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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN R.: Files

Archivist: mjd

File Folder: PAKIS: Rapheal - Nuclear Box 91880

Date: 6/19/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memcon	meeting between Frank Carlucci and FM Sahsbzada Yaqud Khan of Pakistan, 3p <i>D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #89</i>	5/21/87	P1
2. cable	07065Z JUL 87, 8p <i>D 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #90</i>	7/7/87	P1
3. cable	090145Z JUL 87, 1p <i>R 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #91</i>	7/9/87	P1
4. cable	10247Z JUN 87, 2p <i>D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #92</i>	6/10/87	P1
5. cable	040440Z JUN 87, 3p <i>D 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #93</i>	6/4/87	P1
6. cable	111006Z JUN 87, 1p <i>P 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #94</i>	6/11/87	P1
7. cable	110837Z JUN 87, 2p <i>P 2/27/06 F96-128/1 #95</i>	6/11/87	P1
8. cable	111008Z JUN 87, 3p <i>D 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #96</i>	6/11/87	P1
9. cable	111008Z JUN 87, 2p <i>D 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #97</i>	6/11/87	P1
10. cable	110841Z JUN 87, 4p <i>R 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #98</i>	6/11/87	P1
11. cable	110837Z JUN 87, 3p <i>P 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #99</i>	6/11/87	P1
12. cable	251205Z JUN 87, 3p <i>D 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #100</i>	6/25/87	P1
13. cable	211205Z JUN 87, 2p <i>D 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #101</i>	6/21/87	P1
14. letter	President Reagan to President Zia-ul-Haq, 2p <i>D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #102</i>	n.d.	P1
15. letter	Reagan to PM Junejo, 3p <i>D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #103</i>	n.d.	P1
16. memo	from Tahir-Kheli re Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, 6 <i>D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #104</i>	3/5/87	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN R.: Files

Archivist: mjd

File Folder: PAKIS: Rapheal - Nuclear Box 91880

Date: 6/19/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
17. note	to Tahir-Kheli re attached paper, 1p <i>D, 6/14/00 NLSF96-128/1 #105</i>	3/27/87	P1
18. paper	re Pakistan, 9p <i>P 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #106; P 12/6/11</i>	3/27/87	P1, B3
19. cable	re: Pakistan Nuclear Issue, 5p <i>P 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #107</i>	4/15/87	P1
20. cable	301202 JUN 87, 2p <i>D 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #108</i>	6/30/87	P1
21. cable	281232Z JUN 87, 3p <i>P 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #109</i>	6/28/87	P1
22. cable	301554Z APR 87, 1p <i>D 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #110</i>	4/30/87	P1
23. cable	270831Z APR 87, 10p <i>D 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #111</i>	4/27/87	P1
24. cable	080807Z MAY 87, 6p <i>D 2/28/06 F96-128/1 #112</i>	5/8/87	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 5/21/2007

File Folder PAKIS: RAPHEAL-NUCLEAR

FOIA

F96-128/1

Box Number 91880

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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~~18 PAPER RE PAKISTAN mvn 3/5/08 9 3/27/1987~~

~~19 PAPER RE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ISSUE mvn 3/5/08 5 4/15/1987~~

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01 OF 02

AN005304

NSC: BEMIS COBB WAC ERMA LEDSKY OAKL RODM ROSS STK
<DIST>PRT: SIT
SIT: EOB VAX NSJHO

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 090145Z JUN 87
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6103
INFO RUEHCM/USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 2750
RUSBKB/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 3129
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 9203

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: ARMACOST-DUBININ EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN

REF) STATE 159195

TEXT:

~~SECRET~~ STATE 175525 TOSEC 100063

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, UR, XD, AF

SUBJECT: ARMACOST-DUBININ EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN

REF) STATE 159195

1. ~~4~~ - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DURING THE COURSE OF A JUNE 8 MEETING WITH UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST ON OTHER ISSUES (SEPTELS), SOVIET AMBASSADOR DUBININ RAISED AFGHANISTAN. ALSO PRESENT WERE SOVIET EMBASSY MINISTER-COUNSELOR OLEG SOKOLOV, A SOVIET EMBASSY INTERPRETER, EUR SOV ACTING DIRECTOR EVANS, EUR/SOV REGIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICER FRIED AND P STAFFER STEINFELD.

3. DUBININ SAID HE WISHED TO DRAW ARMACOST'S ATTENTION TO GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S MAY 20 INTERVIEW IN "L'UNITA," IN WHICH GORBACHEV INTER ALIA HAD REFERRED TO THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTICIPATION BY EX-KING ZAHIR SHAH IN THE "NATIONAL RECONCILIATION" PROCESS. DUBININ NOTED THAT THE QUESTION OF THE KING'S ROLE IN NATIONAL RECONCILIATION HAD COME UP DURING VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING U.S.-SOVIET EXCHANGES, AND THAT GORBACHEV'S HANDLING OF THE ISSUE MARKED "MOVEMENT, FURTHER DEVELOPMENT" OF THE SOVIET POSITION.

4. ARMACOST RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. INDEED HAD NOTED GORBACHEV'S "L'UNITA" REMARKS ON AFGHANISTAN. WE WELCOMED THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET THINKING ON THE QUESTION OF A POSSIBLE ROLE FOR THE EX-KING. IT REMAINED UNCLEAR, HOWEVER, WHAT ROLE THE USSR HAD IN MIND FOR THE KING TO PLAY: SIMPLY AS A PARTICIPANT OR AS ORGANIZER OF THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS? IN THE U.S. VIEW, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT NAJIB COULD BE AN EFFECTIVE AGENT OF RECONCILIATION AS HE REMAINED A PARTISAN OF THE CIVIL WAR IN AFGHANISTAN. THE QUESTION WAS HOW TO ORGANIZE A PROCESS OF GENUINE RECONCILIATION. A FIGURE OF GENUINE NEUTRALITY, OBJECTIVITY AND A CREDIBLE REPUTATION WOULD LIKELY HAVE TO PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN ORGANIZING A NEW, INTERIM ARRANGEMENT. IT WOULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST TO THE U.S. IF GORBACHEV'S STATEMENT IN "L'UNITA" REFLECTED RECOGNITION THAT THE KING COULD PLAY THIS SPECIAL ROLE.

5. DUBININ REJOINED THAT ONLY THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES COULD ASSIGN ROLES FOR THIS OR THAT FIGURE IN THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS OR IN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE SOVIET UNION SOUGHT TO CONTRIBUTE TO MOVING THIS PROCESS FORWARD. IT WAS IN THE INTERESTS OF THIS PROCESS THAT AS FEW WEAPONS AS POSSIBLE SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO GET INTO THE HANDS OF THOSE FORCES WHO WERE STANDING IN THE WAY OF THIS PROCESS.

6. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. WHITEHEAD

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NLS F96-1281-91

BY SA/L, NARA, DATE 2/22/02

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 01

AN006799

NSC: BEMIS WAC LEDSKY OAKL RODM ROSS SOMM STK
<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET <OSRI> RUEHIL <DTG> 111006Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8459
INFO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0520

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: ZIA COMMENTS ON NUCLEAR ISSUE
<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ ISLAMABAD 12658

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MNUC, PK

SUBJECT: ZIA COMMENTS ON NUCLEAR ISSUE

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR'S JUNE 10 FAREWELL CALL WITH PRESIDENT
CONCLUDED WITH A CIRCULAR REITERATION OF U.S. AND PAK
POSITIONS. AMBASSADOR, TERMING THE NUCLEAR DILEMMA AS
LIKE A GREEK TRAGEDY WHOSE DENOUEMENT WILL COME IN FALL
1989, URGED ZIA TO

HE NOTED AND ZIA AGREED WHOLEHEARTEDLY, THAT,
WITHOUT AFGHANISTAN, IT IS UNLIKELY PAKISTANI AID
PROGRAM COULD MAKE IT THROUGH CONGRESS.

