONS WHICH YOU SET FORTH IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF YOUR MESSAGE. ACCORDINGLY, EXCEPT AS TO THE MATTER OF SECURITY GUARANTEES, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED IN THE CONTEXT OF AND DRAWING ON THE FOREGOING TO UNDERTAKE DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT COMMITMENT. WE WILL BE COMMUNICATING FURTHER THOUGHTS AND PROVIDING SPECIFIC RESPONSES WHICH YOU CAN MAKE TO THE GOP ON THIS REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF STEPPED UP SOVIET-AFGHANISTAN INCURSIONS.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
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MESSAGE NO. **016035** CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 5  
 FROM: KEN QUINN S/S 647-6448  
 (Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)  
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION TELEGRAM TO ISLAMABAD: PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ENCLOSURE(S) MON. 6/12/98

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	ROBERT PEARSON	455-6534	
NSC	EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT	395-3723	
	<i>Grant Green</i>		
	<i>John Kheli</i>		
	<i>Oakley</i>		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY 4/17

S/S Officer: KMG  
*John Kheli*

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PRESS FOR A FULL SIX YEAR WAIVER. HE SAID OUR PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN POLICIES HAD RECENTLY BEEN REVIEWED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, AND WE LIKED WHAT WE SAW (THOUGH ON AFGHANISTAN, CONCERNS HAD BEEN RAISED ABOUT RECENT MOVES TO 7 MONTHS IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS -- A SHORT TIMEFRAME WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO ENSURING BROAD SUPPORT, INCLUDING BY THE RESISTANCE). HE SAID, HOWEVER, U/S ARMACOST INTENDED TO BE FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF PAKISTAN DURING HIS MOSCOW MEETINGS -- THERE WOULD BE NO DAYLIGHT IN OUR TWO POSITIONS. HE ADDED THAT, UNTIL THE SOVIETS AGREE TO A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO KEEP UP, INDEED, IN CERTAIN PLACES INCREASE, PRESSURE.

4. THE ONLY PROBLEM MARRING RELATIONS IS THE NUCLEAR QUESTION. ON INSTRUCTIONS, THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD SEVERAL REQUESTS TO MAKE. WE VIEW THESE AS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT IF WE ARE TO CARRY CONGRESS NOW AND AVOID A NUCLEAR DISASTER SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE. THEY INCLUDE IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE:

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[illegible][illegible]

*Redacted*

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TAGS: MNUC, PREL, PK

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR: DIALOGUE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

6. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING RECENT CALLS IN THE U.S. PRESS FOR AID CUTS BECAUSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NUCLEAR AREA. HE SAID THAT SOME DO NOT UNDERSTAND THAT ASSISTANCE ITSELF CAN GIVE A SENSE OF SECURITY AND HELP ENSURE THAT PAKISTAN DOES NOT TAKE THE "LAST STEPS" TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL WORK HARD TO ENSURE THAT AID CONTINUES.

7. IN REPLY, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE WAS WELL AWARE OF U.S. CONCERNS. EVEN DURING HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, HE HAD NOTED THAT TWO CONCERNS DOMINATED HIS TALKS, BOTH IN GOVERNMENT CIRCLES, AND WITH PRIVATE CITIZENS. THESE WERE THE NUCLEAR QUESTION AND

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NARCOTICS. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT, KNOWING THESE CONCERNS, PAKISTAN HAD REPEATEDLY GIVEN ASSURANCES TO THE USG THAT IT WOULD DO NOTHING TO EMBARRASS THE UNITED STATES.

8. CHANGING TACK, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID PAKISTAN NEEDS A NUCLEAR PROGRAM FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. POWER GENERATION IS A SERIOUS PROBLEM IN THIS LARGE COUNTRY WITH A POPULATION APPROACHING 100 MILLION. HE HAD ASKED EXPERTS HOW BEST TO MEET THE GROWING DEMAND BY THE PEOPLE FOR ELECTRICITY -- THIS WAS NECESSARY IF HIS GOVERNMENT WAS TO BE SUCCESSFUL POLITICALLY. SIMILARLY, WITH WATER LOGGING, HE WANTED TO FIND SOME WAY TO

RECLAIM SALINE AREAS.

9. RETURNING TO THE AMBASSADOR'S POINTS, THE PM SAID PAKISTAN CANNOT AFFORD TO THINK OF SUCH THINGS AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS. [REDACTED]

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10. THE PRIME MINISTER.

