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Records, 1981-1989

Folder Title: France: President Mitterrand
(8290345-8290896)

Box: 11

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Last Updated: 04/22/2024

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Head of State File
File Folder: FRANCE: President Mitterrand (8290345-8290896)
Box 11

Archivist: mjd
FOIA ID: F99-077/1, Zuber
Date: 8/17/2000

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable (8290345)	270350Z MAY 82, 3p R 5/9/83 F99-077/1 #144	5/27/82	P1/F1
2. draft letter	Reagan to Mitterrand (annotated), 3p R ^ ^ #145	nd	P1/F1
3. draft letter	Reagan to Mitterrand (annotated), 3p R - - #146	nd	P1/F1
4. draft letter	Reagan to Mitterrand, 2p R - - #147	nd	P1/F1
5. memo	Lawrence Eagleburger to Robert McFarlane re: proposed letter to Mitterrand (annotated), 1p PART 3/19/01 F99-077/1 #148	5/26/82	P1/F1
6. draft letter	Reagan to Mitterrand (annotated), 2p R 5/9/83 ^ ^ #149	nd	P1/F1
7. draft letter	Reagan to Mitterrand, 2p R - ^ #150	nd	P1/F1
8. draft letter	Reagan to Mitterrand, 2p R ^ ^ #151	nd	P1/F1
9. draft letter (8290847)	Reagan to Mitterrand, 2p R ^ ^ #152	10/19/82	P1/F1
9A. letter (8290876)	Reagan to Mitterrand, 1p R ^ ^ #153	11/10/82	P1/F1
10. letter (8290896)	Reagan to Mitterrand, 1p	11/10/82	P1/F1
11. letter	text same as item 10, 1p	11/10/82	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records
Head of State File

Archivist: mjd
FOIA ID: F99-077/1, Zuber
Date: 8/17/2000

File Folder: FRANCE: President Mitterrand (8290345-8290896)
Box 11

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
12. cable	281849Z OCT 82, 3p	10/28/82	P1/F1
13. draft letter	Reagan to Mitterrand, 1p <i>R 5/9/03 F99-077/1 # 157</i>	nd	P1/F1

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
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F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

ID 8290345

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MIA 8/15/82

RECEIVED 26 MAY 82 16

TO MCFARLANE

FROM EAGLEBURGER, L

DOCDATE 26 MAY 82

BREMER

26 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

HS

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

SUBJECT: PRES MSG LTR TO MITTERRAND

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR CLARK

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

ROBINSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8214924

8215051

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Clark</i>	<i>x 5/26</i>	<i>Pres for decision</i>		
<i>Pres</i>	<i>P 5/26</i>	<i>for decision</i>		
	<i>5/26</i>	<i>Pres approved msg</i>		
	<i>5/26</i>	<i>Clark approved modification</i>		
	<i>C 5/27</i>	<i>cable sent by set room</i>		

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH

FILE

(C)

90345

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 1, 1982

Brian--

Returning the attached
for your System II files--
copy of outgoing message
also included.

Pat Battenfield

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

90345

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 5325
SIT780

DTG: 270350Z MAY 82 PSN: 045968
TOR: 147/0401Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF WHLR JP VP SIT EOB /007

OP IMMED /OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #5325 1470357
O O 270350Z MAY 82 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS NIACT IMMEDIATE 5137

INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE 7599

~~SECRET~~ STATE 145325

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 5/26/01 (EAGLEBURGER, LS)
TAGS: PPDC, FR, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND FROM PRESIDENT
REAGAN.

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT
MITTERRAND. EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER LETTER AT EARLIEST
POSSIBLE TIME MAY 27.

2. BEGIN TEXT:
--HIS EXCELLENCY
--FRANCOIS MITTERRAND
--PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC
--ELYSEE PALACE
--PARIS

--DEAR FRANCOIS: MY MARCH 7 LETTER TO YOU EXPRESSED THE

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 89-0771, #144

BY CIS NARA, DATE 8/9/03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 5325

DTG: 270350Z MAY 82 PSN: 045968

SERIOUS CONCERN I FEEL OVER THE DANGER WHICH A CONTINUATION OF PREVIOUS PRACTICES IN THE MATTER OF WESTERN OFFICIAL CREDITS AND CREDIT GUARANTEES FOR THE SOVIET UNION POSES FOR OUR COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND FINANCIAL INTERESTS. SINCE THAT TIME, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE JIM BUCKLEY HAS BEEN WORKING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND THE OTHER SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD DIMINISH THAT DANGER. IN A RELATED AREA, WE ARE ALSO ANXIOUS TO DEVELOP AGREED MEASURES WHICH WOULD ENHANCE EUROPE'S ENERGY SECURITY AND LESSEN THE POTENTIAL FOR UNDUE DEPENDENCY ON SOVIET SUPPLIES.

