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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAIRO 21497
USCINCEUR FOR POLAD
E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/27/88
TAGS: PEPR, EG, IS, US, XF
SUBJECT: AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS
REF: (A) TEL AVIV 13007; (B) TEL AVIV 12960

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. DURING A MEETING ON OTHER BUSINESS AT THE FOREIGN
MINISTRY AUGUST 26, MFA OFFICERS NOTED THAT BEGIN HAD
CALLED FOR A RESUMPTION OF AUTONOMY TALKS IN TWO-THREE
WEEKS. "IS HE ANNOUNCING ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM
LEBANON?" THEY ASKED SARCASTICALLY. THEY WENT ON TO
NOTE NEWS REPORTS OF SHARON'S INVITATION TO VILLAGE
LEAGUERS TO JOIN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS, AN IDEA
THEY CHARACTERIZED AS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO EGYPT.
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IN THAT CONVERSATION AND IN OTHER TALKS WITH EGYPTIANS
INVOLVED IN THE AUTONOMY NEGOTIATIONS, THEY HAVE BEEN
SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE PRE-LEBANON RECORD OF THOSE
NEGOTIATIONS, CITING ESPECIALLY THE "WEAK" U.S. ROLE
IN NOT ADVANCING OUR OWN VIEWS ON SPECIFIC ISSUES AND

THE "STRONG" PRESSURE THAT SECRETARY HAIG ATTEMPTED TO
EXERT ON EGYPT LAST JANUARY TO JOIN IN AN "UNACCEPTABLE"
AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL.

3. A MORE AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT OF THE CURRENT EGYPTIA
POSITION WAS GIVEN BY DEPPRIMIN KAMAL HASSAN ALI TO THE
PRESS ON AUGUST 27. ALI IS QUOTED AS SAYING, THAT EGYPT
CONSIDERS AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AS ONE OF THE
CONDITIONS FOR ANY EFFORTS TO CONTINUE THE PEACE PROCESS.
ALI WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES CONCERNED -
AMERICA AND ISRAEL -- MUST DEFINE THEIR POSITIONS REGARD-
ING THE FOLLOWING FOUR POINTS:

1. THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO THE SETTLEMENTS ON
- THE WEST BANK AND GAZA "WHICH ARE ILLEGAL;"
2. SELF-RULE OR AUTONOMY FOR THE PEOPLE AND INCLUDING
THE LAND;
3. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION
- FOR THE PALESTINIANS;

4. THE APPLICATION OF TRANSITIONAL MEASURES TO ARAB
- JERUSALEM.

IT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE ARABIC PRESS THUS FAR WHETHER
THESE FOUR POINTS ARE DEFINITE CONDITIONS FOR RESUMPTION
OF THE AUTONOMY TALKS, BUT THAT IS THE WAY THEY WERE
DESCRIBED IN ENGLISH-LANGUAGE RADIO BROADCASTS AND WE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRESUME THEY WILL HAVE THE QUALITY OF PRE-CONDITIONS IN
THE FUTURE.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE SUGGESTION OF ISRAELI
NEGOTIATORS OF RESUMING CONTACTS ON AUTONOMY AT THE WORK-
ING LEVEL (REF. B) SEEMS TO US EXCEEDINGLY DISTANT FROM
THE REALITY OF EGYPT'S POSITION. FROM ALI'S STATEMENTS,
THERE IS VIRTUALLY NO PROSPECT THAT EGYPTIANS WOULD JOIN
IN WORKING LEVEL DISCUSSIONS. IF IN SOME REMOTE CIRCUM-
STANCES THEY DID, THEIR CONTRIBUTION WOULD CERTAINLY BE
POISON POURED IN ISRAELI EARS.

4. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PRECHT

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

PAGE 01 CAIRO 1499
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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 21499
EXDTS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PLO, LE, IS, EG
SUBJECT: PLO CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF LEADERSHIP
REF: (A) TEL AVIV 13004; (B) CAIRO 21371;
- (C) STATE 239795

1. ~~48~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. GIVEN THE INTENSE DISTRUST IN EGYPT FOR ANY MESSAGE COMING FROM THE GOI, WE BELIEVE A REFERENCE TO BEGIN'S "WORD OF HONOR" ON THE SAFETY OF PLO LEADERSHIP (REF. A) WOULD DETRACT FROM, RATHER THAN STRENGTHEN, OUR ASSURANCES IN THAT REGARD. THE EGYPTIANS APPEAR TO HAVE ACCEPTED OUR COMMITMENT ON THIS SUBJECT AS BINDING AS "KISSINGER'S COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL OF 1975." THE AUGUST 27 PRESS FRONT-PAGES AMERICAN "ASSURANCES AND GUARANTEES" IN THIS REGARD "AS FRANKLY STIPULATED BY THE AGREEMENTS REACHED THROUGH U.S. ENVOY PHILIP HABIB."

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NOTHING MORE IN THE WAY OF WRITTEN OR VERBAL ASSURANCES IS NEEDED; THE EGYPTIANS WOULD, OF COURSE, WELCOME ADDITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS ON THE GROUND FOR PROTECTION.

3. FOR THE RECORD, AND NOT TO OVERSTATE THE POINT, EGYPTIAN DISTRUST OF BEGIN'S HONOR DERIVES FROM THEIR PERCEPTION OF ISRAELI VIOLATION OF THE SPIRIT OF CAMP SECRET DAVID BY INVADING LEBANON AND SUCH ACTIONS AS THEIR MOVE BEYOND THE 40 KM LINE; THEIR REPEATED VIOLATION OF CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENTS; THEIR LENGTHY REFUSAL TO ALLOW UTILITIES AND RELIEF SUPPLIES TO BEIRUT'S CIVILIAN POPULATION; THEIR DISPUTES OVER PLACEMENT OF MNF TROOPS ALONG THE BORDERS OF WEST BEIRUT; THEIR INSISTENCE ON THE REMOVAL OF ALL MNF TROOPS AFTER THIRTY DAYS; THEIR ACTIONS IMPEDING THE ENTRY AND DEPARTURE OF CERTAIN

SHIPS FROM BEIRUT HARBOR, INCLUDING TEMPORARILY, THE EGYPTIAN RELIEF SHIP "LOTUS;" THEIR BOMBING OF THE WEST BEIRUT BUILDING WHERE THE PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP WAS TO HAVE ASSEMBLED; AND THEIR ALLEGED SHADOWING AND HARRASSMENT OF THE "ALKYON," THE FIRST SHIP EVACUATING PALESTINIAN COMBATANTS. SOME OF THESE POINTS MAY BE DEBATABLE THE FINAL ONE CAN PRESUMABLY BE CHECKED BY U.S. NAVY ESCORT VESSELS. BUT ALL OF THEM CONTRIBUTE TO A PERCEPTION HERE OF ISRAELI ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR PATTERNS THAT JUSTIFIED ARAFAT'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE WITHOUT FURTHER QUESTIONS.

4. IN CONNECTION WITH THESE PERCEPTIONS, WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY (CAIRO 20014) REGISTERED EGYPT'S CONCERN FOR THE WELL-BEING OF PALESTINIANS IN BEIRUT AFTER PLO EVACUATION. WHAT UNDERSTANDINGS DO WE HAVE WITH THE ISRAELIS REGARDING ENTRY BY THEIR FORCES OR THEIR LEBANESE FRIENDS INTO WEST BEIRUT AFTER EVACUATION? IS THERE A U.S. POSITION REGARDING DISPOSITION OF ISRAELI FORCES DURING THE PERIOD FOLLOWING PLO EVACUATION AND AGAIN FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF TH MNF FORCES?

5. BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PRECHT

CAIRO 1499

DTG: 271219Z AUG 82 PSN: 007086

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3

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1305

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 21507
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, EG, FR, US, IS, LE, PLO
SUBJECT: FRENCH-EGYPTIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION

1. ~~1B~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. DURING MEETING AUGUST 28 WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK, I BRIEFLY SUMMARIZED ARGUMENTS FOR DEFERRING PRESENTATION OF FRENCH-EGYPTIAN DRAFT IN NEW YORK. MUBARAK READILY AGREED, SAYING HE WOULD INSTRUCT MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI TO MAINTAIN CLOSEST POSSIBLE COLLABORATION WITH THE U.S. AND NOT TO PUT FORWARD A DRAFT UNTIL THE U.S. AND EGYPT WERE IN AGREEMENT ON PRESENTING IT. I EXPRESSED THANKS AND SAID THIS WOULD MAKE OUR TASK OF FORMULATING NEW APPROACHES TO THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM EASIER. I CONFIRMED THAT AMBASSADOR ATHERTON WOULD WISH TO MEET PRIVATELY WITH HIM IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE AMBASSADOR'S RETURN TO CAIRO NEXT WEEK.
3. RECOMMEND THAT INFORMATION ON THE POSITION TAKEN BY MUBARAK ON THIS INITIATIVE NOT REPEAT NOT BE USED WITH SUBORDINATE EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS OR THE FRENCH. IF WE EXPERIENCE DIFFICULTY, WE CAN GO BACK TO MUBARAK, BUT WE SHOULD NOT CONVEY HIS UNDERTAKING TO DIPLOMATS WHO WILL BE CRITICAL OF HIM.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 1561
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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1339

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 21561

EXDIS

PASS AID

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: E AID, PEPR, EG, US

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK -- REQUEST
- FOR MASSIVE URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT

1. ~~18~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: IN A MEETING WITH SECRETARY PIERCE, PRESIDENT MUBARAK MADE A STRONG PLEA FOR FOCUSED U.S. AID ASSISTANCE IN A MASSIVE, LONG-TERM WATER AND SEWERAGE PROJECT FOR CAIRO. HE EXPLAINED THAT IT IS URGENT AND ESSENTIAL FOR THE U.S. TO DEMONSTRATE PALPABLY SOME GOOD WORK OF BENEFIT TO THE AVERAGE EGYPTIAN, ESPECIALLY IN THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC HOSTILITY OVER THE LEBANESE CRISIS END SUMMARY.

3. ON AUGUST 28, SECRETARY PIERCE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR BRITTON (HUD), CHARGE, AND MINISTER OF RECONSTRUCTION AND MINISTER OF STATE FOR HOUSING AND LAND RECLAMATION KAFRAWI, MET FOR ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AT HIS DEKHELA RESTHOUSE.

4. AFTER INITIAL EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, MUBARAK CAME DIRECTLY AND FORCEFULLY TO THE POINT. THE U.S. MUST TAKE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

URGENT ACTION TO IMPROVE ITS IMAGE IN EGYPT AND, MORE BROADLY, IN THE ARAB WORLD. IN EGYPT, THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES HAD BECOME VERY BAD AS THE LEBANESE CRISIS CONTINUED. EVERYONE WAS CRITICAL OF THE U.S. AND IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE U.S. AND EGYPT COOPERATE IN A DRAMATIC WAY TO IMPROVE THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. THE LEFTIST OPPOSITION, MUBARAK SAID, WAS PRESSING HIM HARD AND TAKING POLITICAL ADVANTAGE OF THE LEBANESE CRISIS. THE SOVIET UNION WAS BEHIND THEM, HE IMPLIED, DESCRIBING HOW A RECENT INTERMEDIARY HAD COME TO HIM TO SAY THE RUSSIANS WERE READY TO RESUME A PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH EGYPT. ALTHOUGH THE USSR COULD NOT REPLACE AMERICAN AID DOLLAR FOR DOLLAR, RUSSIA COULD HELP AND IT WOULD OFFER MILITARY SPARE PARTS, THE INTERMEDIARY SAID. MUBARAK SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD THE SOVIETS AT BAY. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, MUBARAK

SAID, PEOPLE NEED TO "FEEL" THE U.S. CONNECTION, TO SEE SOME EVIDENCE IN THEIR LIVES OF THE BENEFIT OF THE AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP. UNTIL NOW, THAT HAS NOT HAPPENED IN A DRAMATIC WAY.