3. PRESIDENT ZIA AGAIN STRESSING THE PEACEFUL NATURE OF
PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.

FOIA(b) (1)

FOIA(b) (1)

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4. AMBASSADOR CLOSED BY EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR HIS
IN DEPTH DISCUSSIONS ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE -- BOTH SIDES
NOW HAVE A BETTER APPRECIATION OF EACH OTHER'S
CONCERNS. ZIA RECIPROCATED, NOTING APPRECIATION FOR THE
CANDOR WITH WHICH THE AMBASSADOR PRESENTED USG VIEWS.
MCCARTHY

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01 <SSN> 2658 <TOR> 870611133720 MSG000171725840

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F96-128/1 #94

By AM, NARA, Date 2/28/96

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

AN006739

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET <OSRI> RUEHIL <DTG> 110837Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8447

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 12638

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MNUC, MASS, AF. PK

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENT ZIA

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR MET. WITH PRESIDENT FOR NEARLY FIFTY MINUTES JUNE 10 PRIOR TO DINNER (HOSTED BY PRESIDENT IN HONOR OF THE HINTONS). THIS CABLE SUMMARIZES HIGHLIGHTS. SEPTELS REPORT DETAILS.

3. ON AFGHANISTAN, PRESIDENT AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR'S GENERAL CATEGORIZATION OF THE WAR, AND UNLIKELIHOOD OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS BEFORE FALL. AMBASSADOR STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING POLITICAL, MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE. PRESIDENT GENERALLY AGREED, BUT SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOPE FOR PROGRESS BEFORE 1988. HE BELIEVES THE WAR WILL FINALLY BE RESOLVED WHEN THERE IS A CLEARER OVERALL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV.

4. ZIA SEES THE WAR GOING WELL AND AGREES THE PRESSURE MUST BE MAINTAINED -- INDEED AT ONE POINT HINTED MILITARY PRESSURE COULD INCREASE SLIGHTLY. HE SAID THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT ON OVERALL POLICY, THOUGH, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE WOULD PREFER GREATER EMPHASIS ON INCREASED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE -- INCLUDING MORE PR. ZIA DOUBTS CORDOVEZ WILL CONVENE ANOTHER ROUND UNTIL HE HAS CLEAR SIGNALS FROM ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE U. S. AND SOVIET UNION, THAT THE NEXT ROUND CAN LEAD TO A FOLLOW ON ROUND OR SUCCESS. ZIA HAD HIGH PRAISE FOR ARMAND HAMMER AND, WHILE AWARE OF THE PITFALLS, FINDS HIS INDEPENDENT EFFORT WORKING ALONG FAVORABLE LINES.

FOIA(b) (1)

[illegible]

FOIA(b) (1)

FORESAW THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AS HAVING ELEMENTS OF A GREEK

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F96-128/2#95

By swk, NARA, Date 2/28/16

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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PAGE 02 OF 02

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TRAGEDY, THE DENOUEMENT OF WHICH WOULD COME IN 1989 --

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7. DURING THE MEETING, AND AT DINNER IN A LENGTHY TOAST
EXTOLLING THE AMBASSADOR AND MRS. HINTON, THE PRESIDENT
ALSO STRESSED HIS HIGH REGARD FOR THE SUPPORT PRESIDENT
REAGAN HAS GIVEN PAKISTAN, CALLING THE PRESIDENT ONE OF
THE GREAT STATESMEN OF OUR TIMES.

FOIA(b)(1)

8. COMMENT: ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED AS A 15 MINUTE
COURTESY CALL, THE PRESIDENT ENTERED INTO THE
SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WITH GUSTO AND TWICE WAVED OFF
HIS AIDE WHO CAME IN TO SIGNAL THE OTHER GUESTS WERE
WAITING. HE STATED HIS VIEWS FRANKLY -- AS ALWAYS.
WHAT WAS NOTICEABLE THIS TIME WAS HIS SEVERAL REFERENCES
TO HIS "PERSONAL" VIEWS -- AS JUXTAPOSED AGAINST THAT OF
THE "GOVERNMENT" -- ANOTHER SIGN OF THE SIGNIFICANT
METAMORPHOSIS THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN PAKISTAN OVER THE
LAST THREE AND A HALF YEARS.

FOIA(b)(1)

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9. THE PRESIDENT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE FOREIGN
MINISTER AND MFA DG TOUQIR HUSSAIN. PARTICIPANTS ON
U.S. SIDE INCLUDED AMBASSADOR, DCM AND POLCOUNSELOR.
110. SUGGEST THE DEPARTMENT PASS BEIJING, KABUL, LONDON,
MOSCOW, NEW DELHI AND RIYADH. MCCARTHY

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 . SSN: 2638 <TOR> 870611113227 MSG000171718347
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 . SSN: 2638 <TOR> 870611113246 MSG000171718366

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 OF 04

NLS F96-128/1470

PRT: SIT

SIT: EOB VAX NSJHO

BY BM, NARA, DATE 2/28/01

<PREC? IMMEDIATE <CLAS? ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG? 110841Z JUN 87

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8449

INFO RUSBKB/AMEMBASSY KABUL 5070

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4139

RUSBPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 9501

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 12639

EXDIS KHYBER: S/S - FOR EXDIS KHYBER DISTRIBUTION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PK

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

?BEGIN SUMMARY?

2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT ZIA TOLD AMBASSADOR DURING PRE-DEPARTURE MEETING JUNE 10 THAT HE DOES NOT FORESEE WAR ENDING THIS YEAR -- PERHAPS NEXT YEAR, BUT ONLY AFTER THERE IS A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV. ZIA AGREES ON THE NEED TO MAINTAIN POLITICAL, MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE. HE EXPECTS CORDOVEZ WOULD ONLY CONVENE ANOTHER ROUND IF HE HAS ASSURANCES FROM ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE U.S. AND USSR THAT THE TALKS WOULD BE SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED -- OR AT LEAST LEAD TO ANOTHER ROUND. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE PUBLICITY FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, BUT UNDERScoreD THIS IS A DECISION FOR THE "GOVERNMENT". ZIA WAS QUITE STRUCK BY ARMAND HAMMER'S GRASP OF THE SITUATION, NOTING HE APPEARS RIGHT ON TRACK. END SUMMARY

?END SUMMARY?

3. THE AMBASSADOR BEGAN BY INDICATING THE GENERAL

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EXDIS

EXDIS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

EXDIS
OUTLOOK WAS ENCOURAGING. BUT "NOW THE SOVIETS HAVE US WAITING" FOR THEIR NEXT MOVE. THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA IS CALM; FIGHTING INSIDE THE COUNTRY IS PICKING UP. HE SAID THE U.S. VIEW IS THAT, IF WE CAN MAINTAIN POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURE, IT'S POSSIBLE THAT OUR OBJECTIVES CAN BE ACHIEVED.

EXDIS
4. OVERALL, ZIA AGREED WITH THIS APPRAISAL, NOTING THAT THE ONLY DIFFERENCE MAY BE SOME SMALL ONE ON OVERALL PERSPECTIVE. HE DID NOT FORESEE RESOLUTION OF AFGHANISTAN IN 1987. WHILE THERE MAY BE A "REASONABLY GOOD UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION" ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, A SOLUTION WILL ONLY COME WHEN THERE IS CLEARER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE HEADS OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS ON HOW TO REACH A SETTLEMENT.