3. OUR EFFORTS TO RESTRAIN THE EXTENSION OF CREDITS TO THE USSR ARE CONSISTENT WITH SEEKING A UNIFIED ALLIED POSITION ON THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION FOLLOWING THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW IN POLAND. WE CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN THAT THE NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS FOR A RETURN TO MORE NORMAL COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND POLAND ARE THE LIFTING OF MARTIAL LAW, THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND THE REESTABLISHMENT OF A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT, SOLIDARITY AND THE CHURCH. REGRETTABLY THESE DEVELOPMENTS HAVE NOT TRANSPIRED AND THE OPPOSITE TREND MAY IN FACT BE THE CASE. I CONTINUE TO HOPE THAT THE AGREEMENT AMONG THE ALLIES NOT TO UNDERCUT EACH OTHERS' SANCTIONS DURING THIS DIFFICULT PERIOD WILL BE OBSERVED.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, JIM BUCKLEY REPORTED TO ME THAT HIS MEETING IN PARIS ON MAY 14 WAS A DISAPPOINTMENT DUE TO THE UNEXPECTEDLY NEGATIVE POSITION TAKEN BY YOUR GOVERNMENT. I WOULD NOT BE FRANK IF I WERE TO GLOSS OVER THE MAJOR DIFFICULTIES I BELIEVE THE WEST WILL CONFRONT IF WE FAIL TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY WITH THESE ISSUES. AT THE SAME TIME, I MUST STRESS THE NEGATIVE EFFECT IN MY OWN COUNTRY SHOULD AN APPEARANCE OF ALLIANCE DISUNITY IN THIS SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 5325

DTG: 270350Z MAY 82 PSN: 045968

AREA PREVAIL. SINCE 1974 THE U.S., FOR ITS PART, HAS REFUSED TO SUBSIDIZE OR GUARANTEE CREDITS TO THE SOVIETS, A POLITICAL DECISION WHICH HAS MEANT CONSIDERABLE SACRIFICE TO AMERICAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS. WHILE AMERICANS ARE FULLY PREPARED TO MAKE THESE SACRIFICES IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR MUTUAL SECURITY, THEY WILL PROPERLY VIEW WITH CONCERN ACTIONS WHICH CAN BE INTERPRETED AS UNFAIR TO THEM AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE SHOULDERING GREATLY INCREASED EXPENDITURES ON BEHALF OF OUR COMMON DEFENSE.

5. A SUBSEQUENT MEETING IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS DEMONSTRATED THAT A BALANCED EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT IS WITHIN THE LEGAL AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES PROVIDED THE POLITICAL WILL EXISTS. MY PURPOSE IN WRITING TO YOU TODAY IS THEREFORE TO EXPRESS MY STRONG HOPE THAT WHEN JIM BUCKLEY MEETS TOMORROW IN PARIS WITH HIS COUNTERPARTS, YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL HELP PROVIDE THIS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF POLITICAL WILL AND ENABLE US TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY AT VERSAILLES ON AN ISSUE OF GRAVE IMPORTANCE FOR US ALL. IF A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT IS NOT CONCLUDED IN ADVANCE OF THE SUMMIT, HOWEVER, I INTEND TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION AT THAT TIME.

6. I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU IN PARIS NEXT WEEK.

SINCERELY, RON.

END TEXT. EAGLEBURGER

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MODE

PAGES 3

IMMEDIATE

MSG
8/15/1102

DACOM # 46

RELEASER NZ

PRIORITY

DEX #

DTG 262045Z

ROUTINE

TTY #

FROM/LOCATION/

1. BUD MCFARLAND

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ADM PDINDEXTER for JUDGE CLARK

5/26

2.