5. MUBARAK SAID HE HAD BEEN GIVING THE PROBLEM CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT AND WHEN KAFRAWI PROPOSED A VISIT BY SECRETARY PIERCE, THE PRESIDENT DECIDED THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE THE OCCASION FOR MAKING HIS NEW APPEAL. HE WANTED THE U.S. TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT TO IMPROVE AND EXTEND THE WATER AND SEWERAGE SYSTEMS OF CAIRO. CAIRO WAS ONE-FOURTH OF EGYPT'S POPULATION AND IT WAS "VITAL" THAT THE POPULATION BE AWARE OF WHAT THE U.S. WAS DOING, HOW IT WAS HELPING. WATER AND SEWERAGE, HE SAID, WERE HIS TOP PRIORITIES

6. WHEN THE CHARGE SAID THAT AID WAS ALREADY PUTTING CONSIDERABLE FUNDS INTO WATER AND SEWERAGE PROJECTS IN EGYPT, KAFRAWI INTERJECTED THAT THE MONEY WAS INSUFFICIENT. MUBARAK SAID THAT MONEY WAS LESS IMPORTANT THAN A DRAMATIC GESTURE BY THE U.S. TO SOLVE ONE OF EGYPT'S MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS. KAFRAWI SAID HIS MINISTRY WAS READY TO START AT ANY TIME. HE ESTIMATED THAT A COMPLETE OVERHAUL OF CAIRO'S WATER AND SEWERAGE SYSTEMS WOULD TAKE TWO BILLION DOLLARS OVER FIVE YEARS, OR SOME 400 MILLION DOLLARS PER YEAR. CHARGE ASKED WHETHER EGYPT COULD NOT ACQUIRE SAUDI AND GULF ARAB MONEY TO SUPPLEMENT WHAT THE U.S. HAD ALREADY CONTRIBUTED. MUBARAK RETORTED THAT HE WOULD NOT WANT ANY OTHER COUN-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TRY TO DEPRIVE THE U.S. OF THE IMAGE OF HELPING EGYPT IN A SIGNIFICANT WAY. SAUDI MONEY WAS FINE, IF WE COULD GET IT, BUT HE WANTED THE U.S., NOT THE SAUDIS, TO GET THE CREDIT FOR THE PROJECT.

7. WHEN THE CHARGE SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA FOR MINISTER KAFRAWI, THE MINISTER OF PLANNING AND OTHER ECONOMIC MINISTERS TO SIT DOWN WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND OUR AID DIRECTOR TO DISCUSS EGYPTIAN PRIORITIES, MUBARAK SAID, "FINE, YES, YOU SHOULD SIT AND TALK, BUT AT THE SAME TIME YOU SHOULD GET STARTED ON THIS WORK."

CAIRO 1561

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

5

PAGE 01 CAIRO 1561
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1340

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 21561

~~EXDIS~~

PASS AID

IT IS URGENT AND IT IS VITAL, HE SAID. "YOU DO NOT
KNOW HOW MUCH YOUR IMAGE HAS SUFFERED IN EGYPT AND HOW
HARD THE LEFTISTS ARE PUSHING."

8. COMMENT: THIS IS NOT, OF COURSE, THE FIRST TIME
MUBARAK HAS MADE AN APPEAL FOR MORE TANGIBLE U.S.
ASSISTANCE. HE SPOKE FORCEFULLY, BUT WITH LESS SPECI-
FICITY TO SENATOR PERCY LAST JANUARY. YESTERDAY, HOW-
EVER, IT WAS CLEAR FROM MUBARAK'S EMOTIONAL PRESENTATION
THAT HE IS FEELING CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE FROM WHAT WE
HAVE ALSO DETECTED RECENTLY AS RAPIDLY RISING PUBLIC
DISSATISFACTION WITH THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF HIS
GOVERNMENT. A "DO-NOTHING" LEADERSHIP IS THE OPPOSI-
TION'S DOMINANT THEME. IT WAS ALSO QUITE EVIDENT THAT
MUBARAK IS SEEKING SOME QUICK MEANS OF DIFFUSING PUBLIC
DISCONTENT WHICH HAS BEEN SHARPENED BY THE BITTER REAC-
TION TO THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON, THE PERCEIVED
U.S. ASSOCIATION WITH THAT INVASION AND THE NEGATIVE
FALL-OUT FOR THE GOE AS THE THIRD PARTNER. END COMMENT

9. NEW AID DIRECTOR STONE ARRIVES AUGUST 29. THE MEET-
INGS HE AND THE AMBASSADOR WILL HAVE WITH THE GOE'S
ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP WILL PERMIT US TO ASSESS HOW WE
SHOULD PROCEED IN DEALING WITH MUBARAK'S REQUEST. WE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SHALL HAVE RECOMMENDATIONS AT A LATER DATE. END COMMENT.
PRECHT

CAIRO 1561

DTG: 291254Z AUG 82 PSN: 009832

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 1694
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MODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, EG, US, OVIP

SUBJECT: MUBARAK INTEREST IN VISIT TO WASHINGTON

REF: CAIRO 21506

1. ~~16~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ
AUGUST 30, I ASKED PRESIDENT MUBARAK IF HE HAD GIVEN
ANY THOUGHT TO PREFERRED TIMING FOR A TRIP TO CANADA
AND THE UNITED STATES. HE SAID HE HAD NOT THOUGHT
ABOUT IT IN ANY DETAIL AND WAS OPEN TO OUR IDEAS.
PERHAPS, HE SAID, A VISIT EARLY NEXT YEAR MIGHT BE
THE BEST TIMING. PRECHT

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AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 4107
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3423
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 9265
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0125
BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 22023
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OREP EG IS LE PLO XF
SUBJECT: CODEL SOLARZ -- MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY. IN WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSIONS AUGUST 30 WITH CODEL SOLARZ, PRESIDENT MUBARAK REITERATED EGYPT'S ADHERENCE TO THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK AS THE ONLY REALISTIC WAY TOWARDS PEACE. MUBARAK SAID AGAIN THAT THE NEXT STEP IN THE PROCESS SHOULD BE AN AMERICAN-EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WHICH COULD BE FOLLOWED BY BROADER NEGOTIATIONS. ON THE PLO, MUBARAK SAID THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO DRAW MODERATES LIKE ARAFAT AND HANI AL-HASSAN INTO THE DIALOGUE AND THAT "IT WOULD

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

BE EASY TO CONTAIN THEM." NOT DEALING WITH THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM NOW WOULD MEAN A RESUMPTION OF PLO TERRORISM AND TERRIBLE PROBLEMS FOR THE U.S., MUBARAK WARNED. ON OTHER ISSUES, MUBARAK COMPLAINED ABOUT ISRAELI PUBLIC STATEMENTS; URGED THE U.S. TO BE MORE ACTIVE IN ENDING THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR BECAUSE OF GROWING SOVIET PENETRATION OF IRAN; CHARACTERIZED EGYPTIAN-ARAB RELATIONS AS IMPROVING, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THOSE WITH LIBYA; AND TREATED GEMAYEL'S ELECTION PURELY AS A DOMESTIC LEBANESE MATTER. ON EGYPTIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS, MUBARAK SEEMED SENSITIVE TO CRITICISM FROM THE LEFTISTS, BUT SAID THAT NEITHER THEY NOR ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS WERE ABLE TO POSE A THREAT TO THE EGYPTIAN REGIME. END SUMMARY.

3. PRESIDENT MUBARAK ON AUGUST 30 RECEIVED CODEL SOLARZ,

ACCOMPANIED BY CHARGE, STAFFERS ROTH AND WEISS, AND POLOFF MCKUNE. IN DISCUSSING THE EFFECTS OF RECENT AREA DEVELOPMENTS ON THE PEACE PROCESS, MUBARAK SIGNALLED NO NEW DEPARTURES FOR EGYPTIAN POLICY. COMMENTING ON THE AFTER-EFFECTS OF THE PLO WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT, MUBARAK EMPHASIZED THAT NOW IS THE TIME FOR THE U.S. TO START THE DIALOGUE WITH PLO MODERATES LIKE ARAFAT AND HANI AL-HASSAN. HE REPEATEDLY SAID THAT GIVEN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, "IT WOULD BE EASY TO CONTAIN THEM (THE MODERATES)" AND "WE COULD PERSUADE THEM." IF THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IS NOT DEALT WITH NOW, MUBARAK WARNED, THE PLO WILL UNLEASH TERRORISM AGAIN AND THE UNITED STATES WILL FACE TERRIBLE PROBLEMS.

4. ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ALL THE ARABS, INCLUDING THE PLO, AGREED ON THE FAHD PLAN OR A VARIANT OF IT, MUBARAK RESPONDED THAT NOTHING WOULD HAPPEN BECAUSE ISRAEL WOULD NOT ACCEPT IT. MUBARAK ADDED THAT THE ONLY WAY TOWARDS PEACE IS THE CAMP DAVID FRAMEWORK, AND THAT THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE A DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WORKED OUT BY THE U.S., EGYPT, AND ISRAEL. THIS COULD BE FOLLOWED BY "REAL NEGOTIATIONS" WITH BROADER PARTICIPATION BY THOSE CONCERNED WITH THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE. THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES SHOULD HAVE AS ITS MAIN POINT "AUTONOMY FOR LAND AND PEOPLE" ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. MUBARAK CALLED ON ISRAEL TO BE REALISTIC AND PRACTICAL AND "TO HELP US FIND A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION." IT IS BOTH POSSIBLE, AND

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

NECESSARY, MUBARAK SAID, FOR THE U.S. TO CONVINCE BEGIN TO DO THIS. OTHER POINTS MADE BY MUBARAK:

5. ISRAELI STATEMENTS. FREQUENT ISRAELI STATEMENTS -- ESPECIALLY BY SHARON -- ON LEBANON, JORDAN BEING THE PALESTINIAN STATE, SETTLEMENTS, ANNEXATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND SO FORTH MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO PERSUADE EGYPTIANS AND OTHER ARABS OF THE VALIDITY OF THE PEACE PROCESS. MUBARAK ASKED THE CODEL TO "TELL THEM TO STOP THIS."

6. SOVIETS AND IRAN. THE U.S. MUST WORK ACTIVELY TO END THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR "THROUGH ITS FRIENDS WHO HAVE INFLUENCE IN THE AREA." THE LONGER THIS WAR CONTINUES, THE MORE INFLUENCE THE SOVIETS WILL WIN IN IRAN. MUBARAK MENTIONED THAT THE NORTH KOREANS, WITH SOVIET ENCOURAGEMENT, ARE NOW ACTIVE IN IRAN, AND THAT THE RUSSIANS ARE WORKING ON NAVAL AND AIR BASES NEAR THE INDIAN OCEAN.