EXDIS
5. ZIA SEES POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS GOING IN FAVOR OF THE RESISTANCE, AND NO REASON WHY IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS THESE TRENDS CANNOT IMPROVE. HE SAID THE JUNEJO GOVERNMENT SHARES HIS SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE. HE ALSO SUGGESTED HE FAVORS A SLIGHT INCREASE IN MILITARY SUPPORT. NEVERTHELESS, THE KEY ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL, HE FELT,

EXDIS
WILL BE TALKS BETWEEN REAGAN AND GORBACHEV.

6. ON THE GENEVA PROCESS, ZIA EXPECTS CORDOVEZ WILL NOT CONVENE ANOTHER ROUND UNLESS HE IS 90 PERCENT (IF NOT 100 PERCENT) SURE THE NEXT ROUND WILL SHOW SOME REAL SUCCESS (MEASURED AS OVERALL AGREEMENT OR AT LEAST AGREEMENT ON A SUBSEQUENT ROUND). FOR CORDOVEZ TO MOVE FORWARD, HE WILL NEED ASSURANCES FROM ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE U.S. AND USSR.

7. ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, THE PRESIDENT AGREED WITH THE AMBASSADOR THAT THERE WAS MORE THAT COULD BE DONE AND HERE NOTED HIS DIFFERENCE WITH THE PRIME MINISTER "I WOULD GO WHOLE HOG." ZIA ALSO SAID HE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

THOUGHT MORE PUBLICITY WOULD BE HELPFUL, BUT AGAIN NOTED THE PM DIFFERED.

8. ARMAND HAMMER -- BUILDING ON AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT THAT THE SECRETARY WITH SHEVARDNADZE, AND THE PRESIDENT WITH GORBACHEV, WILL STRESS NEED FOR PROGRESS ON REGIONAL ISSUES AS WELL AS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, ZIA BRIEFED AMBASSADOR ON ARMAND HAMMER'S JUST COMPLETED VISIT. ZIA SAYS HE HAD BEEN HIGHLY IMPRESSED BY HAMMER'S KNOWLEDGE OF EVENTS, OBJECTIVES AND PERSONALITIES. HIS FOCUS IS "DEAD RIGHT." HAMMER SAID ALL HIS EFFORTS WERE TO CONVINCE GORBACHEV THAT AFGHAN SOLUTION IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE TO U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS -- IF A SETTLEMENT COULD BE REACHED BEFORE A SUMMIT, THEN THE WAY WOULD BE CLEARED FOR FAR REACHING SUCCESS AT THE SUMMIT. EVEN WITHOUT AGREEMENT BEFOREHAND, THE SUMMIT COULD SET THE STAGE FOR AN AFGHAN SETTLEMENT. HAMMER'S OTHER OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN TO HELP FRAME SOVIET THINKING ON THE PARAMETERS OF AN ACCEPTABLE INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN KABUL. HAMMER IS PLAYING THE ZAHIR SHAH CARD HARD.

BT

#2639

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 12639

EXDIS KHYBER: S/S - FOR EXDIS KHYBER DISTRIBUTION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PK

SUBJECT: AFGHANISTAN

9. DURING HIS VISIT LAST FALL, HAMMER MET WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF PIR GAILANI. THIS TIME, THE GOP ARRANGED FOR HIM TO MEET RABBANI AND GAILANI, BOTH OF WHOM GAVE GOOD PRESENTATIONS -- FAVORABLE TO GOP'S VIEWPOINT. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING AMBASSADOR'S EXPRESSION OF USG SKEPTICISM ABOUT HAMMER'S EFFORT, ZIA SAID HE HAD READ COPIES OF HAMMER'S LETTERS TO AND FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PM THATCHER, AND TO GORBACHEV -- THE LATTER

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

WAS "FANTASTIC." ZIA SEES HAMMER AS ON THE RIGHT PATH.

10. KABUL AND MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MCCARTHY

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OAKLEY / TAnir-Jhel.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

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FM AMEMBASSY, ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8447

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NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MNUC, MASS, AF, PK

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FAREWELL CALL ON PRESIDENT ZIA

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADOR MET WITH PRESIDENT FOR NEARLY FIFTY MINUTES JUNE 10 PRIOR TO DINNER (HOSTED BY PRESIDENT IN HONOR OF THE HINTONS). THIS CABLE SUMMARIZES HIGHLIGHTS. SEPTELS REPORT DETAILS.
3. ON AFGHANISTAN, PRESIDENT AGREED WITH AMBASSADOR'S GENERAL CATEGORIZATION OF THE WAR, AND UNLIKELIHOOD OF SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS BEFORE FALL. AMBASSADOR STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING POLITICAL, MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE. PRESIDENT GENERALLY AGREED, BUT SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOPE FOR PROGRESS BEFORE 1988. HE BELIEVES THE WAR WILL FINALLY BE RESOLVED WHEN THERE IS A CLEARER OVERALL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV.
4. ZIA SEES THE WAR GOING WELL AND AGREES THE PRESSURE MUST BE MAINTAINED -- INDEED AT ONE POINT HINTED MILITARY PRESSURE COULD INCREASE SLIGHTLY. HE SAID THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE GOVERNMENT ON OVERALL POLICY, THOUGH, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, HE WOULD PREFER GREATER EMPHASIS ON INCREASED HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE -- INCLUDING MORE PR. ZIA DOUBTS CORDOVEZ WILL CONVENE ANOTHER ROUND UNTIL HE HAS CLEAR SIGNALS FROM ALL

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By Jm, NARA, Date 2/22/00

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

NOON

PARTIES, INCLUDING THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION, THAT THE NEXT ROUND CAN LEAD TO A FOLLOW ON ROUND OR SUCCESS. ZIA HAD HIGH PRAISE FOR ARMAND HAMMER AND, WHILE AWARE OF THE PITFALLS, FINDS HIS INDEPENDENT EFFORT WORKING ALONG FAVORABLE LINES.

FOIA(b) (1)

5.

[illegible]

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ABSENT RESTRAINT, HOWEVER, HE FORESAW THE NUCLEAR ISSUE AS HAVING ELEMENTS OF A GREEK TRAGEDY, THE DENOUEMENT OF WHICH WOULD COME IN 1989 --

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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7. DURING THE MEETING, AND AT DINNER IN A LENGTHY TOAST EXTOLLING THE AMBASSADOR AND MRS. HINTON, THE PRESIDENT ALSO STRESSED HIS HIGH REGARD FOR THE SUPPORT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS GIVEN PAKISTAN, CALLING THE PRESIDENT ONE OF THE GREAT STATESMEN OF OUR TIMES.

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8. COMMENT: ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED AS A 15 MINUTE COURTESY CALL, THE PRESIDENT ENTERED INTO THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION WITH GUSTO AND TWICE WAVED OFF HIS AIDE WHO CAME IN TO SIGNAL THE OTHER GUESTS WERE WAITING. HE STATED HIS VIEWS FRANKLY -- AS ALWAYS. WHAT WAS NOTICEABLE THIS TIME WAS HIS SEVERAL REFERENCES TO HIS "PERSONAL" VIEWS -- AS JUXTAPOSED AGAINST THAT OF THE "GOVERNMENT" -- ANOTHER SIGN OF THE SIGNIFICANT METAMORPHOSIS THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN PAKISTAN OVER THE LAST THREE AND A HALF YEARS.