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16. RETURNING TO THE POINTS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE ABOUT ENERGY GENERATION, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT ONE OF HIS VISIONS WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP PAKISTAN WITH NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION, AND ALSO ON NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH, BIOLOGY AND EVEN THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR RELATED MATERIALS (REVERSING CURRENT U.S. POLICY OF TRYING TO FRUSTRATE ANY SUCH PAK ACTIVITIES). ALL THIS COULD COME FROM THE DIALOGUE, THOUGH ONLY IF PAKISTAN AGREED TO SIGN THE NPT OR ADOPT FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS.

17. IMPACT OF INDIA ON PAK NUCLEAR POLICY -- THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IF HE HAD HIS SPEECH TO MAKE AGAIN, HE WOULD CHANGE ONLY ONE WORD "UNILATERAL" -- WHERE HE REFERRED TO A POSSIBLE PAKISTANI DECISION TO ADHERE TO THE NPT. IN FACT, UNILATERAL IS THE WRONG WORD. THERE ARE ALREADY 130 SIGNATORIES TO THE TREATY. WHILE THEY GAVE SOMETHING, INCLUDING A BIT OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, THEY GOT SOMETHING IN RETURN. IT WAS PARADOXICAL THAT PAKISTAN HAD PLACED ITSELF IN A SMALL GROUP INCLUDING INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND ISRAEL, RATHER THAN WITH THE 130 NATIONS WHO WERE NPT SIGNATORIES. HE SAID THERE IS MORE TO THE WORLD THAN INDIA.

18. REPLYING WITH ANIMATION, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID INDIA IS A CONSTANT FACTOR. HE POINTED TO THE ENORMOUS EUPHORIA THE DAY PREVIOUS WHEN PAKISTAN BEAT INDIA IN CRICKET. IN MATTERS PERTAINING TO INDIA, EVERY PAKISTANI FEELS EITHER A WINNER OR LOSER. IF THE UNITED STATES WANTS PAKISTAN TO SIGN "THEN INDIA MUST BE AT PAR. IF INDIA SAYS NO, THEN PAKISTAN CANNOT SIGN."

19. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED SAYING THAT THE U.S. IS CONTINUING TO PRESS INDIA, BUT HE URGED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER NOT FORECLOSE ANY POSSIBILITY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DISCUSSION. WE UNDERSTAND HIS POLITICAL

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FOIA(b)(1)

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

TO POLITICAL PRESSURES. HE URGED THE AMBASSADOR TO PAY  
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TAGS: MNUC, PREL, PK

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## WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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25. AFTER MY EXPECTED TALK WITH ZIA, IF IT ALSO GOES REASONABLY WELL, I'LL ADVANCE SOME SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW WE SHOULD PROCEED. IN THE MEANTIME, PLEASE GET ON WITH SOME IMAGINATIVE THINKING IN WASHINGTON. HINTON

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4931  
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 9666

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 06341  
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MNUC, PREL, PK

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR: DIALOGUE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER

REF: ISLAMABAD 5440

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

>BEGIN SUMMARY>

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR MEJ PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO MARCH 18 TO DISCUSS U.S. NUCLEAR CONCERNS. PRIME MINISTER DENIED ANY PAK WRONG-DOING ON ENRICHMENT, NUCLEAR WEAPONS TRIGGER TESTING, OR PROCUREMENT OF CONTROLLED NUCLEAR RELATED MATERIALS IN THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID HE WOULD SHORTLY REQUEST CABINET CONCURRENCE FOR RATIFICATION OF LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY,

[REDACTED]

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END SUMMARY.

>END SUMMARY>

3. AMBASSADOR BEGAN THE 50 MINUTE CONVERSATION WEDNESDAY EVENING BY REVIEWING THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONCERTED EFFORTS TO FULFILL THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT ON THE FOLLOW ON AID PACKAGE, INCLUDING HIS INTENTION TO PRESS FOR A FULL SIX YEAR WAIVER. HE SAID OUR PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN POLICIES HAD RECENTLY BEEN REVIEWED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, AND WE LIKED WHAT WE SAW (THOUGH ON AFGHANISTAN, CONCERNS HAD BEEN RAISED ABOUT RECENT MOVES TO 7 MONTHS IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS -- A SHORT TIMEFRAME WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO ENSURING BROAD SUPPORT, INCLUDING BY THE RESISTANCE). HE SAID, HOWEVER, U/S ARMACOST INTENDED TO BE FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF PAKISTAN DURING HIS MOSCOW MEETINGS -- THERE WOULD BE NO DAYLIGHT IN OUR TWO POSITIONS. HE ADDED THAT, UNTIL THE SOVIETS AGREE TO A REASONABLE SETTLEMENT, IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT TO KEEP UP, INDEED, IN CERTAIN PLACES INCREASE, PRESSURE