7. EGYPTIAN-ARAB RELATIONS. IN GENERAL, EGYPTIAN-ARAB RELATIONS HAVE IMPROVED. EGYPT HAS HAD CONTACTS WITH IRAQ, JORDAN, AND MOROCCO, FOR EXAMPLE. MUBARAK SAID

CAIRO 2023

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1547

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BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 22023
HE HAD A HAND-WRITTEN NOTE FROM KING HUSSEIN ON
AUGUST 29. LIBYA IS AN EXCEPTION: DESPITE THE FACT
THAT EGYPT APPROVED A LIBYAN REQUEST FOR OVERFLIGHTS
BY ITS COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT EN ROUTE TO THE HAJ, THERE
HAS BEEN NO RECIPROCAL LIBYAN MOVE.

8. GEMAYEL. HIS ELECTION IS A DOMESTIC LEBANESE
MATTER. SYRIA DOESN'T LIKE IT, BUT SOME ARABS SEEM
TO ACCEPT IT. MANY ARABS HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT
THE ISRAELIS BROUGHT GEMAYEL IN.

9. EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION. THE LEFTISTS ARE CRITICIZING
MUBARAK VERY STRONGLY BECAUSE OF WHAT HAPPENED IN
LEBANON, AND ALL THE PEOPLE ARE ASKING "IS THIS THE
MEANING OF PEACE?" THE LEFTISTS ARE MOUNTING STRONG

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PRESSURES BECAUSE OF EGYPTIAN RELIANCE ON THE U.S. IN
THE PEACE PROCESS. NEVERTHELESS, NEITHER THE LEFTISTS
NOR THE RELIGIOUS EXTREMISTS IN EGYPT WILL BECOME
STRONG ENOUGH TO POSE A THREAT TO THE GOVERNMENT.
"WE CAN CONTAIN THEM."

10. PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION. IN FUTURE AUTONOMY
TALKS, EGYPT WOULD NOT OBJECT TO JORDANIAN PARTICIPA-
TION ("BUT THEY DON'T WANT TO BE UNDER CAMP DAVID"),
NOR TO THAT OF SOME WEST BANK MAYORS ("BUT THEY WON'T
DO IT WITHOUT PLO APPROVAL"). ASKED ABOUT PARTICIPATION
BY VILLAGE LEAGUE REPRESENTATIVES SUCH AS MUSTAPHA
DUDIN, MUBARAK RESPONDED FLATLY "THE PLO WILL KILL HIM."
COMMENT: NONE OF MUBARAK'S MINISTERS OR AIDES WERE
PRESENT, AND THE PRESIDENT'S STYLE WAS WARM AND OPEN,
IF UNDRAMATIC. IT IS PERHAPS REMARKABLE THAT HE SPENT

NO TIME IN CONDEMNING ISRAEL OVER ITS ATTACK ON THE
PLO IN LEBANON, AND FOCUSED INSTEAD ON THE NECESSITY
OF RESTORING CREDIBILITY TO THE PEACE PROCESS. HE WAS,
IN FACT, QUITE MILD IN HIS REFERENCES TO BEGIN AND
SHARON. THE THRUST OF HIS REMARKS WAS UPBEAT AND
POSITIVE AND HE KEPT RETURNING TO HOW EASY IT COULD BE
NOW TO CONTAIN AND WORK WITH THE PLO MODERATES. NOW IS
THE TIME, HE EMPHASIZED, FOR DIALOGUE TO START BETWEEN
THOSE MODERATES AND THE U.S. END COMMENT. ATHERTON

CAIRO 2023

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 2135 DTG: 021551Z SEP 82 PSN: 015951
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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1611

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 22135

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, EG, IS, US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER ALI TO SECRETARY
SHULTZ

REF: CAIRO 22037

1. ~~(SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. IN MY MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND
FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI AND MINISTER OF
STATE BOUTROS GHALI SEPTEMBER 2, I ASKED ABOUT THE
RELATIONSHIP OF ALI'S LETTER TO OUR PEACE INITIATIVE.
BOUTROS POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH WE RECEIVED ALI'S
LETTER ON SEPTEMBER 1, IT WAS DATED AUGUST 30 AND
THEREFORE DID NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT MY PRESENTATION
OF OUR NEW PROPOSALS TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK SEPTEMBER 1.
THE POSITIONS STATED IN THE LETTER WILL HAVE TO BE
REEVALUATED IN THE LIGHT OF MY PRESENTATION TO
MUBARAK AND IN THE CONTEXT OF FORMULATING AN EGYPTIAN
POSITION ON PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PROPOSALS. PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S PROPOSALS WILL BE DISCUSSED THOROUGHLY BY
THE GOE LEADERSHIP ON SATURDAY AND SUNDAY AND THERE
COULD WELL BE SOME CHANGES IN THE "REMEDIAL MEASURES"
STIPULATED IN THE ALI LETTER AS "CONDITIONS" FOR
RESUMING PEACE TALKS (SOME OF WHICH, I POINTED OUT,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

WERE SIMPLY NOT FULFILLABLE). ALI CLOSED THE DIS-
CUSSION BY SAYING THAT CLEARLY THE EGYPTIAN GOVERN-
MENT HAD SOME "HOMEWORK" TO DO.

3. TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

CAIRO, 30TH AUGUST 1982.

DEAR SECRETARY SHULTZ,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT
MUBARAK. I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION IN
THE MIDDLE EAST ENTAILS THE INTENSIFICATION OF OUR
CONTACTS AND CONSULTATION. WE HAVE A COMMON
INTEREST IN HALTING THE DETERIORATION IN THIS
STRATEGIC REGION AND MINIMIZING THE DAMAGE WHICH
RESULTED FROM THE ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON.
FIRST AND FOREMOST, WE MUST SAVE THE CAUSE OF

PEACE WHICH FORMS THE CORE OF OUR JOINT COMMITMENT.
CERTAINLY, THE PREVENTION OF AN ALL-OUT ATTACK ON
WEST BEIRUT GAVE US A BREATHING SPACE. BUT I AM
CONFIDENT THAT YOU REALIZE THAT THAT ACT ALONE DID
NOT PUT US CLOSER TO OUR GOAL. OUR TASK HAS BEEN
MADE MUCH MORE COMPLICATED BY THE ISRAELI SHORT-
SIGHTED POLICY. THE INVASION OF LEBANON DESTROYED
THE BRIDGE OF CONFIDENCE AND GOOD WILL WE HAVE BUILT
OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS THROUGH HARD WORK AND
PERSEVERENCE.

WHEN THE CAMP DAVID "FRAMEWORK" WAS SIGNED IN
SEPTEMBER 1978, THE SIGNATORIES COMMITTED THEM-
SELVES TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO ALL ASPECTS OF
THE CONFLICT. THEY VOWED "TO REACH A JUST, COMPRE-
HENSIVE AND DURABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT". THEY
RECOGNIZED THAT, "FOR PEACE TO ENDURE, IT MUST
INVOLVE ALL THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN MOST DEEPLY AFFECTED
BY THAT CONFLICT". THE FIRST PART OF THE "FRAMEWORK",
ENTITLED "WEST BANK AND GAZA" PROVIDED FOR "NEGOTIAT-
ING" A RESOLUTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL
ITS ASPECTS. "THE SOLUTION FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS
MUST RECOGNIZE THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE AND THEIR JUST REQUIREMENTS".
IN THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY, SEVERAL
REFERENCES WERE MADE TO THE OBLIGATION "TO ESTAB-
LISH PEACE, NOT ONLY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, BUT
ALSO BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EACH OF ITS NEIGHBORS WHICH
IS PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE PEACE WITH IT".

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MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

I TRUST THAT YOU AGREE WITH ME THAT THE ISRAELI
INVASION OF LEBANON AND THE DEVASTATING OPERATIONS
WHICH ENSUED CONSTITUTED A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF
THESE SOLEMN COMMITMENTS. FURTHERMORE, THE ISRAELI
CONDUCT THROUGHOUT THE WAR DEEPENED THE FEELING OF
ANIMOSITY AND HOSTILITY BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND ARABS.

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DTG: 021551Z SEP 82 PSN: 015951

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1612

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 CAIRO 22135

WHTS

MANY PROVISIONS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS WERE VIOLATED. AMERICAN LETHAL WEAPONS WERE USED AGAINST CIVILIANS, BOTH LEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS IN A CLEAR BREACH OF RELEVANT AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES. PALESTINIAN PRISONERS OF WAR WERE TORTURED AS WITNESSED BY THIRD-PARTY NATIONALS. ALL THIS HAS DEEPENED THE RIFT AND REVIVED PRE-PEACE DISTRUST AND SUSPICION.

I NEED NOT MENTION THAT THESE SAD EVENTS HAVE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED THE IMAGE AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE REGION. INEVITABLY, THIS DEVELOPMENT WILL HAVE A NEGATIVE REFLECTION ON THE PEACE PROCESS IN WHICH THE U.S. PLAYS A PIVOTAL ROLE. MUCH HAS TO BE DONE TO REDRESS THIS SITUATION BEFORE THE PEACE EFFORTS ARE RESUMED. OTHERWISE, THE CREDIBILITY GAP THAT EXISTS WOULD STRANGLE THE PROCESS FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAS CAUSED THE AUTONOMY TALKS TREMENDOUS DAMAGE BY THE FOLLOWING:

- A. THE STEPPING UP OF REPRESSIVE MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST THE INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. MODERATE MAYORS ARE BEING DISMISSED AT WILL. ALL FORMS OF POLITICAL FREEDOM ARE SUPPRESSED. VILLAGE LEAGUES ARE BEING SET UP AGAINST THE VEHEMENT OPPOSITION

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OF THE PEOPLE. ALL THIS IS TAKING PLACE AT A TIME WHEN ISRAEL SHOULD HAVE CARRIED OUT THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WE PROPOSED TO HER IN OCTOBER 1978 AND OCTOBER 1980 WITH YOUR SUPPORT AND APPROVAL. IN OUR CONTACTS WITH MODERATE LEADERS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, WE CAPITALIZED ON THESE MEASURES TO CONVINCE THEM THAT THE PEACE PROCESS HOLDS GREAT PROMISE FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THIS ARGUMENT CAN HARDLY BE MAINTAINED.

B. SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES ARE BEING PURSUED CONTRARY TO THE WRITTEN COMMITMENT PRIME MINISTER BEGIN MADE AT CAMP DAVID IN SEPTEMBER 1978. THE UNITED STATES EFFORTS EXERTED TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO CEASE SUCH ACTIVITIES HAVE FAILED UNFORTUNATELY. IT IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE ANY PALESTINIAN INHABITANTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA OF

THE VALIDITY OF OUR PEACE POLICY WHILE THE CONVERSION OF ARAB LAND INTO JEWISH SETTLEMENTS GOES ON.

- C. ISRAEL DECLARED SEVERAL LINES OF POLICY WHICH CLEARLY CONTRADICTS THE CAMP DAVID FORMULA.

- FIRST: ISRAELI HIGH RANKING OFFICIALS HAVE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY RULED OUT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY PALESTINIAN ENTITY IN THE FUTURE, EVEN AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD. THUS, ISRAEL IS ATTEMPTING TO PRE-JUDGE THE MAIN ISSUE WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO BE DETERMINED IN THE COURSE OF THE SECOND-STAGE NEGOTIATIONS. IN EFFECT, THIS POLICY MEANS THAT THE AUTONOMY FORMULA WOULD BE THE PERMANENT RATHER THAN A TRANSITIONAL ONE.