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9. THE PRESIDENT WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND MFA DG TOUOIR HUSSAIN. PARTICIPANTS ON U. S. SIDE INCLUDED AMBASSADOR, DCM AND POLCOUNSELOR. 110. SUGGEST THE DEPARTMENT PASS BEIJING, KABUL, LONDON, MOSCOW, NEW DELHI AND RIYADH. MCCARTHY

BT

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ROOM NO. 351	BUILDING OEB	
REMARKS:		
FROM: C/NESA / 1 A		
ROOM NO. 6602	BUILDING Hdgt	EXTENSION 334485

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D. C. 20505

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FOIA(b)(3)

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

27 March 1987

Pakistan and India React to A. Q. Khan's
Nuclear Bomb Statement

Summary

A. Q. Khan, a leading Pakistani nuclear scientist, allegedly told an Indian journalist earlier this year that Pakistan has a nuclear bomb. The statement has pushed to the forefront of public and private debate in India and Pakistan an issue that significantly effects their defense strategies, economies, and foreign relations. It also has resulted in increased criticism of the United States in both countries. [REDACTED]

Pakistan's immediate reaction has been to deny Khan made such a direct statement. Pakistan's official position is that publication of the interview was timed and slanted to hurt Pakistan's chances during current US Congressional hearings for a new aid package. President Zia maintains that Pakistan's nuclear program is peaceful and not geared toward weapons production. Zia probably believes that US security concerns in the region -- particularly Afghanistan -- will override reservations Washington has over Pakistani nuclear aspirations. Most of the Pakistani public and press is in favor of nuclear weapons development and some encourage the government to do so openly. [REDACTED]

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By LOT, NARA, Date 12/6/11

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Indian Prime Minister Gandhi has ordered a reassessment of Pakistan's nuclear capability but has not publicly endorsed an Indian weapons program in the wake of Khan's interview. We believe Western press reports and Indian intelligence assessments were more important than the interview in provoking the investigation. Pressure from the Indian Parliament almost certainly ensures the nuclear issue will receive high government priority through the spring legislative session. Khan's assertions and the upcoming US Congressional vote on aid to Pakistan have led to a spate of articles and commentaries in the Indian press blaming the United States for making possible Pakistan's nuclear achievements and arguing that India should start a weapons program. Public opinion mirrors the press's hawkish stand. [REDACTED]

* * * * *

On 1 March the London Observer published an interview by an Indian journalist of A.Q. Khan, head of Pakistan's uranium enrichment plant. In that interview Khan reportedly said Pakistan had produced weapons grade uranium and had a nuclear bomb. These claims have caused a flurry of press and government reactions in India and Pakistan and has forced both governments to address publicly and privately the question of nuclear weapons in South Asia. [REDACTED]

Pakistani Reactions

Pakistanis have reacted defensively to the A.Q. Khan interview. Government spokesmen have charged India with misrepresenting and distorting Khan's statements and timing the release of the interview to hurt Pakistan's chances for obtaining a proposed \$4.02 billion, six-year aid package from the United States. Pakistani officials have denied repeatedly that Pakistan has anything but a peaceful nuclear program and say they are prepared to accept any global or regional agreements that will keep the region free of nuclear weapons. Mushahid Hussain, the editor of the Muslim, who set up the interview with Dr. Khan, resigned from his post on 4 March. The Muslim printed its version of the interview on 1 March, but it did not quote Khan as saying Pakistan possessed the bomb. [REDACTED]

Pakistani government leaders appear particularly embarrassed

that an Indian reporter could have obtained an interview with Khan with the assistance of a prominent Pakistani journalist.

[REDACTED]

Islamabad appears to be trying to deflect the negative publicity from the interview by stressing close US-Pakistani ties and Pakistan's role in an Afghan settlement, repeating familiar policy statements and proposals on easing the nuclear controversy, and emphasizing the discriminatory nature of the Symington Amendment which has not been applied to Israel or India. [REDACTED] told a US diplomat that by printing the interview, the Muslim was trying to harm Islamabad's relations with Washington and alter Pakistan's Afghan policy. Other Pakistani officials have recommended to the Foreign Ministry that it repeat assurances to US policymakers of the peaceful nature of Islamabad's nuclear program, express Pakistan's willingness to explore solutions to nuclear proliferation with India, and stress the strategic importance of Pakistan to the United States. [REDACTED]

Who Was Behind the A.Q. Khan Interview?

Theories abound throughout Pakistan on the "real" reasons behind the Khan interview. Government spokesmen have pointed the finger at India and unnamed "unfriendly" countries as having concocted the interview with a view to embarrassing Pakistan and damaging its relations with the United States. They give as evidence the fact that the publication of the article was delayed almost two weeks' causing it to be published just before the US aid hearings. The Muslim is a newspaper that is often critical of the government and its close relations with the United States. Some independent and opposition politicians have suggested that the interview was the result of high-level Pakistani Government intrigue designed to signal both Washington and New Delhi that Islamabad is determined to continue its nuclear program. [REDACTED]

According to the US Embassy in Islamabad, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Embassy discounts rumors that Nayyar, allegedly working with the Indian government, delayed publication of the interview to coincide with Congressional aid hearings on Pakistan. Instead, the Embassy attributed the delay to the fact

that Nayyar, who entered Pakistan on 22 or 23 January and apparently interviewed Khan shortly after arriving, did not return to new Delhi until sometime between 12 and 14 February, thus delaying the interview's publication to March 1. [REDACTED]

We cannot dismiss the possibility that the disclosures were a secret Pakistani Government operation that went off-track. In our view, a journalist could not get to Khan, one of the most well-guarded men in Pakistan, without official permission. Islamabad may have wanted the January interview to serve as a warning to India at a time when it was conducting a large military exercise near the Pakistani border. [REDACTED] told US diplomats in Karachi that the government may have wanted to indicate to New Delhi that the exercises could accelerate development of a Pakistani nuclear device. [REDACTED]

A more likely explanation, in our view, is that Khan was more than willing to boast about Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, given his past tendency to speak out on the subject. In 1984, for example, he publicly claimed that Pakistan had mastered enrichment technology and could produce weapons-grade uranium. Later that year, he again made headlines by saying Pakistan could manufacture a hydrogen bomb. [REDACTED] may have deliberately egged on Khan by challenging him with a statement by a leading Indian nuclear scientist that Pakistan had neither the men nor the material with which to have a successful nuclear program. [REDACTED]

It now appears that Khan did not actually say "Pakistan has the bomb." [REDACTED] that the London Observer had done a bad editing job on the interview. According to [REDACTED] the story should have read as it did in the Muslim: "Pakistan has the bomb. Mr. A.Q. Khan would not actually say that, but what he told me should be enough testimony." [REDACTED] claims to be very concerned about Hussain and is convinced the US Government had a hand in Hussain's downfall because the Muslim often prints anti-American articles. [REDACTED]

In the wake of the Khan interview, President Zia has talked candidly about Pakistan's nuclear program. In a recent interview with Time magazine, he acknowledged that Pakistan has the ability to build the bomb "whenever it wishes," although he emphasized there is no intention to make nuclear weapons. We believe that Zia's remarks are an effort to repair the damage done to Pakistan by Khan's remarks. He likely realizes that his repeated denials about the nuclear program no longer hold water in Washington and

that being more open about the issue -- while still denying that Pakistan is actually building a bomb or producing weapons grade uranium -- may help restore Islamabad's image. Zia's interview also suggests he is counting on the convergence of US and Pakistani security interests -- particularly in Afghanistan -- to override Washington's concerns about the nuclear issue. He predicted that the US Congress "will look to the higher national interest rather than Pakistan's tiddly-widdly nuclear program."

[REDACTED]

Indian Reactions

In our view the Indian government's response to the Khan article has been restrained. The government's approach probably is an effort to cultivate a public image of responsible behavior -- deliberately weighing Indian nuclear policy options in the face of both the Khan statements and Western press reports that Pakistan has made significant progress in its weapons program. A Foreign Ministry spokesman announced four days after the publication of Khan's interview that Prime Minister Gandhi was ordering his Defense and Foreign Ministries to reassess Pakistan's nuclear capabilities, but the spokesman rebuked a Pakistani journalist who asked if Khan's remarks would lead India to "reveal its own atom bomb."