3.

4.

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

President approved
as written.
Judge authorized
change in next
to last sentence.
Called Larry King
and told him to
have state release
it - OP IND.
John

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

EYES ONLY

URGENT

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

His Excellency
Francois Mitterrand
President of the French Republic
Elysee Palace
Paris

Dear Francois:

My March 7 letter to you expressed the serious concern I feel over the danger which a continuation of previous practices in the matter of Western official credits and credit guarantees for the Soviet Union poses for our collective security and financial interests. Since that time, Under Secretary of State Jim Buckley has been working with representatives of your government and the other summit participants to reach an agreement which would diminish that danger. In a related area, we are also anxious to develop agreed measures which would enhance Europe's energy security and lessen the potential for undue dependency on Soviet supplies.

Our efforts to restrain the extension of credits to the USSR are consistent with seeking a unified allied position on the sanctions imposed against the Soviet Union following the declaration of martial law in Poland. We continue to maintain that the necessary preconditions for a return to more normal commercial relations with the USSR and Poland are the lifting of martial law, the release of political prisoners, and the reestablishment of a dialogue between the Government, solidarity and the church. Regrettably these developments

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-077/1 P.145

BY CN NARA, DATE 5/9/03

Historical File

have not transpired and the opposite trend may in fact be the case. I continue to hope that the agreement among the Allies not to undercut each others' sanctions during this difficult period will be observed.

Against this background, Jim Buckley reported to me that his meeting in Paris on May 14 was a major disappointment due to the unexpectedly negative position taken by your government. I would not be frank if I were to gloss over the major difficulties I believe the West will confront in strategic terms if we fail to deal forcefully with these issues. At the same time, I must stress the negative effect on public opinion in my own country should an appearance of Alliance disunity in this sensitive area prevail. Since 1974 the U.S., for its part, has refused to subsidize or guarantee credits to the Soviets, a political decision which has meant considerable sacrifice to American commercial interests. While Americans are fully prepared to make these sacrifices in the context of our mutual security, they will properly view with concern actions which can be interpreted as unfair to them at a time when they are shouldering greatly increased expenditures on behalf of our common defense.

A subsequent meeting in Washington last week of technical experts demonstrated that a balanced effective agreement is within the legal and technical capabilities of the participating countries provided the political will exists. My purpose in writing to you today is therefore to express my strong

hope that when Jim Buckley meets tomorrow in Paris with his counterparts, your government will help provide this essential element of political will and enable us to demonstrate Alliance solidarity at Versailles on an issue of grave importance for us all. If a satisfactory agreement is not concluded in advance of the summit, however, ~~I would be perfectly willing~~ *we will intend to* ~~to~~ continue the discussion at that time.

I look forward to seeing you in Paris next week.

Sincerely,

Ron

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

MODE

PAGES

3

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DACOM #

DEX #

TTY #

RELEASER

DTG

NZ

262045Z May 82

FROM/LOCATION/

1. BUD MC FARLAND

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ADM POINDEXTER for JUDGE CLARK TOR: 262000Z

2. MILAIDE/RANCH TOR: 262137Z May 82

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

EYES ONLY
URGENT

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

82 MAY 26 P 5: 45

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

5/26 GMP called back w/changes indicated
on p. 3. Sit Rom called changes to
State ops (State to go out w/mss).

WHCA FORM 8, 26 FEB 81

changes not indicated on orig.

Per Jerry White, Sit Rom

Down

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

His Excellency
Francois Mitterrand
President of the French Republic
Elysee Palace
Paris

Dear Francois:

My March 7 letter to you expressed the serious concern I feel over the danger which a continuation of previous practices in the matter of Western official credits and credit guarantees for the Soviet Union poses for our collective security and financial interests. Since that time, Under Secretary of State Jim Buckley has been working with representatives of your government and the other summit participants to reach an agreement which would diminish that danger. In a related area, we are also anxious to develop agreed measures which would enhance Europe's energy security and lessen the potential for undue dependency on Soviet supplies.