- SECOND: CERTAIN ISRAELI MINISTERS HAVE BEEN OPENLY ADVOCATING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PALESTINIAN STATE IN JORDAN. APART FROM THE ABSURDITY OF THIS IDEA, IT RUNS CONTRARY TO ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO WORK WITH BOTH OF US IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH A PALESTINIAN SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA.

- D. ISRAELI NARROW INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THAT AUTHORITY HAVE DISTORTED THE AUTONOMY FORMULA AND REDUCED IT TO A MUNICIPAL ARRANGEMENT. U. S. EFFORTS TO BRIDGE THIS GAP THROUGH COMPROMISE FORMULAS COULD NOT REMEDY THE SITUATION BECAUSE THEY AIMED AT GLOSSING OVER THE DIFFERENCES AND EVADING THE CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES,

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

RATHER THAN CONFRONTING THEM SQUARELY AND FROM THE ROOT WITH ENOUGH CLARITY AND DECISIVENESS.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVEMENTIONED, I FIND IT MY DUTY TO TELL YOU THAT THE ISRAELI POLICY AND ACTION HAVE RENDERED IT IMPOSSIBLE TO RESUME THE PEACE TALKS IN THE ABSENCE OF ADEQUATE REMEDIAL MEASURES:

- FIRST: THERE SHOULD BE A CLEAR COMMITMENT FROM ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL THE LEBANESE TERRITORIES ACCORDING TO A FIXED TIMETABLE ENDORSED BY THE U. S. GOVERNMENT AND APPROVED BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. FURTHERMORE, ISRAEL MUST REFRAIN FROM

CAIRO 2135

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1613

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 CAIRO 22135

MODIS

INTERFERING IN THE LEBANESE INTERNAL AFFAIRS AND
DECLARE ITS STRICT RESPECT TO THE SOVEREIGNTY,
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
OF LEBANON.

- SECOND: HOPE MUST BE GIVEN TO THE PALESTINIANS
THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL
PERIOD. PREFERABLY, ISRAEL SHOULD ISSUE A STATE-
MENT THAT THE EXERCISE OF SUCH RIGHT WOULD NOT BE
RULED OUT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FINAL-STATUS
NEGOTIATIONS. BUT GIVEN THE STARK REALITIES OF THE
SITUATIONS, IT MIGHT SUFFICE TO HAVE A U. S. ENDORSE-
MENT OF THAT RIGHT. THAT IS NOT TO SAY THAT THE U. S.
WOULD UNILATERALLY DECIDE THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGO-
TIATIONS. IT WOULD SIMPLY MEAN THAT, IN THE NEGO-
TIATIONS, THE U. S. WOULD SUPPORT THE EGYPTIAN POSI-
TION ON THAT POINT.

- THIRD: ISRAEL MUST MAKE A FIRM COMMITMENT TO
CEASE ALL SETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES IMMEDIATELY.

- FOURTH: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES MUST BE
CARRIED OUT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WITHOUT DELAY.
EXPULSED MAYORS AND CITY COUNCILMEN MUST BE ALLOWED
TO RETURN TO THEIR POSTS. ALL RESTRICTIONS ON
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE LIFTED. ISRAEL SHOULD
GRANT ENTRY TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA TO A SIGNIFI-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

CANT NUMBER OF REFUGEES FOR THE PURPOSE OF UNITING
THE FAMILIES. POLITICAL PRISONERS MUST BE FREED.

- FIFTH: THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT MUST ISSUE AN
OFFICIAL DECLARATION RESTATING ITS COMMITMENT TO
ESTABLISH A SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY IN THE WEST
BANK AND GAZA AND RENOUNCING ANY INTENTION TO SEEK
OR ADVOCATE A PALESTINIAN ENTITY IN JORDAN. ISRAEL
MUST OBSERVE THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND POLITICAL
INDEPENDENCE OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242.

- DEAR SECRETARY SHULTZ,
AS WE AGREED WHEN WE MET IN WASHINGTON, WE ARE MOST
WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH YOU FULLY UNTIL WE ATTAIN
OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE; A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE ARE EQUALLY CONFIDENT THAT
YOU REALIZE THE URGENT NECESSITY OF COPING WITH THE

DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE REGION WITH COURAGE
AND VISION. WE WOULD BE VERY PLEASED TO RECEIVE
YOU HERE IN CAIRO AND PURSUE WITH YOU THE STIMULAT-
ING CONVERSATION WE HELD IN WASHINGTON. PRESIDENT
MUBARAK IS LOOKING FORWARD TO MEETING YOU.
SINCERELY, /S/ KAMAL HASSAN ALI, DEPUTY PRIME
MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
END TEXT.

4. SIGNED ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED TO NEA/EGY.
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1657

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 2255

NOTES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, EG, US, IS
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE
- INITIATIVE WITH EGYPTIAN LEADERS DURING
- SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S VISIT

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FULLER ACCOUNTS OF SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND OTHER EGYPTIAN LEADERS WILL BE SUBMITTED IN SEPTELS. IN THIS MESSAGE, I SIMPLY WANT TO REPORT BRIEFLY MY OVERALL IMPRESSIONS. THE ATMOSPHERE HAS BEEN EXCEEDINGLY POSITIVE, CLEARLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO EGYPTIAN SATISFACTION WITH THE LAUNCHING OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE. SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S VISIT HERE HAS BEEN MOST TIMELY. IT HAS PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE AN ADDITIONAL BOOST TO THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, TO ENCOURAGE A POSITIVE EGYPTIAN RESPONSE, AND TO URGE THE EGYPTIANS TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN WORKING ON THE OTHER ARABS TO AVOID DECISIONS AT THE FEZ SUMMIT WHICH WOULD LIMIT THEIR FLEXIBILITY AND OUR ABILITY TO GET A BROADENED NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED.

3. SECRETARY WEINBERGER WAS ABLE TO DRAW ON HIS LONG

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN TO IMPRESS UPON THE EGYPTIANS THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS THE BEST WAY TO RECONCILE ISRAEL'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WITH THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND OTHER ARABS. HE WAS ALSO ABLE TO LEND HIS PERSONAL WEIGHT TO THE EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE EGYPTIANS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS COMMITTED TO SEE HIS INITIATIVE THROUGH AND TO STAND ON THE POSITIONS HE HAS PUT FORWARD IN THE FACE OF ALL CRITICISMS.

4. THE EGYPTIANS, FOR THEIR PART, WERE OBVIOUSLY IMPRESSED WITH THE SECRETARY'S ASSURANCES AND BUOYED UP BY THE PROSPECT OF SEEING THE KIND OF POSITIVE, ACTIVE AND BALANCED AMERICAN ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH THEY HAVE LONG BEEN URGING. BOTH KAMAL HASSAN ALI

LAST NIGHT AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK TODAY SPOKE OF OUR INITIATIVE IN POSITIVE TERMS. WHILE RESERVING A FORMAL RESPONSE UNTIL AFTER THEIR IN-HOUSE DELIBERATIONS TODAY, AND MAKING CLEAR THEY DO NOT AGREE WITH EVERY ELEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES POSITION, THEY EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT OUR INITIATIVE SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE ARABS AS A GOOD BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION IN NEGOTIATIONS. MUBARAK URGED THAT THE UNITED STATES SEND MESSAGES TO A BROAD RANGE OF OTHER ARAB CHIEFS OF STATE, INCLUDING SADDAM HUSSEIN AND POSSIBLY EVEN ASSAD, DESIGNED TO PERSUADE THEM NOT TO BOX THEMSELVES IN DURING THE FEZ SUMMIT. WE SHOULD URGE THEM, MUBARAK SAID, NOT TO "PUT THEMSELVES IN THE CAGE OF A FAHD OR BOURGUIBA PLAN." AS I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED TO NICK VELIOTES ON THE SECURE PHONE, SECRETARY WEINBERGER WANTS IN PARTICULAR TO RECOMMEND TO SECRETARY SHULTZ MUBARAK'S SUGGESTION OF A MESSAGE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN.

6. I TOOK THE OCCASION WITH BOTH KAMAL HASSAN ALI AND MUBARAK TO EMPHASIZE HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT THE ARABS NOT LOCK THEMSELVES INTO PRECONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS OR MAKE THEIR RESPONSE TO THE U.S. INITIATIVE CONTINGENT UPON MODIFICATIONS OR CHANGES IN OUR POSITION. THE OBJECTIVE, I STRESSED, IS TO GET HUSSEIN AND REPRESENTATIVE PALESTINIANS TO JOIN EGYPT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH ISRAEL, AND TO GET OTHER ARABS TO SUPPORT THEIR GOING TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THEY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT SEEK TO PRE-NEGOTIATE WITH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

US THE TERMS UNDER WHICH THEY WOULD GO TO THE TABLE. PRESIDENT REAGAN IS DETERMINED TO STAND ON THE POSITIONS HE HAS ANNOUNCED. EACH PARTY CAN, OF COURSE, STATE ITS OWN POSITION, AS WE HAVE DONE, BUT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT ANY PARTY TO CHANGE ITS POSITION PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS. I STRESSED THAT THE EGYPTIANS, WITH THEIR EXPERIENCE OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE ISRAELIS, WERE IN A PARTICULARLY GOOD POSITION TO HELP THE OTHER ARABS UNDERSTAND THAT THE CHANGES THEY SEEK IN ISRAELI POSITIONS CAN ONLY BE BROUGHT ABOUT IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

7. MUBARAK SAID EGYPT IS IN TOUCH WITH A NUMBER OF ARAB LEADERS (HE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR KING HASSAN, KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT NIMIERI WHOM HE WILL SEE HERE TOMORROW). HIS BASIC MESSAGE TO THEM IS THAT REJECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE WOULD BE A FATAL MISTAKE; THEY SHOULD ACCEPT IT AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND RAISE ANY DIFFERENCES THEY HAVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

CAIRO 2255

DTG: 041540Z SEP 82 PSN: 018815

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 2255
SIT326 DATE 09/17/82

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O 041544Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1658

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 22255
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8. FINALLY, MUBARAK REPEATED TO SECRETARY WEINBERGER THE POINT HE HAD MADE TO ME IN OUR MEETING WEDNESDAY THAT, IF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE SUCCEEDS, THIS WILL DRAMATICALLY REFURBISH THE AMERICAN IMAGE IN THE AREA AND CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT STRATEGIC GAIN VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION. IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S COMMENT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE CLOSE COOPERATION THAT HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES FOR OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT AND THAT OF THE REGION, MUBARAK MADE A POINT OF EMPHASIZING EGYPT'S COMMITMENT TO ITS "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS A THEME WE HAVE NOT HEARD MUCH OF IN THE LAST COUPLE OF MONTHS AND IS A MEASURE OF THE POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S VISIT.

9. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO OTHER ADDRESSEES AS DESIRED.
ATHERTON

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 01 CAIRO 4883
SIT054 DATE 10/05/82

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DE RUEHEG #4883 2771445
O 041445Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2850
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 1528

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8238
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USMISSION GENEVA 1456
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CAIRO 24883

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: ETEL, PORG, ITU, IS, USUN, EG

SUBJECT: ITU CONFERENCE IN NAIROBI: REQUEST FOR

- DEMARCHES TO COUNTER ISRAELI EXCLUSION

- RESOLUTION

REF: STATE 276920

1. ~~10~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. IN-SEQUENTIAL MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR OSAMA EL-BAZ AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI, WE MADE POINTS SUGGESTED REFTEL, ASKING FOR EGYPTIAN SUPPORT IN EFFORT TO PRE-SERVE ISRAELI PARTICIPATION IN THE ITU. ALI SAID THAT THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED WITHIN THE MFA AND THE DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO "SUSTAIN" ISRAELI MEMBERSHIP IN THE ITU. ALI WAS NOT PRECISE ON HOW EGYPT WOULD VOTE. BUT WE CAN COUNT ON GOE DELEGATION'S COOPERATION WITH US IN DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE AT NAIROBI. AHERTON

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

18

PAGE 01 CAIRO 2255 DTG: 041540Z SEP 82 PSN: 018815
SIT933 DATE 09/10/82 TOR: 247/1756Z

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O 041540Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1657

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 22255

NOTES

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, EG, US, IS

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE
- INITIATIVE WITH EGYPTIAN LEADERS DURING
- SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S VISIT

1. ~~SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.~~

2. FULLER ACCOUNTS OF SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT MUBARAK AND OTHER EGYPTIAN READERS WILL BE SUBMITTED IN SEPTELS. IN THIS MESSAGE, I SIMPLY WANT TO REPORT BRIEFLY MY OVERALL IMPRESSIONS. THE ATMOSPHERE HAS BEEN EXCEEDINGLY POSITIVE, CLEARLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO EGYPTIAN SATISFACTION WITH THE LAUNCHING OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE. SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S VISIT HERE HAS BEEN MOST TIMELY. IT HAS PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE AN ADDITIONAL BOOST TO THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS, TO ENCOURAGE A POSITIVE EGYPTIAN RESPONSE, AND TO URGE THE EGYPTIANS TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN WORKING ON THE OTHER ARABS TO AVOID DECISIONS AT THE FEZ SUMMIT WHICH WOULD LIMIT THEIR FLEXIBILITY AND OUR ABILITY TO GET A BROADENED NEGOTIATING PROCESS STARTED.

3. SECRETARY WEINBERGER WAS ABLE TO DRAW ON HIS LONG

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN TO IMPRESS UPON THE EGYPTIANS THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS THE BEST WAY TO RECONCILE ISRAEL'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS WITH THE LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND OTHER ARABS. HE WAS ALSO ABLE TO LEND HIS PERSONAL WEIGHT TO THE EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE EGYPTIANS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS COMMITTED TO SEE HIS INITIATIVE THROUGH AND TO STAND ON THE POSITIONS HE HAS PUT FORWARD IN THE FACE OF ALL CRITICISMS.

4. THE EGYPTIANS, FOR THEIR PART, WERE OBVIOUSLY IMPRESSED WITH THE SECRETARY'S ASSURANCES AND BUOYED UP BY THE PROSPECT OF SEEING THE KIND OF POSITIVE, ACTIVE AND BALANCED AMERICAN ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH THEY HAVE LONG BEEN URGING. BOTH KAMAL HASSAN ALI

LAST NIGHT AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK TODAY SPOKE OF OUR INITIATIVE IN POSITIVE TERMS. WHILE RESERVING A FORMAL RESPONSE UNTIL AFTER THEIR IN-HOUSE DELIBERATIONS TODAY, AND MAKING CLEAR THEY DO NOT AGREE WITH EVERY ELEMENT OF THE UNITED STATES POSITION, THEY EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT OUR INITIATIVE SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE ARABS AS A GOOD BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION IN NEGOTIATIONS. MUBARAK URGED THAT THE UNITED STATES SEND MESSAGES TO A BROAD RANGE OF OTHER ARAB CHIEFS OF STATE, INCLUDING SADDAM HUSSEIN AND POSSIBLY EVEN ASSAD, DESIGNED TO PERSUADE THEM NOT TO BOX THEMSELVES IN DURING THE FEZ SUMMIT. WE SHOULD URGE THEM, MUBARAK SAID, NOT TO "PUT THEMSELVES IN THE CAGE OF A FAHD OR BOURGUIBA PLAN." AS I HAVE ALREADY REPORTED TO NICK VELIOTES ON THE SECURE PHONE, SECRETARY WEINBERGER WANTS IN PARTICULAR TO RECOMMEND TO SECRETARY SHULTZ MUBARAK'S SUGGESTION OF A MESSAGE TO SADDAM HUSSEIN.

6. I TOOK THE OCCASION WITH BOTH KAMAL HASSAN ALI AND MUBARAK TO EMPHASIZE HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT THE ARABS NOT LOCK THEMSELVES INTO PRECONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS OR MAKE THEIR RESPONSE TO THE U.S. INITIATIVE CONTINGENT UPON MODIFICATIONS OR CHANGES IN OUR POSITION. THE OBJECTIVE, I STRESSED, IS TO GET HUSSEIN AND REPRESENTATIVE PALESTINIANS TO JOIN EGYPT AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE WITH ISRAEL, AND TO GET OTHER ARABS TO SUPPORT THEIR GOING TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THEY SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT SEEK TO PRE-NEGOTIATE WITH

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

US THE TERMS UNDER WHICH THEY WOULD GO TO THE TABLE. PRESIDENT REAGAN IS DETERMINED TO STAND ON THE POSITIONS HE HAS ANNOUNCED. EACH PARTY CAN, OF COURSE, STATE ITS OWN POSITION, AS WE HAVE DONE, BUT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT ANY PARTY TO CHANGE ITS POSITION PRIOR TO NEGOTIATIONS. I STRESSED THAT THE EGYPTIANS, WITH THEIR EXPERIENCE OF NEGOTIATING WITH THE ISRAELIS, WERE IN A PARTICULARLY GOOD POSITION TO HELP THE OTHER ARABS UNDERSTAND THAT THE CHANGES THEY SEEK IN ISRAELI POSITIONS CAN ONLY BE BROUGHT ABOUT IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

7. MUBARAK SAID EGYPT IS IN TOUCH WITH A NUMBER OF ARAB LEADERS (HE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR KING HASSAN, KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT NIMIERI WHOM HE WILL SEE HERE TOMORROW). HIS BASIC MESSAGE TO THEM IS THAT REJECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE WOULD BE A FATAL MISTAKE; THEY SHOULD ACCEPT IT AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND RAISE ANY DIFFERENCES THEY HAVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

CAIRO 2255

DTG: 041540Z SEP 82 PSN: 018815

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19

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 2255
SIT932 DATE 09/10/82

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DE RUEHEG #2255 2471545
O 041544Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1658

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 22255
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8. FINALLY, MUBARAK REPEATED TO SECRETARY WEINBERGER THE POINT HE HAD MADE TO ME IN OUR MEETING WEDNESDAY THAT, IF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE SUCCEEDS, THIS WILL DRAMATICALLY REFURBISH THE AMERICAN IMAGE IN THE AREA AND CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT STRATEGIC GAIN VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIET UNION. IN RESPONSE TO THE SECRETARY'S COMMENT ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE CLOSE COOPERATION THAT HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES FOR OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT AND THAT OF THE REGION, MUBARAK MADE A POINT OF EMPHASIZING EGYPT'S COMMITMENT TO ITS "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS A THEME WE HAVE NOT HEARD MUCH OF IN THE LAST COUPLE OF MONTHS AND IS A MEASURE OF THE POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S VISIT.

9. DEPARTMENT REPEAT TO OTHER ADDRESSEES AS DESIRED.
ATHERTON

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1677

~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 22280
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, EG, US, IS
SUBJECT: FEZ SUMMIT
REF: A. CAIRO 22255; B. STATE 250304

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I INFORMED MINISTER OF STATE BOUTROS GHALI THIS MORNING, WITH THE REQUEST THAT HE PASS IT ON TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK, THAT IN RESPONSE TO MUBARAK'S SUGGESTION (REFTEL A), THE DEPARTMENT HAD SENT MESSAGES TO BAGHDAD AND OTHER SELECTED ARAB CAPITALS URGING FLEXIBILITY AND SUPPORT OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE AT THE FEZ SUMMIT. ATHERTON

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BY LCRB NARA DATE 6/5/13

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

23

PAGE 01 CAIRO 2869 DTG: 101502Z SEP 82 PSN: 026347
SIT866 DATE 09/10/82 TOR: 253/1526Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1928

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0066

AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 4410

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 8774

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AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1503

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 9296

AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 2895

AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 4134

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 22869

EXDTS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, PLO, US, EG, IS

SUBJECT: GHALI ON PEACE INITIATIVE

REF: CAIRO 22826

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: IN HOUR LONG MEETING, MINSTATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS BOUTROS GHALI HAMMERED AWAY ON NEED FOR U.S. TO BUILD ITS CREDIBILITY BY TAKING CONCRETE MEASURES IN RESPONSE TO ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW SETTLEMENTS, AND TO COUNTER ISRAELI TACTICS DESIGNED TO SLOW THE MOMENTUM BEHIND THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. HE ALSO OFFERED PERSONAL VIEW THAT MORE FORMAL U.S. GUARANTEES MIGHT BE NEEDED TO BUILD ARAB SUPPORT FOR

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

THE INITIATIVE. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR, ACCOMPANIED BY COUNTRY DIRECTOR LLOYD AND POLOFF KEENE, CALLED ON BOUTROS GHALI SEPTEMBER 9 TO DISCUSS EGYPTIAN REACTION TO AND SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE. GHALI AGREED WITH THE AMBASSADOR'S OBSERVATION THAT, IN GENERAL, REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE WAS ENCOURAGING AND OUTLINED STEPS EGYPT WAS TAKING TO SUPPORT INITIATIVE (REFTEL). ONE ASPECT TROUBLED HIM, HOWEVER, BOUTROS SAID. THE FIRST TEST OF U.S. RESOLVE HAD ALREADY COME IN THE FORM OF ISRAEL'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF ITS INTENT TO ESTABLISH NEW SETTLEMENTS. IN RESPONSE, THE U.S. HAD ONLY WORDS. EGYPT HOPES THERE WILL BE SOME CONCRETE ACTION IN RESPONSE BY THE U.S. THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST CONFRONTATION FAVORED ISRAEL.

4. THE AMBASSADOR COUNTERED THAT THE U.S. STATEMENT HAD BEEN AMONG THE STRONGEST HE HAD HEARD IN HIS YEARS OF DEALING WITH MIDDLE EAST ISSUES. BOUTROS CONCEDED THIS POINT, BUT SAID PUBLIC OPINION DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE NUANCES OF DIPLOMATIC LANGUAGE. HE HAD PERSONALLY SAMPLED PUBLIC OPINION -- JOURNALISTS, MEMBERS OF THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY, NDP MEMBERS AND OTHERS, BASICALLY PEOPLE WHO FAVORED THE U.S. PLAN -- AND FOUND THAT U.S. CREDIBILITY HAD BEEN HURT. THE ARABS HAD SEEN THE U.S. BACK OFF TOO OFTEN, HE SAID, CITING THE ROGERS PLAN AND THE AFTERMATH OF CAMP DAVID. THEY NEEDED TO SEE SOME CONCRETE ACTION. THE REACTION HAD BEEN SIMILAR IN EUROPE, ACCORDING TO MFA REPORTING, HE SAID.

5. BOUTROS CONTINUED THAT WHAT HE FEARED MOST WAS AN ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO POSTPONE REAL NEGOTIATIONS FOR SIX TO EIGHT MONTHS, DRAINING THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE OF MOMENTUM. HE UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF AVOIDING FAITS ACCOMPLISHED THAT COULD WEAKEN THE U.S. POSITION. HE OUTLINED THREE POSSIBLE SCENARIOS. ISRAEL COULD: (A) PROVOKE A CONFRONTATION WITH SYRIA; (B) TAKE ACTIONS IN LEBANON THAT WOULD PUSH THAT COUNTRY INTO RENEWED CIVIL WAR; OR (C) CALL FOR ELECTIONS IN ISRAEL.