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] India may have been warned about the story and would have had time to prepare a measured response. [REDACTED]

We believe that Gandhi's personal statements reflect his government's restraint. He did not portray the Khan statements as the evidence needed to push New Delhi to nuclear weapons, although in the past he has stated publicly that India could build a nuclear weapon within months after receiving compelling evidence that Pakistan had done so. He said publicly that Pakistan's clandestine nuclear program had hampered bilateral relations, and remarked after Zia's Time magazine interview that India would make an "appropriate" response to Pakistani moves to acquire nuclear weapons. He also obliquely but unmistakably tied the United States to Islamabad's weapons program, claiming that Pakistan "gained momentum" with help from "certain countries." Gandhi was, in our view, forced to answer the interview -- regardless of how he judged its veracity -- in part because Parliamentary debate quickly focused on the issue.

[REDACTED]

We believe Indian officials regard Khan's statements as genuine, but it is only part of the evidence that is leading New Delhi to reassess Pakistan's nuclear program. According to [REDACTED] an influential Indian journalist with access to high level

political circles, Khan's statements were only the catalyst for the Indian review of Pakistan's weapon's capabilities. [REDACTED] claimed the review actually was provoked by Indian intelligence assessments of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. The Indian Foreign Ministry publicly characterized the interview as part of a series of evidence that Pakistan's nuclear program had a weapons orientation. We believe Western press reports that Pakistan was "two screwdriver turns" away from a weapon also helped spur the Indian move. [REDACTED]

Khan's interview has dredged up anti-US feelings in India in the midst of current concern that the US Congress will approve a large aid package for Pakistan and Pakistan may acquire AWACS reconnaissance aircraft from the United States. According to [REDACTED] prominent Indians there have blamed the United States for making Pakistan's achievement possible and argue for an accelerated countermove from New Delhi. One state legislator from the ruling Congress Party said that continued US aid to Pakistan would impel India to seek shelter under a Soviet "nuclear umbrella." Another Indian observer likened alleged US complicity in the Pakistani weapons program to the presence of the USS Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal during the Bangladesh's 1971 war of independence, which Indians still point to as evidence of US support for Pakistan in times of crisis. [REDACTED]

Some Indian observers have used Khan's statements as fuel for criticism of US arms sales to Pakistan and allege that these sales occurred in the face of Washington's knowledge of the military orientation of Islamabad's nuclear program. In his interview Khan alleged that the CIA knew everything about the Pakistani program, and many journalists and politicians have emphasized this point. Articles by press commentators range between allegations that the United States aided the Pakistani program and accusations that the US simply tolerated it. A former member of the Indian Parliament compared US policy on Pakistan's nuclear developments to the US sale of weapons to Iran and said "both are double-faced and hypocritical." He claimed there was a "clear understanding between United States and Pakistan over the latter achieving nuclear capability." Other commentators have taken a wait-and-see attitude, arguing that the real test for US non-proliferation policy will be the Congressional hearing on aid to Pakistan. A leading Indian political scientist said that whether India should make the bomb was secondary to the tremendous damage done to America's image in India. [REDACTED]

The majority of post-interview newspaper articles and commentaries favor Indian nuclear weaponization. Some argue that

nuclear parity with Pakistan is the only way to guarantee peace. Others claim that nuclear weapons superiority is the only way to control Pakistan's behavior. A few journalists opposed to an Indian weapons program argue that only improved bilateral relations can guarantee peace, while some deny Pakistan has the capability to build a bomb despite Khan's statement and warn India against being pushed into acquiring nuclear weapons. [REDACTED]

Segments from articles in four major Indian newspapers offer good examples of the tone and views being presented in the press on the weapons issue.

--28 February, Times of India: "History shows that the development of nuclear weapons capability among nations having an adversarial relationship has led to stability; this has happened in Central Europe and on the Sino-Soviet border. Political wisdom lies in accepting the inevitable and planning for safeguarding our national security and interests in the light of that inevitability."

--03 March, Indian Express: "The immediate and urgent question for New Delhi now is to reconsider its non-conventional security strategy."

--04 March, The Statesman: "If Pakistan can make a bomb and claims it is for peaceful purposes only, India too may be under pressure to manufacture a bomb, even only for display."

--05 March, Hindustan Times: "There is a view gaining ground in the country that it should not bother if Pakistan does not renounce its nuclear weapons program, and that India must exercise its own nuclear option." [REDACTED]

Outlook

Pakistani officials will continue to do their utmost to put the embarrassing A.Q. Khan affair behind them and to lessen the threat to the proposed US aid package. Security around Dr. Khan will be tightened and he will likely be warned about future indiscretions, if this was not a deliberately planned interview.

Government leaders will echo the rhetoric of the Foreign Ministry official who said "Pakistan's nuclear program shall go on ... We shall neither be browbeaten nor cajoled." Such sentiments easily arouse popular approval from Pakistanis who like to see their government standing up to India or the big powers. [REDACTED]

Islamabad will probably try to mount an intensive public relations campaign, aimed primarily at the United States, to meet apprehension about the nature of Pakistan's nuclear program. The government may even decide to ratify the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty as a sop to non-proliferation proponents in the United States and elsewhere. Basic objectives of the nuclear weapons program, however, will remain unchanged. [REDACTED]

In India, we do not believe press support for nuclear weaponization will significantly influence the outcome of India's nuclear debate. We believe Gandhi and a few senior advisors determine nuclear policy in India, and we doubt the Indian press has enough influence to mold opinion. We do, however, believe that the press has enough power to influence the direction of the public debate, and we expect Parliament's ongoing spring session will ensure continued heavy media exposure to the nuclear issue. [REDACTED]

We believe New Delhi's public statement that it is reassessing Pakistan's nuclear program is in part an effort to prepare the Indian public should the government decide to begin an overt nuclear weapons program. If India has decided on an overt weapons program, we would expect that before announcing its decision New Delhi will try to gain the moral high ground by portraying itself as a reluctant nuclear participant seeking only to defend against a threat initiated by Pakistan. As part of this program, we would also expect continued Indian suggestions that the United States' failure to pressure Islamabad against building a nuclear weapon played a role in pushing India to counter with a weapon of its own. [REDACTED]

If Gandhi decides not to pursue an overt weapons program, he will continue to try to counter the nuclear threat from Pakistan by stating that India could quickly produce a weapon of its own. The government will continue to play on parliamentary and press interest in the issue to portray Pakistan as the aggressor. [REDACTED]

Appendix I.

POLLING DATA ON HOW URBAN INDIANS VIEW WEAPONIZATION

India's Observer newspaper recently published a 4-5 March survey of Bombay and New Delhi residents' views of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programs. A polling agency asked questions to a cross-section of 627 literate adult men and women.

- 69 percent believed Pakistan has a nuclear weapon.
- 82 percent believed that in view of reports that Pakistan had developed a bomb, India should also develop a bomb.
- 32 percent believed foreign reports that India already possessed a bomb.
- 68 percent believed that India should develop a nuclear weapons program regardless of the cost.
- 75 percent believed that in the event of an Indo-Pakistani war, Pakistan would use a nuclear weapon first.
- 79 percent believed that India and Pakistan should sign a treaty banning the use of nuclear weapons against each other.
- 45 percent believed that India should bomb the Pakistani uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta. (46 percent said no.)
- 52 percent believed that India's recent hike in defense expenditures was due to the fact that India knew Pakistan had developed a nuclear weapon. [REDACTED]

Appendix II.