Our efforts to restrain the extension of credits to the USSR are consistent with seeking a unified allied position on the sanctions imposed against the Soviet Union following the declaration of martial law in Poland. We continue to maintain that the necessary preconditions for a return to more normal commercial relations with the USSR and Poland are the lifting of martial law, the release of political prisoners, and the reestablishment of a dialogue between the Government, Solidarity and the Church. Regrettably these developments

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

FP9-0771 #146

BY

CS

NARA, DATE

5/9/03

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Against this background, Jim Buckley reported to me that his meeting in Paris on May 14 was a ~~major~~ disappointment due to the unexpectedly negative position taken by your government. I would not be frank if I were to gloss over the major difficulties I believe the West will confront ~~in strategic terms~~ if we fail to deal ~~forcefully~~ ^{EFFECTIVELY} with these issues. At the same time, I must stress the negative effect ~~on public opinion~~ in my own country should an appearance of Alliance disunity in this sensitive area prevail. Since 1974 the U.S., for its part, has refused to subsidize or guarantee credits to the Soviets, a political decision which has meant considerable sacrifice to American commercial interests. While Americans are fully prepared to make these sacrifices in the context of our mutual security, they will properly view with concern actions which can be interpreted as unfair to them at a time when they are shouldering greatly increased expenditures on behalf of our common defense.

A subsequent meeting in Washington last week of technical experts demonstrated that a balanced effective agreement is within the legal and technical capabilities of the participating countries provided the political will exists. My purpose in writing to you today is therefore to express my strong

hope that when Jim Buckley meets tomorrow in Paris with his counterparts, your government will help provide this essential element of political will and enable us to demonstrate Alliance solidarity at Versailles on an issue of grave importance for us all. If a satisfactory agreement is not concluded in advance of the summit, however, I ~~would be perfectly willing~~ ^{INTEND TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION} to continue the discussion at that time.

I look forward to seeing you in Paris next week.

Sincerely,

SIGNED Ron

OPS 11MMD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1982

MEMO FOR JUDGE CLARK

FROM: Bud McFarlane

Attached is the State draft of a letter from the President to Mitterand. It is a little timid in comparison to our draft. I have sent this redo to the Staff and will follow up with their proposals, if any, to you promptly.

SECRET

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

Dear Francois:

In my letter of March 7, I called your attention to my serious concern over the danger which a continuation of previous practices in the matter of Western official credits and credit guarantees for the Soviet Union posed for our collective security and financial interests. Since that time, Under Secretary of State Jim Buckley has been working with representatives of your government and the other summit participants to reach an agreement which would limit future official credits and credit guarantees to the Soviet Union. Our experience with Poland and Romania, as well as our common analysis of the Soviet Union's hard currency earning capacity over the coming decade, demonstrate the necessity of greater prudence in this area.

Jim Buckley has reported to me that his most recent meeting in Paris on May 14, was largely a disappointment due to the unexpectedly negative position taken by your government. A subsequent meeting in Washington last week of technical experts demonstrated that a balanced and effective agreement is within the legal and technical possibilities of all the participants provided there is political will.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

199-07711-7447

BY

CUJ

NARA, DATE

5/9/03

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

-2-


My purpose in writing to you today is to express my strong hope that, when Jim Buckley meets again in Paris with his counterparts from the other summit participants, he will encounter this essential element of political will and reach agreement on an effective mechanism to restrict future credits to the Soviet Union. In this way, we would be able during the summit meeting in Versailles next week to take due note of this demonstration of Allied solidarity on an issue of grave importance for all of us. This outcome, rather than further discussion at Versailles, is clearly in our common interest and in the interest of a successful summit.

I look forward to seeing you in Paris next week.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ronald Reagan

~~SECRET~~



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

URGENT

May 26, 1982

FOR: ROGER ROBINSON

FROM: Bud McFarlane

Attached is a State redraft of your original draft. May I have your comments.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 5 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

Dear Francois:

^{March 7} ^{to you} ^{extended}
~~In my letter of March 7, I called your attention to my~~
^{^ J Cui}
The serious concern over the danger which a continuation of previous practices in the matter of Western official credits and credit guarantees for the Soviet Union posed for our collective security and financial interests. Since that time, Under Secretary of State Jim Buckley has been working with representatives of your government and the other summit participants to reach an agreement which would limit future official credits and credit guarantees to the Soviet Union. Our experience with Poland and Romania, as well as our common analysis of the Soviet Union's hard currency earning capacity over the coming decade, demonstrate the necessity of greater prudence in this area.