6. THE AMBASSADOR AGREED WE DID NOT WANT TO LOSE MOMENTUM, AND SAID MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT WOULD HAPPEN

CAIRO 2869
MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

DTG: 101502Z SEP 82 PSN: 026347

NEXT ON THE ARAB SIDE. BOUTROS RESPONDED THAT WE WOULD NOT GET JORDAN OR THE OTHER ARABS TO SUPPORT THE INITIATIVE OPENLY UNLESS WE OFFERED GUARANTEES. "ALL YOU'VE DONE IS GIVE A SPEECH," SAID BOUTROS. THE AMBASSADOR TOOK STRONG EXCEPTION, POINTING TO THE MAJOR DIPLOMATIC EFFORT U.S. HAS UNDERTAKEN. AMBASSADOR ALSO POINTED TO ADDITIONAL U.S. POINTS SETTING FORTH OUR POSITION, AND CONVEYED IN THE NAME OF THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY AS CONCRETE EVIDENCE OF SINCERE U.S. EFFORT TO GET OTHERS TO JOIN THE PROCESS.

7. BOUTROS SAID IT WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW, NOT DISCUSSED WITH MUBARAK, THAT ADDITIONAL WRITTEN U.S. UNDERTAKINGS, PERHAPS IN THE FORM OF A JOINT MEMORANDUM OR A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER IN RESPONSE TO THE MUBARAK-REAGAN LETTER

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PAGE 01 OF 02 CAIRO 2869
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AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 2896

AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 4135

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 CAIRO 22869

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WHICH WE WILL BE RECEIVING IN A FEW DAYS, WOULD BE IMPORTANT IN HELPING EGYPT GAIN ARAB SUPPORT. EGYPT WAS BEING ASKED TO PLAY THE ROLE OF ADVOCATE OF THE U.S. INITIATIVE WHILE MANY U.S. POSITIONS WERE VAGUE. THREE MONTHS FROM NOW EGYPT COULD FIND ITSELF ALONE, SQUEEZED BETWEEN ISRAELI REJECTIONISTS AND ARAB REJECTIONISTS, AS WAS THE CASE AFTER CAMP DAVID. EGYPT COULD NOT RELY ON ORAL COMMITMENTS. PERSONNEL CHANGE AFTER ALL. U.S. COULD NOT CONTINUE TO GIVE COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL, WHILE ASKING EGYPT TO ACT ON FAITH. U.S. HAD TO HELP EGYPT OVERCOME ITS OWN CRISIS OF CREDIBILITY.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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PAGE 02 OF 02 CAIRO 2869

DTG: 101502Z SEP 82 PSN: 026349

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8. AMBASSADOR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT EGYPT HAD SOME REASON TO FEEL LET DOWN BY THE USG IN THE PAST BUT COULD NOT STRESS TOO STRONGLY HIS CONVICTION THAT THIS TIME WAS DIFFERENT. THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY WERE BOTH FULLY COMMITTED TO STAND ON THE POSITIONS WE HAD PUT FORWARD. TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDINGS, HOWEVER, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT GOE COULD NOT EXPECT CHANGES OR ELABORATIONS OF THOSE POSITIONS PRIOR TO OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAD STATED THE POSITIONS WE WOULD TAKE INTO NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHERS COULD DO THE SAME. THE IMPORTANT THING NOW WAS TO GET JORDAN AND SOME PALESTINIA TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. THAT WAS THE PLACE TO TRY TO GET THE OTHER SIDE TO MODIFY ITS POSITIONS, AS EGYPT'S OWN EXPERIENCE HAD SHOWN. BOUTROS AGREED AND SAID EGYPT WAS MAKING THIS POINT TO OTHER ARABS. IN HIS VIEW, HOWEVER (AND HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER PRESIDENT MUBARAK WOULD AGREE), IT WOULD STILL BE IMPORTANT TO RECEIVE FORMAL WRITTEN GUARANTEES OF THE POSITIONS THE USG HAD CONVEYED.

9. MEETING CLOSED WITH AMBASSADOR STRESSING REAL TRAGEDY OF ALLOWING THIS HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE. IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE OF MONUMENTAL PROPORTION TO INSIST ON AN AGREED PLAN AS A PRECONDITION TO NEGOTIATION. BOUTROS AGREED, CAUTIONING ONCE AGAIN AGAINST ISRAELI ACTIONS IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO NEGOTIATIONS AND STRESSING AS HE HAD REPEATEDLY, NEED FOR U.S. TO STRENGTHEN ITS CREDIBILITY THROUGH CONCRETE ACTIONS. ATHERTON
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 CAIRO 3634 DTG: 191539Z SEP 82 PSN: 038509
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O 191539Z SEP 82
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2282

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0120
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AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9329
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1549
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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, EG, IS, US
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI: LEBANON
REF: A. STATE 261452; B. STATE 255965

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. IN MY MEETING WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI SATURDAY AFTERNOON (PRIOR TO REPORTS OF ATTACKS ON BEIRUT REFUGEE CAMPS), HE MADE CLEAR EGYPT'S GREAT UNHAPPINESS WITH CONTINUED ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIVITY IN LEBANON. HE GAVE ME A MESSAGE FROM THE PLO TO BE CONVEYED TO WASHINGTON, DESCRIBING ISRAELI ACTIONS AGAINST PALESTINIAN WELFARE AND OTHER OFFICES IN BEIRUT, AND ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION OF REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN, APPEARING TO JUSTIFY ISRAEL'S MOVE

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

INTO THE LEBANESE CAPITAL. I WOULD APPRECIATE GUIDANCE.
END SUMMARY.

3. IN MY 90-MINUTE MEETING (ACCOMPANIED BY DCM PRECHT) WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI ON SEVERAL SUBJECTS, I DREW ON REFTELS TO DESCRIBE OUR POSITION AND PLAN OF ACTION ON LEBANON.

4. SHORTLY AFTER I BEGAN MY PRESENTATION, AN MFA OFFICER CAME IN WITH NOTES FROM A PLO MESSAGE EGYPT HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM BEIRUT. ALI READ EXCERPTS OF THE MESSAGE TO ME. IT STATED ISRAELI FORCES WERE TAKING OVER ALL PLO SCIENTIFIC, EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL AND HEALTH FACILITIES IN BEIRUT. THE ISRAELIS WERE ARRESTING MANY YOUNG PEOPLE, INCLUDING SOME WHO HAD BEEN

RESIDENTS OF THE CITY SINCE 1948. ISRAELI FORCES HAD SURROUNDED THE REFUGEE CAMPS AND WERE DEMANDING SURRENDER OF THE INHABITANTS. THERE HAD BEEN AN ASSAULT ON THE CENTER FOR PALESTINIAN STUDIES, AND BOOKS AND DOCUMENTS WERE BEING REMOVED. THE ISRAELIS HAD OCCUPIED THE RIVERIA HOTEL. ALL OF THIS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN VIOLATION OF THE UNDERSTANDING THE PALESTINIANS HAD REACHED WITH HABIB. THE U.S. CHARGE IN BEIRUT HAD BEEN INFORMED. I TOLD ALI I WOULD REPORT THIS INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON AND ASSURED HIM WE WERE AS DISTRESSED AS EGYPT AT ISRAELI MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT. I REVIEWED WITH ALI THE STATEMENTS WE HAD MADE AND THE POSITIONS WE HAD TAKEN PUBLICLY AT NEW YORK AND IN MEETINGS PRIVATELY WITH THE ISRAELIS IN WASHINGTON AND IN JERUSALEM. AS I WAS CONTINUING MY PRESENTATION, ALI MENTIONED A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO PRESIDENT REAGAN SUGGESTING THAT ISRAEL HAD SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR ENTERING WEST BEIRUT. I SAID IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS SIMPLY NOTING THE ISRAELI POSITION AND HAD BEEN QUOTED OUT OF CONTEXT BUT THAT I WOULD SEEK CLARIFICATION FROM WASHINGTON. AMBASSADOR GHORBAL, WHO WAS PRESENT, SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT GIVE THE ISRAELIS ANY EXCUSE FOR FURTHER ACTIONS DAMAGING TO THE PEACE PROCESS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

5. I EMPHASIZED, AS I HAD EARLIER IN OUR DISCUSSION, THAT WE MUST KEEP LEBANON AND THE PEACE PROCESS AS SEPARATE, ALBEIT SIMULTANEOUS, ACTIONS ON OUR AGENDA. ALI SHOWED NO GIVE ON THAT POINT, SIMPLY NOTING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR POSITION.

6. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. ATHERTON

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PEPR, EG, US, IS

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH KAMAL HASSAN ALI: FEZ AND PRESI-
- DENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE

REF: A. STATE 259157; B. CAIRO 23508

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. WE WILL GET EGYPT'S FORMAL POSITION ON THE
PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE LATER THIS WEEK. ALTHOUGH EGYPT
DOES NOT BELIEVE HUSSEIN ACQUIRED THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILI

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AT FEZ, EGYPT WILL WORK ON THE PLO AND HUSSEIN TO ENCOURAGE MOVEMENT FORWARD TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. ALI THEN SEEMED TO QUALIFY THIS BY WARNING THAT RESUMING PEACE TALKS IS NOT IN THE CARDS UNTIL AN "ATMOSPHERE OF PEACE" HAS BEEN RESTORED IN LEBANON -- I.E., HOSTILITIES CEASE AND THERE IS A DEFINITE ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL -- AND SAID THAT IN THE MEANTIME IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO TALK WITH HUSSEIN AND THE PALESTINIANS ABOUT ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. I STRONGLY URGED THAT EGYPT NOT LINK LEBANON AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. END SUMMARY.

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3. I MET WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI SEPTEMBER 18 TO INTRODUCE AID DIRECTOR MICHAEL STONE, TO COMPARE NOTES POST-FEZ, AND TO DISCUSS LEBANON (SEPTTEL). OUR MEETING PREDATED REPORTS OF THE ATTACKS ON BEIRUT REFUGEE CAMPS. AMBASSADOR GHORBAL AND TWO NOTETAKERS WERE WITH ALI. DCM ACCOMPANIED ME. ALI EXTENDED A CORDIAL WELCOME TO STONE AND ASSURED HIM OF HIS WILLINGNESS TO BE HELPFUL ON ANY MATTERS THAT COULD NOT BE RESOLVED THROUGH CUSTOMARY ECONOMIC CHANNELS. STONE THEN LEFT THE MEETING, AND I ASKED ALI IF THE FORMAL EGYPTIAN REACTION TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE WAS TO BE GIVEN TO US. ALI SAID THAT THE EGYPTIAN POSITION WOULD COME IN TWO PARTS. FIRST, I WOULD BE GIVEN THIS WEEK A MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO PRESIDENT REAGAN. SUBSEQUENTLY, THERE WILL BE A MESSAGE FROM ALI TO SECRETARY SHULTZ. IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE DISCUSSIONS THAT FOLLOWED THAT ALI WAS NOT PREPARED TO COMMENT IN ANY DETAIL ON THE INITIATIVE OR THE FEZ SUMMIT PENDING FURTHER APPROVAL OF THE EGYPTIAN POSITION.