CHINA AND INDIAN NUCLEAR POLICY

In our judgement, Indian military and nuclear hawks perceive China, not Pakistan, as the key long-term strategic threat to India. [REDACTED] Indians still rankle at their humiliation by China in 1962 and see the Chinese as opposed to India's rise as a South Asian powerbroker. India also almost certainly worries that its lack of a nuclear deterrent against China, coupled with a Sino-Pakistani strategic alliance, would limit India's nuclear options against Pakistan. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] India measures its technological achievements in part against those of the Chinese--for example, both have set goals of 10,000 megawatts of nuclear power by the year 2000. [REDACTED]

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

87 APR 18 12:59

87 APR 18



S/S #

ITUATION ROOM

URGENT

MESSAGE NO. 016065 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 5
FROM: Kenneth M. Quinn S/S 78448 7224
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
MESSAGE DESCRIPTION IMMEDIATE CABLE TO ISLAMABAD:
PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Robert Pearson	6534	
	Executive Secretary		
	GREEN		
	TAHIR-KHLEE		
	OKLEY		

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: PLEASE CLEAR BY: 11/18

** RE-CROSSHATCH OF MESSAGE NO. 016035

URGENT

S/S Officer:

KMQ

Kenneth M. Quinn

CROSSHATCH

RETURN TIME-STAMPED COVERSHEET TO S/S.

4/17
~~SECRET~~

S/NP:RTKENNEDY
04/15/86 EXT. 73112 WANG 4176A
P:MHARMACOST

NEA:EDJEREJIAN
NEA:RAPECK
S/S-O:RDOWNNEY
DOD/ISA:RARMITAGE

S/NP:GSAMORE
NEA:SAOKI
S/S:JLAKE
NSC:SHIRIN TAHER-KHELI

IMMEDIATE ISLAMABAD

NODIS

DECL: OADR

PREL, MNUC, MASS, PK

PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

REF: ISLAMABAD 7318

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS ON HOW TO PROCEED IN DISCUSSIONS WITH PAKISTAN ON RESOLVING THE SOUTH ASIA NUCLEAR ISSUE. WE ARE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT ON THE NEED BOTH TO SEEK PAKISTANI RESTRAINT TO ADDRESS THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS RAISED BY CONGRESSIONAL DELIBERATIONS AND TO SEARCH FOR A SOLID UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE THAT CAN SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP.

3. WE HAVE ALSO BEEN CONSIDERING ELEMENTS OF AN ACTION PLAN, PART OF WHICH WILL DRAW ON YOUR CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH THE PAKISTANI LEADERSHIP. THE SECRETARY HAS APPROVED THIS ACTION PLAN, WHICH WILL BE CONVEYED TO YOU SEPARATELY. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE YOU HAVE BEGUN WITH SATTAR, INCLUDING A DISCUSSION OF PAKISTANI INTENTIONS, PAKISTANI PERCEPTIONS OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, WAYS TO PURSUE

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By AM, NARA, Date 2/28/06

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A REGIONAL APPROACH, AND [REDACTED]

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4. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] WE WANT TO FORGED A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WHICH WILL REFLECT DURABLE MUTUAL INTERESTS AND CONCERNS. BUT WITHOUT A CLEAR COMMITMENT TO A RESOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM, THIS FUTURE WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE.

5. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT NUCLEAR RESTRAINT IS IN PAKISTAN'S OWN BEST INTERESTS, NOT JUST A TACTICAL DEVICE TO SLIP PAST THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE. NONETHELESS, THE CONGRESSIONAL SITUATION GIVES A NOTE OF URGENCY SINCE PAKISTANI ACTIONS AT THIS TIME CAN HELP TO LAY A BIPARTISAN FOUNDATION FOR AN ENDURING RELATIONSHIP. [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

6. OUR OBJECTIVE REMAINS NPT ADHERENCE BY PAKISTAN AND INDIA, OR SOME DURABLE REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, BOLSTERED BY BINDING AND PUBLIC COMMITMENTS BY INDIA AND PAKISTAN. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WILL NOT BE EASY TO ACHIEVE BUT WE MUST CONTINUE TO PRESS IN THIS DIRECTION. AT PRESENT, WE NEED TO CONVINCE PAKISTAN AND INDIA TO REFRAIN FROM FURTHER ELABORATION OF THEIR NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, I.E., NO ASSEMBLY, NO TESTING, AND NO FURTHER ACCUMULATION OF UNSAFEGUARDED WEAPONS GRADE MATERIAL. THIS "FREEZE" COULD BUY TIME FOR NEGOTIATIONS OF ADDITIONAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND VERIFICATION MEASURES AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD SERVE OUR GOAL OF CREATING A MORE PERMANENT AND SECURE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME, BUT WE MUST KEEP OUR FOCUS AND THEIRS ON THE ULTIMATE GOAL IF WE ARE TO HAVE ANY HOPE OF CREDIBILITY AND SUCCESS IN ESTABLISHING THE KIND OF LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WE SEEK. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO EXPLORE ANY IDEAS OF THIS SORT WHICH COME UP IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PAKISTANIS.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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7. ALTHOUGH HEAC MARK-UP DID NOT RESULT IN NEW NON-PROLIFERATION CONDITIONS IN THE HOUSE BILL, WE STILL FACE STRONG CONGRESSIONAL CONCERN ABOUT PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THE SENATE HAS RECESSED WITHOUT AN SFRC MARK-UP ON THE PAKISTANI AID AUTHORIZATION, BUT THE CURRENT STAFF DRAFT WOULD REQUIRE CERTIFICATION THAT PAKISTAN HAS CEASED PRODUCTION OF WEAPONS USABLE NUCLEAR MATERIAL, WITH DOLS 100 MILLION OF FMS AND ALL SALES OF SOPHISTICATED MILITARY ITEMS CONDITIONED ON THE CERTIFICATION. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT SIMILAR LANGUAGE WILL BE INTRODUCED ON THE HOUSE FLOOR.

8. TO FEND OFF THESE AND OTHER NON-PROLIFERATION CONDITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON OUR AID PACKAGE, WE WILL NEED IMMEDIATE PAKISTANI ACTION TO DEMONSTRATE COMMITMENT AND RESTRAINT. PRESIDENT ZIA'S RECENT INTERVIEW IN TIME MAGAZINE MAY REPRESENT A PAKISTANI EFFORT TO ENGAGE IN A MORE CANDID DIALOGUE, AND YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO PURSUE FRANK DISCUSSIONS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (7)

[REDACTED] VERIFICATION IS AN ABSOLUTE MUST IF PAKISTANI CREDIBILITY IS TO BE RESTORED. IAEA SAFEGUARDS WOULD BE POLITICALLY PREFERABLE TO BILATERAL US-PAKISTAN ARRANGEMENTS, BUT WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER VERIFICATION OPTIONS IF NECESSARY INVOLVING THE US OR OTHER PARTIES.

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

[REDACTED] WHICH MIGHT BE AN OPENING STEP ON THE WAY TO AN INCREASINGLY BROAD INDO-PAK NUCLEAR AGREEMENT.

9. THIS APPROACH TO THE GOP WOULD, IN OUR THINKING, BE THE FIRST STEP IN A SERIES OF ACTIONS WE PLAN TO TAKE ON THE SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROBLEM. AS PART OF THE SAME ACTION, WE HAVE ALREADY INITIATED A NUMBER OF STEPS WHICH FOCUS ON THE REGIONAL ASPECTS OF THE NUCLEAR PROBLEM. SPECIFICALLY: THE PRESIDENT WROTE TO SENATOR GLENN ON APRIL 10, 1987 THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT INDIA BE ENGAGED IF THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, AND ITS UNDERLYING CAUSES, ARE TO BE PERMANENTLY REMOVED FROM THE REGION. IFYI. HE MADE THIS POINT

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DIRECTLY IN A LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER GANDHI ON MARCH 13TH.] WE CONTINUE TO URGE THE GOI -- AS WILL BE REFLECTED IN NATWAR SINGH'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK -- TO RESPOND TO GOP PROPOSALS ON MUTUAL NUCLEAR RESTRAINT OR MAKE ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS; CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION OF THIS INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN DURING RECENT WEEKS, WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAS FOSTERED, IS A NEW AND POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT DESPITE GOI UNHAPPINESS. OUR INITIAL GOAL IS TO OBTAIN SOME TANGIBLE (AND MEANINGFUL) PAKISTANI ACTION THAT WE CAN USE WITH THE CONGRESS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE GOP WILL RESPECT A SET OF NUCLEAR FIREBREAKS, PARTICULARLY ON ASSEMBLY AND TESTING OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE AND ON ENRICHMENT LEVELS. AS YOU WILL NOTE FROM SEPTTEL DESCRIBING OUR STRATEGY, WE ALSO WANT TO PURSUE MORE COMPREHENSIVE MEASURES, AND EXPECT TO BE DESIGNATING AN EMISSARY WHO WILL BE ABLE TO PURSUE BOTH ADDITIONAL UNILATERAL STEPS PAKISTAN CAN TAKE, AND A REGIONAL NON-PROLIFERATION DIALOGUE INVOLVING INDIA.