Jim Buckley has reported to me that his most recent meeting in Paris on May 14, was largely a disappointment due to the unexpectedly negative position taken by your government. A subsequent meeting in Washington last week of technical experts demonstrated that a balanced and effective agreement is within the legal and technical possibilities of all the participants provided there is political will.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F99-077/1 7149

BY

CIS

NARA, DATE

5/5/03

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

My purpose in writing to you today is to express my strong hope that, when Jim Buckley meets again in Paris with his counterparts from the other summit participants, he will encounter this essential element of political will and reach agreement on an effective mechanism to restrict future credits to the Soviet Union. In this way, we would be able during the summit meeting in Versailles next week to take due note of this demonstration of Allied solidarity on an issue of grave importance for all of us. This outcome, ~~rather than further discussion at Versailles,~~ is clearly in our common interest and in the interest of a successful summit.

I look forward to seeing you in Paris next week.

Sincerely,

/s/ Ronald Reagan

~~SECRET~~



NODIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

90345
S/S 8215051 System II

~~SECRET~~

82 MAY 26 P10:34

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

May 26, 1982

CR 2874
13 for action

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Proposed Message to President
Mitterrand

Ambassador Eagleburger has reworked your
proposed message to President Mitterrand. Our
version of the message is attached.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By mn NARA, Date 8/15/00

~~SECRET~~

RDS-3, 5/26/02

NODIS

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

His Excellency
Francois Mitterrand
President of the French Republic
Elysee Palace
Paris

Dear Francois:

My March 7 letter to you expressed the serious concern I feel over the danger which a continuation of previous practices in the matter of Western official credits and credit guarantees for the Soviet Union poses for our collective security and financial interests. Since that time, Under Secretary of State Jim Buckley has been working with representatives of your government and the other summit participants to reach an agreement which would demonstrate economic prudence and thus diminish that danger. Our experience with Poland and Romania, as well as our common analysis of the Soviet Union's hard currency earning capacity over the coming decade, demonstrate the necessity of greater prudence in this area. In a related area, we are also anxious to work with Europe in order to develop agreed measures which would enhance Europe's energy security and thus lessen the potential for undue dependency on Soviet supplies.

Against this background, Jim Buckley reported to me that his meeting in Paris on May 14 was a disappointment due to the unexpectedly negative position taken by your government. I would not be frank if I were to gloss over the major difficulties I

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F99-077/1 #150
BY CH NARA, DATE 5/9/03

believe the West will confront if we fail to deal effectively with these issues. At the same time, I must stress the negative effect in my own country should an appearance of Alliance disunity in this sensitive area prevail.

A subsequent meeting in Washington last week of technical experts demonstrated that a balanced effective agreement is within the legal and technical capabilities of the participating countries provided the political will exists. My purpose in writing to you today is therefore to express my strong hope that when Jim Buckley meets tomorrow in Paris with his counterparts, your government will help provide this essential element of political will and enable us to demonstrate Alliance solidarity at Versailles on an issue of grave importance for us all. In this way, we would be able during the summit meeting in Versailles next week to take due note of this demonstration of Allied unity. This outcome, rather than further discussion at Versailles, is clearly in our common interest and in the interest of a successful summit.

I look forward to seeing you in Paris next week.

Sincerely,

5/24/82

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

John, f

Another version!

Henry

Check with Bud on
when will get
draft.

Dear Francois:

As you know, Under Secretary of State James Buckley has been negotiating since March with the same countries which will be attending the Versailles Summit on a meaningful agreement to limit officially-backed medium- and long-term credits to the Soviet Union. To date, despite our common efforts, we have not been able to reach agreement. I am writing to convey to you the extreme importance of this issue to me and my sincere hope that we can still reach agreement on this matter before the Summit.

I want to be clearly understood on this issue. At the present time, we are asking considerable sacrifice from our people to strengthen Western defenses. In this context, it seems contradictory for our governments to subsidize credit to finance exports to the Soviet Union. We succeed only in lowering at the margin the costs of the Soviet military buildup, risk the accumulation of large debt in the Soviet Union by the end of the decade, and create abnormal pressure to increase our imports from the Soviet Union to enable them to pay off their debt.