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4. ALI READILY AGREED THAT I SHOULD SHARE OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE FEZ SUMMIT. I DID SO, DRAWING ON

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THE POINTS CONTAINED IN REFTEL A. I POINTED OUT THAT WHILE WE HAD PRIVATE RESERVATIONS OR DOUBTS ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF FEZ, SECRETARY SHULTZ HAD EMPHASIZED THE POSITIVE IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. WE WERE GIVING THE FEZ CONFERENCE THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT. THE TEST WOULD BE WHETHER OR NOT IT FACILITATED HUSSEIN'S JOINING THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. I TOLD ALI THAT I WAS SURE WASHINGTON HAD APPRECIATED THE VERY HELPFUL COMMENTS PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAD MADE IN PARIS IN WHICH HE EMPHASIZED THAT WHILE FEZ SET FORTH A SERIES OF PRINCIPLES OR CONCEPTS FOR NEGOTIATION, IT ESTABLISHED NO MECHANISM FOR CONDUCTING NEGOTIATIONS. MUBARAK'S SUPPORT FOR THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AND CAMP DAVID AS AN ESTABLISHED MECHANISM WAS A VERY HELPFUL OBSERVATION.

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5. AFTER GOING THROUGH REFTEL A, I SUMMARIZED OUR ASSESSMENT ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES. I SAID THE NEXT STEP WOULD BE TO MEET WITH THE ARAB DELEGATION FROM FEZ. IT WAS CERTAIN THE U.S. WOULD NOT RECEIVE A PLO LEADER UNLESS THERE WERE A BASIC CHANGE IN THE PLO ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BASED ON RESOLUTION 242.

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6. A SECOND STEP, I SAID, WOULD BE TO EXPLORE FURTHER, ESPECIALLY WITH HUSSEIN AND FAHD, THE DEGREE

OF FLEXIBILITY THAT JORDAN MIGHT HAVE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INITIATIVE. IT WAS NOT CLEAR THAT HUSSEIN FELT HE HAD SUFFICIENT FLEXIBILITY TO MOVE INTO NEGOTIATIONS NOW. WE HOPED TO KEEP FOCUS ON THE REAGAN INITIATIVE RATHER THAN FEZ BECAUSE, AS PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAD
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SAID, THE INITIATIVE CONSTITUTED THE ONLY MECHANISM FOR MOVING TOWARD PEACE.

7. I NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN VERY STRONG INTERNATIONAL, AS WELL AS U.S., PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. WE HAD BEEN PLEASED WITH THE POSITIVE REACTION OF PALESTINIANS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND ALSO SOME EXILES FROM THE TERRITORIES WHO WANTED TO MOVE AHEAD WITH THE INITIATIVE.

8. I SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT AND URGENT FOR US TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM. ABOVE ALL, WE SHOULD NOT ALLOW PEACE NEGOTIATIONS TO BE LINKED TO DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON. OTHERWISE THE ARABS WOULD ALLOW ISRAEL TO SET THE TIMING FOR PEACE TALKS. WE HOPED THAT EGYPT COULD BE HELPFUL IN ENCOURAGING HUSSEIN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

TO COME FORWARD.

9. ALI REPLIED THAT THE EGYPTIAN ASSESSMENT WAS NEARLY THE SAME AS OURS. HE CALLED FEZ A POSITIVE STEP FOR IT REPRESENTED THE FIRST ARAB CONSENSUS TO WORK FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION RATHER THAN TO GIVE BACKING TO A WAR POLICY OR MILITARY SUPPORT FOR SYRIA AND THE PLO. THE VOICES OF THE REJECTIONISTS HAD BEEN SILENT AT FEZ, AND EGYPT HOPED THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE SUPPRESSED. THE ARABS COULD NOT, ALI SAID, SAY SOMETHING POSITIVE ABOUT THE REAGAN INITIATIVE AT FEZ BECAUSE OF THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD CAMP DAVID. HE THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD STEP TO SEND A DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS BOTH THE FEZ RESOLUTION AND THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE "A GOOD COMPROMISE" TO HAVE

A RESPECTED WEST BANK MAYOR (SITTING OR EXILED) AS A MEMBER OF THE FEZ DELEGATION IN LIEU OF THE PLO. ALI GAVE KING HASSAN FULL MARKS FOR EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP OF THE SUMMIT, ALTHOUGH HE NOTED THE RESULTS HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO GIVE HUSSEIN A GREEN LIGHT TO ENTER NEGOTIATIONS. THE SWITCH WAS IN THE HANDS OF ARAFAT. EGYPT, HE SAID, WILL ENCOURAGE HUSSEIN TO COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH THE PLO AND VICE VERSA AND TO MOVE TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS. EGYPT HOPES THE SAUDIS WILL MAKE A SIMILAR EFFORT AND URGED THE USG TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THEM.

10. ANOTHER POSITIVE OUTCOME OF FEZ, ALI SAID, WAS THE FREEING OF THE PLO FROM SYRIAN CONTROL. EGYPT WOULD ENCOURAGE THE PLO TO REMAIN INDEPENDENT FROM SYRIA. ALI SAID HE HAD MET FOR 2-1/2 HOURS THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 17 WITH AN IMPORTANT PLO REPRESENTATIVE. EGYPT WAS ATTEMPTING TO GET PLO ACCEPTANCE OF RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 BUT THE PALESTINIANS WILL NEED SOME MORE TIME. THE AUTHENTIC PLO REACTION TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE HAD BEEN GIVEN BY NABIL SHA'ATH, WHO REFERRED TO POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE INITIATIVE AND SOME OTHER ELEMENTS THAT NEEDED TO BE DISCUSSED.

11. I ASKED WHETHER THE EGYPTIANS HAD EVER DISCUSSED WITH THE PLO HOW PALESTINIANS MIGHT

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS IF THE ISRAELIS REFUSED TO MEET WITH THE PLO EVEN IF IT ACCEPTED RESOLUTION 242 AND ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. ALI SAID THE SUBJECT HAD NOT BEEN RECENTLY MENTIONED BUT EARLIER THE PLO SEEMED TO HAVE NO OBJECTION TO PALESTINIANS' TAKING PART IN A JORDANIAN OR EGYPTIAN DELEGATION, AS PROVIDED FOR IN CAMP DAVID.

12. I ASKED ALI HOW HIS SEPTEMBER 15 PRESS CONFERENCE REMARKS ON THREE CONDITIONS FOR ENTERING AUTONOMY TALKS WERE TO BE UNDERSTOOD (REFTEL B). SOME REPORTS REFERRED TO THE THREE CONDITIONS AS NECESSARY FOR RESUMING TALKS, WHILE OTHER QUOTED ALI AS SAYING THEY WERE NECESSARY FOR PEACE. ALI SAID THE THREE POINTS WERE NOT REPEAT NOT "PRECONDITIONS" FOR A RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS BUT WE SHOULD KNOW THAT IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS WHILE ISRAEL REMAINS IN LEBANON. IN RESPONSE TO MY URGING THAT LEBANON AND PEACE TALKS BE KEPT SEPARATE, ALI REPEATED THAT IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO CONSIDER HOLDING DISCUSSIONS. PEOPLE SIMPLY WOULD

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NOT UNDERSTAND A RESUMPTION OF MEETINGS WITH THE
ISRAELIS WHILE PALESTINIANS WERE BEING ARRESTED IN
BEIRUT OR ISRAELI PLANES WERE BOMBING THE BEKAA
VALLEY. IT WOULD EVEN BE DIFFICULT, ALI SAID,
TO TALK WITH HUSSEIN AND THE PALESTINIANS ABOUT
ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS WHILE THE ISRAELIS OCCUPIED
LEBANON. AT A MINIMUM, EGYPT NEEDED A CLEAR
COMMITMENT ON FINAL WITHDRAWAL AND BEFORE THAT, A
FREEZE ON HOSTILITIES. EGYPT NEEDED AN
ATMOSPHERE OF PEACE FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO MOVE AHEAD.
I URGED ALI TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SITTING AROUND
THE TABLE WITH ISRAEL, WHICH WAS NOT THE IMMEDIATE
ISSUE, AND LAYING THE GROUNDWORK WITH HUSSEIN AND
OTHERS FOR RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WE SHOULD
BE DOING REGARDLESS OF LEBANON. ALI SAID HE UNDER-
STOOD THE POINT, BUT WOULD NOT BE DRAWN OUT FURTHER.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

13. IN DISCUSSING WHAT I SHOULD SAY TO THE PRESS WAIT-
ING OUTSIDE ALI'S OFFICE, ALI SUGGESTED I DOWNPLAY
FEZ AND SAY INTER ALIA THAT WE HAD DISCUSSED
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE, IN ORDER TO
KEEP ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE U.S. INITIATIVE.
ATHERTON

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NOT UNDERSTAND A RESUMPTION OF MEETINGS WITH THE ISRAELIS WHILE PALESTINIANS WERE BEING ARRESTED IN BEIRUT OR ISRAELI PLANES WERE BOMBING THE BEKAA VALLEY. IT WOULD EVEN BE DIFFICULT, ALI SAID, TO TALK WITH HUSSEIN AND THE PALESTINIANS ABOUT ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS WHILE THE ISRAELIS OCCUPIED LEBANON. AT A MINIMUM, EGYPT NEEDED A CLEAR COMMITMENT ON FINAL WITHDRAWAL AND BEFORE THAT, A FREEZE ON HOSTILITIES. EGYPT NEEDED AN ATMOSPHERE OF PEACE FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO MOVE AHEAD. I URGED ALI TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SITTING AROUND THE TABLE WITH ISRAEL, WHICH WAS NOT THE IMMEDIATE ISSUE, AND LAYING THE GROUNDWORK WITH HUSSEIN AND

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OTHERS FOR RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WE SHOULD BE DOING REGARDLESS OF LEBANON. ALI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE POINT, BUT WOULD NOT BE DRAWN OUT FURTHER.

13. IN DISCUSSING WHAT I SHOULD SAY TO THE PRESS WAITING OUTSIDE ALI'S OFFICE, ALI SUGGESTED I DOWNPLAY FEZ AND SAY INTER ALIA THAT WE HAD DISCUSSED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S PEACE INITIATIVE, IN ORDER TO KEEP ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE U.S. INITIATIVE.

ATHERTON

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EX015

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, US, EG, IS
SUBJECT: DELIVERY OF SECRETARY SHULTZ'S LETTER TO KAMAL
- HASSAN ALI
REF: STATE 263789

1. ~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. I DELIVERED SECRETARY'S LETTER TO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI AT NOON, LOCAL TIME, SEPTEMBER 19. IN THE MOST SOBER MEETING I HAVE HAD WITH A GOE OFFICIAL, A GRIM-FACED ALI TERMED THE BEIRUT MASSACRE A REAL SETBACK TO THE PEACE PROCESS. HE CALLED FOR FORMATION OF A NEW MNF AND SAID U.S. HAD TO EXERT REAL PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO REGAIN CREDIBILITY. END SUMMARY.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

3. AFTER READING SECRETARY'S LETTER, KAMAL HASSAN ALI SAID THAT THE MASSACRE HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED BY EGYPT. IN FACT, ALI HAD DISCUSSED THIS POSSIBILITY WITH SECRETARY HAIG DURING HIS JUNE VISIT TO THE U.S. EVEN THOUGH EGYPT HAD BEEN CONCERNED, IT HAD CONSIDERED ISRAEL A RESPONSIBLE PARTY TO THE HABIB ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE MNF HAD BEEN DESIGNED TO PREVENT PHALANGE ENTRY INTO PALESTINIAN CAMPS. NOW THIS HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT UNDER THE CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE IDF. THE MASSACRE WAS A REAL SETBACK TO THE PEACE PROCESS.

