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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN R.: Files

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File Folder: PAKIS: Nuclear - Next Steps Box 91880 8

Date: 6/19/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Lewis Dunn to Robert Oakley re non-proliferation, 2p R 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #113	5/29/87	P1
2. memo	Frank Carlucci to Kenneth Adelman re Next Steps on Pakistan, 1p D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #114	4/22/87	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 5/21/2007

File Folder PAKIS: NUCLEAR - NEXT STEPS

FOIA

F96-128/1

Box Number 91880

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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1	MEMO	LEWIS DUNN TO ROBERT OAKLEY RE NON-PROLIFERATION	2	5/29/1987
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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

(May 29, 1987

MEMORANDUM

TO : NSC - Robert Oakley
FROM : ACDA - Lewis A. Dunn
SUBJECT: Deterring Nuclear Explosions

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS E96-128/1 #113

BY smf, NARA, DATE 3/28/06

You asked whether there are any useful steps we could take to deter future nuclear explosions by non-nuclear weapon states and to bolster our overall non-proliferation posture. Dick Kennedy and I have worked the question, and he notes this memo reflects his personal views as well.

U.S. law already precludes provision of economic and military assistance as well as exports of nuclear equipment and materials to non-nuclear weapon states that engage in activities of proliferation concern, such as nuclear testing. Nevertheless, there are additional steps that could be taken.

First, the President should reaffirm his 1981 policy statement that non-proliferation is a fundamental foreign policy and national security objective, and that we would view "any nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear weapon state with grave concern." To complement this, the President should call on other leaders and we should make high-level approaches to encourage other governments to make similar statements.

In addition, we should seek multilateral agreement to terminate exports of nuclear equipment and material covered by international nuclear export control lists to non-nuclear weapon states that conduct nuclear explosions. U.S. law already precludes such exports, but multilateral support would reinforce our controls.

The President should also announce that henceforth it will be U.S. policy to withhold general tariff preference and to vote against loans and grants from multilateral development institutions to non-nuclear weapon states that conduct nuclear

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explosions. U.S. law already requires us to take non-proliferation into account in such loans; any possible charges of politicization of such bodies could be answered by arguing that we saw no reason to support economic aid to countries that were prepared to divert their scarce resources to making bombs. Here, too, we should make high level approaches to other governments to seek their support for this policy, though some countries' may be reluctant to do so.

Finally, the President could also announce that henceforth the USG will terminate arms sales to non-nuclear weapon states that conduct nuclear explosions, unless there are compelling national security reasons not to do so.

These steps would send a strong signal of U.S. opposition to countries contemplating nuclear weapons programs, thereby helping to lessen the risk that such countries would mistakenly conclude that continued US aid to Pakistan demonstrates any lack of commitment to non-proliferation. If we are able to obtain international support, which will vary from measure to measure, that signal would be heightened. These steps would also signal to Congress the Administrations's readiness to take a tough non-proliferation stance.

By way of presentation, I think such initiatives could be the highlight of a five-minute Saturday address by the President, which I am working on. He also could convey them to Congress in a letter. (However, should we seek any legislative changes, it would be important to include a waiver provision to preserve some flexibility.)

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Draft Presidential Radio Address on Non-Proliferation

My Fellow Americans:

In recent months, we have made important progress in our negotiations with the Soviet Union on eliminating two complete categories of intermediate-range nuclear weapons. We hope not only that these negotiations will succeed but that the Soviets will also join us in an agreement to greatly reduce both sides' strategic nuclear arsenals.

Today, however, I want to discuss with you an equally important challenge--namely to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries around the globe. This is critical to our security and a safer world. Just imagine the dangers if Iran or Iraq today had nuclear weapons? Or Libya's Colonel Qadhafi? International peace would be gravely threatened and the risk of a nuclear war would rise sharply.

Early in my Administration, I confirmed that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons would remain a fundamental U.S. national security and foreign policy objective. For these six years, we have worked on many fronts to achieve this objective.

We have restored a sense of cooperation with our allies and friends. We have tightened international controls on the supply of materials and equipment that could be used to make a nuclear bomb. We have fought off efforts to weaken the International Atomic Energy Agency, which conducts vital inspections to assure that the peaceful atom is not misused.

These and many other steps have made it harder for countries to acquire nuclear weapons. They have bought us more time to try to convince the leaders of such countries that acquiring nuclear weapons would actually hurt their security. We have used that time in many ways.

South Asia presents a great proliferation threat. I have told President Zia of Pakistan that we are prepared to do our part to help Pakistan meet the threat from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to build a solid long-term relationship between our two countries. But I have also made clear that he must do his part curb his country's bomb program. I have urged him and Prime Minister Gandhi of India to work together to head off a dangerous nuclear arms race.

We have strengthened our dialogue with the Soviet Union on these critical issues so that we can work in parallel to support the standard that nuclear weapons should not spread further.

We have elsewhere encouraged still more countries to renounce nuclear explosions and to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is the most successful arms control treaty in history with over 130 countries joining it.

We also must ensure, however, that if a country chooses to reject that global stand and to build nuclear weapons, it should pay a price. At the start of my Administration, I stressed that a violation of international safeguards would have "profound consequences" for our bilateral relations and that we would view "any nuclear explosion,

by a non-nuclear weapon state with grave concern." This remains my policy. But we can and should do more.

Therefore, I have instructed our representatives in the World Bank and other global aid organizations that the United States will no longer support loans and grants to non-nuclear weapon states that test nuclear explosives. I also am directing that they not receive preferential access to the American market under our general tariff preference policy. If a country in need chooses to waste its scarce monies on making nuclear bombs, we see no reason to help it pay the costs.

I call on our allies and friends to make clear -- by word and deed, that they, too, are prepared to move further against nuclear proliferation. We also will talk with them about tougher actions we can take in common when there is clear evidence that a country is taking steps that could lead to its possession of a nuclear weapon.

For seven years now, I have been working to make this a safer world for all of our children and grandchildren. With strength, perseverance, and your support, we have made progress. But my experience also teaches that it is far easier to agree not to acquire nuclear weapons than to rid ourselves of their threat and burden once they exist. Let this lesson not go unheeded in those regions where time still remains to head off the dangers of nuclear arms competition.

The United States must and shall continue vigorously to work to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Our security and world peace demand no less.



ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

June 5, 1987

STK

NOTE TO: AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY
National Security Council

Bob,

As one of my last acts as I leave the Government, I am forwarding to you a draft speech for a Saturday Presidential radio address on non-proliferation. It contains initiatives that might strengthen disincentives to nuclear detonations by non-nuclear weapon states, and signal Administration commitment to a tough non-proliferation policy. While the eventual content of such a speech would entail, of course, the usual bureaucratic pushing and shoving, this draft should give you a sense of what a speech could include.

I understand Dick Kennedy will ask Secretary Shultz to propose formally such a non-proliferation speech.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "L. Dunn", with a stylized flourish.

Lewis A. Dunn

Attachment:
As stated.

Draft Presidential Radio Address on Non-Proliferation

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