In the first instance, we seek to raise the cost to the Soviet Union of their access to Western credit. To achieve this in the face of competitive pressures, we must also initiate a process for monitoring the volume of credits being provided to the Soviet Union. I can assure you that we do not seek economic warfare with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, we also do not think it is prudent to help the Soviets avoid the

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLS F99-0776 #151

FY CN, NARA, DATE 5/9/03

~~true economic~~
market costs of their decisions. Indeed, if left to the market, the volume of credit to the Soviet Union will most probably decline over the next several years. If our governments resist this market trend, they will assume an increasing share of the risk for repayment of credits provided to the Soviet Union.

In the hopes that we could reach an agreement on this credit issue, I have deferred the extraterritorial extension of the sanctions imposed on oil and gas equipment after the imposition of ~~marshall~~ ^{martial} law in Poland. I would like very much to avoid this step, but I must be very candid with you. If we fail to achieve an agreement on credits, I will not be able to continue a situation which at the moment only affects US firms based in the US.

I have no desire whatsoever to raise these issues at the Versailles Summit. I am seeking an agreement on substance and do not wish to emphasize the symbol of East-West issues at Versailles. But I do not see how we could avoid a frank discussion of this issue at Versailles if we have not been able to reach agreement before then.

I sincerely hope, Francois, that we can redouble our efforts to reach agreement on this matter before Versailles. We have far too much in common on the many challenges before us to have this issue dominate our discussions at Versailles.

Sincerely,

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 25 OCT 82 15

TO MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS FROM PRESIDENT

DOCDATE 19 OCT 82

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

HS

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO MITTERRAND RE US / FRENCH RELATIONS

ACTION: PRES SGD LTR

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COMMENTS SENT VIA BLUE LINE; NO COPIES PER POINDEXTER

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

This was LDX'd

2100 10/19. Cops

will be put in
Morning take.

Don

RECEIVED 09 NOV 82 13

TO CLARK

FROM NAU

DOCDATE 08 NOV 82

KEYWORDS: SUMMIT

ECONOMICS

MITTERRAND, FRANCOIS

HS

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO MITTERRAND RE WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT

ACTION: FWD TO PRES FOR SIG

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

CLARK

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(B / B)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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<i>Pres</i>	<i>P</i> NOV 1 0 1982	<i>signature</i>		
	NOV 1 0 1982	<i>Pres spl ltr</i>		<i>HW</i>
<i>NAU</i>	<i><</i> NOV 1 0 1982	<i>for despatch</i>		<i>1</i>

DISPATCH

ed by NAU NOV 1 0 1982

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90847

October 19, 1982

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

VIA BLUE LINE

FOR PRESIDENT MITTERRAND - EYES ONLY

Dear Francois:

Over the course of the past seven months, since you and I last had the opportunity for a full discussion of U. S. relations with France, there has developed a trend of unfortunate disagreements which I believe must be corrected. It was with a considerable sense of confidence for the future that those talks were held and I recall now as then how close our views coincided on the major issues before us. But in the intervening months as we have sought to deal concretely with specific problems, the results have reflected what appear to be fundamental differences which, in light of the common views we shared, I can only find puzzling and a source of sorrow. These issues have included the adoption of principles for the conduct of East-West relations as they are applied to security and trade matters, the transfer of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union, the resolution of the Namibian problem, how best to further the cause of peace in Central America and other important matters.

It seems to me certain of these problems may be the consequence of misunderstanding. On the other hand it may be that the consensus I believe we shared has dissipated. In either case, U. S. relations with France are too important to allow them to suffer further without the most serious reflection by both of us.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-077/1 #152

BY CIS, NARA, DATE 5/9/03

~~SECRET~~

L

~~SECRET~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE

-2-

Toward the objectives of assuring the closest possible understanding on these matters, I would like to propose that my close friend and advisor, Bill Clark, visit Paris for a meeting with you at an early opportunity. Knowing of the demands on your time, I would not propose such a visit were I not extremely concerned over the apparent divergent courses we are now following. I hope you will be able to see Bill early next week. Needless to say, it would be helpful in creating a constructive climate for the meeting if both of us could avoid taking actions in the meantime which could adversely affect our relations.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

/s/ Ron

SECRET/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

76-81

90896

CR 70

November 15, 1982

NOTE TO: NSC - Carol Cleveland

FROM: S/S-S - babs Hambrick

After checking with your office on Friday, we went ahead and added a hyphen in "post-July" in paragraph 2 of the attached letter.