4. READING FROM A PREPARED POSITION PAPER, ALI SAID GOE CONSIDERED ISRAEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASSACRE. CONSEQUENCES OF THIS ACTION WILL BE ESCALATION OF THE TENSIONS BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND CHRISTIANS IN LEBANON. ISRAEL ARRANGED THE MASSACRE IN ORDER TO

BREACH THE MODERATION DISPLAYED BY THE PALESTINIANS. THIS MEANS, ALI SAID, ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT PEACE. IT ALSO MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR EGYPT. THE OPPOSITION WILL SEIZE ON THE INCIDENT TO TURN PEOPLE AGAINST THE PEACE PROCESS. PUBLIC OPINION, HOWEVER, DOES NOT NEED ANY PROVOCATION FROM THE OPPOSITION TO FEEL REVULSION ABOUT ISRAELI BEHAVIOR. THE UNITED STATES SHOULD IMPOSE ITS VIEWS AND PRESS ISRAEL TO MAKE CONCESSIONS.

5. ALI INTERRUPTED HIS FORMAL PRESENTATION TO ASK WHETHER U.S. WAS NOW EXERTING PRESSURE FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OF BEIRUT, OR FROM JUST WEST BEIRUT. I RESPONDED THAT OUR IMMEDIATE CONCERN WAS WEST BEIRUT, BUT THAT WE PLANNED TO ADDRESS TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES WITHOUT DELAY. IN THIS REGARD, I POINTED OUT THAT AMBASSADOR DRAPER HAD BEEN SENT TO THE AREA TO DO JUST THIS. WHILE HE NECESSARILY HAD TO DEAL WITH THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF WEST BEIRUT, HE WOULD BE ADDRESSING TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AS WELL.

6. RESUMING, ALI NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAD SUPPORTED AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF UN OBSERVERS IN BEIRUT. IN GOE VIEW, THIS WAS NOT THE SOLUTION. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A NEW MNF WITH U.S. PARTICIPATION. AN MNF COULD IMPLEMENT THE HABIB PLAN. EGYPT EXPECTS ISRAEL TO ESCALATE THE SITUATION IN THE BIQA VALLEY. AN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

OVERALL AGREEMENT FOR DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ARMED FORCES IS NEEDED. I AGREED, SAYING THIS WAS DRAPER'S MAIN JOB.

7. I THEN SAID I COULD NOT COMMENT ON THE GOE SUGGESTION ABOUT A NEW MNF BUT PROMISED ALI I WOULD REPORT IT TO WASHINGTON. TURNING AGAIN TO BEIRUT, I SAID OUR LATEST INFORMATION WAS THAT THE LAF WAS SCHEDULED TO ENTER AREAS IN WEST BEIRUT TODAY. VERY EXTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS HAD BEEN HELD ABOUT THE LAF ROLE IN PROTECTING THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS. THE U.S. WANTED THE IDF OUT. THERE WAS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE STRENGTH OF THE U.S. STATEMENTS AND OF U.S. EFFORTS. WE HAD

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0150

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9334

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DEMANDED IMMEDIATE IDF WITHDRAWAL FROM WEST BEIRUT
AND QUICK FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS ON WITHDRAWAL OF
FOREIGN FORCES FROM ALL LEBANON.

8. KAMAL HASSAN ALI THEN TOLD ME THAT HE WANTED TO
BE SURE WE WERE AWARE THAT WHAT HE WAS SAYING DID NOT
REPRESENT AN EMOTIONAL RESPONSE BUT RATHER A WELL-
REASONED GOE POSITION. GOE HAD BEEN EXPECTING THIS FOR
SOME MONTHS AND HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY CONCERNED
WHEN THE MNF WITHDREW. I SAID THAT THE HABIB
SCENARIO HAD SEEMED TO BE WORKING UNTIL THE IDF
HAD ENTERED WEST BEIRUT. IN ANY EVENT, THE IDF
MOVE WAS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS PHIL HABI
HAD REACHED. ALI OBSERVED THAT THERE HAD EVEN SEEMED
A GOOD CHANCE FOR A GENUINE COALITION IN
LEBANON, EVEN AFTER BASHIR'S ASSASSINATION.
ALI ASKED WHOSE INTERESTS WERE SERVED BY SUCH ACTS.

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

I REPLIED THAT THEY WERE IN NO ONE'S REAL INTEREST.
ALTHOUGH SOME PARTIES MIGHT THINK THEY COULD GAIN
ADVANTAGE, ASSASSINATION AND MASSACRE WERE NOT IN
THE INTEREST OF ANYONE.

9. I THEN OFFERED THAT THESE TRAGIC EVENTS
WERE ALL THE MORE REASON TO RESUME THE PEACE PROCESS.
ALI QUICKLY REJOINED "NOT IN SUCH AN ATMOSPHERE."
THESE EVENTS AFFECT U.S. CREDIBILITY. THE BEST WAY FOR
THE U.S. TO STOP THESE ISRAELI ACTIONS WAS A NEW
MULTINATIONAL FORCE. THE PUBLIC WILL NO LONGER
ACCEPT ISRAELI ACTIONS BEING COUNTERED ONLY BY
U.S. WORDS, ALI SAID. I SAID THAT WORDS ARE PART
OF THE PROCESS OF ACHIEVING RESULTS, BUT
THIS REJOINDER MADE LITTLE IMPRESSION ON ALI.

10. COMMENT: ALI CONFIRMED, IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY,
THAT THE IDEA OF RETURNING THE MNF TO BEIRUT WAS AN
OFFICIAL GOE PROPOSAL. I WILL NEED TO GIVE HIM AN
ANSWER ON THIS, AS WELL AS OTHER COMMENTS ON THE EGYPTIAN
REACTION WHICH THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH ME TO CONVEY.

11. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. AHERTON

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, EG, US, IS
SUBJECT: GHALI ON LEBANON, DEALING WITH ISRAEL

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I PAID A PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED CALL SEPTEMBER 19 ON
MINSTATE BOUTROS GHALI TO INTRODUCE NEW AID DIRECTOR
MIKE STONE. THE MASSACRE IN BEIRUT CAME UP IMMEDIATELY.
BOUTROS BEGAN BY SAYING THAT IT SEEMED THAT ISRAEL
HAD ARRANGED THE MASSACRE. IT WAS CERTAINLY IMPOSSIBLE
FOR HADDAD'S MEN TO MOVE INTO THE CAMPS WITHOUT ISRAELI
COMPLICITY. WHEN I PROTESTED THAT REPORTS WERE CONFUSING
AND ALL THE FACTS NOT IN, HE QUICKLY BACKED OFF. I
THEN WENT THROUGH THE HISTORY OF RECENT EVENTS, EXPLAIN-

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ING THE HABIB SCENARIO AND CONCLUDING THAT THE IDF
MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT WAS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE
UNDERSTANDINGS HABIB HAD REACHED.

3. SWITCHING GEARS, BOUTROS SAID THIS WAS ISRAEL'S
ANSWER TO THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE. HARKING
BACK TO OUR SEPTEMBER 9 MEETING (CAIRO 22869), BOUTROS
SAID ISRAEL WAS PROVING HIM CORRECT. THE IDF ENTRY
INTO BEIRUT HAD BROUGHT ABOUT A SITUATION WHERE NO ONE
WAS TALKING ABOUT THE INITIATIVE; RATHER ALL THE
FOCUS WAS ON BEIRUT. STOPPING THE INITIATIVE IS
WHAT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE ISRAELIS. ISRAEL KNOWS
THE U.S. WILL NOT TAKE ANY DIRECT ACTION AGAINST IT
IN THE TWO MONTHS LEADING UP TO THE U.S. ELECTIONS
IN NOVEMBER-AND IS TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THIS TO CREATE
MAXIMUM TROUBLE IN THE AREA, WHICH WILL BURY THE

4. I COUNTERED THAT THERE WAS NOW A SERIOUS INTERNAL
DEBATE IN ISRAEL, NOW SURELY INTENSIFIED FOLLOWING
THE MASSACRES. OVERT U.S. PRESSURE MIGHT SERVE ONLY
TO UNIFY ISRAEL, WHILE THE INTERNAL DEBATE COULD
PROVIDE REAL PRESSURE ON THE GOI. BOUTROS DID NOT
BUY THIS. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IDF ADVANCE AND
THE MASSACRE ARE GRAVE, HE SAID. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE,
FOR EXAMPLE, FOR KING HUSSEIN TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
PEACE PROCESS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

5. BOUTROS THEN OFFERED HIS ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT
SITUATION, WHICH HE SAID WAS BASED ON FIVE YEARS OF
DIRECT CONTACT WITH ISRAELIS, PLUS 20-25 YEARS OF
ACADEMIC STUDY OF ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUES. (IN AN ASIDE,
HE SAID HE HAD FIRST HEARD AN ANALYSIS ALONG
THESE LINES FROM TITO IN 1978.) A REAL DEBATE IN
ISRAEL WOULD ONLY OCCUR IF THE U.S. TOOK REAL ACTION,
HE SAID. A CUT OFF OF U.S. ECONOMIC AID, FOR EXAMPLE,
WOULD AFFECT THE LIFE OF THE AVERAGE ISRAELI IN TWO
MONTHS. THEY WOULD FEEL THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE
ACTIONS OF THEIR GOVERNMENT. STATEMENTS ONLY WERE
DO ANYTHING. IN ANY EVENT, BOUTROS CONCLUDED,
INSUFFICIENT AND IN FACT SOMETIMES PLAYED INTO BEGIN'S
HANDS. BY SUCCESSFULLY DEFYING A SUPERPOWER, HE
APPEARED TO BE EXTRAORDINARILY CAPABLE, A MAN WHO CAN
DO ANYTHING. IN ANY EVENT, BOUTROS CONCLUDED, EGYPTIAN

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

PUBLIC OPINION COULD NOT BE MOLLIFIED BY WORDS.
EGYPTIANS NEEDED TO SEE ACTION FROM THE U.S.
ATHERTON

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, EG, US, IS
SUBJECT: RECALL OF EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR FROM ISRAEL

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR OSAMA EL-BAZ CONTACTED ME EARLY TODAY (MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 20) TO SAY THAT THE GOE WANTED TO GIVE US ADVANCE INFORMATION THAT IT WOULD ANNOUNCE AROUND NOON TODAY, LOCAL TIME, THAT IT WAS RECALLING ITS AMBASSADOR, SAAD MURTADA, FROM ISRAEL. THIS WAS THE ONLY ACTION THAT EGYPT WAS TAKING AND WAS NOT A STEP TOWARD BREAKING RELATIONS. THE GOE WOULD NOT ELABORATE PUBLICLY ON THE REASONS FOR RECALLING AMBASSADOR BUT THE PURPOSE WAS TO DEMONSTRATE DISPLEASURE OVER ISRAELI BEHAVIOR IN BEIRUT.

3. OSAMA SAID THAT WE WERE THE FIRST ONES BEING NOTIFIED OF THIS DECISION. I PROMISED WE WOULD HOLD IT CLOSELY UNTIL THE GOE ANNOUNCEMENT LATER TODAY. ATHERTON

END OF MESSAGE FOOTER

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