4. THE ONLY PROBLEM MARRING RELATIONS IS THE NUCLEAR QUESTION. ON INSTRUCTIONS, THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD SEVERAL REQUESTS TO MAKE. WE VIEW THESE AS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT IF WE ARE TO CARRY CONGRESS NOW AND AVOID A NUCLEAR DISASTER SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE. THEY INCLUDE IN ORDER OF IMPORTANCE:

[REDACTED]

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By AMK, NARA, Date 2/22/06

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14. INFORMAL DISCUSSION -- THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE DID NOT MIND -- "CARRY ON, AND KEEP ME INFORMED." HE WANTED TO SATISFY THE USG, BUT HOPED THE USG WOULD CONSIDER PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS-- WHICH, THE AMBASSADOR INTERJECTED, WERE VERY CLOSE TO THOSE OF THE U. S.

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16. RETURNING TO THE POINTS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE ABOUT ENERGY GENERATION, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT ONE OF

HIS VISIONS WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP PAKISTAN WITH NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION, AND ALSO ON NUCLEAR APPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH, BIOLOGY AND EVEN THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR RELATED MATERIALS (REVERSING CURRENT U.S. POLICY OF TRYING TO FRUSTRATE ANY SUCH PAK ACTIVITIES). ALL THIS COULD COME FROM THE DIALOGUE, THOUGH ONLY IF PAKISTAN AGREED TO SIGN THE NPT OR ADOPT FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS.

17. IMPACT OF INDIA ON PAK NUCLEAR POLICY -- THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IF HE HAD HIS SPEECH TO MAKE AGAIN, HE WOULD CHANGE ONLY ONE WORD "UNILATERAL" -- WHERE HE REFERRED TO A POSSIBLE PAKISTANI DECISION TO ADHERE TO THE NPT. IN FACT, "UNILATERAL IS THE WRONG WORD. THERE ARE ALREADY 130 SIGNATORIES TO THE TREATY. WHILE THEY GAVE SOMETHING, INCLUDING A BIT OF THEIR SOVEREIGNTY, THEY GOT SOMETHING IN RETURN. IT WAS PARADOXICAL THAT PAKISTAN HAD PLACED ITSELF IN A SMALL GROUP INCLUDING INDIA, SOUTH AFRICA, AND ISRAEL, RATHER THAN WITH THE 130 NATIONS WHO WERE NPT SIGNATORIES. HE SAID THERE IS MORE TO THE WORLD THAN INDIA.

18. REPLYING WITH ANIMATION, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID INDIA IS A CONSTANT FACTOR. HE POINTED TO THE ENORMOUS EUPHORIA THE DAY PREVIOUS WHEN PAKISTAN BEAT INDIA IN CRICKET. IN MATTERS PERTAINING TO INDIA, EVERY PAKISTANI FEELS EITHER A WINNER OR LOSER. IF THE UNITED STATES WANTS PAKISTAN TO SIGN "THEN INDIA MUST BE AT

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PAR. IF INDIA SAYS NO, THEN PAKISTAN CANNOT SIGN."  
19. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED SAYING THAT THE U.S. IS CONTINUING TO PRESS INDIA, BUT HE URGED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER NOT FORECLOSE ANY POSSIBILITY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE DISCUSSION. WE UNDERSTAND HIS POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES; WE UNDERSTAND THE OBSESSION WITH INDIA. THE IMPORTANT THING IS HOW TO DEAL WITH INDIA AND ITS ENORMOUS LATENT CAPABILITY. HE SAID WE UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE OF PAK PROPOSALS FOR A REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. WE ALSO SAW REASONS INDIA MIGHT NOT ACCEPT, INCLUDING ITS OWN POWER ASPIRATIONS, ITS WORLD POSITION, AND THE LIKE. THOUGH WE DO NOT BELIEVE RAJIV GANDHI WANTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR INDIA, CLEARLY SOME OF HIS ADVISORS DO.

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 06341

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MNUC, PREL, PK

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR: DIALOGUE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER  
APRIL. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE WOULD LISTEN CAREFULLY.  
21. CONCLUDING, THE AMBASSADOR AGAIN STRESSED THE

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22. THE PM DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY, BUT HE REITERATED THAT HE WELCOMED THE CHANCE FOR A DIALOGUE.

23. AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT:

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