A copy of the corrected letter is attached for your files.

Many thanks.

Attachment:

As stated.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1982

Dear Francois:

I am pleased to receive your letter on the next Economic Summit. Your recent statements on these meetings, frankly evaluating their usefulness and suggesting improvements in their execution, have been helpful for us. We are very close in our thinking on these issues.

As for the date of the meeting, I understand and I regret your dissatisfaction. I assure you that your preference for a post-July date was not ignored. All other participants stated a clear preference for a date in the first half of the year. Such a date is consistent with meeting at the Summit, if possible, when a Summit country holds the EC Presidency. In the spirit of cooperation and friendship that is essential to the Summit meeting and its preparation, I ask you to join us in Williamsburg.

I have instructed Allen Wallis to make proposals at the first meeting of Personal Representatives that are in accord with our shared views about the Summit. I look forward to working with you toward an enjoyable and productive Summit.

Sincerely,

Ron

His Excellency
Francois Mitterrand
President of the French Republic
Paris

DECLASSIFIED/28/07/02
NLS 899-077/1 #153

BY CR NARA, DATE 5/9/03

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 18-11 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

418

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package #

90896

82 NOV 9 P 1: 11

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	X	A
Bud McFarlane	2	m	
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4		A
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary	5		D
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

pls get ey of signed
ltr to Row urgently

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SIGNED

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Letter to President Mitterand on the
Williamsburg Summit

Issue

You are being asked to sign a reply to a letter you received from President Mitterand on the Williamsburg Summit.

Discussion

President Mitterand wrote you on October 28, 1982, (Tab B) concerning the Williamsburg Summit. In your response, you indicate that you understand his dissatisfaction with the May dates for the Summit, but that -- given the preferences of all other participants -- there was really no possibility of accommodating his desire for a post July date. You ask him in a spirit of cooperation and friendship to join you in Williamsburg.

Recommendation

OK

No

_____ That you sign the letter to President Mitterand
_____ at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A - Letter to President Mitterand

Prepared by:
Henry R. Nau

NW

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 8, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM:

HENRY NAU *HN*

SUBJECT:

President's Letter to Mitterand on Williamsburg Summit

The letter from the President to Mitterand on the Williamsburg Summit, which you edited, is attached at Tab A. It has been cleared by the speechwriters and is ready to be forwarded to the President for his signature.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memo at Tab I to the President, asking him to sign the letter to Mitterand at Tab A.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Memo to the President
Tab A - Letter to Mitterand
Tab B - Incoming from Mitterand

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

11/9/82 10:30^{am}

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Speechwriters:

Would you please comment/
clear the attached letter
to President Mitterand
from President Reagan. I
need back quickly so it
can be forwarded for
signature today.

Henry Nau

Thanks,

Jeanne Hickie
X6961

*Please rewrite 3rd
sentence of 2nd paragraph.
It makes no sense!
TBE*

Letter to President Mitterrand

Dear Francois:

I am pleased to receive your letter on the next Economic Summit. Your recent statements on these meetings, *Frankly* evaluating their usefulness and suggesting improvements in their execution, have been helpful for us. We are very close in our thinking on these issues.

As for the date of the meeting, I understand and I regret your dissatisfaction. I assure you that your preference for a post July date was not ignored. All other participants stated a clear preference for a date in the first half of the year! *Such a date* ~~and that is consistent with meeting, if possible, (when a Summit~~ *meeting at the Summit, if possible* country holds the EC Presidency. In the spirit of cooperation and friendship that is essential to the Summit meeting and its preparation, I ask you to join us in Williamsburg.

I have instructed Allen Wallis to make proposals at the first meeting of Personal Representatives that are in accord with *Shared* ~~your views~~ *about the Summit, and in these views.* ~~for the meeting~~ *working* I look forward to sharing with you *shared* an enjoyable and productive Summit.

Sincerely,

DECLASSIFIED/RETIRED
NLS 199-0771-1157
BY CH MADE DATE 5/9/03