10. YOU SHOULD MAKE CLEAR IN YOUR DIALOGUE THAT WE HAVE BEEN, AND WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS ON THE REGIONAL APPROACH TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE. WE HAVE BEEN URGING OTHERS TO BRING WHATEVER INFLUENCE THEY HAVE TO BEAR ON INDIA -- MOST RECENTLY IN SECRETARY SHULTZ'S TALKS WITH SHEVARDNADZE -- AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1)

AS TIME GOES ON WE WILL SEEK OTHER AVENUES TO PUSH THE REGIONAL EFFORT AS YOU HAVE SUGGESTED. BUT WE NEED PAKISTAN'S HELP OUT FRONT. ALONG THIS LINE YOU SHOULD ENDEAVOR TO GET ACROSS THE POINT THAT A DRAMATIC MOVE BY PAKISTAN

[REDACTED]

FOIA(b)(1)

AS WELL, IT WOULD CLEARLY BE A SIGNAL ACHIEVEMENT VIS-A-VIS OUR EFFORTS ON THE HILL. WE WOULD FOLLOW UP SUCH A STEP WITH A MAJOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY CAMPAIGN TO BRING FURTHER PRESSURE ON INDIA TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD AND WOULD URGE OTHERS TO DO LIKEWISE INCLUDING IN THE UN.

11. AS TO THE PEACEFUL USES COOPERATION AGREEMENT, YOU ARE QUITE RIGHT THAT OUR ABILITY TO MOVE HINGES UPON

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PAKISTANI AGREEMENT TO THE NPT. WE HAVE MADE THIS POINT REGULARLY WITH PROMISES OF HELP IF THEY ARE WILLING TO UNDERTAKE THE NPT. YOU SHOULD ASSERT THAT IF PAKISTAN TAKES THAT STEP, NOT ONLY WILL THEY BENEFIT ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE (WHICH WE WILL DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO FOSTER) BUT WILL BENEFIT ECONOMICALLY FROM OUR ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN A PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROGRAM WHICH IS DEMONSTRABLY PEACEFUL. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION UNDER THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT AND SEEK, WITH EVERY REASONABLE ASSUMPTION OF SUCCESS, ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR THE PROGRAM. WE WOULD ALSO URGE THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHERS (RATHER THAN CONTINUING OUR VIGOROUS AND LARGELY SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS AT DISSUADING THEM).

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13. FROM THE FOREGOING IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT WE AGREE WITH THE ASSUMPTIONS WHICH YOU SET FORTH IN THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF YOUR MESSAGE. ACCORDINGLY, EXCEPT AS TO THE MATTER OF SECURITY GUARANTEES, YOU ARE AUTHORIZED IN THE CONTEXT OF AND DRAWING ON THE FOREGOING TO UNDERTAKE DISCUSSIONS WITHOUT COMMITMENT. WE WILL BE COMMUNICATING FURTHER THOUGHTS AND PROVIDING SPECIFIC RESPONSES WHICH YOU CAN MAKE TO THE GOP ON THIS REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL MILITARY SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF STEPPED UP SOVIET-AFGHANISTAN INCURSIONS.

FOIA(b) (1)

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PAGE 01 OF 03

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NSC: BEMIS WAC ERMA LEDSKY OAKL RODM ROSS STK
DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET <OSRI> RUEHIL <DTG> 281232Z JUN 87
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9116

SUBJ>SUBJECT: NUCLEAR DISCUSSION WITH ZIA
SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 13819
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MNUC, PK

SUBJECT: NUCLEAR DISCUSSION WITH ZIA

1. S - ENTIRE TEXT

BEGIN SUMMARY>

2. SUMMARY - DURING THIRTY MINUTE DISCUSSION WITH
PRESIDENT JUNE 24 FOLLOWING PRESENTATION OF MY
CREDENTIALS, I RAISED THE NUCLEAR ISSUE,

FOIA(b)(1)

I SAID WE
MUST CONTINUE SEEKING A SOLUTION THAT CAN SUPPORT THE
RELATIONSHIP ONCE AFGHANISTAN IS BEHIND US.

FOIA(b)(1)

END SUMMARY.

>END SUMMARY>

3. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MY CREDENTIALS PRESENTATION
CEREMONY ON JUNE 24, GENERAL ZIA ASKED ME TO STAY
BEHIND FOR A TALK. THE ONLY OTHER PERSON THERE WAS
FOREIGN SECRETARY SATTAR. ZIA WAS VERY WARM, AFFABLE
AND RELAXED AND HAD GREETED ME AT THE BEGINNING OF
THE CEREMONY WITH A TRADITIONAL PAKISTANI EMBRACE.
MOST OF THE HALF-HOUR WE HAD TOGETHER WAS SPENT
TALKING ABOUT ISSUES AS VARIED AS OLD TIMES TOGETHER
IN PAKISTAN AND HOW THE SENATE CONFIRMATION PROCESS
WORKS IN THE STATES.

4. AFTER ABOUT 20 MINUTES, I TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT
THERE WAS ONE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE I WISHED TO DISCUSS.
HE KNEW ME AS AN OLD FRIEND AND A STRONG SUPPORTER OF
PAKISTAN. OUR RELATIONSHIP HAD BEEN MARKED BY CANDOR
AND FRANKNESS AND I WAS CERTAIN IT WOULD CONTINUE. I
THEREFORE WANTED TO SHARE WITH HIM SOME IMPRESSIONS I
BROUGHT WITH ME FROM WASHINGTON.

5. I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET A NUMBER OF HIS
FRIENDS IN WASHINGTON AND HAD VERY USEFUL DISCUSSIONS
WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY SHULTZ, AMONG
OTHERS. I CAME AWAY FROM THOSE TALKS WITH TWO
DISTINCT IMPRESSIONS. FIRST, PAKISTAN STILL COMMANDS
CONSIDERABLE RESPECT AND ADMIRATION IN THE US FOR ITS
FIRM STAND ON AFGHANISTAN AND FOR ITS CONTRIBUTION TO
REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY. THERE WAS,

SPECIFICALLY, ADMIRATION FOR ZIA'S LEADERSHIP. I WAS
CONFIDENT, AS THE PRESIDENT HAD WRITTEN ZIA, THAT THE
US WOULD CONTINUE TO STAND BY PAKISTAN AS IT OPPOSED
SOVIET INTIMIDATION AND AGGRESSION.

FOIA(b)(1)

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By Am, NARA, Date 2/25/06

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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9. HE ADDED THAT BOTH HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER ARE FULLY BRIEFED ON THE PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM. THEY BOTH KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON AND ARE PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE. HE HAS PLEDGED THAT PAKISTAN WILL NOT BUILD A NUCLEAR DEVICE AND AS LONG AS HE IS AROUND, PAKISTAN WILL STAND BY THAT PLEDGE.

FOIA(b) (1)

[illegible]

13. AFTER SOME FURTHER PERSONAL CHAT, WE ADJOURNED FOR AN HOUR AND ONE HALF LUNCH WITH THE NEW SAUDI AND CHILEAN AMBASSADORS. THEY HAD ALSO PRESENTED THEIR CREDENTIALS THAT DAY AND WERE WAITING FOR US.

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PAGE 03 OF 03

AN000242

15. COMMENT AND THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS TO FOLLOW
SEPTEL.
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<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 3819 <TOR> 870629125159 MSG000173278319

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PAGE 01

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NSC: CHLD DANZ ERMA KELL PAAL RAY ROSS STK
<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> PRIORITY <CLAS> CONFIDENTIAL <OSRI> RUEHC # <DTG> 240145Z APR 87
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7860
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 6498
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6806

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: (U) PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SENATOR GLENN
<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 123163

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OPRC, PARM, EAID, MASS, XD, US

SUBJECT: (U) PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO SENATOR GLENN

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF 10 APRIL LETTER SENT BY THE PRESIDENT TO SENATOR GLENN; YOU MAY DISCREETLY PROVIDE A COPY OF THIS TO THE GOP, GOI, AND HMG ON CONDITION THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC UNTIL IT AFTER IT HAS SURFACED HERE IN WASHINGTON.

2. BEGIN QUOTE: DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: THANK YOU FOR YOUR RECENT LETTER REGARDING SOUTH ASIA. I SHARE YOUR LONGSTANDING INTEREST IN NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AS REFLECTED IN THAT LETTER AND IN YOUR MARCH 23 TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE. I ASSURE YOU THAT PREVENTING THE FURTHER SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REMAINS A LEADING NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITY OF MY ADMINISTRATION.

3. OUR CURRENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PAKISTAN AND THE NEW SIX-YEAR PACKAGE NEGOTIATED LAST YEAR ARE DESIGNED TO PERMIT THE CONTINUATION OF THE ASSISTANCE WHICH GIVES PAKISTAN CONFIDENCE IN OUR SUPPORT AND IN ITS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY CAPABILITY. THIS SUPPORT IS NECESSARY TO BUTTRESS PAKISTAN'S STRONG AND PRINCIPLED OPPOSITION TO THE SOVIET UNION'S BRUTAL EFFORT TO IMPOSE ITS WILL ON AFGHANISTAN.

4. IN SUPPORTING SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR PAKISTAN, I DID NOT CHOOSE -- NOR DID I HAVE TO -- BETWEEN FREEDOM FOR AFGHANISTAN AND AN EFFECTIVE NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA. MY ADMINISTRATION HAS DIRECTED ITS EFFORTS AT BOTH. I HAVE WORKED TO ENSURE THAT THE SOVIET AGGRESSION AGAINST AFGHANISTAN DOES NOT SUCCEED. IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, I HAVE ALSO THOUGHT IT ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME AND PREVENT A NUCLEAR WEAPONS RACE IN SOUTH ASIA. YOUR TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE SIMILARLY RECOGNIZES THAT THESE GOALS ARE NOT INCOMPATIBLE.

5. I SHARE THE CONCERNS YOU HAVE EXPRESSED ABOUT THE DIRECTION OF PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND THE DANGER IT POSES OF A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN SOUTH ASIA. I HAVE PERSONALLY STATED MY CONCERNS TO PRESIDENT ZIA-UL-HAQ AND TO PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. AND, IN CASE THEY HAVE DOUBTS, AMBASSADOR HINTON'S RECENT SPEECH ON THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROGRAM REINFORCED MY MESSAGE.

6. AS YOU HAVE NOTED, AND AS PRESIDENT ZIA RECENTLY TOLD REPORTERS, PAKISTAN IS CAPABLE OF BECOMING A NUCLEAR

WEAPONS STATE. BUT I CERTIFIED LAST FALL THAT PAKISTAN HAD NOT CROSSED THE THRESHOLD OF POSSESSING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. PRESIDENT ZIA HAS SAID REPEATEDLY, MOST RECENTLY IN AN INTERVIEW, THAT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO CROSS THIS THRESHOLD BY BUILDING A NUCLEAR WEAPON. OUR EFFORTS ARE AIMED AT ENSURING THAT HE REMAINS COMMITTED TO THIS.

7. IN MY VIEW, THE BEST WAY TO DO THAT IS TO KEEP A STEADY COURSE. WE SHOULD IMPLEMENT, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CURRENT LAW, THE SIX-YEAR PROGRAM I HAVE PROPOSED

TO THE CONGRESS. AND, AT THE SAME TIME, CONTINUE MAKING CLEAR HOW STRONGLY WE FEEL ABOUT NON-PROLIFERATION. WE MUST NOT JEOPARDIZE, HOWEVER, THE OTHER IMPORTANT GOALS WE SEEK TO ATTAIN IN RESISTING SOVIET ACTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN, HELPING TO MAKE PAKISTAN SECURE AND PROSPEROUS, ENCOURAGING REGIONAL PEACE AND COOPERATION, COMBATING DRUG PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING, AND PREVENTING A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA.

8. WITH YOU, I BELIEVE THAT OVER THE LONGER TERM, INDIA MUST BE ENGAGED IF THE THREAT OF A NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, AND ITS UNDERLYING CAUSES, ARE TO BE PERMANENTLY REMOVED FROM THE REGION. WE HAVE WELCOMED PAKISTAN'S PROPOSALS TO INDIA FOR MUTUAL MEASURES TO ADDRESS THIS OBJECTIVE. WE WILL CONTINUE TO URGE INDIA TO RESPOND TO THESE PROPOSALS OR TO OFFER SUGGESTIONS OF ITS OWN. AS YOU HAVE ELOQUENTLY STATED, WE WOULD BE FAILING OUR DUTY AS A FRIEND OF BOTH COUNTRIES IF WE DID LESS.

9. WITH THESE CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND, I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT THE PAKISTAN PROGRAM AS IT HAS BEEN PROPOSED. SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. END QUOTE.

10. DECONTROL ON RECEIPT. SHULTZ

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PRT: OAKLEY

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 8061

~~SECRET~~ STATE 130467

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PARM, XD, US

SUBJECT: (U) ZIA PHONE CALL AND LTBT RATIFICATION

1. ~~487~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ZIA PHONE CALL: YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT ZIA-UL-HAQ PHONED THE PRESIDENT ON FRIDAY 24 APRIL TO EXPRESS HIS GRATITUDE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S SUPPORT FOR THE PAKISTAN FOLLOW-ON ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND ESPECIALLY HIS PLEASURE AT THE OUTCOME OF THE SFRC MARK-UP ON THE 23RD.

3. LTBT RATIFICATION: AS YOU KNOW, THE STRONG ADMINISTRATION EFFORT WITH CONGRESS ON THE PAK PROGRAM IS PART OF A STRATEGY APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT WHICH INCLUDES GOP FORWARD MOVEMENT ON NUCLEAR ISSUES. IN THIS CONTEXT WE ARE DELIGHTED THAT GOP MAY NOW BE MOVING (SEPTEL) TO RATIFY LTBT DURING CURRENT SESSION OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY/SENATE, AS UNDERSECRETARY ARMACOST EARLIER URGED ON PAK AMB MARKER. TIMING NOW WOULD BE SALUTARY, FOR THE REASONS ALREADY PUT FORTH BY ARMACOST BUT ALSO IN TERMS OF THE ONGOING CONGRESSIONAL PROCESS AS WELL; NOW THAT THE HFAC AND SFRC HAVE ACTED AND BEFORE NEXT STAGE STARTS, GOP RATIFICATION COULD BE SEEN TO BE INDEPENDENT OF SPECIFIC CONGRESSIONAL ULTIMATUM. SHULTZ

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BY AM, NARA, DATE 2/20/06

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